Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School

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Table of Contents

Note on Conventions ............................................... 9

Preface ................................................................. 15

Acknowledgments .................................................... 25

Part One: Introduction to the Unique Tenets and Analysis of Selected Topics

1. The Unique Tenets ................................................. 31

   The Prasangika "School" ....................................... 33

   Why the Unique Tenets are "Unique": Conventional and Ultimate Analysis ............................................. 41

   Enumeration of the Unique Tenets ............................ 58

   Sources for the Unique Tenets ................................ 63

2. The Prasangika Critique of Mind-Only Idealism ....... 73

   The Cittamatra "School" ........................................ 76

   Indian Sources for the Mind-Only Controversy .......... 94

   Cittamatra and Prasangika Perspectives on Mind-Only Scriptures ......................................................... 101

3. Gelukba Renditions of the Mind-Only Controversy 107

   Cittamatra Arguments That the Assertion of External Objects Contradicts Meditative Experiences .......... 109

   Cittamatra and Prasangika on "Partless Particles" ...... 123

   Arguments Concerning the Necessity of External Objects for the Production of Consciousness ............... 128

   Other Prasangika Criticisms of Mind-Only ............... 143

4. Refutation of Self-Consciousness ......................... 153

   Sources for the Debate on Self-Consciousness .......... 157
Refutation of the Necessity of Self-Consciousness for Later Memory of Consciousness ............ 160

The Argument That Mind Is Self-conscious but Is Not a Self-consciousness ............... 170

The Objection That Positing Self-Consciousness Would Require Ultimate Analysis ..................... 173

5. Disintegration and the Three Times ............. 181

Why Non-Prasangikas Do Not Consider Disintegratedness to Be a Functioning Thing ............. 190

Scriptural Proofs That Disintegratedness Is a Functioning Thing ............................. 193

Logical Proofs That Disintegratedness Is a Functioning Thing ................................. 197

Candrakirti's First Argument ......................... 200

Candrakirti's Second Argument ....................... 204

Candrakirti's Third Argument .......................... 206

Candrakirti's Fourth Argument ......................... 207

Dzongkaba's Argument ................................. 209

Jamyang Shayba on Ultimate Analysis ............... 211

Ngawang Belden's Objections to Jamyang Shayba ...... 215

The Three Times ........................................... 220

6. Other Unique Tenets .................................. 231

Refutation of a Mind-Basis-of-All ..................... 235

Valid Cognition Is Mistaken but Reliable ............. 237

Refutation of Autonomous Syllogisms .................. 239

Prasangika Perspective on the Destruction of the Obstructions to Omniscience ............. 243

Pramana Is Not Necessarily New Cognition .......... 248
Mental Direct Perception Can be Conceptual .......... 251
Prasarigika Perspectives on Nirvana .................. 253
The Two Selflessnesses of Persons and Phenomena Are Equally Subtle ...................... 258
Desire and Aversion Conceive True Existence ........... 259
Common Beings Can Have Yogic Direct Perception ..... 262
One Can Directly Realize the Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths Even before the Path of Preparation ... 265
True Cessations Are the Dharmadhatu .................. 266
Pratyaksa Refers to Objects ............................. 269
How Prasangikas Avoid the Two Extremes .......... 271

7. Conclusion ....................................... 275

Part Two: Jamyang Shayba's "Unique Tenets of the Prasangika-Madhyamika School" with the Annotations of Ngawang Belden

Translator's Introduction ............................. 285
Jamyang Shayba's Introduction ......................... 289

1. External Objects Exist but a Mind-Basis-of-All Does Not ................................. 299

2. The Two Selflessnesses .............................. 315

3. Prime Cognition and Conventional Valid Cognition .. 323

4. Mental and Yogic Direct Perception ................. 331

5. The Sixteen Attributes of the Four Noble Truths and the Three Times .................... 341

6. Disintegratedness Is a Thing and Effects Are Feasible 349

7. The Non-Assertion of Autonomous Syllogisms and Self-Consciousness ..................... 369

8. Pratyaksa and True Cessations ...................... 391
9. Nirvanas with Remainder and without Remainder .. 397

10. The Two Obstructions ............................... 411

11. Avoiding the Two Extremes ......................... 419

Part Three: Janggya's "Unique Tenets of the Prasangika-Madhyamika School"

Translator's Introduction ............................... 427

Janggya's Introduction .................................. 429

A: Explanation of the Eight Chief Distinguishing Features of Prasangika-Madhyamika

1. The Unique Way of Refuting a Mind-Basis-of-All ..... 435

2. The Unique Way of Refuting Self-Consciousness ...... 439

3. The Non-Assertion of Autonomous Reasons .......... 449

4. The Unique Way of Asserting External Objects ...... 455

5. The Proof That Hearers and Solitary Realizers Realize the Selflessness of Phenomena ............. 459

6. The Unique Way of Positing the Conception of a Self of Phenomena as an Affliction ............. 463

7. The Unique Way of Asserting That Disintegratedness Is a Functioning Thing ...................... 471

8. The Unique Presentation of the Three Times ........ 475

B: The System of Refuting Inherent Existence .......... 479

C: The Way of Distinguishing Definitive Sutras and Those Requiring Interpretation in Dependence on [Unique Tenets and the Refutation of Inherent Existence] ........................................... 485

Emendations of the Tibetan Texts ....................... 493

Jamyang Shayba Text ................................. 497

Ngawang Belden Text ................................. 505

Janggya Text ......................................... 519
Note on Conventions

It is my hope that this book will be of some use to anyone interested in Buddhist philosophy. For specialists in Tibetan and Sanskrit, I have included key terms and book titles upon their first occurrence; noted emendations in the Tibetan texts; whenever possible, located and reproduced in the notes passages from Sanskrit texts that are cited in the translated texts; constructed three glossaries of technical terms; and have attempted to include in the bibliography all translations and critical editions of cited texts.

For others, I have followed several procedures in the main text as part of an effort to bring Tibetan Buddhism out of the arcane and make it accessible to other scholars of Buddhism, other scholars of religion and philosophy, and others who are simply interested in Buddhism, philosophy, or Tibetica:

1. Sanskrit and Tibetan words have been limited to parenthetical citation with two exceptions: a few Sanskrit terms are treated as English words and therefore are neither translated nor italicized, and proper names are not translated. The Sanskrit terms treated as English words are: abhidharma, Arhat, Bodhisattva, Buddha, dharma, karma, mandala, nirvana, samsara, sutra, tantra, vajra, yogi, Mahayana and Hinayana. Parenthetical citation and citation in the notes follow the Wylie transliteration system with the exception that I have not capitalized any letters.'

2. Throughout the body of the book, I use a system of "essay phonetics" that renders Tibetan names in an easily pronounceable form. Devised by Professor Jeffrey Hopkins of the University of Virginia, it is fully explained on pp. 19-22 of his Meditation on Emptiness (1983). It approximates Hla-sa (= Lhasa) pronunciation. Hopkins' system enables readers who are not familiar with Tibetan and / or Sanskrit to gain access to the names of important Buddhist philosophers, a goal with which I am in complete agreement. Without a pronunciation system, the non-Tibetanist who might wish to refer to philosophers such as Janggya or Jamyang Shayba is faced with consonant-cluster nightmares like lcang skya or 'jams dbyangs bzhad pa. Such strings of apparent typographical errors are destined to remain alien and instantly forgettable. The following table indicates the transliteration and basic pronunciation systems for each Tibetan consonant; marks over certain sounds indicate that such a letter would be pronounced with a sharper, higher tone:
In the Hopkins system, the nasals (far right columns) are low in tone except when there is a superscribed or prefixed letter; a subscribed la is high in tone, except for zla which is pronounced "da"; dbang is pronounced "wang," dbyarngs, "yang"; and the letters ga and ba are phoneticized as k and p when they are found in the suffix position. Since my modest aim was to give readers an approximate pronunciation, I have not used high tone markers. I also differ from the Hopkins system by not inserting hyphens between the syllables of Tibetan names, for which I have several reasons. First, it seems to me that nonhyphenated names look less alien than those that are; second, Tibetans who come to the West or publish books in Western languages adopt nonhyphenated forms, and there are an increasing number of such persons; and third, persons who are not professional Buddhologists and who publish many translations, transcriptions, etc., seldom use hyphenated forms. Since the readership for even scholarly books now extends far beyond the circle of other scholars, some accommodation to widely used styles seems called for. The absence of hyphens occasionally leads to an awkward-looking result, such as in the name Janggya, but I have not found this to provide a difficulty with pronunciation, which is the point.

A list of Tibetan names in both easy pronunciation and transliterated form is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ṭa</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
found below. The proper names of those who have established a form for their names in the West are the only exceptions to the easy pronunciation system. For instance, I have not made an exception for the relatively famous name of Dzongkaba, although it is true enough that "Tsongkhapa" and "Tsong-kha-pa" have more renown than "Dzongkaba." (His is a rare name that can be pronounced more or less as it appears in transliterated form; such names have in some cases disguised the need for a pronunciation system. See the table below for more representative instances.) Tibetan studies are still in a developing state, and I feel that it is not yet too late for a different (and improved) convention to become accepted.

3. In the service of a more readable translation, I have usually shortened titles. Full titles can be found in the bibliography. Tibetans normally abbreviate, too, but often to an extreme degree. For instance, Jamyang Shayba sometimes refers to Dzongkaba’s Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti’s) "Entrance to the Middle Way" (dbu ma la jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal) simply as Explanation (rnam bshad).

I have used few abbreviations. In the notes, "P" refers to the modern reprint of the Peking edition of the Tibetan canon, the Tibetan Tripitaka (Tokyo-Kyoto: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1956). Since I do not have, nor have easy access to, a copy of this, whereas I do have copies of many of the works referred to in this study, references in the notes, unless specified as "P," are to the first edition listed after the P number in the bibliography. In notes referring to the works of Jamyang Shayba and Ngawang Belden, "NG" denotes the Ngawang Gelek Demo edition, "DSK" the Drashikyil edition reprinted at Gomang College. See my introduction to the translations for more information on these editions.

Following is a list of all Tibetan names appearing in the book in "essay phonetics" and transliterated form:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agya Yongdzin</td>
<td>a kya yongs 'dzin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amdo</td>
<td>a mdo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batsap Nyimadrak</td>
<td>pa tshab nyi ma grags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belden Chöjay</td>
<td>dpal ldan chos rje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belden Drakba</td>
<td>dpal ldan grags pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budön</td>
<td>bu ston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daktsang Shayrab Rinchen</td>
<td>stag tshang shes rap rin chen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drashi Chöpel</td>
<td>bkra shis chos 'phel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drashikyil</td>
<td>bkra shis 'khyil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drebung</td>
<td>'bras spungs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzongkaba Losang Drakba</td>
<td>tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadamba</td>
<td>bka' gdamspa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gagyuba</td>
<td>bka' rgyudpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganden</td>
<td>dga' ldan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganden Jinchaling</td>
<td>dga' ldan byin chags gling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganggya Dingring</td>
<td>rgang gya'i lting ring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelukba</td>
<td>dge lugs pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendün Gyatso</td>
<td>dge 'dun rgya mtsho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomang</td>
<td>sgo mang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gönchok Jikmay Wangbo</td>
<td>dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gönchok Tsering</td>
<td>dkon mchog tshe ring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gungtang Gönchok Denbay Drönmay</td>
<td>gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeltsap Darma Rinchen</td>
<td>rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyumay</td>
<td>rgyud smad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlasa</td>
<td>lha sa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambel Sampel</td>
<td>'jam dpal bsam 'phel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambel Trinlay Yönden Gyatso</td>
<td>'jam dpal 'phrin las yon tan rgya mtsho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamyang Shaybay Dorjay Nga-wang Dzöndrü</td>
<td>'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang btson 'grus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jangdzay</td>
<td>byang rtse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janggya Rolbay Dorjay</td>
<td>lcang kya rol pa'i rdo rje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaydzün Chögyi Gyeltsen</td>
<td>rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonangba</td>
<td>jo nang pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaydrup Gelek Belsang</td>
<td>mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losang Chögyi Nyima</td>
<td>blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losang Dayang</td>
<td>blo bzang rta dbyangs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losang Denbay Nyima</td>
<td>blo bzang bstan pa'i nyi ma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losang Gönchok</td>
<td>blo bzang kun mchog</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loseling</td>
<td>blo gsal gling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ngawang Belden</td>
<td>ngag dbang dpal ldan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngawang Drashi</td>
<td>ngag dbang bkra shis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paṇchen Sönam Drakba</td>
<td>Paṇ chen bsod nams grags pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purbujok</td>
<td>phur bu lcog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rongta Losang Damchö Gyatso</td>
<td>rong thā blo bzang dam chos rgya mtsho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagyaba</td>
<td>sa skya pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sera</td>
<td>se ra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sönam Rinchen</td>
<td>bsod nams rin chen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tügen Losang Chögyi Nyima</td>
<td>thu'u bkwan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tupden Gyatso</td>
<td>thub bstan rgya mtsho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Üba Losel</td>
<td>dbus pa blo gsal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangjen Gaway Lodrö</td>
<td>dbyangs can dga' ba'i blo gros</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

This is a book about certain implications of the philosophy of emptiness (stong pa nyid, gunyata). It is, in several ways, a continuation of the work that Jeffrey Hopkins began in Meditation on Emptiness (1983) and Emptiness Yoga (1987). It too introduces and analyzes interpretations of the Prasarigika-Madhyamika "school" of Indian Buddhism by prominent scholars, past and present, of the Gelukpa (dge lugs pa) monastic order of Tibetan Buddhism; it also uses as a textual base the encyclopedic works of Jamyang Shayba (jam dbyangs bzhad pa, 1648-1721), Ngawang Belden (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797) and Janggya (Icang skya, 1717-86).

Hopkins' pioneering work brought to English-speaking readers the worldview of what might be call "Gelukpa Buddhism," including much of the material that a monk would absorb in many years of study. In particular, he explored in great detail the system for meditation on emptiness that Gelukbas have constructed out of terse and ambiguous Indian sutras and sastras. Hopkins showed that for Gelukbas, the enigma of Nagarjuna's first-century Treatise on the Middle Way (dbu ma'i bstan bcos, madhyamakasstra) has been solved. "Emptiness" means something quite precise; therefore, that of which things are empty can be described finely enough to enable the construction of specific practices to isolate and destroy harmful misconceptions. In short, Gelukbas have systematized a highly unsystematic philosophy, and Hopkins' important work has revealed this intricate and ingenious system.

Compared to Meditation on Emptiness, the present study is far more modest in scope and execution. It focuses upon certain implications of the Madhyamika view which are well known among Gelukbas as the "unique tenets" of the Prasangika-Madhyamika School. "Prasangika" is the Tibetan appellation for the tradition based primarily on Candrakirti's seventh-century exegesis of the works of Nagarjuna. The "unique tenets" are a list of positions that Gelukbas link to Nagarjuna himself and which mainly comprise careful refutations of the tenets of non-Prasangikas, prominently those who are identified as Cittamatrins (=Yogacarins) or SvantrtrikaMadhyamikas.

The "unique tenets" are a kind of miscellany of topics, ranging from a qualified realism (in this case, a defense of the idea that there is an external world) to propositions about perception, nirvana, the "extremes" of annihilation and permanence, etc. Some topics concern central issues in Buddhism; others merely clarify the way in which certain terms (e.g, pratyaksa) are used by Prasangikas. All of them are difficult and controversial, even those that do not seem particularly crucial.

The "unique tenets" hinge upon a principle that Gelukbas regard as a kind of
key that opens all philosophical doors. This key is called "ultimate analysis" and is discussed generally in the first chapter and specifically in every subsequent chapter. It is what Gelukbas say non-Prasangikas do, prompting those schools to invent things that don't exist and to deny the existence of things that do exist. The "ultimate analysis" key is a unique contribution of Gelukbas to Prasangika thought, although of course Gelukbas claim that it is a direct derivation of Nagarjuna's own criticisms of the metaphysical entities propounded by others.

As a corollary to rejecting ultimate analysis, Gelukbas (in this case with much explicit support in Indian texts) maintain that the "unique tenets" are founded upon a respect for the way in which ordinary people see the world. Indeed, "ultimate analysis" and "worldly conceptions" are virtual antonyms. Thus, in the "unique tenets," Gelukbas claim that the Prasangikas perform a graceful philosophical pirouette that returns them to common sense, the place where all philosophy begins.

The attribution of particular tenets to "schools" is not well grounded in historical realities. There were no schools of Indian Buddhism as such; Indian Buddhism was never so organized! Monk-scholars did not identify themselves as belonging to this or that school (and certainly not to the many subschools identified in Gelukba literature), and it is hazardous and, I think, unhelpful to guess now at their affiliations. It is a mistake, we know, even to presume that the commentator of a text agrees with its positions. Then, as now, traditional Buddhist scholars have played roles in order to understand better the perspectives of their opponents. Moreover, the way in which these purported schools are fit into a hierarchy (see the table in chapter 1) is nothing that was self-evident in the Indian context, but is something done in a purely speculative way by Gelukbas who are looking at Indian Buddhist treatises through the lens of their own constructed version of Prasangika-Madhyamika. It may not even be appropriate, for instance, to place the Sautrantikas in the "Hinayana" camp; they may have been Mahayanists who did not clearly identify themselves as such.

Nevertheless, the Gelukba view on the merits of "tenets" study, as pithily expressed by Losang Gonchok, is that "Understanding the views of the lower systems is also a platform or method of coming to understand the views of the higher systems." The fiction of "four schools" is a heuristic device that allows a student to come gradually to the Prasargigka view by way of absorbing, analyzing, and finally rejecting other points of view. (This rejection, it should be noted, is only of selected aspects; the "schools" do not disagree on most issues.) Implicitly, this teaches the student how to be a Prasargigka, since the Prasarigka method is precisely one of beginning with the assertions of others and revealing the absurd or at least awkward consequences (prasahga) that they entail. The study of tenets is thought to sharpen the intellect and to give the student an exposure to coherent points of view that challenge his or her presuppositions.

The particular sections of the "tenets" books translated here are one means for
Gelukba monks, particularly those of Drebung Monastery's Gomang College, to understand the implications of the works of Indian Madhyamikas. It might be objected that they, and for that matter, we, ought not to try to understand the views of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti through the lens of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century works and twentieth-century interpreters. In the case of this book, such an objection would be misplaced, since I make no claim to have understood Nagarjuna, et al. Rather, what is presented here is a particular interpretation of the thought of these figures. It might be seen as a piece of the puzzle of Tibetan Buddhism rather than a piece of the Indian puzzle. However, I would argue that this particular interpretation is interesting, plausible, and for the most part well argued and supported. It deserves the light of day more, I think, than, for instance, yet another speculative study of Nagarjuna.

Also, inasmuch as any and all interpretations of the Indian tradition involve a hermeneutic, the relevant questions for any would-be interpreter are what that hermeneutic should be and how self-consciously one can use it. It has been my fortunate experience that deliberately reading the Buddhist philosophical past through the eyes of the contemporary and nearcontemporary Gelukba tradition is rich and satisfying. It is a pleasure to work with Tibetan scholars, whose kindness and generosity are legendary, and it is instructive and stimulating to see them doing philosophy on their feet. They are, of course, biased; they revere Dzongkaba and cannot easily bring themselves to be critical of his views. But the best of them are also true philosophers who are willing to put everything on the table, who know the Indian sources and will put their formidable intellects to bear on extremely subtle points. Far from beings slaves to their own intellectual tradition, they are masters of it more than most Westerners could claim to be of theirs. Furthermore, the great scholars are, unfortunately, a dwindling resource. Even if one seems to be putting the cart before the horse to utilize a more contemporary tradition when work remains to be done on older texts, there seems to me to be great merit in working with members of a living tradition while they are still available, and to work with them on the sort of texts, such as monastic textbooks, with which they are intimately familiar.

Having said all of that, I cannot claim that this book does a particularly good job of contextualizing this piece of the Gelukba worldview in the overall picture of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. That is, I have only looked in the original languages at those parts of the Indian sources (except for those already translated) that are cited by Tibetan authors. I am no expert in many areas of Indian Buddhism or in Tibetan Buddhism prior to Dzongkaba. I cannot be certain how significant are these limitations. On the very specific topics which comprise the "unique tenets," it is possible, if unlikely, that there are relevant passages in the Indian texts that were never cited by our Tibetan authors, for instance. And it may be, for instance, that Dzongkaba relied heavily upon, or for that matter, was rejecting, the interpretation by his own teacher Rendawa of specific points in Candrakirti's work. So, I must again make clear my intention, which is to present, and, to the extent I am able, to analyze a particular Gelukba interpretation of points drawn from
works the Gelukbas identify as "Prasangika" (mainly those of Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti). As best I am able I have tried to determine whether or not the Gelukba positions are a justifiable reading of the Indian texts, but my principal goal has been to consider them on their own and to ask whether they are coherent and cogent. I hope that I have been able to present this philosophy in a way that is clear and accessible and that it will in some small measure be helpful to someone else.

Sources

This book is based on several levels of oral and textual commentary. Since my primary goal is to provide a picture of how one large and important segment of Tibetan Buddhism views these issues, I rely upon two normative texts and representative written and oral commentary. I call the texts-the tenets "encyclopedias" of Jamyang Shayba and Janggya- "normative" because they are among those upon which many contemporary Gelukba scholars rely for their understanding of these philosophical tenets. I have more to say about these works and their authors in the first chapter, so for now it will suffice to say that these works synthesize a vast amount of Indian sutra and sastra literature as well as the Tibetan works of Dzongkaba, founder of the Gelukba order, and his chief disciples. They are the culmination of several centuries that saw the composition of "tenets" books and monastic "textbooks" (yig cha). In fact, Jamyang Shayba is the last of the major writers of the latter, and Janggya the last of the former. They also reflect centuries of monastic courtyard debate (Jamyang Shayba's work, in particular, includes many hypothetical debates). My many sessions with eminent native scholars did not turn up a great many perspectives in addition to those already found in these pages; although monk-scholars continue to read and debate about the Indian and Tibetan sources utilized by the tenets-book authors, they seem to feel no pressing need for something even more thorough. I translated portions of these works and also translated two works commenting on Jamyang Shayba, the Annotations by Ngawang Belden (included here) and Word Commentary by Losang Gonchok (blo bzang dkon mchog). In addition, I read portions of many Indian and Tibetan works cited by the authors whose works I translated.

For oral commentary, I eventually gathered the opinions of a fairly wide range of Gelukba monastics. From Jeffrey Hopkins I got grounding in the teaching of the late Gomang College (Jamyang Shayba's college) scholar Kensur Ngawang Lekden; later, I clarified some questions with Gomang's Geshay Tupden Gyatso. I did a great deal of study with Kensur Yeshey Tupden and Geshe Belden Drakba, two scholars of Loseling College, Gomang's sister college in Drebung Monastery. Loseling's friendly rivalry with Gomang has made scholars of either place particularly sensitive to points of difference in their respective monastic textbooks. I also had several interviews with Geshay Gonchok Tsayring and Amchok Tulku of Ganden Monastery and with Geshay Sonam Rinchen of Sera Monastery. Finally, I was able to address many questions to the Dalai Lama, who is not a member of any
of the three great Gelukba monasteries, and who is the rare scholar whose knowledge extends to non-Gelukba Tibetan writings. These scholars did not merely impart an oral tradition with which they were familiar, but, in our sessions, probed, questioned, reversed themselves, disagreed with the authors, and, most of all, threw consequences at me. It is difficult to imagine a more thorough thrashing of a text than that which they delivered. I am gratified to be able to place before others the result of this process, and I hope that it will prove to be stimulating and otherwise helpful.
Dedication

For Harry, with inexpressible gratitude
Acknowledgments

In the spring of 1980, with only a rudimentary command of Tibetan and only the vaguest notion of what I was getting myself into, I began slowly, a little bit week-by-week, to translate that portion of Janggya's Presentation of Tenets concerning the unique tenets. Jeffrey Hopkins suggested the topic and met with me privately to review my translations and annotations. At every turn, it seemed, more questions arose than were answered. Some of those were swept away in my first classes with a Tibetan lama, Gyumay Kensur Jambel Shenpen (who later became the Ganden Th Rinbochay, head of the Gelukba order). However, we had only a half-dozen meetings. It was the late Kensur Yeshey Tupden, former abbot of Loseling College of Drebung Monastery (and great humanitarian), who really opened these texts for me. My classes with him over three years, in America and India, ranged over all of the texts translated herein and a good deal of the Losang Gonchok book upon which I often relied; readers will see that his many insights and suggestions leaven the footnotes with which I have annotated those translations.

In 1983, with the crucial assistance of an American Institute of Indian Studies fellowship, my wife and I left for nearly a year's stay in India. While there, I was able to complete my sessions with Kensur Yeshey Tupden at Drebung Monastery, where the problems of life in the Third World seemed tolerable in the spirited company of the marvelous monks of Drebung. Prior to that, I had been enamored only of the genius of the Buddha, but had no special feelings for the Tibetans or for India; our visit changed all of that.

During the remainder of our stay in India, I consulted with several other adroit Tibetan scholars. I benefitted greatly from studying for nearly three months with Geshay Belden Drakba, at that time the librarian of Tibet House in Delhi. The Ven. Losang Tarchin (Gordon Aston) participated in these sessions, asking excellent questions and helping me through numerous linguistic logjams. Later, in Dharamsala, I brought my most vexing questions to Geshay Gonchok Tsayring and Amchok Rinbochay of Ganden Monastery and to Geshay Sonam Rinchen of Sera Monastery (the latter two were then working at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives). Most treasured of all such sessions, though, were two audiences with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who showed himself to be not only a great spiritual leader but one of the greatest scholars of his tradition. His Holiness showed a remarkable capability to understand the thrust of my questions even when I was not able to express myself clearly, to come up with approaches to them that no one else had suggested, and to playfully speculate about the answers when the questions could not be settled. He exemplifies what is best about the Gelukba traditionit's commitment to the use of reason to jar the foundations of misconception, without losing sight of the higher purpose of religious practice. Ngari Rinbochay (Tendzin Choegyal), then His Holiness' secretary, not only
arranged but participated in the interviews. Finally, back in the U.S., I addressed a number of questions to Geshay Tupden Gyatso, of Drebung’s Gomang College, who resides at the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center in New Jersey.

My greatest debt is to Jeffrey Hopkins, who spent hundreds of hours with me on these topics. It has been a privilege to be the apprentice to such a master craftsman. I am grateful to Paul Groner, Bryan Pfaffenger, and Karen Lang for reading the entire manuscript and making many good suggestions. In particular, I am indebted to Karen Lang, who raised some very good questions about an earlier draft, discovered many errors that had crept into my Sanskrit citations, and gave me valuable bibliographic pointers. Craig Preston, Jules Levinson, and Guy Newland all discussed certain points with me and helped me to clarify those issues. I also am grateful to my former colleagues at Bates College and to my present colleagues at Dickinson College for their encouragement and friendship. I would also like to thank Alex Mast, a Dickinson student who helped me with many final details.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Christine Alfieri, who has not even read this book, much less typed or proofread it. More importantly, she understood what I needed to do and let me do it despite the many sacrifices that entailed. That is why I think of this book as hers also.
Part One:
Introduction to the Unique Tenets and Analysis of Selected Topics

“My Doctrine has two modes,
Advice and tenets.
To children I speak advice
And to yogis, tenets.”

- Lahkavatara Sutra
1 The Unique Tenets

Nearly two millennia ago, around the time Paul of Tarsus and his fellow apostles had begun to propagate the new and radical teaching of Jesus throughout the Roman Empire, the south Indian scholar and monk Nagarjuna was attracting a following at the great Nalanda Monastic University in Magadha by teaching a new way of understanding the sixcenturies-old message of Sakyamuni Buddha. Like Paul, Nagarjuna had an impact that was widespread, enduring, and continues to provoke creative thought.

Little is known of Nagarjuna's life, except from a legendary account in a biography that survives only in Chinese translation. He is said to have been so intelligent, and his memory so prodigious, that he was able to master the entirety of the enormous Buddhist canon (but of which school is uncertain) in only ninety days. He sought even more scriptures, obtaining several of the long-hidden Mahayana ("Great Vehicle") discourses (mdo, sutra) from a monk in the Himalayas. He absorbed these and traveled widely, debating with many Strivers (gramana, the spiritual seekers of the forest) and seeking more texts. A Naga then appeared to him and took him to a place in the ocean where he was presented with the Vaipulya ("extensive," i.e., Mahayana) sutras; again he was able to memorize these in just ninety days, and was returned to south India where he taught the revealed Mahayana of the Buddha.

Through his teaching and writing, Nagarjuna articulated a point of view that came to be regarded as distinctive and resulted in his being regarded as the founder of the first philosophical school of the Mahayana, the Madhyamika ("Middle Way," dbu ma). His followers, ancient and contemporary, regard his teachings as expressing the very essence of the Buddha's discourses on the Perfection of Wisdom (shes rab kyi pha rol to phyin pa, prajnaparamita), the seminal texts of the Mahayana.

The "middle way" of the school's name and which is propounded by Nagarjuna in his most famous work, the Treatise on the Middle Way (dbu ma'i bstan bcos, madhyamakagāstra), is a way he claims to have been articulated by the Buddha himself. It is a spiritual path that falls neither to the extreme of "existence" or "permanence" (rtag mtha', gagvatanta) nor to the extreme of "non-existence" or "annihilation" (chad mtha', ucchedanta). As set forth by the particular Tibetan tradition utilized in the present study, Nagarjuna meant by these extremes the fallacies of either propounding the inherent existence (rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhavasiddhi) of phenomena or propounding the non-existence of phenomena even conventionally. The former extreme is a reification of things, conceiving them to exist exactly in the manner in which they appear-as if they existed in and of themselves, as if they could, for instance, be pointed to as the collection of their parts, or an individual part, or separate from them. The latter extreme of "non-
existence" is the nihilistic rejection of the cause and effect of actions (las, karma) and consequently of transmigration in a cycle ('khor ba, samsara) of rebirth and the possibility of liberation from it. A few ancient Indian thinkers like the Carvakas fell to the latter extreme, but most fell to the former, Nagarjuna thought; non-Buddhists generally posited a permanent and unchanging soul or essence, of course, but even most Buddhists propounded some kind of "true" or independent existence.'

The Prasangika "School"

Tibetan traditions consider Nagarjuna's school to have two branches, the split coming from Bhavaviveka's (legs ldan 'byed c. 500-570, a.k.a. Bhava or Bhavya) criticism of Buddhapalita's (sang rgyas bskyangs, c. 470-540) commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way. Candrakirti (seventh century), in turn, defended Buddhapalita's. The schools of Bhavaviveka on the one hand and Buddhapalita and Candrakirti on the other are called the Svatatantrika-Madhyamika (Middle Way "Autonomy," dbu ma rang rgyud pa) and Prasangika-Madhyamika (Middle Way "Consequence," dbu ma thal 'gyur pa) Schools; these names reflect two different approaches to awakening in others a realization of the nature of reality, depending respectively on so-called "autonomous inferences" (rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag, svatrantranumana) in which the members of a syllogism are held to be inherently existent and are asserted as being established in a common manner in the systems of both the stater and the hearer, and on consequences (that 'gyur, prasariga) that contradict the listener's own positions.'

Candrakirti may justifiably be considered the defacto founder of the Prasangika School because he clearly championed the method of flinging contradictory consequences and defended other aspects of Buddhapalita's thought over against the school of Bhavaviveka.8 For Tibetan Prasartgikas, Candra kirti is, after Nagarjuna, clearly the most important figure in the history of the school. According to Taranatha 9 Candrakirti was a south Indian who learned all branches of knowledge at an early age and became a scholar's scholar at Nalanda University, learning about Nagarjuna's treatises from both Bhavaviveka's and Buddhapalita's disciples but favoring the latter. He was able to do many miraculous feats such as milking a picture of a cow and passing through walls. He defeated many non-Buddhist opponents in debate, converted many people to Buddhism, and wrote several profound treatises on the Middle Way philosophy.

According to the Gelukba scholar Losang Gonchok No bzang dkon mchog, other Indian Prasangikas of great stature include Nagarjuna's student Aryadeva (c. 170-270); ~antideva (eighth century), who wrote the well-loved classic Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa, bodhisattvacaryavatara); Atisa (982-1054), who was instrumental in the revitalization of Tibetan Buddhism in the eleventh century; and Jayananda (latter half of eleventh century), who, as the translator of his works into Tibetan,
promoted Candrakirti's stature even though he was later criticized for his own commentary on Candrakirti's *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"* (dbu ma la 'jug pa, madhyamakavatara). Together with Nagarjuna and Candrakirti they are the authors of the distinctive Prasangika literature, which includes the following nineteen works:

**By Nagarjuna:**

1. Treatise on the Middle Way / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way, Called "Wisdom" (dbu ma'i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba, madhyamakasastra / prajnanamamulamadhyamakakarika)

2. Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa, bodhicittavivarana)

3. Refutation of Objections (rtsod pa bzlog pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, vigrahavyavartanikarika)

4. Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (stong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, gunyatasaptatikarika)

5. Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, yuktisastikakarika)

6. Treatise Called "The Finely Woven" (zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo, vaidalyasutranama)

7. Precious Garland of Advice for the King (rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba, rajaparikatharatnavali)

**By Aryadeva:**

8. Four Hundred / Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas (bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa, catuhsatakagastakarika)

**By Buddhapalita:**

9. Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa Buddha pa li ta, buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavrtti)

**By Candrakirti:**

10. *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"* (dbu ma la jug pa, madhyamakavatara)"
11 Autocommentary on the "Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) Treatise on the Middle Way" (dbu ma la 'jug pa'i bshad pa / dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rang 'grel, madhyamakavatara- bhasya)

12 Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" (rigs pa drug cu pa'i grel pa, yuktisastikavrtti)

13 Clear Words, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba, mulamadhyamakavruttiprasannapada)

14 Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas" (byang chub sems dpa'i rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa, bodhisattvayogacaryacatuhgatakakita)

By Santideva:

15 Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa, bodhisattvacaryavatara)

16 Compendium of Learnings (bslab pa kun las btus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, giks isamuccayakarika)

By Atisa:

17 Explanation of (Santideva's) "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds" (byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i bshad pa, bodhisattvacaryavatarahbhaya)

18 Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (byang chub lam gyi sgron ma, bodhipathapradipa)

19 Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way (dbu ma'i man ngag, madhyamakopadesa).

These works have been a dominant force in Tibetan Buddhism. Monks of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) order, the largest and, for more than four centuries, the most powerful of Tibet's Buddhist orders, explicitly identify themselves as Prasangikas and argue that all of the other principal Buddhist orders are basically Prasangika as well.12 They are particularly committed to the writings of Candrakirti. Though they study the works of Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, and others-of the nineteen works on this list, seven are by Nagarjuna and five others are commentaries13 on his works-they place particular emphasis on the Entrance to the Middle Way by Candrakirti. They commit it to memory, work through monastic textbooks (yig cha) thick with detailed commentaries and hypothetical debates on it, and engage each other in hours of daily dialectical debate on its implications.
Despite the fact that they regard themselves as Prasangikas, the Gelukbas display a somewhat critical attitude toward the Prasangika texts; although they regard them with great reverence, they are at the same time willing, even eager, to creatively extend their conclusions. The Gelukba respect for Nagarjuna and Candrakirti—and their own founder, Dzongkaba Losang Drakba (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419)—usually inhibits criticism. They cite the works of these scholars as authoritative in much the same way that earlier Buddhists cited the sutras of Sakyamuni. On the other hand, since they are clearly committed to the pursuit of truth and prize logical consistency, they do not hesitate to "clarify" apparently incorrect statements with ingenious explanations that explicate what those Madhyamika luminaries "must have meant." So, while it is true that the Gelukbas do not question the most fundamental aspects of Madhyamika and Prasangika-Madhyamika philosophy, regarding themselves as its conservators, they continue to struggle creatively toward a coherent system of Prasangika thought from the many sources they accept as authoritative. In this way they go far beyond Nagarjuna and even Candrakirti, neither of whom exhibits interest in the construction of a comprehensive system of tenets.

The translations (in parts two and three) of the works of Jamyang Shayba (jam dbyangs bzhad pa, 1648-1721), Ngawang Belden (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797) and Janggya (lcang skya, 1717-86) demonstrate both conservative (uncritical) and liberal (extrapolating) tendencies. These seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Gelukbas, who wrote the most exhaustive works on comparative philosophical tenets in the history of Buddhism, attempt in their works to map a coherent system of Prasangika philosophy. In the process they make virtually no claims without the support of citations from the works, Indian and Tibetan, that they consider authoritative. This makes their texts a rich compendium of Prasangika writing (albeit one heavily weighted toward Candrakirti and Dzongkaba).

Nevertheless, they will admit that there are apparent errors in those texts and will identify and correct them. To give just one example, in his annotations to the first chapter of Jamyang Shayba's text, Ngawang Belden notes that Candrakirti says that one needs to interpret statements (by the Buddha) that a mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, alayavijnana), person, and the five aggregates (phung po, skandha) substantially exist (rdzas su yod pa, dravyasat). The potential problem with Candrakirti's statement is that it does not distinguish between the conventional, non-substantial existence of the person and aggregates on the one hand and the total non-existence of the mind-basis-of-all on the other hand. Thus, although he is "correct," Candrakirti seems to have left himself open to potential criticism and this is being signaled."

Moreover, Gelukba scholars explicate the rather terse and even obscure statements of Nagarjuna, Candrakirti, etc., making subtle distinctions that go well beyond those made in the Indian sources. This is evident in many of the unique tenets, such as those that concern the path attainments of nonPrasarigikas (discussed in chapter 6). Crucial to the Gelukba exegesis of passages from
Aryadeva, Candrakirti, Santideva, etc., is the distinction between different varieties of misconceptions of self: subtle versus coarse, innate versus artificial (i.e., acquired, not inborn), etc. Despite the fact that no such distinctions are made by any of those Indian philosophers, it would be difficult otherwise to explain many of the passages cited from their works.

Why the Unique Tenets are Unique: Conventional and Ultimate Analysis

The Gelukba presentation of Prasangika philosophy gives a somewhat different picture of Nagarjuna’s enterprise than has emerged from many studies that have not utilized Tibetan sources. Nagarjuna subjected the assertions of Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers to withering analysis, reducing to absurdity all views that (according to Gelukba exegetes) depended on the postulation of inherently existent entities. Again and again he flung at opponents, real and hypothetical, consequences (that ’gyur, prasar ga) of their positions that demonstrated their untenability. For taking this approach of working from the assertions of others, Nagarjuna has often been labeled a negativist without a system whose statement “I have no thesis of my own” indicates a refusal to make positive assertions.15 An extreme version of this view is expressed by A. B. Keith, who characterizes Nagarjuna as a nihilist:

Nagarjuna denies consistently that he has any thesis of his own, for to uphold one would be wholly erroneous; the truth is silence, which is neither affirmation nor negation, for negation in itself is essentially positive in implying a reality. He confines himself to reducing every positive assertion to absurdity, thus showing that the intellect condemns itself as inadequate just as it finds hopeless antimonies in the world of experience... If we accept the strict doctrine of Nagarjuna, as interpreted by Buddhapalita and Candrakirti, and accepted by Santideva, we must admit that the phenomenal world has not merely no existence in absolute truth, but has no phenomenal existence, difficult as this conception is, and numerous as are the failures of its holders to exactly express it.

Others, to be sure, have been more moderate in their assessment of Nagarjuna and his method, but even if they have admitted that Nagarjuna did not reject the existence of conventional phenomena, they maintain that he refused to make any positive assertions. B. K. Matilal concludes:

It needs to be emphasized, even at the risk of repetition, that the doctrine of emptiness does not actually consist in the rejection of the phenomenal world, but in the maintenance of a non-committal attitude toward the phenomena and in the non-acceptance of any theory of the phenomenal world as finally valid.
Of course, a number of writers have recognized that even Nagarjuna's rejection of the views of others in some sense constitutes "views" of his own, and that Nagarjuna's assertion that things arise only dependently, not by their own character, is a positive assertion about dependent-arising (pratityasamutpada, rten 'byung). Still, the preponderance of scholarship, perhaps wary of distorting Nagarjuna's intention by ascribing to him particular positions on such matters as the validation of perception, the Buddhist soteriological path structure, etc., has focused exclusively on Nagarjuna's negative dialectic.

The topics with which this book is concerned reflect a radically different assessment, since they comprise a collection of Madhyamika School tenets (grub mtha', siddhanta) that are attributed directly or indirectly to Nagarjuna himself. They show that those in Tibet who consider themselves Nagarjuna's spiritual heirs have adopted particular positive metaphysical, epistemological, and soteriological positions that they believe are his. These topics are widely known among Gelukba scholars as the "unique tenets" (thun mong ma yin pa'i grub mtha') of the Prasangika-Madhyamika School. Dzongkaba has explicitly identified them with Nagarjuna, calling them the "great difficult points of (Nagarjuna's) Treatise on the Middle Way Called 'Wisdom."'

They are, indeed, difficult points. Several of the prominent Gelukba scholars with whom I worked, when informed that my project concerned these topics, sucked in their breath and shook their heads: "Very difficult. Very difficult." Some are thorny problems of a highly technical nature; others are issues that go to the heart of the unique Prasangika view that no phenomenon exists inherently, but only as a mere nominal imputation, which even its adherents admit is a tenet notoriously difficult to understand properly and therefore not the appropriate view to be taught to a mass audience. Some of the topics of the "unique tenets" are all the more difficult because they pivot on these crucial bases.

The presentation of the Prasangika tenets occurs against the backdrop of a hierarchical arrangement of Buddhist philosophies. The historical verity of this arrangement is highly disputable; there is little evidence of real Indian "schools" in the sense of lineages dedicated to a certain systematic view. However, for Gelukbas the "schools" represent the distillation of certain definite and strong currents in Indian thinking, based on the intellectual heritage translated from Sanskrit to Tibetan during the formative period (sixth century C.E. onwards) of Tibetan Buddhism. Also, Tibetans have seen the schools as the natural outcome of the Buddha's three "Wheel Turnings" (as exemplified in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought [dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo, samdhinirmocanasutra]); their hermeneutic stresses that the Buddha, the master pedagogue, fully intended to promote distinctive and contradictory views to serve different types of students. In ascending order of proximity to the correct position of the highest school, the Prasaiigika School, they are:

1 Vaibhasikas (Proponents of the "Great Exposition," bye brag smra ba)'
In the Gelukba monasteries, the positions of all schools are studied in order to fully understand the Buddhist context of the highest system, the Prasangika School. Jamyang Shayba, whose Great Exposition of Tenets is itself the greatest textbook for such a study, says that "the views of the lower systems are also a platform for understanding] the views of the upper systems.s29 The twentieth-century Gelukba abbot, Kensur Yeshey Tupden, recommended that:30

The student who has faith in emptiness but does not understand it begins by studying the Vaibhāṣika system, then Sautrantika, Cittamatra, Svatantrika, and finally Prasangika. This method guards against undermining students' understanding of dependent arising, so that they will not [wrongly] conclude that validly established phenomena do not exist at all.

Partly as a result of giving these "lower" views a high degree of value in the overall soteriology, and partly because of their role-playing in the debate courtyard, Gelukba expositors of tenets attempt to present them in a fair and balanced way.31

Since Tibetans named those of the Nagarjuna-Candrakirti school "Prasangikas" ("flingers of consequences") because of their procedure of working with the assertions of others adding unwanted consequences to those positions rather than pushing their own conclusions-it will not be surprising that the "unique tenets" are largely a list of the faulty assertions of others, exposed as such by the unique standpoint of the Prasangika School. However, the Gelukbas who have collected these tenets are not content to merely propound the negative assertions of the Prasangikas; they also construct, out of the Indian source-material, Prasangika solutions to the difficulties they raise. For instance, the Prasangika
School is hardly unique in denying the existence of a "mind-basis-of-all" (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, alayavijnana), a consciousness that contains all of the seeds for future experiences that have been deposited by past intentional actions (las, karman). In fact, only one of the eight principal Buddhist schools or subschools identified by the Tibetan doxographers claim that such a consciousness exists. Nevertheless, the Prasafigika refutation of the mind-basis-of-all reveals the unique viewpoint of the Prasangikas, who reject the existence of any entities that exist by their own nature, and it affords them an opportunity to articulate the unique assertion that the mere disintegratedness (zhig pa, nasa) of an action is sufficient to cause a later effect.

This example also is used to demonstrate that Prasartgikas do not merely qualify the assertions of the lower schools by - labeling them "conventional," as some have thought. Because the Prasangikas accept nothing as existing ultimately, but do accept things that exist conventionally, it has sometimes been thought that the only difference between Prasangikas and others is that what the lower schools assert as ultimate, Prasangikas assert to be conventional. In fact, Candrakirti accuses the Sva
tantrika-Madhya
yamikas of making this generalization about Nagarjuna's positions:

May scholars ascertain that just as it is the case that except for this Madhyamika textual system, in other treatises this doctrine of emptiness is not expressed without error, so also this system appearing here, which I have expressed along with answers to objections, like the doctrine of emptiness, does not exist in other treatises. Because of that, the proposition by certain Madhyamikas that just what Sautrantikas and Vaibha~ikas propound to be ultimate, Madhyamikas assert to be conventional, is set forth by those who do not understand the suchness [explained] in (Nagarjuna's) Treatise on the Middle Way because it is unreasonable for a supramundane doctrine to be similar to a mundane doctrine.

According to Gelukba scholars, it is true enough that, because non-Prasangikas assert the existence of phenomena that are inherently or truly existent-what they consider "ultimate"- Prasangikas in general accept as "conventional" what others assert to be "ultimate." However, there are a number of other phenomena, such as a mind-basis-of-all, self-consciousness (rang rig, svasamvedana), and autonomous syllogisms (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba, svatantra-prayoga), that Prasangikas do not accept as existing even conventionally. Therefore, they do reject some positions entirely and, furthermore, provide alternative explanations for them.

On what basis are these phenomena rejected? I wish to argue that one major way in which Gelukba Prasangikas have creatively extended Candrakirti's Prasangika philosophy is through distinguishing an implicit principle that Prasangikas can use to challenge and dispense with certain assertions of their opponents, and that in several of the "unique tenets" it is precisely this principle that is evoked. Simply put, the Gelukbas distinguish between two types of analysis,
conventional and ultimate, the former being the proper establisher of all conventional phenomena (i.e., those phenomena other than emptinesses), the latter being employed by schools such as Cittamatra in the course of describing or attempting to prove the existence of entities such as the mind-basis-of-all or selfconsciousness. The Gelukba authors whose works are translated in parts two and three explain that Prasahgikas must reject some supposed existents outright because they cannot be established through conventional analysis, the only valid means of establishing phenomena other than emptiness. Thus, the distinction between ultimate and conventional analysis often becomes the analytical knife with which the Prasangikas distinguish themselves from other schools—not conventional and ultimate existence, which all schools propound, but conventional and ultimate analysis, which has to do with the way in which those phenomena are analytically established.

Following Dharmakirti, Gelukbas say that conventional valid cognition, the means by which conventional analysis is carried out, is of two types: direct and inferential. Valid cognition is that which is correct and incontrovertible toward its main object. Sense direct valid cognition such as by the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body is simply that sense cognition that is not affected by superficial causes of error such as a fault in the physical sense-power, distorting atmospheric conditions, movement, etc., and that apprehends its object without the medium of concepts. Direct valid cognition also includes mental direct valid cognition, which is induced by sense direct valid cognition, and yogic direct valid cognition. Nevertheless, all such cognition by ordinary beings is affected by an element of false appearance because objects that appear to ordinary beings seem to inherently exist. Still, Gelukbas say that Prasartgikas regard such conventional cognition to be valid, since it is correct with regard to the basic entity of its object.

Inferential valid cognition of the conventional sort includes all types of reasoning processes with the exception of (1) those that are fallacious and (2) those that seek to establish an ultimately existent object. An instance of the former would be reasoning that because wherever there is smoke, there is fire, that it follows that wherever there is fire, there is smoke (which does not follow because there are many kinds of smokeless fire). An instance of the latter would be a conceptual consciousness that imputes a phenomenon to its parts—e.g., that thinks that the legs, back, and seat of a chair are a chair, rather than merely being the basis of the designation "chair," chair being a mere imputation or nominal designation in dependence on legs, seat, and back. Opponents are said to engage in ultimate analysis when they posit entities through this sort of process; in other words, they are being said to posit some objects that, if they could be established at all, could be established only by engaging in ultimate analysis. Candrakirti and subsequent Prasangikas, on the other hand, are said to posit objects the way the world does, without (ultimate) analysis and investigation.

According to Dzongkaba, something is established as existing conventionally if it is (1) well known to a conventional consciousness, (2) not damaged by
conventional valid cognition, and (3) not damaged by ultimate valid cognition. In other words, a phenomenon must be perceivable by a consciousness that is not involved in realizing its emptiness of inherent existence, such as an eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness not investigating the ultimate 36 it must not be vulnerable to refutation by conventional valid cognition, such as occurs when “blue” snowy mountains seen from a distance are discovered to be white or when a reflection is discovered not to function in the manner of the object reflected; and it must not be vulnerable to refutation by ultimate valid cognition, such as occurs when something is claimed to be inherently existent but in fact cannot be found when sought by ultimate analysis (for instance, the mind-basis-of-all or self-consciousness asserted by the Cittamatra School).37

The first criterion—that something be well known to a conventional consciousness—is not logically necessary," since the remaining two will exclude all non-existent and ultimate phenomena, but it is useful because it indicates that Prasartgikas begin with the conceptions of ordinary worldlings, limiting that class only by excluding what valid cognition refutes. That something is well known to a conventional consciousness does not have to mean that ordinary beings have to know about it. If that were the case, then emptiness and many other phenomena could not be said to exist. The point is that if ordinary beings did know about it, their ordinary non-analytical awarenesses would not be seeking the mode of being of those phenomena. Concerning this criterion, Dzongkaba says:39

[The relationship between] actions and effects, the grounds and paths, and so forth are not well known to the common person. However, when [such things] are taken as objects through hearing and experience, etc., they appear to ordinary minds that do not analyze how [their final] mode of being exists. Thus, [while it would be] a fault [if such things] were not well known in the world, this is not the case.

All things that exist, exist conventionally, for nothing exists ultimately. Even emptiness, despite being an ultimate truth, exists only conventionally, not ultimately. Furthermore, emptiness exists only conventionally despite the fact that it is realized as the result of an ultimate analysis, the point being that it was not what was sought in the analysis but is itself precisely the non-finding of an ultimately existing phenomenon by ultimate analysis.90 Emptiness, too, is empty; it does not withstand ultimate analysis.

The distinction between ultimate and conventional analysis is not used to make blanket rejections of other schools. Prasangikas are in fact rejecting only what they see as those schools' hypotheses-phenomena that can be certified by neither valid sense cognition nor valid inference, phenomena invented to paper over certain perceived philosophical conundrums. For instance, the Cittamatra School's assertion of a mind-basis-of-all is really a hypothesis formulated to meet the perceived need for a stable, neutral medium for the transmittal of karmic latencies; but of course it is not put forward as a mere hypothesis, since it is said to
exist. Gelukbas object not to the imputation of a basis for karmic latencies-ac-
according to them, the Prasangikas have their own, the "mere P"-but to treating a
mere imputation as if it existed in and of itself. Otherwise, as stated earlier,
Prasangikas are content to accept the conventional existence of phenomena that
other schools assert.

The prohibition against ultimate analysis does not prohibit analysis in general,
and Prasarigikas demonstrate this by some of their discriminations with respect to
conventional phenomena. Candrakirti distinguishes between objects that are real
and unreal from the viewpoint of the world:42

Objects realized by the world [and] apprehended
By the six unimpaired sense powers
Are true from just [the viewpoint of] the world. The rest
Are posited as unreal from just [the viewpoint of] the world.

Dzongkaba, commenting on this, identifies phenomena such as reflections as
unreal in relation to the world:43

The rest-that is, reflections, and so forth-that appear as objects when the
sense powers are impaired, are posited as being unreal in relation to just
the world. The word "just" indicates that without relying on a reasoning
consciousness, just conventional valid cognition is sufficient to posit those
consciousnesses as mistaken.

According to Dzongkaba, the ordinary worldly discrimination involved in
recognizing that a mirror-image of a face is not a face, etc., is not a search for an
object that can be found upon analysis, but merely the use of conventional valid
cognition to overcome error or potential error based on one's initial perception of
the mirror-image. The distinctions of Candrakzrti and Dzongkaba are further
refined by Ngawang Belden, who distinguishes between what is real in relation to
the perspective of the world ('jig rten shes ngo la ltos to yang dak) and what is
unreal in that perspective.44 The first category includes those phenomena that
cannot be realized as unreal without depending upon ultimate analysis-
conventional phenomena such as trees, rocks, etc. The second category comprises
phenomena that can be realized as unreal by conventional valid cognition, such
as reflections or mirages. Presumably, the latter, when just considered as
reflections, mirages, etc., are also real in relation to the perspective of the world-a
reflection is really a reflection, though it is not really that which it reflects. Many
other kinds of distinctions might be made with regard to how conventional
phenomena may be analyzed without falling into the extreme of ultimate analysis.

To recapitulate, the Gelukba extension of Candrakirti’s Prasahgika philosophy
provides the implicit rationale for Candrakirti’s rejection of certain positions by
demonstrating a principle at the heart of his work that is used to cut down mistaken tenets. Those assertions that are not supported by worldly renown and must involve the use of ultimate analysis, since they cannot be established by conventional analysis, must be rejected. Thus, the Cittamatra School's fabrication of self-consciousness is rejected in part because it involves ultimate analysis of the cause and effect of memory; its rejection of external objects is repudiated in part because it involves ultimate analysis into the cause and effect of consciousness; its theory of a mind-basis-of-all is opposed because it involves ultimate analysis of the relationship between a thing and its bases of designation; and those who deny that disintegratedness is a functioning thing are disputed because their reasoning is based on ultimate analysis into the relationship between disintegratedness and its basis of designation, that which has disintegrated.

But as was said earlier, the Gelukbas go even further, not only elaborating Candrakirti's criticisms of the positions of others but also proposing solutions to those problems. That is, their analysis is not purely negative, but extends to an explanation of positive principles. The crucial question to be considered now is whether or not they violate their own principles by inventing entities that, no less than those proposed by the Cittamatra or other schools, require ultimate analysis for their establishment. I would argue that they do not.

For instance, an enduring problem in Indian religion is the provision of a way to account for the transmittal of karmic potencies from one incarnation to the next. Non-Buddhist theories have been built upon the postulation of an enduring metaphysical self or soul, the atman, in which karmic potencies can be infused or (as in Jainism) upon which karmic potencies can become encrusted. Buddhist schools, which for the most part have never admitted the possibility of an atman (the Pudgala-adhikars—"Proponents of the Person" [gang zed smra ba]-being a possible exception) have invented a number of substantial entities that could serve to link two incarnations: "obtainers" (thob pa, prapti), the basic continuum of the mind (sems rgyud, cittasritana), "non-wastage" (chud mi za ba, avipranasa), and mind-basis-of-all.'

On this topic, the Gelukbas assert, in effect, that the Prasahgikas find it unnecessary to posit any such entity at all. Rather, the mere fact that actions have ceased, or disintegrated-their disintegratedness (zhig pa, nasta)-is sufficient to cause a future effect to issue forth from those actions. An action's disintegratedness is neither a substantial entity separate from it nor a permanent, unchanging phenomenon; hence, disintegratedness does not accrue the same unwanted consequences flung by Prasarigikas at the other possibilities. In order to construct the "solution" of disintegratedness, Gelukbas put together Candrakirti's statements in two sources-statements in his Clear Words (his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way) in which he establishes that a state of disintegratedness is caused and acts as a cause and statements in his Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hun- dred," where he says that even though many eons have passed since an action has ceased, its effects can be experienced. These statements
are used explicitly to construct an alternative to substantialist positions that cannot be established through conventional valid cognition. The Gelukba solution to the problem is unique in that it does not involve the postulation of a metaphysical entity.

Another strategy employed by Gelukbas in formulating Prasarigika solutions to the problems for which others resort to the postulation of substantial entities is to argue that since things do not inherently exist, it is unnecessary to posit a way to bridge apparent differences: rather, the conventions of the world can be taken at face value. For instance, refuting the notion of self-consciousness, they argue that since a remembering consciousness and the previous consciousness, such as an eye consciousness that apprehended a patch of blue, are not inherently other, there is no need to make a distinction between the two. We merely say, "I saw blue," not distinguishing between the self of the time of seeing and the time of remembering, between an eye consciousness and a later memory consciousness. Candrakirti says in his Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (VI.75):

Because for me this memory is not [inherently] other
Than that [mind] by which the object was experienced,
One remembers, "I saw [this earlier]."
This is also the way of worldly convention.

Ngawang Belden, commenting on this, says:

One does not think, "The self of the time of remembering is the self of the time of [previous] experience," and one does not use the verbal convention, "Previously I saw the blue which was qualified by being the object which subsists [both] at the time of this utterance and the time of the [previous object]."

The postulation of inherently existent entities only serves to unnecessarily complicate matters. In this way, the Prasaragikas can simultaneously affirm the conventions of the world and avoid the creation of a substantialist solution.

The theme of the acceptance of worldly conventions is frequently sounded in both Indian and Tibetan Prasarigika philosophy. Among Candrakirti's numerous affirmations of the value of the world's conventions is this passage in his Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.22):

"We assert that worldly [people], abiding in their own views, are valid." In his Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning," he says:

Worldly things are not to be asserted through scrutiny and analysis. How then? In accordance with what is well known in the world.
In his Clear Words,' he says that this acceptance of what the world asserts is for the sake of ordinary persons, who may not be able to understand the Buddha's teaching about emptiness (also called "suchness"): "...the Buddhas help beings who are trainees, and who do not know suchness, with reasoning as it is well known to them." For this reason, Prasarigikas are sometimes called "Madhyamikas who take what is well known in the world" (jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa, lokaprasiddhavargacarimadhyamika).51

In general, Prasarigikas agree with the world about the existence of worldly things, though they do not always agree with the world's assessment of those things, such as the efficacy of ritual sacrifice or bathing.52 And of course Prasari gikas cannot approve of phenomena as the world perceives them, for the world conceives of phenomena as if they existed inherently, from their own side, and Prasangikas regard that conception to be the very root of cyclic existence. To be true to both the conventions of the world and to the tenet of the lack of inherent existence requires the Gelukbas to use numerous subtle distinctions, distinctions not always made in Candrakirti's works. Candrakirti's insistence upon respect for the conventions of the world stopped short of schemes to classify and order conventionalities. Gelukbas place great emphasis on respecting the conventions of the world, perhaps stemming from Dzongkaba's experience of a vision of Manjushri, who advised him to value appearances.'

Of things about which ordinary people do not speak, I would argue that Gelukbas consider Prasangikas to accept only those that are supramundane aspects of the Buddhist path such as the special consciousnesses that occur as a result of building the accumulations of merit and wisdom necessary to progress toward Buddhahood and the extraordinary powers such as levitation, clairvoyance, etc., that are by-products of that development. On what grounds can Prasangikas accept these phenomena without giving up the principle of rejecting what is not accepted by the world? Perhaps it is because these phenomena can at least be certified by yogis whereas those the Prasangikas reject cannot. Since these can be empirically verified in one's own experience without resorting to ultimate analysis, they are distinct from the postulated entities of the Cittamatra School, such as self-consciousness and the mind basis-of-all, which cannot, according to Prasatigika, be objects of knowledge.

Enumeration of the Unique Tenets

A number of Gelukba authors have written about the "unique tenets"; most of them comment only on the eight points identified by Dzongkaba,' who may have been the first to produce such a list. Translations of the relevant portions of two Gelukba works on philosophical tenets comprise the last two parts of this book. Those are Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets, published in 1699, and Janggya's Presentation of Tenets (grub mtha'i rnam bzhag), composed between 1736 and 1746. Jamyang Shayba's list, comprising eight pairs of tenets, is by far the
largest. The following is a collation of lists of the "unique tenets," beginning with the sixteen identified by Jamyang Shayba:

1. External objects (phyi don, bahyarthta) exist because they are not refuted by a conventional analytical awareness (tha snyad dpyod byed kyi blo).

2. A mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, alayavijnana) does not exist because it cannot be posited except through a search for an imputed object.

3. The selflessness of the person (gang zag gi bdag med, pudgalanairatmya) is as subtle as the selflessness of other phenomena (chos kyi bdag med, dharmanairatmya).

4. There are instances of conceptual, mental, directly perceiving consciousnesses (yid kyi mngon sum, manasa- pratyaksa) such as feelings (tshor ba, vedana).

5. Even common beings can have yogic directly perceiving consciousnesses (rnal 'byor mngon sum, yoga- pratyaksa).

6. One can directly realize the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths even before the path of preparation (sbyor lam, prayogamarga).

7. The three times-past, present, and future-are all functioning things (dngos po, bhava).

8. Disintegratedness (zhig pa, nasta)-a functioning thing's state of having ceased-is itself a functioning thing.

9. There are no autonomous syllogisms (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba, svatantra-prayoga).

10. There is no self-consciousness (rang rig, svasamvedana).

11. Pratyaksa refers principally to objects, not subjects.

12. True cessations ('gog bden, nirodha-satya) are both emptinesses (stong pa nyid, gunyata) and ultimate truths (don dam bden pa, paramartha-satya).

13. The terms "nirvana with remainder" (lhag bcas myang Was, sopadhigesa-nirvana) and "nirvana without remainder" (lhag med myang Was, nirupadhisesa-nirvana) refer to the presence or absence, respectively, of the appearance of true existence (bden yod, satya-sat) to a person (who has overcome all afflictive obstructions), depending on whether or not that person is out of or in meditative equipoise directly realizing emtiness.

14. One cannot begin to destroy the obstructions to omniscience (shes bya'i sgrib pa, jneyavarana) until one has destroyed all of the obstructions to liberation (nyon
15 In addition to afflictive ignorance, there is also nonafflictive ignorance (nyon mong can ma yin pa'i ma rig pa, aklegavidya?).

16 The extreme of permanence or eternalism is avoided through the appearance of conventional truths (kun rdzob bden pa, samvrtisatyay), and the extreme of annihilation is avoided through positing them as empty of inherent existence.

To these points we can add two from Dzongkaba's list in his Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance"

17 Hearers (nyan thos, gravaka) and Solitary Realizers (rang sang rgyas, pratyekabuddha) realize the selflessness of phenomena just as Bodhisattvas do.

18 The conception of a self of phenomena is an affliction (nyon mong, klega).

Also, we can add three points from Dzongkaba's Eight Great Difficult Points of (Nagarjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way":

19 Even conventionally, nothing exists inherently."

20 There is a unique way of positing the obstructions to omniscience and liberation.

21 There is a unique way to explain how a Buddha's omniscient awareness knows impure phenomena without itself being mistaken.

The eight tenets identified by Dzongkaba in the small latter work are numbers 1, 2, 9, 10, 17, 19, 20, and 21. He also identified eight topics in his Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" numbers 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17, and 18; this is the list used by Janggya.

Dzongkaba saw eight difficult topics (or twelve, if one wants to collate his two lists), but their enumeration seems to have been quite arbitrary. He himself found "limitless subtle distinctions." Indeed, since the basic viewpoint of the Prasangika School—that there is no inherent existence, even conventionally—is unique, it could be said that every assertion that is qualified in that way by a Prasangika is a unique tenet. Indeed, in many of the unique tenets it is this basic point that provides the means to distinguish the Prasangikas from others.

As noted earlier, most commentators have chosen to include only the eight points identified by Dzongkaba in his Illumination of the Thought. This is not the case with Jamyang Shayba, who has clearly been prodded into expansion of the list in reaction to the withering attack leveled against Dzongkaba by the fifteenth-century Sagya (sa skya) order scholar Daktsang Shaprap Rinchen (stag tshang shes rap rin chen, b. 1405), known as Daktsang the Translator (lo tsa ba). Daktsang (at...
least according to Jamyang Shayba) explicitly asserts the contraries of many of the points found on Jamyang Shayba's list, and can be construed, with a little work, to assert even more; thus Jamyang Shayba found many more topics, indeed, twice as many as Dzongkaba, to assemble under the rubric of "unique tenets." At least five of Jamyang Shayba's topics (1, 2, 5, 8, and 13) are connected with accusations he makes against Daktsang. In the introduction to the Madhyamika School section of the Great Exposition of Tenets, Jamyang Shayba ridicules Daktsang for asserting that actions produce effects without disintegrating, that nirvana without remainder is utterly without form (i.e., that one who possesses it has no body), that a mind-basis-of-all exists and external objects do not, and that those who are not Superiors ('phags pa, arya) cannot have yogic direct perception.63

Jamyang Shayba seems to have wished in his own list to reflect Dzongkaba's pioneering list of eight, so he referred to his own list as eight pairs of topics. It is clear, however, that the pairing of these topics was somewhat arbitrary, for Jamyang Shayba found it most sensible to discuss them in eleven sections. In the translation section, I have retained Jamyang Shayba's plan of organization rather than creating chapter headings for each of his topics because it is sometimes important to note what he has paired together.

In the first section of this book, several of these topics are examined in greater detail: the Prasangika School refutation of "mind-only" in the sense of no external objects (chapters 2 and 3); its refutation of self-consciousness (chapter 4); and its position on disintegratedness and the three times (chapter 5). It would have been a massive task, beyond the scope of this book, to have discussed every topic in such detail, and thus I have commented on the other topics in a briefer way in chapter 6 and through explanatory footnotes in the translations.

The topics treated in greater detail have been chosen because (1) they are important topics to which Janggya and Jamyang Shayba give much space, (2) they are topics that have not already been extensively discussed in Western sources, and (3) they are topics that illustrate the Gelukba principles of rejecting what requires ultimate analysis on the one hand and of preserving the conventions of the world on the other. As will be seen, the existence of external objects (the rejection of "mind-only") is upheld on the grounds that external objects are found in the conventions of the world and are not refuted by conventional analysis; self-consciousness is rejected because it falls outside of the conventions of the world and cannot be certified by conventional valid cognition; and disintegratedness is shown to be a convention of the world, upheld by conventional analysis, whereas all other solutions to the basic problem of the connection between karmic cause and effect would require the postulation of a metaphysical entity.

Topics that do not meet these criteria are discussed more briefly. For instance, I do not choose to discuss autonomous syllogisms, a very important topic in the debate between the Svaţantrika and Prasarrowika schools, both because Jamyang Shayba barely mentions the topic in this selection and because his treatment of the
Sources for the Unique Tenets

This book concerns itself principally with several, but by no means all, of the perspectives within the Gelukba order on Candrakirti's Prasangika-Madhyamika School. For the most part, it is not an exploration of the Indian antecedents to Tibetan Gelukba Prasangika philosophy except where the Gelukbas cite Indian sources. Nevertheless, many if not all of the pertinent comments of past masters such as Nagarjuna and Candrakirti are cited by Jamyang Shayba or Janggya (particularly the former), and in any case, the Indian sources tend to be few in number and terse in manner on the "unique tenets" with which we are concerned.

Nor is this book a presentation of the Prasangika School's philosophy of emptiness or its methods for gaining a realization of emptiness. That is unnecessary, for several recent works on the Prasangika School as defined in the Tibetan Gelukba tradition have already greatly enhanced our understanding of the Prasangika-Madhyamika School's definition of the object to be negated in the view of emptiness and the reasonings used to negate it. They include Jeffrey Hopkins's Meditation on Emptiness and Emptiness Yoga, Robert A. F. Thurman's translation of Dzongkaba's 'The Essence of the Good Explanations (entitled Tsongkhapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of Eloquence), Geshe Rabten and Stephen Batchelor's Echoes of Voidness, Elizabeth Napper's Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, and Guy Newland's The Two Truths (see the bibliography for references). The present book complements these outstanding works by exploring the application of the Prasangika School's principles to a number of persistently puzzling points in Buddhist philosophy.

Specifically, this book explores the views of several closely associated seventeenth- and eighteenth-century eastern Tibetan and Mongolian Gelukba scholars. Jamyang Shayba, Ngawang Belden (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797, also known as Belden Chojay [dpal Idan chos rje]), and several other authors whose works were consulted are associated with Gomang (sgo mang) College of Drebung ('bras spungs) Monastery outside of Hlasa (= Lhasa), and their presentation of the unique Prasarigika tenets contains some positions unique to Gomang, as can be seen in the notes to the translation. Although Janggya is not formally associated with any one of the colleges of the great Gelukba monasteries, he studied at several, including Gomang.

This exposition of the unique tenets of the Prasangika School cannot be equated with Nagarjuna's views, nor with those of Candrakirti, Dzongkaba, or even Drebung Monastery. However, the explanations of Jamyang Shayba, Janggya, and others, are careful, reasoned analyses that seem to me to have as much claim on the truth as do any other interpretations of Candrakirti; they cite his works copiously; and they rely heavily on the works of Dzongkaba. They are, in short,
close to the heart of the Gelukba understanding of Madhyamika and are worthy of study. They are, no doubt, not completely reliable, but the extent to which these Gelukbas have used, ignored, distorted, clarified, or extended their Indian and Tibetan antecedents is a large question that I am able to address only in a preliminary way as the material unfolds in subsequent chapters.

Jamyang Shayba's full name is Jamyang Shaybay Dorjay Ngawang Dzondrii; he was born in 1648 in lower Amdo (a *indo*, the easternmost region of Tibet (now in Qinghai Province of the People's Republic of China), in the area of Ganggya Dingring (*rgang gya'i lting ring*).65 A serious student, he became a novice monk in his teens, traveling to Hlasa at the age of 21 to enter the Gomang College of Drebung Monastery. At age 27 he became a fully ordained monk, and at 29 he entered the Tantric College of Lower Hlasa, Gyumay (*rgyud smad*). Among his teachers were the great Fifth Dalai Lama Losang Gyatso (*blo bzang rgya mtsho*) and the first of the line of reincarnating Janggya lamas, Ngawang Choden (*ngag dbang chos ldan*).

At the age of 33 he entered a two-year meditation retreat in a cave near Drebung, thereby attaining yogic powers (*dbang, siddhi*). He wrote prolifically for the rest of his life. Among the dozens of texts collected in the fifteen volumes of his "Collected Works" (*gsung 'butts*) are his famous monastic textbooks (*yig cha*) on the five "root" topics: Valid Cognition (*tshad ma, praniarta*);6b the Perfection of Wisdom; Madhyamika; Abhidharma (*chos mngon pa*); and Monastic Discipline (*'dul ba, vinaya*). His textbook on Madhyamika (a commentary on Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way (*dbu nta chen mo*, 442 folios in the Ngawang Gelek edition), has been frequently used in this study to elucidate points made in what is perhaps his greatest work, the Great Exposition of Tenets (*grub mtha' chen no*, 530 folios in the Drashikyil edition), a portion of which has been translated in the second part of this book.

The Great Exposition of Tenets is a commentary on Jamyang Shayba's own terse 16-folio verse treatise on tenets, which was written ten years earlier.67 The Great Exposition of Tenets was written at the request of Sanggyay Gyatso (*sangs rgyas rgya mtsho*), whom Jamyang Shayba tutored, and was published in 1699, a year before he became abbot of Gomang College, a position he held for seven years. The verse treatise, or "root text," is normally memorized by Gomang monks early in their studies, prior to the classes on the Perfection of Wisdom. The Great Exposition of Tenets itself is not the focus of any class, but rather is used as an encyclopedia of philosophy to which teachers and their students refer again and again as relevant topics arise in their major texts.

In 1709 Jamyang Shayba returned to Amdo, and in the following year he founded the Drashikyil (bkra shis 'khyil) Monastery, which grew into a major Gelukba center (and a tantric college was also established there in 1717). Its first abbot was Ngawang Drashi (*ngag dbang bkra shis*), who, using Jamyang Shayba's
writings, authored the "Collected Topics" (bsdus grwa) textbook still studied by those beginning the Gomang curriculum. Jamyang Shayba died at age seventy-three or four in 1721 or 1722.

Ngawang Belden, author of the Annotations for the "Great Exposition of Tenets," Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought, was a Mongolian, born in 1797, and is often referred to as "Belden Chojay of Urga" because his career centered around Urga (later called Ulanbator, the capital of Outer Mongolia). Most of his study took place in Mongolia, in the Drashi Chopel (bkra shis chos 'phel) College of Ganden (dga' ldan) Monastery in Urga. In his fortieth year, he became the Chojay (chos rje, a rank just beneath that of abbot [mkhan po] of Urga. He visited Tibet at least once, but spent most of his latter years in China and Mongolia. In addition to his Annotations on the Great Exposition of Tenets, he is well known for his books setting forth the paths of the four tantra sets, setting forth the differences between the Gomang and Loseling Colleges of Drebung Monastery on the Prasahgika School and the Perfection of Wisdom, and setting forth the teachings on the two truths in the four systems of tenets. Ngawang Belden's Annotations, which is even longer than Jamyang Shayba's massive text, sheds a great deal of light and a little heat, since he sometimes is critical of Jamyang Shayba's conclusions on topics that Jamyang Shayba does not always make clear.

Janggya Rolbay Dorjay, the author of the Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets, Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching, is the second of the line of Janggya reincarnate lamas (sprul sku)." He was born in 1717 in the Amdo region of Tibet, but spent little of his life in Tibet. Recognized as the reincarnation of the former Janggya at the age of three (with the assistance of the aged Jamyang Shaybay Dorjay), he was taken to the Janggya monastery, Gonlung Jambaling, but stayed there only a few years before being taken to Beijing.

There he became friends with a fellow schoolmate who would later become the Ch'ienlung Emperor, who in 1736, having ascended the throne, appointed Janggya the lama of the seal, the highest position for a Tibetan lama in the Chinese court. Janggya at the time was only nineteen years old and had just the previous year received the full ordination of a monk.

The Emperor asked Janggya to organize and carry out the translation of the Indian commentaries (bstan 'gyur) in the Tibetan canon into Mongolian; he began by compiling an extensive Tibetan-Mongolian glossary in the remarkably brief time of one year (helped presumably by many scholars) and accomplished the translation by the end of seven years. With the Emperor, Janggya established the monastery of Ganden Jinchaling (dga' Idan byin chags gling) in Beijing, a teaching monastery like those of Tibet, which later became known as the "Lama Temple."

Janggya had many eminent teachers, including Losang Denbay Nyima (head of the Gelukba order) and the Seventh Dalai Lama; he in turn had many eminent
students, including Gönchok Jikmay Wangbo, the second Jamyang Shayba, and Tugen Losang Chogyi Nyima, who became his biographer. Janggya gave many teachings and initiations to thousands of people, including the Emperor, who when receiving initiation performed the required prostrations, etc., to Janggya. His final great work was to oversee the translation of the Buddha-word (bka’ ’gyur) portion of the Tibetan canon into Manchu. He died in 1786.

As has been indicated, the relations between these authors are close and complex. Jamyang Shayba Ngawang Dzondrii, the first of a lineage of Jamyang Shayba lamas, was tutored in tantric studies by Janggya Ngawang Choden (lcang skya ngag dbang chos Idan), the first Janggya; the second Jamyang Shayba, Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo (1728-91), and third Tiigen, Losang Chogyi Nyima (1737-1802), were students of the second Janggya, Rolbay Dorjay. Gungtang Denbay Dronmay, whose work clarifies a number of points involved in the Madhyamika School critique of the philosophy of the Cittamatra School, was a disciple of Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo. There is an "eastern" flavor to this circle, as it centers around Drashikyil Monastery (founded by Jamyang Shayba) and Gonlung Jambaling Monastery (Janggya's home monastery) in Amdo and because the group contains several Mongolians—the Janggyas and Ngawang Belden.

Thus, there is a certain unity in the translated works upon which this presentation of the "unique tenets" relies. However, there are significant differences in style, and some in content. Janggya does not go into nearly the same degree of detail as does Jamyang Shayba, nor does he pepper his text with hypothetical debates; on the other hand, he is relatively clear and straightforward and often goes more deeply into issues than does Jamyang Shayba, who is sometimes content merely to cite Indian sources without elaboration. He sometimes disagrees with Jamyang Shayba, though not by name. Jamyang Shayba, on the other hand, does not always express his point clearly and occasionally omits details that would be helpful; in those instances, the annotations of Ngawang Belden are indispensable. The annotations are frequently many times as long as an entire section of a chapter in Jamyang Shayba's work, and sometimes put the annotator at odds with his subject. However, when Ngawang Belden disagrees with Jamyang Shayba, which is not infrequent, he does not distort Jamyang Shayba's points in order to make his own.

In addition to the selections translated in parts two and three, I have also made frequent recourse, in the introductory chapters and in the notes to the translations, to Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (his massive commentary on Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way), to Losang Gonchok's Word Commentary on the Root Text of "Tenets" (a compact summary of the Great Exposition of Tenets), and the slim but pithy Precious Garland of Tenets by Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo, the second Jamyang Shayba. These works are, as might be expected, useful supplements that do not depart in any significant way from the material in the translations. I received some further clarification of Gomang College traditions by addressing questions to Gomang's Geshay Tupden Gyatso. By
way of contrast, I have attempted to point out those arguments and textual interpretations with which Gelukba scholars from other monasteries or monastic colleges would disagree and to present their positions in the notes. For this purpose, it has been very helpful to study the translated texts with several non-Gomang College scholars, principally those of Gomang's surviving rival college within Drebung monastery, Loseling (blo gsal gling) College. Due to their physical and intellectual proximity to Gomang the Loseling scholars tend to be familiar with the issues that divide the two schools. The illuminating commentary of Loseling's Kensur Yeshey Tupden and Geshay Belden Drakba, and the answers of Sera (se ra) Monastery's Geshay Sonam Rinchen and Ganden (dga' ldan) Monastery's Geshay Gonchok Tsayring to my specific questions, have provided other angles to issues raised by Jamyang Shayba, et al.

Also, a thought-provoking contrast to this Gelukba explanation of Candrakirti's system is included by way of the many references to the counter-arguments of Daktsang the Translator, who wrote his own book on the tenets of Indian Buddhism and whose criticisms of Dzongkaba served as a major source of Jamyang Shayba's inspiration for his Great Exposition of Tenets. Reading Daktsang is a reminder that Candrakirti's works are sufficiently ambiguous on numerous points to permit a variety of interpretations and forces us to consider the way in which Dzongkaba, Jamyang Shayba, Ngawang Belden, Janggya, and others marshal the evidence for their interpretations.

In conclusion, let us raise a question related to the use of these specific sources for an exploration of the unique tenets of the Prasar gika School: if the "unique tenets" at least nominally stem from the work of Nagarjuna, the founder of the Madhyamika School, what purpose is there in studying the opinions of Tibetans sixteen centuries or more removed from him? We might answer that in the first place, certainly it is not necessary to justify the study of Gelukba monastic literature on the basis of its value for understanding Indian Buddhism, for it is surely also important to understand Tibetan Buddhism on its own terms. Even if it could be shown that the Gelukbas have totally misunderstood the philosophy of the Indian Madhyamika School, the Tibetan Madhyamika School is itself a worthy subject for investigation. These works of Tibetan scholars of the Madhyamika School draw us into a world of thought that has considerable coherence and subtlety and may be appreciated on that level alone.

However, I believe that it can be shown that works such as Janggya's Presentation of Tenets, Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets, and Ngawang Belden's Annotations to the latter are valuable for the study of the Indian Madhyamika School in that they suggest definite, concrete avenues of interpretation for the typically terse, difficult Sanskrit texts of Nagarjuna, Candrakirti, etc., and because they extend the arguments made by those Indian masters. A study of the unique tenets based on Nagarjuna alone would be slim, for as we shall see, the statements of Nagarjuna cited by the Gelukbas are few in number and tend to be pointers rather than maps. The Tibetan authors are careful
scholars who liberally cite both the seminal Indian sources and the exegeses of Dzongkaba and his closest disciples, providing an anthology of Prasangika literature interspersed with their own commentaries and hypothetical objections and replies. They provide a rich medium for the exploration of some of Buddhism's most controversial doctrinal questions.
Candrakirti's Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way," the well from which Gelukbas draw their understanding of Nagarjuna's Madhyamika School, is the principal Indian source for Jamyang Shayba's criticism of the philosophy of Cittamatra in the Great Exposition of Tenets.' Candrakirti is generally regarded by Tibetan scholars as the founder of the Prasangika-Madhyamika School; ironically, Jamyang Shayba diverges, as he identifies its founder as Buddhapalita (fifth century), whom Candrakirti defended against the criticisms of Bhavaviveka (sixth century, considered the founder of the Svatantrika-Madhyamika School). Jamyang Shayba clearly intends no slight to Candrakirti, but rather sees himself as merely following the lead of Dzongkaba, who calls Buddhapalita the "revealer" of the Prasangika path.'

The seventeenth-century Buddhist historian Taranatha tells us that Candrakirti had extensive experience debating against Cittamatra. As a pandita of the monastic university of Nalanda, he is said to have engaged in a seven-year-long debate with Candragomin (zla ba dge bsnyen), who followed the views of Asartga and would therefore be regarded as a Cittamatrik Following Scripture. (Regrettably, none of Candragomin's Cittamatra writings are extant, though he wrote copiously on many topics.) Apparently the debate went miserably for Candrakirti despite his renown for brilliant disputation, for Taranatha tells us that spectators were heard to declare, "Nagarjuna's doctrine is medicine for some, poison for others, but Asanga's is nectar for all." Candrakirti was quite bewildered by Candragomin's unexpected prowess until one night he followed Candragomin, and discovered that each night his adversary was receiving coaching from a statue of Avalokitegara, the Bodhisattva who personifies compassion; when he saw this, he conceded the debate, judging that it was folly to continue against such competition.

This story of Candrakirti's defeat at the hands of Candragomin is perhaps entirely apocryphal (Taranatha was an important figure of the Jo-nang-ba [Jo nang pa] sect, which was often accused by members of other Tibetan sects of being a Tibetan version of Cittamatra) However, Nalanda was apparently the sort of place where Buddhist scholars of all stripes lived side by side and where there developed the distinctive style of monastic debate still practiced daily in the monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism. Whatever its historicity, the story points to an active competition in an arena of ideas between proponents of the Cittamatra and Madhyamika viewpoints (whatever was the degree of actual self-identification
Prasangika authors have criticized several positions identified with the Cittamatra School, such as its assertion of a mind-basis-of-all, self-consciousness, and three distinct vehicles for liberation. However, Candrakirti was most concerned with what he saw as the core assertion of Cittamatra Buddhism, that there are no external objects. Basically, Gelukbas interpret "no external objects" to mean that there are no objects of mind that are different substantial entities from the minds that apprehend them. Roughly, but perhaps more evocatively, then, "mind-only" means that an object arises only along with a particular consciousness, not prior to it, and that objects therefore are inseparably related with the minds that observe them. The present chapter concerns the Cittamatra presentation of this tenet and Prasangika responses to it as it is addressed in the seminal works of Indian Buddhists such as Asanga, Vasubandhu, and Candrakirti; the following chapter will explore the works of Gelukba scholars such as Jamyang Shayba and Janggya.

The Cittamatra "School"

According to the Gelukba reckoning, the seminal writings of the Cittamatra School were composed last of the four major Indian Buddhist schools of tenets. This is not a fact that is particularly important to them because they assume that the sutras upon which the Cittamatrins relied are authentic, genuine utterances of the Buddha. It is relevant only because of the possibility mentioned by Dzongkaba that a major purpose for Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way was to refute Cittamatra misunderstandings of Nagarjuna's teachings.

Mahayana tradition explains that the philosophical systems required "openers of a chariot-way" (shing rta srol 'byed) because those sutras upon which they rely remained hidden from view and from widespread practice for an extensive period. Janggya explains that in the first centuries following the passing (parinirvana, complete passage beyond sorrow) of the Buddha, only a few humans openly held the positions of the Mahayana; fortunately, many of the Mahayana scriptures were solicited by gods and divine serpents (naga) and eventually came to be found in those places. Then, as the Buddha had prophesied, the south Indian Buddhist monk Nagarjuna brought the scriptures up from the depths of the ocean where the serpents lived and disseminated them. Most Western scholars consider the Perfection of Wisdom sutras and Cittamatra sutras to have been fabricated by Mahayana monks in the early centuries of the Common Era.

The Cittamatrins are also called Yogacarins (rnal 'byor spyod pa; "Practitioners of Yoga"), Vijnanavadins (rnam shes smra ba; "Proponents of Knowledge"), or Vijnaptivadins (rnam rig smra ba; "Proponents of Knowledge-Only"). Asanga (c. 31090) is almost universally held to be the founder of the school, and he and his
half-brother Vasubandhu (320-400)" wrote most of the foundational literature of Cittamatra, setting forth its unique doctrines.'2 Ironically, Gelukbas say that although Asanga did indeed found the Cittamatra system, since it was he who set forth Cittamatra as a separate system, his own final view was that of the Prasangika School, as can be seen from the way in which he commented on several sutras in his Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana. "13

Little can be said with certainty about the careers of Asariga and Vasubandhu. Asahga lived in the late third and early fourth century." According to Taranatha,15 Asanga had a prodigious command of the Three Baskets of the Hinayana canon and many Mahayana sutras as well, being able to memorize 100,000 verses per year. But because he had difficulty understanding the Perfection of Wisdom scriptures, he took up a practice in which he meditated on Maitreya, hoping for enhancement of his capacity for comprehension. He meditated for twelve years in the hopes of seeing a sign from Maitreya. Every three years, on the verge of abandoning his quest, he saw something that inspired him to renew his effort: the slow but steady wearing away of a mountain due to its being brushed by the wings of birds; stones that were being worn away by drips of water; and an old man making needles by rubbing ingots of iron with a soft cotton cloth. However, in the twelfth year, discouraged again, he left his cave. He encountered a dog on the road, infested with worms and crying out in pain. Moved by the dog's suffering, he resolved to remove its worms; but not wanting to hurt the worms, he cut off a strip of his own flesh to which to transfer them. At that moment, the dog was transformed into Maitreya, who took Asanga to his abode, Tusita heaven, where he taught Asanga his five great treatises.16

Among Asarnga's Cittamatra works translated into Tibetan are:

Compendium of the Mahayana (theg pa chen po bsdus pa, mahayanamasgraha)

Compendium of Ascertainments (rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdus ba, viniscayasamgrahani, sometimes called nirnaya-samgraha)

Explanation of (Maitreya's)" "Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana"(theg pa chen po'i rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa, mahayanottaratantragastravyakhyya or ratnagotravibhagavyakhyana)

Explanation of the "Sutra Unraveling the Thought" (dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa, samdhi-nirmocanabhasya)18

Of these, the Compendium of the Mahayana is a particularly important source for those positions identified by Gelukbas as Cittamatra.

Vasubandhu19 was Asanga's younger half-brother, born the year after Asanga's
ordination as a monk. He too became a monk and studied at Nalanda. But while Asanga meditated in his cave, Vasubandhu trekked to Kashmir to master the texts of abhidharma (chos mngon pa). Later, Asanga converted him to the Mahayana by having two monks recite first the Teachings of Akshayamati (blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa'i mdo, aksayamatinirdesa-sutra) and then the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (sa bcu pa'i mdo, dasabhumika-sutra). Among Vasubandhu's Cittamatra works are:

Twelve Stanzas (nyi shu pa'i le'ur byas pa, vimsikakarika, with his own commentary, nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa, vimsi- kavrtti)

Thirty Stanzas (sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, trimgika- karika)

Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes" (dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa' 'grel pa, madhyantavibhagatika)

Commentary on (Asanga's) "Compendium of the Mahayana"(theg pa chen po bsdus pa'i 'grel pa, mahayanasamgraha- habhasya).

Of these, the Twelve Stanzas is particularly important.

These works by Asanga and Vasubandhu are, in turn, largely dependent upon a small number of second- or thirdcentury sutras expounding Cittamatra doctrine:

Sutra Unraveling the Thought (dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo, samdhinirmocanasutra)

Sutra on the Ten Grounds (dagabhumikasutra, sa bcu pa'i mdo, part of the Buddha Garland Sutra [sangs rgyas phal po che'i mdo, buddhavatamsakasutra])

Descent to Lanka Sutra (lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo, lartkavata- rasutra)

Mahayana Abhidharma Sutra (theg chen chos ngon pa'i mdo, mahaydnabhidsromasutra)

The Sutra Unraveling the Thought is Asanga's principal source. The Mahayana Abhidharma Sutra seems also to have been important. It is no longer extant, but on the basis of its remaining fragments (such as those cited by Asanga) it seems to have contained the basic ideas of the Cittamatra system. The Gelukba roster of later Cittamatra thinkers includes Dharmakirti, Sthiramati, Dharmapala, and Asvabhava; however, since, on the particular issue of mind-only, the earlier works of Vasubandhu and Asanga are those to which Candrakirti seems to respond and are those on which Tibetan Prasangikas focus, we need not be concerned with them here.
Before outlining the specific aspects of Cittamatra philosophy to which the Prasangnikas reacted so robustly, let us put it in perspective by reflecting that it was perhaps inevitable that "mind-only" idealism would arise in Buddhism, which must itself broadly be considered an idealism due to its emphasis on the primacy of mind. Idealism is a perennial philosophy that regards with skepticism the data of the senses, perhaps arising in reflection on ordinary human experience such as mirages, optical illusions, solar phenomena, hallucinations, visionary experiences, and vivid dreams; the latter, particularly, throw doubt on the reality of all of waking life. An apt illustration, though not Buddhist, is found in the well-known story about the Daoist master Zhuang-zi:

Once Chuang Chou dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn't know he was Chuang Chou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable Chuang Chou. But he didn't know if he was Chuang Chou who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Chuang Chou.

In very broad strokes, all Buddhists are idealists because they believe, in H. B. Acton's words, that "mind and spiritual values are fundamental in the world as a whole," and secondly, they oppose the view that mind is derived from or reducible to material processes. The first aspect of the idealistic outlook, the primacy of mind over matter, is affirmed in the basic Buddhist notion that the mind is the source of cyclic existence ('khor ba, samsdra), the round of rebirth in various forms of existence brought about by actions (las, karma) contaminated by ignorance (ma rig pa, avidya). In the Sarnyutta-Nikaya\textsuperscript{2b} the Buddha says:

The world is led by mind and drawn along by mind. All phenomena are controlled by one phenomenon, mind.

Similarly, Candrakirti, commenting on the Sutra on the Ten Grounds in his Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.84), says:

The Bodhisattva of the Manifest [sixth ground]... realizes that the creator is only mind.

Stripped of its reference to the Bodhisattva grounds (a concept present only in Mahayana Buddhism), this naming of mind as the creator of the world could be accepted by Buddhists of all persuasions. Specifically, Buddhists consider the ignorant mind (ma rig pa, avidya), the misconception of self, to be the root from which cyclic existence issues.

The second aspect of the idealistic outlook, the insistence that the mind cannot be reduced to physical processes, is also a fundamental principle of Buddhist doctrine. For instance, if the mind were not distinct from the body, reincarnation would not be possible, for the continuum of mind and the vitality of the body would cease in concert. Also, there could be no Formless Realm (gzugs med
khams, arupya-dhatu)-in which there are no physical processes, since all the beings there have a disembodied existence-as specified in Buddhist cosmology.

In addition to being idealists in the broadest sense, all Mahayana doctrinalists are anti-realists insofar as they deny that forms exist independently of being perceived. In general, Buddhists speak of the very existence of phenomena in terms of mind: one definition of "existent" is, in fact, "that which is observed by valid cognition" (tshad mas dmigs pa, pramanalambana).

The philosophy of Cittamatra is sometimes called Buddhist Idealism, which in the light of the preceding discussion should be understood to indicate that it is the most idealistic form of Buddhist thought. Although all Buddhists emphasize the primacy of mind and resist its reduction to physical processes, most stop short of rejecting the validity of perceptions that affirm an external world. Interpreters agree that the Cittamatra School, on the other hand, at the very least denies that one can directly apprehend an external object (an object that is a separate entity from the mind that apprehends it); moreover, the Tibetan tradition, and the greater part of the Indian tradition, has understood the Cittamatra School to deny the very existence of any external object.

Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo, the second Jamyang Shayba, defines a Cittamatrín as:

a person propounding Buddhist tenets who asserts the true existence (bden grub, satyasat) of dependent natures (gzhan dbang, paratantra) but does not assert external objects (phyi don, bahyartha).

This definition brings out two crucial aspects of Cittamatra thought as it is understood by Gelukba interpreters: (1) the assumption that if impermanent things exist at all, they must exist by way of their own character, i.e., truly or ultimately, and (2) that they do not exist as objects that are a separate entity from the awarenesses that apprehend them, though that is how they appear.

With regard to the first of these aspects, the conception of "true existence" refers to the conception that a phenomenon does not merely exist in dependence on being imputed by terms and thought, but rather exists by way of its own nature (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa, svarupa-siddhi) and is analytically findable among its bases of designation, such as its parts. For instance, to conceive of a chair as truly existent is to conceive that the chair exists in its own right either as its back, seat, and legs, or as the collection of these parts, or apart from them. That is, one would expect to be able to point to the chair either as being one or more of those parts, the collection of them, or as a thing apart from them, not having to settle for a chair that is a mere nominal designation. Cittamatrins are said to feel that what they call dependent natures (gzhan dbang, paratantra; literally, "other-powered")-the appearances of objects that arise from causes and conditions-and thoroughly established natures (yongs grub, parinispanna)-the absence, in those
dependent natures, of a difference in entity from the awarenesses apprehending them—must truly exist, or they would not exist at all.

However, according to Gelukba scholars, the term "true existence" has a slightly different meaning for Prasangikas than for Cittamatrins. For the Cittamatra School, existent imputational natures (rnam grags pa’i kun btags, parikalpita) are not truly existent. These phenomena include space and cessations (’gog pa, nirodha)—mere negatives or absences such as emptiness or the cessation of an affliction (nyon mongs, klega) upon its destruction. Space and cessations exist, but they must be imputed in dependence on terms and thought. They do not exist from their own side, but rather must be posited by the negation of another phenomenon. Still other imputational natures, such as a phenomenon's difference in entity from the awareness that apprehends it (i.e., a phenomenon's being an external object), lack true existence for Cittamatrins because they do not exist at all. Because of these problems, Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo has deliberately excluded imputational natures by specifying, in his definition of Cittamatrins, that they assert the true existence of dependent natures.

Gelukbas attempt to become even more precise: they say that according to Cittamatrins, existent imputational natures have inherent existence (rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhava-siddhi) and existence in their own right (rang ngos nas grub pa, svarupa-siddhi) but do not have true existence, existence by way of their own nature (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa, svalaksana-siddhi), or ultimate existence (don dam par grub pa, paramartha-siddhi). All phenomena are inherently existent, etc.; but because phenomena such as space are only imputedly existent, they are not also truly existent, etc. Therefore, "true existence" may be summed up as meaning that which exists from its own side and is not merely imputed. For Prasarigikas, on the other hand, all of these terms are equivalent, equally implying an object that can be found upon analysis.

All phenomena have dependent, thoroughly established, and imputational natures: impermanent phenomena are themselves dependent natures because they depend on causes and conditions; they are falsely imagined to be different entities from the awarenesses that apprehend them; and their emptiness of such an imputational nature is thoroughly established. Hence, that dependent natures are truly existent does not mean that they necessarily exist the way they appear to ordinary beings, for they appear to be external objects; thus, although these phenomena truly exist, they do not truly exist as external objects. They are falsities that truly exist.

With regard to the second aspect of Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo's definition, there are numerous statements in the sutras on which the Cittamatra School relies to suggest that external objects—objects separate from, i.e., a different entity from, the consciousnesses apprehending them—do not exist. The Sutra on the "Ten Grounds is the source of perhaps the most famous statement:35
[The Bodhisattva] thinks as follows, "What belongs to the triple world, that is (of) mere mind. The Subhasitasamgraha quotes as follows: "This triple world is mind-only."

The Descent to Lanka Sutra says:

Through relying on mind-only
One does not conceive of external objects.
Abiding in correct observation
One passes beyond mind-only as well.

and :31

[Objects] do not appear as external objects as perceived.
The mind appears as various [objects through the power of predispositions].

[Because the mind is generated] in the likeness of bodies [senses], enjoyments [objects of senses], and abodes [physical sense organs and environments],

I have explained [that all phenomena are] mind-only.

In interpreting these passages, Gelukbas take "mind-only" to mean that although minds and their objects, such as a visual consciousness and a visible object, seem to us to be unconnected entities, they are actually one inseparable entity. Minds and appearances arise simultaneously from a single cause, the ripening of a predisposition (bag chags, vasana)38 established by a previous action (las, karma). Actions are themselves primarily the mental factor of intention (sems pa, cetana). All appearances of objects are caused by these karmic predispositions that are contained within a neutral, continuously operating consciousness called the mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, alayavijriana). A single potency in this consciousness simultaneously causes both the appearance of an object and a consciousness apprehending it; hence, an apprehended object such as an orange and its apprehending subject such as an eye consciousness are simultaneous and are said to be a single substantial entity within being conceptually diverse. In other words, they occur inseparably. As Janggya says:

Although there are no external objects, on account of latencies for the perception of external objects having been infused [and subsequently ripening in the mind-basis-of-all], there occur knowledges [i.e., phenomena] that are perceived as [external] objects.
According to Gelukba scholars, the Cittamatra School regards external objects to be not only not ultimately existent, but not even conventionally existent, for although the world believes in them, they cannot be established by a valid conventional awareness. On the other hand, Cittamatra accepts objects that are one entity with the minds that apprehend them and can be certified by conventional valid cognition. Thus, even though Cittamatra rejects utterly the existence of external objects, it accepts the existence of objects other than mind. In other words, "mind-only" is not an absolute idealism in which only mind exists.

According to the Gelukba exegesis of Dharmakirti on mind-only, that objects are "one entity with mind" means that the two must arise concomitantly and must be observed together. Thus, objects cannot be considered "external objects," even though it is not the case that, for instance, the objects of the senses such as sights, sounds, and odors are contained within the mind-body aggregates (phung po, skandha) of the person apprehending them. Objects and subjects are different, but not different entities. Because there are no external objects acting as conditions for consciousnesses, Cittamatrins do not explain, as other Buddhists do, sense experience on the basis of the coming together of three conditions—an empowering condition (bdag rkyen, adhipatipratyaya) such as an eye sensepower, an immediately preceding condition (de nia thag rkyen, samanantarapratyaya) such as a previous moment of consciousness, and an observed-object condition (dmigs rkyen, alambanapratyaya) such as an external object. In other versions of the working of karma, it can be said that other beings and the environment itself can set up the conditions under which one's karmic potentials can ripen; in the Cittamatra scheme, since there are no external objects appearing to consciousness, it can only be the fruition of one's own karma and one's reactions to those events that determine the chain of latency-generated appearances that is one's stream of experience.

Although the Cittamatra school maintains that there are no external objects, that is usually the way that objects appear to ordinary beings and are conceived by them to exist. The assent to the appearance of subject-object duality is extremely important, for the Cittamatra system considers it to be a type of ignorance that prevents the attainment of omniscience and Buddhahood. The realization of the emptiness (stung pa nyid, sunyata) of subject and object being different entities is the wisdom (ye shes, jnana) that overcomes the obstructions to omniscience, i.e., achieves Buddhahood.

Some modern interpreters have suggested that although Asanga and Vasubandhu deny the theories of realists such as the Vaibhasikas, they do not actually deny the existence of external objects. They raise the possibility that Vasubandhu and other Cittamatrins assert only that external objects cannot appear directly to the mind; the mind instead processes mere representations of those phenomena, with those representations being the same entity as the mind. In other words, the philosophy of mind-only can be considered as merely an epistemological rather than ontological judgement. This is a case difficult to prove
and which depends on the unlikely possibility that (1) Asanga and Vasubandhu have been consistently misinterpreted throughout subsequent Buddhist doctrinal history' and (2) that they themselves did not see that in order to avoid misunderstanding it was necessary to clarify the sutras they cite that seem so clearly to indicate a denial of external objects. Actually, not only Buddhists, but the Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsaka, Jain, and other schools` understood the Cittamatra position to be a rejection of external objects.

Often the evidence of the revisionists seems rather thin. Anacker45 cites one passage in Vasubandhu's Commentary on (Asariga's) "Compendium of the Mahayana," in which he refers to the causes of a visual consciousness, to show that Vasubandhu asserts that there are forms separate from consciousness: "An eye consciousness occurs in dependence on an eye and a form together with the mind-basis-of-all." However, this statement does not seem to preclude the possibility that the eye and form are one entity with the eye consciousness. To give another example, Kochumuttom96 argues that Vasubandhu's position is that there are external objects, even though only "forms of consciousness" (rnam rig pa, vijriana) appear to minds. He gives the example of mistaking a coiled rope for a snake. The problem with this example, if this is indeed his model, is that mistaking a rope for a snake can be explained simply as a matter of mixing something from the side of consciousness with what exists outside, so that a speckled, coiled form is imbued with the additional attributes of animation and danger. This is far short of a "form of consciousness." If "mind-only" means nothing more than acknowledging that in an act of cognition there is a subjective element as well as an objective one, then it is hardly worthy of being called a distinct tenet system.

Rather, the best evidence, it seems to me, is that some Cittamatra arguments against external objects are so poor that it is difficult to believe that the Cittamatra philosophers themselves found them convincing. For instance, it does seem odd that if Cittamatra thinkers actually disbelieved the existence of external objects that they refuted only the possibility of partless particles, not those with parts, leaving open the possibility that they were refuting only external objects as defined by the Sautrantikas and Vaibhasikas, not external objects in general. (On the other hand, since Gelukbas consider Asanga to have been a Prasangika, it is not the case that he had to be convinced by his own Cittamatra arguments!)

Whether or not it is reasonable to read some Cittamatra texts as not denying external objects, the subsequent Indian and Tibetan traditions alike have accepted no-external-objects as the Cittamatra School's final position. Since we are mainly concerned with the Prasangika refutation of what is taken to be the Cittamatra position, the outcome of the modern investigation of Cittamatra, though interesting, is not relevant here. Also, it may not ever be possible to determine precisely what Asariga and Vasubandhu meant or even that they composed the works attributed to them.

In any case, the idealism of Cittamatra must be distinguished from an absolute
idealism in which only one mind exists, for Vasubandhu, in particular, makes it clear that there are a plurality of subjects. Nor is it an immaterialism, holding that only minds exist, for the objects of consciousness are not themselves called mind, but form, etc., albeit form that is one entity with mind. Jamyang Shayba is very critical of Daktsang the Translator for what he sees as the latter's misinterpretation of Cittamatra by equating mind and its objects:

Daktsang's saying that all phenomena are mind is also incorrect. It is the sign of a very coarse awareness that is the system of analysis of a fool. It is as follows: Then it [absurdly] follows that all faults and good qualities are one because when all faults and good qualities appear to one consciousness that one consciousness must be all faults and good qualities. If that is accepted, the two, cyclic existence and nirvana, would [absurdly] be one. Furthermore, there are many faults such as that one would eat consciousness and drink consciousness.

A Cittamatrin might say, for instance, that a table and the mind apprehending it may not be different entities, but they are not identical; neither is the other. Similarly, a table and the space it occupies are one entity, but no one would claim that the space is the table or that the table is the space.

According to Gelukba scholars, Prasarigikas do not refute all of the Cittamatra positions, although those they accept are sometimes creatively adapted. For instance, it is said that Prasarigikas do refute the true existence of any phenomenon and the non-existence of external objects, but they do not deny that subject-object dualism is transcended in the experience of the direct realization of emptiness by an exalted wisdom consciousness, for they do not wish to deny that one's experience of directly realizing emptiness is as if the mind and emptiness are fused, like fresh water poured into fresh water. They merely resist the conclusion that the experience of fusion means that the mind and emptiness are the same. The Prasarigikas also do not deny that phenomena have the three natures. As Janggya says:

The presentation of the three characters [i.e., natures] in our own Prasangika system is: those conventionalities that are the substrata [of emptiness] just like those appearing [to our minds now] are posited as other-powered [or dependent] natures; factors of superimposition that are their own objective mode of subsistence or mode of disposition are posited as imputational natures; and the factors of the emptiness of such superimpositions are posited as thoroughly established natures.

Thus, for Prasarigikas, a dependent nature is a conventional truth (conventional truths comprising all existents other than emptinesses); the inherent existence conceived with respect to a dependent nature is a non-existent imputational nature; and a thoroughly established nature is the emptiness of inherent existence of any phenomenon. In other words, like the Citta matrins, they explain that in
terms of a dependent nature, its thoroughly established nature is its emptiness of an imputational nature. For example, for a table, its dependent nature is the table itself; its thoroughly established nature is the table's emptiness of inherent existence; and the opposite of that, the inherent existence of table, is its imputational nature, i.e., the nature that does not exist despite the fact that ignorance imputes it to the table.

Indian Sources for the Mind-Only Controversy

Let us turn now to the specific issue of the Cittamatra refutation of external objects and the Prasargika rebuttal of their positions. In their citation of Indian sources for the debate, Jamyang Shayba and Janggya draw almost exclusively upon the works of Asariga and Vasubandhu for the Cittamatra view and upon the sixth chapter of Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way for the Prasarigika critique. Although we are principally concerned with the Tibetan exposition of the arguments, before exploring the full range of the arguments set forth by the two Tibetan philosophers let us briefly review what is propounded in the seminal works of the great Indian Buddhists.

The principal arguments made by Cittamatra thinkers in their denial of the existence of external objects are set forth in Asariga's Compendium of the Mahayana (which in turn cites the Mahayana Abhidharma Sutra) and in Vasubandhu's Twenty Stanzas.

Asariga's principal treatment of external objects is in the second chapter of the Compendium of the Mahayana." The following is a list of his arguments, which will be examined in more detail in the next chapter:

1. External objects are not needed for the production of consciousness, since in a dream (or magical emanation, or mirage, or optical illusion) we perceive objects without there having been any actual objects. Waking and dreaming are different mainly because upon waking we realize that our dream-objects do not exist, whereas an ordinary person has no break from the delusion that the objects of waking life exist as they appear (11.6).

2. Buddha said in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds that all phenomena are mind-only and explained this further to Maitreya in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought (II.7).

3. Objects, such as a blue totality (kasina) or the appearance of a skeleton-covered area, perceived by yogis who have achieved special meditative states, are not external objects that have been recalled through memory, but rather are just internal images. Hence, consciousness can occur without external objects (11.8, 11.14.-2).

4. Hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods see one thing-a running stream-
as blood and pus, as an abode, as water, and as nectar, respectively. Since it would be impossible for a single external object to have many natures, there must be no external object (11.14.1).

5. One can observe past objects, future objects, dreamobjects, or reflections even though those are not external objects: (11.14.2).

6. If external objects existed as they appear, one could correctly know suchness without effort. Therefore they must not exist as they appear (11.14.3).

7. Bodhisattvas who have gained meditative power in a concentration cause things to appear through the power of their belief. Yogis who have obtained calm abiding (zhi gnas, gamatha) and special insight (lhag mthong, vipagya) can, with effort, see things such as subtle impermanence when they take them to mind (11.14.4).

8. No external objects appear to one who has attained a non-conceptual exalted wisdom consciousness (11.14.4).

In his approach to the existence of external objects in the Twenty Stanzas, Vasubandhu is primarily concerned with two points: showing that external objects are not necessary to explain the production of consciousness; and refuting the existence of the types of objects posited by the Hinayana schools. The following is a summary of his arguments:

1. External objects are not needed for the production of consciousness, since they are generated even in the absence of external objects, such as when someone with amblyopia (an eye condition diminishing sight) sees non-existent "hairs" or when someone (with crossed eyes) sees a "double-moon" (verse 1).

2. External objects are not needed for the production of consciousness in the instance of a dream, where non-existent objects appear to the mind. Dream-objects can even be consistent with respect to time and place, just like "external" objects (verses 3, 16).

3. It makes as much sense to consider the guards, etc., of the hells as projections of consciousness rather than external reality as it does to claim that they are not sentient beings but rather are appearances of external elements generated by the karma of beings born in the hells (verses 4-7).

4. There could be no external objects composed of directionally partless particles (rdul phra rab cha med, paramanu) because either a particle touches other particles, in which case it has different parts where the other particles touch it, or else all the particles surrounding the particle touch the same place on it, in which case there could be only one particle (verse 12).

5. If there were partless particles, there could be no gross objects composed of
them because the aggregation of those particles would necessitate their having parts. On the other hand, if the partless particles did aggregate, there could be just one "part." Hence, the earth could be covered in a single stride, etc. (verses 13-15).

The arguments made by Vasubandhu and Asarlga are in many respects the same. They fall into three basic categories: (1) the refutation of external objects made from directionally partless particles; (2) examples that show that external objects are unnecessary; and (3) consequences contradictory to the assertion of external objects. Candrakirti does not appear to have been concerned with refuting all of them; instead, demonstrating why he is aptly called the "opener of the chariot-way" for the Prasarigika School, he concentrates on exposing the internal contradictions in the Cittamatra positions.

Candrakirti’s critique of Cittamatra comes in the context of the second part of his explanation of the famous tetralemma of the Madhyamika School with respect to production, the inquiry into whether things are produced from things that are different from them. This is found in the sixth chapter of the Entrance to the Middle Way, verses 45-71 and 84-97 (the intervening verses are concerned with refuting the notion of selfconsciousness).” The following is a summary of his arguments:

1. The Cittamatra School points out that in a dream, there is apprehension of a dream-object, and one can later remember that dream-object, even though there is no external object. For them, the absence of the object after the dream shows that it had no external existence whereas its recollection when one is awake shows that consciousness truly exists. However, this is fallacious; if a subsequent recollection could establish the existence of an (inherently existent) mind, an external object would also be established, since it was recalled as an external object (VI.48-49).

2. Similarly, the Cittamatra School likes to point out that the objects of a dream function just like external objects, since a dream-object can be the cause of attachment. Thus, they say that there really is no difference between a dreaming and waking mind, nor between internal dream-objects and so-called external objects. However, this does not establish the true existence of the dreaming mind, but rather only proves that both a waking mind and a dreaming mind are false. Both a dream consciousness and a waking consciousness are mistaken with respect to their objects, for their objects do not inherently exist even though that is the way they appear. Hence, the visual object, the eye, and the eye consciousness are all false. When one awakens from the sleep of ignorance, one understands that one’s ordinary cognition was mistaken, just as upon awakening from a dream one realizes that the dream-objects did not exist (VI.50-53).

3. As another illustration of perception without an external object, the Cittamatra School likes to point to the instance of persons with the eye disease amblyopia who see "falling hairs" in front of them. However, this example establishes merely that the awareness is defective, without valid perception, and
thus not truly existent, since people with good vision see nothing in the place where "falling hairs" are seen. If a mind were truly existent, it could not be contradicted by the perceptions of others; hence, others would also see the falling hairs. (VI.54-55). (This, then is like the example of dreaming: perception "without an object" occurs only when one's consciousness is under the control of a distorting force such as sleep or amblyopia; and if the consciousness in question truly existed, its objects would absurdly exist for others.)

4. The Cittamatra contention that the appearance of objects and the perception of them arise from seeds that are in the mind-basis-of-all is not feasible. A potential must be the cause of either a present consciousness or a future consciousness. If it is the cause of a present consciousness, then as a cause it would exist at the same time as its effect, which is absurd, since a cause must exist prior to its effect. On the other hand, if it were the cause of a future consciousness, it would not exist when its effect did, in which case it would have no connection to it (VI.56-61).

5. If the appearance of objects is dependent only on karmic seeds, and not on one's sense organs, then the blind absurdly should be able to see things while awake just as they do when they are asleep and dreaming (VI.62-67).

6. A yogin can perceive the ground to be covered with skeletons as the result of meditative stabilization. If the mind truly existed, its object would always be visible to others, but that is obviously not the case here, since others do not see the skeletons. The same holds true with respect to a hungry ghost's perception of blood and pus in a river. If the blood and pus truly existed, everyone would see those substances there. The Cittamatra reply that the hungry ghost's perception would be like that of a person with amblyopia is inadmissible, for there is nothing invalid about the hungry ghost's perception (VI.69-71).

7. The notion of self-consciousness (a consciousness that non-dualistically realizes a consciousness that in turn apprehends an object) is refuted. If the dependent natures that consciousness experiences are one entity with it, they are not apprehended-objects of that consciousness; how then can consciousness be posited, since there is nothing separate from it that it can be said to know? That is, how could consciousness be known if there is no object for it to know? The Cittamatra School replies that a consciousness knows itself. In fact, they maintain that only if a consciousness knew itself could recollection of that consciousness come about at a later time. However, this is both unnecessary and absurd. It is unnecessary because recalling the object experienced previously serves as a sufficient cause for the recollection of the awareness; we remember, "I saw blue," for instance, and that serves as recollection not only of blue but of the seeing of blue. It is absurd because something posited as truly existent could not be the cause for something else that is also truly existent, as both the consciousness and its self-consciousness are. Also, selfconsciousness is absurd because something cannot be both agent and recipient of action, just as a sword cannot cut itself nor
8. The Cittamatrins have rejected the conventions of the world without warrant; they have fallen from both conventional truths and from ultimate truths (since they assume the true existence of consciousness) (VI.78-83).

9. The scriptures upon which the Cittamatra School relies either have been misinterpreted in the sense that they have been treated too literally or have not been understood to be merely provisional teachings for those incapable of hearing the more profound doctrine of the emptiness of inherent existence. First, in some sutras such as the Sutra on the Ten Grounds, Buddha said "The three realms are mind-only" just to indicate that, rather than a god who created the world and beings, the creative agency is only the intentional actions of beings. Second, in sutras such as the Descent to Lanka Sutra, Buddha taught that what appear to be external objects are actually mental forms, but he did this only to help certain persons give up their attachment to forms and to make it easier for some to later understand the non-inherent existence of consciousness. Buddha said that both forms and conscious nesses equally exist conventionally and equally do not exist ultimately (VI.84-97).

In the next chapter, we will examine Gelukba approaches to these arguments by exploring several works, primarily those of Jamyang Shayba, Ngawang Belden, and Janggya. Before passing on to those matters, let us consider the more fundamental question that divides the Cittamatra and Prasarigika viewpoints—whether or not the Cittamatrins are accurate in their assertion that the Buddha actually taught that external objects do not exist.

Cittamatra and Prasangika Perspectives on Mind-Only Scriptures

As noted earlier, the Cittamatra works of Asariga and Vasubandhu are dependent upon a small number of sutras from which they derive Cittamatra doctrine: the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, the Sutra on the Ten Grounds, the Descent to Lanka Sutra, and the Mahayana Abhidharma Sutra. The first of these is Asahga's principal source.

What should be noted first about the Prasangika stance toward the scriptural sources of the Cittamatra School is that the most obvious ground for the dismissal of the Cittamatra philosophy is not employed. Prasangikas might be expected to deny the authenticity of Cittamatra scriptural sources by showing through various modes of literary or deductive criticism that those words were never uttered by the Buddha and hence must be regarded as a sheer fabrication by certain Mahayana monks. However, such a tactic is not used against Cittamatra. One reason, perhaps, is that it was realized that such a move might have the undesirable side-effect of casting doubt on the authenticity of the Mahayana scriptures in general. That is, it would be difficult for Madhyamikas, as Mahayanists, to reject any scripture on the
grounds of authenticity; to convince the Hinayanists who doubt the Mahayana because of its apparent contradictions with previously canonized scriptures, Mahayanists have generally argued that the Blessed One, from the depths of his compassion, taught a broad range of doctrines to captivate diverse types of people. Hence, the Cittamatra and Madhyamika Schools alike characterize the sutras accorded primacy by the other as authentic, but "requiring interpretation" (drang don, neyartha), whereas their own authoritative sutras are labeled "definitive" (nges don, nitartha).

According to Gelukpa scholars, the Prasarigikas, therefore, do not use historical inquiry or literary criticism to distinguish definitive and non-definitive sutras; rather, these categories are established on the basis of what stands up to reasoning, for of course the Buddha's own final view, the definitive view, could not be logically subordinate to any other. This is not a new idea, for even if there were not competing interpretations of the Buddha's own final view, it is a common notion that the Buddha's doctrine is not to be blindly accepted without analysis. The Buddha's own dictum was that his doctrine be subjected to reasoning in the way in which a goldsmith analyzes a gold nugget.

Accordingly, Bhavaviveka, said to be the founder of the Svatantrika-Madhyamika School, does not deny the authenticity of so-called Cittamatra scriptures. His criticism of Cittamatra is to deny that the Buddha literally taught in any of those scriptures that there are no external objects, implying that the basic thrust of the philosophy of Cittamatra is based on a misunderstanding. In saying this, he goes far beyond Candrakirti, who is willing to say that in most cases, Buddha actually did mean to say that there are no external objects (although that was not the Buddha's own final view). According to Bhavaviveka, when, in scriptures such as the Sutra on the Ten Grounds, Buddha said that the "three realms"-the Form Realm (gzugs khams, rupadhatu), Formless Realm (gzugs med khams, arupya-dhatu), and Desire Realm ('dod khams, kamadhatu)-which comprise the whole of cyclic existence ('khor ba, samsara), are "mind-only," he did not mean that there are no external objects. He meant only that mind, in the sense of intentions (sems pa, cetana) to act or in the sense of karmic latencies with the mind, is the creator of cyclic existence." Thus, in Bhavaviveka's view, these sutras not only are in need of clarification regarding their presentation of ultimate truths, but are not even literal. Bhavaviveka says:

In the sixth Bodhisattva stage, the Bodhisattva,,, thinks: the three realms are mind-only, they are established by mindonly, and are brought about by mind-only. God (Isvara) is not an agent. When this is clear to him he says, "0 Jinaputra, it is so, the three realms are mind-only." The word "only" should be understood as negating an agent [other than mind]; but it should not be understood as negating [external] objects.

Janggya explains:
The term "only" in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds statement "The three realms are only mind" does not eliminate external objects; rather, [it means that] since all three realms are constructed by actions and since actions are limited to the two, intention and thought [i.e., intentional and operational actions], the three realms are constructed by mind. Therefore, the term "only" is stated for the purpose of negating the existence of a creator of the world other than the mind, such as Isvara, who is different than the mind, and so forth.

The Prasangikas did not go to the same lengths as Bhavaviveka. True, they, like other Buddhists, understood the mind to be the creator of cyclic existence in the sense described by Bhavaviveka. And it is also true that they consider that in general the "Cittamatra scriptures" require interpretation because they do not explicitly identify the mode of being of their subjects as the lack of inherent existence. However, Prasangikas do not say that those sutras are necessarily nonliteral; it is accepted that often "mind-only" is what the Buddha intended his listeners to understand when he spoke. As Candrakirti says, Buddha taught mind-only just provisionally and for certain persons-those not yet capable of understanding the absence of inherent existence. As he says in his Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.43):65

The teachings that a basis-of-all exists, that the person [inherently] exists,

And that only the aggregates [inherently] exist

Should be taken as teachings for those who would not understand

The very profound meaning [of emptiness].

And (VI.94):66

These sutras teaching no external objects of perception, i.e.,

Teaching that the mind appears as the variety of objects,

Turn away from forms those extremely attached to forms.

These also require interpretation.

In this way, the Buddha acts like a doctor who acts for the good of his patients; the Descent into Lanka Sutra states:67

Just as a doctor distributes

Medicines to the ill,

So Buddha teaches
Mind-only to sentient beings.

Therefore, Prasarigikas maintain that the teaching of the Cittamatra School is an authentic teaching of the Buddha and, within the sphere of those suffering from over attachment to forms, is an appropriate "medicine" to relieve symptoms such as the reification of subject-object dualism, even if it does not teach the final mode of being of phenomena as does the tradition of the Madhyamika School.

However, although the Prasangika hermeneutic relies principally on logic, establishing the true mode of existence of phenomena so as to be able to explain that the Buddha's teaching of other systems was a matter of skillful pedagogy, it does not rely only on logic when assessing the scriptures upon which Cittamatra depends. Prasangikas also take note of sutras that appear to directly contravene the teaching of mind-only. According to Candrakirti:68

[Truly existent mind and form] were equally abandoned by Buddha in the sutras on the mode of wisdom and [conventionally existent mind and form] were equally set forth

In the Abhidharma [scriptures].

According to Candrakirti, the Perfection of Wisdom sutras teach that all five aggregates of body and mind lack true existence, and the abhidharma scriptures accord all five equivalence in terms of conventional existence. Therefore, there is no difference between mind and its objects in terms of true or conventional existence.

Hence, with regard to Cittamatra texts, Prasangikas argue both that those texts are valid, serving a useful function for appropriate persons, and that those texts are contradictory with the Buddha's higher teachings in the Perfection of Wisdom sutras and abhidharma texts. It is then presumably for the sake of those who do not require the diluted teachings of Cittamatra that they develop their arguments against its central tenet; these arguments will be explored in the next chapter.
3

Gelukba Renditions of the Mind-Only Controversy

Now that we have made a brief survey of the Indian sources for the analyses of Jamyang Shayba and Janggya, let us consider the issues in more detail. According to those Gelukba authorities, the Prasahgika rebuttal of the Cittamatra refutation of external objects includes the arguments listed below. That the Gelukbas feel free to extend the analysis of mind-only beyond Candrakirti is clear: only the second through fifth arguments are drawn directly from Candrakirti. The first four are direct replies to points made by the early Cittamatra School.

1 The Cittamatra refutation of partless particles does not preclude the existence of external objects.

2 Several of the examples used by the Cittamatra School to establish the feasibility of consciousness in the absence of external objects in fact only indicate that consciousness lacks true existence.

3 The Cittamatra use of ultimate analysis to refute external objects does not refute their conventional existence.

4 The Cittamatra assertion of simultaneous observation of both subject and object is not possible.

In addition to those four direct replies, another seven arguments and contradictory consequences are asserted:

5 Scriptures—the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and the abhidharma scriptures—say that both form and consciousness conventionally exist but do not ultimately exist.

6 There is no conventional validly cognizing consciousness that refutes external objects.

7 Objects that were mere mental representations could not appear to conventional valid cognition.

8 Whatever is one entity with mind would absurdly be mind.

9 Although the existence of a mind-basis-of-all would entail the non-existence of external objects, a mindbasis-of-all does not exist.
10 Without external objects, nothing would exist.

11 Without external objects, shared objects of perception would be impossible.

Of the three authors whose works are translated in parts two and three, Jamyang Shayba is the most laconic on this subject, contributing only a short statement that contains the fifth and sixth arguments listed above. Janggya devotes much of his treatment to the issue of the interpretation of sutras (see chapter 2), an issue not addressed by Jamyang Shayba and Ngawang Belden in the context of the unique tenets of the Prasaingika School. Like Ngawang Belden, he denies that the Cittamatra refutation of partless particles (the first argument listed above) serves as a refutation of external objects; unlike either of the others, he examines the Cittamatra examples such as dreams and argues, in reliance on Candrakirti, that such examples can be turned against Cittamatra (the second argument listed above). Ngawang Belden, relying in part on Candrakirti and Dzongkaba (to make the point that the Cittamatra refutation of external objects, relying on ultimate analysis, undermines the teaching on conventional and ultimate truths), supplies most of the remaining criticisms; of the three authors, his is the most extensive analysis.

These arguments will be organized around four headings: (1) the Cittamatra School's allegation of contradictions in the assertion of external objects; (2) the Cittamatra School's refutation of directionally partless particles; (3) the Cittamatra School's refutation of the necessity of external objects for the production of consciousness; and (4) miscellaneous criticisms of Mind-Only by the Prasarigikas.

Cittamatra Arguments That the Assertion of External Objects Contradicts Meditative Experiences

Cittamatra philosophers, as understood by Gelukbas, argue that the assertion of external objects contradicts other common Buddhist tenets. The illustrations for these arguments fall into two categories: (1) there are meditative experiences in which external objects are not found, either because there is simply an absence of any positive appearance or because an internal mental image has blocked out the appearance of external objects; and (2) there are cases in which different types of individuals validly perceive different objects in the same place, which would be contradictory if external objects existed.

First, let us consider instances of meditative experience in which no external objects are found. One, suggested by Asahga, is that no external objects appear to the mind at the time the mind is absorbed in meditative equipoise on emptiness. He assumes that the most valid consciousness is the wisdom that realizes an ultimate truth (don dam bden pa, paramartha-sat-ya), i.e., an emptiness (which in the Cittamatra system is principally the lack of a difference of entity of subject and object—the absence of an external world). He argues that if external objects actually
existed, they would have to appear to this consciousness, since it is the knower of reality (chos nyid, dharmata), and the externality of the objects would be their very nature. The Cittamatra School and the Madhyamika School agree that at the time of direct realization of emptiness, when one is in meditative equipoise (mnyam bzhag, samahita) on emptiness, only emptiness itself appears to the mind; even Prasangikas agree that external objects do not appear to a consciousness absorbed in the direct realization of an ultimate truth. Asariga takes this as an indication that those objects do not exist.

The principal Prasargika reply, according to the Gelukba authorities, is that this sort of analysis is obviously ultimate analysis and hence proves nothing in terms of the conventional existence of external objects. As Ngawang Belden says:

That forms, sounds, and so forth, are external objects is not refuted by valid cognition distinguishing conventionalities which does not depend on valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate because: (1) there is no instance of valid cognition distinguishing conventionalities that refutes external objects and (2) consciousnesses also are not established when they are analyzed by valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate.

Conventional valid cognition-direct perception or inference certifies external objects. Only a consciousness analytically searching for an object, i.e., a validly cognizing consciousness distinguishing the ultimate, fails to find an external object. However, this failure to find an external object that can bear analysis refutes only the existence of truly existent external objects, not the existence of external objects conventionally. In other words, it is not surprising that an analytical awareness seeking an external object fails to establish one, since there is nothing, even consciousness, that can withstand such analysis. That is, when one attempts to designate an object that can be apprehended apart from the consciousness that realizes it, no such object appears, and one might erroneously conclude that no such object exists even conventionally. In this case, ultimate analysis involves the investigation into the relationship between a cause and effect, namely, the object and the consciousness for which it is an object of knowledge.

Even if Asahga's point did not entail ultimate analysis, Gelukbas might answer that it is not necessarily the case that external objects do not appear to an exalted wisdom consciousness, since they can appear to a Buddha. This is not an answer given in the context of their discussion of the tenet of mind-only, but is clearly indicated by Jamyang Shayba, for instance, in the root verses of his section on Buddhahood in the Great Exposition of Tenets, where he says of a Buddha:

With respect to the effect [of Buddhahood], meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment do not alternate; they have become one entity....

All elaborations have vanished for the perspective of [the Buddha's]
perception of the element of [Superior] qualities (chos dbyings, dharmadhatu, i.e., emptiness), but

[For the perspective] of [the Buddha's] non-analytical [perception], the varieties are known, like an olive.

His commentator, Losang Gonchok, explains:

For the perspective of [the Buddha's] perception of emptiness-the element of qualities-all elaborations of conventionalities have vanished and do not exist. Still, for the perspective of [the Buddha's] non-analytical perception of conventionalities, all the phenomena of the varieties are known individually without confusion, like a wet olive fruit set in the palm of the hand.

Therefore, meditative absorption on emptiness does not necessarily preclude the appearance of objects; that is the case only for those who have not yet overcome the obstructions to omniscience. Since Buddhas are omniscient, they are able to cognize simultaneously both the bases of emptinesses, such as tables and chairs, and emptinesses themselves; hence, the realization of emptiness does not itself preclude the appearance of external objects. According to Jamyang Shayba, then, Prasangikas may assert that it is only the obstructions to omniscience that prevent the appearance of external objects while one is absorbed in the realization of emptiness, not the non-existence of such objects.

Other examples adduced by the Cittamatra thinkers to contradict the validity of the perception of external objects have to do with particular perceptions of external objects that, if true, would entail that more than one object could exist in one place or that one object had several contradictory natures. We have already referred to one instance, cited by Asariga, of yogis who practice a type of meditation in which all that appears to their minds is water or earth, the water "totality" or earth "totality." The yogi's cognition of only water or only earth, produced by profound concentration, is considered valid.' Asariga raises the difficulty that if these are external objects, the cognitions of other persons who are unable to see what appears to the yogi would be invalidated. If, on the other hand, there are no external objects and all appearances are produced from seeds that ripen simultaneously to produce appearances and consciousnesses, different cognitions are not necessarily contradictory.

Another of Asar ga's examples' is particularly evocative. It concerns a certain trio consisting of a human, a god (lha, deva), and a hungry ghost (yi dvags, preta). In the Compendium of the Mahayana, Asariga says:'

One thing [appears] to hungry ghosts, animals, humans

And gods in accordance with whatsoever type [is appropriate to those
Because their minds are different; 

Therefore it is asserted that [external] objects are not established.

Asvabhava (c. 450-530)’ commenting on this example in his Connected Explanation of (Asariga’s) "Compendium of the Mahayana"(theg pa chen po'i bsdud pa'i bshad sbyar, mahayanasamgraho- panibandhana), suggests a curious situation: suppose that a god, a hungry ghost, and a human were to stand together, viewing a flowing river. As described in Buddhist cosmologies such as that found in Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Higher Knowledge (chos mngon pa'i mdzod, abhidharmakosa), these three types of beings are extremely diverse in terms of their physical and mental characteristics and occupy vastly different environments. Gods and goddesses live long, blissful lives in sublime surroundings; hungry ghosts live in continual desperation in hot, dry, filthy places." Their physical proximity is therefore unlikely. But if we suppose that gods, ghosts, and humans were spatially and temporally proximate, we can speculate about what each would see.

According to Asvabhava:

By the power of their own karma, hungry ghosts see a river as full of pus, etc.; animals take that very river as a dwelling with the thought that it is a dwelling; humans think that it is water that is sweet, pure, and cool-they bathe in it, drink it, and enter it; and gods that dwell in the meditative equipoise of the sphere of limitless space (nam kha' mtha' yes, akasanantya) see it as space-that is, their discrimination of form has been destroyed.

Jamyang Shayba’s explanation of this adds that gods (other than those in the levels of meditative equipoise) see the river as nectar. Hence, the following scenario can be constructed: among the beings at the river-bank, some gods would perceive nothing but space; other gods, who evidently in their previous lives possessed the karmic predispositions to "ripen" upon death into a new lifetime full of sensual delights, would see a stream of nectar, perhaps with a delicious fragrance wafting upwards. The poor hungry ghost, always surrounded by a disgusting and frustrating environment, would observe yet another slow-moving stream of blood and pus. The human, of course, would see a river. It is notable that there is no suggestion that any Buddhist school would reject this scenario.

Each of the three beings would perceive only that which would be appropriate to their characteristic natures. That such would be the case must have seemed to Buddhist doctrinalists to be the only possibility that would preserve traditional cosmology; for it would be unseemly that gods experience anything unpleasant or that hungry ghosts experience anything pleasurable. However, at the same time it presented the puzzling result that apparently one stream of fluid can appear in
many guises to different beings.

Is this simply analogous to the differences in perception that would occur amongst a fish, bird, or human momentarily located at a certain point on a river? The water of a stream undoubtedly looks vastly different to such different beings due to (1) great differences in their optical structures and capacity, which would affect factors such as hue, resolution of detail, depth perception, etc.; (2) the respective size and position of the observers, which would result in great variations in perspective; and (3) other factors such as familiarity with water, desire for and use of water, and so forth. However, even though a stream undoubtedly looks, feels, smells, sounds, etc., vastly different to a fish, a bird, and a human, it could not be experienced in a way that is completely different. All would be moistened by it; all would feel its weight, its pressure, its movement. It is quite another thing to say that what a hungry ghost experiences as a hot, barren desert a god can experience as empty space or as a garden of delights. The differences in the perspectives of the god and hungry ghost are much more extreme than can be explained through mere differences in optical structure or environment; not only are their experiences even of the color and texture of the fluid entirely different, but it is perfectly possible that what one god experiences as empty space, another can experience as nectar, and a hungry ghost will experience as a barren desert. There need not be the slightest correspondence between their experiences.

How, then, can these parties all be correct? It seems that the possibilities are limited to three: (1) that only one of the beings has correct perception, the other two being deluded-in a sense, suffering from elaborate hallucinations; (2) that all of the beings have deluded perception such that none of them sees what is really there; and (3) that all of the beings have correct perception, entailing that water, nectar, and blood and pus are all actually present in the same place.

The first of these possibilities is the one that surely most people would regard as the commonsense notion (especially from a human perspective). A naive realism would insist that there is an external basis for what is perceived and that it would be impossible for that basis to have a multiple nature-to be at once water, nectar, and blood and pus. In that case, only one of the three beings could be correct. Presumably, this would be the human, with the god and hungry ghost presumed to be seeing water mistakenly as nectar or as blood and pus.

The second interpretation, that all three beings are deluded, is essentially that of the Cittamatrins. In one sense, this is not their unique claim, for all Buddhist schools assert that ordinary (unenlightened) beings of every type are under the sway of the delusion that the objects of their experience exist exactly the way that they appear. However, the Vaibha$ika and Sautrantika schools would consider an epistemic delusion with respect to objects other than a person to be the exception rather than the rule.
For the Cittamatra School, there is for the cognition of ordinary persons a continual layer of delusion in the very appearance of subject-object duality. It explains that the prima facie appearance of objects as independent of the sense or mental consciousness apprehending them is delusory. Along with the Madhyamika School, the Cittamatra School says that objects exist in dependence upon minds, but the Prasahgikas do not find it necessary thereby to conclude that objects have no entity other than the mind that apprehends them. According to Gelukbas, the Cittamatra School does.

The third interpretation of the example—that all three beings are correct—is the explanation of the Prasarigikas. The basic assumption is that existence is established by valid cognition and that the six consciousnesses of all beings are capable of such. Since all three beings have awarenesses that are neither affected by a deep cause of error—such as a defect in the eye—nor a superficial cause of error—such as fog, dim light, etc.—they respectively establish the existence of water, nectar, and blood and pus. All three substances must exist. Yet it is not possible for water also to be blood and pus or to be nectar, so it cannot be the case that all three substances exist in one entity. Rather, three entities are present in one place, each seen only by beings with the karmic propensities to be able to see them.

To illustrate this, Jamyang Shayba uses two analogies. First, each being has six types of consciousness that certify different types of objects. The fact that an eye consciousness cannot certify a sound does not preclude the existence of the sound, just as the fact that an ear consciousness cannot certify a visible form does not preclude the existence of that form. Jamyang Shayba says:

That [the eye consciousnesses of such hungry ghosts and gods are not validly cognizing consciousnesses] cannot be accepted because (1) at that time the production of pus as part of the river is established by the valid cognition of the hungry ghost's eye consciousness and (2) although the production of part [of the fluid] as water is established by the valid cognition of the eye consciousness of a human, pus is merely not established [by the human]. Therefore, although both are validly cognizing consciousnesses, the objects are discrete and the object established by one is not harmed by the other. For example, it is like the fact that the objects of the two sense consciousnesses, eye and ear, are contradictory and although the object of one is not mutually held by the other, they are not mutually invalidating. This is because Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" says:

Although there are two objects which are established by valid cognition, since they are discrete [functioning] things, how could it be that with respect to just that object established by one of those two, the other establishes its opposite?

Due to their difference in capacity, each consciousness exercises a discrete
function that does not contradict another. That is, the eye consciousness merely certifies a visible form, not also the absence of sound. In the same way, the eye consciousness of a hungry ghost has a different purview than that of a human and does not contradict the human's perception. It certifies only blood and pus, not non-water. It is simply the case that what is sensate for one type of being is supersensory for another. This is not mere relativism: one eye consciousness can contradict another, such that if one person with amblyopia sees falling hairs, another without that defect can establish non-hairs. However, the first party's ear consciousness, for instance, could not establish non-hairs because such are not within its purview.

This is much like the Gelukba characterization of the difference between an ordinary being's perception of phenomena and that of a Buddha. Non-Buddhas, even Superiors ('phags pa, aryan) who have realized emptiness, are restricted to a view of either ultimate or conventional truths, not both simultaneously; and ultimate truths are cognized only by a few, who at the time of meditative equipoise on emptiness (that which is an ultimate truth) are unable to cognize conventional truths (the bases of the ultimate truths). Nevertheless, the cognition of only an ultimate truth does not negate the existence of conventional truths, nor does the later cognition of conventional truths negate the existence of ultimate truths. Still, the simultaneous cognition of the two truths requires omniscience, just as the simultaneous cognition of the water, blood and pus, and nectar would require at least the removal of obstructing predispositions, if not omniscience.

The other metaphor Jamyang Shayba uses concerns the partial viewing of an object; when we see an object we typically see only that part of it that faces us; we do not see its far side or interior. Just so, we do not see the nectar or blood and pus that are hidden from us, only the water that appears. Only the water casts its aspect toward our eye consciousness and forms it in its image. The other substances are, for us, supersensory.

Unfortunately, the exact relationship of the three worlds is not spelled out even by Jamyang Shayba, but there seem to be three possible delineations. One is that there is an external substratum of some fluid that remains the same, but which each being experiences in a different way, just as two people might experience a third person as being attractive or repulsive. A second possibility is that there is a substratum that is continually changeable, being at one time nectar, at another water, and at another blood and pus. A third possibility is that the three universes interpenetrate, so that all three fluids exist in the same place at the same time.

The first of these options, that there is a common substratum-generic fluid, generic container, etc.-is contradicted by the very terms of the example, which states that gods of the Formless Realm validly perceive only space where others experience some form of fluid. To this we can add Jamyang Shayba's approving citation of Kaydrup's statement that not all hungry ghosts or gods have the same
experience. That there is a common substratum is a tempting, but not viable, solution.

The second option, that the environment is continually changing depending on the beings for which it serves as a basis of experience, depends on extrapolating from Kaydrup's remark that the hungry ghost comes upon water, which then changes into blood and pus as he raises the vessel to his mouth to drink. In other words, the environment is depicted as changing as different kinds of beings come to inhabit it; it may change before they are aware of it (as would be the case with us) or it may change perceptively (as would be the case with a hungry ghost, as part of the frustration to which hungry ghosts are prone). In this view, the essential fluidity of existence "coagulates" in different ways, as blood and pus for the disgusting hungry ghost world, as water for the bland human world, and as nectar for the rich god world. However, this model of a world of substances that continually change in type falters where we postulate the existence of different types of beings in one place; in that case, the substratum would have to change in three ways, in which case it would not be any different than the third option.

The third option, that the three universes interpenetrate, seems to be the clear implication of our example. It is not extraordinary for Buddhists to postulate levels of existence that are beyond an ordinary person's ken, for the Form Realm and Formless Realm are such. The surprise here is that these other worlds are no place other than the same temporal and spatial dimension in which we ourselves reside. For instance, Jamyang Shayba says that the hungry ghost, god, and human that simultaneously view the stream may all stand on the same spot (though there is a problem in saying "same" since even the surface of the land would be different for these three beings). And that is not because the god and hungry ghost have immaterial or non-obstructive bodies, for we are told that their bodies are coarse and obstructive. It is simply the case that their coarse obstructive bodies are not coarse and obstructive for humans or for each other, but only for others of their own type and the phenomena created by their karma. He constructs a hypothetical debate:

Incorrect Position: It [absurdly] follows that at that time a human does not see the water under the pus because the pus is obstructive and coarse, as is the case, for example, with the water that underlies pus at the present time.

Correct Position: There is no entailment [that because the pus is coarse and obstructive, a human cannot see the water beneath it]. It [absurdly] follows that at that time the ground that is covered by a hungry ghost is not seen by that human because the form of that hungry ghost is obstructive and coarse, as is the case, for example, with the ground that is the underlying basis on which a human stands. You asserted the entailment. The three circles!
Incorrect Position: Even though a hungry ghost's form is obstructive and coarse, a human does not perceive it due to the power of karma. Therefore the ground that is covered by that does not appear to be obscured.

Correct Position: It follows that nectar and pus are very similar in that way because the other two do not appear in that way to that human, whereby only water appears. The three circles!

A debater seeks to capture his opponent in the three "circles" of self-contradiction: (1) the opponent has accepted the reason; (2) the opponent has accepted the entailment; and (3) the opponent has accepted the opposite of the consequence. Here, the opponent has accepted that the body of a hungry ghost is coarse and obstructive; that if something is covered by a coarse, obstructive form, it cannot be seen; and that, nevertheless, the ground covered by a hungry ghost is seen by a human. Realizing the absurdity of the entailment (no one holds that a hungry ghost's body would obstruct a human's view), the opponent would realize that the ground underneath a hungry ghost's body would be visible and therefore would realize the absurdity of the original contention that a human would not see water where a hungry ghost sees blood and pus.

But there is a hedge, it seems, and it comes in the form of explaining that each of the three substances or beings that occupy the same area are in fact located in their own space, even though those spaces interpenetrate in the same area. What this means is mysterious, but seems to be a distinction constructed to prevent the mixture of the substances; they preserve their integrity. Perhaps if they did not have their own spaces, it would absurdly (and revoltingly) follow that when we drink water, we also drink blood and pus.

Whichever of the final two options represents Jamyang Shayba's thinking, we are left with a remarkable conclusion about the radical relativity of the external world. Jamyang Shayba apparently says that these universes interpenetrate, that the totality of samsara is immeasurably richer than we are capable of apprehending. This is itself taken as a very powerful indication that phenomena lack any kind of enduring substantial existence. For the Gelukba interpreters, and doubtless also for Candrakirti, the interpenetration of phenomena (in this sense) precludes their true existence. An important aspect of our basic ignorance is to conceive of phenomena as though they existed independently of our karma, which actually is the basic cause for their very existence.

A different instance of apparently contradictory perception of external objects is raised by Dharmakirti, who points to the fact that when one person is simultaneously seen by a friend and an enemy, the former sees the person as attractive whereas the latter sees the person as repulsive." Or, as Nagarjuna says in his Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (verse 20), an ascetic, a lover, and a wild dog respectively see a woman as a corpse, a mistress, and a tasty morsel. How can one person be both attractive and repulsive? Rather, beauty and ugliness must be
in the "eye of the beholder"; i.e., they must be mental representations rather than external objects.

This is another example without a direct reply from the Prasahgikas. It lacks the force of the previous one, for it has to do only with an intangible quality of the observed object rather than its basic entity. That is, it would be easy enough to concede that beauty or ugliness is a mere superimposition without conceding that the beautiful or ugly person is a mere projection or superimposition.

Cittamatra and Prasal gika Perspectives on "Partless Particles"

Having considered the Cittamatra allegation of contradictions in the assertion of external objects, let us turn to its refutation of external objects by way of refuting partless particles, the basic elements that, according to the Vaibhasikas and perhaps some Sautrantikas, comprise gross objects. These tiny or "subtle" (phra ba) particles are for them the principal units of impermanent physical entities, the "building blocks" for gross objects. Hypothetically, these particles are partless because they are too minute to be physically subdivided.

Technically, that particles could not be physically divided does not preclude the possibility that they could be mentally subdivided; but in order for these particles to retain their ultimacy, it would be necessary that the consciousness that apprehends them not be canceled out by that cleavage. In this way, according to Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo, the Vaibhasika School and the Sautrantikas Following Scripture consider partless atoms to be "ultimate truths," an ultimate truth for them being something for which the consciousness apprehending it is not canceled if it is broken physically or distinguished mentally into parts. A partless particle is in fact only directionally, i.e., spatially partless, without north, south, east, west, top, or bottom; it is, however, temporally divisible, the particle of one moment not being the same as the particle of a past or future moment, and can be distinguished as a cause and as an effect.

There is, however, controversy over whether or not partless particles touch one another or have interstices. The difficulty of maintaining that particles can touch each other is that it would seem to imply that they have parts, since certainly if a particle touched a particle below it, the part that touched the bottommost particle would not also be touching a particle above it. On the other hand, it is difficult (without being able to postulate a theory of nuclear forces) to explain the cohesiveness of conglomerations of particles.

Vasubandhu's refutation of directionally partless particles is two-pronged. First, he says that if we imagine several particles in an array, surely a different part of the central particle would touch (or come close to touching) a particle to its west than would touch (or come close to touching) a particle to its east. That being the case, it is argued, subtle particles are not "directionless" after all. Second, he
argues that if one side of a particle were also its opposite side—that is, if there were no "sides" at all, the particle being without directions—it would be impossible to construct gross forms out of them. All other particles would touch the same place; effectively, there would be just one particle, for no matter how many of the particles were put together, the aggregate could not get any larger. Hence, the notion of directionally partless particles is not viable.

According to Janggya, the Cittamatra School considers this refutation of directionally partless particles to effectively undermine the assertion of external objects:25

The Cittamatra School thinks that when partless external objects are refuted, sense consciousnesses that are non-mistaken with respect to their appearing [objects] are refuted; in that case, since [for them,] mistaken sense consciousnesses are unable to posit objects, external objects would be negated.

This conclusion is based on what is taken to be the view of the Vaibhasika School that only a non-mistaken sense consciousness can validly posit objects and that only sense consciousnesses that apprehend partless particles or objects constructed of them can be non-mistaken. Hence, if there are no partless particles, the sense consciousnesses to which such appear must be mistaken; if there are no non-mistaken sense consciousnesses, there is no way to validly posit external objects. Since what cannot be posited by valid cognition cannot be said to exist, external objects are not feasible.

Prasahgikas agree with Cittamatrins that directionally partless atoms or particles cannot be asserted.26 In fact, the Cittamatra School's rejection of partless particles is said to make them superior to the lower schools, even though they assert external objects. Ngawang Belden gives a hypothetical objection and reply:21

Objection: It follows that in that case the Cittamatrins are inferior to the Sautrantikas because (1) they are similar in asserting that consciousnesses are truly established and (2) propounding that external objects exist is better than propounding that they do not exist.

Response: This is a wrong conception, manifesting complete ignorance of the respective status of tenet systems, because the Sautrantikas assert, upon analysis by reasoning, partless particles and gross objects that are composed of them whereas the Cittamatrins are able to refute thoroughly such external objects by means of reasoning.

The partless particles described by the philosophers of the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika schools are also truly existent particles, things able to withstand analysis, things that exist from their own side and are not just imputations; it is
better to assert, as the Cittamatra School does, that there are no external objects than to speak of truly existent partless particles. In this case, the Cittamatrins have performed ultimate analysis and have properly concluded that the object under analysis cannot withstand it. Hence, Prasarigikas quarrel only with the Cittamatra failure to extend the analysis to other phenomena, such as consciousnesses.

**However, according to Gelukbas, Prasahgikas do not agree that the rejection of directionally partless particles amounts to a rejection of external objects. As Janggya says,**

The Cittamatra School thinks that when partless external objects are refuted, sense consciousnesses that are nonmistaken with respect to their appearing [objects] are refuted; in that case, since [for them,] mistaken sense consciousnesses are unable to posit objects, external objects would be negated. In this excellent system the thought is that although it is true that a mistaken sense consciousness is unable to posit a true object of comprehension, such [mistaken sense consciousnesses] serve as assisters in positing false objects of comprehension; therefore, there is no proof of the nonexistence of [external] objects.

**In other words, even if there are no truly existent partless particles, it is possible for objects composed of mere particles to be posited by sense consciousnesses. The Cittamatrins maintain that those sense consciousnesses would be mistaken with respect to their objects (by which they mean that the sense consciousnesses mistakenly apprehend the objects composed of particles to be a different entity from the awarenesses apprehending them). Prasarigikas agree that the sense consciousnesses of ordinary beings are mistaken; Jamyang Shayba, commenting on Candrakirti’s statement that the awarenesses of ordinary beings are polluted by error, says:***

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Until Buddhahood is attained, one has no non-mistaken consciousnesses except for a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Also, due to that, for childish persons, i.e., common beings, even [the exalted wisdom] of meditative equipoise of the supreme mundane qualities path of preparation (sbyor lam chos mchok, laukikagradharma-prayoga- marga) is polluted by error with respect to what appears. Therefore, that all consciousnesses of common beings are mistaken is also a unique [tenet of the Prasaiigika School].

The eye, ear, nose, etc., consciousnesses of ordinary persons are mistaken because objects appear to those awarenesses to be inherently existent whereas they are not. However, a consciousness does not have to be non-mistaken in order to posit the existence of its object. For example, when we view distant mountains, they appear to be blue because of the haze between our eyes and the mountains; we suffer from a superficial cause of error and thus are mistaken with regard to the actual color of the mountains. Nevertheless, we can correctly identify the mountains as mountains. Similarly, even though we might mistake a mirage for a lake, we can nevertheless certify the existence of the mirage, which is itself an external object.
In the same way, the existence of mere particles can be established by sense consciousnesses, even though those consciousnesses are mistaken with respect to the appearance of the particles as truly existent.

Arguments Concerning the Necessity of External Objects for the Production of Consciousness

Both Asariga and Vasubandhu adduce several examples to demonstrate the plausibility of the production of consciousness in the absence of external objects, concluding that such objects are not necessary. They refer to dreams, illusions, faults in the sense powers, the experiences of yogis and the experiences of beings in the hells; all involve the generation of consciousnesses, apparently without external objects.

Both Asanga and Vasubandhu refer first to dreams, noting that objects that appear to dreamers have no external counterparts; nevertheless, dream-objects are capable of producing effects in dreamers, such as a pleasant or unpleasant feeling, and even physical effects such as perspiration or talking out loud. Similarly, because mirror-images falsely appear to be the objects of which they are reflections they can provoke a reaction. Just so, the non-external objects posited by the Cittamatra School function to produce effects in those to whom they appear, even though they have no external reality.

Along the same lines as the dream example is that of a person with amblyopia (rab rib, timara), an eye condition that, like cataracts, causes the appearance of squiggly lines in the air that can be mistaken for hairs, insects in one’s food, and so forth. Vasubandhu refers to this example in the first stanza of his Twenty Verses. Similarly, Asariga refers to a person who sees a "double moon," i.e., a double-image of the moon, voluntarily or not. As in the case of dreaming, there is a consciousness generated without an external object (that is, at least the "second" moon is not an external object).

Another instance, cited by Asariga, of an awareness in which apparently no external objects appear is that of yogis who practice a type of meditation in which all that appears to their minds is water or earth, the water "totality" (kasina) or earth "totality." The water or earth is called an object for one with "meditative power" (dbang ‘byor ba, vaibhutvika), these being phenomena that appear only to the mental consciousness, and then only to the mental consciousness of the person who has performed the meditation. Asariga considers these phenomena to be obviously only internal objects (since there is obviously more in the world than just earth or just water), produced without the need for an external object.

Finally, Vasubandhu writes about the guards, tormenters, creatures, etc., of the Buddhist hells. As he points out, it is not fitting that these beings be themselves sentient beings who have been born in the hells, since the hells exist as places of
suffering and these beings do not suffer from the hells' intense heat or cold or other discomfitures. Hence, he argues, their appearance is not based on an external reality; rather, they are mere projections of consciousness. Others who explain this phenomenon are forced to say that the guards are appearances of external elements generated by the karma of beings born in the hells but are not real sentient beings.

**In response to these examples, Prasarigikas argue that the fact that a dream-horse, a mirage, or a mirror-image can be an object of a consciousness does not necessarily demonstrate that external objects are not needed for the production of awareness, only that the observed objects of consciousnesses are not necessarily objects that exist the way they appear.** Candrakirti implies that even forms such as dream-images, reflections, and echoes are external objects even though they are deceptive and immaterial, serving as the observed-objects of the awarenesses that perceive them:3s

It is not the case that it is not renowned that empty [i.e., delusive] things such as reflections

[Arise] in dependence on the collection [of causes and conditions].

Just as reflections, and so forth, [arise] from empty [things],

So consciousnesses are produced from empty [things] in those aspects.

**Dzongkaba explains:**36

Here, it is said that an eye consciousness apprehending a reflection is produced from it....Since [a reflection] is the basis of observation of an eye consciousness, it is asserted to be a form-source (gzugs kyi skye mched, rupayatana); the appearance of a double-moon or falling hairs, mirages, and so forth, and echoes, and so forth, also should be understood [as form-sources].

Candrakirti and Dzongkaba say that even though phenomena such as reflections are deceptive, they arise in dependence on causes and conditions and are capable of serving as a cause for consciousnesses that are produced in the aspect of those objects. The appearance of imaginary "falling hairs" to a person with amblyopia37 is similar. Although the hairs, like the reflection, do not exist in the way they appear, the false appearance of hairs nevertheless functions as an external object by serving as a cause for the eye consciousness that apprehends them.

But beyond this, Prasarngikas argue that these examples demonstrate only that external objects have no true or ultimate existence (don dam du yod pa, paramartha-sat), something with which they have no quarrel, for the false appearance of these objects precludes their being truly existent. Instead, they criticize Cittamatrins for not being sufficiently radical-for failing to extend their
reasoning similarly to consciousness, which also lacks true existence. The Cittamatra School is taken to propound the true existence of consciousness\(^38\) (as well as its objects, except of course for the imputational nature superimposed upon them) because for them, anything impermanent that exists must truly exist. (As noted earlier, there are permanent phenomena that are existent imaginaries, such as space and cessations such as the absence of afflictions due to insight, that are said by the Cittamatra School to be merely imputedly existent, not truly existent.) The realization of ultimate truths in their system is only the realization of a lack of a difference in entity between subject and object; nowhere is it said that mind and its objects are mere nominalities, that they are only imputed in dependence on their bases of designation, etc., as would be the case if they were not regarded as truly existent. According to Gelukba scholars, the fact that they call "imputational" only the subject-object appearance, not the appearance of true existence, indicates that they accept true existence. As Dzongkaba says:\(^39\)

This [Prasarigika] system also indeed asserts that external objects are not established by way of their own character but with respect to that disagrees [with the Cittamatra School] in terms of whether or not this necessitates that external objects do not exist. Therefore, in general, if one knows how to posit any phenomenon as existing even though it does not exist by way of its own character, one can understand well the reasoning concerning the impossibility of distinguishing [external] objects and consciousnesses as existing or not existing, whereas if one does not [understand the first], one cannot [understand the second].

From a Prasarigika perspective, the failure to extend the analysis to consciousnesses has led the Cittamatra philosophers inaccurately to conclude that consciousness truly exists and that external objects do not exist even conventionally (tha snyad du yod pa, samvrti-sat). It has been suggested by some Western scholars that the Cittamatra philosophers made this error because their tenets were propounded on the basis of meditative experience\(^40\) (they were, after all, called the Practitioners of Yoga, yogacara) in which no external objects appear, and felt, as do all Buddhist tenet-holders with the exception of Madhyamikas, that denying the true existence of consciousness would be nihilistic.

In fact, the examples used by Asariga and Vasubandhu are said by Candrakirti and Janggya to demonstrate only the absence of true existence of consciousness, for they show that consciousness is produced in dependence on an object, that it has no independent existence. Candrakrtti\(^41\) points out that the Cittamatra School itself admits, in the dream example, that dream-images can deceive dreamers, making them think, for instance, that an elephant is charging toward them when it is not. For Janggya, the very fact that the dream consciousness can be deceived is an "extremely powerful reasoning" demonstrating that consciousness does not truly exist, since it indicates that the mind is dependent on an object:\(^42\)

The Mind-Only School offers a dream consciousness and a sense
consciousness to which falling hairs appear as examples of inherently established consciousnesses without there being external objects. When, in the root text and commentary to his Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.50-55), Candrakirti refutes this, he says that the examples are not correct. For at the time of those [consciousnesses], although within [the range of] external objects there are no [dream-] elephants, falling hairs, and so forth, they appear as though they do exist. Therefore, the consciousnesses that have [such] as their objects are also false and do not inherently exist. Therefore, objects and consciousnesses are equally established by their own nature or not. This is an extremely powerful reasoning that refutes the unfeasibility of external objects.

In that case, there is no basis for giving subjects ontological priority over objects. If the mind were truly existent, it would be non-deceptive; then, in the case of a person with amblyopia, others would absurdly be able to see the "hairs" that appear to that person. In other words, there would be no way to distinguish between a valid and a non-valid conventional awareness.

Cittamatra philosophy is also criticized for denying the conventional existence of external objects. Here, "conventional existence" does not mean to exist according to the opinions of ordinary people, for there is no denying that the ordinary convention of the world is that external objects exist. The Cittamatra School does not at all deny that things appear to be external objects. However, since those convictions are based on a false conception of the mode of existence of impermanent phenomena, they are invalid. What conventionally exists must, first of all, exist, and external objects are no more conventionally existent than is the horse that appears in a dream, the oasis that appears in a mirage, or the "body" that appears in a mirror.

According to Gelukba interpretations of the Prasarigika School, on the other hand, all phenomena equally exist conventionally and do not exist ultimately. Again, Candrakirti says (Entrance to the Middle Way VI.92):

[Truly existent mind and form] were equally abandoned by Buddha in the sutras on the mode of wisdom and [conventionally existent mind and form] were [equally] set forth

In the abhidharma [scriptures].

Buddha rejected truly existent form and mind in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and set out conventionally existent mind and form in the abhidharma scriptures. Phenomena are said to exist conventionally because there is no conventional valid cognizing awareness that refutes them. That is, among the six types of valid consciousness, other than a mental consciousness investigating ultimate existence, there is no valid awareness that can contradict the existence of external objects. In brief, this says that (1) we must assume that our ordinary awarenesses are valid
unless shown otherwise and (2) that the reasonings put forward by the Cittamatra School are not valid since a reasoning consciousness could not be produced that would refute external objects.

Conventional valid cognition is not a mere affirmation of what appears to the senses, for there are many causes for the deception or faulty functioning of the senses. The sense organ may be damaged or otherwise affected, as in the case of cataracts or jaundice, or may be influenced by atmospheric or other disturbances that create phenomena such as mirages. Hence, something is established for conventional valid cognition if and only if it is not contradicted by another's valid cognition. For instance, one's perception of distant mountains as blue, caused by the intervening haze, could be easily contradicted by the testimony of someone closer to the mountains who saw them as green and brown.

But no matter what vantage point is assumed by another person with valid cognition, there is no way in which that person could contradict one's perception of an external object. One might be corrected with respect to the color of the mountains, or their distance, or even one's identification of them as mountains (if, for instance, the "mountains" turn out to have been a low bank of clouds)—but it cannot be denied that an eye consciousness was caused, and for Prasahgikas that means that an external object existed, since that which causes a sense consciousness is external to it. Another valid cognition could show that there was no conventionally existent mountain, but not that there was no external object.

In the arguments discussed thus far, the Gelukbas, relying on Candrakrtti, have established only that it cannot be shown through conventional valid cognition that external objects do not exist. However, in his root verse, Jamyang Shayba seems to make the much broader claim that it can be assumed that external objects exist because they are not refuted by conventional valid cognition:

Because of not being refuted by and not being established by an awareness distinguishing conventionalities [respectively],

It is asserted that external objects exist but that a mindbasis-of-all does not exist.

Ngawang Belden seems to support this claim:

The final reason why Prasahgikas assert that external objects exist conventionally is as follows: That forms, sounds, and so forth, are external objects is not refuted by valid cognition distinguishing conventionalities which does not depend on valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate because: (1) there is no instance of valid cognition distinguishing conventionalities that refutes external objects and (2) consciousnesses also are not established when they are analyzed by valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate.
It should be noted first of all that Candrakirti did not himself make the claim that the failure to refute external objects establishes their existence. He refuted only the non-assertion of external objects without going on to claim that this meant that external objects were established. Jarnyang Shayba seems to be saying that the non-refutation of external objects implies their existence. If he means what he says, there would seem to be several problems. For instance, for ordinary human beings, conventional valid cognition is unable to refute countless claims about past events for which there is now no evidence one way or the other. For instance, we might consider the claims of supermarket tabloids: Did Jesus spend his twenties in India, as some have claimed? Has Elvis risen from the dead? Both claims seem preposterous, but they cannot be dismissed by conventional valid cognition.

On the other hand, Jamyang Shayba's seemingly objectionable statement is found only in his terse root verse; in his commentary we can see that it is probable that he means that external objects are at least established by scripture and that they are not refuted by conventional valid cognition:

External objects exist because: (1) Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment] (byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa, bodhi- cittavivarana) and the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras say that the two, object and subject, equally exist conventionally and equally do not exist in the context of ultimate analysis, (2) [external objects] are set forth at length in the abhidharma texts and (3) [external objects] are not refuted by any awareness distinguishing conventionalities.

In other words, Jamyang Shayba is not trying to say that external objects are established just because they are not refuted by conventional valid cognition, but is saying merely that not only have they been established by scripture, they are not refuted by the reasonings articulated by the Cittamatra School. Moreover, the section on valid cognition in his Great Exposition of the Middle Way demonstrates that he, like all other Prasarigikas, regards external objects as being certified by conventional valid cognition. Ngawang Belden, like Jamyang Shayba, precedes his problematic assertion that external objects are established because they are not refuted by conventional valid cognition with a reference to the same sources as Jamyang Shayba, showing that external objects are established by scripture.

External objects are also asserted to exist in the conventions of the world, and the acceptance of ordinary worldly awareness is a frequent theme in Madhyamika School writings. Candrakirti, for instance, says in his Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.22),49 "We assert that worldly [people], abiding in their own views, are valid." In his Clear Words he says 50 "...the Buddhas help beings who are trainees, and who do not know suchness, with reasoning as it is renowned to them."

In keeping with the spirit of Candrakirti's statements, Prasaingikas generally accept whatever a reasonable person would accept; this, of course, excludes some
of what people tend to think and say. Ordinary people are mistaken with respect to the ultimate nature of things, since they assent to the way things appear to them, which is as though they were inherently existent. Furthermore, they may believe in the efficacy of sacrifices and prayers to their gods; they may believe that they are spiritually purified by washing; they may not believe in the cause-and-effect of actions. However, none of these convictions are upheld by conventional valid cognition.

It should be noted that Cittamatrins do not rest their rejection of external objects on the claim that such objects are refuted by conventional valid cognition: thus, Prasangikas do not have that burden of proof toward Cittamatrins. Ngawang Belden states:51

The Cittamatrins themselves do not propound that [external objects] are refuted by valid cognition that distinguishes conventionalities because: (1) they assert that the refutation of external objects needs to depend on valid cognition that distinguishes the ultimate [as described in] the Cittamatra system itself, such as a [reasoning consciousness realizing that subject and object are the same entity in dependence on] the logical mark of the definite simultaneous observation [of objects and the consciousnesses realizing them] and (2) the emptiness of establishment in accordance with the appearance of [objects as] external is an ultimate truth and a suchness in the Cittamatra system itself.

Dharmakirti refutes external objects by reasoning that if an object and the consciousness which realizes it are observed to necessarily occur simultaneously they could not be separate entities.52 In the statement, "The subject, the two, an apprehending subject and an apprehended object, are not different entities because they are observed to necessarily occur simultaneously (lhan cig dmigs panges pa, sahopalambhaniyama)," the sign (the reason, "because they are observed... simultaneously") of definite simultaneous observation serves to cause one to realize that an apprehending subject and an apprehended object are not different entities. Simultaneous observation is assumed to be possible because of the existence of selfconsciousness (rang rig, svasamvedana, the subject of the next chapter) a consciousness that apprehends another consciousness simultaneous with its knowledge of its object. That reasoning consciousness would be an instance of valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate because its object, the lack (or emptiness) of a difference in entity of subject and object, is an ultimate truth, or suchness, in the Cittamatra system itself. In the Cittamatra system, ultimate truths are (1) the person's emptiness of being substantially existent or self-sufficient, (2) an object's emptiness of naturally being the basis of names, and (3) the emptiness of object and subject being different entities.

According to Ngawang Belden, then, Cittamatrins refute external objects by ultimate analysis (as they themselves have defined ultimate analysis, the search for an object that is a different entity from consciousness). No conventional valid
awareness is able to refute external objects, because such consciousnesses are not investigators of the mode of being of the objects that appear to them, and such objects appear to be external objects. However, when external objects are subjected to reasoning, such as the reasoning that since subject and object definitely are produced simultaneously, they must not be different substantial entities, they are found not to exist.

Prasangikas agree with Cittamatra that forms, etc., do not exist ultimately, but not for the same reasons. Cittamatrins base their analyses on the unfindability of partless particles and the absence of external objects at the time of realizing ultimate truths. In the Prasangika system, phenomena are said not to exist ultimately because the Perfection of Wisdom sutras refute inherent existence-true existence-for all five aggregates, including the aggregates of consciousness and its accompanying mental factors, not just the aggregate of form (gzugs kyi phung po, rupa-skandha). In fact, nothing can withstand the brunt of ultimate analysis (such as the analysis Nagarjuna performs on causation, time, motion, etc., in his Treatise on the Middle Way), not even consciousness. If consciousness were ultimately (inherently, truly) existent, it would be findable among its bases of designation, either be the same as or different from its bases of designation, etc. However, lack of ultimate existence is no proof of a lack of conventional existence.

Moreover, according to Ngawang Belden, the Cittamatra identification of objects as being "internal" rather than external because they are not separate entities from their apprehending consciousnesses would entail that such objects ultimately existed:

Moreover, in the Prasangika system, if external objects did not exist conventionally, one would have to assert that forms, and so forth, conventionally are mental things (shes pa'i dngos po). In that case, there would be no way that they could be established by an ordinary conventional consciousness that operates without investigating through reasoning and without analysis. Therefore, analyzing by way of a reasoning which examined whether forms, and so forth, are established as the nature of consciousness, one would have to find that they are the nature of consciousness. In that case, form, and so forth, would have to be established by way of its own character, whereby that [this] is the Prasangika system would be a thorough deprecation.

Ngawang Belden is pointing out that the consequence of asserting objects that are not external is that they would be of the nature of consciousness, which the Cittamatra School considers to be truly or ultimately established. Hence, the Prasangika School cannot accept the existence of non-external objects, since that would mean accepting objects that exist by way of their own character. He concludes: "Therefore, the Prasangikas' assertion of external objects meets back to their assertion of imputedly existent nominalities."
Let us conclude this section by taking one last look at the Cittamatra equation of dreams with waking reality in terms of their ability to produce effects. I wish to suggest that Prasangikas might have argued, though they did not, that the Cittamatra explanation that all appearances are equally the manifestation of seeds with the mind-basis-of-all would mean that a dream and a waking experience would have an equal status. This would present several difficulties. For instance, suppose that last night I dreamt that my house burned down, but today I see it standing as though nothing happened. Someone other than a Cittamatrin would naturally say that the dream experience is unreal, having been invalidated by the waking experience; a Cittamatrin, on the other hand, would be forced to admit that both appearances are brought about in the same fashion, leaving no basis for preferring one over the other. Cittamatrins would presumably say that predispositions (bag chags, vasana) for the appearance of a burning house ripened at one time whereas predispositions for the appearance of an unburnt house ripened at another. Hence, our guidelines for action in this universe must be purely pragmatic; since I note that when I appear to be awake (for ripening predispositions are causing the appearance of wakefulness as well as the objects of that experience) my house appears to be whole, I would be prudent to act as though the burnt house of my dream were an illusion. Otherwise, the beings who appear as my relatives and companions in waking life might reasonably conclude that I am no longer mentally competent.

Vasubandhu seems to be aware of such a potential objection, for he apparently denies that the dream experience has the validity of a waking experience, saying:

Because the mind is overcome by sleepiness,

A dream and its effects are different [from a wakeful mind and its object].

In other words, sleep is like a mental impairment that causes a hallucination; thus, one cannot trust the results of such a state of consciousness. Moreover, in such an impaired state, one cannot be held responsible for one's actions, e.g., dreaming of killing an irritating person.

However, Vasubandhu's reply seems somewhat less than convincing since it seems to be inconsistent with his other pronouncements. He has already argued for the reliability and efficacy of dreams—that they can be consistent with respect to place and time, that they can cause physical effects, etc. Moreover, in Cittamatra terms, the "mental impairment" of sleep to which he refers is itself an appearance generated by the ripening of latencies with the mind-basis-of-all. It is a different experience but no more or less real than the experience of being "awake." Thus, in conclusion, Prasangikas might have argued that the example of the dream merely raises new difficulties with the Cittamatra position.
Other Prasangika Criticisms of Mind-Only

Let us conclude this survey of Prasangika arguments against Mind-Only philosophy by considering three points that were not linked to specific Cittamatra School claims concerning the non-existence of external objects. The first is also purportedly" the first Madhyamika School refutation of Mind-Only-a passage from Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa, bodhicittavivarana)58 in which Nagarjuna says that objects and minds are equivalent in terms of existence or non-existence:

A consciousness realizes an object of knowledge.

Without objects known there are no consciousnesses.

In that case, why not assert

That [both] object of knowledge and knower [absurdly] do not exist?

This is taken to mean that without conventionally existent external objects, there would be no objects of knowledge, i.e., nothing would exist (since what cannot be known cannot be said to exist).

The passage in question is ambiguous at best. There is nothing in Nagarjuna's passage to preclude a hypothetical Cittamatra objection that he is referring not to external objects, but only to "knowledges" (rnam rig, vijriana), the dependent natures that Cittamatrins say arise from seeds with the mindbasis-of-all and are one entity with the mind. Asanga, in his Compendium of the Mahayana (2.5), lists fifteen knowledges, all of which are dependent natures 59 Moreover, if Nagarjuna had truly been aware of Cittamatra criticisms of his philosophy, he surely would have replied to them in no uncertain terms. Nevertheless, this statement has been taken to say that the alternative to the existence of external objects is nihilism, since there would be no objects to be known. The conclusion is that since all Buddhists reject nihilism," external objects must exist. Candrakirti's Entrance (VI.92) seems to echo this sentiment:61

If [external] form does not exist, do not hold that mind exists.

Also, if [internal] mind just exists, do not hold that [external] form does not exist.

Jamyang Shayba takes these statements to mean that external objects and minds both either exist or do not exist (the latter being precluded as nihilism).

The second argument we will consider is not one made by Candrakirti or found in the "unique tenets" sections of the tenets books of Janggya or Jamyang Shayba, but comes from observations made by Gungtang, a disciple of Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo (the second Jamyang Shayba), in his book on Cittamatra.62 This is
the argument that without external objects, there could be no objects of perception shared by two or more persons. Gungtang gives one such argument:

Statement of Opinion: Concerning [the way in which the external environment is produced by internal latencies], it then follows that there does not exist a single functioning thing that is an object of perception shared [with another person] because whatever appears to Devadatta's basis-of-all necessarily does not appear to Yajnadatta's basis-of-all. This reason follows because whatever [appears to Devadatta's basis-of-all] is necessarily not an empowered effect of an action by Yajnadatta.

Since all appearances would be generated solely by individual awarenesses (due to individual karmic latencies, established by individual past actions, with the mind-basis-of-all), there could be no object that appeared to more than one person. Hence, Mind-Only thought ultimately entails solipsism.

Even though this argument is not made by Candrakirti or the Gelukba authors whose works are herein translated, it is an obvious criticism that warrants attention since it is one that Vasubandhu anticipated. Vasubandhu considered how one person can affect another in his Twenty Verses (18a):

Knowledges (rnam rig, vijnapti) are mutually determined by The force of one on another.

Vasubandhu, unfortunately, does not explain how persons can mutually influence one another, but simply makes the assertion. In the following two verses (19-20), he gives examples of ways in which the mental power of one person, such as a demon, causes in others a loss of memory, mental anguish, nightmares, or even death. In any case, he seems clearly to deny that persons are so separate that they cannot have mutual-objects.

We might also note that even if he were not to deny the mutual influence of persons, he would not have an insurmountable logical problem for Mind-Only theory. It is quite possible that even if all appearances are generated only by an individual's karmic latencies, there might still be real communication between two individuals or they might simultaneously perceive some third thing or person, but it would be necessary that there be a precise coordination of ripening seeds with those bases-of-all to produce a common appearance. According to Gungtang, the Cittamatra response to the question of solipsism is just that:

It is not the case [that whatever is an empowered effect of an action by Devadatta is necessarily not an empowered effect of an action by Yajnadatta] because there exists a common locus of both. This reason follows because even though there do not exist fruitional effects shared [with another person] there do exist shared empowered effects.
In other words, there is no reason why an appearance should not be caused by the ripening of a latency with not only one individual, but two. Still, according to Janggya,67 although the Cittamatra position is that there are indeed such shared empowered effects, individuals experience different aspects of them—e.g., when two people stand on opposite sides of an object, one sees the front while the other sees the back. This is due to the force of different latencies ripening to produce different appearances in the minds of two different individuals; nevertheless, despite the differences in perspective, etc., the appearance bears many similarities and is in that sense "shared."

Finally, to conclude this survey of Prasangika objections to Mind-Only it is interesting to note that the Cittamatra School does not use the argument that the existence of a mindbasis-of-all, asserted so frequently in the Cittamatra sutras and Cittamatra School treatises, entails the non-existence of external objects. Nevertheless, it is an implicit argument that is set up and demolished by the Gelukbas and thus warrants mention.

It is a little puzzling that the Cittamatrins do not refer to their proofs for the existence of a mind-basis-of-all in the context of their assertions on external objects. It would seem to be a persuasive move, establishing at least the implausibility of external objects, since an important function of a mind-basisof-all is to account for the possibility of appearances without the stimulus of external objects. There are many proofs given for the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. Among those presented in Asariga's Compendium of Ascertainments68 are that if there were no mind-basis-of-all, there would be no continuously operating consciousness to appropriate a new body at the time of rebirth or to be present during "mindless" states such as the meditative equipoise of cessation ('gog pa'i snyoms 'jug, nirodhasamapatti), and there would be no basis for the infusion of karmic latencies.

Despite the absence of a Cittamatra source that even implicitly links the existence of a mind-basis-of-all and the nonexistence of external objects, it is clear that Gelukbas see the issues as related and have raised for themselves the question of whether the establishment of the one would establish the other. Ngawang Belden cites Dzongkaba's argument that one reason for not asserting the existence of a mind-basis-of-all is that external objects are asserted:69

Moreover, because Prasangikas assert external objects it is also established that they do not assert a mind-basis-of-all. Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says:70

Also, a mind-basis-of-all is not posited due to the essential point of asserting external objects. If [a mind-basis-of-all] were asserted, it would have to be asserted in accordance with the statement in Maitreya's Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes (I.4):71
Consciousnesses that perceive

Objects, the sentient, selves, and knowledges are thoroughly produced.

They have no [external] objects.

Because there are no [external objects], there are no [minds apprehending external objects].

Maitreya's statement is taken to mean that minds that apprehend the objects of the senses, the sense-powers, and the mind-basis-of-all—all of which are appearances generated from karmic latencies with the mind-basis-of-all—are all truly existent and have no external objects.

If the existence of a mind-basis-of-all could be established, it would entail the non-existence of external objects, for a mind-basis-of-all just serves the function of accounting for experience in the absence of external objects. Dzongkaba's position, though it is not universally held in Tibet, is just that: the existence of external objects would entail the non-existence of a mind-basis-of-all and conversely the existence of a mindbasis-of-all would entail that there be no external objects. Therefore, because a mind-basis-of-all is refuted, the existence of a mind-basis-of-all cannot serve as a reason for the rejection of external objects (though it does not prove that external objects exist).

In this chapter, we have looked at a number of Cittamatra School arguments against the existence of external objects and at Prasangika rebuttals and counter arguments. We cannot be certain with the Gelukbas that Nagarjuna initiated this debate, but evidently later Prasangikas saw Cittamatrins as a threat of some magnitude because a good deal of space and hostile rhetoric is reserved for them in places such as Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way.

Despite this, Candrakirti and his followers seem to have equivocal attitudes toward Mind-Only. On the one hand, they admit that it can be useful for some people to hear the doctrine of Mind-Only initially, since that will help them to overcome their attachment to forms, i.e., to external objects.72 That explains the acceptance of the "mind-only" scriptures as authentic, for Buddha would not have taught them if they could not have been of use to certain people. There is irony, then, in the fact that the very debate in which the Prasangikas engage the Cittamatrins would seem to undermine the soteriological purpose served by the preservation of distinct, viable systems of thought. However, perhaps the Prasahgikas can be defended by the tradition of Buddhist logic, which rests on the assumption that a process of reasoning brings one closer to the realization of
ultimate reality, that wisdom comes in part from the successful identification and reversal of one's most deeply held beliefs. In any case, those persons not yet capable of understanding the Prasarigika view will probably not be swayed by Candrakirti's arguments; but he presumably hopes that those who are ready to hear about the Middle Way of Nagarjuna will have the good fortune to shed their erroneous Mind-Only conceptions.

The other concern that Candrakirti displays in regard to Mind-Only is that adepts under the sway of Cittamatra philosophy might lose their opportunity for liberation, since they would not gain the liberating realization of ultimate truths, the absence of inherent existence of phenomena. In his Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.79-80), he says:

Those outside of the path of the glorious Nagarjuna

Do not obtain peace.

They fall from conventional truths and the truth of suchness.

There is no liberation for those who fall from those [truths].

For those who achieve [i.e., understand] conventional truths

The achievement of ultimate truths arises.

Those who do not understand how to distinguish those

Enter into bad paths because of their erroneous conceptions.

Because the Cittamatra School does not properly understand conventional truths, considering dependent phenomena to be truly existent and not external to the minds apprehending them, they cannot properly understand ultimate truths, the knowledge of which can deliver one from suffering. Thus, it can be speculated that Candrakirti opposes Mind-Only because he wants to prevent those capable of penetrating the profound Madhyamika view from fruitlessly pursuing a realization of the non-existence of external objects, even though he admits that the Cittamatra approach is suitable for certain persons. With regard to those capable of understanding the Madhyamika but trapped in the Cittamatra view, he might agree with what Bhavaviveka says: adopting the Cittamatra view and then using the Madhyamika philosophy to reject the true existence of the mind is like wallowing in mud so that one can wash and get clean; it would be better not to get dirty in the first place.

Finally, although, as we have seen, there are significant differences between Madhyamika and Cittamatra thought, we should note that historically this did not preclude their conflation. Santaraksita, who founded the Yogacara-SvatantrikaMadhyamika (Yogic Practice-Middle Way-Autonomy School, rnal 'byor
spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa) is one who found the two views basically compatible, for his school rejects inherent existence (ultimately) but also rejects the existence of external objects. According to Gelukba scholars, Prasangikas find āntaraksita's views untenable because he admits that conventionally, things inherently exist, even if they do not exist that way ultimately. For Prasangikas, however, conventional valid cognition does not establish the mode of being of the object, and certainly does not certify it as being inherently existent. Therefore, things do not inherently exist even conventionally.

Indeed, without careful analysis, Prasangikas might well seem to reject external objects themselves, for they certainly refute truly existent external objects and describe phenomena as existing only as nominal designations in dependence on thought; and they are like the Cittamatra School in the broad sense that they propound that phenomena do not stand by themselves, independently of apprehending awarenesses. Indeed, the twentieth-century Gelukba abbot Kensur Yeshey Tupden felt that the Cittamatrins come closer to the Prasangika view than do the other Madhyamikas, the Svaṭantrikas, primarily because they give more primacy to the mind and less to the mind's object. The Svaṭantrikas, after all, do not deny that objects exist from their own side, only that they have a mode of subsistence other than that which can be posited due to the force of the object appearing to consciousness.

However, Prasangikas are unwilling to reject phenomena merely because they cannot withstand analysis, and they are unwilling to suspend the conventions of the world in order to agree that objects do not exist as separate entities from mind. In the end, the Prasangikas attempt to take a middle way between a naive acceptance of the world's conventions accepting objects to exist in the way they appear to exist, whether this means as inherently existent as in the Prasangika view or as external objects as in the Cittamatra view-and rejection of the world's conventions.
When we gaze at an impressive vista or behold the face of a loved one, it is the operation of the eye consciousness, says the Buddhist epistemological tradition of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, that enables us to recall at a later time what we have seen. But sometimes, if not always, we can recall not merely that which was seen, but the very seeing itself. That is, we remember not only the mountain range and the feelings and conceptions that arose as we beheld it, but also the mere awareness that was the seeing itself. This subtle reflexive action occurs, say the epistemologists, through the agency of "selfconsciousness" (rang rig, svasamvedand), a type of consciousness whose object is only another consciousness.

That even ordinary persons can remember not only an object previously experienced but also the awareness that experienced the object is generally accepted, and not only by those who assert self-consciousness, such as the Cittamatrins, but also by the Prasangikas. Proponents of self-consciousness contend that knowledge is like a lamp, not like a measuring weight. A lamp illuminates itself at the same time that it illuminates other things; so, they say, just as we see the lamp itself by the same light with which we see other things, in our acts of knowing we are aware of our knowing—for instance, our visual consciousness itself—at the same time we are aware of the object that is known (in this case, being seen). Opponents of the concept of self-consciousness assert that knowledge is like a measuring weight; it cannot be itself measured at the same time that it measures other things. A weight in one pan of a balance is that by which the heaviness of the object in the other pan is known, but we do not thereby also know the heaviness of the weight; another weight must be set against it to measure it. Similarly, in this model, knowledge knows only its object and must itself subsequently be known by another knowledge.

Within the four principal Buddhist systems of tenets identified by Gelukba scholars, self-consciousness is accepted only by certain Sautrantikas, certain Cittamatrins, and the Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas. Both the Sautrantikas and Cittamatrins are subdivided into those who are "Followers of Reasoning"—followers of the logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti—and others who are "Followers of Scripture." The Followers of Reasoning of these two schools assert the existence of self-consciousness; they are joined by some Followers of Scripture—though not, apparently, Asanga himself—and the Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas, Vaibhasikas, Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas, and Prasarigikas do not accept self-consciousness.

According to Jamyang Shayba, the definition of self-consciousness is: "that
having the aspect (rnam pa, akara) of the apprehender ('dzin pa, grahaka)." That is, a self-consciousness takes on the "aspect"-the semblance-of a consciousness that itself "has the aspect of the apprehended (bzung ba, grhya)," the aspect of the object it apprehends.8

The relation of a self-consciousness to the consciousness it apprehends is a subtle one. A self-consciousness is said to be in a non-dualistic simultaneous relationship with the apprehending consciousness, one in which there is no appearance of subject and object, for the two just seem to be fused. Because of the invariability of their appearance together, they are "one entity" (ngo bo gcig, ekavastu), incontrovertibly concomitant. Nevertheless, a self-consciousness and the consciousness it knows are not identical, and so it is not the case that a consciousness such as an eye consciousness is "self-conscious." That this would seem to be the implication of the term "selfconsciousness" is unfortunate, since a "self"-consciousness is, in fact, a consciousness of another consciousness.

For instance, a self-consciousness of a visual consciousness is not that visual consciousness itself, since as a type of consciousness a self-consciousness is a mental consciousness (yid shes, manovijnana) and a visual consciousness is a sense consciousness (dbang shes, indriyavijnana). For that reason, Lati Rinbochay9 says that although a wrong consciousness-e.g., a visual consciousness that sees snow-covered mountains in the distance as blue, although they are really brown, green, etc.- and its self-consciousness are one entity, the self-consciousness is not itself a wrong consciousness (since it is merely the observer of the visual consciousness).

Also, a consciousness and its self-consciousness have different empowering conditions (bdag rkyen, adhipatipratyaya), that is, different media through which they work. For instance, a visual consciousness is empowered by the eye indriya (sense-power), an invisible but physical aspect of the eye organ, whereas a mental consciousness is empowered by a previous moment of consciousness itself.10 To give another instance, when Lati Rinbochay discusses whether a yogic directly perceiving consciousness (rnal 'byor mngon sum, yogipratyaksa) and its self-consciousness can have the same causal conditions," he says that they cannot have the same empowering condition because self-consciousness, of course, does not arise through the power of meditation. It may seem confusing to impute such differences to things that are said to be one entity, but it needs to be borne in mind that it is not contradictory that two different phenomena that are the same entity have differences, even to the extent of having different empowering conditions. For instance, a table and its emptiness of inherent existence are one entity, but emptiness, a permanent phenomenon, does not have causes, whereas the table itself has many. That a table and its emptiness, or an eye consciousness and its self-consciousness, are one entity means that they are not found apart from one another, not that they are conceptually indistinguishable.

Self-consciousness should not be confused with the mental factor (sems byung,
caitta) called "introspection" (shes bzhin, samprajanya), which also involves the apprehension of consciousness. Introspection has been described as the use of a "corner" of the mind to observe subtly the rest of the mind, "like a spy in wartime." In meditation practice, introspection is essential for the application of mindfulness to mental states. However, introspection is not held to be in a non-dualistic, simultaneous relationship with the consciousness under observation, as is self-consciousness; rather, it is described as either a "corner" of consciousness observing the main consciousness or the observation of a previous moment of consciousness.

Sources for the Debate on Self-Consciousness

Let us first look at the basic assertions of Dignaga, found in the first chapter of his Compendium on Prime Cognition (pramanasamuccaya, tshad ma kun las btus pa). First, Dignaga argues that if self-consciousness were absent, people would be uncertain about the sources of knowledge and would absurdly be unable to exercise the reflective aspect of awareness. He argues that if there were no self-consciousness, an awareness would not be later remembered; therefore, when we reflected on how an object came to be known, we could not be certain whether it appeared all by itself or appeared due to the activity of consciousness being trained upon it. In other words, we would not be able to say that we know things because we deliberately attempted to know them; they would just have appeared. Moreover, this would further imply that because we could have no memory of our instances of knowledge, we also could not achieve the sort of self-consciousness that everyone accepts, the ability to reflect on how we know things and the ability to plan to know in the future what we do not now presently know.

Second, he shows that self-consciousness must exist because a consciousness is necessarily simultaneously known as it knows its own object. He relies on a Cittamatra assumption that a knower and object known are simultaneous to argue: since it is (1) the case that a present awareness knows a present object and (2) we do remember the knowing of something as well as the thing that is known, proving that a knowing of that knowing occurred, that knowing of knowing must have occurred simultaneous with the knowing of an object. As long as we accept that a present mind knows a present object, not one separated from it in time, we are logically led to accept self-consciousness.

Now that we have considered the basic position of proponents of self-consciousness, let us turn to the Madhyamika refutation of that tenet, both in India and Tibet. According to Gelukba scholars, Prasailgikas refute the notion of self-consciousness by arguing that (1) it is not necessary for the functions it is held to perform, (2) its assertion would entail the use of ultimate analysis, which in turn would mean that it is unfindable, and (3) its existence would entail several absurd consequences. The refutation of self-consciousness is traced back to the early Mahayana sutra Questions of Ratnacuda Sutra (ratnacudapariprcchasutra, gtsug na...
If just that which is observed is the mind, how could the mind see the mind? For, for example, a sword-edge is unable to cut just that sword-edge, and a fingertip is unable to touch just that fingertip.

Also, Gelukbas cite several passages in the works of Nagarjuna. In his Refutation of Objections, he says that "Valid cognition is not established by itself," which is taken to mean that there is no self-consciousness. In his Treatise Called "The Finely Woven" (zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo, vaidalyasutranama) he says, "A lamp does not illuminate itself because it is without darkness," a statement taken to imply that self-consciousness is superfluous because consciousness requires no illumination to be known (an argument to which we will return later). Similar statements are made in his most famous work, the Treatise on the Middle Way.

However, the main arguments are from Candrakirti, who is the source of four arguments against self-consciousness." Of the three Gelukba authors whose works are translated here, Jamyang Shayba mainly cites Nagarjuna's arguments that no valid cognition can establish itself and that consciousness, while having a nature of illumination, does not need to illuminate itself, adding little more. Ngawang Belden mentions Nagarjuna's arguments, but is more concerned with extensively working through Candrakirti's four arguments against self-consciousness, mixing in citations from the works of Santideva, Dzongkaba and Kaydrup and providing his own insight into how the postulation of self-consciousness amounts to ultimate analysis. mainly summarizes the material from Candrakirti and Santideva, without quite as much analysis as Ngawang Belden.

Refutation of the Necessity of Self-Consciousness for Later Memory of Consciousness

The basic approach taken by Prasangika critics of self-consciousness is to argue that it is unnecessary, since memory of the subjective aspect of experience can be generated without it. Of the points made by Shayba and Janggja, most are drawn from Candrakirti, but Santideva and Kaydrup also are cited.

Those who assert the existence of self-consciousness regard it as essential for the production of memory. Candrakirti refutes the notion that the existence of memory is a proof of its existence. Ngawang Belden summarizes Candrakirti's presentation in his Entrance to the Middle Way and Candrakirti's own commentary:

The Prasangika School method of refuting those is that it is not feasible to prove [self-consciousness] by the sign of memory because (1) if it were said, "Self-consciousness exists because inherently established memory exists."
The sign would not be established, just as the probandum would not be established\textsuperscript{19} and (2) if it were said that self-consciousness exists because memory exists, since the two, self-consciousness and memory consciousnesses, do not have the relation of [memory] not occurring if [self-consciousness] does not occur, the entailment is indefinite; it would be similar to the proof that since water and fire exist, a water-crystal and fire crystal exist.\textsuperscript{20} For Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says:\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{[Candrakirti's Commentary on the 'Entrance 1 says:]}

Here, if this is treated as proving a substantially established [memory consciousness], since such a memory consciousness does not exist, it is the same as what is being proved [i.e., self-consciousness, in terms of not existing and thus being incapable of serving as a proof]. If it is taken in terms of conventionalities, since self-consciousness is not established for a second party [e.g., a Prasangika], then it and memory are not established as cause and effect. Also, it is explained that the two, (1) the proof that since water and fire exist, [respectively] water-crystals and fire-crystals exist, and (2) the proof that since a memory exists, self-consciousness exists, are similar[ly fallacious].

This is done in terms of treating [memory] as an effect sign and holding self-consciousness to be the predicate of what is proved.

Candrakirti, Dzongkaba, and Ngawang Belden here contend that the existence of memory as the Cittamatrins have described it would not entail self-consciousness. When they propound that self-consciousness exists because memory exists, they posit consciousnesses that are inherently established. Prasangikas assert that if inherently existent or substantially established memory is the reason or sign in such a proof, then both the sign (memory) and the predicate of what which is to be proved, i.e., the probandum (self-consciousness), are equally non-existent.

Those who propound self-consciousness claim that memory, the sign of their proof for self-consciousness, is an "effect sign" ('bras rtags, phalaliriga), one in which the sign is an effect of the predicate of the probandum. For example, in the proof "the subject, fire, exists because smoke exists," smoke, an effect of fire, indicates its existence. Similarly, it is being said that in the proof "the subject, self-consciousness, exists because memory exists," memory is the effect of self-consciousness and indicates its existence.

Prasahgikas deny that relationship. Dzongkaba notes that using memory as a sign of self-consciousness would be like using "object of eye consciousness" as a sign to prove sound is impermanent (which is absurd because sound is an object of an ear consciousness) or inferring the existence of a watercrystal from mere water
(which is absurd because there are many other sources of water). One would either be using an inappropriate sign or would have switched the predicate and sign of the syllogism.

Candrakirti argues that self-consciousness is not necessary for the function it is imputed to serve—facilitating later memory of the subjective aspect of experience—because the memory of a previous consciousness and that previous consciousness are not inherently different. He says, in his Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (VI.74-75):'

If self-consciousness were to be established,

It would not be reasonable that the remembering consciousness have a memory of [a former consciousness]

Because [the previous consciousness and present memory] would be [inherently] other. No such consciousness [could] be generated in one's continuum.

This reasoning precludes any relation [between them].

Because for me this memory is not [inherently] other

Than that [consciousness] by which the object was experienced,

One remembers, "I saw [this earlier]."

This is also the way of worldly conventions.

Candrakirti sees the assertion of self-consciousness as entailing the assertion of an inherent difference between the consciousness that experiences an object and the consciousness that later remembers that earlier consciousness. Perhaps his thought is that the Cittamatra School asserts the existence of self-consciousness precisely because it sees the earlier and later awarenesses as being unrelated and uses self-consciousness to bridge them. In any case, he implicitly argues that since what is inherently other is unrelatedly other, there could be no causal connection between a previous awareness and the later memory of it. Since it is clearly not feasible that there be no connection between a previous experience and the later memory of it, the Cittamatra School is tempted to postulate the existence of self-consciousness, which can somehow mediate between the two.

Candrakirti simply asserts that since these two awarenesses are not inherently other (since, in the Madhyamika view, there is nothing that is inherently other than something else), they are not inherently unrelated (and therefore do not need to be bridged). This is borne out by the fact that no hard distinction between them is made in the conventions of the world; for instance, when referring to a former perception, we merely say, "I saw blue," not, "The self now, of the time of
remembering, which is also the self of the time of the original experience, saw blue," or "Previously I saw blue, which exists now just as it existed then." In other words, the world does not analyze; there is no thought that the self of the past and the present are the same or that the object of the past and the present are the same. Since it is not necessary, in ordinary worldly conventions, to distinguish between a previous experience and present memory, it is unnecessary to posit an intermediary agent that originally was conscious of the experience.

Put another way, self-consciousness is considered to be unnecessary because the original experiencer of the object—e.g., a visual consciousness that sees a blue patch—and the later recollection of that blue patch have the same object. As Dzongkaba boldly says, 26

...it is established that a memory consciousness thinking, "I saw it previously," is generated through the force of the two, the earlier experience of the object, blue, and a later remembering consciousness, engaging in one object.

Dzongkaba is saying that in the conventions of the world, one's recollection of having seen blue is nothing other than a re-engagement with the original blue, not a special engagement with a subsequently generated mental construct. This is an idea at odds with a philosophical model of memory, in which we consider the mechanism of recollection to involve mental images, e.g., as being like the retrieval of stored records which are then displayed on the screen of consciousness. The convention of the world on recollection is simply that the remembering awareness engages the original object: one says, "I saw that," as though the object remembered is the original object, but without any thought that the object seen is the same as or different from the original object. Dzongkaba's solution does not itself explain the memory of a previous awareness; but since memory has the power to reach back to the original object without mediation, it can, presumably, also reach back to the previous awareness, as the world itself implies. It would also seem to be concordant with ~antideva's explanation, to be examined later, that required no previous experience of an awareness in order for that awareness to be recalled later.

Moving on from the issue of how memory can occur without self-consciousness, let us briefly consider the issue of how consciousness can be certified as existing without it. It is a commonplace that objects are validated as existing by consciousnesses; then, is it not reasonable to assume that awarenesses themselves have to be validated by an awareness? Candrakirti's reply is that self-consciousness is not needed as the "certifier" of the previous consciousness—the "registrar" of its existence—in the manner that an eye consciousness is the certifier of a visual object. Candrakirti says, "Mere realization of the aspects of the objects of comprehension establishes the entity of the valid cognition." In other words, consciousnesses are certified simply by operation; the mere apprehension of an object by a sense consciousness or mental consciousness certifies the existence of
that consciousness. It might be objected that in a sense, then, it does certify itself; however, this occurs not by a double movement in which one movement is reflexive and the other directed outward. It is unnecessary that there be a self-consciousness present to certify the awareness.

This also disposes of a pair of objections made by proponents of self-consciousness, who argue that it is necessary that the consciousness that experiences another consciousness be an instance of self-consciousness because if it were a different substantial entity, absurd consequences would follow. Ngawang Belden provides a hypothetical opponent's argument:

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It follows that the subject, the experience of the earlier subject [the consciousness], is a self-experience because it is either a self-experience or other-experience and there is the damage that if it is an other-experience, (1) it would follow that the experiencers would be endless and (2) it would follow that the later consciousness would not distinguish another object. The mode of establishment of the latter two reasons should be known from extensive statements in Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance."29
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The proponent of self-consciousness alleges that two absurd consequences would stem from identifying the experiencer of an earlier consciousness as an other-experiencing consciousness: (1) an infinite regress of consciousnesses and (2) that consciousness would be unable to distinguish another object. This person thinks that if one remembered an earlier consciousness apprehending blue, one would need yet another consciousness to apprehend that remembering consciousness while it apprehended the consciousness apprehending blue, and another to apprehend that consciousness, ad infinitum. Moreover, this remembering consciousness would not be able to distinguish blue because it would be full of its apprehension of the eye consciousness apprehending blue.

However, Candrakirti, by saying that an eye consciousness needs no certifier of its existence other than its own operation, diffuses the criticism that there would be an infinite regress of certifiers. If it is not necessary that a consciousness be remembered in order to be certified, then the first step in the regress is not taken. Also, Dzongkaba, by saying that a previous eye consciousness and a later memory engage in the same object, undermines the argument that a later remembering consciousness is full of its apprehension of the previous eye consciousness and therefore could not remember that eye consciousness's object. Presumably, Dzongkaba would argue that the memory of the previous eye consciousness is simply a different memory than that of the memory of the object seen; or he might argue, as Santideva does below, that the memory of the previously seen object induces the memory of the previous consciousness.

Kaydrup, one of Dzongkaba's two chief disciples, is apparently unsatisfied with Candrakirti's explanation of the certification of consciousness and arrives at his
own alternative. He contends that memories of awarenesses are directly induced by the awarenesses themselves—for instance, that the memory of seeing a patch of blue is directly induced by the eye consciousness; this later remembering consciousness certifies the earlier eye consciousness. This explanation is one that Janggya finds "easier" to understand. Janggya says:

A subsequent remembering consciousness also certifies [a consciousness] because (1) through the power of comprehending blue, without needing the mediation of any other valid cognition, an eye consciousness apprehending blue directly induces a consciousness remembering the apprehension of such and that remembering consciousness itself eliminates the superimpositions of both the non-existence of blue and the non-existence of the eye consciousness apprehending blue, and (2) the remembering consciousness itself validly cognizes the existence of the eye consciousness. This appears to be the thought also of Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate and it is a little easier to realize than the former [i.e., Candrakirti's presentation in his Clear Words].

This would appear in some ways to be just as difficult as Candrakirti's explanation. The simpler aspect is the explanation of the certification of consciousness; an eye consciousness, for instance, is not certified by self-consciousness, nor simply by its own operation (as in Candrakirti's system), but it is certified by another consciousness, namely, the later remembering consciousness. (It is not clear whether Kaydrup and / or Janggya feels that all awarenesses can later be remembered and can therefore be certified in this manner.)

On the other hand, with regard to the generation of memory, Kaydrup seems to be making the rather problematic argument that one's present memory can be induced by one's previous experience without any mediation. For example, Kaydrup seems to be arguing that the eye consciousness with which I saw my friend ten years ago can be said to be the cause both of my memory of that friend today and of my memory of seeing, itself. The apparent difficulty with this explanation is that it allows cause and effect to be separated by a great deal of time. Still, it might be noted that this is parallel to the notion that since an action is not inherently other than the karmic latency that it establishes, it is possible for that action, many eons hence, to produce an effect. (This is the concept of "disintegratedness" [zhig pa, nasta], the subject of the next chapter.) To make the parallel explicit, just as the factor of disintegratedness of the action produces an effect, so here the disintegratedness of the eye consciousness produces a later memory. Once again, like Candrakirti's hypothesis, the argument depends on the assertion that an eye consciousness and the later memory of it are not inherently different.

A third type of explanation for the production of memory without self-consciousness is that proposed by Santideva. In his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.23), he says that the memory of a previous consciousness can be
generated even without any previous experience of the subject 31

If self-consciousness did not exist,

How would a consciousness be remembered?

Memory [of consciousness] occurs due to the relation [of an object] with other-experiencers32

Like [being mindful of] the poison of a rodent.

According to ~antideva, self-consciousness is unnecessary because the earlier object and the consciousness that experienced it are relatedly remembered. For instance, when one remembers having seen a patch of blue, one does so by first of all remembering the patch of blue and then remembering the eye consciousness that saw the patch of blue. It seems that this is not a case of merely inferring that an eye consciousness must have been present, since that would not actually be a memory of a previous awareness, but of experiencing newly what was previously experienced, if it was at all, only in a subliminal way.

Santideva’s example (“...like [experiencing] the poison of a rodent”) concerns a hibernating bear that is bitten by a rodent but does not fully awaken from its slumber. When it awakens in the springtime, it feels the pain of the infection from the bite, and through that remembers the experience of having been bitten. The bite was not experienced at the time it occurred, but only later. Similarly, one does not experience one’s eye consciousness seeing a blue patch at the time it occurs (but only the blue patch itself), only later experiencing the eye consciousness at the time of remembering the blue. In short, Santideva does not claim that there need be any previous experience of a consciousness in order for there to be a subsequent recollection of that awareness.35

The Argument That Mind Is Self-Conscious But Is Not a Self-Consciousness

In addition to their refutation of the need for self-consciousness in the production of the memory of the subjective aspect of experience, Prasarigikas argue that since consciousness is itself knowledge, it is self-certifying and therefore needs knowing no more than a lamp needs illumination. That is, the very entity of consciousness is knowing (it is defined as "clear and knowingi36), just as the very entity of a lamp is light. (Note that a "lamp" is a vessel of oil with a wick that has been lit; an unlit vessel is not a lamp.37) A mind is self-knowing but does not itself know itself, acting as agent on itself, just as a -lamp does not itself illuminate itself.

Many Prasahgika authorities have made this point. Nagarjuna’s Treatise Called "The Finely Woven"(zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo, vaidalyasutranama) says, "A butter-lamp does not illuminate itself because it is without darkness." Santideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.19ab) says 39
"The butter-lamp is not an object of illumination. Why? It is not obscured by darkness." And Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" comments,40

... because just as a butter-lamp itself does not illuminate itself but nevertheless its having luminosity is not precluded, so even though consciousness itself does not experience itself in the manner asserted by those who hold the contrary position, that it has mere experience is not precluded.

Objection: The butter-lamp itself does illuminate itself.

Response: If that were the case, darkness itself would obscure itself, and if that were asserted, just as a pot is not seen in a mass of darkness, darkness also would not be seen.41

Since the lamp is not obscured by darkness, it requires no illumination; the darkness that exists prior to the light is not something in the nature of the lamp. In fact, Prasarigikas deny that a lamp and darkness even meet. Ngawang Belden states z

Darkness and a butter-lamp do not meet. This is because the two, light and darkness, are contradictory in the sense of not abiding together.43

Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (VII.10,11) says:"4

If at the time of a butter-lamp's state of being produced as

It does not meet with darkness,

How, by a butter-lamp's being produced,

Would darkness be illuminated?

If, even without a butter-lamp's meeting darkness,

Darkness is cleared away,

Then the darkness dwelling all over the world

46 Would definitely be removed.

With respect to that reasoning, Dzongkaba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" says:47

Also, with respect to asserting that conventionally a butter-lamp clears away darkness, although the two, a butter-lamp's state of being produced and darkness, must indeed meet, at the time of a butter-
lamp's state of being produced a butter-lamp does not exist; therefore, [a butter-lamp] need not meet with darkness.

In accordance with the assertion that a butter-lamp's clearing away of darkness is established by its own character, if a butter-lamp's state of being produced met with darkness, a butter-lamp would have to exist at that time whereas it does not. Therefore, [Nagarjuna's] is a reasoning which indicates that since [darkness] does not meet [inherently] with a butter-lamp's state of being produced, it is not feasible for a butter-lamp to clear away darkness.48

If a light and darkness met, then light would have to clear away the darkness before it could be seen. Similarly, if consciousness and obscuration met, then consciousness would have to clear away the obscuration before it could be seen. Implicitly, those who propound the existence of self-consciousness are being accused of saying that consciousness is obscured and must be illuminated. Rather, it is being implied, because consciousness has a nature of illumination (or knowing), it is self-certifying (which again, is not a certification of itself by itself, which implies an extra reflexive movement; it is self-certifying simply through its operation) and simply knowable. Also, it would follow that if light illuminated itself, darkness would obscure itself; and if darkness obscured itself, then absurdly darkness could not be seen. Darkness would obscure itself just as it obscures objects like pots in unlit places.

Consciousness shines forth as it knows its objects, and that shining forth is why it needs no further knower in order to be seen clearly at a later time. This, it seems, is finally how these explanations of memory without self-consciousness are justified; we can easily remember even that of which we were not specifically aware earlier simply because awareness shines forth just as does a previously experienced object. To engage in recollection, whether of the previously experienced object or of the consciousness that knew the object, is simple because one was illuminated and the other was simply luminous.

The Objection That Positing Self-Consciousness Would Require Ultimate Analysis

Janggya argues that self-consciousness is not only unnecessary, but it cannot be established by conventional valid cognition:49 "No matter how much one aims the mind, there is no appearance of [the mind] itself as the known and itself as the knower." Those who assert the existence of self-consciousness are not being said to claim that self-consciousness is in turn observed by another consciousness such as another selfconsciousness, ad infinitum; even if they did, Janggya says, there could be no such direct observation. If self-consciousness can be established at all, it must be established through reasoning. But it cannot be established merely through conventional reasoning-reasoning that investigates conventionalities-since self-consciousness, the object about which the reasoning revolves, is held to be
inherently or ultimately established. Therefore, the reasoning upon which proponents of self-consciousness depend is that investigating the ultimate analysis. Ngawang Belden asserts that the establishment of self-consciousness would "obviously" require ultimate analysis:

If self-consciousness were asserted it would be necessary to assert that it is able to bear the analysis of a reasoning [consciousness] searching for the imputed object, because searching for a means of positing [or certifying] a consciousness, that is, whether it is self-experiencing or the object of experience of another [consciousness], is a mode of searching for an imputed object which is even more obviously [a case of ultimate analysis] than searching [to see whether] a sprout is produced from self or produced from [that which is inherently] others.'

What does Ngawang Belden mean in this context by ultimate analysis? Let us first consider the reasoning concerning a sprout and seed that he uses as an analogy. Beginning with Nagarjuna, Prasaingika explorations of the possibilities for the production of a sprout consider four options; in Gelukba exegeses these are presented as the possibilities that: (1) a sprout is produced from itself; (2) it is produced from that which is inherently other than it; (3) it is produced both from itself and from that which is other than it; and (4) it is produced causelessly. Such analysis is ultimate analysis because it constitutes a search for that which exists ultimately, in this case a mode of production in which the sprout does not arise in dependence on a seed.

The Prasangika method to ascertain whether or not a sprout inherently exists (which for them also means that it ultimately exists) is to search analytically for a sprout as being produced in any of these four ways. Such ultimate analysis into the cause and effect of seed and sprout is bound to fail at its proposed goal of finding the cause of the sprout. A sprout cannot produce itself, since that would entail that it already existed at the time of its production, in which case its reproduction would be unnecessary; or, since it must produced even though it already exists, its production and re-production would be endless. Nor can a sprout be produced from that which is inherently other than it. Things that are inherently other must be completely unrelated, since if they were related, they would be posited in dependence on each other and would not be inherently different. If something can be a cause of something that is unrelated to it, then it would absurdly follow that darkness could be caused by a lamp, or that rice could absurdly grow from a barley seed, and so forth." Since neither self-production nor production from (what is inherently) other is feasible, the third possibility, the conjunction of both, is rejected; the fourth possibility is rejected because, for instance, if a sprout were causeless, it would be absurd to plant a field since it would arise without seeding.

With regard to the production of a sprout, it is not ultimate analysis to merely observe that a sprout is produced from a seed and that the two are different. Rather, this is a determination based not on the sort of analysis just indicated, but
on the most mundane sort of inquiry. It is simply well known in the world that a sprout arises from a seed, but when people in the world assert that relationship, they do not do so within assuming that a seed and sprout are inherently other. Hence, a seed and a sprout are conventionally, or nominally, cause and effect.

This brings us to the question of how the relationship between a previous experience and later memory is like that of a seed and sprout. The question concerns the production of a later memory of a previous experience: is the consciousness at a previous time self-experienced, or is it experienced by another consciousness? For instance, was the eye consciousness that apprehended a patch of blue (and which is currently being remembered) apprehended by self-consciousness at the time it occurred, or is the memory of this eye consciousness the result of a later consciousness? (Note that in order for this example to be parallel, the latter option would have to be understood to be a case of inherent otherness, i.e., that the eye consciousness and its experiencer are inherently other.) The latter option is easy to dispose of through the same sort of analysis done with respect to a seed and sprout that are conceived to be inherently other: if the eye consciousness and its experiencer (such as a later remembering consciousness) are inherently other, they would be unrelatedly other, entailing the absurd consequence that an eye consciousness apprehending blue could cause a later memory of an eye consciousness apprehending red or an ear consciousness hearing an echo, since there would be no definite relation between the cause and the effect. But the first option is absurd as well, for as the Questions of Ratnacuda Sutra says, and all the Prasangikas repeat, if a consciousness could know itself then absurdly a sword can cut itself, a finger touch itself, an eye see itself, gymnasts stand on their own shoulders, and so on.

Again, since none of those possibilities can withstand analysis, the only acceptable possibility for the production of later memory is to posit merely nominal experience by other: a later memory occurs because a previous experience, such as an eye consciousness, is apprehended by a later consciousness. In the conventions of the world, it is well known that one only later recalls a previous experience: "I saw that." By "I saw" is indicated the recollection of previous experience, and by "that" is indicated the object of that experience (which is, at the same time, the object of one's present experience, the subject of the statement). However, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, often not even this much is said in the conventions of the world. For instance, one might plant a seed, and later point to the sprout and say, "I planted that," not explicitly or implicitly distinguishing between the seed that was planted and the sprout that was the effect of the seed. Just so, when one sees a blue patch and later points to the patch, saying, "I saw that," one does not distinguish the previous blue from the blue that is its effect (a later moment of similar type of blue, but not, due to the moment-by-moment disintegration of impermanent things, the same patch of blue).

The Prasarigika authors, avoiding ultimate analysis when positing conventional phenomena, simply say that one remembers at a later time what was
The two, previous experience and later memory, are not others established by way of their own character. It has already been explained [earlier in the sixth chapter, verse 32 of the Entrance] that the conception of substantial cause and effect—for instance, seed and sprout—as others established by their own character does not exist in an ordinary worldly awareness. Just so, the two, previous experience and later memory, not only are not conceived by an innate worldly awareness to be others established by their own character, but also when one later remembers the object seen in the previous apprehension of blue, one uses the verbal convention, "I saw this previously also."

Although such is indeed the case, one does not think, "The self of the time of remembering is the self of the time of [previous] experience," and one does not use the verbal convention, "Previously I saw the blue which was qualified by being the object which subsists [both] at the time of this utterance and the time of the [previous object]." Therefore, the verbal convention is not factually discordant. For example, it is like the fact that in the world, even though one uses the verbal convention, "I hurt," when one's hand hurts, it is not a case of thinking, "This hand is me," and so forth, and hence the verbal convention is not factually discordant. An ordinary worldly awareness does not have the conception that such experience and memory or the two objects at those times are others established by their own character. Therefore, it is not the case that the [object] experienced and distinguished by the consciousness that earlier experienced it is not later experienced or distinguished by the consciousness which remembers that, whereby the remembering consciousness thinking, "I saw this earlier too," comes to be generated. This is the way of worldly convention; it is not to be taken as a case of positing something upon analysis by way of searching for an imputed object because it is a worldly convention that has a sense of falseness in that when the imputed object is sought it is not found.

Gelukbas do explain that conventionally, a seed and sprout, or a previous and later moment of a patch of blue, are different substantial entities, even though they are not substantially existent (since, for them, that would mean that they are inherently existent). That is, conventional valid cognition such as a sense consciousness can determine the difference between a seed and a sprout and a former and a later moment of blue. However, Ngawang Belden points out that in the world they are not ordinarily conceived to be so. They are ordinarily not even conceived to be other, as when we say, of a tree, "I planted this," when in fact we planted a seed. Similarly, we do not ordinarily conceive that the blue we experienced in the past and the blue of our current recollection are different.
To reconcile the apparent contradiction between what ordinary people say and what conventionally exists, Ngawang Belden appears to be making a difference between what is well known to the world (‘jig rten la grags pa) and what is well known to an ordinary worldly awareness (‘jig rten rang ‘ga’ ba’i blo la grags pa). The first category appears to be broader; everything established for conventional valid cognition except emptiness, i.e., all conventional truths, is well known to the world. Perhaps this means that these phenomena are all within the purview of an awareness that is not turned toward emptiness, even if that awareness belongs to someone who is not ordinary, i.e., is a Superior, one who has realized emptiness directly, but who is not engaged in meditation on emptiness at that time. Moreover, the distinctions that philosophers make about ordinary and non-ordinary worldly conventionssuch as that eyes have as their own unique objects of apprehension only color and shapes, not bodies, etc., or that the deceptiveness of reflections is an appropriate metaphor for the deceptiveness of conventional phenomena, which appear to inherently exist but do not-may be well known to the world, but certainly are not well known to an ordinary worldly awareness.

The second category-renown to an ordinary worldly awareness-precludes anything not obvious to an ordinary person; for example, that there is a difference between the seed that is the substantial cause of a tree and the tree itself is well known to the world but is not well known to an ordinary worldly awareness because an ordinary person, considering the production of a tree, does not even conceive of the seed and tree as different: "I planted that." Excluded from either category, of course, are beliefs that are not established by valid cognition.

Distinctions such as these seem to be a natural outcome of reflections on Candrakirti's call to respect the conventions of the world; but do they in fact exceed his intentions by overanalyzing what the world says? I would argue that they do not, since the Gelukbas do not actually affirm anything that Candrakurti himself does not affirm and do not reject anything that Candrakirti himself does not reject. Still, we can see that the very existence of the distinctions made by Jamyang Shayba and Ngawang Belden indicates that it is not easy to determine what it means to uphold the world's conventions.

In conclusion, Prasangikas see self-consciousness as a concept in opposition to worldly conventions and one that is not necessary to explain the formation of memory. They propose several models of memory that reflect the conventions of the world and avoid the assumption of a metaphysical entity the establishment of which would require ultimate analysis. As in their defense of external objects, their reasoning stems from the fundamental rejection of inherent existence even conventionally.
Disintegration and the Three Times

Traditional accounts of the Buddha's enlightenment such as the introduction to the Life Stories (skyes pa rabs kyi gleng gzhi, jatakanidana) state that in the last watch of that night he discovered the causal chain that binds sentient beings in cyclic existence ('khor ba, samsara), the round of transmigration. With the insight produced by profound mindfulness, he saw the causation of suffering: that death is caused by birth; birth by the "ripening" of a seed for rebirth; that ripening by grasping; grasping by attachment; attachment by contact; contact by the six senses; the six senses by mind and body; mind and body by consciousness; consciousness by action; and action by ignorance. These he called the twelve links of dependent-arising (rten 'byung, pratityasamutpada), the chain of cause and effect originating with ignorance and terminating in death that underlies cyclic existence.

This chapter is concerned with the final link, in particular with the implications arising from the seemingly innocuous assertions that death is something that is produced and something that can act as a cause. In a wider sense, we will be concerned with issues surrounding the disintegration of impermanent things. Gelukba treatments of the topic of disintegration begin with Buddha's statement, in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (mdo sde sa bcu pa, dasabhumika-sutra, "Aging and death [are produced] by the condition of birth," which is taken to indicate the Buddha's realization that death is not a mere absence of life, but life's destruction, a state produced indirectly but inexorably from the creation of life itself. That is, since death does not come into existence without birth, it belongs to the sphere of conditioned or compounded phenomena (dus byas kyi chos, samskrtadharma). Moreover, in that sutra he identified two functions that death performs:

Death subsists in two activities: (1) it causes a compounded phenomenon to disintegrate and (2) it issues forth the cause of the non-severance of the continuum of thorough nonknowingness [i.e., ignorance].

Armed with these passages, which undeniably indicate a scriptural basis for the position that death is both caused and acts as a cause, Gelukba Prasangikas have attempted to demonstrate that, analogously, the "death" or, more strictly, "deadness" of past actions (las, karma)-their state of having disintegrated after being produced, or, in an abbreviated way, their "disintegratedness" (zhig pa, nasta)-also produced and may have effects. Actions, like all impermanent phenomena, disintegrate moment-by-moment. For example, swatting a fly in anger, immediately disintegrating, gives rise to the "disintegratedness" of the action of swatting. In brief, Prasangikas from Candrakirti onward assert that this
action's state of having ceased has been caused (by the disintegratedness of the action's causes) and that it is capable of producing the effect of the action (such as an episode or entire lifetime of experience) in the future.

By identifying "disintegratedness" as a functioning thing, i.e., an impermanent, caused, potent phenomenon that disintegrates moment-by-moment and is able to perform a function,' Prasangikas contradict most other Buddhist tenet systems, which identify disintegratedness as a permanent, uncaused, non-disintegrating phenomenon. The sole exception among other Buddhist schools is the Vaibhasika School, which also labels disintegratedness as a functioning thing, but the Prasarigika School diverges from it as well: Gelukba Prasangikas explain that even though the disintegratedness of an action may exist at the present time, the action that has disintegrated no longer exists, whereas the Vaibhasika School holds that the past action exists as an action even at the time of its having disintegrated. Similarly, the Vaibhasika School asserts that the futureness of an action—the fact that its basic causes exist although its supporting conditions are not yet complete—exists even at the present time. For instance, for them, a sprout actually exists even at the time of the seed from which it will sprout (a position also said to be held by the non-Buddhist Samkhya). Other Buddhist schools, including the Prasarigika School, deny that a sprout exists at the time of the seed; Gelukba exegetes say that it is permissible to say only that even though at that time the sprout does not exist, the sprout exists as the entity of the seed, which amounts to saying that a seed exists that will, upon the aggregation of the proper conditions, become a sprout.

The disagreement between the various Buddhist schools over the status of disintegratedness does not extend to the mere disintegration of things, for disintegration is one of the three characteristics of compounded phenomena set forth by the Buddha (the other two being production and endurance). No one denies that disintegration exists as an impermanent phenomenon, but according to Gelukba scholars, all schools other than the Prasangika and Vaibhasika Schools make a radical distinction between disintegration (jig pa) and disintegratedness (zhig pa), saying that disintegratedness is the mere absence of the phenomenon that has been extinguished, and therefore is a mere negative or non-affirming negative (med dgag, prasajyapratisedha), a permanent phenomenon that is both uncaused and incapable of acting as a cause.

According to Gelukba explanations of the Prasangika School, on the other hand, disintegration and disintegratedness are generally related in the same way that dying and death are related. For instance, when a person is dying, that person exists; however, when that person has died, it is no longer possible to posit a person, for a corpse cannot serve as the basis of imputation for a person (in other words, a dead "person" is not a person). Only that person's "deadness"—the actuality of his/her having died—exists. In the same way, while a thing disintegrates, that thing exists, for its production, endurance, and disintegration occur simultaneously and comprise the thing's "own time," its presentness. However,
when that thing has disintegrated, it no longer exists; only its disintegratedness, its factor of having disintegrated, exists. Disintegration and disintegratedness, like dying and death, are, in general, sequential.'

From a different angle, it could also be said that when a thing disintegrates, its disintegration continues, for disintegratedness is said to be part of the "activity" of disintegration. Ngawang Belden says.'

In the Prasangika system, it is asserted that since disintegratedness and disintegration are not mutually exclusive, a pot's disintegratedness is also a pot's disintegration. Moreover, the assertion that "a pot's disintegration" is the activity of a pot's disintegration is an assertion agreeing with the Sautrantikas and above. However, Prasarigikas assert that both a pot's not enduring and not having endured in the second [moment after] its own time are activities of a pot's disintegration; therefore both a pot's approaching to disintegratedness and a pot's disintegratedness are activities of a pot's disintegration.

For example, it is asserted that [disintegratedness being an activity of disintegration] is similar to the fact that both a sprout's approaching to production and a sprout's production are activities of a sprout's production.

Prasarigikas find that a pot's disintegratedness, its "not having endured," is part of the activity of a pot's disintegration, its "not enduring." Since disintegratedness is included within disintegration, a thing's disintegratedness is also its disintegration.' Like disintegration, then, disintegratedness is an impermanent phenomenon. The other Buddhist schools hold that a pot's disintegration is just its approaching to disintegratedness, which is simultaneous with pot's own time and does not include its disintegratedness, which occurs in the moment after its own time. (A thing's "own time" is just the moment in which it is present, so the following moment is not its own time, but rather is the moment of its disintegratedness.) Ngawang Belden asserts that the same relationship holds for approaching to production and to production itself, which are both activities of production.

However, disintegration is not necessarily disintegratedness; for instance, at the moment a pot is present, it is disintegrating (as are all impermanent phenomena) but has not disintegrated, and hence, its disintegratedness does not yet exist. This relationship is a further indication that disintegratedness is impermanent, because disintegration, of which it is a part, is impermanent.

Moreover, there is a sense in which the process of disintegration never ends, since disintegratedness itself disintegrates, producing its own disintegratedness, and so forth, in an endless series that begins with the production of the thing itself. There must, in fact, be an infinite regress, for once something has disintegrated, it always has disintegrated; even when an action, via its disintegratedness, has
brought forth an effect, its status as something that has disintegrated could not change. (This may be why disintegratedness is said to be the main activity of disintegration.) The Sagya (sa skya) scholar Dak-tsang,10 who is Jamyang Shayba's favorite target due to his criticisms of Dzongkaba, is held by Jamyang Shayba to have objected to this endless series on the grounds that it constituted an absurd endless regress:11

Daktsang: It [absurdly] follows that the disintegratedness of a pot is endless because there is disintegratedness also of pot's disintegratedness!

Reply: There is no entailment [that because there is disintegratedness also of pot's disintegratedness that the disintegratedness of pot is endless]. Then, it would [absurdly] follow [for you] that although pot is impermanent it is endless because there is impermanence also of pot's impermanence. You asserted the entailment.

Another Incorrect Position: It [absurdly] follows that pot's disintegratedness and another disintegratedness of that and yet another are endless because of your assertion.

Response: That is acceptable.

Incorrect position: It [absurdly] follows that the disintegratedness of a pot is not established because the disintegratedness of that and another and another are endless.

Response: There is no entailment [that because disintegratedness involves an endless progression, that the disintegratedness of a pot is not established]. It [absurdly] follows that pot's production is not established because [according to you,] with respect to the time of pot's production, the time of pot's cause, the time of the cause of that, [etc.,] would be endless.

This seems to be a disjointed dialogue because Jamyang Shayba at first claims that there is endless regress and then, admitting that the series is endless, denies any fallacy involved with it. In any case, he finds it just as reasonable to say that upon the disintegration of a disintegratedness, a disintegratedness of a disintegratedness is produced, and so on, as it is to say that a pot's impermanence is impermanent, as is the impermanence of a pot's impermanence, and so on, or to say that a pot's cause has a cause, its cause's cause has a cause, and so on.

Other schools consider disintegration and disintegratedness to be mutually exclusive. They admit that disintegration is an activity, but hold that disintegratedness is not, being a mere absence of something upon its disintegration. Hence, they claim that disintegratedness is a "non-affirming" negative (med dgag, prasajyapratisedha), a phenomenon neither caused nor capable of producing an effect. (Non-affirming negatives are phenomena such as
emptiness, the negation of a phenomenon's inherent existence; they are mere negatives, negatives that imply nothing positive in their place. On the other hand, a phrase like "treeless plain" involves an affirming negative, since "plain" is affirmed.)"

The seemingly minor topic of disintegratedness becomes important because Gelukba Prasarigikas are interested in avoiding the pitfalls of the various explanations put forward by other schools to account for the transmission of karmic potentials from one life to the next. Other tenet systems posit various substantially existent entities to serve as karmic seedholders or as bases of the "infusion" of karmic seeds that are themselves conceived to be substantially existent. The problem faced by all Buddhist tenet systems, which share with most other Indian philosophical systems a cosmology based on the notions of karma and reincarnation, is that there must be a continual basis for such latencies or, otherwise, actions and their effects would not necessarily be related.

Gelukbas contend that most of the subschools comprising the Vaibhasika School (from what they have gathered from close reading of Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge) assert that karmic latencies have "acquisition" (thob pa, prapti), a factor of adherence that causes the latencies to remain attached to the continuum of the sentient being who has acquired them. Several other subschools-the Sarvastivada, Vibhajyavada, and Sammitiya-assert "non-wastage" of actions (las chud mi za ba, karmavipranaga), that the potencies of karma persist until their fruition without being "wasted." Kashmiri Vaiibhasikas, Sautrntikas, and the SautrantikaSvatantrika-Madhyamika School consider the continuum of mind to be the basis of infusion," while Cittamatrins and the Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika School propound a mindbasis-of-all.

According to Gelukba scholars, Prasangikas hold that it is not necessary to posit any of these possibilities. Rather, a factor of actions themselves (their disintegratedness), which requires neither intervening causes nor making actions into permanent entities, is responsible for the production of effects. The Prasangikas have, in fact, made it possible to change the terminology of karmic cause and effect. It is no longer necessary to say that actions establish "seeds" for future effects. It is also no longer necessary to say that they are held in a neutral medium until ripened by appropriate conditions into an individual fruition, for each virtuous or non-virtuous action has a later continuum-its continuum of disintegratedness- that serves to link the action and its effect. It might be said that for Prasarigikas, the disintegratedness of actions simply performs the same functions that, in other explanations, are performed by a karmic seed.

In addition, saying that the disintegratedness of actions produces future effects allows Prasarigikas to avoid explaining that actions persist without disintegrating. This is a consequence that could be flung at proponents of "acquisition" and "non-wastage" and is flung at Daktsang:"
If [as Daktsang says] that which has been done—the utterance of harsh speech, and so forth-produced effects by means of not having disintegrated, then even though many aeons had passed, those [actions which had] not issued forth their effects would have to exist even now. Hence, why is it that even though [the actions of] the three-body, speech, and mind—which were performed in earlier [lifetimes] also would not have been destroyed, they not only are not seen but not remembered? Whoever makes such an explanation has already been refuted earlier.

Daktsang has been interpreted by Jamyang Shayba to hold the idea that actions themselves persist without disintegrating in some manner over time until their effects issue forth. It would then absurdly follow that those actions would exist now, and we would see (experience) them, remember them, and endlessly re-live them.

The remainder of this chapter will, after a section on the position of non-Prasangikas, examine specific arguments, based on either scripture or reasoning, for considering disintegratedness to be a functioning thing. Whereas the Indian sources for previous "unique tenets" have been somewhat slim, in this area there is much to cite from the sutras and from the seminal Madhyamikas, Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, and Candrakirti. All of the Gelukba authors in this study quote liberally from the Indian sources; Jamyang Shayba, as usual, makes that his main concern, whereas Ngawang Belden often adds the commentaries of Dzongkaba and occasionally cites Kaydrup. As has been the case previously, Candrakirti is the principal Gelukba source, particularly with regard to four sets of reasonings. However, each Gelukba author treats this material differently. Janggya ignores the reasonings altogether; Jamyang Shayba just announces them and cites a passage from a luminary such as Candrakirti. Ngawang Belden, however, supplies an analysis of each argument. On the other hand, with regard to the ancillary topic of the three times, Ngawang Belden uncharacteristically adds no annotations to Jamyang Shayba's explanation (which relies on Candrakirti); also, both Jamyang Shayba and Janggya, but not Ngawang Belden, carefully explain why positing disintegratedness as a functioning thing does not involve ultimate analysis.

Why Non-Prasangikas Do Not Consider Disintegratedness to Be a Functioning Thing

Proponents of True Existence (dngos smra ba, bhkvavadin) is the name Gelukbas give to those who belong to Buddhist tenet systems that propound, explicitly or implicitly, that phenomena necessarily inherently exist. (As before, Gelukbas make such designations based on their interpretation of the manner in which those schools posit phenomena, not necessarily on explicit statements made by them.) As noted earlier, except for the Vaibha$ika School these schools consider disintegratedness to be a permanent phenomenon. Why? The first reason identified by Janggya and Ngawang Belden18 (who expand on Dzongkaba's
Illumination of the Thought), is that the **Proponents of True Existence assume that when an object such as a sprout is destroyed, everything that is part of that sprout is destroyed. Dzongkaba says:**

In the former systems, they think: When a [functioning] thing such as a sprout has disintegrated, everything that is part of the sprout is obliterated. Since one does not get any other thing that is different from a sprout, such as a pot, they assert that disintegratedness is utterly not a [functioning] thing. [Also,] neither the [functioning] things among the separate sense-spheres, such as blue, nor that which is a collection of the [functioning] things which are its parts, such as a pot, are suitable to be illustrations of that [sprout's] disintegratedness. Therefore, [they think that disintegratedness] is not a [functioning] thing.

In the latter [i.e., Prasangika] system, for example, one cannot posit (1) Upagupta's individual five aggregates, (2) their collection, or (3) that which is a different entity from those two as an illustration of Upagupta, and Upagupta is also unsuitable to be an illustration of those three. However, it is not contradictory that despite that, what is designated as Upagupta in dependence on his aggregates is a [functioning] thing. Similarly, even though disintegratedness also cannot [be posited] as an illustration of either the thing which has been destroyed or anything which is the same type as that [former object], it is a [functioning] thing because it is produced in dependence on a thing that is destroyed.

In other tenet systems it is felt that for something to be a functioning thing there must be an illustration that one can point to, as is the case with a patch of blue or a pot. But concerning the disintegratedness of a pot, what can one point to? Neither a part or quality of the pot, such as its color, nor the pot itself (the whole comprising many parts) is suitable to be an illustration of disintegratedness. Non-Prasargikas conclude from this that there is no functioning thing that can be a disintegratedness, and hence, disintegratedness must be permanent. For them, a mere nominal designation could not be a functioning thing. An illustration of something must be that thing. However, Dzongkaba says that Prasangikas, who assert that all phenomena are mere nominal designations, have no such problem. Just as it is possible to designate a person named Upagupta in dependence on a certain collection of the aggregates of mind and body even though Upagupta is not any of the aggregates, their collection, or a different entity from them (being a mere nominal designation in dependence on those aggregates), so it is possible to designate the phenomenon disintegratedness even though it is not the thing which has been destroyed or a later moment of similar type of that thing. The crucial point is that Upagupta is merely designated in dependence upon his aggregates, not to those aggregates.

*The Proponents of True Existence do admit the mere nonexistence of the*
sprout, but they consider this non-existence to be a permanent phenomenon, just as space, the absence of obstructions, is permanent, i.e., non-disintegrating. According to Gelukbas, Prasangikas reply that although when a sprout is destroyed, it no longer exists, there is in addition to the absence of that sprout a functioning thing, namely, the disintegratedness that is its factor of having disintegrated.20

Scriptural Proofs That Disintegratedness Is a Functioning Thing

The scriptural proofs used by Janggya, Jamyang Shayba, and Ngawang Belden are based on the passage from the Sutra on the Ten Grounds cited at the beginning of this chapter (though it is asserted that many Perfection of Wisdom sutras agree): "Aging and death [are produced] by the condition of birth"; and, "Death subsists in two activities: (1) it causes a compounded phenomenon to disintegrate and (2) it issues forth the cause of the non-severance of the continuum of thorough non-knowingness [i.e., ignorance]." They also depend, though to a lesser degree, on the writings of Nagarjuna, which are considered virtually as authoritative as Buddha's own words. In his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (rigs pa drug cu pa, yuktisastika, 20ab), he says,21 "Peace [i.e., death] due to exhaustion of causes / Is realized as 'exhaustion.'" That passage is adduced to show that disintegratedness is both caused and acts as a cause.

The first proof from the Sutra on the Ten Grounds is simply the assertion that disintegratedness is a caused phenomenon, based on the statement in that sutra that, "Aging and death [are produced] from the condition of birth." Because disintegratedness is a caused phenomenon, it is necessarily impermanent and a functioning thing, since caused phenomenon, impermanent phenomenon, and functioning thing are equivalent. None of the Gelukba authors goes on to explain precisely how birth causes death; however, on the basis of the example of a butter-lamp dying out, where the lighting of a lamp is the cause of the disintegratedness of the wick and fuel, which in turn causes the disintegratedness of the lamp, it can be supposed that it is birth that causes the exhaustion of life that in turn causes the death of a person.

The second proof from scripture concerns the statement in that sutra that "Death subsists in two activities: (1) it causes a compounded phenomenon to disintegrate and (2) it issues forth the cause of the non-severance of the continuum of thorough non-knowingness [i.e., ignorance]." Death's two activities are its causing (1) the disintegration of a sentient being and (2) the continuance of ignorance, i.e., the continuity of the karmic residues established directly or indirectly by ignorance, the misconception of an inherently existent self. None of the Gelukba authors explain further the first of these two functions, that death causes the disintegration of a sentient being. Dzongkaba clearly states with reference to the Sutra on the Ten Grounds that72 "Death is the disintegratedness of a sentient being who has died," but if by "death" in this passage is meant a sentient being's disintegratedness, it in fact could not be the cause of a sentient being's
disintegration. Disintegration occurs prior to disintegratedness and is its cause; similarly, death (or deadness) is caused by dying and is the second phase of the activity of dying. Rather, the passage must either indicate that death is not the disintegratedness of a sentient being or must refer to a second meaning for "death," viz., that death is the disintegratedness not of a sentient being but of the causes for the sentient being's life. That "death" has the latter meaning is consistent with the illustration that Dzongkaba himself uses (and which is examined in the following section) of the consumption of the wick and fuel of a butter-lamp. With regard to the consumption of the wick and fuel being the cause of a butter-lamp's dying out he says that the consumption, or disintegratedness, of the wick and fuel is not the disintegratedness of the lamp itself, but only of the causes of the lamp. Similarly, with death being understood as the disintegratedness of the causes for life and not the disintegratedness of the sentient being who has died, death is indeed the cause of a sentient being's having disintegrated.

Except for the Vaibhasika School, Buddhist schools, operating from the Buddha's teaching that all things are impermanent (mi rtag pa, anitya), hold that something that disintegrates requires no causes other than its own production in order to disintegrate, for disintegration is in its nature. Also, all but the Vaibhasika School hold that a thing's production, endurance, and disintegration occur simultaneously. That is because products last for only a single moment, and therefore all the activities associated with its present moment-its "own time"must occur in that single moment. Since something disintegrates in the same moment it is produced, without the need for any further causes, the causes for the production of something are also the causes for its disintegration. Similarly, the disintegratedness of those causes is the cause for the disintegratedness of the thing itself. If something's causes did not disintegrate, the thing would continue, whereas if they disintegrate, the thing also disintegrates. The causes of a thing's production, endurance, and disintegration occur in the moment prior to its "own time" (the moment it is present). The disintegratedness of those causes occurs in the next moment, the "own time" of the thing itself, the moment of its production, endurance, and disintegration. Therefore, the disintegratedness of a thing's causes brings about the disintegratedness of the thing itself in a subsequent moment.

Death is also said to cause the non-severance of the continuum of ignorance. That is, death causes the continuation of the karmic latencies generated directly or indirectly by ignorance (for even latencies produced by desire, hatred, etc., are produced on a basis of ignorance). As long as death and disintegratedness are equated (i.e., that death is taken to mean "deadness"), this is basically another way of saying that the disintegratedness of an action preserves its potency to produce an effect until the time of its fruition. The latencies, of course, must be carried over to succeeding transmigrations or the whole doctrine of action and effect would collapse. Actually, death must preserve more than just the continuum of ignorance, for Arhats, who also die and are reborn (though not due to the force of afflictive karma) have predispositions for mistaken dualistic appearance-the
obstructions to omniscience—that are established by ignorance and must be carried over.

_In addition to these proofs based on the Sutra on the Ten Grounds, Jamyang Shayba also attempts to show that Nagarjuna himself held that disintegratedness is a functioning thing, because in the Treatise on the Middle Way in the chapter on nirvana (XXV.13) Nagarjuna says:'_

How can nirvana

Be both a thing and the non-existence of a thing?

Nirvana is an uncompounded phenomenon

And things and the non-existence of things [i.e., their disintegratedness] are compounded phenomena.

This stanza forms a portion of Nagarjuna’s refutation of the four extremes concerning nirvana, which are, according to Gelukba exegetes: that it is a [functioning] thing; that it is a non-thing [i.e., a thing’s having become non-existent, its disintegratedness, which is also a thing]; that it is both a thing and a non-thing; or that it is neither. Here he says that nirvana is not both a thing and non-thing because those are both caused whereas nirvana is uncaused. This unusual interpretation of the term "non-thing" (dngos med, abhava) as a disintegratedness, and hence a functioning thing, rests on Candrakirti’s comments’ that a thing is caused and thus is a compounded phenomenon, but so also is a non-thing, since it arises in dependence on a thing and the Sutra on the Ten Grounds says that aging and death are caused by birth. In brief, according to Gelukba exegetes, even though the main point of the passage is to show that nirvana is uncompounded, it also shows that Nagarjuna classifies disintegratedness as a thing, i.e., as a compounded phenomenon. Ngawang Belden relates Nagarjuna’s statement on non-things to not asserting inherent existence:27

[Nagarjuna] says that both a [functioning] thing and its absence upon its destruction are compounded phenomena because that also has its source in not asserting that [a phenomenon is established] by its own character (rang mtshan, svalaksana).

Ngawang Belden sees Nagarjuna as rejecting the attempt to label disintegratedness as a permanent phenomenon, i.e., a non-affirming negative, because that would involve the assertion of an inherently existent entity, one findable upon analysis. Ngawang Belden does not explain this further, but clearly sees this as a support for the sort of argument that Jamyang Shayba makes, discussed later in this chapter, that the assertion of disintegratedness as a non-affirming negative involves ultimate analysis.
Logical Proofs That Disintegratedness Is a Functioning Thing

In addition to their scriptural proofs, Prasarnigikas set forth a number of reasonings concerning disintegratedness. The principal arguments are made by Candrakirti in his Clear Words, where he sets forth four reasons to prove that disintegratedness is a functioning thing. However, let us first turn to the earlier statements of Nagarjuna and his chief disciple, Aryadeva.

Nagarjuna, in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (rigs pa drug cu pa, yuktisastika) states that death (the disintegratedness of a sentient being) is caused by the exhaustion of causes for the continuation of life:

Peace [i.e., death] due to exhaustion of causes is realized as "exhaustion."

Candrakirti comments that:

... since if the conditions for remaining are not complete, it disintegrates. In accordance with that, in the world that which is extinct or used up is observed as "exhausted" due to only the exhaustion of its causes.... According to those whose thought is that the cessation of things is only causeless, ceasedness also would [absurdly] not depend on [functioning] things because of being causeless like a flower in the sky.

Dzongkaba comments:

The subsistence of [functioning] things depends upon conditions that cause subsistence because if the conditions for subsistence are not present, [the continua of things] would disintegrate. Therefore, the extinguishment and cessation of a butter-lamp's light, which arises from the extinguishment and cessation of the causes that make [the butter-lamp] subsist-the wick, oil, and so forth-is observed to be "extinguishment and cessation."

They say that disintegratedness obviously has a cause because a lamp dies out as a result of the consumption of its wick and fuel. Since the lamp would endure unless its causes came to be absent, it must be forced to go out. The destruction of the wick and fuel serves as the cause for the lamp's disintegratedness. Also, the example of the lamp shows that disintegratedness is a functioning thing because it acts as a cause; the disintegratedness of the wick and fuel causes the dying out of the lamp.

Aryadeva adds that the disintegratedness of a cause is generated by the production of an effect. Dzongkaba cites him immediately after the passage quoted above:

Aryadeva's Four Hundred (IX.18ab) says:
Effects destroy causes.

Therefore, a non-existent is not what is produced.

This explains that the cause's ceasedness is caused by the effect's being produced, whereby [such] is the assertion of the Superior (Nagarjuna) and his spiritual son (Aryadeva).

Through the essential point of asserting that the pastness that is the disintegratedness of a sprout is a [functioning] thing, even the futureness of a sprout is likewise [a functioning thing]. Therefore, [that] is the meaning of [Aryadeva's saying], "a non-existent is not what is produced."

For instance, the "being produced" (skye bzhin pa) or "approaching production" (skye ba la mngon du phyogs pa) of an effect is simultaneous with the disintegration or approaching to disintegratedness of the cause. Since, if the causes for something's subsistence are not destroyed, it remains, it is neces sary that an effect be produced to interrupt the continuance of the thing. Hence, the production of a thing serves as a cause of the disintegratedness of the causes; Aryadeva says, "Effects destroy causes." Applied to the example of seed and sprout, the production of a sprout brings about the destruction of the seed that is its cause.33

Candrakirti's First Argument

Let us now turn to arguments employed by Candrakirti. Candrakirti uses four sets of reasonings in his Clear Words to show that disintegration (and, according to Gelukbas, disintegratedness) is a functioning thing. Although Candrakirti himself does not seem to explicitly distinguish between "disintegration" and "disintegratedness," it seems clear, from his fourth reasoning if nowhere else (it uses the example of a crop perishing due to water having evaporated), that he wishes to show that something's absence upon its disintegration-its dis-integratedness is a functioning thing.

The first of the those four is: if disintegratedness were not a functioning thing, it would absurdly follow that disintegration could not be a characteristic of compounded phenomena. Candrakirti says, in his Clear Words'...
A "sky-flower" is a famous instance of a non-existent (like "son of a barren woman," "cloak of turtle hairs," or "horns of a rabbit"). Candrakirti flings the absurd consequence that if disintegration were causeless, it would be a "sky-flower." If compounded phenomena did not disintegrate, there would be no disintegration. However, those phenomena would absurdly not be momentary or compounded.

Disintegration, along with production, endurance, and aging, is a characteristic of compounded phenomena-functioning things-that also characterizes something as a compounded phenomenon. Some terms that are characteristics of compounded phenomena do not characterize them as compounded phenomena. For instance, emptiness is a characteristic of all phenomena, but does not characterize something as a compounded phenomenon because it is not unique to compounded phenomena and therefore would not help one to understand something as a compounded phenomenon. Jamyang Shayba cites Dzongkaba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way":

The activity of blue's disintegration includes the disintegratedness in its second period. And, whatever are nonassociated compositional factors must be compounded by their causes and conditions, whereby they are established as having causes.

Jamyang Shayba concludes:

It follows that blue is the agent and that the four, blue's activities of production, disintegration, abiding, and aging, characterize blue as a compounded phenomenon because (1) it is contradictory for blue itself to be its own activity and (2) blue's own activity of characterizing blue as a compounded phenomenon exists.

Thus, disintegratedness is a characteristic that causes one to understand what a compounded phenomenon is. It is argued that if disintegration were not a functioning thing, it would be causeless and therefore not a characteristic of compounded phenomena. Then, how could things be momentary? They would not disintegrate.

In Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way the argument takes a slightly different tack: he asks how disintegration could be a characteristic that causes one to understand compounded phenomena if the activity of disintegration had no causes:

It [absurdly] follows that the disintegration of a sprout is not suitable as a characteristic that causes one to understand compounded phenomena because [according to you] the disintegrating of a sprout and the activity of disintegration [of a sprout] have no causes.
In that case, disintegration would be like emptiness in the sense that although it would be a characteristic of compounded phenomena, it would not characterize compounded phenomena because it could not help one understand compounded phenomena as compounded phenomena.

Other schools might reply that although disintegration is caused, disintegratedness is uncaused. According to Kaydrup, the Prasartgika response to this is that if there were no causes for something's disintegratedness, there would be no causes for its disintegration, and then the thing itself could not be momentary. Kaydrup makes the parallel that "approaching to production" (skye ba la mngon du phyogs pa) has causes and so does production, a premise that no one would deny; his Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:

In brief, does the disintegratedness of a sprout exist or not exist without relying on causes? If it does, it is contradictory that a sprout does not disintegrate without depending on causes, and if it does not, it is contradictory that the disintegratedness of a sprout does not depend on causes. Since "approaching to disintegratedness" is called "disintegration" ('jig pa) it is very contradictory that approaching to disintegratedness depends on causes whereas disintegratedness does not depend on causes. Otherwise, it would [absurdly] equally follow that even though approaching to production is caused by causes, producedness is not caused by causes.

Just as both approaching to production and production have causes, so approaching to disintegratedness (i.e., disintegration) has causes and so also must its effect, disintegratedness.

Of course, in one sense, disintegration is causeless, for it requires no causes in addition to the object's own causes; the same causes that produce a sprout cause its disintegration. But it is not actually causeless, for it does have those causes. Just so, disintegratedness has the causes of the thing as its indirect causes and has disintegration as its direct cause. Disintegration's principal activity is disintegratedness.' In fact, Dzongkaba goes so far as to say (in his Ocean of Reasoning) that something's disintegratedness is its impermanence because it is its having disintegrated after a time when it had not disintegrated:

The reason why a disintegratedness that is blue's activity of disintegrating must be posited is that the two, blue's not having disintegrated at its own time and having disintegrated at a second time, are indicated as equally [functioning] things or not [functioning] things; in that case, its disintegratedness also is its impermanence.

However, just because a thing's disintegration and disintegratedness—respectively, its not enduring and not having endured—equally do or do not have causes does not mean that they are produced simultaneously from one cause. This
would be absurd because, for example, a pot and a rabbit equally have causes but do not have the same causes. A pot's disintegration and a pot have the same causes, and a pot's disintegratedness is caused by the disintegration of the pot or the disintegratedness of the pot's causes. For example, the disintegratedness of a lamp is due to the exhaustion or disintegratedness of the lamp's causes (i.e., the disintegration of the lamp), the causes for the lamp's remaining having become incomplete."

Candrakirti's Second Argument

Candrakirti's first argument was that if disintegratedness were not a functioning thing, it could not be posited as characterizing compounded phenomena. His second argument is that if disintegratedness were not a functioning thing, nothing would be produced by causes. He says, in his Clear Words:

Objection: Since this called disintegration [i.e., disintegratedness42] is a non-[functioning] thing, of what use are causes to a non-thing?

Response: Is it not the case that [functioning] things also would be causeless? For [functioning] things already exist, and of what use are causes for that which exists? What already exists is not produced again. Hence, it would [absurdly] follow that [functioning] things would be causeless in all respects. Therefore, that is not feasible.

The argument is a response to a hypothetical opponent who thinks that because, for instance, the disintegratedness of a seed already exists as a non-thing (in his view), it needs no causes. Candrakirti points out that, of course, something that already exists needs no causes and that if this person's position were taken to its logical extreme, it would absurdly follow that causes would be unnecessary for anything because nothing that exists needs causes. What the person really means to say is that something that already exists needs no further causes, that is, no causes in addition to those that produced it, to which Candrakirti replies that disintegratedness also needs no further causes than those that produced it.

In fairness to the opponent, it seems that Candrakirti may have ignored a vital part of his argument, namely that since disintegratedness is a non-thing, it is an uncaused phenomenon. In other words, the opponent's argument is not really that since disintegratedness exists, it needs no causes, for no school denies that although some phenomena that exist (i.e., permanent phenomena) require no causes, all others do; but rather, it is that the uncaused phenomenon disintegratedness needs no causes. In that case, Candrakirti's response ought to have been to prove that disintegratedness is caused. Jamyang Shayba apparently notices this,43 remarking:
Candrakirti says that it is feasible to assert that the disintegratedness of a sprout is a [functioning] thing because the disintegratedness of a sprout is a [functioning] thing in relation to its own entity and is the non-existence of a thing in relation to a sprout. That follows because it is both (1) a thing due to not having disintegrated in relation to its own entity and (2) the non-existence upon cessation of a thing that is a sprout in relation to a sprout.

In other words, Candrakirti says that although disintegratedness is the non-existence of a thing, it is a "non-thing" in relation to a sprout but a thing in relation to its own entity.

Candrakirti's Third Argument

The third argument Candrakirti makes in his Clear Words is that disintegratedness is a functioning thing because it is newly produced. He says:'

Furthermore, just as production has causes because [something] did not previously exist and because it did exist later, just so, disintegration [i.e., disintegration and disintegratedness] also should be asserted [to have causes].

The argument is simply that since it is admitted that, for instance, a seed's disintegratedness exists at the time of a sprout, but did not exist earlier, it must have been caused. Its earlier non-existence and later existence are adduced as proof of its having been newly produced.

This would be a powerful reasoning were it not flawed by the fact that there are "occasionally permanent" phenomena that earlier do not exist, but later do, and nevertheless are not functioning things.45 For instance, until the production of a table, there is no space of a table nor is there an emptiness of inherent existence of the table, but after its production those come into being. They are not considered "newly produced," for "production" is a term appropriately applied only to functioning things. Being mere absences, the space and emptiness of the table are simply "occasional permanent phenomena," permanent not in the sense of being everlasting but in the basic sense of not disintegrating moment-by-moment. Therefore, the fact that a seed's disintegratedness once did not exist but now exists does not itself prove that the seed's disintegratedness is a functioning thing. The argument is saved if by "exist later" is meant "arises later," that is, produced later.

Candrakirti's Fourth Argument

The fourth reason given in Candrakirti's Clear Words is that it is well known in the world that disintegratedness is a functioning thing. Candrakirti frequently sounds the theme of accepting what the world accepts, so it is not surprising that in the end he appeals to the common sense of the world. In the Heap of Jewels Sutra (dkon mchog btsegs pa'i mdo, ratnakuta- sutra), Buddha says, "What is
asserted to exist in the world, that I also assert to exist." Aryadeva adds in his Four Hundred [VIII.21cd]):46 "Except with the worldly, one is unable to approach the world." Candrakirti himself says in his Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning": 47

Worldly things are not to be asserted through scrutiny and analysis. How then? In accordance with what is well known in the world.

In general, whatever is well known in the world is accepted as existing conventionally, except for what cannot be established by valid cognition. In the last chapter, we saw that Ngawang Belden makes a distinction between what is well known in the world (which seems to be synonymous with what conventionally exists) and what is well known to an ordinary worldly awareness (which does not have to meet the criterion of being established by valid cognition). Since Candrakirti criticizes some of what ordinary people say, his use of the phrase "well known in the world" must refer to what conventionally exists.

In any case, that disintegratedness is well known in the world is a necessary if not sufficient condition for the conventional existence of disintegratedness that is a thing. Worldly conventions are the phenomena established by conventional valid cognition. They are not to be refuted by reasoned investigation ('thad pa), that is, ultimate analysis.

With regard to disintegratedness, the world often says that disintegratedness acts as a cause. For instance, if a farmer's field of wheat withers due to drought, it is said that the lack of water-its having been consumed through evaporation-is the cause of the crop's failure. Similarly, a child that perishes from starvation is said to die from lack of food-food's having been consumed. Candrakirti says:49

In the world, even non-existence exists as just a cause. For as in "If there is no water, my grain will be ruined," and "My child will die from lack of food," the loss of grain and child is propounded to occur due to the non-existence of water and food [respectively].

Hence, according to Candrakirti, the world clearly holds that disintegratedness, though negative, is an affirming negative rather than a non-affirming negative, implying a positive phenomenon, i.e., a causal phenomenon. Similarly, Jamyang Shayba asserts that "disintegratedness of a sprout" implies the sprout in dependence on which disintegratedness arises,50 and Dzongkaba asserts that it implies a functioning thing:51

That which has disintegrated [i.e., a disintegratedness] is not a mere elimination, but implies a [functioning] thing that involves an elimination of that.

Janggya adds:52
The term "sprout's disintegratedness" serves both to eliminate a sprout's not having disintegrated and to imply that the disintegration of a sprout occurs in dependence on the sprout.

Thus, disintegratedness is an affirming negative because it implies an activity of a sprout, not merely an elimination. That is, a sprout's merely not existing is a non-affirming negative, but the non-existence of a sprout upon its destruction is its disintegratedness, a functioning thing.

In a similar way, a futureness is an affirming rather than a non-affirming negative. Both Janggya and Jamyang Shayba contend that "sprout's futureness" implies (1) that the sprout will be produced when its conditions are complete or (2) a thing that is the non-completion of conditions. A sprout is implied, a sprout being a positive phenomenon. The sprout does not yet exist, but it is not necessary that the existent implied by an affirming negative exist at the present time.

Dzongkaba's Argument

Let us now turn to an argument made by Dzongkaba and commented upon by Janggya. Dzongkaba in his Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" contends that there is a parallel between birth and death on the one hand and disintegration (a thing's not remaining for another moment beyond its own time) and disintegratedness (its not having remained for another moment beyond its own time) on the other:

This [example of a sentient being's death has concerned] the disintegratedness of a continuum, but it is the same for the disintegratedness of the first moment [of a phenomenon] at its next period, and it also indicates that the first moment [of a phenomenon] is a cause of its disintegratedness in the next period. Therefore, with respect to the two, the birth and death of a sentient being, [and the two,] not enduring in the next period and not having endured in the next period, whether they are posited or not posited as [functioning] things and whether they are produced or not produced by causes is the same in every way.

Janggya paraphrases this:

The reasoning is: (1) the birth and death of a sentient being and (2) something not remaining for a second moment and not having remained for a second moment are proved to be thoroughly similar in terms of whether or not they are posited as [functioning] things and whether or not they depend on causes.

The present moment of a thing, its existing but not enduring for another moment, is the cause of its own disintegratedness, its not having endured. In other words,
moment A is the cause of the disintegratedness of moment A, which occurs in moment B. Similarly, birth, a sentient being's having been born, is that sentient being's life or endurance and his/her not remaining for another moment after his/her (karmically allotted) time, just as disintegration corresponds to the time in which something is present and is that thing's not remaining for another moment beyond that time. Death, the sentient being's having died, is his/her not having remained for another moment beyond that time, just as disintegratedness is something's not having remained for another moment beyond its own time.

There are also parallels to disintegration and disintegratedness just with birth itself and just with death itself.55 Regarding birth, a sentient being's "being born" (skye bzhin pa) or "approaching birth" (skye ba la mngon du phyogs pa), the moment before birth (birth in this case being the moment of conception, which then is the first moment of life), is a sentient being's not remaining for another moment in the state of futureness, or, put another way, is a sentient being's futureness not remaining for another moment. Birth, the sentient being's having been born, is that sentient being's futureness not having remained for another moment. Similarly, with regard to death, dying (approaching death) is a sentient being's not remaining for another moment; death, a sentient being's having died, is that being's not having remained for another moment. (A table setting out some of these relationships and those that are similar is at the end of this chapter in the discussion of the three times.)

These examples have involved the severance of some continuum-the continuum of a sentient being's futureness, for birth, and the continuum of the sentient being himself or herself, for death-but the parallels can be upheld for any moment in that continuum. For instance, the present moment of a pot has been produced by its previous moment and will produce a subsequent moment of that pot unless a necessary condition for its production has ceased. If, for instance, someone were to break the pot, the pot would no longer produce another moment of itself.

Jamyang Shayba on Ultimate Analysis

Having surveyed the various arguments made by Indian and Tibetan Prasangikas in support of the thesis that disintegratedness is a functioning thing, let us turn to Jamyang Shayba's discussion of ultimate analysis, which occurs in the context of his criticism of Daktsang. Among the many contradictions Daktsang thought he had discovered in Dzongkaba's works, one concerned Dzongkaba's alleged positing of disintegratedness as something found upon analysis. Jamyang Shayba, in turn, used Daktsang's objection to accuse him of holding that disintegratedness is not a functioning thing.

What Daktsang actually said was:'
No pot other than the phenomena that are its discrete parts is found when the parts of a pot—its form, odor, and so forth—are analyzed by reasoning. It is contradictory to assert this and yet find, in the face of analysis, a thing that is a disintegratedness that is different from an action's continuum of similar type (las rang gi rigs 'dra'i rgyun) due to analyzing the moments of an action, because both the object analyzed and the mode of analysis are completely the same.

In other words, Daktsang seems to be saying that if one holds that when a pot's parts are analyzed, no pot is found apart from or among them (a statement with which all Prasarigikas would presumably agree, for a pot is not its parts or separate from them, but merely imputed in dependence on them), then similarly, when the moments of an action are analyzed, one should hold that no disintegratedness is found among or apart from the action's continuum of similar type. However, this is precisely what he sees in Dzongkaba's analysis. Let us again look at what Dzongkaba said in his Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance":

In the former systems, they think: When a [functioning] thing such as a sprout has disintegrated, everything that is part of the sprout is obliterated. Since one does not get any other thing that is different from a sprout, such as a pot, they assert that disintegratedness is utterly not a [functioning] thing [i.e., they assert that it is a permanent or non-disintegrating phenomenon. Also,] neither the [functioning] things among the separate sense-spheres, such as blue, nor that which is a collection of the [functioning] things which are its parts, such as a pot, are suitable to be illustrations of that disintegratedness [of a sprout]. Therefore, [disintegratedness] is not a [functioning] thing.

In the latter [i.e., Prasarigika] system, for example, one cannot posit (1) Upagupta's individual five aggregates, (2) their collection, or (3) that which is a different entity from those two as an illustration of Upagupta, and Upagupta is also unsuitable to be an illustration of those three. However, it is not contradictory that despite that, what is designated as Upagupta in dependence on his aggregates is a [functioning] thing. Similarly, even though disintegratedness also cannot [be posited] as an illustration of either the thing which has been destroyed or anything which is the same type [i.e., same causal continuum] as that, it is a [functioning] thing because it is produced in dependence on a thing that is destroyed.

Dzongkaba says that concerning the disintegratedness of a pot, neither a part or quality of the pot, such as its color, nor the pot itself (the whole comprising many parts) is suitable to be an illustration of disintegratedness. The other tenet systems conclude from this that there is no functioning thing that can be a disintegratedness, and hence, disintegratedness must be permanent. In other tenet systems, it is felt that for something to be a functioning thing there must be an illustration that one can point to, as is the case with a patch of blue or a pot. For
them, a mere nominal designation could not be a functioning thing.

Dzongkaba replies that even though someone called Upagupta is not his five aggregates, nor vice versa, nevertheless, Upagupta can be posited in dependence on those aggregates. He then goes on to say that disintegratedness can be posited neither as an illustration of the thing nor of the continuum of similar type of that thing (for an illustration of something must be that thing). This may be how Daktsang got the notion that Dzongkaba considers the disintegratedness of an action to be different from its continuum of similar type. A subtle distinction must be made: disintegratedness is not the continuum of similar type of, for instance, an act of giving, for that would mean that the disintegratedness of that action would itself be an act of giving. Nevertheless, it is possible to designate the phenomenon, disintegratedness, in dependence on the act of giving, even though it is not the giving which has been destroyed or some other thing like it. It is merely designated in dependence on the thing that has been destroyed, just as Upagupta is merely designated in dependence upon his aggregates, not to those aggregates. On the other hand, it is not found separate from the continuum of similar type of the action, for that is the basis in dependence on which it is imputed. Thus, the disintegratedness of an action can be found neither as nor separate from its continuum of similar type; to posit it as either of these possibilities would be to claim that something can be found upon ultimate analysis.

With regard to ultimate analysis, Jamyang Shayba specifically denies that disintegratedness is posited by way of performing an analytical search. He cites Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred!

Even though a very long time has passed and gone after the cessation of an action which was done and accumulated, [the action itself] indeed does not persist, but nevertheless, effects actually arise even from actions with many aeons intervening after their cessation.

Jamyang Shayba then comments:58

His mere propounding that disintegratedness is a [functioning] thing is not a matter of searching for the imputed object, a disintegratedness, because merely analyzing whether disintegratedness is a thing or a non-thing does not constitute ultimate analysis. And, for example, it is like propounding that a pot is a [functioning] thing. Otherwise, there would be much that is damaging and contradictory, such as that even your propounding that disintegratedness is not a [functioning] thing would be a matter of searching for an imputed object; however, as was said earlier, merely analyzing whether or not disintegratedness has causes does not constitute a search for an imputed object because it merely explains the way in which [things] act as cause and condition conventionally, like, for example, the explanation in the texts of manifest knowledge of the causes and conditions of compounded phenomena.
In other words, it is not being claimed that disintegratedness is findable as, or apart from, an action's later continuum of similar type, simply that disintegratedness conventionally has causes and effects, as the world says. It is no different than positing a pot as a functioning thing because one can observe its causes, such as the clay, potter, and fire. One would cross over into ultimate analysis if in searching for the cause of an object one were to claim that it was either the object itself or inherently other than the object, as would be the case if in the analysis of the going out of a butter-lamp one claimed that the going out was self-generated—that the lamp itself caused its own going-out—or that it was inherently different from the exhaustion of the wick and fuel, which conventionally is its cause. Investigating the mere causes of something is not ultimate analysis; it is only when one holds that those causes are inherently one or different from their effect that the line between conventional and ultimate analysis has been crossed. Once again, whether or not one's analysis constitutes ultimate analysis stems from whether or not one holds the Prasāhikā view that denies inherent existence but that allows nominal conventional existence.

Ngawang Belden's Objections to Jamyang Shayba

Before passing on to the topic of the three times, let us look briefly at two criticisms of Jamyang Shayba by Ngawang Belden on the subject of disintegratedness. Ngawang Belden is not afraid to disagree with Jamyang Shayba or to point out ambiguities in his writings (though often he does so discreetly, citing Jamyang Shayba and adding, this "should be analyzed"). With regard to disintegratedness, Ngawang Belden calls into question two statements of Jamyang Shayba in the Great Exposition of the Middle Way: (1) there is no disintegratedness of the obstructions to omniscience in the continuum of a Buddha Superior; and (2) if something is to be posited as a pastness or a futureness, it must not be totally consumed. Jamyang Shayba's statement is:

Incorrect Position: It follows that there is disintegratedness of subtle obstructions to omniscience in the continuum of a Buddha Superior because those have disintegrated in the continuum of a Buddha Superior.

Correct Position: Although some assert that, there is no entailment [that because subtle obstructions to omniscience have disintegrated in the continuum of a Buddha Superior that there necessarily is disintegratedness of those in the continuum of a Buddha Superior]. Then, [for you] it would [absurdly] follow that the horns of a rabbit are a future phenomenon because the horns of a rabbit have not come. The three circles!!!

If the [consequence] above were accepted, it would [absurdly] follow that past obstructions to omniscience would exist in the continuum of a Buddha Superior because of that assertion. That cannot be accepted because those have been totally exhausted without remainder in the element of qualities
in the continuum of a Buddha Superior. The reason is easy [to prove]. There is entailment [that because obstructions to omniscience have been totally exhausted without remainder in the element of qualities it cannot be accepted that the disintegratedness of subtle obstructions to omniscience exists in the continuum of a Buddha Superior] because to posit [something as a] pastness or futureness it is necessary that it not be totally consumed or totally destroyed.

In other words, the fact that the obstructions to omniscience have disintegrated does not mean that their disintegratedness exists. Disintegratedness implies an effect to come out, but there is none here. Still, why not say that Buddha's omniscience is the effect? Ngawang Belden cites Dzongkaba to make his point:

Dzongkaba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" says:

Therefore, these causes and effects such as seeds and sprouts must be posited in the manner seen by people in the world. In the world, saying, "My rice spoiled due to lack of water," and, "My son died due to lack of food," are cases of propounding that through the non-existence of the former the latter is lost. Moreover, just as the nonextinction of food and water are taken to be the causes of a child's being alive and rice being good, the extinction of those is posited as the cause of the extinction of [child and rice]. Therefore, those [things] which have not become extinct are different from those which do not exist [i.e., have become extinct]; through that the class of effects from those [things which have become non-existent] should also be understood.

That explains that the disintegratedness of a continuum is a [functioning] thing; even though those [actions] are totally consumed or totally destroyed, [their effects] appear to exist."Z Therefore, there appear to be great bases for analysis with respect to the statements in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (dbu ma chen mo)" that (1) the disintegratedness of obstructions to omniscience does not exist in the continuum of a Buddha Superior and (2) that in order to posit [something] as a pastness or as a futureness it is necessary that it not be totally consumed or totally destroyed. However, I will not write [more about these] because I fear it would be too much.

With regard to the first of these, it is easy to appreciate the paradox Ngawang Belden sees. Buddhahood is attained upon the destruction of the last of the obstructions to omniscience, the appearance of true existence that prevents simultaneous cognition of objects and their emptinesses, that is, of conventional and ultimate truths. For a Buddha Superior, then, the obstructions to omniscience have been destroyed; why then is it not possible to say that the disintegratedness of those obstructions exists as a factor in the mental continuum of that Buddha?
Jamyang Shayba's discussion of this question implies that for him, the mere fact that something has disintegrated does not entail that its disintegratedness necessarily exists, any more than the fact that something has not come yet implies that it will come. For instance, the imaginary "horns of a rabbit" have of course not come to be, but that does not make them a future object. For something to be future, its causes must exist, whereas there are no existing causes for rabbithorns; likewise, for something to be a disintegratedness, which is a functioning thing, it must be able to cause an effect. In order to produce an effect it must not be totally consumed or destroyed. Contrary to this, the disintegratedness of the obstructions to omniscience is totally destroyed. The obstructions to omniscience have been totally exhausted without remainder in the "element of qualities" (chos 'bying, dharmadhatu), i.e., emptiness. The "remainder" that is lacking for those obstructions to omniscience is their disintegratedness, which is posited in dependence on the continuum of similar type of those obstructions to omniscience (though the obstructions to omniscience themselves no longer exist).

Jamyang Shayba wants to avoid saying that somehow there is a continuation of the obstructions to omniscience for a Buddha. Geshay Gonchok Tsering, a contemporary Gelukba scholar, suggests that Jamyang Shayba's thought is that although there is an abandonment and elimination of the obstructions to omniscience, "abandonment" or "elimination" are not effects of the obstructions to omniscience and so would not contaminate a Buddha's continuum, whereas disintegratedness would (as an effect of the obstructions to omniscience and their continuum of similar type); moreover, the continuum of the obstructions to omniscience would not have been cut.

If this is what he means, Jamyang Shayba would seem to have a defensible position. Still, he seems inconsistent: he claims that the disintegratedness of obstructions to omniscience is not possible because it would have no effect, but in a similar case, the disintegratedness of a sentient being, he says that such a disintegratedness causes the non-severance of the continuum of ignorance; why not, then, say that the disintegratedness of the obstructions to omniscience causes the continuation of the absence of obstructions to omniscience? Note that such an absence would not be a non-affirming negative because the positive phenomenon of omniscience is implied by the absence of obstructions to it.

On the other hand, it is possible to make a good argument that an effect of the obstructions to omniscience-their disintegratedness-without the obstructions to omniscience themselves, must be considered contaminating, and hence that it is not possible for it to occur in the continuum of a Buddha. Such a view seems reasonable when it is considered that a Buddha's Truth Body (chos sku, dharmakaya) and Form Body (gzugs sku, rupakdya), which comprise a Buddha's continuum, are the "imprints" of merit and wisdom; how could the disintegratedness of the obstructions to omniscience, for instance, be the result of merit or wisdom? Although a Buddha's continuum contains virtues such as non-hatred and non-desire, these are not mere factors of the destruction of hatred and
desire, but are positive qualities that are their opposites.

We have already alluded to Ngawang Belden's second objection, concerning Jamyang Shayba's statement that in order to posit a pastness or futureness, it must not be totally consumed or destroyed. Perhaps what Jamyang Shayba means is nothing more than that disintegratedness, which is a pastness, is not a disintegratedness of itself. Elsewhere (in the section on the Svaatantrika-Madhyamikas), he points out that although, when something is destroyed, it itself no longer exists, its "continuum of similar type" is not destroyed, for its disintegratedness is that continuum. Therefore, what is destroyed is the action, not its disintegratedness. It is all the more puzzling that Ngawang Belden makes this objection, since he himself refutes the contention of most other schools that when a sprout is destroyed, everything that is part of it is destroyed. It appears that Ngawang Belden failed to grasp the referent of what is posited as a pastness or futureness, which is not the present object itself but a factor of its having disintegrated or not having come.

The Three Times

The topic of the three times-past, present, and future—is a debater's delight; there are so many terms and relations to keep straight that it is relatively easy for a challenger to make a defender's head spin. It might be helpful to place a number of these terms in tabular form and review them before proceeding further.

The following chart illustrating the three times by the last two moments of a seed and first moment of a sprout shows a few of the many possible ways of expressing their relationship. It should be remembered that since many terms within each column are synonymous, the horizontal matchups are somewhat arbitrary. Also, it is very important to note that, in general, the terms of columns A and C are set out in relation to the term of column B, which represents the present seed. Thus, "seed's futureness" in the first column indicates the futureness of a seed that is present in moment B. Moment A would also be a time of "seed's presentness," namely the presentness of the seed of the next-to-last moment of a seed, but it would take a far larger chart to begin to express all the possible relationships of these three moments.

The Three Times Illustrated by The Last Two Moments of a Seed and First Moment of a Sprout
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment A</th>
<th>Moment B</th>
<th>Moment C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>next-to-last moment of seed</td>
<td>last moment of seed</td>
<td>first moment of sprout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's futureness</td>
<td>seed's presentness</td>
<td>seed's pastness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's futureness</td>
<td>seed (seed's own time)</td>
<td>seed's disintegratedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's approaching to production</td>
<td>seed's production</td>
<td>seed's effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's non-existence despite having causes</td>
<td>seed's existence</td>
<td>seed's non-existence upon having disintegrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's cause</td>
<td>effect of seed's cause</td>
<td>seed's effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's, sprout's non-existence</td>
<td>sprout's non-existence</td>
<td>sprout's existence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>futureness of sprout's futureness</td>
<td>sprout's futureness</td>
<td>sprout (sprout's own time, presentness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sprout's indirect cause</td>
<td>sprout's direct cause</td>
<td>effect of sprout's cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past at time of seed</td>
<td>past at time of sprout</td>
<td>future at time of seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's approaching to production</td>
<td>sprout's approaching to production</td>
<td>sprout's production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's being produced</td>
<td>sprout's being produced</td>
<td>sprout's production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's approaching to disintegration</td>
<td>seed's disintegration</td>
<td>seed's disintegratedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>seed's not enduring another moment</td>
<td>seed's not having endured another moment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seed's approaching to cessation</td>
<td>seed's cessation</td>
<td>seed's ceasedness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jamyang Shayba gives identical definitions for the three times in his Great Exposition of Tenets and Great Exposition of the Middle Way, and Janggya, possibly
following him, cites the same definitions. They are based on Candrakirti's statements in his Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred": "The past is what has passed beyond just this [present time]," "The present has been produced but has not ceased," and "The future is what has not come at the present time."

A presentness—a phenomenon's factor of being present—is defined as:

that which (1) is neither a factor of disintegratedness nor a factor of futureness of another [functioning] thing and (2) has been produced but has not ceased.

Candrakirti said merely that the present has been produced but has not ceased, but, as Jamyang Shayba shows, that is not itself sufficient for a definition of presentness. Pastness—a factor of disintegratedness of another functioning thing that has already been produced—would absurdly be a presentness, for at its own time (its moment of existing) it has, of course, been produced but has not ceased. It would absurdly be the case that the disintegratedness of a seed would be both the seed's presentness and its pastness. Similarly, a futureness—a factor of non-production of another functioning thing due to the non-completion of its conditions, though its substantial causes exist—would absurdly be a presentness, since at its own time it has been produced but has not ceased. All things are present at their own times, but that does not necessarily indicate that they are presentnesses.

Nor are past and future present merely because they are known at the present time. One can remember a past object or clairvoyantly know a future object at the present time, but one does not know that thing at its own time. Even when a past or a future object is known at its own time, as by a Buddha's omniscient consciousness, the past or future object is not established at the present time. Analogously, Jamyang Shayba points out that although a person on the plain sees a distant mountain, that mountain is not established in the plain with that person.

Since the three times are mutually exclusive, pastnesses and futurenesses cannot be presentnesses, even though at their own time they are present. This does not mean that it is not possible to posit a presentness for a sprout's futureness or its disintegratedness; a disintegratedness's presentness is its factor of having been produced but not having ceased, that factor being a different functioning thing from that disintegratedness, and a futureness's presentness is its factor of having been produced but not having ceased, that factor being a different functioning thing from that futureness.

Also, it must be understood that even though something has itself been produced and has itself not ceased, it has not necessarily itself been produced without having ceased. That is, pastnesses and futurenesses have themselves been produced and have themselves not ceased, but they are not said to have themselves been produced without ceasing, that term being reserved for
presentnesses. For these reasons, it is necessary to specify that a presentness is neither a factor of disintegratedness nor a factor of futureness of some other thing.

Moreover, futureness, although it has been produced without having ceased, is not a presentness because it is not the producedness-but-not-ceasedness of some other thing and because it is a factor of non-production of another thing. As Dzongkaba says in his Ocean of Reasoning:

Similarly, moments of similar type of futureness arise, but since its entity must be posited from the point of view of only the nonproduction of some other thing, it is very different from the two, past and present.

The definition of a futureness is:

a factor of non-production of another [functioning] thing due to the non-completion of its conditions, even though the causes for its production exist.

For instance, a seed does not sprout in the wintertime because even though the sprout's substantial cause-the seed-exists, the cooperative conditions such as moisture and warmth are not present. The sprout's factor of not having come due to incomplete conditions, even though it has causes, is its futureness.

Again, Candrakirti's statement is not itself sufficient as a definition of a futureness. Candrakirti said only, "The future has not come at the present time." This would leave open the possibility that even permanent phenomena and non-existents could be posited as futurenesses. For example, space, a nondisintegrating phenomenon, can be said not to have come at the present time, as can the traditional illustration of a nonexistent, the horns of a rabbit. It is necessary to add that (1) a futureness is not a futureness of itself, but of another thing; (2) for a futureness to exist, the causes of the thing of which it is a factor must exist; and (3) it is a factor of non-production.

That as which the future has not come is the present; i.e., when the future comes, it will come as the present. For example, a "future sprout" is a sprout's factor of not having come, though its causes exist, due to the temporary incompleteness of its cooperative conditions. This future sprout is not itself a sprout, for no sprout exists prior to a sprout's production. However, when a future sprout comes, it will come as a present sprout. A sprout is what will come and thus can be posited as that which has not (but will) come.

It might be thought that since this sprout will come in the future, it should be posited as future. But, when the sprout comes, it will be present. What is posited as future is just the futureness of a sprout. That is, the sprout that will come is not future since when it exists, it exists at the present time. What is posited as the future is that sprout's futureness.
Futurenesses have causes, because the non-completion of conditions for the arising of something causes a futureness. Candrakirti says in his Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning".

... the non-completion of [a future phenomenon's] conditions subsists as the cause for the non-production of a future phenomenon. If its conditions were not incomplete, it would definitely be produced.

The futureness of something is different than that which is future in relation to it. The futureness of a pot occurs prior to it and, hence, is past at the time of a pot. That is, when a pot is produced, its futureness is finished. Thus, a pot's futureness is actually past in relation to a pot. It is also true that being something's futureness or its "being produced" (skye bzhin pa) does not mean that it itself is future or not yet produced. It has been produced, but that of which it is a futureness has not been produced. Also, although a futureness is "produced but not ceased," it is not posited as a presentness. It is a factor of the non-production of another thing, whereas a presentness is not.

A futureness is not only caused, but acts as a cause-it causes the temporary non-production of something. Still, a disintegratedness is not the same as a futureness even though the disintegratedness of a butter-lamp's wick and fuel is the cause of the non-production of a future butter-lamp. That is because the futureness of something does not exist unless that thing's causes exist, and in the case of a spent lamp, there are no causes present for a future lamp.

A pastness is defined as:

a factor of disintegratedness of another [functioning] thing that has already been produced (skyes zin).

Candrakirti describes the past simply as that which has passed beyond the present, referring to something that was present but has passed, not to something that has passed beyond the current present time (for something that will pass beyond the current present time is future at the present time, not past).

Janggya points out that it is not sufficient to define the past as "not present," for a pastness is a factor of disintegratedness of something that has already arisen. Also, it could be said that such a definition would allow futurenesses and nonexistent phenomena to be posited as pastnesses, for the futureness of a sprout is, in relation to the sprout, not present, and non-existent phenomena such as the horns of a rabbit are none of the three times.

It is not necessary to add to the definition of a pastness that this factor of disintegratedness be something that has itself ceased. It might be thought that a disintegratedness is not actually a pastness but a presentness, since at its own time it has been produced but has not ceased. Then, it might be thought that if a
disintegratedness is a pastness, it absurdly must have ceased. However, this is irrelevant. A disintegratedness is not posited as a pastness because it has itself ceased, but because it is the disintegratedness of something else. In relation to that thing of which it is a factor of disintegratedness, it is a pastness. In fact, whenever we say that something is past, it is past only in relation to some other thing; for instance, the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City is past in relation to the present, future in relation to the 1994 elections, and present in its own time.

Vasubandhu defines the past by saying, "Having arisen, disintegrated (byung nas zhig pa)." It might be thought that what "arisen" refers to is also past. Rather, what has arisen is a sprout, which has disintegrated. Even though the sprout has passed, it is not a pastness. It is non-existent, but its pastness, the disintegratedness of a sprout, exists. This disintegratedness is a disintegratedness of a present object, even though a present object no longer exists, because it is only a disintegratedness in relation to something, and that something was the present sprout.

Also, what has passed has partaken of both the causes for being present and of being present, the effect of those causes. The present has partaken of causes for being present, but has not partaken of being present—rather, it is partaking of being present.

A pastness also cannot be defined as that which is past in relation to something such as a pot, for the pastness of a pot is not past in relation to a pot. What is past in relation to a pot occurs prior to a pot, whereas the pastness of a pot can occur only after that pot. For example, a pot's futureness is past in relation to that pot (that is, it occurs prior to that pot) and its disintegratedness is future in relation to that pot (because of occurring subsequent to it, for disintegratedness is the effect of the thing of which it is a disintegratedness). The same sort of distinction applies to futurenesses and the future. The futureness of a pot occurs prior to that pot and is its cause, and so forth.

Finally, a pastness, being a functioning thing, lasts only for a single moment; hence, the pastness or disintegratedness of a thing occurs only in the moment following the existence of the thing, when the disintegratedness of the thing also disintegrates. This means that the later moments of similar type of a pot's disintegratedness are not pot's disintegratedness. All such moments are posited as pastnesses, but only a pot's disintegratedness is a pot's pastness. The disintegratedness of a pot's disintegratedness is not that pot's pastness, but rather is the pastness of that pot's pastness, and so on. At the time of the disintegratedness of a pot's disintegratedness, a pot's disintegratedness has already ceased.

From among the three times, the present is main and the past and future are secondary, because the present is posited by way of having been produced and not having disintegrated. Past and future, on the other hand, are posited not in their own terms but in terms of the present. They must be posited in dependence on the disintegration or non-production of another thing, whereas the present does not.
Also, the present is main because it is observed now (whereas past and future are not directly perceived by ordinary persons). Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" says,88 "The present is main because it is observed now."

Still, even though the past and future are secondary, there is mutual interdependence of all three times such that in order for one to appear to a person's mind, aspects of the others also must appear. The present cannot be posited without relying on the other two times. Why? It is necessary to say, "has been produced," in order to eliminate the possibility that something has not come (due to temporarily incomplete conditions, though the causes exist) and "not ceased," to eliminate the possibility of it being past. In other words, to realize "present," which requires realization of the present's defining characteristics, necessitates a negative route, an elimination of what it is not. Candrakirti says in his Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred,"89 "Those three times also are interdependent because each does not exist without depending on the [other] two," and Dzongkaba's Ocean of Reasoning says:90

Since one must posit the present with regard to what has not crossed or not passed beyond that, it is contradictory for the present not to depend on the past. Therefore, the future also must indirectly depend on the past because something is posited as future due to not having come in the present.

Hence, not only does presentness depend upon pastness and futureness, but the futureness of a pot depends on both present and past. It is obvious that the future depends on the present, for the future is posited in relation to the present, and it is equally obvious that the present depends on the past, for the present is not established without eliminating the past. In addition, by this route it can be said that futureness depends on pastness. Even though futureness occurs before the object, it is dependent not on that object but also on that thing's having disintegrated.
6

Other Unique Tenets

As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the Prasangikas (according to their Gelukba followers) not only criticize the views of other schools, usually by asserting that their opponents have improperly engaged in ultimate analysis, but also tender their own solutions to the sticky problems that comprise the "unique tenets." This chapter will turn toward the unique Prasarigika tenets that we have not yet explored to consider what sort of critical stance the Prasarigikas are said to take and whether they have devised a positive thesis to replace the one refuted.

Let us begin by briefly reviewing what, in the preceding chapters, has been identified as ultimate analysis. We have already seen that Prasargikas are said to reject, on a number of grounds, the Cittamatra thesis that there are no external objects. Gelukbas explain that one of these grounds is that the Cittamatra refutation of external objects depends on ultimate analysis because the Cittamatrins look for, but do not find, objects that are different entities from consciousness and which occur prior to, and act as causes for, the production of consciousness. Dharmakirti, for instance, is said to argue that since a consciousness and the self-consciousness that observes it act upon their objects simultaneously, a consciousness and its object arise simultaneously. This precludes the existence of objects that are a separate entity from their apprehenders, i.e., are external objects. Prasargikas, on the other hand, maintain that external objects exist simply because they are asserted to exist in the conventions of the world and are not refuted by a conventional analytical awareness.

We have also seen that Prasargikas reject the postulation of self-consciousness on the grounds that it requires that one regard an experience and its recollection at a later time to be inherently other. This constitutes ultimate analysis because it is an investigation into whether a memory is inherently other than its cause (what is being remembered). Prasargikas, on the other hand, give several explanations for the production of memory of previous experience without self-consciousness, none of which involve the assumption of a mediating entity. These explanations also just accept the conventions of the world.

We have also seen that Prasangikas reject the notion that disintegratedness lacks the capacity to act as a cause. Here too, their opponents such as the Sautrantikas and Cittamatrins are accused of engaging in ultimate analysis by searching for a disintegratedness that can be imputed either as the thing destroyed or apart from it. Because they have not found such a self-sufficient disintegratedness, those others have concluded that disintegratedness is a mere
negative. Prasangikas, on the other hand, assert positively that disintegratedness is a functioning thing that can cause a future effect to arise from an action that has ceased and, moreover, show that this assertion is nothing other than what the world accepts.

Let us now examine the other "unique tenets" to see what kind of analysis and positive alternatives the Gelukba authors of this study see as being offered by Prasangikas. Looking over the many tenets analyzed by Jamyang Shayba (which include all of those subsequently enumerated by Janggya and many more) we can see roughly three categories. First, there are those tenets that involve the rejection of specific assertions of one or more Buddhist schools on the basis that those assertions result from ultimate analysis. Prasangikas:

- Reject the Cittamatra School's assertion of a mindbasis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, alayavijnana).
- Deny that there are non-defective sense consciousnesses among non-Buddhas that are non-mistaken with regard to the appearance of inherent existence.
- Deny that autonomous syllogisms must be stated to an opponent to cause that person to understand emptiness.
- **Deny that there can be destruction of the obstructions to omniscience even while one is working on the destruction of the obstructions to liberation.'**
- Reject the claims of the lower schools that pramana necessarily means new realization of an object and that mental direct perception is necessarily non-conceptual.
- Reject the claim of the lower schools that nirvana "with remainder" and "without remainder" refer to nirvanas with and without aggregates impelled by contaminated actions and afflictions.

In this category of tenets, the Gelukbas often say that the basis of the Prasangika rejection of the other schools' views is the Prasangika rejection of positing objects upon ultimate analysis—which in turn is based on its assertion of non-inherent existence—and acceptance of what the world accepts.

A second category of tenets is concerned with implications of the Mahayana and Hinayana path structures. For the most part, they are tenets propounded to demonstrate that some persons who are regarded by other schools as Arhats—liberated beings—are only ersatz Arhats, having realized only a coarse selflessness and having thereby suppressed, but not removed from the root, the obstructions to liberation. These tenets, then, revolve around the unique Prasangika assertion that the root of cyclic existence is the conception of inherent existence, which is more subtle than the conception of a self described by other
systems of tenets. Five assertions are elucidated in this regard:

One must realize emptiness in order to become liberated and therefore some "Arhats" who have only realized a coarse selflessness are not actually liberated.

- There is desire that either is, or is thoroughly mixed with, the conception of true existence, and so-called Arhats still have this sort of desire.

- Although some of these "Arhats" do indeed have yogic direct perception of the four noble truths, one does not have to be an Arhat or even a Superior (one who has directly realized emptiness) in order to have such yogic direct perception.

- Although some of these "Arhats" have indeed realized the coarse aspects of the four noble truths, such a realization is not sufficient to overcome the obstructions to liberation.

- Since true cessations, the irrevocable cessation of some portion of the afflictions of desire, hatred, etc., are also emptinesses, such "Arhats" who have not realized emptiness could not have experienced true cessations, i.e., could not have overcome the afflictive obstructions.

The final category of unique Prasangika tenets seems to involve neither the rejection of a specific position posited by others upon using ultimate analysis nor to bear on the authenticity of persons regarded by non-Prasangikas as Arhats. Included in this category is the Prasangika use of the term pratyaksa to accord with its use in the world and the unique way in which the Prasangikas, by not asserting inherent existence, can explain the avoidance of the two extremes of per manence and annihilation. Thus, all of these tenets in one way or another are connected to the fundamental viewpoint of the Prasangika School that nothing inherently exists and that in general one should accord with the conventions of the world.

Only four of the tenets to be discussed in the present chapter are propounded by Janggya (the other Janggya tenets having been discussed in previous chapters): (1) the nonexistence of a mind-basis-of-all, (2) the non-existence of autonomous reasons, (3) that one must realize emptiness in order to be liberated from cyclic existence, and (4) that the conception of a self of phenomena is an obstruction to liberation. These are all included in the many tenets set forth by Jamyang Shayba and further explained by Ngawang Belden.

Refutation of a Mind-Basis-of-All

First, let us consider those tenets that involve the rejection of entities posited by other schools upon engaging in ultimate analysis. Let us begin with Asanga's
Cittamatra assertion of a mind-basis-of-all—a neutral, continuously operating consciousness the function of which is to hold the seeds of actions (las, karman). The mind-basis-of-all is not accepted by Prasangikas because they claim that it cannot be posited except through a search for an imputed object. According to Gelukbas, the Cittamatra School asserts that the mind-basis-of-all is the person (gang zag, purusa)—that which bears the karmic latencies or seeds—and is findable upon analysis. That is, the Cittamatra School is considered to hold that if one sought the basis of imputation of the person one would discover the mind-basis-of-all. Ngawang Belden states:

Moreover, if a mind-basis-of-all which is a different entity from the six collections [of consciousness] were asserted, it would have to be asserted in accordance with the explanation that just that [mind-basis-of-all] is the object of observation of the innate view of the transitory [collection of aggregates] that conceives of an [inherently existent] "I" and which is associated with the afflicted mentality. Therefore, it would have to be asserted that the mind-basis-of-all is the illustration of the person and that when the person—the imputed object—is sought, it is findable.

In place of a mind-basis-of-all, Prasangikas are held to assert that the mere disintegratedness of actions can bring about the future occurrence of effects. Also, they claim that the "mere I" (nga tsam)—the "I" that is designated in dependence on the aggregates of mind and body—is a sufficient basis with which to associate the factors of disintegratedness, it being unnecessary to posit an additional consciousness such as a mindbasis-of-all. Janggya states:

In a system that does not assert inherent existence, there is no assertion of a mind-basis-of-all, non-wastage, acquisition, and so forth, but there is no need to assert those because [Prasangikas] are able to posit a presentation of actions and effects [without them].

Question: How are you able to posit [actions and effects]?

Answer: Even without asserting a mind-basis-of-all, it is feasible to posit the arising of effects from an action that has been accumulated and has ceased, because the cessation of actions is not inherently established. There is a way in which that ["not inherently ceased"] serves as a reason for [the arising of effects from actions that have been accumulated and that have ceased] because the reason, "because it has not inherently ceased," establishes that later effects arise from an action's having disintegrated.

Janggya is saying that if an action had inherently ceased, that action's ceasedness or disintegratedness could indeed not possibly produce a later effect; however, since phenomena are neither inherently produced nor are inherently destroyed, the possibility of mere production of a later effect is not precluded. We can note that this does not establish that a later effect will emerge, but we are probably
meant to put this statement together with all of the arguments adduced for disintegratedness that were explored in the previous chapter.

Valid Cognition Is Mistaken but Reliable

The unique tenets of the Prasangika School also include three positions that are mainly refutations of tenets identified with the Svatantrika School (but which also apply to the other non-Prasangika schools). The first of these Prasangika tenets is that until Buddhahood, all instances of conventional valid cognition, whether those of childish persons or of Superiors, are mistaken in the sense that their objects falsely appear to be inherently existent. Only the direct realization of emptiness in meditative equipoise is unmistaken cognition. Jamyang Shayba states:

In that way, until Buddhahood is attained, one has no nonmistaken consciousnesses except for a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Also, due to that, for childish persons, i.e., common beings, even [the exalted wisdom] of meditative equipoise of the supreme mundane qualities path of preparation (snyor lam chos mchog, lauki-kagradharma-prayogamarga) is polluted by error with respect to what appears. Therefore, that all consciousnesses of common beings are mistaken is also a unique [tenet of the Prasangika School].

Among non-Buddhas, only a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, the direct realization of emptiness, is a non-mistaken consciousness. All awarenesses that are not direct realizations of emptiness, even the conceptual realization of emptiness on the highest level of the path of preparation, are mistaken because their object-emptiness-appears to be inherently existent.

Jamyang Shayba cites Candrakirti's Clear Words, which seems to indicate that any consciousness to which something appears to be inherently existent must be labelled "erroneous" (phyin ci log):

The erroneous and the non-erroneous are different [i.e., a dichotomy]. Therefore, like the falling hairs [seen by] one with cataracts /dimness of sight, and so forth, when what does not [inherently] exist is apprehended by [that is, appears to] an erroneous [consciousness] as just [inherently] existing, how could even a portion of an [inherently] existent object be observed?

Despite the fact that most validly cognizing consciousnesses are mistaken in this way, Gelukbas assert that these consciousnesses are able to certify the basic entity of their objects of knowledge. Their basis seems to be to accept the worldly convention that these awarenesses are valid but to reject claims that they are correct with regard to the inherent existence of their objects; that would entail an
affirmation of inherent existence, since objects undeniably appear to exist this way. This then becomes an issue involving the use of ultimate analysis, since those who would claim that conventional valid cognition was correct with respect to the inherent existence of its object would have to maintain that such objects were findable upon analysis. The Svatantrikas are, then, wrong to claim that the non-defective sense consciousnesses that certify their objects also certify the manner in which those objects appear, i.e., their appearing to be inherently existent.

Refutation of Autonomous Syllogisms

Another Prasangika criticism of the Svatantrika School is embodied in its rejection of autonomous syllogisms (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba, svatantra-prayoga). This topic is barely touched upon in Jamyang Shayba's exposition of Prasangika tenets, because he has discussed it extensively elsewhere, but it is an important topic for Janggya. He describes autonomous syllogisms as follows:

Svatantrikas assert that the mere establishment of the three modes of a sign in the proof of non-true [existence] for either of the parties of a dispute is not sufficient; rather, [the three modes] must be established from within an objective mode of subsistence (don gyi sdod lugs).

In this interpretation of the Svatantrika School, all three aspects of a correct reason or logical sign—the subject, predicate, and reason (e.g., pot, impermanence, and being a product, in the syllogism "The subject, a pot, is impermanent because of being a product")—must be inherently existent and inherently related. In the Gelukba presentation of the Svatantrika School, Svatantrikas are held to propound that conventionally, objects inherently exist; i.e., objects do exist the way they appear, as if inherently existent, to non-defective sense consciousnesses. For them, a phenomenon cannot be a mere imputedly existent nominality, as for the Prasangikas; it must have its own inherent nature (rang bzhin, svabhava) in the sense of being findable among its bases of designation. Prasangikas reject this, saying that even conventionally, nothing inherently exists.

As will be seen later, Svatantrikas do not want to have to say that all sense consciousnesses, to which things appear to be inherently existent, are mistaken, for then how could objects be validly posited? Prasangikas take the plunge of asserting that even though sense consciousnesses are mistaken, they can validly posit objects (though not as existing the way they appear). Janggya continues:

The meaning of autonomy (rang rgyud, svatantra) is asserted as: the generation of inferential cognition realizing the probandum (bsgrub bya) within the [context of the three modes] being established in that manner. The reason for that is that in their system any non-conceptual or conceptual valid cognition must definitely be non-mistaken with respect to the inherent nature (rang bzhin, svabhava) of the appearing object or referent object [respectively] with respect to which it is a valid cognition,
because, if [a consciousness] is mistaken with respect to that, it cannot be posited that an object of comprehension is found by valid cognition. Furthermore, this meets back to the fact that they cannot posit a phenomenon as existent if conventionally it does not have its own nature that is not an imputedly existent nominality.

Therefore, they think that if the bases [that is, the subjects] on which depend the predicates about which the two parties debate-permanence, impermanence, true existence, non-true existence, etc.-do not exist within being established as commonly appearing and as demonstrably established objectively, they are not able to prove the modes of the sign in terms of such [a subject] because it is not feasible that there be a predicate of a non-existent substratum. That is the meaning of a commonly appearing subject.

For the Svatantrikas, the systems of the stater and the hearer of a syllogism must agree that the consciousness that certifies the existence of the subject, etc., of the syllogism also certifies its inherent existence. Therefore, the subject must be inherently existent, because (1) objects appear to Svatantrikas and to their hearers alike as if they were inherently existent and (2) both systems agree on the validity of this appearance. Prasangikas do not need to posit this, since their principal method is to reveal contradictions that arise from their opponent's convictions, without insisting, as the non-Prasahgikas do, that the two systems agree that the inherent existence of objects is certified by the validly cognizing consciousnesses that certify the subject, etc. Therefore, for Prasahgikas there need not be, nor could there be, a commonly appearing subject. Janggya continues:

According to this excellent [Prasarigika] system, once such [a subject and sign] are demonstrable, both of those have become objects that exist by way of their own entity, and just that is the meaning of being ultimately established. Therefore, the assertion that there exists the establishment of a commonly appearing subject for both parties in a debate-that is, a mode of proving a predicate within taking just that [subject] as the substratum-is very wrong. According to the Madhyamika who is the first party, this is because existence by way of [an object's] own entity is not feasible even conventionally, whereby such [a commonly appearing subject] necessarily does not exist. As long as the other parties have not generated the [correct] view in their continua, they cannot distinguish the difference between existing by its own entity and mere [conventional] existence; therefore, until they realize the view, they cannot be shown the mode of mere conventional existence.

Therefore, a mode of objective establishment which exists in the manner of common appearance [in the systems of] both parties is asserted by those who do not just lead from an opponent's assertions [i.e., non-Prasarigikas]; this mode is not found, whereby it is asserted that a commonly appearing subject does not exist.
Also, this meets back to asserting or not asserting conventionally phenomena that exist by way of their own character. Even the essential points such as that Svatantrikas distinguish real and unreal conventionalities and that Prasangikas do not assert real conventionalities in their own system must be known in dependence on this [position].

According to Janggya, because Prasangikas do not accept that things inherently exist even conventionally whereas non-Prasangikas do, they do not think that a Madhyamika and an opponent could possibly have a commonly appearing subject. Moreover, they are not drawn into the additional difficulty of distinguishing between real and unreal conventionalities except on the level of ordinary worldlings themselves, who correctly assert, for instance, that the appearance of a mirage can be mistaken for water. Prasangikas assert that since all appearances are unreal in the sense that they appear to inherently exist whereas they do not, there are no real conventionalities. However, from the point of view of the world they also say that most objects, with the exception of those of consciousnesses affected by superficial causes of error such as those that apprehend mirages as water, are real in relation to a worldly consciousness."

The Prasangikas themselves mainly work with their opponent's own assertions, which they will demonstrate to entail unwanted consequences. However, although when addressing sharp opponents they do not depend on, nor consider necessary, the use of syllogisms, they use them for opponents who are not as sharp. The syllogisms used are not autonomous syllogisms because they are not regarded as being about inherently existent objects or to entail inherent relationships. Again, Janggya states:"}

Although autonomous reasons are not asserted in the Prasangika School, signs with the three modes definitely must be asserted, and the three modes also must definitely be established by valid cognition. Also, that [establishment of the three modes] is accomplished by other-renowned reasons.

In accordance with the earlier explanation, there is no objective mode of establishing, for the two parties of a debate, an object of comprehension that appears commonly [without contradicting their respective systems]. Therefore, leading from the assertions of an opponent, one states reasons that are well known to the opponents themselves. [One may also state reasons that are] well known to [the opponent who is] other in relation to the first party, i.e., a Madhyamika. Therefore, the two, self-renowned reasons and other-renowned reasons, are equivalent."

The Prasangikas use reasonings that play upon an opponent's own knowledge and beliefs. From their own point of view, then, all of their reasonings are "other-renowned," i.e., those well known to the person with whom they are debating.
The third Prasangika tenet in this list, directed against assertions said to be made by schools such as the Svatatntrika and Cittamatra upon engaging in ultimate analysis, is the assertion that one cannot begin to destroy the obstructions to omniscience (shes bya'i sgrib pa, jneyavarana) until one has destroyed all of the obstructions to liberation (nyon mong pa'i sgrib pa, klegavarana). This contradicts the Svatatntrakas, who assert that beginning on the first Bodhisattva ground (the path of seeing) one simultaneously destroys the obstructions to liberation and the obstructions to omniscience." The obstructions to omniscience "pollute" the mind, causing the appearance of inherent existence even for Arhats, persons who have overcome the afflictions of ignorance, desire, and aversion through realizing the emptiness of inherent existence. According to Janggya:15

Since the two [Hearer and Solitary Realizer] Arhats and Bodhisattvas who abide on the pure [eighth through tenth] grounds have removed all the seeds of the afflictions, the consciousness that conceives of true existence is not produced [in their continua]. However, since their [minds] are polluted by the predispositions [established by] those [afflictions], awarenesses are produced that are mistaken with respect to their appearing objects.

In that case, the predispositions [established by] the afflictions are the chief of the obstructions to omniscience, and the effects of those-the factors of mistaken dualistic appearance-are also included in those [obstructions to omniscience].

Further meditation on emptiness conjoined with the practice of the perfections is required to remove the obstructions to omniscience, which are like the stubborn stains that persist in a piece of cloth that has been thoroughly washed. Jamyang Shayba, depending on Dzongkaba, asserts that one does not begin to abandon them until after the obstructions to liberation have been removed:16

The bottom limit of an exalted wisdom that releases one from any of the impedimentary obstructions [i.e., the obstructions to omniscience] is posited from the ground of irreversibility, the eighth [Bodhisattva] ground." In consideration of many such meanings, Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" says:18

...because obstructions that are predispositions and that are different from those seeds [producing the afflictions] are posited as obstructions to omniscience, they are not [begun to be] abandoned until one attains the eighth [Bodhisattva] ground.

Jamyang Shayba's principal Indian Prasangika source is Candrakirti; Jamyang Shayba cites Candrakirti's graphic examples:19
When one has abandoned all afflictions on the eighth [Bodhisattva] ground, one must [then begin to] abandon the obstructions to omniscience but not earlier than that because until the afflictions have been abandoned, there is no way to abandon their predispositions. For example, until one removes the oil in something fouled with oil, one is unable to remove its befoulment. That is because Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance" says:

Those that are involved in stopping up and infusing the mental continuum are predispositions. "The aftermath of the afflictions," "conditioning of the afflictions," "the root of the afflictions," and "predispositions of the afflictions" are synonymous.

Even though they have abandoned the afflictions by an uncontaminated path, all Hearer and Solitary Realizer [Arhats] are unable to abandon [the obstructions to omniscience]. This is like the fact that because a pot and [a piece of] woolen cloth have contacted [sesame oil and flowers, respectively], even though the sesame oil and flowers, and so forth, have been removed, a subtle quality [of those can be] observed.

Jamyang Shayba also wants to show that the obstructions to omniscience can be described as "non-afflictive ignorance" (nyon mong can ma yin pa'i ma rig pa) and that there are instances of obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses. His reasoning appears to be that since ignorance is a consciousness, that which is ignorance is a consciousness, whereby the obstructions to omniscience, being non-afflictive ignorance, must be consciousnesses. Otherwise, it would be necessary to admit that non-afflictive ignorance is not actually ignorance. He first cites a passage from Candrakirti that specifically mentions non-afflictive ignorance:

There is non-afflictive ignorance and ignorance that is an obstruction to omniscience because Candrakirti says in his Autocommentary on the "Entrance,"...because of being thoroughly involved in ignorance that is not afflictive..." and his Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges (skyabs gsum 'gro bdun cu pa, trisaranasaptati) says:

For the sake of abandoning non-afflictive ignorance,

[Arhats] are later urged on by the Buddhas.

And:

Since non-afflictive ignorance exists,

[It must be] abandoned [in order to attain] omniscience.
However, his contention that these passages show that there are obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses is opposed by Janggya and Ngawang Belden; Janggya refers to many authorities who also oppose that view:

In dependence on Candrakirti's Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges which says, "For the sake of abandoning non-afflictive ignorance..." and "...non-afflictive ignorance exists...." and his statement in his Autocommentary on the "Entrance," "...ignorance that is not afflictive..." Panchen Sonam Gyeltsen (pan chen bsod nams rgyal mtshan) and the great scholar and adept Jamyang Shaybay Dorjay [Jamyang Shayba] say that the existence of obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses is correct.

Nevertheless, with respect to the Foremost Omniscient [Dzongkaba's] interpretations of the ignorance that is an obstruction to omniscience, except for his interpretation [of it] as predispositions of mistaken dualistic appearance, he does not appear to have interpreted it as ignorance that is a consciousness.

Most scholars and adepts such as the omniscient Kaydrup, the lord of reasoning Jaydziin Chogyi Gyeltsen (rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan) of Sera (se-ra) and his [spiritual] sons, as well as the great treasure of wisdom Jamyang Gaway Lodro ('jam dbyangs dga' ba'i No gros), the foremost omniscient Genddn Gyatso (dge 'dun rgya mtsho), and Panchen Sonam Drakba, assert that there are no obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses. Also, the omniscient Panchen Losang Chogyi Gyeltsen (pan Chen blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan), a keeper of the teaching of both the transmission of explanation and the transmission of achievement of the Foremost Lama [Dzongkaba], says:

The subtle obstructions [preventing] the perception

Of the two truths directly and simultaneously by one consciousness

Are designated "ignorance" [but] are not actual consciousnesses;

Hence there is not even partial contradiction.

His statements along with his reasons are very concordant with the great mass of the speech of the Foremost [Dzong kaba]. Therefore, [this topic] still should be finely analyzed by the intelligent.

Though no reasons are given for Janggya's denial of obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses, it could be speculated that Janggya and the others want to avoid saying that even sense consciousnesses such as an eye consciousness are instances of obstructions to omniscience just because they have predispositions for mistaken dualistic appearance.
Pramana Is Not Necessarily New Cognition

In addition to their criticisms of the Cittamatra and Svatantrika Schools, Prasangikas also refute the notion, held by all the lower schools, that prime cognition (tshad ma, pramana) is necessarily new realization of an object. The Prasangika School interprets the "pra" of "pramdna" as meaning "prime," but not in the sense of first; rather, it is in the sense of main. Hence, all valid awarenesses are pramana, including subsequent cognition (bcad shes, paricchinajndna[?]), a category that includes all valid consciousnesses other than those which occur in the first moment of cognizing an object. Jamyang Shayba says:

The statement in Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections (rtsod zlog, vigrahavyavartani, vs. 32):30

If it is thought that [valid cognition] is established

By other validly cognizing consciousnesses, it would be endless.

Furthermore, the first is not established,

Nor the middling, nor the last ... 31

refutes that [pramana necessarily means] new realization and refutes that [consciousnesses are certified by] self-consciousness or other-knowing consciousnesses.32

Ngawang Belden, relying on Dzongkaba's student Kaydrup, explains that the reason why it is inappropriate to indicate that pramana must mean new realization is that it would constitute ultimate analysis. He does not specify exactly the manner in which the ultimate analysis would take place, but it seems reasonable to speculate that he would regard that assertion about pramana to be an investigation to determine whether or not a certain consciousness was the first, or a subsequent, moment of a continuum of perception, in other words, investigation of whether or not the object imputed-the consciousness-is its basis of imputation-the moments of a continuum of consciousness. He says:

Both of the assertions that all awarenesses of common beings are mistaken consciousnesses and that subsequent [valid] cognition is prime cognition have their source in the non-assertion of [establishment by a phenomenon's] own character, because (1) whatever is an awareness of a common being necessarily perceives [phenomena] to be established by their own character and (2) whatever might be a new incontrovertible consciousness would have to be an object that is findable through analysis by a reasoning consciousness. The first [reason] is easy. The second is established because Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate (bskal bzang mig 'byed/stong thun chen mo) says:
The assertion that [prime cognition] is necessarily newly incontrovertible-[that an awareness] cannot be posited as prime cognition merely by being incontrovertible with respect to the object of comprehension—is incorrect because (1) mere conventional prime cognition does not establish that prime cognition must be newly incontrovertible and (2) prime cognition analyzing the ultimate does not in any way find prime cognition. That the former [reason-that mere conventional prime cognition does not establish that prime cognition must be newly incontrovertible-] is so follows (1) because an ordinary innate awareness of a worldly being that is not affected by adventitious causes of error and operates without investigation or analysis designates as prime cognition what is merely incontrovertible with respect to the object it comprehends and does not in any way designate [a consciousness as prime cognition] by way of it being newly incontrovertible and (2) because in all logicians' statements of proofs for the necessity of mentioning the term "newly" as part of the definition of prime cognition, the way something becomes prime cognition is put in terms of positing as prime cognition an object found by analysis through reasoning.

Kaydrup says that conventional valid cognition does not establish that prime cognition must be a new awareness; thus, Ngawang Belden thinks, if an instance of prime cognition which must be newly incontrovertible does exist, it must be established by ultimate valid cognition, in which case it would be findable through analysis by a reasoning consciousness. Similarly, Kaydrup also notes that prime cognition is not found by ultimate valid cognition either; indeed, in the PrasaAgika system, nothing is findable upon analysis by ultimate valid cognition. It seems that in this case, Prasangikas accept the conventions of an ordinary worldly awareness, for whom pramana is simply correct awareness; they reject the conclusions of those who designate it as just the first moment of awareness by noting that this would be an attempt to find consciousness as being its basis of designation—a moment of consciousness—and thus would be ultimate analysis.

Mental Direct Perception Can Be Conceptual

In another tenet that stands in opposition to at least those followers of Dharmakirti in the Sautrantika and Cittamatra Schools, Prasangikas accept the existence of instances of mental direct perception (yid kyi mngon sum, manasapratyaksa) that are conceptual (rtog pa, kalpana). Jamyang Shayba cites Candrakirti’s Clear Words.

Since in scripture it is also not the case that only non-conceptual consciousnesses are directly perceiving consciousnesses (mngon sum, pratyaksa), this [contrary assertion that there is only non-conceptual direct perception] is untenable.
One reason is that, according to Dzongkaba, there are instances of mental direct perception that are remembering consciousnesses, which are always conceptual consciousnesses. He says:

Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred," at the point of explaining the meaning of the passages in the abhidharma texts that the five, forms, and so forth, are individually known by the [corresponding] sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness, says:

The two [types of] perception [sense and mental] do not perceive the same object. One, [a sense consciousness] which is generated first, directly distinguishes the aspect of the object. The second [the mental consciousness] does not know [the object] in the sense of just acting [on it] directly; [however,] since, by the power of a sense consciousness, it is produced thinking of such, it is designated that it also knows that object.

Initially, a sense consciousness directly knows an object such as a form, and through the power of that sense consciousness, the mental consciousness knows it, but it is said [that the mental consciousness] does not know it directly like a sense consciousness. It is also said that the mental consciousness that knows its object through the force of a sense consciousness is a memory consciousness.

Jamyang Shayba also seems to assert that there are instances of these conceptual, mental directly perceiving consciousnesses that are feelings (tshor ba, vedand), although he does not elaborate. The main meaning of feeling is a mental factor that accompanies a main consciousness and that experiences an object. Dzongkaba (who is cited by Ngawang Belden) indicates how feeling is also an experiencer of an object:

"Feeling" is a word related with an agent, an activity, or an object; thus there come to be three: (1) feeling in the sense of the person [who feels]; (2) feeling in the sense of the activity [of feeling]; and (3) what is felt. The second of these is the valid [i.e., actual] one, the mental factor feeling. The third is the object of comprehension [of a feeling], that is, pleasure, pain, or neutral feeling. This is in terms of a mental consciousness.

Feeling can include not only the mental factor that accompanies a mental consciousness following sense experience, but also "internal feelings." Dzongkaba identifies two types of direct comprehension, one having to do with internal feelings, in his Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance":

Therefore, with respect to direct comprehension, there are two, (1) the distinguishing by a sense consciousness of forms, and so forth, for instance,
and (2) the thorough distinguishing by internal experience of pleasant and painful feelings, and so forth, for instance. The latter of those two has to be asserted [to occur] even during the ordinary state.

Thus, Jamyang Shayba interprets the second, "internal experience," as feeling that, since it is a "direct comprehension" and is in a category separate from sense consciousnesses, must be a mental direct perception. For instance, the mental factor feeling that accompanies a pleasant memory is a direct comprehension of pleasantness but is not sense direct perception; hence, it would seem that for Jamyang Shayba it would necessarily be mental direct perception.

Also, the Prasangikas are held to assert that direct perception can be conceptual, in contradistinction to those Sautrantikas and Cittamatra who follow the great epistemologists, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Their expansion of the range of mental direct perception to include conceptual instances is, based, it seems, on the assertion of feelings that are instances of mental direct perception and does not seem to be related to a deeper issue, such as the use of ultimate analysis.

Prasangika Perspectives on Nirvana

The final tenet of this category-rejection of the assertions of other schools on issues other than path structure-is that according to Gelukba scholars, over against the lower schools, Prasarigikas define the terms "nirvana with remainder" (lhag bcas myang Was, sopadhigesa-nirvana) and "nirvana without remainder" (lhag med myang Was, nirupadhigesa-nirvana) not by whether or not a liberated person is or is not still alive, but to whether or not such a person is experiencing the appearance of true existence (bden yod, satya-sat). The term "nirvana with remainder" (lhag bcas myang Was, sopadhigesa-nirvana) refers to the persistence of the appearance of true existence to a person who has overcome all afflictive obstructions when that person is not in meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness. "Nirvana without remainder" (lhag med myang Was, nirupad-higesa-nirvana) refers to the absence of the appearance of true existence to such a person when that person is meditating on emptiness.

In general, the nirvanas posited by the lower schools are contradictory with those posited by the Prasangika School, since they mean very different things by "with remainder" and "without remainder." Both sides agree that nirvana occurs when the afflictions of desire, hatred, etc., have been utterly destroyed; that much is shared. But according to the Prasangika School one first manifests a nirvana without remainder because in the meditative equipoise in which the affictions are finally abandoned, there is no remainder of an appearance of true existence. The lower schools would identify that nirvana as a nirvana with remainder because unless one dies at that time there is no discontinuation of the continuum of aggregates impelled by contaminated actions and afflictions.
Subsequent to meditative equipoise, both would identify one's nirvana as a nirvana with remainder, but within meaning different things by "remainder." For the lower schools, it means that there is a remainder of aggregates impelled by contaminated actions and afflictions; for the Prasangika School, that there remains an appearance of true existence due to obstructions to omniscience, here specifically predispositions established by the ignorant consciousness that conceives true existence. Similarly, all schools would identify the nirvana of an Arhat at the time of death as being a nirvana without remainder, but within meaning different things by "without remainder." For the lower schools, it means that the continuum of the aggregates of the Arhat have been completely cut off; for the Prasangika Schools, it means that at that time an Arhat in meditative equipoise on emptiness experiences no conventional appearances whatsoever, and therefore experiences no mistaken dualistic appearances.

Jamyang Shayba argues that there are three reasons why the assertions of the lower schools are incorrect: (1) if a nirvana without remainder meant the nirvana experienced upon death, it would not be actualized; (2) the way in which Arhats attain a nirvana in which the contaminated aggregates are completely abandoned is just that the aggregates are primordially extinguished into emptiness, not that they are irrevocably cut off, and (3) there is a Hinayana sutra in which Sariputra, having actualized a nirvana without remainder, spoke, demonstrating that one need not die to have such a nirvana. With regard to the first of these reasons, Jamyang Shayba relies on Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning":39

Since there is nothing whatsoever in an entity which is a severance of the continuum of the aggregates, in whom is that cessation actualized? ...For the time being, as long as there is an impelling force for the continuation of those aggregates by the power of causes and conditions, so long can [the continuum of the aggregates] not be fully understood as extinct because it has production.

No person would be able to actualize a nirvana without a remainder of aggregates because the mental and physical aggregates are the basis of imputation for persons. A person whose aggregates had been destroyed would be dead. In most Mahayana systems (the Madhyamika School and the followers of Dharmakirti in the Cittamatra School) there is no instance in which the aggregates of a person are completely extinguished in the sense of irrevocably cutting their continuum (although the form aggregate is temporarily absent in the case of persons born in the Formless Realm). From the point of view of the Mahayana schools (other than the followers of Asanga in the Cittamatra School), all sentient beings eventually attain Buddhahood. Those who have attained nirvana have purified their aggregates of afflictions and are no longer powerlessly reborn in cyclic existence, but the process of transformation from ordinary being to Arhat and from Arhat to Buddha does not disturb the basic continuum of the aggregates.
The lower schools would probably answer that there is after all an attainer of their version of nirvana without remainder—one in which the continuum of the aggregates is cut off—because the person who is about to attain that nirvana in the next moment may be designated as the attainer of a nirvana without remainder. Such a designation would be a coarse worldly convention, analogous to the way in which the world refers to persons and death. For example, although it is not possible to posit a person who is dead (because persons are imputed in dependence on their aggregates, and a corpse has neither a living body nor a consciousness associated with it) people in the world often speak as though such a person could be posited.

To Jamyang Shayba this is not a satisfactory answer. It is no more admissible to talk about persons who have attained a nirvana in which the aggregates have been utterly destroyed than to talk about persons who are dead.

With regard to the second reason, that Arhats just attain a nirvana in which the aggregates are "extinguished into emptiness" but not irrevocably destroyed, Jamyang Shayba following the lead of Candrakirti and Dzongkaba, cites a Hearer sutra:

This which is suffering is completely abandoned, definitely abandoned, purified, extinguished, freed from desire, stopped, thoroughly pacified, vanished, not connected to other sufferings, not arisen, not produced. This is peace, this is auspiciousness. It is like this: since all the aggregates are abandoned, attachment is extinguished, one is freed from desire, has cessation, nirvana.

Dzongkaba explains that this sutra indicates that there is no destruction of the aggregates upon the attainment of this nirvana:

Otherwise, according to the Proponents of True Existence, it is not fit to explain [the Hearer sutra] as primordial extinguishment in the sense that the aggregates have been primordially without inherently existent production, as [the line] in Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana, "The afflictions are primordially extinguished," is explained; rather, it must [incorrectly] be explained as an utter abandonment [of the aggregates] by means of the path.

If it is [explained this way, then there are the following faults:] when the nirvana that is to be actualized existed, the actualizer would not [and thus could not report on the extinguishment that was realized, as was done in the Repetition Sutra]. Also, when the actualizer existed, the nirvana to be actualized would not because the aggregates would not have been extinguished. Hence, they are unable to explain this sutra.

According to us, it is permissible to explain extinguishment here in
Extinguishment [in this case] does not [occur] by means of an antidote;

It is so called because of primordial extinguishment.

We are able to explain well the meaning of the sutra [as referring to a natural or primordial absence of inherent existence in phenomena].

Since the Proponents of True Existence—the proponents of the lower tenet systems—interpret this sutra as being concerned with a nirvana without remainder in the sense of an irrevocable extinguishment of the aggregates, they would not interpret it as Dzongkaba has done or as Maitreya would, as being concerned with the primordial extinguishment of the aggregates into emptiness. In the section in which the quoted passage occurs, Maitreya speaks about the natural purity of the mind and the adventitious nature of the afflictions defiling it; he does not mean that the afflictions are removed by the path from beginningless time. They would then have the problem of explaining how there could be an actualizer of that nirvana (since the aggregates would have been abandoned at the point of attaining the nirvana), or, vice versa, how there could be an actualized nirvana without remainder if there were a person who had actualized it.

The Two Selflessnesses of Persons and Phenomena Are Equally Subtle

The second category of unique tenets revolves around the issue of defining Arhats; the Prasangikas deny that status to certain so-called Arhats who have only realized what, for them, is a coarse selflessness and, although they have thereby suppressed the coarse afflictions, have not removed any of the obstructions to liberation from the root.

First, Prasangikas take issue with the Svatantrika School's assertion that it is necessary only to realize the selflessness of the person (gang zag gi bdag med, pudgalanairatmya) in order to attain liberation from cyclic existence. In all schools other than the Prasangika School, the selflessness of the person is the non-existence of a self-sufficient person (rang rkya ba'i gang zag), which (in the non-Prasangika Mahayana schools) is coarser than the selflessness of phenomena; essentially, then, other schools allow for the possibility of gaining liberation even if one realizes only a less subtle level of selflessness. According to Gelukba explanations of Prasangika, the selflessness of the person is as subtle as the selflessness of phenomena; all phenomena are devoid of inherent existence, the subtle selflessness.

In this case, the explicit basis for the rejection of the view of other schools is just scripture. The Indian Prasangika source is ~antideva's Engaging in the
Desire and Aversion Conceive True Existence

The second tenet related to Arhats is Jamyang Shayba's claim that it is a unique Prasangika tenet that there are instances of desire and aversion, in addition to ignorance, that are consciousnesses that conceive true existence. That is, since all afflictions such as desire and aversion have ignorance as their basis, and there are instances of them arising only after an ignorant consciousness (one conceiving true existence) has determined an object to be inherently attractive or unattractive, those afflictions are mixed with a conception of true existence. The Indian source is Aryadeva's Four Hundred (VI.11):16

Like the body sense-power in the body,

**Delusion** serves as the basis for all [afflictions].

Therefore, all afflictions are overcome

Through overcoming obscuration.

The body sense power is the physical basis for touch. It is said that where it is absent, such as in most of the hair, the ends of the nails, etc., no other senses may operate. In the same way, desire and hatred are absent or inoperable in the absence of the consciousness conceiving true existence. Gyeltsap, in his Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" (bzhi rgya pa'i dar tik) makes this connection explicitly:

In the body, the body sense power pervades the other sense powers such as
the eye and dwells as the basis of those. If it did not exist, the other sense powers would also not dwell [in the body]. In just that way, the afflictive ignorance—the obscuration which [mistakenly] determines that dependentarisings, which are empty of inherent existence, are truly existent-pervades and dwells in all the afflictions such as desire and hatred. That is because one adheres to desire, hatred, and so forth, upon determining a thing [falsely] imputed by obscuration to be inherently attractive or unattractive. Therefore, the manner in which the mode of apprehension of both desire and hatred and the mode of apprehension of the consciousness conceiving true existence are mixed should be known.

According to Jamyang Shayba,

This is because of the unique assertion that just as those two [levels, coarse and subtle]' exist with respect to ignorance, they also [exist] with respect to attachment, and so forth.

Arhats are those persons who have abandoned ignorance and thus have also abandoned all of the afflictions such as desire that are based on it. A controversy arose over the status of certain persons who some regarded as Arhats, but who still manifested a kind of craving. Prasarnigikas such as Santideva are reacting against the designation of "Arhat" for some persons who have only realized a coarse selflessness and have thereby gotten rid of only coarse levels of desire, aversion, and so forth. Jamyang Shayba cites ~antideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.47cd):

This attachment is not afflictive but

Why is it not like obscuration?

Ngawang Belden explains this passage:

This craving in the continuum of the person whom you [wrongly] assert to be an Arhat is [afflictive, but not] in the manner explained in the abhidharma texts. Also, it is said in those abhidharma texts that thorough obscuration-ignorance-is of two [types], afflictive and non-afflictive. Just so, in accordance with the explanation in the abhidharma texts that there is one type [of ignorance] that is afflictive and one which is not afflictive, why do you not also [absurdly] assert craving [as afflictive and non-afflictive]? You should assert this.

According to Ngawang Belden, ~antideva admits that the so-called "Arhats" do not have afflicted craving based on a coarse conception of self (the misconception of a self described in the abhidharma texts). However, he wants to make the point that they do have afflicted craving based on a subtle conception of self. He does this by arguing that the lower schools should admit that the so-called "Arhats" still have
craving, and invites them to call it "non-afflicted craving," since that is the only conceivable kind of craving that could exist in the continuum of an Arhat. However, Santideva considers this to be absurd: craving is craving; "non-afflictive craving" is an oxymoron. For him, the fact that these "Arhats" have craving indicates that they are not Arhats at all, for they retain at least a subtle level of ignorance. Therefore, what the proponents of the abhidharma texts call "non-afflictive" ignorance is in fact just a subtle level of afflictive ignorance.

Hence, this tenet is linked to the fact that one must overcome subtle ignorance and not merely the conception of a self of persons as defined in the lower schools; otherwise, one might be an ersatz "Arhat" who manifests some kinds of desire or aversion based on having a remainder of ignorance. The Prasangika basis of refutation in this case is simply a refusal to dilute the achievement of becoming an Arhat by permitting it to include a residue of what to them is obviously ignorance-based action. Their "innovation" is the assertion of desire or aversion that is thoroughly mixed with the conception of true existence, making it clear that "Arhats" with even subtle craving are mislabeled.

Common Beings Can Have Yogic Direct Perception

The third tenet concerning Arhats is Jamyang Shayba's argument, based on a sutra cited by Candrakirti, that even common beings can have yogic directly perceiving consciousnesses (rnal 'byor mngon sum, yoga-pratyaksa). Yogic direct perception is a special type of mental direct perception that arises from meditative stabilization, but most definitions of it specify that it occurs only in the continuum of a Superior. However, Jamyang Shayba refers to the so-called "Arhats" who have obviously had yogic direct perception, since they have been able to realize the sixteen coarse attributes of the four noble truths. However, they are not Superiors, but only common beings, because they have not realized the subtle aspects of the four noble truths. Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" says:

Also, in the Sutra on the Miserliness of One in Trance (bsam gtan dpe 'khyud kyi mdo, dhyanitamusi), which is quoted in [the twenty-fourth chapter of] Candrakirti's Clear Words," Buddha says, "Manjugri, sentient beings, whose minds are mistaken due to four errors through not seeing the noble truths correctly as they are in reality, do not pass beyond this unreal cyclic existence." Manjugri responds, "Oh, Supramundane Victors please indicate what is apprehended by sentient beings that causes them not to pass beyond cyclic existence." The Teacher said that sentient beings are not liberated because they do not know the four truths as they are in reality, and Manjusri requested Buddha to explain what is misconceived by sentient beings that causes them not to be liberated from cyclic existence. In answer to this, Buddha says that they think, "I will pass beyond cyclic existence, and I will attain nirvana," with a sense of adhering
to the true existence of these. Therefore, when they have meditated on impermanence and so forth, they think, "I know suffering, I have abandoned its sources, I have actualized its cessation, I have cultivated the path." They then think, "I have become an Arhat." When they have temporarily abandoned the manifest [coarse] afflictions explained above, they think, "I have extinguished all contaminations." It is said that at the time of death they perceive that they will be reborn; thereby, they doubt Buddha, and this fault causes them to fall into a great hell. This applies to some who abide on such a path but not to all.

These persons conceive of things as truly existent even in their meditation on subtle impermanence, and so forth. Therefore, they manage to abandon, or suppress, coarse afflictions only temporarily.

Jamyang Shayba's stand that yogic direct perception is not necessarily included only in the continuum of a Superior is a conclusion drawn from Dzongkaba's analysis of the Sutra on the Miserliness of One in Trance, a sutra cited in Candrakirti's Clear Words. What is gained or lost by this position? Jamyang Shayba allows the possibility that the so-called Arhats have yogic direct perception while carefully stipulating that they have not achieved liberation. This, of course, is an attack on the way in which the lower schools define the four noble truths, particularly the way in which they define ignorance. Because their identification of the self to be negated in the view of selflessness has been too coarse, no one could become an Arhat by merely adhering to their tenets.

One Can Directly Realize the Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths Even before the Path of Preparation

Jamyang Shayba makes essentially the same point concerning the fourth tenet of this type when he contends that one can directly realize the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths even before the path of preparation (sbyor lam, prayogamarga). These sixteen attributes have both coarse and subtle aspects; e.g., coarse sufferings arise from the coarse actions and afflictions established by the coarse conception of self, subtle sufferings from the subtle conception of self.' Hence, it is possible for one to directly realize the coarse sixteen attributes of the four noble truths without having reached the path of preparation, i.e., without having had special insight with respect to the subtle emptiness. Hypothetically, this could be done without reaching even the first path, the path of accumulation (tshogs lam, sambharamarga), though it seems unlikely that one might realize impermanence or selflessness without having generated the spirit of renunciation.

The point being made here is that although there are some persons who claim to be Arhats on the basis of having realized the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, it is easy to see that they have not attained special insight that realizes the subtle emptiness and hence have not attained the heat path of preparation because, as Jamyang Shayba points out, they are boastful whereas real Arhats are
Because the attainment of special insight realizing emptiness and the heat (drod, usmagata) path of preparation are simultaneous,' when those are attained such pride of wrong conceit [i.e., boasting] is not produced. Therefore, one does not arrive even at the path of preparation by just directly realizing the sixteen coarse attributes of the four truths.

This is essentially the same point as was made with regard to yogic direct perception, where persons who considered themselves to be Arhats were obviously mistaken since they, upon having realized the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, generated doubt with respect to the Buddha's enlightenment, demonstrating that they had only temporarily suppressed the manifest afflictions.

True Cessations Are the Dharmadhatu

Finally, Jamyang Shayba, citing Nagarjuna and Dzongkaba argues that true cessations ('gog bden, nirodha-satya), absences of afflictions in the minds of persons who have irrevocably eliminated a portion of the afflictions, are the element of a [Superior's] qualities (chos dbyings, dharmadhdtu) 61 i.e., emptiness. The import of this is that it then follows that all Superiors are persons who have realized emptiness, not anything more coarse such as the absence of a self-sufficient person, since Superiors are necessarily those who have realized true cessations. Jamyang Shayba makes this point through his exegesis of Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning:62

True cessations are understood to be the element of a [Superior's] qualities, i.e., [emptiness]) by way of how they are included in the four truths and two truths. Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (4cd) says:

Through [believing in inherent] existence one is not released.

Through [believing in total] non-existence one does not transcend cyclic existence.

By thoroughly understanding [the nature of] things and non-things (dngos med, abhava) b4

The great beings are released.

Thereby, it is also explained that Superiors realize emptiness.

What is not so clear is why Jamyang Shayba considers true cessations to be emptinesses, and hence to be ultimate truths within the division of all phenomena into two truths, ultimate truths (don dam bden pa, paramartha satya) and conventional truths (kun rdzob bden pa, samvrtisatya). True cessations are
absences of afflictions in the minds of persons who have irrevocably eliminated a portion of the afflictions; but are they emptinesses of inherent existence, as Jamyang Shayba says? According to Jamyang Shayba:

Candrakirti's Clear Words (XVIII.1):66

Internal and external things are not observable [as truly existent]. Therefore, the consciousnesses conceiving the internal and external as [inherently existent] self and as [inherently existent] mine are extinguished totally. Here, this is suchness.

The meaning of this is set forth in Dzongkaba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim chen mo):67

The total extinguishment of all conceptions of [inherently existent] I and mine through the thorough pacification of all these appearances of the varieties of internal and external phenomena as [their own] suchness, whereas they are not [their own] suchness, along with their predispositions, is the suchness that is to be attained here, the Truth Body.

This explains that true cessations are ultimate truths.

"Suchness," i.e., emptiness, here is explained to be the elimination of the object of the conception of an inherently existent I and mine. Thus, in Jamyang Shayba's view, a true cessation is being explicitly indicated by Candrakirti and Dzongkaba to be an emptiness.

Not all Gelukbas agree with Jamyang Shayba; Panchen Sonam Drakba (pan-chen bsod-nams-grag-pa, 1478-1554), author of textbooks for Loseling College of Drebung Monastery, regards true cessations to be ultimate truths but not necessarily to be the element of qualities, emptiness.69 His position is that a true cessation, being the abandonment of a specific affliction (such as desire, hatred, or ignorance) in a yogi's mental continuum, is merely the negation of that affliction and not a negation of true existence. They argue that the object of negation of a true cessation is an existent (an affliction), whereas the object of negation of a wisdom consciousness realizing emptiness is a non-existent (inherent existence). However, Jamyang Shayba can avoid the possible problem of explaining how, without switching objects of observation, persons realizing an absence of inherent existence on the uninterrupted path of a path of meditation in one moment are in the next moment able to realize the factor of an absence of an affliction in their own continua.

Pratyaksa Refers to Objects

Finally, several Prasangika tenets do not fall into either of the previous two
categories. For instance, Prasangikas make what seems to be a rather minor point that the term pratyaksa refers principally to objects, not the consciousnesses that realize them. It is not necessary to reserve the term for valid directly perceiving consciousnesses. Jamyang Shayba explains:70

The [Sanskrit] translation equivalent of mngon sum, pratyaksa, was used for both mngon sum [which often refers to a directly perceiving consciousness] and mngon gyur ["manifest phenomenon," synonymous with manifest object]. Hence, when the two, a pot and the directly perceiving sense consciousness apprehending it, are considered together, it is asserted that the pot is the actual pratyaksa and that the term pratyaksa is used imputedly with respect to the directly perceiving sense consciousness. Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" says:

In that way [when considering a subject and object together], a consciousness is not fit to be considered a pratyaksa. It is fit for the object [to be considered a pratyaksa].

And, his Clear Words says:72

Furthermore, because the term pratyaksa expresses the meaning, "not hidden," pratyaksa means to manifest to a sense-power. With respect to [pratyaksa], since it is taken to mean "manifesting to a sense power," non-hidden phenomena such as a pot or blue are established as manifest objects (mngon sum, pratyaksa), and the consciousnesses which thoroughly distinguish those are called manifest (mngon sum, pratyaksa) due to having as their cause a manifest object like hay-fire or grass-fire.73

In general, then, the PrasaAgika School does not consider consciousnesses to be pratyaksa. However, a consciousness that has its objects "before the eyes," that is, a directly perceiving consciousness, is also often called pratyaksa. Candrakirti explains that they come to have that name only by way of their association with their objects. Just as fire in the instances of a hay-fire or grass-fire has been given the name of its object, the substance being burned, so consciousnesses are given the name pratyaksa ("manifest") because their objects are pratyaksa ("manifest"). Still, this is not the only sense in which consciousnesses are pratyaksa; minds themselves can be manifest objects for other minds, such as the eye consciousness apprehending a form that is later recalled by a memory consciousness. This does not contradict Candrakzrtri's point, since in this sense minds are being considered as objects rather than as apprehending subjects, and it is the latter sense that is being rejected as the main meaning of pratyaksa. As Ngawang Belden states:74

Whatever is an established base (gzhi grub) is necessarily an actual manifest object (mngon sum, pratyaksa) in relation to an awareness that
clearly realizes it, and with regard to whatever consciousness is a valid directly perceiving consciousness with respect to an object, that consciousness is necessarily an imputed directly perceiving consciousness (mngon sum, pratyaksa) in relation to that object.

Ngawang Belden himself thinks that not only is pratyaksa not restricted to only sense-objects (which would have excluded consciousnesses), but that all phenomena are pratyaksa to awarenesses that clearly, i.e., directly realize them. This would imply that for him, even a permanent phenomenon such as an emptiness can be considered a pratyaksa in relation to the wisdom consciousness of meditative equipoise directly realizing it.

How Prasangikas Avoid the Two Extremes

Finally, according to Dzongkaba, it is a unique Prasangika tenet that the extreme of permanence or eternalism is avoided through the appearance of conventional truths, and the extreme of annihilation is avoided through positing them as empty of inherent existence. This is based on Dzongkaba's statements regarding the compatibility of emptiness and dependent-arising in his Three Principal Aspects of the Path (lam gyi gtso bo rnam gsum, stanza 13):75

When [the two realizations of dependent-arising and emptiness exist] simultaneously without alternation

And when from only seeing dependent-arising as infallible,

Definite knowledge entirely destroys the mode of apprehension [of the conception of inherent existence],

Then the analysis of the view [of reality] is complete.

Further, the extreme of [inherent] existence is excluded [by knowledge of the nature] of appearances [existing only as nominal designations],

And the extreme of [total] non-existence is excluded [by knowledge of the nature] of emptiness [as the absence of inherent existence and not the absence of nominal existence].

Ngawang Belden explains:"

For persons who have completed analysis of the view as in this passage, the force of the awareness conceiving inherent existence decreases to the extent they apply their minds to the meaning of dependent-arisings which are [understood to be] posited by names and terms. This is the way the
extreme of [inherent] existence is eliminated through appearance.

Also, for such persons, the force of the awareness that lacks conviction in the cause and effect of actions and conceives those to be non-existent decreases to the extent they apply their minds to the emptiness of inherent existence. This is the way the extreme of non-existence [i.e., no conventional existence] is eliminated through emptiness.

All Buddhist philosophers might say that the extreme of existence is avoided through realizing selflessness and that the existence of non-existence is avoided through the appearance of conventional phenomena, but, according to Gelukba scholars, the Prasangikas are asserting that the opposite also is true. It seems that by switching these terms, the Prasangikas are emphasizing the compatibility of emptiness and dependentarising. The observation of dependent-arisings is a sign of their lack of inherent existence, and the realization of emptiness makes possible one's understanding of conventionalities as conventionalities. Similarly, Dzongkaba says in the beginning of the sixth chapter of his Illumination of the Thought that understanding that phenomena are merely imputed by thought assists one in understanding emptiness, whereas usually it is said that until one has realized emptiness one is unable to understand conventionalities as mere conventionalities, imputed by thought.

This tenet does not seem to be directed against any particular school, although it implicitly rejects any explanation of the avoidance of the two extremes that does not reject inherent existence, since otherwise one would fall to an extreme of permanence. All other Buddhist schools would fall to that extreme.

This concludes our survey of the unique tenets of the Prasargika School as described by some of the luminaries of the Gelukba tradition.
7

Conclusion

Now that we have concluded our survey of the unique tenets of the Prasangika School as identified and developed in Tibetan Gelukba sources, we can address several questions of a general nature. The most general question is whether or not these tenets are actually those of the Indian founders of the Madhyamika and Prasangika-Madhyamika Schools, recalling that according to Dzongkaba, all of these tenets stem from the writings of the father of the Madhyamika School, Nagarjuna. Of course, since Nagarjuna himself claims only to be propounding the thought of the Buddha in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, his special inspiration and original source for these tenets would have to be the Buddha himself. But did the Sage of the Sakyas ever counsel his monks not to use "autonomous syllogisms"? Did he speak of "obstructions to omniscience"? Did he assert "conceptual mental direct perception"? Certainly he did not do so explicitly. But if, as is claimed in these Gelukba sources, he denied inherent existence, he logically would also deny autonomous syllogisms. If he taught the Mahayana sutras, he denied that Hearer Arhats have destroyed the predispositions established by ignorance, even though they have destroyed ignorance itself, and therefore he would affirm the existence of obstructions to omniscience. If he did not deny that memory is mental direct perception, he might well affirm it if asked. And so forth.

The sutras are cited on a number of occasions: to show that there are so-called Arhats who actually have subtle afflictions and, in their disappointment over not being liberated, cause their own births in a hell; that Hearer Arhats have not overcome the obstructions to omniscience; that death (disintegratedness) acts as a cause; that even the Buddha accepted what the world accepted; and that self-consciousness is absurd. On other points, the product of philosophical development in the centuries after Sakyamuni’s parinirvana, it is only the much later writings of Nagarjuna and his followers that provide direct authority for the collectors of unique tenets.

Nagarjuna, as the articulator of the unique view that nothing can withstand ultimate analysis, is cited a little more frequently than are the sutras. He is cited to show that external objects exist, since minds and objects equally conventionally exist; that pramana need not mean new realization; that self-consciousness is absurd; that disintegratedness is a functioning thing; and that one cannot become a Superior without realizing the subtle aspects of the four noble truths. His disciple, Aryadeva, is cited to demonstrate that ignorance is the basis of all the afflictions; that disintegratedness is itself caused; and that the conventions of the world must be respected.
These citations are insufficient in themselves to justify Dzongkaba's characterization of the "unique tenets" as difficult points in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way, except in the sense that many of them are rooted in the basic viewpoint of the Madhyamika School. Nevertheless, they do support the Gelukba contention that Nagarjuna, far from being "without any thesis," definitely held positions on a variety of epistemological, metaphysical, and soteriological issues, and that he respected the conventions of the world.

Despite Dzongkaba's nod to Nagarjuna, the Gelukba authors whose works we have been considering have clearly founded their analysis of the unique tenets of the Prasai gika School on the rock of Candrakirti, who in turn is seen as supplementing and clarifying the work of Nagarjuna. Occasionally, other Indians such as Santideva are cited, but on relatively few occasions. Jamyang Shayba, who has put together the most extensive list of the unique tenets, refers to Candrakirti at every opportunity; Ngawang Belden, his annotator, glosses the quotations with which Jamyang Shayba peppers his text and offers many passages from Dzongkaba's commentary on Candrakirti's Entrance and his The Essence of the Good Explanations. Janggya cites authorities far less frequently, and when he does tends to cite Dzongkaba, but obviously has drawn arguments from Candrakirti even when he does not cite him.

From Candrakirti has come an insistence on the uniqueness of Nagarjuna's system. Indeed, one could find little better justification than these topics for translating the avatarā in the title of Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatārā as "supplement," since that work explicitly distinguishes the system founded by Nagarjuna from the systems of Cittamatra and Svaṭantrika-Madhyamika. There were obviously many topics, such as that of a mind-basis-of-all, that Nagarjuna either did not anticipate or on which he did not comment (presuming, as the tradition does, that he was still alive at the time of the founding of the Cittamatra School); on such matters, Candrakirti supplied what Gelukbas accept would be Nagarjuna's view. Candrakirti also is the source for the bulk of the unique tenets; only a few of the topics we have considered are built on anything other than a passage from his works.

However, it is also obvious that Candrakirti did not attempt to lay out his own system of tenets; his greatest works are his Clear Words, a commentary on the Treatise on the Middle Way, and his Entrance to Nagarjuna's text, and even in the latter he identifies Madhyamika tenets only to the extent that he is defending Nagarjuna's thought against the emerging Cittamatra and Svaṭantrika-Madhyamika systems. Thus, it is really the Gelukbas who systematize. We have seen that they do not openly innovate, but rather modestly advertise their project as the distillation, the creation of an anthology, of many sources on a topic. But they do much more than this. For instance, we have seen that of twelve arguments made against the Cittamatra School refutation of external objects, Candrakirti is the explicit source of only four.
The question of whether or not these Tibetans have accurately represented their Indian antecedents is one that cannot be answered here. In the first place, the terseness and ambiguity of many passages in the Indian texts make it difficult to definitively assess their intent. This is particularly true of Nagarjuna. Second, the establishment of the full context in which the citations are found remains a desideratum. Many of the texts on which the Gelukbas have relied remain unstudied or have not themselves been adequately contextualized. I have attempted here, with all citations I was able to locate in their original sources, to read enough of the surrounding material to determine their context, but I did not study these texts in depth.

The crux of the Gelukba presentation of the unique Prasangika tenets has been the two-fold assertion, based on Candrakirti, that no phenomenon inherently exists and that, in general, what is well known to the world should also be accepted by philosophers. By making the first assertion, the Gelukba Prasangikas have been able to make a distinction between ultimate and conventional analysis, since positing of objects upon engaging in ultimate analysis involves the imputation of inherently existent entities or relationships. Thus, the Cittamatra refutation of external objects can be rejected in part because it involves ultimate analysis into the causes of consciousnesses; the existence of a mind-basis-of-all can be rejected because, in part, its assertion involves the notion that it is findable under analysis; self-consciousness is rejected because its postulation involves the assertion of an analytically findable, inherent difference between the object of one's recollection and the object originally experienced; objections to positing disintegratedness as a functioning thing are dismissed because they would involve ultimate analysis into the findability of a state of having been destroyed apart from that which has been destroyed; that conventional valid cognition is necessarily non-mistaken with regard to the mode of being of its object is rejected as involving the assertion of analytically findable objects; autonomous syllogisms are rejected because they would involve the assertion that the three modes of the sign in such syllogisms are analytically findable; and that pramana must mean "new realization" is rejected because it would involve ultimate analysis to find a basis of designation-moments of consciousness-identical to the objected designated-pramana. Thus, non-Prasangikas are criticized for either postulating an inherently existent entity that could supposedly withstand analysis, or for using such analysis to overturn legitimate conventions of the world.

The second basic Gelukba assertion on the unique Prasangika tenets, directly drawn from Candrakirti, is that the world's conventions should generally be accepted. Even if this were not clearly stated by Candrakirti, Dzongkaba's legendary encounter with Manjushri (the Bodhisattva personifying wisdom), who reportedly advised him to value appearances even as he sought to understand their emptiness, would have influenced the Gelukba stance. For the most part, this is clearly stated: the world obviously accepts external objects; the world's language shows that it thinks of death or disintegratedness as being caused and acting as a cause; the world does not conceive that memory requires an intermediary
consciousness; the world uses the term pramana in the sense of "correct," not necessarily "first."

Even though these and other points are asserted by awarenesses to which things appear falsely, and which are therefore mistaken, Gelukbas affirm them; in the midst of mistakenness about the mode of being of phenomena is a non-mistaken aspect that deserves respect. Still, what of questions about which ordinary persons have no opinion? How is it "upholding the conventions of the world" when it comes to questions such as how nirvana with and without remainder should be defined, or whether yogic direct perception can be attained by common beings, or what kinds of selflessness are realized by Arhats. In these cases, Gelukbas sometimes try to distinguish between ordinary and non-ordinary conventions, or between what is well known to the world and well known to ordinary people in the world, etc., though in the sources we have examined there is not sufficient explanation of these distinctions to make them fully useful. Principally, Gelukbas assert that these tenets can be adopted because they can be established by conventional valid cognition, without relying on ultimate analysis.

But why should the conventions of the world be so honored? Are not the descriptions of philosophers, qualified in such a way as to clarify the nature and relationships of phenomena, better to rely upon? There is no direct answer to this question in the sources we have at our disposal, but it seems to me that the Prasangikas/Gelukbas feel that it is essential to the project of liberating sentient beings that people not have their faith in worldly conventions weakened. That might seem to be an odd assertion, since they have identified the root of samsara to be the assent to the false appearance of the world; but we must remember that only one part of that appearance is declared to be false, and it is from the remainder that the Prasangikas can work with people, or they can work with themselves. The salvific process called "meditation on emptiness" begins with identifying the precise way in which phenomena, personal or otherwise, appear to the mind. It introduces an unhelpful level of complexity to declare that sense perception is fundamentally unveridical or that there are types of consciousness, such as the mind-basis-of-all, that exist but cannot be experienced. The Prasangika, says the Gelukba, wants to simplify matters so as to be able to focus on the analysis of ordinary experience. Thus, upholding the conventions of the world as a way to abet the all-important work of coming to realize emptiness is one aspect of the religious significance of the unique tenets. Another, it seems to me, is that in order to keep good ethics, one needs to have conviction in a convincing presentation of conventional phenomena. Dzongkaba implies this when he says:'

Therefore, in the system of the masters Buddhapalita and Candrakirti, inherent existence, that is, establishment by way of the object's own entity, is refuted even conventionally. Hence, it appears to be very difficult to posit conventional objects. If one does not know how to posit these well, without damage [by reasoning], one does not gain ascertainment with respect to the class of deeds whereby it appears that most fall to a view of deprecation.
Dzongkaba's thought seems to be that if one feels that the appearances of the world have no validity, one treats them with contempt; how, then, could one act properly? How could it be possible for one to generate compassion for others?

Also, the acceptance of the world's conventions is a principal way for the Prasangikas to demonstrate that they have many theses, positive as well as negative, and not merely on the topics mentioned in the "unique tenets," but in all other areas as well. For to fully live up to Candrakirti's acceptance of the world's conventions, Prasangikas must accept as part of their world-view all that can be verified by valid cognition. This is virtually a reversal of the critical stance, cited in chapter 1, that characterizes Nagarjuna's system as nihilistic and single-minded and would lead one to expect that the Prasangika system, to the extent that any system existed, would be mere negation. However, the Prasangika philosophy of Candrakirti, particularly as it is developed in the Tibetan Gelukba sources to which we have referred, is actually a school rich with ideas, freed by the dynamic principle that nothing has inherent existence, and holds its own as a conceptual system within the traditions of Buddhist philosophy. The "unique tenets" are themselves only a few of the many issues to which the unique Prasangika viewpoint could be applied.

Indeed, while noting that this book is but a beginning to the project of understanding the unique tenets of the Prasahgika School, we should also recognize that their philosophical development is clearly not finished, at least within Gelukba scholasticism. The Gelukba tradition is a living force, and at least as long as it can survive, monks will study Dzongkaba's discussion of the unique tenets; as long as Jamyang Shayba is revered, young monks will memorize his verses on the schools of tenets, including the unique tenets of the Prasafigika School. And they will debate about them. Dzongkaba's or Jamyang Shayba's or Janggya's interpretation of the points comprising the unique tenets is not sacrosanct; their positions can be effectively undermined in the crucible of debate. Indeed, an extension of this book would include a record of the sorts of debates a monastic class would create in their study of each of these tenets. With regard to the endurance of this tradition, the mirror is now clouded: perhaps the whole tradition will fade away under the pressure of the tragic events of this century, or perhaps it will be firmly rooted in India or the West and be continued. I conclude the present work in 1995, with guarded optimism that for a long time to come it will still be possible to find Tibetan philosophers for whom the unique tenets of the Prasahgika School are living questions.
Part Two

Jamyang Shayba’s “Unique Tenets of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika School”

from Jamyang Shayba Ngawang Dzondru's Great Exposition of Tenets /Explanation of "Tenets," Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

With the Annotations of Ngawang Belden

from Ngawang Belden's Annotations for the "Great Exposition of Tenets," Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought
The portion of Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets translated in the following pages is only a small part of the twelfth chapter of that massive work. The first third of the chapter, concerning the interpretation of scripture, the object of negation in meditation on emptiness, and the reasonings used to generate realization of emptiness, has been translated by Jeffrey Hopkins.

The twelfth is the penultimate chapter, followed only by a short "elimination of doubts" with respect to tantra, the Vajrayana (Diamond Vehicle). In previous chapters Jamyang Shayba discusses the nature of philosophical tenets (grub mtha', siddhanta); refutes the positions of the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy (Vedanta, Mim5msa, Nyaya, Vaisesika and Samkhya / Yoga), their minor variants, and the theologies of Vaisnavism and Saivism; refutes the positions of the materialist Carvaka and heterodox Jaina systems; discusses Buddhist tenets in general; presents the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika systems; presents a traditional history of the Mahayana; presents the Cittamatra system; introduces the Madhyamika system; and presents the Svatantrika-Madhyamika system.

There are three published editions of the Great Exposition of Tenets: the "Drashikyil edition," recently reprinted by Go mang and also included in The Collected Works of 'Jam-dbaris- bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje published in New Delhi in 1973 by Ngawang Gelek Demo; the "Musoorie edition" published by Dalama in 1962; and the "Gomang edition" published by Gomang College in India (n.d.). The Musoorie and Gomang editions are essentially identical and contain numerous errors not present in the Drashikyil edition. I began with the Musoorie edition but later compared the entire text to the Drashikyil edition (in the Ngawang Gelek printing); emendations based on that comparison will be found after the translations, "NG" denoting the Ngawang Gelek text. There are also references to "DSK" (the Gomang publication of the Drashikyil text), which I have been using for the past few years.

The translation of Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets has been interspersed with a translation of Ngawang Belden's (ngag dbang deal ldan, b. 1779, known as Belden Chojay [dpal-ldan-chos-rje]) Annotations for the "Great Exposition of Tenets,"Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought. Page numbers from the cha section of the 1962 Musoorie edition used for the Jamyang Shayba translation and from the dbu ma pa section of the 1964 Sarnath edition used for the Ngawang Belden translation have been placed in the text, in brackets and boldfaced for greater contrast.

The chapter headings follow the organization of Jamyang Shayba's text, but the sub-headings often are my own, introduced for the sake of clarity. Ngawang Belden's annotations have been inserted at what seemed to be the proper place
based on Ngawang Belden's comments on a particular text or point. However, Ngawang Belden does not quote or otherwise indicate, at the start of his notes, the precise passage in Jamyang Shayba on which he is commenting; thus, there are a few occasions where the Ngawang Belden annotation may have been inserted a little ahead or behind of the place in Jamyang Shayba's text where Ngawang Belden would have placed it himself.
The presentation of unique PrasangikaMadhyamika School (dbu ma thal 'gyur ba, prasangika-madhyamika) tenets has two parts: a brief indication and an extensive explanation.

A. Brief Indication of the Unique Tenets

Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance to the Middle Way" (dbu ma la 'jug pa'i bshad pa, madhyamakavatara bhasya) says: "The learned should determine that this system3 is unique." Although there are many subtle [tenets] unshared with the Svatantrika-Madhyamikas (dbu ma rang rgyud pa) and below, when they are condensed into the greater distinguishing features, there are eight pairs4 of great distinguishing features. These may be known from Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance"(dbu ma dgongs pa rab gsal), Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance"and so forth. Because I have mentioned [some] of these earlier [in this book] and have also explained it extensively in other places, what follows is treated as a mere textual commentary.'

Ngawang Belden: This is as Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" says:'

Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance" says:8

May scholars ascertain that except for this Madhyamika School textual system, in other treatises this doctrine of emptiness is not expressed without error;9 just so, this system appearing here, which I have expressed along with answers to objections, does not, like the doctrine of emptiness, exist in other treatises. Because of that, the proposition by certain Madhyamikas (dbu ma pa) that just what Sautrantikas (mdo sde pa) and Vaibha~ikas (bye brag smra ba) propound to be ultimate, Madhyamikas assert to be conventional, is set forth by those who do not understand the suchness [explained] in (Nagarjuna's) Treatise on the Middle Way (dbu ma'i bstan bcos, madhyamakagstra) because it is unreasonable for a supramundane doctrine to be similar to a mundane doctrine.10

This is a system that posits all conventional presentations it asserts as being without establishment by their own character. Therefore, it asserts that tenets such as those of the two proponents of [truly existing external] objects which are presented only within establishment by the object's own character [108b] lack establishment not only ultimately but even
conventionally.11 Thus, [Candrakirti] advises that this system of his is not only unshared even with the Cittamatrins (sems tsham pa) but should be known as unique in relation to the systems of other Madhyamikas12 who comment on the thought of the Protectors.” Nagarjuna and Aryadeva.

Dzongkaba’s Great Exposition of Special Insight (hlag mthong chen mo) says:14

That which is asserted to be ultimate by those two schools [the Vaibhāṣika School and the Sautrāntika School] and not asserted [even] conventionally by Madhyamikas refers to things such as partless [particles or moments of consciousness].15 However, [Candrakirti] is not indicating that what those two schools assert to be truly established is not asserted by Madhyamikas conventionally, for even though they assert forms, sounds, and so forth, to be truly established, Madhyamikas assert them conventionally."

However,” Dzongkaba’s The Essence of the Good Explanations (legs bshad snying po) says:18

Because our own system is unique in relation to other Madhyamikas [i.e., the Svaṭantrika-Madhyamikas, some persons] assert that what is propounded as ultimate by the two [schools that] propound [truly existent external] objects is asserted conventionally by Madhyamikas. They are to be posited as not knowing the middle way suchness, the reason being that in our system phenomena that are established by their own character are not asserted even conventionally whereas they posit [phenomena] within [establishment by their own character].19 If one falls from either of the two truths, one would fall from the other also, whereby it is unsuitable for the supramundane doctrine that does not fall from the mode of the two truths to be similar to a mundane doctrine which has fallen from the two truths in terms of either of the two truths.20 Therefore, this system of the Superior (Nagarjuna)21 is unique in relation to the tenets of the proponents of true existence not only ultimately but even conventionally.22

Jamyang Shayba:73 The root text says:

Because they do not assert establishment by way of [the object's] own character even conventionally,

There are many distinguishing features—the eight unique [pairs of tenets] and so forth.

In general, [asserting] the existence of external objects and the non-existence of a mind-basis-of-all, and so forth, is not unique.24 However, it is unique to assert certain [tenets] within imputedly existent mere nominalism (ming rkyang) due to not asserting [phenomena] as existing by way of their own character.25 This is the unexcelled thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras (phar rol du phyin pa’i
With respect to this system, the monk Candrakirti,

Having collected it from the Treatise on the Middle Way,

Has expressed it in accordance with scripture

*And quintessential instructions.* 28

Just as, in places other than this Treatise

*This doctrine [of emptiness]*29 does not exist

So also the mode of what has arisen here does not exist in other places.

The learned should determine that this system is unique.

B. Extensive Explanation of the Unique Tenets

This section has eleven parts:

1. The distinctive tenets that external objects (phyi don, bayartha) and a mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhī rnam par shes pa, alayavijriana) [respectively] exist and do not exist.

2. The distinctive tenets concerning the two selflessnesses (bdag med, nairatmya).

3. The distinctive tenets that subsequent cognition (bcad shes, paricchinnajriana30) is prime cognition (tshad ma, pramana) and that [all] conventional (tha snyad) [validly cognizing consciousnesses are mistaken].

4. The distinctive tenets concerning mental direct perception (yid kyi mngon sum, manasa-pratyaksa) and yogic direct perception (rnal 'byor mngon sum, yoga-pratyaksa).

5. The distinctive tenets on the mode of asserting the sixteen aspects of the four noble (*'phags pa, aryan) truths and the three times.

6. The distinctive tenets that disintegratedness (zhig pa) is a [functioning] thing (dngos po, bhava) and that effects [from actions that have ceased] are feasible, along with adispelling of objections.

7. The distinctive tenets that autonomous syllogisms (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba, svaatantra-prayoga) and selfconsciousness (rang rig, svasamvedana) are not asserted [36b].
8 The distinctive tenets concerning direct perception (mngon sum, pratyaksa) and true cessations ('gog bden, nirodha-satya).

9 The distinctive tenet concerning [nirvanas] with remainder (lhag bcas, sopadhigesa) and without remainder (lhag med, nirupadhisesa).

10 The distinctive tenet concerning the two [types of] obstructions (sgrib pa, avarana) and their mode of abandonment.

11 The distinctive tenet concerning the mode of eliminating the two extremes, along with subsidiary topics.
External Objects Exist
But a Mind-Basis-of-All\textsuperscript{1} Does Not

"Mind-basis-of-all" translates kun gzhi rnam par shes pa/alayavijriana. I usually render rnam par shes pa/vijriana as "consciousness," but in this phrase it will be translated as "mind" for the sake of brevity.

\textbf{Jamyang Shayba:2} The root text says:

\textbf{Because of not being refuted by and not being established by an awareness distinguishing convention- alities3} [respectively],

It is asserted that external objects exist but a mindbasis-of-all does not exist.

A. External Objects Exist

External objects exist because: (1) Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa, bodhicitta- vivarana) and the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras say that the two, object and subject, equally exist conventionally and equally do not exist in the context of ultimate analysis, (2) [external objects] are set forth at length in the abhidharma (chos mngon pa) texts, and (3) [external objects] are not refuted by any awareness distinguishing conventionalities.

\textbf{Ngawang Belden:' Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (39) says:'}

A consciousness realizes an object of knowledge.

Without objects known there are no consciousnesses.

In that case, why not assert

That [both] object of knowledge and knower do not exist?

\textbf{In such passages he says that [external] objects and consciousnesses similarly exist [conventionally] and do not exist [ultimately]. Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.92) says:'}

If form does not exist, do not hold that mind exists.

Also, if mind just exists, do not hold that form does not exist.
Truly existent mind and form were equally abandoned by Buddha in the sutras on the mode of wisdom, and conventionally existent mind and form were equally set forth.

In the abhidharma scriptures.

Through this, he explains that when it is asserted that external forms do not exist, one should not hold that mind exists [109a]. Also, when it is asserted that internal mind exists, one should not hold that external forms do not exist.

Also, he explains that with respect to the five aggregates, in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras Buddha refutes inherent existence similarly for all five and that the abhidharma scriptures say that all five are similar in terms of having specific characteristics and sharing general characteristics, and so forth.

The final reason why Prasangikas assert that external objects exist conventionally is as follows: that forms, sounds, and so forth, are external objects is not refuted by valid cognition distinguishing conventionalities which does not depend on valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate because: (1) there is no instance of valid cognition distinguishing conventionalities that refutes external objects and (2) consciousnesses also are not established when they are analyzed by valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate.

The Cittamatrins themselves do not propound that external objects are refuted by valid cognition that distinguishes conventionalities because: (1) they assert that the refutation of external objects needs to depend on valid cognition that distinguishes the ultimate [as described in] the Cittamatra system itself, such as a reasoning consciousness realizing that subject and object are not different entities in dependence on the logical mark of the definite simultaneous observation [of objects and the consciousnesses realizing them] and (2) the emptiness of establishment in accordance with the appearance of objects as external is an ultimate truth and a suchness in the Cittamatra system itself.

Moreover, in the Prasangika system, if external objects did not exist conventionally, one would have to assert that forms, and so forth, conventionally are mental things. In that case, there would be no way that they could be established by an ordinary conventional consciousness that operates without investigating through reasoning and without analysis. Therefore, analyzing by way of a reasoning which examined whether forms, and so forth, are established as the nature of consciousness, one would have to find that they are the nature of consciousness. In that case, form, and so forth, would have to be established by way of its own character, whereby that [this] is the Prasangika system would be a thorough deprecation.

Objection: It follows that in that case the Cittamatrins are inferior to the Sautrantikas because (1) they are similar in asserting that consciousnesses are
truly established and (2) propounding that external objects exist is better than propounding that they do not exist.

Response: This is a wrong conception, manifesting complete ignorance of the respective status of tenet systems, because the Sautrantikas assert, upon analysis by reasoning, partless particles and gross objects that are composed of them whereas [109b] the Cittamatrins are able to refute thoroughly such external objects by means of reasoning.17

However, because (1) the Cittamatrins are unable to posit objects that are established merely conventionally without investigation or analysis by reasoning and (2) the Prasahgikas have the distinguishing feature of being able to posit such, there comes to be a difference in their asserting or not asserting external objects.18 Therefore, the Prasahgikas' assertion of external objects meets back to their assertion of imputedly existent nominalities. Hence, Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says:19

The presentation of the Prasahgika School's unique mode of commenting on the thought of the Superior [Nagarjuna] in dependence on [its refutation of inherent existence] has three parts: (1) the unique distinction of realizing selflessness, the coarse and subtle conceptions of self, and so forth; (2) the unique distinction of positing external objects while not asserting a mind-basis-of-all or self-knowing consciousness; and (3) the unique distinction of not asserting autonomous [syllogisms].

And:Z°

This system also indeed asserts that external objects are not established by way of their own character but with respect to that disagrees [with the Svatantrikas]21 in terms of whether or not this necessitates that external objects do not exist. Therefore, in general, if one knows how to posit any phenomenon as existing even though it does not exist by way of its own character, one can understand well the reasoning concerning the impossibility of distinguishing [external] objects and consciousnesses as existing or not existing, whereas if one does not [know how to so posit objects without their being established by way of their own character] one cannot [understand the reasoning].Z"

Therefore, that the Cittamatrins assert the non-existence of external objects and the true establishment of the mind destroys the presentation of the two truths and causes [the Cittamatrins] to fall from both truths. This is because those assertions are harmed by valid cognition distinguishing the conventional and valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate, respectively, because:

(1) Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.93) says:'
Also, having destroyed those stages of the two truths, 24

Your [Cittamatra assertion of] substantial entities is refuted, whereby [the true existence of mind and the non-existence of external objects] is not established.

and (2) Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says:

Therefore, to distinguish a difference of existence and nonexistence with respect to such as those [consciousnesses and external objects] is to contravene worldly conventions and to contravene the presentation of the ultimate as well, whereby one falls from both truths. Aryadeva's Four Hundred (bzhi bgya pa, catuhgataka) (XVI.24) says:26

"One exists, one does not"

Is not so in reality and also not in the world.

Therefore, "this exists, that does not"

Cannot be said.

B. A Mind-Basis-Of-All Does Not Exist

Jamyang Shayba:Z' Even though many sutras describe a mind-basis-of-all,' many [other] profound sutras explain that [the former sutras] require interpretation. With respect to positing [a mind-basis-of-all], since it cannot be posited without searching for the imputed object of the seeds for the fruition of actions, it is not established by a conventional reasoning consciousness.' Therefore, a mind-basis-of-all necessarily does not exist.

Ngawang Belden:3° Another reason why Prasangikas do not assert a mind-basis-of-all that is a different entity from the six collections [of consciousness]31 is founded on not accepting inherent establishment in terms of both truths, because if a mind-basis-of-all which is a different entity from the six collections were asserted, it would have to be asserted in accordance with the explanation of the Sutra Unraveling the Thought (dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo, samdhinirmocanasutra), Asarga's Compendium of the Mahayana (theg pa chen po bsdus pa, mahayanasamgraha), his Compendium of Ascertainments (rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdus ba, viniscayasam-raham), the root text and commentaries on Maitreya's Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes (dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa, madhyantavibhanga), and so forth [110a]. If such [a mind-basis-of-all] were asserted, there would be no way that it could be established by a non-defective conventional consciousness that neither investigates nor analyzes.32 Therefore, when one sought the object that is imputed by the name "basis-of-all," it would have to be findable by reasoning; were that the case, inherently established
objects would also have to be asserted even while one was not asserting such.

Moreover, if a mind-basis-of-all which is a different entity from the six collections [of consciousness] were asserted, it would have to be asserted in accordance with the explanation that just that [mind-basis-of-all] is the object of observation of the innate view of the transitory [collection of aggregates] that conceives of an [inherently existent] "I" and which is associated with the afflicted mentality. Therefore, it would have to be asserted that the mind-basis-of-all is the illustration of the person and that when the person-the imputed object-is sought, it is findable.'

Moreover, because Prasārīgikas assert external objects, it is also established that they do not assert a mind-basis-of-all.34 Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says:3s

Also, a mind-basis-of-all is not posited due to the essential point of asserting external objects. If [a mind-basis-of-all] were asserted, it would have to be asserted in accordance with the statement in Maitreya's Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes (I.4):36

Consciousnesses that perceive

Objects, the sentient, selves, and knowledges are thoroughly produced.37

They have no [external] objects.

Because there are no [external objects], there are no [minds apprehending external objects].

Jamyang Shayba:39 Because these two [tenets-the existence of external objects and the non-existence of a mindbasis-of-all-] also have their source in an imputed object's non-existence upon analysis, they are unique [Prasangika tenets].

[Also,] as Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.92cd) says:39

[Truly existent mind and form] were equally abandoned by Buddha in the sutras on the mode of wisdom and [conventionally existent mind and form] were [equally] set forth

In the abhidharma [scriptures].

And (VI.43):4°

The teachings that a basis-of-all exists.4° that the self [inherently] exists,

And that only the aggregates [inherently] exist
Should be taken as teachings for those who would not understand

The very profound meaning [of emptiness].

**Ngawang Belden:** The teaching from some sutras that a mind-basis-of-all exists, that persons substantially exist, and that the mere aggregates substantially exist were spoken in consideration of trainees who [for the time being] are unable to realize the profound meaning previously explained.

Without making any difference, [Candrakirti] says that the statements that all three—mind-basis-of-all, person, and aggregates—are substantially existent requires interpretation. However, the basis of [Buddha's] thought when he said that the person and aggregates are substantially existent is that he spoke within thinking that the person and aggregates conventionally exist; therefore, the basis of his thought does not [need to be] set forth as something separate from [persons and aggregates]. However, the basis of his thought [when he said that the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent] is set forth separately in accordance with [Candrakirti's] saying in his Autocommentary on the "Entrance" that Buddha's statement that the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent was made in consideration of emptiness [its purpose being directed for those not ready to hear about emptiness]. By that also, one can understand that Prasangikas do not assert that a mindbasis-of-all conventionally exists.
The Two Selflessnesses

Jamyang Shayba: The root text says:

There is no liberation for those who conceive of true existence, an afflictive obstruction.

The selflessnesses are similarly subtle.

A. Liberation Depends on Realizing Emptiness

~antideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.41cd) says:

Therefore, scripture says that without this path there can be no enlightenment.

Ngawang Belden: This is as Gyeltsap's Explanation of (9antideva's) "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds" (spyod jug dar tfk) says:

It follows that one definitely needs to realize emptiness in order to obtain the fruit of a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Arhat. Why? Because it is said in passages of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras that without familiarity with this path of realizing emptiness one attains none of the three enlightenments [of a Hearer Arhat, a Solitary Realizer Arhat, or a Buddha]. Prajnamoksa, in his Explanation of (Santideva's) "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds" (spyod 'jug 'grel chen, bodhisattvacaryavatrabhasya), cites the statement in the Mother [Perfection of Wisdom] Sutras that one who has the discrimination of things (dngos po, bhava) does not have liberation, and that the completely perfect Buddhas of the three times and [others] ranging from Stream-Enterers to Solitary Realizers attain [liberation] in dependence upon just this perfection of wisdom. In accordance with that, the meaning of [Santideva's] passage is not that it refers to only the unexcelled enlightenment [of a Buddha].

"Having the discrimination of things (dngos po)" is the same as "having the discrimination of true establishment (bden grub)" because it is said that the two, "true establishment" and "thing," have a common [Sanskrit] original [i.e., bhava].

Jamyang Shayba: Like that passage [in ~antideva], the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras explain that there is no liberation for one who has the discrimination of true existence. Therefore, it is necessary to assert that the consciousness
conceiving true existence is the mental affliction that prevents the attainment of liberation-in which the mind is released from afflictions-whereby it is asserted that the consciousness conceiving true existence is an afflictive obstruction. For this reason, although there is no difference between the modes of emptiness of the two selflessnesses, they must be posited [merely] by way of the bases of emptiness [i.e., persons and other phenomena]. Therefore, the two selflessnesses are equally subtle. Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.179) says:

So that transmigrants might be liberated [from the two obstructions]

This selflessness was set forth [by the Buddha] in two aspects by way of the divisions of phenomena and persons.

Ngawang Belden: Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" says:

This selflessness which is the absence of inherent establishment of phenomena was set forth by the Supramundane Victor (Buddha) in two aspects, the divisions of the selflessness of persons and of the selflessness of [other] phenomena. The mode of dividing [selflessness] into two is not a differentiation by way of two different selves which are nonexistent in terms of their bases, persons and [other] phenomena. For that [one type of self] which does not exist is inherent establishment. Because of this, the two selflessnesses [the subtle selflessness of the person and the subtle selflessness of phenomena] are distinguished by way of the divisions of the bases-the subjects-(1) phenomena such as the aggregates and (2) persons.

Question: For what purpose did he teach those two?

Answer: The selflessness of persons was taught so that transmigrants who are Hearers and Solitary Realizers might be liberated from cyclic existence. Both selflessnesses are taught so that transmigrants who are Bodhisattvas could be liberated through attaining omniscience.

B. Ignorance Is the Basis of All Afflictions

Jamyang Shayba: Aryadeva's Four Hundred (VI.11) says:

Like the body sense power in the body, Delusion serves as the basis for all [afflictions].

Therefore, all afflictions are overcome

Through overcoming obscurations.
Also, with respect to the meaning of "the body sense power in the body," and so forth [from Aryadeva’s Four Hundred], Gyeltsap’s Commentary on (Aryadeva’s) "Four Hundred" (bzhi rgya pa’i dar tik) says:

In the body, the body sense power pervades the other sense powers such as the eye and dwells as the basis of those. If it did not exist, the other sense powers would also not dwell [in the body]. In just that way, the afflictive ignorance—the obscuration which [mistakenly] determines that dependentarising, which are empty of inherent existence, are truly existent-pervades and dwells in all the afflictions such as desire and hatred. That is because one adheres to desire, hatred, and so forth, upon determining a thing [falsely] imputed by obscuration to be inherently attractive or unattractive. Therefore, the manner in which the mode of apprehension of both desire and hatred and the mode of apprehension of the consciousness conceiving true existence are mixed should be known.

This can be known extensively from the two, Dzongkaba’s Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti’s) "En-trance" and Dzongkaba’s The Essence of the Good Explanations.

Jamyang Shayba: Hence, the Svatantrikas and below do not assert desires, and so forth, that are consciousnesses that conceive true existence, but here it is asserted not only that [desire and hatred] have the aspect of a coarse consciousness conceiving of self but also that there are [instances] of the three poisons that have the aspect of conceiving true existence. This is because of the unique assertion that just as those two [levels, coarse and subtle] exist with respect to ignorance, they also [exist] with respect to attachment, and so forth. Antarideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.47cd) says:

This attachment is not afflictive but

Why is it not like obscuration?

Ngawang Belden: This craving in the continuum of the person whom you [wrongly] assert to be an Arhat is [afflictive, but not] in the manner explained in the abhidharma texts. Also, it is said in those abhidharma texts that thorough obscuration-ignorance—is of two [types], afflictive and nonafflictive. Just so, in accordance with the explanation in the abhidharma texts that there is one type [of ignorance] that is afflictive and one which is not afflictive, why do you not also [absurdly] assert craving [as afflictive and non-afflictive]? You should assert this.
Prime Cognition and Conventional Valid Cognition

Jamyang Shayba:1 The root text says:

Because of not being unpolluted and because new realization is unsuitable [respectively] [37a],

All consciousnesses of childish persons are mistaken and subsequent cognition is established as prime cognition.'

A. Conventional Valid Cognition Is Necessarily Mistaken

Candrakirti's Clear Words (tshig gsal, prasannapada) says:3

The erroneous and the non-erroneous" (phyin ci log dang phyin ci ma log pa dag, viparyasavaiparyasa) are different [i.e., a dichotomy]. Therefore, like the falling hairs [seen by] one with cataracts / dimness of sight, and so forth, when what does not [inherently] exist is apprehended by [that is, appears to] an erroneous [consciousness] as just [inherently] existing, how could even a portion of an [inherently] existent object be observed?

Ngawang Belden: An erroneous object of knowledge—a falsity—and a non-erroneous object of knowledge—a truth—are different in the sense of being a dichotomy. Mistaken object of knowledge, falsity, object found by a mistaken consciousness, and truth for a concealer are equivalent.' Hence, it is said that just as "falling hairs," and so forth, do not exist even though they appear to exist to a person with cataracts, truths for a concealer are objects found by a mistaken consciousness which, although they do not ultimately exist, appear to [ultimately] exist.

Jamyang Shayba: Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.29) says:

One with pure eyes would see the nature-suchness -

Of the falling hairs, and so forth, in the place

Where these unreal entities are imputed

Through the force of cataracts.9
The meaning of "through the force of cataracts" is: when someone without cataracts concentrates his vision on that place where falling hairs, and so forth, are seen by one with cataracts, he does not observe the falling hairs, and so forth, and sees that they do not exist. Just as the mode of being [of the falling hairs] is seen by one without cataracts but is not seen by one with cataracts, so even though a Buddha, who has abandoned the predispositions of ignorance, turns his mind toward the bases-aggregates, constituents, sources, and so forth—which are perceived by a person who is polluted by ignorance to be truly existent, he does not observe even a mere speck of true establishment in those places and sees such to be non-existent. Know that this object [i.e., non-true establishment] is an ultimate truth.

In that way, until Buddhahood is attained, one has no non-mistaken consciousnesses except for a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Also, due to that, in childish persons, i.e., common beings, even [the exalted wisdom] of meditative equipoise of the supreme mundane qualities path of preparation (sbyor lamchos mchog, laukikagradharma-prayogamarga) is polluted by error with respect to what appears. Therefore, that all consciousnesses of common beings are mistaken is also a unique [Prasangika tenet].

B. Prime Cognition Is Not Necessarily New Realization

The statement in Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections (rtsod zlog, vigrahavyavartani, vs. 32): If it is thought that [valid cognition] is established by other validly cognizing consciousnesses, it would be endless. Furthermore, the first is not established, nor the middling, nor the last... refutes that [pramana necessarily means] new realization and refutes that [consciousnesses are certified by] self-consciousness or other-knowing consciousnesses.

Furthermore, the meaning of "the first is not established" was explained in the context of the Svatatantrika School.

Also, it is explained in Candrakirti's Clear Words that it is unsuitable to analyze in this way [i.e., whether or not prime cognition involves new realization of an object] and it is explained that the definition of prime cognition is "an incontrovertible consciousness" (mi bslu ba'i shes pa).

Therefore, the establishment of subsequent cognition as prime cognition is unique, and these two [assertions-that prime cognition need not be new realization... is an ultimate truth."

Jamyang Shayba: In that way, until Buddhahood is attained, one has no non-mistaken consciousnesses except for a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Also, due to that, in childish persons, i.e., common beings, even [the exalted wisdom] of meditative equipoise of the supreme mundane qualities path of preparation (sbyor lamchos mchog, laukikagradharma-prayogamarga) is polluted by error with respect to what appears. Therefore, that all consciousnesses of common beings are mistaken is also a unique [Prasangika tenet].

Ngawang Belden: Furthermore, the meaning of "the first is not established" was explained in the context of the Svatatantrika School.
and that all consciousnesses of common beings are mistaken—have their source in the non-assertion of [establishment by a phenomenon's] own character.72

Ngawang Belden:72 [111b] Both of the assertions that all awarenesses of common beings are mistaken consciousnesses and that subsequent [valid] cognition is prime cognition have their source in the non-assertion of [establishment by a phenomenon's] own character, because (1) whatever is an awareness of a common being necessarily perceives [phenomena] to be established by their own character and (2) whatever might be a new incontrovertible consciousness would have to be an object that is findable through analysis by a reasoning consciousness. The first [reason] is easy. The second is established because Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate (bskal bzang mig 'byed /stong thun chen mo) says:

The assertion that [prime cognition] is necessarily newly incontrovertible—[that an awareness] cannot be posited as prime cognition merely by being incontrovertible with respect to the object of comprehension that is its object of the mode of apprehension—is incorrect because (1) mere conventional prime cognition does not establish that prime cognition must be newly incontrovertible and (2) prime cognition analyzing the ultimate does not in any way find prime cognition.24 That the former [reason—that mere conventional prime cognition does not establish that prime cognition must be newly incontrovertible -] is so follows (1) because an ordinary innate awareness of a worldly being that is not affected by adventitious causes of error and operates without investigation or analysis designates as prime cognition what is merely incontrovertible with respect to the object it comprehends and does not in any way designate [a consciousness as prime cognition] by way of it being newly incontrovertible and (2) because in all logicians' statements of proofs for the necessity of mentioning the term "newly" as part of the definition of prime cognition, the way something becomes prime cognition is put in terms of positing as prime cognition an object found by analysis through reasoning.2s
Mental and Yogic Direct Perception

Jamyang Shayba: The root text says:

Because feeling is mental direct perception (yid kyi mngon sum, manasa-pratyaksa), conceptual mental direct perception exists.

Because even when one actualizes the sixteen [aspects of the four noble truths] one is not [necessarily] a Superior,

It is asserted that there are common beings who actualize the sixteen aspects of the [four noble] truths.

A. Mental Direct Perception May Be Conceptual

Furthermore, the statement in Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" (bzhi rgya pa'i grel pa, catuhgata- katika)?

[???] are not aspects of experience like feelings (tsor ba, vedana), and so forth, nor objects distinguished by way of sense [consciousnesses] like forms, sounds, and so forth.

explains that ordinary feelings that have a conventional aspect are mental direct perception. Also, Candrakirti's Clear Words says:

Since in scripture it is also not the case that only non-conceptual consciousnesses are directly perceiving consciousnesses (mngon sum, pratyaksa), this [contrary assertion that there is only non-conceptual direct perception] is untenable.

Therefore, because [Candrakirti] refutes [the idea] that direct perception is necessarily non-conceptual, conceptual mental direct perception is asserted.

Ngawang Belden: Whatever is direct prime cognition is not necessarily a non-conceptual consciousness (1) because the mental direct perception indicated here, i.e., that [like the] one which is renowned to Epistemologists (tshad ma pa, prdmanika) 5 is asserted in this context [of the Prasarnigika School] to be a memory consciousness and (2) because [the experience of] feeling that is a mental consciousness is asserted to be mental direct perception.

The first reason [-that the mental direct perception indicated here is a memory
Mental direct perception is not asserted in accordance with explanations in [texts] of the Epistemologists. Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred," at the point of explaining the meaning of the passages in the abhidharma texts that the five, forms and so forth, are individually known by the [corresponding] sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness, says:

The two [types of] perception [sense and mental] do not perceive the same object. One, [a sense consciousness] which is generated first, directly distinguishes the aspect of the object. The second [the mental consciousness] does not know [the object] in the sense of just acting [on it] directly; [however,] since, by the power of a sense consciousness, it is produced thinking of such, it is designated that it also knows that object [112a].

Initially, a sense consciousness directly knows an object such as a form, and through the power of that sense consciousness, the mental consciousness knows it, but it is said [that the mental consciousness] does not know it directly like a sense consciousness. It is also said that the mental consciousness that knows its object through the force of a sense consciousness is a memory consciousness.

and (2) Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:

It is said that a sense consciousness clearly and directly knows the object such as a form whereas the mental consciousness knows [the object] through the power of a sense consciousness but does not know it clearly and directly like a sense consciousness, and it is said that the mental consciousness, which knows objects through the power of a sense consciousness, is a memory consciousness. Therefore...

The second [reason-that the experience of feeling, which is a mental consciousness, is mental direct perception] is also established because Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" says: 10

Also, Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" says:

...are not aspects of experience, like feelings, and so forth, nor objects thoroughly distinguished by way of sense [consciousnesses] like forms, sounds, and so forth.

Therefore, with respect to direct comprehension, there are two, (1) the
distinguishing by a sense consciousness of forms, and so forth, for instance, and (2) the thorough distinguishing by internal experience of pleasant and painful feelings, and so forth, for instance. The latter of those two has to be asserted [to occur] even during the ordinary state."

Because it is not explained here that there are more than four [types of] direct valid cognition and since [the experience of feeling] is not suitable to be posited as yogic, sense, or self-conscious direct valid cognition, it is posited as mental direct perception. Such mental direct valid cognition is indeed discordant with the [assertions of] the Epistemologists. Nevertheless, it is not the case that mental direct valid cognition is not asserted."

In that case, "feeling" is a word related with an agent, an activity, or an object; thus there come to be three: (1) feeling in the sense of the person [who feels]; (2) feeling in the sense of the activity [of feeling]; and (3) what is felt. The second of these is the valid [i.e., actual] one, the mental factor feeling. The third is the object of comprehension [of a feeling], that is, pleasure, pain, or neutrality. This is in terms of a mental consciousness; the three [types] of feelings of sense consciousnesses thoroughly distinguish forms, sounds, and so forth [as pleasurable, painful, or neutral]. The way those are established is as before.

Question: If [the experience of] feeling, a mental consciousness, manifestly distinguishes pleasure, pain, and so forth, would [that mental consciousness] not then be self-conscious?13

Answer: There is no fault because (1) the self-consciousness which is refuted [by Prasangikas] is an isolated factor (yan 'ga' ba) of all consciousnesses that has the aspect of the apprehender, is directed inside, and for which the appearance of the known and knower as different has vanished; (2) here it is said in the sets of sutras that "special experience" (nyams su myong ba khyad par can) is the definition of feeling; and (3) even in the conventions of the world it is said, "[I] experience pleasure and pain." Because the object of experience and the experiencer appear to be just different [112b], it is not the same as the self-consciousness of the other party. Therefore, feeling is established through the fact that happiness and so forth are established by experience.

B. Common Beings Have Yogic Direct Perception

Jamyang Shayba:14 Santideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.46cd) says:"

Though [manifest] afflictions are [temporarily] absent,
They are seen to have [rebirth by] the power of actions.16

Ngawang Belden:17 Even though manifest afflictions which are described in the abhidharma texts do not operate temporarily in the continua of persons you assert to be Arhats, it is seen that through the force of actions there is still the capacity to impel later rebirths.

Jamyang Shayba:18 It is seen that those asserted to be Arhats—for instance, those described in the abhidharma texts who are without the afflictions of conceiving of a permanent self, and so forth—doubt the Buddha and through that bad karma are born in a hell. The Sutra on the Miserliness of One in Trance (bsam gtan dpe 'khyud kyi mdo, dhyanitamusi) says:

Having gone alone to a solitary place...This [so-called Arhat] is thinking, "I know I have been liberated from all suffering; I have nothing at all further to be done later, and I have become an Arhat." At the time of his death [37b], he sees that he will be born [again], and becomes doubtful and uncertain about the enlightenment of the Buddha. He falls into doubt and after the time of his death falls into a great hell.19

Ngawang Belden? Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) "Entrance" says:

Also, in the Sutra on the Miserliness of One in Trance, which is quoted in [the twenty-fourth chapter of] Candrakīrti's Clear Words.22 Buddha says, "Manjusri, sentient beings, whose minds are mistaken due to four errors through not seeing the noble truths correctly as they are in reality, do not pass beyond this unreal cyclic existence." Manjusri responds, "Oh, Supramundane Victor,' please indicate what is apprehended by sentient beings that causes them not to pass beyond cyclic existence." The Teacher said that sentient beings are not liberated because they do not know the four truths as they are in reality, and Manjusri requested Buddha to explain what is misconceived by sentient beings that causes them not to be liberated from cyclic existence. In answer to this, Buddha says that they think, "I will pass beyond cyclic existence, and I will attain nirvana," with a sense of adhering to the true existence of these. Therefore, when they have meditated on impermanence and so forth, they think, "I know suffering, I have abandoned its sources, I have actualized its cessation, I have cultivated the path." They then think, "I have become an Arhat." When they have temporarily abandoned the manifest [coarse] afflictions explained above, they think, "I have extinguished all contaminations." It is said that at the time of death they perceive that they will be reborn; thereby, they doubt Buddha, and this fault causes them to fall into a great hell. This applies to some who abide on such a path but not to all.24

[With regard to a textual corruption in Jamyang Shayba's citation of that sutra-the
Jamyang Shayba:26 This passage explains that even though [such a person] had actualized the coarse four noble truths as [explained] before, he is born in a great hell through the force of doubting the Buddha's enlightenment, whereby it is unsuitable for [such a person] to be a Superior. Therefore, it is a unique assertion [of the Prasangika system] that there are common beings who have in their continua yogic direct perception' manifestly realizing the sixteen coarse attributes of the four noble truths.28
The Sixteen Attributes of the Four Noble Truths and the Three Times

Jamyang Shayba: The root text says:

Because special insight (lhag mthong, vipasyana) with respect to emptiness and the path of preparation (sbyor lam, prayogamarga) are simultaneous,

Even though one has directly, realized the sixteen [attributes of the four noble truths]

One has not reached the path of preparation,

And because disintegratedness (zhig pa) is a [functioning] thing (dngos po, badva), the three times are asserted to be [functioning] things.

A. Direct Realization of the Four Noble Truths Is Not the Path of Preparation

Because the attainment of special insight realizing emptiness3 and the heat (drod, usmagata) path of preparation are simultaneous,’ when those are attained such pride of wrong conceit [i.e., boasting] is not produced. Therefore, one does not arrive even at the path of preparation by just directly realizing the sixteen coarse attributes of the four truths.’

B. Disintegratedness Is a Functioning Thing

Because the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (mdo sde sa bcu pa, dagabhumikasutra)6 and many Perfection of Wisdom (shes rab kyi pha rol to phyin pa, prajnaparamita) Sutras say that aging and death [are caused] by the condition of birth, it is established that the death of a sentient being, disintegratedness (zhig pa), and pastness ('das pa) are [functioning] things.’ Therefore, all three times-past, future, and present-are implicitly established as [functioning] things; this will be explained later.

Ngawang Belden: In the systems of other proponents of tenets it is asserted that because disintegratedness (zhig) and disintegration ('jig) are mutually exclusive, the two, a pot's disintegratedness and a pot's disintegration, are mutually exclusive. A pot's not enduring in the next [moment after] its own time is the meaning of a pot's disintegration, and a pot's [113a] not having endured in the next [moment after] its own time is the meaning of a pot's disintegratedness.10 The first is asserted to be [included in] the aggregates of compositional factors, and the
In the Prasangika system, it is asserted that since disintegratedness and disintegration are not mutually exclusive, a pot's disintegratedness is also a pot's disintegration. Moreover, the assertion that "a pot's disintegration" is the activity of a pot's disintegration is an assertion agreeing with the Sautrantikas and above. However, Prasangikas assert that both a pot's not enduring and not having endured in the second [moment after] its own time are activities of a pot's disintegration; therefore both a pot's approaching to disintegratedness and a pot's disintegratedness are activities of a pot's disintegration.

For example, it is asserted that [disintegratedness being an activity of disintegration] is similar to the fact that both a sprout's approaching to production and a sprout's production are activities of a sprout's production. However, the three-Sautrantikas, Cittamatrins, and Svatantrikas-assert that even though both a sprout's approaching to production and a sprout's production are activities of a sprout's production, it is not the case that both a sprout's approaching to disintegratedness and a sprout's disintegratedness are activities of a sprout's disintegration. That is because [for them,] a sprout's disintegratedness is not an activity of a sprout's disintegration because it is not a [functioning] thing.

Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" says:

Candrakirti's Clear Words sets forth the two, scripture and reasoning, in order to prove that in the Prasangika system, disintegratedness is a [functioning] thing. With respect to the first [i.e., scriptural proofs], the Sutra on the Ten Grounds says, "Aging and death [are produced] by the condition of birth." Death is the disintegratedness of a sentient being who has died, and [the sutra] says that it is produced by the condition of birth. Also, [the sutra] says:

Death subsists in two activities: (1) it causes a composed phenomenon to disintegrate and (2) it issues forth the cause of the non-severance of the continuum of thorough non-knowingness [i.e., ignorance].

This says that two activities are performed by death; it also says that death is generated by causes and that death produces ignorance. Therefore, disintegratedness is produced by causes, and disintegratedness is able to produce effects."

This [example has concerned] the disintegratedness of a continuum, but it is the same for the disintegratedness of the first moment [of a phenomenon] at its next period, and it also indicates that the first moment [of a phenomenon] is a cause of its disintegratedness in the next period. Therefore, with respect to the two, the birth and death of a sentient being.
[and the two,] not enduring in the next period and not having endured in the next period, whether they are posited or not posited as [functioning] things and whether they are produced or not produced by causes [113b] is the same in every way.19
Disintegratedness Is a Thing and Effects Are Feasible

Jamyang Shayba: The root text says:

Because of being produced, disintegratedness is a [functioning] thing. Although many [aeons pass after an action has ceased,

Effects issue forth, even though obtainers (thob pa, prapti), [mental] continuas [in which predispositions are infused], and non-wastage (chud mi za ba, avipranasa) do not exist.'

The mere propounding that disintegratedness is a [functioning] thing is without analysis, like [saying] pots are things.

If harsh speech of long ago had not disintegrated but appeared to an innate [awareness],

Why is all that one did previously not remembered?'

This can be known extensively in my Final Analysis [the Great Exposition of the Middle Way].

A. Disintegratedness Is a Functioning Thing

   Here, since there are causes for the three times, the three times are established as [functioning] things. If mere characterizations (so so'i mtshan nyid tsam) of them are stated, from among the three-past, future, and present-it is explained in scripture that a pastness or disintegratedness is a [functioning] thing and thus its causes exist, due to which it has both cause and effect. For at the time of teaching dependent-arising, in the third scriptural collection [the abhidharma scriptures] it is said,' "Aging and death are caused by the condition of birth." [Disintegratedness] is also said to issue forth effects; the Sutra on the Ten Grounds says:'

   Deadness subsists in two activities: (1) it causes a composed phenomenon to disintegrate and (2) it issues forth the cause of the non-severance of the continuum of thorough nonknowingness [i.e., ignorance].'

Also, Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (XXV.13) says:'
How can nirvana
Be both a thing and the non-existence of a thing?

Nirvana is a non-compounded phenomenon (‘dus ma byas kyi chos, asatnaskrtadharma)

And things and the non-existence of things [their disintegratedness] are compounded phenomena (‘dus byas kyi chos, samskrtadharma).

Ngawang Belden: [Nagarjuna] says that both a [functioning] thing and its absence upon its destruction are compounded phenomena because that also has its source in not asserting that [a phenomenon is established] by its own character (rang mtshan, svalaksana). That is because Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakrfti's) 'Entrance "says:

Moreover, in all positions that assert that things are inherently established it is not feasible that disintegratedness be a [functioning] thing, but in the system of the [Prasangika-] Madhyamikas who assert that [phenomena] are not inherently established, it is an essential point that disintegratedness is established as a [functioning] thing.

In the former systems, they think: When a [functioning] thing such as a sprout has disintegrated, everything that is part of the sprout is obliterated. Since one does not get any other thing that is different from a sprout, such as a pot, they assert that disintegratedness is utterly not a [functioning] thing [i.e., they assert that it is a permanent or non-disintegrating phenomenon. Also,] neither the [functioning] things among the separate sense-fields, such as blue, nor that which is a collection of the [functioning] things which are its parts, such as a pot, are suitable to be illustrations of that disintegratedness [of a sprout]." Therefore, [disintegratedness] is not a [functioning] thing.

In the latter [i.e., Prasangika] system, for example, one cannot posit (1) Upagupta's individual five aggregates, (2) their collection, or (3) that which is a different entity from those two as an illustration of Upagupta, and Upagupta is also unsuitable to be an illustration of those three. However, it is not contradictory that despite that, what is designated as Upagupta in dependence on his aggregates is a [functioning] thing. Similarly, even though disintegratedness also cannot [be posited] as an illustration of either the thing which has been destroyed or anything which is the same type [i.e., same causal continuum] as that, it is a [functioning] thing because it is produced in dependence on a thing that is destroyed.12

Jamyang Shayba:13 It is said that the consumption or disintegratedness of the wick is the cause of a butter-lamp's dying out.14 Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of
Reasoning (rigs pa drug cu pa, yuktisastika) (20ab) says:

Peace [i.e., death] due to exhaustion of causes is realized as "exhaustion."

And, Candrakirti’s Commentary on (Nagarjuna’s) ‘Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning” (rigs pa drug cu pa’i ’grel pa, yuktisastikavrtti) says:

...since if the conditions for remaining are not complete [38a], it disintegrates. In accordance with that, in the world that which is extinct or used up is observed as "exhausted" due to only the exhaustion of its causes.

Also, the same text says:

According to those whose thought is that the cessation of things is only causeless, ceasedness also would [absurdly] not depend on [functioning] things because of being causeless like a flower in the sky.

Ngawang Belden:’ Dzongkaba’s Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle Way” (rigs pa'i rgya mtsho / rtsa she tik Chen) says:

The subsistence of [functioning] things depends upon conditions that cause subsistence because if the conditions for subsistence are not present, [the continua of things] would disintegrate. Therefore, the extinguishment and cessation of a butter-lamp's light, which arises from the extinguishment and cessation of the causes that make [the butter-lamp] subsist-the wick, oil, and so forth-is observed to be "extinguishment and cessation." Also, Aryadeva's Four Hundred (IX.18ab) says:

Effects destroy causes.

Therefore, a non-existent is not what is produced.

This explains that the cause's ceasedness is caused by the effect's being produced, whereby [such] is the assertion of the Superior (Nagarjuna) and his spiritual son (Aryadeva).

Through the essential point of asserting that the pastness that is the disintegratedness of a sprout is a [functioning] thing, even the futureness of a sprout is likewise [a functioning thing]. Therefore, [that] is the meaning of [Aryadeva's saying], "a non-existent is not what is produced [114a]."

Jamyang Shayba:72 There are proofs that disintegratedness is a [functioning thing because of (1) the [absurd] consequence that [otherwise] the explanation of [disintegration] as a characteristic of compounded phenomena would be incorrect,
the [absurd] consequence that [otherwise] nothing would be produced by causes, (3) the reasoning concerning the new production [of disintegration] that did not previously exist, and (4) being established by worldly renown.

With respect to the first consequence [that the explanation of disintegration as a characteristic of compounded phenomena would be incorrect], Candrakirti's Clear Words says:73

According to those who, having asserted that disintegration [i.e., disintegration and disintegratedness] is causeless, propound that all compounded phenomena are momentary, disintegration would be non-existent because of being causeless like a flower in the sky. Therefore, it would be contradictory to establish that things are momentary and that those [things you propound that are] devoid of disintegration are compounded phenomena. Because of that, all of these [assertions] would not fit together."

Ngawang Belden:' The meaning of the first consequence is as follows: Our own schools who assert that disintegratedness and disintegration are contradictory assert that since the disintegration which consists of [functioning] things' not enduring in the next period after the time of their establishment is produced from just the causes of this and that thing, it does not depend on causes that occur later and are other than [the thing's] own causes, and they assert that since the disintegratedness [of a thing] at that second period is a nonthing, it is utterly uncaused.

Here it is demonstrated that there is damage [to their assertions] by drawing a parallel between production by causes and non-production by causes of the two, that which has not disintegrated [i.e., disintegration] and disintegratedness, as follows. If there were no causes for something's not having endured [i.e., its disintegratedness] in its next period, there would also have to be no causes for its not enduring [i.e., its disintegration] in its next period, whereby [that thing] would not be momentary. In that case, [that thing] would not be established as a compounded phenomenon, and it would also be incorrect to propound that compounded phenomena are momentary. It is as Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:

In brief, does the disintegratedness of a sprout exist or not exist without relying on causes? If it does, it is contradictory that a sprout does not disintegrate without depending on causes, and if it does not, it is contradictory that the disintegratedness of a sprout does not depend on causes. Since "approaching to disintegratedness" is called "disintegration" (jig pa), it is very contradictory that approaching to disintegratedness depends on causes whereas disintegratedness does not depend on causes. Otherwise, it would [absurdly] equally follow that even though approaching to production is caused by causes, producedness is not caused by causes.
This text [i.e., Jamyang Shayba] says 31 "The [absurd] consequence that [if disintegratedness were not a functioning thing] the explanation of [disintegration] as a characteristic of compounded phenomena would be incorrect." Whether or not the printing is corrupt [at that point] should be analyzed, because (1) the explanation in Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate of the meaning of the passage in Candrakirti's Clear Words which [Jamyang Shayba] cites as his source is what I have just cited32 and (2) a statement such as that in Dzongkaba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way,' which, after the earlier passage, says, "That is a refutation by reasoning, and with respect to a refutation by scripture..." and so forth, says that the earlier proof is a refutation by reasoning and that the statement that the characteristics of compounded phenomena are included in the aggregate of compositional factors is a refutation [of uncaused disintegratedness] by scripture.' Hence, if [Jamyang Shayba's] text read, "It would follow that propounding that compounded phenomena are momentary is incorrect," it would be fitting.

Jamyang Shayba:3’ With respect to the second consequence [that if disintegratedness were not a functioning thing, nothing could be produced by causes], Candrakirti's Clear Words says:3s

Objection: Since this called disintegration [i.e., disintegratedness'] is a non-[functioning] thing, of what use are causes to a non-thing?

Response: Is it not the case that [functioning] things also would be causeless? For [functioning] things already exist, and of what use are causes for that which exists? What already exists is not produced again. Hence, it would [absurdly] follow that [functioning] things would be causeless in all respects. Therefore, that is not feasible.

Ngawang Belden:37 The meaning of the second consequence is as follows:

Objection: The disintegratedness of a sprout is a non[-functioning] thing. What could causes do for that? Therefore, [disintegratedness] has no causes [114b].

Response: Then, a sprout also exists, and what use are causes to it? What is already produced is not produced again. This draws the parallel that if causes cannot do anything for a sprout's disintegratedness, there is no need for causes to act on what has not disintegrated.

Objection: Since what has not disintegrated has already been established, at this time it need not be caused; however, since just that establishment is caused, it has causes.

Response: I also do not assert that a sprout's disintegratedness which is already [established] is further caused, but I do say that just that sprout's disintegratedness is caused.
The third reasoning [that disintegratedness is a functioning thing because it is newly produced] exists because Candrakirti's Clear Words says:

Furthermore, just as production has causes because [something] did not previously exist and because it did exist later, just so, disintegration [i.e., disintegration and disintegratedness] also should be asserted [to have causes].

The meaning of the third consequence is as follows: because [a sprout] did not exist earlier at the time of the seed but later does exist, the production of a sprout has causes. Similarly, a sprout's disintegratedness also has causes because it did not exist earlier at the time of the sprout but later it does exist.

The fourth reason is establishment [that disintegratedness is a functioning thing] even by worldly renown, (1) because it is seen that through the lack of water due to its consumption, grain is lost, and through the lack of food due to its consumption, a child is lost, (2) because what is seen by the world is not suitable to be taken as non-existent upon analysis by reasoning, and (3) because even Buddhas accept [phenomena] in terms of such [worldly conventions]. For:

(1) the Chapter Showing the Three Vows Sutra (sdom pa gsum bstan pa'i le'u'i mdo, trisambaranirdegapartivartasutra) says, "What is asserted to exist in the world, that I also assert to exist."

(2) Both Buddhapalita and Candrakirti explain it similarly, and there are many instances, such as Aryadeva's saying (in his Four Hundred [VIII.21cd]):

   Just as a barbarian cannot be
   Guided in a foreign language,
   Except with the worldly
   One is unable to approach the world.

(3) Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" says:

   Worldly things are not to be asserted through scrutiny and analysis. How then? In accordance with what is renowned in the world.

(4) The same text says:

   In the world, even non-existence exists as just a cause. For as in "If there is no water, my grain will be ruined" and "My child will die from lack of food," the loss of grain and child is propounded to occur due to the non-existence of water and food [respectively].
Moreover, since all the conventions of the world are without reasoned investigation, the meaning of being renowned in the world [38b] is that [something] is to be posited through only its renown in the world but not by reasoned investigation because the conventions of the world are contradictory with reasoned investigation.47

Therefore, food having been consumed and so forth are affirming negatives,48 not non-affirming negatives, like, for instance, non-desire, non-hatred, non-obscuration, endless life (amitayus), and endless light (amitabhal).49

Therefore, even though Daktsang pretends to be a follower of Candrakirti, he refutes that disintegratedness is a [functioning] thing by means of the reasonings of the Sautrantikas and the Cittamatrins, and even though he acts astonished [at Dzongkaba], he errs because he is not aware of the necessity of the two distinctions of worldly conventions, coarse and subtle.50 Since he does not appear to reply to any of these scriptural passages or reasonings, the analytical should throw away [his works] like poison.

Ngawang Belden: ``The meaning of the fourth reasoning [that it is established by worldly renown that disintegratedness is a functioning thing] is as follows: it is as Dzongkaba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" says:52

Therefore, these causes and effects such as seeds and sprouts must be posited in the manner seen by people in the world. In the world, saying, "My rice spoiled due to lack of water," and, "My son died due to lack of food," are cases of propounding that through the non-existence of the former the latter is lost. Moreover, just as the non-extinction of food and of water are taken [respectively] to be the causes of a child's being alive and rice being good, the extinction of those is posited as the cause of the extinction of [child and rice]. Therefore, those [things] which have not become extinct are different from those which do not exist [i.e., have become extinct]; through this the class of effects from those [things which have become non-existent] should also be understood.

This explains that the disintegratedness of a continuum is a [functioning] thing; even though those [actions] are totally consumed or totally destroyed, [their effects] appear to exist.53 Therefore, there appear to be great bases for analysis with respect to the statements in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (dbu ma chen mo)' that (1) the disintegratedness of obstructions to omniscience do not exist in the continuum of a Buddha Superior and (2) that in order to posit [something] as a pastness or as a futureness it is necessary that it not be totally consumed or totally destroyed." However, I will not write [more about these] because I fear it would be too much.
B. The Three Times

Jamyang Shayba: There are causes even for futurenesses because they exist due to the force of the non-completion and non-aggregation of the causes and conditions of something's coming about at this time even though the causes for that exist. This is because Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" says:

With respect to that, then, the non-completion of [a future phenomenon's] conditions subsists as the cause for the nonproduction of a future phenomenon. If its conditions were not incomplete, it would definitely be produced.

The definition of a pastness is:

a factor of disintegratedness of another [functioning] thing that was already produced.

An illustration is, for instance, the disintegratedness of a sprout. Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" says, "A pastness is what has passed beyond just this [present time]."

The definition of a presentness is:

that which (1) is neither a factor of disintegratedness nor a factor of futureness of another [functioning] thing and (2) has been produced but has not ceased.

For instance, a sprout. Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" says, "The present has been produced but has not ceased."

The definition of a futureness is:

a factor of non-production of another [functioning] thing due to the non-completion of its conditions, even though the causes for its production exist.

For instance, a sprout's not having arrived at the present time even though the causes for a future sprout exist. For Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" says b1 "With respect to that, the future has not come at the present time."

Since disintegratedness is a [functioning] thing, an action that has been done and accumulated, even though many aeons have gone after its having disintegrated, actually issues forth its fruit. Therefore, "obtainer," mind-basis-of-all, nonwastage [of actions, mental`] continua and so forth do not have to be asserted. Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" says:
Even though a very long time has passed and gone after the cessation of an action which was done and accumulated, [the action itself] indeed does not persist, but nevertheless, effects actually arise even from actions with many aeons intervening after their cessation.

His mere propounding that disintegratedness is a [functioning] thing is not a matter of searching for the imputed object, a disintegratedness, because merely analyzing whether disintegratedness is a thing or a non-thing does not constitute ultimate analysis. And, for example, it is like propounding that a pot is a [functioning] thing. Otherwise, there would be much that is damaging and contradictory, such as that even your propounding that disintegratedness is not a [functioning] thing would be a matter of searching for an imputed object [39a]; however, as was said earlier, merely analyzing whether or not disintegratedness has causes does not constitute a search for an imputed object because it merely explains the way in which [things] act as cause and condition conventionally, like, for example, the explanation in the abhidharma texts of the causes and conditions of compounded phenomena.

If [as Daktsang says] that which has been done—the utterance of harsh speech and so forth—produced effects by means of not having disintegrated, then even though many aeons had passed, those [actions which had] not issued forth their effects would have to exist even now. Hence, why is it that even though [the actions of] the three-body, speech, and mind—which were performed in earlier lifetimes also would not have been destroyed, they not only are not seen but not remembered? Whoever makes such an explanation has already been refuted earlier."
The Non-Assertion of Autonomous Syllogisms and Self-Consciousness

Jamyang Shayba: The root text says:

Because they cannot [be posited] without analysis, autonomous [reasons] and self-consciousness do not exist.

A. Autonomous Reasons Are Not Asserted

Autonomous [reasons] cannot be posited without finding something positable upon analyzing for the imputed object. Self-consciousness also does not exist because if one also analyzed for the imputed object-consciousness—there is no mode of analysis [more] obvious than this [to be ultimate analysis]. These are unique assertions [of the Prasangika School]. Candrakirti’s Clear Words says:

[It is not admissible] for one who is a Madhyamika to use an autonomous inference because another position [among the four extremes] is not asserted.

B. Self-Consciousness Is Not Asserted

Nagarjuna’s Refutation of Objections (LI) says:

Valid cognition is not established by itself,

Neither mutually

Nor by other valid cognition,

Not by its object of comprehension nor causelessly.

Ngawang Belden: Dzongkaba’s Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti’s) “Entrance says that this system’s refutation of self-consciousness also meets back to not asserting establishment by way of [a phenomenon’s] own character. Why? It is by reason of the fact that if self-consciousness were asserted it would be necessary to assert that it is able to bear the analysis of a reasoning [consciousness] searching for the imputed object, because searching for a means of positing [or certifying] a consciousness, that is, whether it is self-experiencing or
the object of experience of another [consciousness] [115a], is a mode of searching for an imputed object which is even more obviously [a case of ultimate analysis] than searching [to see whether] a sprout is produced from self or produced from other.'

With respect to the four [types of valid cognition]-a directly perceiving consciousness, inferential cognition, [inference] comprehending through an example, and scriptural valid cognition-a directly perceiving consciousness is not established by that directly perceiving consciousness itself, inferential cognition is not established by inferential cognition itself, [inferential cognition] comprehending through an example is not established by [inferential cognition] comprehending through an example itself, and scriptural valid cognition is not established by scriptural valid cognition itself. To explain this, [Nagarjuna] says, "Valid cognition is not established by itself."

A directly perceiving consciousness is not established by the [other] three [types of] valid cognition, that is, [the four types] with the exception of itself; inferential cognition is not established by the [other] three [types of] valid cognitions; [inferential cognition] comprehending through an example is not established by the [other] three [types of] valid cognitions; scriptural valid cognition is not established by the [other] three [types of] valid cognitions. To explain this, [Nagarjuna] says, "[Valid cognition] is not [established] mutually."

A directly perceiving consciousness is not established by other directly perceiving consciousnesses; inferential cognition is not established by other inferential cognition; [inferential cognition] comprehending through an example is not established by other [inferential cognition] comprehending through an example; and scriptural valid cognition is not established by other scriptural valid cognition. To explain this, [Nagarjuna] says, "[Valid cognition] is not [established] by other valid cognition." [Valid cognition] is also neither established by way of its object of comprehension that is its object or the object of other [valid cognition] together or individually, nor is it established causelessly. To explain this, [Nagarjuna] says, "[Valid cognition] is neither [established] by its object of comprehension nor causelessly."

Jamyang Shayba:10 The Questions of Ratnacuda Sutra (gtsug na rin po ches zhus pa'i mdo, ratnacudaparipricchasutra) says:"If that mind is sought everywhere... However, if just that which is observed is the mind, how could the mind see the mind? For, for example, a sword-edge is unable to cut just that sword-edge, and a finger-tip is unable to touch just that fingertip.

~antideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.17cd-18ab) says:'Z

Also, the Protector of the World [Buddha] said
"The mind does not see the mind."

Just as the edge of the sword does not cut itself

The mind also [does not know itself].

Passages such as these refute [self-consciousness].

Ngawang Belden: Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" says:

With respect to that, it is not feasible that a consciousness apprehends that same consciousness because it is contradictory that its activity operate on itself. For a sword-edge does not cut just that same [sword-edge], a fingertip does not touch itself, even well-trained gymnasts are unable to mount their own shoulders, fire does not burn itself, and an eye does not see itself.

Jamyang Shayba: [The Prasahgikas] also refute [the reasoning that] just as a butter-lamp illumines both itself and other [things], the mind knows both itself and other [things]. Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections (XXXV, XXXVI) says:16

If, as you say,

Fire illumines itself [just as it illumines other things],

Then fire would burn itself

Just as it [bums] other things.

If, as you say,

Fire illumines itself and other things,

Then just as a butter-lamp [illumines itself and other things], darkness also

Would obscure both itself and other things.

Ngawang Belden: The statements "If fire illumined itself" and so forth were explained in the context of the Svatantrika School. Also, that letters are left off and that there are errors in this citation in this [Prasarigika School] context can be understood from [my annotation there in the Svatantrika School section].

Jamyang Shayba: Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (VII.12) says:21

If a butter-lamp illumines

Itself and other things,
There is no doubt that darkness also would obscure itself and other things.

It would [absurdly] follow that even darkness, upon being obscured by itself, does not appear. Also, there is no need for an illuminator [of the butter-lamp] other than the butter-lamp [itself] because darkness does not exist in it. Nagarjuna's Treatise Called "The Finely Woven" (zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo, vaidalyasutranama) says:

A butter-lamp neither clears away darkness that it meets nor clears away darkness that it does not meet.

Question: Here it would be like the harms of [the eighth] planet?23

Answer: No, because [that is] contradictory with the example [of light and darkness].

"A butter-lamp does not illuminate itself because it is without darkness." Also, Santideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.19ab) says:

The butter-lamp is not an object of illumination.

Why? It is not obscured by darkness.

Ngawang Belden:26 It is as Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance" says:

...because just as a butter-lamp itself does not illuminate itself but nevertheless its having luminosity is not precluded, so even though consciousness itself does not experience itself in the manner asserted by those who hold the contrary position, that it has mere experience is not precluded.

Objection: The butter-lamp itself does illuminate itself [115b].

Response: If that were the case, darkness itself would obscure itself, and if that were asserted, just as a pot is not seen in a mass of darkness, darkness also would not be seen.28

Nagarjuna's Treatise Called "The Finely Woven" says:

A butter-lamp neither clears away darkness that it meets nor clears away darkness that it does not meet.

Question: Here it would be like the harms of [the eighth] planet?
Answer: No, because [that is] contradictory with the example [of light and darkness].

The meaning of that statement is that the butter-lamp does not inherently clear away darkness which it either meets or does not meet.30

Opponent: Just as someone such as Devadatta3’ is harmed by meeting with the faults brought about by [the eighth] planet, a butter-lamp harms darkness through meeting it.

Prasangika: That is incorrect because the example and meaning are discordant, since even though there is a meeting of Devadatta and the faults brought about by [the eighth] planet, darkness and a butter-lamp do not meet. This is because the two, light and darkness, are contradictory in the sense of not abiding together.32 Nagajuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (VII.10,11) says:33

If at the time of a butter-lamp's state of being produced34

It does not meet with darkness,

How, by a butter-lamp's being produced,

Would darkness be illuminated?

If, even without a butter-lamp's meeting darkness,

Darkness is cleared away,

Then the darkness dwelling all over the world

Would definitely be removed.35

With respect to that reasoning, Dzongkaba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagajuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" says:36

Also, with respect to asserting that conventionally a butterlamp clears away darkness, although the two, a butterlamp's state of being produced and darkness, must indeed meet, at the time of a butter-lamp's state of being produced a butter-lamp does not exist; therefore, [a butter-lamp] need not meet with darkness.

In accordance with the assertion that a butter-lamp's clearing away of darkness is established by its own character, if a butter-lamp's state of being produced met with darkness, a butter-lamp would have to exist at that time, whereas it does not. Therefore, [Nagajuna's] is a reasoning which indicates that since [darkness] does not meet [inherently] with a butterlamp's state of being produced," it is not feasible for a butterlamp to clear away darkness. It can be understood [more] extensively in
Here, let us abbreviate the mode of asserting self-consciousness and refuting it in accordance with how it is set forth in the root text and (auto-)commentary of Candrakirti's Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way.'

Opponent: In the continuum of a common being who is seeing blue with his eyes, there is both an experience of the object, blue, and an experiencer of the subject, [the consciousness] apprehending blue [116a], because when this is remembered at a later time, there is both a memory of the object"This blue was previously seen"-and a memory of the subject-"I saw."

If that is accepted, it follows that the subject, the experience of the earlier subject [the consciousness], is a self-experience because it is either a self-experience or other-experience and there is the damage that if it is an other-experience, (1) it would follow that the experiencers would be endless and (2) it would follow that the later consciousness would not distinguish another object. The mode of establishment of the latter two reasons should be known from extensive statements in Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candra-kirti's) "Entrance."

Answer: The Prasangika School method of refuting those is that it is not feasible to prove [self-consciousness] by the sign of memory because (1) if it were said, "Self-consciousness exists because inherently established memory exists," the sign would not be established, just as the probandum would not be established and (2) if it were said that self-consciousness exists because memory exists, since the two, self-consciousness and memory consciousnesses, do not have the relation of [memory] not occurring if [self-consciousness] does not occur, the entailment is indefinite; it would be similar to the proof that since water and fire exist, a water-crystal and fire-crystal exist. For Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says: 42

Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance" says: 43

Here, if this is treated as proving a substantially established [memory consciousness], since such a memory consciousness does not exist, it is the same as what is being proved [i.e., self-consciousness, in terms of not existing and thus being incapable of serving as a proof]. If it is taken in terms of conventionalities, since self-consciousness is not established for the second party [i.e., a Prasangika], then it and memory are not established as cause and effect. Also, it is explained that the two, (1) the proof that since water and fire exist water-crystals and fire-crystals exist [respectively], and (2) the proof that since a memory exists, self-consciousness exists, are similar[ly fallacious].

This is done in terms of treating [memory] as an effect sign and holding
self-consciousness to be the predicate of what is proved.'

Objection: With respect to this [proof that self-consciousness exists by the sign of memory], if self-consciousness is held to be the predicate of the probandum [that is, what is to be proved], a concordant example would not exist. Therefore, such is not to be stated. However, we will say, "With respect to the subject, an eye consciousness apprehending blue, an experiencer of it exists in the continuum of a common being who is seeing blue with his eyes because such a common being has a memory of it at a later time, for example, blue.'"

Answer: Even though in this the sign and the predicate are present in the example, the entailment cannot be proven;" hence, it is similar to the former [statement]. This is because Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says:'

Also, when it is taken that way, an example is not found. Therefore, even if one were to state, "An experiences [rather than self-consciousness] of [a consciousness] apprehending blue exists because later memory exists, as is the case, for example, with blue" [116b], although it is the case that the sign [later memory of it] and the predicate [an experiencer of it] are present in the example, the entailment [that if later memory exists, then an experiencer of it exists] cannot be proven. Hence, [specifying "an experiencer of a consciousness"] is the same as holding self-consciousness to be the predicate of what is to be proved. [If] therefore [you rephrased this such that] even if without explicitly stating [self-consciousness as the predicate of what is to be proved, you] prove mere experience....

Also, [that there is no entailment that because a memory of an eye consciousness apprehending blue exists, a self-experience of that consciousness exists] is because ~antideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.23) says that memory is generated without experiencing the subject:49

If self-consciousness did not exist,

How would a consciousness be remembered?

Memory [of consciousness] occurs due to the relation [of an object] with other-experiencers50

Like [being mindful of] a rodent's poison.

Opponent: Mere experience exists because memory exists.

Response: That would be proving what is already established [for Prasarigikas]; hence, there would be no purpose [in stating it]. That is because Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says:'
Even if mere experience is being proved, since it is already established [for Prasargigakas], such is not set forth [since it does not prove what the Cittamatrins seek to establish].

There are two modes of generating memory even without the existence of self-consciousness [as explained in Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way and ~antideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds. Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.75) says:5z

Because for me this memory is not [inherently] other

Than that [consciousness] by which the object was experienced,

One remembers, "I saw [this earlier]."

This is also the way of worldly convention.

The meaning of this is as follows: The two, previous experience and later memory, are not others established by way of their own character. It has already been explained [earlier in the sixth chapter of the Entrance] that the conception of substantial cause and effect—for instance, seed and sprout—as others established by their own character does not exist in an ordinary worldly awareness.53 Just so, the two, previous experience and later memory, not only are not conceived by an innate worldly awareness to be others established by their own character, but also when one later remembers the object seen in the previous apprehension of blue, one uses the verbal convention "I saw this previously also."

Although such is indeed the case, one does not think "The self of the time of remembering is the self of the time of [previous] experience," and one does not use the verbal convention "Previously I saw the blue which was qualified by being the object which subsists [both] at the time of this utterance and the time of the [previous object]." Therefore, the verbal convention is not factually discordant. For example, it is like the fact that in the world, even though one uses the verbal convention "I hurt," when one's hand hurts, it is not a case of thinking "This hand is me," and so forth, and hence the verbal convention is not factually discordant. An ordinary worldly [awareness] does not have the conception that such experience and memory or the two objects at those times are others established by their own character. Therefore, it is not the case that the [object] experienced and distinguished by the consciousness that earlier experienced it is not later experienced or distinguished by the consciousness which remembers that [117a], whereby the remembering consciousness thinking, "I saw this earlier too," comes to be generated. This is the way of worldly convention; it is not to be taken as a case of positing something upon analysis by way of searching for an imputed object because it is a worldly convention that has a sense of falseness in that when the imputed object is sought it is not found.
Those who assert self-consciousness say, "If self-consciousnesses did not exist, it would be contradictory that a memory of a subject would be generated because there is no generation of a memory without previous experience." The reason in that statement is not refuted by scriptural passages such as:

Because for me this memory is not [inherently] other

Than that [consciousness] by which the object was experienced,

One remembers, "I saw [this earlier]."

This is also the way of worldly conventions.

For otherwise [the syllogism being put forth] would have to be stated as:

It is not contradictory that a later memory of the [consciousness] apprehending blue is generated even though one did not previously experience the [consciousness] apprehending blue, because for the perspective of an innate worldly awareness, the two, the previous apprehension of blue and the later memory, are not others established by way of their own character and the two, the previous apprehension of blue and later memory, have the same object.

in which case [the syllogism] would be senseless. Therefore, this passage does not eliminate the "wrong" conception that "There is no generation of memory without previous experience." Rather, the above passage in Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way eliminates the wrong conception that "If an eye consciousness apprehending blue did not experience itself by itself, when seeing blue is later remembered it would be contradictory to remember that oneself saw just that which was previously seen, [as in] 'I saw [it].'" This is because Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says:

This [citation of Candrakirti] does not eliminate the reason, previously explained, in the conception "It is contradictory that if self-consciousness does not exist, memory is generated [because there is no memory without previous experience]." This is a conception that an earlier [eye consciousness apprehending blue] is self-conscious in dependence on there being a special mode of remembering which generates the memory: when the earlier seeing of blue is remembered later, just that earlier seeing-'I saw [that] earlier'-is remembered as one's own seeing. Therefore it is thought that it would be contradictory for that mode of memory to be produced if the previous experience of blue did not experience itself by itself, whereby the earlier [eye consciousness apprehending blue] would be self-conscious.

[According to Candrakirti] this [mode of memory] does not occur through
the power of self-consciousness, but nevertheless it is established that a memory consciousness thinking "I saw it previously," is generated through the force of the two, the earlier experience of the object, blue, and a later remembering consciousness, engaging in one object.

This can be known at length in just that [text].

The explanation in ~antideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds of the way in which it is not contradictory that there is generation of memory even though self-consciousness does not exist is indicated by (IX.23) [117b]:`

If self-consciousness did not exist,

How would a consciousness be remembered?

Memory [of consciousness] occurs due to the relation [of an object] with other-experiencers

Like [being mindful of] a rodent's poison.

This is to be known extensively from Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance’ and Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way.` Because it is greatly renowned and easy to understand, I will not write [more about it] here.
Pratyakṣa and True Cessations

Jamyang Shayba: The root text says:

When [an object and subject] are related, pratyakṣa (mgon sum) is for objects, not subjects.

True cessations are the element of a [Superior's] qualities (chos dbyings, dharmadhatu). Therefore Superiors perceive the absence of true establishment [directly].'

A. Pratyakṣa Refers to Objects, Not Subjects

It is not said that in general even a valid directly cognizing consciousness (mngon sum tshad ma, pratyakṣa-pramana) is not a manifest object (mngon sum, pratyakṣa). However, the [Sanskrit] translation equivalent of mngon sum, pratyakṣa, was used for both mngon sum [which often refers to a directly perceiving consciousness] and mngon gyur ["manifest phenomenon," synonymous with manifest object]. Hence, when the two, a pot and the directly perceiving sense consciousness apprehending it, are considered together, it is asserted that the pot is the actual pratyakṣa and that the term pratyakṣa is used imputedly with respect to the directly perceiving sense consciousness. Candrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" says:5

In that way [when considering a subject and object together], a consciousness is not fit to be considered a pratyakṣa. It is fit for the object [to be considered a pratyakṣa].

His Clear Words says:

Furthermore, because the term pratyakṣa expresses the meaning, "not hidden," pratyakṣa means to manifest to a sense power. With respect to [pratyakṣa], since it is taken to mean "manifesting to a sense power," non-hidden phenomena such as a pot or blue are established as manifest objects (mngon sum, pratyakṣa), and the consciousnesses which thoroughly distinguish those are called manifest (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) due to having as their cause a manifest object like hay-fire or grass-fire.'

Ngawang Belden: It appears as if both this and Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate9 say that in general direct valid cognition (mngon sum tshad ma) is pratyakṣa (mngon sum). However, since they also explain that manifest object (mngon sum), sense object (dbang po'i yul), and manifest phenomenon (mgon
Whatever is an established base is necessarily an actual manifest object (mngon sum, pratyaksa) in relation to an awareness that clearly realizes it, and with regard to whatever consciousness is a valid directly perceiving consciousness with respect to an object, that consciousness is necessarily an imputed directly perceiving consciousness (mngon sum, pratyaksa) in relation to that object."

B. True Cessations Are the Element of a [Superior's] Qualities; Therefore, All Superiors Realize Emptiness

Jamyang Shayba:12 True cessations are understood to be the element of a [Superior's] qualities (chos dbyings, dharmadhatu [i.e., emptiness]) by way of how they are included in the four truths and two truths. Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (4cd) saysendum"

Through [believing in inherent] existence one is not released.

Through [believing in total] non-existence one does not transcend cyclic existence.

By thoroughly understanding [the nature of] things and non-things (dngos med, abhava),75

The great beings are released.

Thereby, it is also explained that Superiors realize emptiness. Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" repeatedly explains this, as where it says:16

It is thoroughly understood [by Superiors] that those two [things and non-things] do not inherently exist.... Those are called great beings who have many [qualities]" of great essence; this refers to Superiors.18

Ngawang Belden:19 Gyeltsap's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" (rigs pa drug bcu pa'i dar tfk) explains:20

A thing does not become a non-thing without depending on a thing because the disintegratedness which is its having become another thing is asserted to be the non-existence of a thing. A thing is not established without depending on a non-thing because a thing is not established without negating a non-thing. Therefore, the two, thing and non-thing, are thoroughly realized directly as having a nature of emptiness due to being mutually dependent. Therefore, because [the Superiors] are the basis of the exalted wisdom consciousness which does not observe [the basis of the emptiness it realizes] the great beings, the Superiors, are liberated.
Nirvāṇas with Remainder and without Remainder

The root text says:

Because it is explained that (1) it is unsuitable that [a remainderless nirvana] be extinction of the aggregates [in the sense of cutting the continuum of mind and body], and (2) that feelings and discriminations are destroyed [only in the sense of being primordially extinguished into emptiness],

Without remainder (lhag med myang bdas, nirupa-dhisesa-nirvana) and with remainder (lhag bcas myang Was, sopadhisesa-nirvana) [means] the extinction and non-extinction of mistaken [dualistic] appearances.'

A. Contradictions in the Presentation of the Lower Schools

[According to] the Supramundane Victor, nirvana has two aspects: that with a remainder of aggregates and that without a remainder. I have explained elsewhere the mode of assertion and mode of objection of certain Cittamatrins and below that the first [nirvana with remainder] is the mere abandonment of the afflictions and the second [nirvana without remainder] is the cutting of the continuum of the -aggregates."

If here we speak briefly [in accordance with the Prasartgika School], this [explanation of the lower schools] is incorrect, because (1) in that case nirvana [without remainder] would not be actualized, (2) it is explained that each Arhat also attains a nirvana in which the contaminated aggregates are completely abandoned [in the sense that they are primordially extinguished into emptiness, not that they are irrevocably cut off] [40a1, and (3) there is a Hinayana sutra in which Sariputra, having actualized such a nirvana, set forth a repetition [of what he had accomplished].'

[With respect to the first consequence, that nirvana would not be realized,] Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" says:'

Since there is nothing whatsoever in an entity which is a severance of the continuum of the aggregates, in whom is that cessation actualized? ...For the time being, as long as there is an impelling force for the continuation of those aggregates by the power of causes and conditions, so long can [the
continuum of the aggregates] not be fully understood as extinct because it has production.'

[With regard to the second reason, that Arhats attain a nirvana in which the aggregates are extinguished into emptiness, but not irrevocably cut off,] a Hearer sutra says:8

This which is suffering is completely abandoned, definitely abandoned, purified, extinguished, freed from desire, stopped, thoroughly pacified, vanished, not connected to other sufferings, not arisen, not produced. This is peace, this is auspiciousness. It is like this: since all the aggregates are abandoned, attachment is extinguished, one is freed from desire, has cessation, nirvana.

Moreover, it is explained in Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"9 that the sutra says, "completely abandoned... vanished" in terms of a present nirvana and says, "not connected to other sufferings... nirvana" in terms of a future mode of freedom from sufferings.

Ngawang Belden: ` The meaning of this sutra is as set forth in Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance":11

Commenting on the meaning of this, [Candrakirti] says that because the phrase "this which is suffering" uses the term of proximity "this," the passage "This which is suffering is completely abandoned... vanished" refers only to the sufferings of aggregates that exist presently in one's own continuum. The passage "not connected to other suffering... nirvana" refers to future suffering.12

[Dzongkaba continues]

Objection: "[This which is] suffering" and "[all] aggregates" are general terms used here for their instances, the afflictions.

Answer: This also is not feasible. If general terms [such as "aggregates"] are not amenable to explanation with a general meaning, they must be explained as referring to [some of] their instances [i.e., the afflictions]; here, however, this can be explained in the context of a generality [118a].13

Thus, if the meaning of this sutra is explained according to the Proponents of True Existence, there would be no actualizing of nirvana. With respect to how that is so, Dzongkaba, in that same text, says:``

Otherwise, according to the Proponents of True Existence, it is not fit to explain [the Hearer sutra] as primordial extinguishment in the sense that the aggregates have been primordially without inherently existent production, as in Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana, "The
afflictions are primordially extinguished." It must be explained as an utter abandonment [of the aggregates] by means of the path.

[However, in that case] when the nirvana that is to be actualized existed, the actualizer would not [and thus could not report on the extinguishment that was realized, as was done in the Repetition Sutra]. Also, when the actualizer existed, the nirvana to be actualized would not because the aggregates would not have been extinguished. Hence, they are unable to explain this sutra.

According to us, it is permissible to explain extinguishment here in accordance with the statement:\(^{15}\)

Extinguishment [in this case] is not [caused] by means of an antidote;

It is so called because of primordial extinguishment.

We are able to explain well the meaning of the sutra [as referring to a natural or primordial absence of inherent existence in phenomena].\(^{16}\)

Jamyang Shayba:"

[With respect to the third reason for rejection of the explanations of the lower systems on types of nirvana, that ariputra set forth a Low Vehicle sutra after actualizing a nirvana without remainder,] the Repetition Sutra (rjes zlos kyi mdo) says:\(^{18}\)

This sutra called "Repetition"

Was set forth by ariputra

After having actualized nirvana.

Ngawang Belden:`

Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" says:\(^{Z°}\)

If you think that because [for you] there being no remainder of aggregates is characterized by cutting the continuum of the aggregates, a nirvana that has [a remainder of] aggregates is not asserted to be a [full-fledged] nirvana even though the fetters such as desire have been abandoned, then how do you explain this which appears in a sutra:

This sutra called "Repetition"

Was set forth by Sariputra

After having actualized nirvana.

In accordance with that, if it were said, "As long as the continuum of aggregates is
not severed, there is no full-fledged nirvana," this would contradict the explanation that Sariputra, having actualized nirvana, subsequently repeated, "My births are extinguished," etc., to his other friends. That is what [Candrakirti] is saying; he is not refuting the assertion by the Proponents of True Existence that initially one must actualize a nirvana with remainder and subsequently one must actualize a nirvana without remainder [though he would in fact disagree with them].

Moreover, the Repetition Sutra is as explained above: Gyaltsap's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" explains that the stanza uttered by the Superior Asvajit2' is not it.22

B. Definitions of Nirvana with and without Remainder

Jamyang Shayba:73 When the afflictions are abandoned along with their seeds, nirvana is attained. Moreover, a nirvana with remainder is:z4

a nirvana which, although the afflictions are extinguished, involves a remainder of mistaken [dualistic appearance due to] the predispositions of those [afflictions].

and a nirvana without remainder is:25

a nirvana without a remainder of mistaken [dualistic appearance], because this extinguishment of the aggregates and so forth has the meaning of being extinguished into the element of qualities.

For with respect to the mode of abandonment in this [Hinayana] sutra where it says, "these sufferings which are completely abandoned," and so forth, and the many profound [Mahayana] sutras which say, "...unproduced, unceasing, primordially peaceful, and naturally beyond sorrow," the extinguishment mentioned in the former sutra and non-production in this one are similar in necessarily being the element of qualities [and do not refer to a nirvana that is attained on the path. For] (1) Nagarjuna's Precious Garland (rin chen phreng ba, ratna- vali) (111.86) says:26

The teaching in the Mahayana of non-production

And [the teaching] in the other, [the Hinayana, of] extinction are [of the same] emptiness.

Extinction and non-production have the same meaning.

Therefore let [the Mahayana] be accepted [as Buddha's word].27

(2) Also, Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana (rgyud bla ma, uttaratantra 1.15) says:7-8
Because [Superiors] realize phenomena as having a nature of quiescence,
[They realize] the mode [of being, emptiness]; moreover, [this is]
Because [the mind] is naturally pure

And because the afflictions are primordially extinguished.29

(3) And Asahga's Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana" (rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos rnam bshad, uttaratantravyakhya) says:30

...because the mind is seen to be naturally luminous and because the afflictions in proximity to that are seen to be primordially extinguished and ceased [40b].31

Candrakirti's Clear Words (XVIII.1) says:32

Internal and external things are not observable [as truly existent]. Therefore, the consciousnesses conceiving the internal and external as [inherently existent] self and as [inherently existent] mine are extinguished totally. Here, this is suchness.

The meaning of this is set forth in Dzongkaba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim chen mo):33

The total extinguishment of all conceptions of [inherently existent] I and mine through the thorough pacification of all these appearances of the varieties of internal and external phenomena as [their own] suchness, whereas they are not [their own] suchness, along with their predispositions, is the suchness that is to be attained here, the Truth Body.

This explains that true cessations are ultimate truths.'
The Two Obstructions

Jamyang Shayba:1 The root text says:

Predispositions [established by afflictions] are obstructions to omniscience. Non-afflictive ignorance is also asserted.

[Until] the afflictions are removed, abandonment of obstructions to omniscience is not begun.

A. Predispositions and Non-Afflictive Ignorance Are Obstructions to Omniscience

The [Prasangikas'] way of abandoning the two obstructions [to liberation and omniscience] is unique. Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance" says:'

With respect to [the existence of predispositions established by afflictions in the continua of Arhats] the predispositions [established by] ignorance are obstacles preventing thoroughly distinguishing objects of knowledge, and the existence of predispositions [established by] desire, and so forth, is the cause of such engagement in body and speech [as spontaneously jumping like a monkey or saying "bitch!"]? Also, the predispositions of ignorance, desire, and so forth, are overcome only in exalted knowers of all aspects (rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa, sarvakarafr ana) and Buddhas but not in others.

By that statement he [indicates that] the predispositions [established by] the three poisons [desire, hatred, and ignorance] are obstructions to omniscience.

Also, although the three poisons mentioned in Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance" when he says,4 "The afflictions are ignorance, desire, and so forth..." are described as afflictions [and thus might lead one to think that all ignorance is afflictive], there is non-afflictive ignorance and ignorance that is an obstruction to omniscience because Candrakirti says in his Autocommentary on the "Entrance."s "...because of being thoroughly involved in ignorance that is not afflictive..." and his Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges (skyabs gsum 'gro bdun cu pa, trisaranasaptati) says:'

For the sake of abandoning non-afflictive ignorance,

[Arhats] are later urged on by the Buddhas.
And:

Since non-afflictive ignorance exists,

[It must be] abandoned [in order to attain] omniscience.

The obstructions to omniscience are of two types, those that are consciousnesses and those that are not.

Ngawang Belden:’ Janggya's Presentation of Tenets says:

In dependence on Candrakirti's Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges, which says, "For the sake of abandoning non-afflictive ignorance..." and "...non-afflictive ignorance exists..." and his statement in his Autocommentary on the 'Entrance,"

Ngawang Belden:’ Janggya's Presentation of Tenets says:

In dependence on Candrakirti's Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges, which says, "For the sake of abandoning non-afflictive ignorance..." and "...non-afflictive ignorance exists..." and his statement in his Autocommentary on the 'Entrance,"

[118b], Panchen Sonam Gyeltsen (pan chen bsod nams rgyal mtshan)10 and the great scholar and adept Jamyang Shaybay Dorjay [Jamyang Shayba] say that the existence of obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses is correct.

Nevertheless, with respect to the Foremost Omniscient [Dzongkaba's] interpretations of the ignorance that is an obstruction to omniscience, except for his interpretation [of it] as predispositions of mistaken dualistic appearance, he does not appear to have interpreted it as ignorance that is a consciousness.

Most scholars and adepts, such as the omniscient Kaydrup, the lord of reasoning Jaydzun Chogyi Gyeltse (rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan) of Sera (se ra) and his [spiritual] sons, as well as the great treasure of wisdom Jamyang Gaway Lodro (jam dbyangs dga' ba'i blo gros), the foremost omniscient Gendun Gyatso (dge 'dun rgya mtsho), and Panchen Sonam Drakba,1 assert that there are no obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses. Also, the omniscient Panchen Losang Chogyi Gyeltse (pan chen blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan),12 a keeper of the teaching of both the transmission of explanation and the transmission of achievement of the Foremost Lama [Dzongkaba], says:

The subtle obstructions [preventing] the perception

Of the two truths directly and simultaneously by one consciousness

Are designated "ignorance" [but] are not actual consciousnesses;

Hence there is not even partial contradiction.

His statements along with his reasons are very concordant with the great mass of the speech of the Foremost [Dzongkaba]. Therefore, [this topic] still
should be finely analyzed by the intelligent.

**Jamyang Shayba:** Obstructions to omniscience and impedimentary obstructions (thogs sgrib) are equivalent.

**Ngawang Belden:** Although there also is an explanation that the three-obstructions of attachment (chags sgrib), impedimentary obstructions, and obstructions to omniscience are equivalent, Gyel-tsap's Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana"(rgyud bla ma'i dar tik), at the point at which [the Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana] says, "Because there are no attachments in the stainless expanse and..." says:

Because there are no attachments, i.e., consciousnesses conceiving (zhen pa) true existence, and no impediments to [knowing] all objects of knowledge in the naturally undefiled expanse, [the exalted wisdom of irreversible Bodhisattvas] is pure of obstructions of attachments and of impediments.

And:

Moreover, in brief, for two reasons [those realizations of irreversible Bodhisattva Superiors are very pure relative to the perceptions] of partial exalted wisdoms that do not realize emptiness or do not engage all objects of knowledge. With respect to the exalted wisdom of an irreversible Superior, through the very seeing of the mode of existence [of things] it is [a consciousness] having as its object the naturally pure realm of sentient beings; hence, it is without the attachments of consciousnesses conceiving true existence. Through the very seeing of the varieties [of phenomena] that exist, it is [a consciousness] having as its object the limitless things which are objects of knowledge; hence, it is without impediment [119a].

Also, Dzongkaba's Golden Rosary (gser phreng) describes attachments as afflictive obstructions and impediments as obstructions to omniscience.

**B. Obstructions to Omniscience Are Not Abandoned until after the Afflictions Are Abandoned**

**Jamyang Shayba:** When one has abandoned all afflictions on the eighth [Bodhisattva] ground, one must [then begin to] abandon the obstructions to omniscience but not earlier than that because until the afflictions have been abandoned, there is no way to abandon their predispositions." For example, until one removes the oil in something fouled with oil, one is unable to remove its befoulment. That is because: (1) Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance" says:21
Those that are involved in stopping up and infusing the mental continuum are predispositions. "The aftermath of the afflictions," "conditioning of the afflictions," "the root of the afflictions," and "predispositions of the afflictions" are equivalent.

Even though they have abandoned the afflictions by an uncontaminated path, all Hearer and Solitary Realizer [Arhats] are unable to abandon [the obstructions to omniscience]. This is like the fact that because a pot and [a piece of] woolen cloth have contacted [sesame oil and flowers, respectively], even though the sesame oil and flowers, and so forth, have been removed, a subtle quality [of those can be] observed.

(2) The Questions of King Dharanisvara Sutra (gzung rgyal gyis zhus pa, dharanisvararajapariprcchasutra) says:22

The knowledge of a One Gone Thus (de bzhin gshegs pa, tatha- gatha) that contamination has been eliminated is pure, stainless, thoroughly pure, luminous, and has thoroughly destroyed every connection to predispositions [of ignorance]. There is a limit to Hearers' elimination of contamination [41a]; they have not thoroughly destroyed the predispositions.

and so forth. (3) Also, Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana (I.17cd-18) says:73

Because there are no attachments and no impediments in the stainless expanse,

[The exalted wisdom of Bodhisattvas] is pure.

Because their pure vision of exalted wisdom

[Approximates the] Buddhas' unexcelled exalted wisdom,

The irreversible Superiors [of the eighth ground and above]

Are refuges for all beings.

(4) Concerning that, Asarlga's Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum" says:24

In brief, for two reasons the one [the exalted wisdom of an irreversible Superior in meditative equipoise on emptiness] is called very pure relative to the vision of a partial exalted wisdom consciousness [of a Superior not in meditative equipoise on emptiness or who has not attained the ground of irreversibility]. For which two [reasons]? Because it is without attachments and because it is without [some] impediments.
And:

In that way, the vision of exalted wisdom of such Bodhisattvas who abide on the grounds of irreversibility [i.e., the eighth ground and above] comes into proximity with the pure vision of the exalted wisdom of the Unexcelled Ones, the Ones Gone Thus.

The bottom limit of an exalted wisdom that releases one from any of the impedimentary obstructions [i.e., the obstructions to omniscience] is posited from the ground of irreversibility, the eighth [Bodhisattva] ground.26 In consideration of many such meanings, Dzongkaba’s Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti’s) "Entrance" says:27

...because obstructions that are predispositions and that are different from those seeds [producing the afflictions] are posited as obstructions to omniscience, one does not [begin to] abandon them until one attains the eighth [Bodhisattva] ground.

Here there is much to be elaborated, but it should be known from other [texts].
11

Avoiding the Two Extremes

Jamyang Shayba: The root text says:

The extreme of [inherent] existence is avoided through appearance, and
the extreme of [utter] non-existence is avoided through emptiness.'

For many unique [tenets] such as these, look in [the texts of the]
Madhyamika School.'

Earlier, there was a short explanation at the point of [explaining] dependent-arising 4 The reason for dissimilarity with the lower tenet systems must be known in detail.'

Ngawang Belden: Dzongkaba's Three Principal Aspects of the Path (lam gyi gtso bo rnam gsum, stanza 13), says:

When [the two realizations of dependent-arising and emptiness exist] simultaneously without alternation

And when from only seeing dependent-arising as infallible,

Definite knowledge entirely destroys the mode of apprehension [of the conception of inherent existence],

Then the analysis of the view [of reality] is complete.

For persons who have completed analysis of the view as in this passage, the extent to which they apply their minds to the meaning of dependent-arisings which are [understood to be] posited by names and terms decreases [to that extent] the force of the awareness concerning inherent existence. This is the way the extreme of [inherent] existence is eliminated through appearance.

Also, for such persons, the extent to which they apply their minds to the emptiness of inherent existence decreases [to that extent] the force of the awareness that lacks conviction in the cause and effect of actions and conceives those to be non-existent. This is the way the extreme of non-existence [i.e., no conventional existence] is eliminated through emptiness.' The [Questions of the Naga King Anavataptal Sutra (klu rgyal ma dros pa'i zhus pa'i mdo, anavatapta-naga-raja-pariprccha-sutra) says:]

That which is produced from conditions is not produced, [i.e.,]
It has no inherently existent production.
That which depends on conditions is explained to be empty.
Those who understand emptiness are conscientious.

**Aryadeva's Four Hundred (XII.5) says:**

Whoever has generated doubt
Toward what is not obvious in Buddha's word
Will believe that only Buddha [is omniscient]
Based on [his profound teaching of] emptiness.

**Also, the Foremost Great Being [Dzongkaba, in his In Praise of Dependent-Arising (rten 'brel bstod pa)] says:**

From [the concordance of appearances and emptiness] one can well understand

[Nagarjuna's] statement that there are no disputants
Who could factually oppose what you taught

**Or find any possibility for censure in the Teaching.**

Why? This explanation
Puts far away the possibility
Of exaggerating or discrediting
Things seen and unseen.

**It is greatly renowned nowadays that even though the mere assertion that the extreme of [inherent] existence is eliminated by appearance and the extreme of no [conventional] existence is eliminated by emptiness is not unique, the [Prasangika] mode of elimination is unique. However, I think that whether or not such an explanation exists in the texts of the Svatantrikas and below should be examined.**

**Jamyang Shayba:** Moreover, the distinctive [presentation] of the absorption of cessation ('gog pa'i snyoms 'jug, nirodha-samapatti), the mode of generating the profound view, and so forth," should be known from the texts of the Father, the Superior (Nagarjuna), and his spiritual son (Aryadeva), the two Compendiums [Nagarjuna’s Compendium of Sutra (mdo kun las btus pa, sutrasamuccaya) and
~antideva's Compendium of Learnings (bslab pa kun las btus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, giksasamuccayakarika), the two Explanations [Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Supplement" and his Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"], Dzongkaba's [Great, Middling, and Small] Exposition of the Stages of the Path, and so forth.
Part Three

Janggya’s “Unique Tenets of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika School”

from Janggya Rolbay Dorjay’s Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets, Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer’s Teaching
Translator's Introduction

During his twenties, while he oversaw the translation of the Indian treatise portion of the Tibetan canon into Mongolian, Janggya also composed his best-known work, the Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets. He may have begun the project because of his interest in the doctrines of the Cittamatra School current in China, since he wrote that chapter first; but like Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets, his encyclopedic work discusses the prominent non-Buddhist systems of India as well as the major Buddhist tenet systems. Janggya's presentation is more straightforward than Jamyang Shayba's, without the latter's terseness, polemics, and copious citation of Indian sources. Janggya presents the tenet systems through a careful reading of the works of Dzongkaba, whom he clearly regards as having already done the fine analysis necessary to establish the supremacy of the Prasangika view.

A small group of American scholars has recently translated various portions of the Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets. Anne C. Klein has published a translation of the "Sautrantika School" chapter; Donald S. Lopez has published a translation of the "Introduction to Madhyamika" and "Svatantrika-Madhyamika School" chapters; Jeffrey Hopkins has published a translation of the first part of the "Prasarigika School" chapter (on the history of the school and the reasonings used in meditation on emptiness); and Guy Newland has translated the section on the two truths in the "Prasangika School" chapter.

Two editions of the Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets have been used for this translation. The principal edition, chosen mainly for its legibility and availability, is the 1970 type-set edition published in Sarnath, India, by the Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press (legs bshad gter mdzod khang). Bracketed numbers found in the text of the translation are the page numbers of this edition. It has been compared to the xylograph edition edited by Lokesh Chandra and photoreproduced by Sharada Rani in 1977. Differences between the two editions (consisting mainly of minor printer's errors in the Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press edition) have been noted in the "emendations" section following the translation.
Janggya's Introduction

The explanation of the unique tenets of the PrasangikaMadhyamika School has two parts: a brief explanation and an explanation of the eight chief distinguishing features [472].

A. Brief Explanation of the Unique Tenets

The chief of the unique ways in which the PrasangikaMadhyamika School comments on the thought of sutra and of the Superior [Nagarjuna] are these two: (1) there is not even a mere speck of inherent establishment (rang gyi mtshan nyid gyis grub pa, svalaksana-siddhi), and (2) it is permissible to posit all actions, agents, and objects as mere nominal imputations (ming gis btags tsam) without losing [even] a tiny piece [of a valid presentation of conventional phenomena].

In dependence on that, among the many pure tenets unshared with other commentators, the chief are renowned to our [Gelukba] scholars as explained by condensing them into eight difficult topics. [Inclusion into eight] appears to depend upon the statement by the Foremost Omniscient [Dzongkaba] in his Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of Candrakirti's "Entrance":

There are many pure tenets unshared with other commentators. What are they? Now, if the chief are expressed, they are:

1 The unique way of refuting a mind-basis-of-all that is a different entity from the six collections [of consciousness].

2 The unique way of refuting self-consciousness.

3 The unique way of not asserting that [it is feasible) to generate [realization of] suchness (de bzhin nyid, tathata) just as it is in the continuum of another party by means of an autonomous syllogism.

4 The unique way of positing the need to assert external objects just as consciousnesses are asserted.

5 The unique way of positing that Hearers and Solitary Realizers realize that things do not have their own nature.

6 The unique way of positing the consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena (chos kyi bdag, dharmatman) as an affliction.

7 The unique way of positing disintegratedness as a [functioning] thing.
8 The unique way of positing that by reason of [disintegratedness being a functioning thing] the [Prasangika] way of positing the three times, and so forth.

From within "and so forth" there are also many features from the topics of the path and fruit that could be adduced.'

**Objection: Refutation of a mind-basis-of-all4** that is a different entity from the six collections [of consciousness] is not feasible as a unique Prasangika School tenet because the Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika School also refutes that, and also affixes the same [negation or affirmation as the Prasartgikas] to other tenets [473]. Also, the assertion that disintegratedness is a [functioning] thing cannot be unique because the Vaibhasika School also denies that [disintegratedness] is a [functioning] thing.

**Response: [You] give a refutation of the literal reading of Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of Candrakirti's "Entrance." Even some of our own followers, fearing damage by those reasonings, take up the well-intentioned burden of adding many word-patches to the literal reading of Illumination of the Thought. Both mutually indicate clearly the posture of not knowing even just how to read a great text, because the phrases in Illumination of the Thought "unique system of refutation" and "unique way of positing"-are "indicators at the end" [of a list that apply to all members of that list]' and it appears that [our followers] did not know anything about the purpose for what is excluded and included by those statements. That those with such a disposition take up the burden of explaining, disputing, and composing the major texts manifests a sign of great deterioration of the precious teaching and is only a source of extreme discouragement for the analytical.

Now, here I will briefly express some of the chief from among those unique features. This has three parts: (1) explanation of the eight chief distinguishing features; (2) the way to refute inherent existence; and (3) in dependence on that, the way to differentiate definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation.
Section A: Explanation of the Eight Chief Distinguishing Features of Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika
The Unique Way of Refuting a Mind-Basis-of-All

In a system that does not assert inherent existence, there is no assertion of a mind-basis-of-all, non-wastage (chud mi za ba, avipranasa), acquisition (thob pa, prapti), and so forth, but there is no need to assert those because [Prasaingikas] are able to posit a presentation of actions and effects [without them].

Question: How are you able to posit [actions and effects]?

Answer: Even without asserting a mind-basis-of-all, it is feasible to posit the arising of effects from an action (las, kar-man) that has been collected and has ceased, because the cessation of actions is not inherently established [474]. There is a way in which that "not inherently ceased" serves as a reason for [the arising of effects from actions that have been collected and that have ceased] because the reason, "because it has not inherently ceased," establishes that later effects arise from an action's having disintegrated.

The arising of effects from an action's non-inherently existent disintegratedness also has neither the fallacies of its fruition occurring endlessly nor of its fruition occurring in a confused fashion. That is because just as it is definite that falling hairs appear to someone with cataracts whereas the horns of a donkeys do not appear, even though [the horns of a donkey and falling hairs] are the same in being non-existent, just so it is feasible to posit effects that do not arise from [actions] that have already fructified and to posit effects of virtuous and non-virtuous actions that are definite to be discrete, even though they are not inherently existent.

This does not contradict [Buddha's] statements in the Descent to Lanka Sutra, the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, and the Mahayana Abhidharma Sutra, that the mind-basis-of-all exists, because he said such in terms of an intention to lead trainees who are temporarily not suitable vessels for the teaching of the profound reality [of emptiness] gradually to that profound doctrine. That was [Buddha's] purpose, and the basis of his thought was emptiness, [a phenomenon's] absence of establishment-by its own nature.

The damage to the literal teaching from reasoning is that if a mind-basis-of-all were asserted it would have to be asserted that [all phenomena] are exhausted as mere appearances as forms, sounds, and so forth, from the fruition of the predispositions in the mind-basis-of-all, and that there are no external objects. However, that is not feasible because it is estab lished by reasoning that the two,
objects and consciousnesses, equally do not ultimately exist and equally conventionally exist, and so forth. [The damage to the literal teaching] from scripture is that the teacher himself indicates his thought explaining a mind-basis-of-all [in the Descent to Lanka Sutra itself].

Question: In this system, what is asserted as the basis or support for establishing the predispositions of virtuous or non-virtuous actions?

Answer: The continual basis of predispositions is the mere I (nga tsam) or person, and it is also permissible to posit the mental continuum as the occasional basis of predispositions [4751.8]

In dependence on those [points], what is the way to posit a basis, in the continuum of one on an uninterrupted path (bar chad med lam, anantarya-marga) of a path of seeing (mthong lam, dargana-marga) for dormancies [i.e., predispositions], that are to be abandoned by the path of meditation?1° Does or does not the Mahayana altruistic mind generation exist in that person's continuum?11 When uncontaminated minds are actualized in the continua of Superiors who have been born in [such a state as] the sphere of limitless space (nam mkha' mtha' yas Skye mched, akasanantyayatanam),12 are they still transmigrators of that [level]? When the statements of the Foremost Precious [Buddha] and the texts of the great chariots13 are arranged, there are limitless subtle points to be analyzed.
A. Explanation of Self-Consciousness

The way of asserting self-consciousness by our opponents is like [my previous] explanation in the chapter on the Cittamatra School.14 In our system that refutes it, it is not feasible to establish self-consciousness by the sign, memory. If later memory is set as the sign within the context of being established by its own nature, that sign is not a proof, just as when one [posits] "object of apprehension by an eye [consciousness] as the sign" in the proof of sound as an impermanent phenomenon.15 Even if [later memory is set as the sign] within the context of worldly conventions, it is not correct, because there is no memory that is a fruit of a self-consciousness. This is because when [it is established that] self-consciousness does not exist, a memory that is an effect of that is not established. Without a relation, no probandum is proved. It would be like inferring a water-crystal jewel from mere water and a fire-crystal jewel from mere fire.16

Objection: One infers the existence of the experience of the former consciousness in dependence on memory; self-consciousness is not proved by way of establishing self-consciousness and memory as cause and effect." With respect to [the experience of a consciousness], it is limited to two [types], self-experience (rang myong) and other-experience (gzhan myong), and since other-experience is refuted, self-experience is established.

Response: That is wrong, because a mind's knowledge of objects is not limited to the two, self-experience and other experience, as they are posited by the Sautrantikas and Cittamatrins [4761.18]

These are reasonings that refute the proofs (sgrub byed, sadhana) [of self-consciousness by the signs of memory and self-experience], and the reasonings that refute the probandum (bsgrub bya), that is, self-consciousness, are as follows."

"An isolated phenomenon that has the aspect of an apprehender" ('dzin rnam yan gar ba) is not feasible [as a definition of a self-consciousness] because (1) no matter how much one aims the mind, there is no appearance of [the mind] itself as the known and itself as the knower and because (2) there is the fallacy that it
would [absurdly] follow that if something's functioning naturally operated on itself, the three-action, agent, and object-would be one. Also, it would [absurdly] follow that fire would burn itself, and so forth.

In our own system, even though self-consciousness does not exist, the generation of memory is feasible because (1) the two, the previous consciousness that saw blue and the later consciousness that remembers the eye consciousness apprehending blue, are not diverse in terms of inherent establishment and because (2) since my eye consciousness apprehending blue sees blue it can also be posited as my seeing blue, and because (3) just that blue that is previously seen by an eye consciousness apprehending blue is also distinguished by the later memory consciousness, whereby the experiencer and the rememberer have the same object. This reasoning can be found in the root text and autocommentary [of Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way].

Even though self-consciousnesses do not exist, the generation of memory [of a consciousness] is feasible because when a consciousness remembering blue is generated, what is seen previously is not remembered by way of dispensing with the previous eye consciousness, but rather blue and the eye consciousness apprehending blue are relatedly remembered [as in thinking], "Earlier I saw blue."

For instance, when [a bear's] body is bitten by a rodent in the wintertime, he experiences a bite but is not mindful of having been poisoned. However, later, when [the bear] hears the sound of thunder, it is not contradictory that a memory is generated, "Before, at the time of being bitten, poison entered in." These are reasons explained in [the ninth chapter of] Santideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds.

B. The Prasangika Presentation of Valid Cognition

This system gives the definition of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramdna) as only, "a consciousness that is incontrovertible with respect to its own object of the way of apprehension (‘dzin stangs kyi yul). It is not necessary to affix the qualification of its being newly incontrovertible.

The etymology [of pramana] is asserted to be: comprehended (mana) thoroughly or well (pra) [4771.

The divisions [of valid cognition] are explained in Candrakirti's Clear Words as four: the two, direct perception and inferential cognition, as well as valid cognition of belief and valid cognition of comprehension through an example.' Nevertheless, it is not that [valid cognition] is not limited in number to two, direct perception and inferential cognition, because the latter two [types of] valid cognition [those of belief and those of comprehension through an example] are included within inferential cognition and also because [valid cognition] is explained as two in Aryadeva's Four Hundred (bzhi brgya pa, catuhgataka).
The enumeration of valid cognition is posited through the force of objects of comprehension (gzhal bya, prameya) because there are the three: manifest, hidden, and very hidden objects of comprehension.26 Objects of comprehension of valid cognition of comprehension through an example are hidden phenomena with mutually similar attributes.27 The entity [or definition] of direct valid cognition is:

that which (1) is valid cognition and (2), without depending on a sign, is incontrovertible with respect to the directly perceived object of comprehension that is its object of the mode of apprehension.

Since [this system] does not assert self-knowing direct perception, there are [just] the two, valid cognition that depends on a physical sense power [as its] empowering condition (bdag rkyen, adhipatipratyaya) and valid cognition that depends upon a mental sense power [as its] empowering condition.28

With respect to mental direct perception, there are two [types]: that which does not depend on a union of calm abiding (zhi gnas, gamatha) and special insight (lhag mthong, vipag-yana) and that which does depend on it. The former is mental direct perception and the latter is yogic direct perception (rnal 'byor mngon sum, yogi-pratyaksa). Although in general, yogic direct perception is indeed mental direct perception, at the time of distinguishing direct perception into three [types: sense, mental, and yogic] those two are mutually exclusive.

The object of the way of apprehension for yogic direct perception is either the [sixteen] attributes of the four noble truths or a subtle or coarse selflessness. Svatantrika-Madhyamikas and below assert that yogic direct perception is necessarily a Superior's exalted wisdom (ye shes, jnana).29 However, in this system it is asserted that even before realizing subtle selflessness there is yogic direct perception that realizes the sixteen aspects-impermanence, and so forth-of the four noble truths as well as the coarse selflessness of the person, and so forth; therefore, there is yogic direct perception even in the continua of ordinary beings [on the paths of accumulation and preparation].30

[This system's presentation of] mental direct perception is also different from other [systems]. [Mental direct perception] is not necessarily a non-conceptual consciousness that clearly realizes its object. Hence, even a memory consciousness or subsequent cognition induced by inferential cognition is [mental] direct valid cognition. Mental direct perception that experiences the feelings of bliss, misery, and so forth, accompanying a mental consciousness is not the same as self-consciousness. That is because it is asserted that a [consciousness that] looks inward does not necessarily have a vanishing of dualistic appearance, but rather it is asserted that to that awareness the experienced and experiencer appear to be just different."

A manifest object of comprehension is a phenomenon that is necessarily an
object of realization by the power of experience [of an ordinary being]" without dependence on a sign. A hidden phenomenon is a phenomenon that is necessarily initially realized in dependence on a sign. The entity [or definition] of inferential valid cognition is:

a consciousness that, explicitly in dependence on a sign, is incontrovertible with respect to the hidden object of comprehension that is its object of the way of apprehension.'

Also, with respect to [inferential valid cognition] there are three [types]:" inferential cognition by the power of the fact (dngos stobs rjes dpag), inferential cognition of belief (yid ches rjes dpag), and inferential cognition of comprehension through an example (dpe nyer 'jal gyi rjes dpag).36 [This system] also asserts the conventions of the two, inferential cognition that depends on only a consequence and inferential cognition that depends on a reason that has the three modes. With respect to [inferential cognition of] comprehension through an example, even though someone else does not state [to one] either a reason that has the three modes or a consequence, one comprehends [a thesis] in dependence on a logical mark; therefore, it is permissible to posit [this cognition] as depending on a sign.37

This system's way of certifying direct valid cognition apprehending blue is: an eye consciousness apprehending blue perceives the realized [blue] and realizer [itself] as different by the force of the dawning of the blue aspect from outside to itself, and, due to its perceiving thus, the eye consciousness apprehending blue becomes [an instance of] valid cognition with respect to its own entity;38 therefore, [valid cognition] does not have to be established by self-consciousness as in other systems. This is asserted to be the meaning of Candrakirti's Clear Words: "Mere realization of the aspects of the objects of comprehension establishes the entity of the valid cognition." Since this appears to be very difficult, one must know how to analyze it with fine intelligence [479].

A subsequent remembering consciousness also certifies [a consciousness] because (1) through the power of comprehending blue, without needing the mediation of any other valid cognition, an eye consciousness apprehending blue directly induces a consciousness remembering the apprehension of such and that remembering consciousness itself eliminates the superimpositions of both the non-existence of blue and the non-existence of the eye consciousness apprehending blue, and (2) the remembering consciousness itself validly cognizes the existence of the eye consciousness.39

This appears to be the thought also of Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate, and it is a little easier to realize than the former [i.e., Candrakirti’s presentation in his Clear Words]. These topics can be known extensively elsewhere.
The Non-Assertion of Autonomous Reasons

This section consists of the actual [explanation] and the way of asserting other-renowned reasons (gzhan grags kyi gtan tshigs, parasiddhahetu).

A. Why Autonomous Reasons Are Not Asserted

Svatantrikas assert that the mere establishment of the three modes of a sign in the proof of non-true [existence] for either of the parties of a dispute is not sufficient; rather, [the three modes] must be established from within an objective way of subsistence (don gyi sdod lugs). The meaning of autonomy (rang rgyud, svatantra) is asserted as: the generation of inferential cognition realizing the probandum (bsgrub bya) within the [context of the three modes] being established in that manner. The reason for that is that in their system any non-conceptual or conceptual valid cognition must definitely be non-mistaken with respect to the inherent nature (rang bzhin, svabadva) of the appearing object or referent object [respectively] with respect to which it is a valid cognition, because, if [a consciousness] is mistaken with respect to that, it cannot be posited that an object of comprehension is found by valid cognition. Furthermore, this meets back to the fact that they cannot posit a phenomenon as existent if conventionally it does not have its own nature that is not an imputedly existent nominality.

Therefore, they think that if the bases [that is, the subjects] on which depend the predicates about which the two parties debate-permanence, impermanence, true existence, non-true existence, etc.-do not exist within being established as commonly appearing and as demonstrably established objectively, they are not able to prove the modes of the sign in terms of such [a subject] because it is not feasible that there be a predicate of a non-existent substratum. That is the meaning of a commonly appearing subject.

According to this excellent [Prasangika] system, once such [a subject and sign] are demonstrable, both of those have become objects that exist by way of their own entity, and just that is the meaning of being ultimately established. Therefore, the assertion that there exists the establishment of a commonly appearing subject for both parties in a debate-that is, a way of proving a predicate within taking just that [subject] as the substratum-is very wrong. According to the Madhyamika who is the first party, this is because existence by way of [an object's] own entity is not feasible even conventionally, whereby such [a commonly appearing subject] necessarily does not exist. As long as the other parties have not generated the
[correct] view in their continua, they cannot distinguish the difference between existing by its own entity and mere [conventional] existence; therefore, until they realize the view, they cannot be shown the way of mere conventional existence.

Therefore, a way of objective establishment which exists in the manner of common appearance [in the systems of] both parties is asserted by those who do not just lead from an opponent's assertions [i.e., non-Prasangikas]; this way is not found, whereby it is asserted that a commonly appearing subject does not exist.

Also, this meets back to asserting or not asserting conventionally phenomena that exist by way of their own character. Even the essential points such as that Svatantrikas distinguish real and unreal conventionalities and that Prasarigikas do not assert real conventionalities in their own system must be known in dependence on these [positions].

B. The Prasangika Assertion of OtherRenowned Reasons

Although autonomous reasons are not asserted in the Prasangika School, signs with the three modes definitely must be asserted, and the three modes also must definitely be established by valid cognition. Also, that [establishment of the three modes] is accomplished by other-renowned reasons.

In accordance with the earlier explanation, there is no objective way of establishing, for the two parties of a debate, an object of comprehension that appears commonly [without contradicting their respective systems]. Therefore, leading from the assertions of an opponent, one states reasons that are renowned to the opponents themselves. [One may also state reasons that are renowned to the opponent who is other in relation to the first party, i.e., a Madhyamika. Therefore, the two, self-renowned reasons and other-renowned reasons, are equivalent.

Moreover, let us exemplify this in, for example, the explanation [in the second stanza] of the third chapter of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way that "The seer [just does not see] his own entity." The subject, "an eye"; the sign, "does not see itself"; and the example, "pot," are asserted by the opponent himself and do not need to be proved for him. The entailment is ascertained by way of the concomitance [of not seeing other with not seeing itself] and the obverse concomitance [of seeing self with seeing other]. With respect to the way of entailment of not seeing itself by not seeing others inherently, the concomitance and obverse concomitance are ascertained in terms of an example that is renowned to the opponent himself.

The presentation of this reason is very important, and realization [of it] is difficult. No follower has appeared to have clearly explained this in accordance with the detailed statements in Dzongkaba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path.
The Unique Way of Asserting External Objects

Asserting truly existent consciousnesses without external objects as the Cittamatrins do is incorrect because (1) neither objects nor consciousnesses can be posited in terms of being their own suchness (de kho na nyid, tathata) as existing upon seeking them through reasoning and also because (2) objects exist just like consciousnesses in terms of worldly renown. For also the Supramundane Victor [Buddha] says in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras that all five aggregates are empty of inherent existence; therefore, they equally do not ultimately exist. Also, the Mahaydna Abhidharma Sutra says that all five aggregates equally exist conventionally by way of their specific and general characteristics and so forth; therefore, the distinguishing of a difference of existence or non-existence with respect to objects and consciousnesses would destroy these stages of the two truths.

Question: Have not the Cittamatrins refuted directionally partless external objects through the reasonings that, by [proving] the non-existence of partless particles, refute external objects that are composites of those?

Answer: There is no fault, because although it is not the case that [the Cittamatrins] do not refute such directionally partless external objects, the mere negation of them does not necessarily negate external objects.

Similarly, it can be understood that even though a partless moment of consciousness and a continuum that is a connected series of those are refuted, consciousness is not necessarily negated. The Cittamatra School thinks that when partless external objects are refuted, sense consciousnesses that are non-mistaken with respect to their appearing [objects] are refuted; in that case, since [for them,] mistaken sense consciousnesses are unable to posit objects, external objects would be negated.

In this excellent system the thought is that although it is true that a mistaken sense consciousness is unable to posit a true object of comprehension, such [mistaken sense consciousnesses] serve as assisters in positing false objects of comprehension; therefore, there is no proof of the non-existence of [external] objects.

In sutra, the thought in setting forth Cittamatra is of two types. [First] the term "only" in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds statement "The three realms are only mind" does not eliminate external objects; rather, [it means that] since all three
realms are constructed by actions and since actions are limited to the two, intention and thought [i.e., intentional and operational actions], the three realms are constructed by mind. Therefore, the term "only" is stated for the purpose of negating the existence of a creator of the world other than the mind, such as Isvara, who is different than the mind, and so forth.

[Second] also, in the Descent into Larikd Sutra [Buddha] speaks of mind-only [in the sense of no external objects]:"

[Objects] do not exist as external objects as perceived.

The mind [appears] as various [objects through the power of predispositions].

[Because the mind is generated] in the likeness of bodies [i.e., senses], enjoyments [i.e., the objects of the senses], and abodes [i.e., the physical sense organs and environments],

I have explained [that all phenomena are] mind-only.

This is said in consideration of the thought of trainees who must gradually approach suchness; it is not fit to be taken literally [as refuting the existence of external objects] because it would be damaged by the reasonings explained earlier.

Another reason [for not taking literally sutras setting forth mind-only] is that the Supramundane Victor says [in the Descent into Larikd Sutra]:

Just as a doctor distributes

Medicines to the ill [483],

So Buddha teaches

Mind-only to sentient beings.

Moreover, the Cittamatra School offers [the instances of] a dream consciousness and a sense consciousness to which falling hairs appears' as examples of inherently established consciousnesses [that function] without there being external objects. When, in the root text and the autocommentary to his Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.50-55), [Candrakirti] refutes this, he says that the examples are not correct. For at the time of those [consciousnesses], although there are no [dream-] elephants, falling hairs, and so forth, that are included within external objects, they appear as though they do exist. Therefore, the consciousnesses that have [such] as their objects are also false and [hence] do not inherently exist. Therefore, objects and consciousnesses are equally established by their own nature or not. This is an extremely powerful reasoning that refutes the unfeasibility of external objects.
The Proof That Hearers and Solitary Realizers Realize the Selflessness of Phenomena

The scriptural proof is in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds, which says that Bodhisattvas on the seventh ground outshine Hearers and Solitary Realizers by way of their wisdom realizing the selflessness of phenomena but cannot outshine them on the sixth ground and below. Additionally, there are three reasonings explained in Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance."

First, if Hearers and Solitary Realizers did not realize the subtle selflessness of phenomena, it would [absurdly] follow that just like sages (drang srong, rsi) who, through worldly paths, are free from desire with respect to the state of [the absorption of] Nothingness (ci yang med, akimcanya) and below, Solitary Realizers would be outshone even by Bodhisattvas who generate the first mind [i.e., ground] by way of [the Bodhisattvas'] wisdom realizing the absence of inherent existence.

Second, because Hearer and Solitary Realizer Arhats would not have generated in their continua a path whose mode of apprehension is directly contradictory to the consciousness conceiving true existence-the root of all afflictions-it would [absurdly] follow that they, like the sages of the Outsiders [i.e., non-Buddhists] would not have abandoned all the afflictions-the subtle increasers (phra rgyas, anusaya)- that are involved with the three realms.

Third, if Hearers and Solitary Realizers did not realize the subtle selflessness of phenomena, then, because they would have erroneous awarenesses due to observing the aggregates, such as the form aggregate, as truly existent, they [absurdly] would not realize a fully qualified form even of the selflessness of persons. This is because they would not have come to disbelieve the [referent] object of the consciousness observing the aggregates-the bases of imputation of the I or person-as truly existent. This indicates that without coming to disbelieve the referent object of the consciousness conceiving the aggregates-the bases of designation-as truly existent, one also would not come to disbelieve the referent object of the consciousness conceiving the person-the object designated-as truly existent." This is asserted to be the thought of Nagarjuna's Precious Garland (1.35), which says:

As long as the aggregates are [mis-]conceived,

So long is there [mis]conception of an "I."
When there is this conception of an "I,"

There is action that results in birth.

These [topics] can be known extensively in other places.
A. The Self of Phenomena Should Be Posited as an Affliction

When Buddhapalita identifies the self that is non-existent in the statement in the Hearers' scriptural collection' "All phenomena are selfless," he explains that it [refers to] establishment by way of [the phenomenon's own] entity (ngo bo nyid kyi grub pa). The glorious Candrakirti also asserts it accordingly. Furthermore, [their assertions] are made in terms of a fully qualified selflessness or-subtle-selflessness.

Therefore, since a fully qualified selflessness of persons must mean that persons are not established by way of their own entity, the two selflessnesses [of persons and other phenomena] are asserted not to differ in terms of coarseness or subtlety. The reason was already explained earlier. Therefore, one who realizes a fully qualified selflessness of persons also definitely realizes the subtle selflessness of phenomena.65 In accordance with these reasons, it must definitely be asserted that the consciousness conceiving phenomena to be truly established is an affliction [and not an obstruction to omniscience].

Both Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the "Entrance" and his Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred" explain that both consciousnesses conceiving true existence-the consciousnesses conceiving persons and [other] phenomena to be truly existent-are afflictive ignorance and that those are [equally] abandoned by the three, the two [Hearer and Solitary Realizer] Arhats and Bodhisattvas who have attained forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production [4851.66] The reason that proves this is: at the time of refuting establishment by something's own character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa, svalaksana-siddhi) with respect to phenomena and persons by the reasoning that refutes the inherent existence (rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhava-siddhi) of those two, the consciousness that conceives that those two are established as their own character is established as the consciousness that conceives of true existence and that is mistaken with respect to its referent object. When that is established, the consciousnesses that conceive that the two, persons and [other] phenomena, are truly existent are established as the two consciousnesses conceiving of self. When that is established, it is established that the consciousness conceiving true existence is the discordant class, the contradictory opposite of the exalted wisdom consciousness that is the knower knowing the meaning of suchness. Therefore, [the consciousness conceiving true
existence] is established as ignorance. Also, since it can be proved that one does not remove even the view of the transitory [collection of aggregates as a real "I" and "mine"] until [the consciousness that conceives of true existence] is removed, those two [consciousnesses misconceiving self] are established as afflictive ignorance.

In dependence on the good explanations of the Foremost Precious [Dzongkaba], in the Prasahgika School there are many who know merely that the consciousness that conceives a self of phenomena is just afflictive ignorance, but those who know how to explain the way to prove such in accordance with the Foremost One's thought seem to be rare.

Nevertheless, it is not that the afflictions explained in the two [treatises on] abhidharma [Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge (chos mngon pa'i mdzod, abhidharmakosakarika) and Asanga's Compendium of Higher Knowledge (chos mngon pa kun btus, abhidharmasamuccaya)] are not asserted as coarse afflictions. The paths explained in those [texts] are able to suppress the manifest form of those coarse afflictions; however, at that time one is unable to suppress even the manifest form of the [subtle] desire, and so forth, induced by the subtle consciousness conceiving true existence, and so forth.67 There are many such difficult points to be analyzed; [for instance, it should be noted that] the uncommon ignorance, view of the transitory [collection of aggregates as a real "I" and "mine"], and extreme views also have both artificial and innate forms.

B. Explanation of the Obstructions to Omniscience

In this system, the obstructions to omniscience are asserted to be predispositions established by afflictions. Also, with respect to [predispositions], from among the two, the seeds of afflictions that are posited as predispositions and predispositions that are not seeds of afflictions, the latter are to be posited as the obstructions to omniscience [486].68

Since the two [Hearer and Solitary Realizer] Arhats and Bodhisattvas who abide on the pure [eighth through tenth] grounds have removed all the seeds of the afflictions, the consciousness that conceives of true existence is not produced [in their continua]. However, since their [minds] are polluted by the predispositions [established by] those [afflictions], awarenesses are produced that are mistaken with respect to their appearing objects.

In that case, the predispositions [established by] the afflictions are the chief of the obstructions to omniscience, and the effects of those-the factors of mistaken dualistic appearanceare also included in those [obstructions to omniscience].

Most scholars following [Dzongkaba] agree with just this mere literal rendering of the Foremost One's speech. Gyeltsap, in his Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Science," does indeed explain, for example, the existence of artificial
obstructions to omniscience, but it is established by many scriptures and reasonings that obstructions to omniscience are necessarily innate. Therefore, Kaydrup's great Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate along with its followers assert that [Gyeltsap's] statement is not to be accepted literally. It is good [to assert this point] in this way.

The contemporary proponent of reasoning who has the name Prajna indeed propounds that: (1) there are artificial obstructions to omniscience; (2) since there is a mistaken consciousness explicitly indicated on the occasion of the word "mistaken" which is part of the phrase, "factors of mistaken dualistic appearance" in Dzongkaba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way,"it is the thought of the Foremost One that there is a common locus of something’s being a consciousness and being an obstruction to omniscience; and (3) the thought of Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate that explains that there are no artificial obstructions to omniscience is concerned only with the obstructions to omniscience that are predispositions.

However, these are not seen to be correct.'Z Although it is indeed stated in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought that there are obscurations [i.e., the twenty-two thorough obscurations] that are objects of abandonment corresponding to each of the ten grounds, there is no source that on this occasion [of the Prasangika School] one needs to make assertions in a manner like the presentations of objects of abandonment and antidotes explained in that [sutra]."

In dependence on Candrakirti's Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges, which says, "For the sake of abandoning nonafflictive ignorance..." and "...non-afflictive ignorance exists...," and his statement in his Autocommentary on the "Entrance," "...ignorance that is not afflictive..." [4871, Panchen Sonam Gyeltsen74 and the great scholar and adept Jamyang Shjaybay Dorjay say that the existence of obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses is correct.

Nevertheless, with respect to the Foremost Omniscient [Dzongkaba's] interpretations of the ignorance that is an obstruction to omniscience, except for his interpretation [of it] as predispositions of mistaken dualistic appearance, he does not appear to have interpreted it as ignorance that is a consciousness.75

Most scholars and adepts such as the omniscient Kaydrup, the lord of reasoning Jaydziin Chogyi Gyeltsen (rje bstun chos kyi rgyal mtshan) of Sera and his [spiritual] sons, as well as the great treasure of wisdom Jamyang Gaway Lodro (jam dbyangs dga' ba'i blo Bros), the foremost omniscient Gendun Gyatso (dge 'dun rgya mtsho), and Panchen Sonam Drakba,76 assert that there are no obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses. Also, the omniscient Panchen Losang Chogyi Gyeltsen (pan chen blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan),77 a keeper of the teaching of both the transmission of explanation and the transmission of achievement78 of the Foremost Lama [Dzongkaba], says:
The subtle obstructions [preventing] the perception
Of the two truths directly and simultaneously by one consciousness
Are designated "ignorance" [but] are not actual consciousnesses;
Hence there is not even partial contradiction.

His statements along with his reasons are very concordant with the great mass of the speech of the Foremost [Dzongkaba]. Therefore, [this topic] still should be finely analyzed by the intelligent.
The modes of assertion, and so forth, of the Vaibad5ika School have previously been explained. The Sautrantikas, Cittamatrins, and Svan6antrika-Madhyamikas assert that (1) when a thing—a sprout, for instance—has disintegrated, everything that is a part of the sprout is obliterated, and (2) since no other thing, such as a pot, that is other than that [sprout] is obtained, that disintegratedness is utterly not a [functioning] thing. For they propound that any things that are individual sense-spheres (sky6ed mched, ayatana), such as blue, and any things that are collections of parts are unsuitable to be illustrations of [that disintegratedness [488]. [These assertions] are [made] through the essential point that [according to them, phenomena] must be posited upon searching for the imputed object. Although this [Prasangika] system does not posit [phenomena] by way of such a search, since disintegratedness is suitable to be asserted as a [functioning] thing, disintegratedness is asserted to be a thing.79

Moreover, with respect to scripture, the Sutra on the Ten Grounds80 says, "Aging and death are [produced] by the condition of birth." Thus, the death of a sentient being is said to be produced by a condition. Therefore, death must be posited as the disintegratedness of the sentient being who has died. Therefore [that disintegratedness is a functioning thing has been established by this scripture]. It also says:81

Death subsists in two activities: it causes a composed phenomenon to disintegrate and (2) it issues forth the cause of the non-severance of the continuum of thorough non-knowingness [i.e., ignorance].

Thus, it is said that death is produced by a cause and also produces ignorance. Therefore, since that which is produced by its own causes and is able to produce effects must be asserted to be a [functioning] thing, [this passage also establishes that disintegratedness is a functioning thing]. Although [death] is the disintegratedness of a continuum, the disintegratedness of the first moment of something in its next moment is similar.82

The reasoning is: (1) the birth and death of a sentient being and (2) something not remaining for a second moment and not having remained for a second moment are proved to be thoroughly similar in terms of whether or not they are
posed as [functioning] things and whether or not they depend on causes. This system asserts that even something's disintegratedness disintegrates, but other [systems] assert that disintegratedness and disintegration are contradictory.

The explanation, for instance, in Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning," which says that the exhaustion of the butter and wick is the cause of the butter-lamp's dying out, is the way to prove that the disintegratedness of a continuum is a [functioning] thing. The disintegratedness of the first moment [of something] in the next moment is a negative phenomenon due to the necessity of its being realized through eliminating an explicit object of negation, and, moreover, that which is destroyed is not a mere elimination, but rather implies a [functioning] thing that involves an elimination; therefore, it is an affirming negatives'

The two, the Vaibhasika School and this [Prasangika system], are similar in the mere assertion of the three times as [functioning] things but are very dissimilar in their modes of assertion [489]. This [Prasangika] system does not assert substantial existence in all [i.e., any] aspects and asserts that even the disintegratedness of a sprout is a [functioning] thing due to merely being produced in dependence on a thing that is destroyed. [Unlike the Vaibhasika School] they do not assert that [the disintegratedness of a sprout] is a thing due to positing, upon analysis by reasoning, the thing that is destroyed or anything that is a type concordant with that [thing] as an illustration of the disintegratedness of a sprout.85

Since these are also said to be subtle points that are very difficult to realize, they must be known in detail from the great texts.
The Unique Presentation of the Three Times

If [the three times] are exemplified with a sprout, for instance, with respect to a sprout that has already been produced from causes and conditions, its disintegratedness in its second moment [i.e., the moment after] its own time is the time of the sprout's pastness. The sprout's not having been produced at some place and time, like, for instance, a field in wintertime, due to the power of conditions that are, for the time being, incomplete, although the causes for the sprout's production exist, is the time of the sprout's futureness. The sprout's having been produced but not having ceased is the time of the sprout's presentness.

Therefore, since a pastness necessarily is a factor of disintegratedness of something that has already arisen, it not being sufficient for it to be merely not present, the great texts also say, "Having arisen, ceased." "Arisen" refers to, for instance, a sprout that has passed. Also, thinking of a special mode of the future not having arrived, it is said, "although the causes exist, it is not [yet] arisen."

These points are the same in all [the systems] of the Sautrantika School and above. However, SvatantrikaMadhyamikas and below [excluding the Vaibha$ika School] assert that the two, past and future, are not [functioning] things, and moreover, they assert that those are non-affirming negatives. In the Prasartgika School, all three times are asserted to be [functioning] things, and the two, pastnesses and futurenesses, are asserted to be affirming negatives.

The term "sprout's disintegratedness" serves both to eliminate a sprout's not having disintegrated and to imply that the disintegration of a sprout occurs in dependence on the sprout. The term "sprout's futureness" serves both to eliminate sprout's having arrived and to imply that the futureness of a sprout is a [functioning] thing that is the non-completion of the conditions for a sprout's production.

Each [functioning thing] such as a sprout cannot be treated as [three things due to] having three times, and since the two, pastnesses and futurenesses, must be posited by way of the disintegration and non-production of a [functioning] thing that is other than themselves, they are secondary. The present [functioning thing] itself is posited as present; since it does not have to be posited by way of the disintegration or non-disintegration and production or non-production of another [functioning] thing, it is chief.

Objection: It is not feasible to posit the disintegratedness of a sprout as a
pastness, for, since in its own time it has been produced but has not ceased, it is present.

Response: There is no fault. At its own time, a sprout's disintegratedness is not a disintegratedness of itself, but rather is a disintegratedness of the sprout. Similarly, at its own time the disintegratedness of the disintegratedness of a sprout at its own time is not a disintegratedness of itself, but rather is the disintegratedness of the first moment of the disintegratedness of a sprout. Therefore, since [the disintegratedness of a sprout] must be posited in general as a disintegratedness, it is not present, but only a pastness.

Because of that, no matter how many [moments] of similar type of a pastness have occurred, their entities must be posited by way of the disintegration of another thing, and however many [moments] of similar type of a futureness occur, their entities must be posited by way of the non-production of another [functioning] thing. For a present object—for instance, a sprout that has been produced but has not ceased—such is unnecessary. Therefore, the three times are mutually exclusive.

Nevertheless, it is not contradictory that the three times are also established in mutual dependence, because (1) the mode of dependence of the other two [on the present] is easy to understand, and (2) presentness must depend on the elimination, by the words "already produced," that it is a futureness, and the elimination, by the words "not ceased," that it is a pastness. The definition of a pastness is:

a factor of disintegratedness of another [functioning] thing that has already been produced [4911.

The definition of a futureness is:

a [factor of] non-production of another [functioning] thing due to the non-completion of its conditions, even though its causes exist.

The definition of a presentness is:

that which is (1) neither a factor of disintegratedness nor a factor of futureness of another [functioning] thing and (2) has been produced but has not ceased.

Positing [the definitions] either as those or in accordance with what occurs in Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate is permissible.92

The differences between that which is past at the time of a sprout and sprout's pastness, and so forth, should also be understood. They are greatly renowned and can be known from other [sources]."
Section B: The System of Refuting Inherent Existence

The ultimate root, the chief of all of these distinguishing features, is the [Prasangika School's] refutation of inherent existence. Four reasons are explained in the root text and autocommentary of Candrakirti's Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way":

(1) If things had their own inherent nature in the sense of being inherently existent, then, when Superiors realized that all phenomena lack inherent existence, their wisdom consciousnesses would have to observe those [inherently existent things]. However, because they are not observed, they are non-existent. In that case, the later non-existence of a thing that existed earlier would be its disintegratedness, and since one would have to assert that those wisdom consciousnesses served as the cause of [the thing's] disintegration, it would [absurdly] follow that a Superior's meditative equipoise is the cause of the disintegration of things.

(2) If things were inherently existent, at the time of analysis with reasoning on the meaning of the designation of the verbal convention of "production," one would have to find, upon searching through reasoning, production in which the seed and sprout are either inherently one or inherently different, because otherwise they would be mere verbal conventions and would not be inherently existent. [This reason] flings the [absurd] consequence that conventional truths would be able to withstand analysis by reasoning.

(3) If the conventional inherent existence of the production of things were not refuted by the reasoning that refutes production of the four extremes, ultimately established [production] also would not be refuted because if something inherently exists, it is necessarily ultimately established. With respect to all three reasons, one must also know how the SvaatankaMadhyamikas answer them and also understand the reasons why the Svaatankas' replies are nevertheless unable to eradicate fallacies.

(4) If phenomena were inherently existent, it would [absurdly] follow that statements in many sutras such as the Kdshyapa Chapter Sutra 4 that phenomena are empty of inherent existence would be incorrect. One must know in detail the reasons why [Prasahgikas say that] the view of those sutras as interpreted by the Cittamatrins and the Svaatankas is not the final view.
Section C: The Way of Distinguishing Definitive Sūtras and Those Requiring Interpretation in Dependence on [Unique Tenets and the Refutation of Inherent Existence]

In the first wheel [of doctrine as described in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, Buddha] explained the coarse, but not the subtle, mode of selflessness with respect to persons. Also, [he said that] the aggregates, and so forth, are inherently existent. These statements [require] interpretation.' That is because:

(1) the basis [of Buddha's] thought [when he turned the first wheel of doctrine] is the thought that [phenomena] merely conventionally exist;

(2) the purpose is that he spoke for the sake of trainees who are temporarily unsuitable vessels, since if they were taught the subtle selflessness, a view of annihilation would be produced; [he taught such] so that they might gradually train their continua and enter [into the profound teaching]; and

(3) the damage to the literal [teaching] is the reasonings that refute inherent existence.

[Buddha's] statement in the middle wheel [of doctrine] that persons and [other] phenomena merely conventionally exist, refuting that they inherently exist, is of final definitive meaning, and is set forth for sharp-facultied trainees having the Mahayana lineage who are able to realize emptiness as the meaning of dependent-arising.

Moreover, this excellent [Prasarngika] system, unlike the two Svatantrika-Madhyamika systems [the Yogacara- and Sautrantika-Svatantrika systems] asserts that all sutras that teach the profound emptiness are similar in being sutras of definitive meaning. [These include] not only, for instance, the One Hundred
In the last wheel of doctrine, statements that the three natures have differences in terms of being or not being existent by their own character require interpretation. Moreover, the basis in [Buddha's] thought when he made those statements was the thought that the first two natures [otherpowered and thoroughly established natures] and the latter nature [imputational natures] conventionally have a difference in terms of being posited and not being posited by terms and conceptions in the way they are asserted by the Cittamatra School. [His] purpose was so that trainees who have the Mahayana lineage but who are temporarily unable to realize that the emptiness and the dependent-arising that exist with all phenomena have the same meaning might enter into realizing the subtle selflessness of phenomena after having trained their continua in dependence on having previously been taught the coarse selflessness of phenomena.

The damage to the literal [teaching] is (1) that there is not the slightest harm of reasoning with respect to the position that all phenomena are empty of existence by way of their own character and (2) that there are reasonings that prove that it is unsuitable to posit all objects and agents within the position of asserting that [they] exist by way of their own character.

Moreover, this is the mode of positing what is definitive and what requires interpretation within the three wheels as they are explained in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, but it is not asserted that in general [the sutras of] the entire first wheel require interpretation, because statements in first wheel [sutras] that persons and phenomena lack inherent existence are definitive. In that case, the commentary by the Vijñaptikas (rnam rig pa; = Cittamatrins) on the three natures by way of distinguishing a difference of existence or lack of existence by way of their own character is the meaning of the Sutra Unraveling the Thought but is not the thought of the speaker, the Teacher [Buddha]. It is the meaning of the sutra, since he taught, for instance, those subjects in accordance with the thoughts of trainees; however, there does not come to be a refutation of the
meaning [of the thought] of the sutra through refuting [what the sutra says], and furthermore, it is not the case that the speaker has internal contradictions due to having set forth two discordant systems.6

With respect to this, most say that although such is the thought of the speaker, i.e., the Teacher, and the thought of the sutra, it is not the final thought of those two. However, if one says, in accordance with a literal reading of Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations, that it is not the thought of the speaker but is the meaning of the subjects of the scripture, it would accord with the meaning as well as with the words, because establishment by way of an object's own character cannot be posited with respect to other-powered phenomena in any place, time, or tenet system.'

Objection: However, Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations says:

In relation to the awarenesses of the trainees who are, temporarily, unfit to be vessels for the complete teachings on the meaning of the profound, [it is taught that] there is existence by way of [an object's] own character.

How can you interpret that statement?

Response: There is no fault, because this is merely an explanation that the teaching of existence by way of [an object's] own character in relation to the awarenesses [of trainees] is the meaning of the sutra.

The presentation of the three characters (mtshan nyid, sva- laksana) [i.e., natures] in our own Prasangika system is: those conventionalities that are the substrata [of emptiness] just like those appearing [to our minds now] are posited as other-powered phenomena (gzhan dbang, paratantra); factors of superimposition that those are their own objective mode of subsistence or mode of disposition are posited as imputational natures (kun btags, parikalpita); and the factors of the emptiness of such superimpositions are posited as thoroughly established phenomena (yongs grub, parinispanna).
The "Musoorie edition" was published by Dalama in 1962. It is compared to the "Drashikyil edition," recently reprinted by Gomang and also included in The Collected Works of 'Jam-'dbans-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje published in New Delhi in 1973 by Ngawang Gelek Demo (NG).

36a.5 "Also," reading 'ang for yang in accordance with NG 1015.2.

36a.8 "Self-consciousness," reading rang rig for rang rigs in accordance with NG 1016.1.

36b.8 "Childish" (byi, bāla), apparently short for byis pa, which is how both Losang Gönchok (Word Commentary) and Ngawang Belden cite the root text. NG edition (wrongly, I think) reads phyi.

37a.1 "Erroneous," reading phyin ci log for phyin ci logs in accordance with Clear Words 9b.4 and NG 1017.6 (pha 203a.6).

37a.2 "Unreal entities," reading ngo bo log pa gang zhir for ngo bo log pa gang gis in accordance with Supplement to the Middle Way 5b.9 and NG 1018.2 (203b.2).

37a.4 For "unsuitable," NG 1018.3 (203b.3) reads mi rung ba for mi rung bar.

37a.7 "Are seen," reading mthong ba yin for mthong ba bzhin in accordance with V. Bhattacharya (197) and NG 1019.1 (pha 204a.1).

37a.8 "I know," reading bdag gis shes for bdag gis bshad shes, omitting the superfluous bshad. Ngawang Belden notes this error.

37b.1 "Of"; NG 1019.5 (pha 204a.5) reads pa'i for gyi.

37b.6 "Stated"; NG 1020.5 alternately reads bkod for bkod pa.
37b.8 "Realized," reading rto gs for dmigs in accordance with P.

38a.1 "Things," reading gang dag dngos po for gang dag gi dngos po in accordance with P.

38a.2 "Causeless," reading rgyu med pa'i phyir ro for rgyu med pa nyid kyi phyir ro in accordance with P.

38a.2 "Ceased," reading de dag gi 'gag pa de dngos po for de dag gi ltar na 'gag pa de yang dngos po in accordance with P.

38a.4 For "Previously," Clear Words 118.1 and NG 1022.1 read sngar for Jamyang Shayba's snga na; also, "and" (dang) is added from Clear Words 118.1.

38b.5 For "present," P alternately reads da ltar byung ba ni for da ltar ba ni. The Great Exposition of the Middle Way 624.6 also has da ltar ba ni.

38b.6 "Present time"; P alternately reads da ltar byung ba'i dus for da ltar ba'i dus.

38b.6 "Having disintegrated," reading zhig nas for zhig in accordance with NG 1024.2.

38b.6 "Actually," reading dngos su for dngos in accordance with NG 1024.2.

39a.1 For "not constitute a search," NG 1024.6 alternately reads btsal bar mi 'gro for btsal mi 'gro.

39a.3 "Valid cognition," reading tshad ma rnams kyi for tshad ma rnams ni in accordance with P 5228, vol. 98, 15.3.1.

39a.4 "Comprehension," reading gzhal for gzhan in accordance with P 5228, vol. 98, 15.3.2.

39b.4 "Manifest object," reading mngon sum gyi for mngon sum gyis in accordance with Clear Words 48.3 and NG 1027.3.

40a.1 For "nothing whatsoever," P reads gang yang med na for 'ga' yang mi srid pas (same meaning).
“Of,” reading *phung po’i* for *phung po* in accordance with P.

"Completely"; NG 1029.1 reads *ma lus par* for *ma lus pa*.

"Attained," reading *thob par bya ba* for *thob dang bya ba* in accordance with *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* 371b.3 and NG 1030.3.

"And," reading *chags med dang* for *chags med pa* in accordance with P.

"Vision of exalted wisdom," reading *ye shes kyi gzigs* for *kyis gzigs* in accordance with P.

Ngawang Belden Text (Sarnath Edition)

"In that case," reading *de ltar na* for *de lta na* in accordance with P.

"And"; Ngawang Belden has added a *zhing* (Skt. *ca*) which is not present in the Peking edition and puts one syllable too many in the *pāda* but which is concordant with the meaning of Āryadeva’s statement.

"Path"; Ngawang Gelek edition of Gyeltsap’s text (253.6) incorrectly reads *le’u* for *lam*.

"Thing," reading *dngos po* for *dngos por*.


Janggya Text (Sarnath Edition)

"Permissible," reading *chog pa* for *tshog pa* in accordance with SR 761.3.

"Explained," reading *‘chad par* for *‘tshad par* in accordance with SR 761.4.

"Chief," reading *gtso bo* for *gtso bor* in accordance with *Illumination of the Thought* 124b.2 and SR 761.5.
"Just as it is" (ji lta ba bzhin). SR (762.1) alternately reads ji lta ba. Kensur Yeshey Tupden (2/12/82) thought this should read "generate a view of suchness" (de kho na nyid kyi lta ba skyed pa).

"Affixes," reading sbyor for spyor in accordance with SR 762.4.

"Chief," reading gtso bo for gtso bor in accordance with SR 763.4.

"Sees blue," reading sgon po mthong for sdon po ma mthong in accordance with SR 767.3.

"Poisoned," reading dmug pa for rmugs pa in accordance with SR 768.1.

"Very difficult," reading shin tu dka' bar for shan tu dka' bur in accordance with SR 771.3.

"Subsequent," reading rjes kyi for rjes kyis in accordance with SR 771.3.

"Parties," reading phyi rgol for phyir rgol in accordance with SR 772.1.

"Established," reading 'grub for grub in accordance with SR 772.2.

"Being established," reading grub nas for grub na in accordance with SR 772.2.

"Permanence, impermanence," reading rtag mi rtag for rtag in accordance with SR 772.4.

"Both of those," reading de gnyis ka for de nyid in accordance with SR 773.1.

"First party," reading sngar rgol for snga rgol in accordance with SR 773.2.

"Relation," reading ltos for bltos in accordance with SR 774.3.
481.1 "Of"; SR 774.3 alternately reads *rtsa shes* for *rtsa she'i*.

481.13 "Victor," reading *bcom* for *bcon* in accordance with SR 775.3.

482.15 "Exist," reading *yod med* for *yongs med* in accordance with SR 777.1 and P 775, vol. 29, 53.4.2.

482.20 "The ill" (*nad pa nad pa*). SR reads *nad pa na ba*. I have not yet checked P.

484.11 "Identifies," reading *ngos bzung* for *ngos gzung* in accordance with SR 779.5.

485.7 "Contradictory opposite"; SR 781.1 reads *'gal ba* for *'gal zla*.

485.18 "Both," reading *gnyis gnyis* for *gnyis* in accordance with SR 781.5.

493.18 "Entire," reading *yin tshad* for *yin chad* in accordance with the *gam bcar phan bde legs bshad gling groa tshang dang rgyud rnying slar gso tshogs pa* edition 542.1.
Jamyang Shayba Text (Musoori Edition)
Ngawang Belden Text (Sarnath Edition)
Janggya Text (Sarnath Edition)
ལོག་པོ་པ་ལོག་པོ་ལ་བཟབ་བརྩེ་བའི་ཤིང་བཞི་བཞི་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་ཞ་ཡོད་པར་རང་སྐྱར་སྲོག་བཞིན་ལེགས་ེད་ལྡན། བོད་ལྡན་ལ་འབབ་སྡེ་བོ་བཟོ་གྲོས་ལེགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཐེག་པའི་འབབ་ཚིག་ལ་བཟབ་བཞི་བཞི་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་ཞ་ཡོད་པར་རང་སྐྱར་སྲོག་བཞིན་ལེགས་ེད་ལྡན། བོད་ལྡན་ལ་འབབ་སྡེ་བོ་བཟོ་གྲོས་ལེགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཐེག་པའི་འབབ་ཚིག་ལ་བཟབ་བཞི་བཞི་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་ཞ་ཡོད་པར་རང་སྐྱར་སྲོག་བཞིན་ལེགས་ེད་ལྡན།
དེ་ཇི་ཉིད་དཔེ་ར་བ་ཞེས་ཏེ། རང་ཞིང་རྡོ་རྗེཉི་མེད་པར་ཞིག་སོ། ། ཆེན་པོ་ཆུན་དོན་ཁོང་འཛུགས་པ་ ཐོག་མཛོད་བུ་མི་བཟོད་ཆི་ཚུལ་བོ་ཆེད་ཀྱིས་རུང་བོ་སོགས་གནས་དེ་ བསྟེན་པ་གྱི་ཐོང་ དཀར་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གངོས་དབེན་བསྟོད་ཐོག་མཛོད་ཆོས་ བསྟེན་པ་གྱི་ཁོང་ནི་འཛུགས་པ་རང་ཞིང་དོན་ཁུལ་ཆེན་པོ་སོགས་ ཡིན་པོ་ལྟུང་དུ་སོགས་པ་ཀྱི་དུས་ཀི་དུས་པོ་དུ་མཆི་བའི་རུང་བོ་སོགས་ བསྟེན་པ་གྱི་ཐོང་ དཀར་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གངོས་དབེན་བསྟོད་ཐོག་མཛོད་ཆོས་ བསྟེན་པ་གྱི་ཁོང་ནི་འཛུགས་པ་རང་ཞིང་དོན་ཁུལ་དེ་ཚོགས་ བཞི་བཙུགས་པ་དེ་ངོ་བོ་ཐོད་གྱི་གཞལ་སོགས་ལས་འཛིན་པ་རང་ཞིང་རྡོ་རྗེཉི་ མེད་པར་ཞིག་སོ། ། ཆེན་པོ་ཆུན་དོན་ཁོང་འཛུགས་པ་ ཈ེ་མི་རིམ་ཐེ་བོ་ཞིག་སོ། ། ཆེན་པོ་ཆུན་དོན་ཁོང་འཛུགས་པ་ ཆེན་པོ་ཆུན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཐོང་ དཀར་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གངོས་དབེན་བསྟོད་ཐོག་མཛོད་ཆོས་ བསྟེན་པ་གྱི་ཁོང་ནི་འཛུགས་པ་རང་ཞིང་དོན་ཁུལ་ཆེན་པོ་སོགས་ ཡིན་པོ་ལྟུང་དུ་སོགས་པ་ཀྱི་དུས་ཀི་དུས་པོ་དུ་མཆི་བའི་རུང་བོ་སོགས་ བསྟེན་པ་གྱི་ཐོང་ དཀར་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གངོས་དབེན་བསྟོད་ཐོག་མཛོད་ཆོས་ བསྟེན་པ་གྱི་ཁོང་ནི་འཛུགས་པ་རང་ཞིང་དོན་ཁུལ་དེ་ཚོགས་ བཞི་བཙུགས་པ་དེ་ངོ་བོ་ཐོད་གྱི་གཞལ་སོགས་ལས་འཛིན་པ་རང་ཞིང་རྡོ་རྗེཉི་ མེད་པར་ཞིག་སོ། །
བོད་ལ་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་صلاة
བདུན་ཅིག་ལ་གཞག་ལྟར་བཞི་བརྙན་པ་དོན་དགས་པའི་ཐོབ་སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་
ཀྱི་ཐ་བརྙན་པ་དོན་དགས་པའི་ཐོབ་སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་
སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་
བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་
པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་
དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་
དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་
སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་དང་
ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་
དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་
དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་སི་
དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་
སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་
སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་
སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་བདུན་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་
སི་དང་ཆོས་ལ་སྒྲོལ་བརྒྱུད་་ཆེན་པོ་ནི་
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ངོས་པའི་འབུམ་པར་འབོད་དུ་སྣང་བ་པ་བུ་འཕེལ་ཤིས་ལ། འཕགས་པ་དེ་བ་སྐྲུལ་བའི་འཕུགས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཤིན་ཏེ། རྒྱུད་ཀྱིས་མཐོང་ང་བཅོས་པ་བོད་ཀྱི་རྩ་བའི་འབུམ་པ་བོད་ཀྱི་རྩ་བའི་འབུམ་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཞེས་བསྟོད་པར་ཞིག་ ངས་ཀྱི་འབུམ་པའི་འབུམ་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཞིག་གི་འབུམ་པ་བོད་ཀྱི་རྩ་བའི་འབུམ་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཞེས་བསྟོད་པར་ཞིག་ ངས་ཀྱི་འབུམ་པའི་འབུམ་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཞིག་གི་འབུམ་པ་བོད་ཀྱི་རྩ་བའི་འབུམ་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཞེས་བསྟོད་པར་ཞིག་
ཐེ་ཐེ་འགྲོ་ལོ་ལ་ལོ་ཐོབ་པ་ལེན་པར་ཞིག་གི་འབུམ་པ་ོད་པས་ཞེས་བསྟོད་པར་ཞིག་
གི་མི་འབུམ་པའི་འབུམ་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཞེས་བསྟོད་པར་ཞིག་
ཐེ་ཐེ་ངོས་པའི་འབུམ་པར་འབོད་དུ་སྣང་བ་པ་བུ་འཕེལ་ཤིས་ལ། འཕགས་པ་དེ་བ་སྐྲུལ་བའི་འཕུགས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཤིན་

does not make sense
西藏語文
གུ་ཅི་ས་རྣམས་དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་སོགས་ཀྱི་དབང་པོ་ནི་ལྷ་ཁྱབ་ཁྲུང་གི་གཞུགས་པའི་འཇིག་རྟེན། དེ་སུ་གུ་ཅི་ཡི་གུ་དང་བཅས་ཤེས་པ་ན། དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་པའི་བོད་ཡོངས་པོ་ནི་དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཀུན་འཕོ་བུ་མ་ོ་བར་མཐོ་ང་སོན་མ་ཐུ་དྲ་ཐུགས་དང་། དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཀུན་འཕོ་བུ་དག་གི་མི་འདབ་ཐུབ་དེ་ལ་བཤད་པའི་ཆོས་ཁུལ་བོད་གྲ་གྲགས་སུ་བཙུགས་པའི་ལྷ་ཁྱབ་ཁྲུང་གི་མི་འདབ་ཐུབ་ཡི། འཇིག་རྟེན་དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལ་བཤད་པའི་ཐམས་ཅད་གིས་བོད་གྲ་གྲགས་སུ་བཙུགས་པའི་ལྷ་ཁྱབ་ཁྲུང་གི་མི་འདབ་ཐུབ་ཡི། འཇིག་རྟེན་དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལ་བཤད་པའི་ཐམས་ཅད་གིས་བོད་གྲ་གྲགས་སུ་བཙུགས་པའི་ལྷ་ཁྱབ་ཁྲུང་གི་མི་འདབ་ཐུབ་ཡི། འཇིག་རྟེན་དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལ་བཤད་པའི་ཐམས་ཅད་གིས་བོད་གྲ་གྲགས་སུ་བཙུགས་པའི་ལྷ་ཁྱབ་ཁྲུང་གི་མི་འདབ་ཐུབ་ཡི། འཇིག་རྟེན་དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལ་བཤད་པའི་ཐམས་ཅད་གིས་བོད་གྲ་གྲགས་སུ་བཙུགས་པའི་ལྷ་ཁྱབ་ཁྲུང་གི་མི་འདབ་ཐུབ་ཡི། འཇིག་རྟེན་དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལ་བཤད་པའི་ཐམས་ཅད་གིས་བོད་གྲ་གྲགས་སུ་བཙུགས་པའི་ལྷ་ཁྱབ་ཁྲུང་གི་མི་འདབ་ཐུབ་ཡི།
ང་ད་པོ་སེམས་པ་དེར་འར་རིམ་པོ་ཅན་གྱི་ཐོན་དབྱེར་ནི་མ་བཤད་པ་མི་འདི་ལུས་པའི་ནི་ཐོན་ཀུན་འོད་ན། །

དེ་བཟོ་བྲག་པ་མ་ནི་བྱུང་ནི་འབྲིང་ཐོན་པ་དེས་དུང་བཤད་པས་བཤད་པ་མི་ནི་བྱུང་ནི་འབྲིང་ཐོན་པ།

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English-Sanskrit-Tibetan Glossary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>abhidharma</td>
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Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Glossary

To assist the non-specialist, Sanskrit entries follow English alphabetical order. However, long vowels (e.g., a) follow short ones.
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P 775, vol. 29.


Heap of Jewels Sutra (maharatnakutadharma paryayagatasahasrikagran- thasutra, dkon mchog brtsegs pa chen po'i chos kyi rnam grangs le'u stong phrag bgyra pa'i mdo)


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klu'i rgyal po ma dros pas zhus pa'i mdo

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Repetition Sutra [?] (anuvipsasutra [?], rjes zlos kyi mdo)

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P 761.32, vol. 25.


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Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path To Enlightenment (lam rim 'bring /lam rim chung ngu)


Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way' / Great Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'(dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho)


In Praise of Dependent-Arising / Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising, Essence of the Good Explanations (rten 'brel bstod pa /sang rgyas bcom Idan 'das la zab mo rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba gsung ba'i sgo nas bstod pa legs par bshad pa'i snying po)


The Three Principal Aspects of the Path (lam gtso rnam gsum / tsha kho dpon po ngag dbang grags pa la gdam pa)


Gendun Gyatso, Dalai Lama II (dge 'dun rgya mtsho, 1476-1542)

Ship For Entering the Ocean of Tenets (grub mtha' rgya mtshor jug pa'i grudzings)


Gendiin Chopel (dge 'dun chos 'phel, 1905?-1951?)

Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought, Eloquence Containing the Essence of the Profundities of the Middle Way (dbu ma'i zab gnad snying pr dril ba'i legs bshad klu sgrub dgongs rgyan)

Kalimpong: Mani Printing Works, no date.

Gomday Namka Gyeltsen (sgom sde nam mkha' rgyal mtshan, 1532-92)

Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, Key to (Candrakirti's) "Clear Words," Written by Jam-bayang Gom-day Nam-ka-gyeltsen (thal Bzlog gi dka' ba gnas gtan la 'bebs pa 'jam pa'i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha' rgyal mtshan gyis mdzad pa'i tshig gsal gyi lde mig)


Gonchok Denbay Dronmay (dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me, 1762-1823)

Beginnings of Annotations on (Dzongkaba's) "The Essence of the Good Explanations" on the Topic of Mind-Only, Illumination of a Hundred Mind-Only Texts (bstan bcos legs par bshad pa'i snying po las sems tsam skor gyi mchan 'grel rtsom 'phro rnam rig gzhung brgya'i snang ba)

Tibetan blockprint in the possession of HH the Dalai Lama; no other data.

Explanation of the Difficult Points of (Dzongkaba's) "Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All/Entrance for the Wise (yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' gnad rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa'i 'jug ngogs)

Musoorie: Gomang College, no other data.

Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo (dkon mchog jigs med dbang po, 1728-91)

Precious Garland of Tenets / Presentation of Tenets, A Precious Garland (grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba)


Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles (sa lam gyi rnam bzhag theg gsum mdzes rgyan)


Gungtang-see Gonchok Denbay Dronmay

Gyeltsap Dharma Rinchen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432)

Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle"(theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i tika)


Eight Great Difficult Points of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"(dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i dka' gnas chen po brgyad)


Explanation of (Sdntideva's) "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds": Entrance of Conqueror Children (byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad rgyal sras 'jug ngogs)


Notes on the Eight Great Difficult Points, Preventing Forgetfulness of the Foremost One's Speech (dka' gnas brgyad gyi zin bris rje'i gsung bzhin brjed byang du bkod pa bcugs)


Jambel Sampel ('jam dpal bsam 'phel, ?-1975)

Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge, Composite of All the Important
Points, Opener of the Eye of New Intelligence (blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyer mkho kun 'dus blo gsar mig 'byed)

Modern blockprint, no publication data, no date; reprinted in Lati Rinbochay and Napper.


Jambel Trinlay Yonden Gyatso ('jam dpal 'phrin las yon tan rgya mtsho)

Festival for the Wise, Good Explanation Collecting All Points of the Collected Topics (bsdus grwa'i don kun bsdus pa legs bshad mkhas pa'i dga' ston)


Jamyang Shayba Ngawang Dziindrii ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson 'grus, 1648-1721)

Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions / Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions, Adornment Beautifying the Subduer's Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate (bsam gzugs kyi snyons 'jug rnams kyi rnam par bzhag pa'i bstan bcos thub bstan mdzes rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho skal bzang dga' byed)

Folio printing in India; no publication data.


Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of 'Tenets,"Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfiling All Hopes of All Beings (grub mtha' chen mo / grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kin dang zab don mchog to gsal ba kun bzang zhi ng ni nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun


Presentation of Tenets, Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience (grub mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa 'khrul spong gdong Inga'i sgra dbyangs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal ba'i rin chen sgron me)

Folio printing in India; no publication data.

Janggya Rolbay Dorjay (Icang skya rol pa'i rdo rje II, 1717-86)

Presentation of Tenets / Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets, Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching (grub mtha'i rnam bzhag /grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan)


Jnanagrnbhadra (ye-shes-dpal-bzang-po)

Commentary on the "Descent into Lanka"(larikavataravrtti, langkar gshegs pa 'i grel pa)


Jnanavajra (ye-shes-rdo-rje)
Commentary on the "Descent into Lanka Sfitra,0 Ornament of the Heart of the Tathagata (lankavataranamahayanasutra-vrttitathagatahrdayakahakara, langkar gshegs pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo'i 'grel pa de bzhim gshegs pa'i snying po'i rgyan) P5520, vol. 107.

Kamalasila (eighth century)

Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Santaraksita's) "Compendium on Suchness" (tattvasamgrahap? jika, de kho na nyid bsdus pa'i dka' 'grel)


Illumination of the Middle Way (madhyamakaloka, dbu ma snang ba)


Kaydrup Gelek Belsangbo (mkhas sgrub dge legs dpal bzang po,1385- 1438)

General Presentation of the Sets of Tantras, Detailed Explanation (rgyud sde spyi'i rnam par gzag pa rgyas par bshad pa)


Thousand Dosages / Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate, Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness (stong thun chen no / zab no stong pa nyid rab to gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed)


Longchen Rap jam (klong chen rab 'byams / klong chen dri med 'od zer, 1308-63)
Treasury of Tenets, Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles (theg pa mtha' dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa'i mtha' rin po che'i mdzod)

Gangtok: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche, 1969[?].

Precious Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle (theg pa'i mchog rin po che'i mdzod)

Gangtok: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche, 1969[?].

Losang Dayang (blo bzang rta dbyangs, also known as blo bzang rta mgrim, 1867-1937)


Losang Gonchok No bzang dkon mchod

Word Commentary on the Root Text of (Jamyang Shayba's) "Tenets,"Clear Crystal Mirror (grub mtha' rtsa ba'i tshig tik shel dkar me long)


Maitreya (byams pa)

Discrimination of Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena (dharmadharmatavibhahga, chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa)

P 5523, vol. 108.

Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes (madhyan-tavibhanga dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa)


Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras (mahayanasutralamkarakari- ka, theg pa chen po'i mdo sde'i rgyan gyi tshig le' ur byas pa)
Ornament for Clear Realization (abhisamayalamkara, mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan)

Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana (mahayanottaratantrasastra theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos)

Nagarjuna (klu sgrub, first to second century, C.E.)

Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (bodhicittavivarana byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa)

Praise of the Supramundane (Buddha) (lokavitastava,jig rten las 'das par bstod pa)


Precious Garland of Advice for the King (rajarajapatratnava, rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba)


Refutation of Objections (vigrahayavartanikarika, rtsod pa bzlog pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa)


Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (sunyatasaptatikarika, stong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa)


Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (yuktisastikakarika, rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa)

P 5225, vol. 95; Toh. 3825, Tokyo sde dge, vol. I. Also: New Delhi: Delhi Karmapa
Chodhey Gyalwa Suagrab Partun Khang, n.d.


Treatise Called 'The Finely Woven"(vaidalyasutranama, zhib no rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo)

P 5226, vol. 95.

Treatise on the Middle Way / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way, Called "Wisdom" (madhyamakagastra / prajria- namamulamadhyamakakarika, dbu ma'i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba)


Ngawang Belden (ngag dbang deal Idan, b. 1797, a.k.a. Belden Chojay)

Annotations for (Jamyang Shayba's) "Great Exposition of Tenets,"Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought (grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor)


Partial English translation (portion of annotations on Prasangika chapter): in present volume.

Belden Chojay's Partial Statement of a Word Commentary on the Root Verses (of Jamyang Shayba's "Tenets) Done on the Occasion of the Annotations on
(Jamyang Shayba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets' (dpal ldan chos rjes grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel gyi skabs su mdzad pa'i rtsa ba'i tshig 'grel zur du bkod pa)


Eliminating Doubts With Respect to the Meaning of (Vasubandhu's) "Treasury of Higher Knowledge," An Enjoyment for Those of New Intelligence (mngon pa mdzod kyi don la 'dogs pa bcad pa blo gsar rol rtsed)


Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets (grub mtha' bzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzog dang don dam pa'i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi deal moi' glu dbyangs)


Stating the Mode of Explanation in the Textbooks on the Middle Way and the Perfection of Wisdom In the Loseling and Gomang Colleges: Festival For Those of Clear Intelligence (blo gsal gling dang bkra shis sgo mang grva tshang gi dbu phar gyi yig cha'i bshad tshul bkod pa blo gsal dga' ston)


Ngawang Losang Gyatso (ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, Fifth Dalai Lama, 1617-82)

Sacred Word of Marijunsn, Instructions on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i khrid yig 'jam pa'i dbyangs kyi zhal lung)


Panchen Siinam Drakba (pan chen bsod nams grags pa, 1478-1554)

General Meaning of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization" (phar phyin
spyi don / shes rab kyi pha rol to phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rnam bshad snying po rgyan gyi don legs par bshad pa yum don gsal ba'i sgron me)


Prajnamok$ha (shes rab thar pa)

Commentary on (Atisa's) "Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way" (madhyamakopadesavritti, dbu ma'i man ngag ces bya ba'i grel pa)

P 5327, vol. 102.

Explanation of (S`dntideva's) "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds"(byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la jug pa'i bshad pa)

P 5872, vol. 146.

Rabten, Geshe

Annotations for the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) "The Essence of the Good Explanations," joyous Festival for the Unbiased with Clear Awareness (drang nges rham 'byed legs bshad snying po dka' grad rnams mchan bur bkod pa gzur gnas blo gsal dga' ston)

n.p.d. [edition in India in the early 1970s].

Rongta Losang Tamcho Gyatso (rong tha blo gzang dam chos rgya mtsho, 1863-1917)

Mode of Asserting the Unique Tenets of the Glorious PrdsA-gikas, A Few Letters of Beginning, Moonlight by Which the Intelligent Distinguish Errors (dpal Idan bhal 'gyur ba'i thun mong ma yin pa'i bzhed tshul las brtsams pa'i yi ge nyung du blo gros kun da 'byed pa'i zla 'od)


Santarak~ita (zhi ba 'tsho, eighth century)

Compendium of Suchness (tattvasamgrahakarika, de kho na nyid bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa)


gantideva

Compendium of Learnings (siksasamuccayakarika bslab pa kun las btus pai' tshig le'ur byas pa)

P 5336, vol. 102.


Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (bodhisattvacaryavatara byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa)


Shamar Gendun Dendzin Gyatso (zhwa dmar dge bdun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho, 1852-1910)

Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Great Exposition of Special Insight" (lhag mthong chen mo'i dka' gnad rnams brjed byang du bkod pa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me)


Tomay Sangbo (thogs med bzang po)


Ttigen Losang Chogyi Nyima (thu'u bkvan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, 1737-1802)

Mirror of the Good Explanations Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Systems of Tenets (grub mtha' thams cad kyi khungs dang 'dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long) Sarnath: Chos Je Lama, 1963.

Uba Losel (dbus pa blo gsal, fourteenth century)

Treasury of the Presentation of Tenets (grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bzhad pa'i mdzod)

Vasubandhu (dbyig gnyen, c. 320-400)

Commentary on (Asat ga's) "Compendium of the Mahayana" (mahayanasamgrahabhasya, theg pa chen po bsdus pa'i 'grel pa)
P 5551, vol. 112.


Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes"(madhyantavibhagatika, dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa)

Demonstration of the Three Natures (trisvabhavanirdega, rang bzhin gsum nges par bstan pa)
P 5559, Vol. 113.

Explanation of the "Treasury of Knowledge" (abhidharmakogabha- syam, chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa)


Thirty Stanzas (trimsikakarika, sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, known as sum cu pa)

Treasury of Knowledge (abhidharmakosakarika, chos mgon pa'i mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa)


Twenty Stanzas (vimsikakarika, nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, known as nyi shu pa)


Yeshay Gyeltsen (ye shes rgyal mtshan, 1713-93)

Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental Factors, Necklace for Those of Clear Mind (sems dang sems byung gi tshul gsal bar ston pa blo gsal mgul rgyan)


Special Instructions on the View of the Middle Way, the Sacred Word of Losang (zab no dbu ma'i Ita khrid thun mong min pa blo bzang zhal lung)

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Index

Technical terms and book titles are listed by English translations.

Candrakīrti's reference to 105, 251, 301, 310
Ngawang Belden's reference to 261, 321
absorption 112, 422, 423, 459, 543, 547, 563, 570
absorption of cessation 422, 423
Acton 82, 83, 602
affirming negative 139, 184, 187, 197, 208, 209, 219, 342, 473
afflicted mind 568
affliction 7, 60, 86, 260, 269, 315, 317, 319, 375, 401, 430, 463, 464, 547, 560, 570
affictive obstruction 317, 543, 560, 568
aggregate 97, 125, 140, 255, 302, 358, 399, 455, 460, 543, 560, 571
Anacker 90, 91, 602
appearing object 240, 325, 450
ersatz arhat 233, 234, 261–63, 265, 266, 276, 321, 337, 343

Asvabhāva 77, 81, 113, 114, 578
attention 145
Atiśa 35, 38, 58, 578
autonomous inference 370, 572
autonomous syllogism 423, 430, 572
basis of designation 53, 367, 371, 543, 558
Batchelor 97, 158, 170, 258, 316, 336, 372, 373, 375, 582, 599, 602
Bhattacharya 159, 248, 258, 261, 307, 316, 321, 327, 336, 370, 373, 493, 595, 599, 602
Bhāvaviveka 34, 33, 34, 45, 73, 90, 102–104, 151, 188, 292, 296, 312, 313, 579
bliss 445, 543, 550, 556, 571
Bodhisattva ground 243, 295, 418
Buddha Garland Sūtra 80, 575
Buddhahood 57, 89, 90, 111, 127, 217, 237, 244, 255, 319, 326, 398, 399, 604
Buddhapālita 33–36, 39, 42, 73, 74, 281, 296, 361, 463, 579
Buescher 67, 602

Cabezón 39, 102, 114, 119, 169, 202, 334, 357, 478, 592, 603
calm abiding 96, 263, 339, 444, 543, 564, 572, 584
cataracts 127, 129, 135, 238, 324-26, 436
cause and effect 33, 53, 63, 111, 161, 168, 175, 176, 181, 188, 272, 350, 380, 421, 440, 482
Chapter Showing the Three Vows Sūtra 360, 575
chariot 73, 76, 85, 97, 143, 438
Chuang-tzu 81
clairvoyance 57, 337, 543, 559, 565
Clear Words, 33, 37, 38, 56, 127, 165, 197, 200, 204, 238, 263, 277, 338, 580
coarse selflessness 233, 234, 258, 259, 261, 266, 342, 445, 463, 489, 543, 555
common being 249, 329, 378, 381, 543, 563, 570
compassion 74, 101, 151, 256, 281, 403, 416, 438, 544, 546, 563, 567, 568, 582, 585, 606
Compendium of Ascertainments 78, 81, 147, 308, 578
Compendium of Learnings 38, 599
Compendium on Prime Cognition 44, 139, 157, 583
Complete Enjoyment Body 362, 544, 559, 571
compositional factor 308, 385, 544, 548, 555, 558, 559, 563, 571, 573
concentration 95, 96, 112, 544, 556, 567
conception of self 262, 265, 321, 343, 544, 556, 566
conceptuality 328, 333
consequence 1, 3, 4, 121, 141, 176, 189, 201, 355, 356, 358, 360, 399, 423, 446, 482, 544, 555, 564, 569
contaminated 82, 233, 254, 398, 544, 564, 572
conventional analysis, 48, 53, 63, 278
conventional truth 88, 93, 544, 558, 571
cooperative condition 347, 570

Daktsang 12, 61, 62, 70, 80, 84, 92, 125, 178, 186, 189, 211-13, 290, 328, 337, 350, 362, 367, 385, 582
deed 544, 559, 567
Della Santina 370, 603
dependent phenomena 150
dependent-arising 42, 64, 83, 103, 181, 272, 350, 351, 419-22, 488, 489, 544, 562, 569, 584, 586, 610
Descent Into Laṅkā Sūtra 457, 575
as conception of true existence 259-62
desire realm 102, 103, 456, 544, 555, 567
dharmadhatu 6, 111, 266, 391, 394, 545, 556, 566
Dharmakirti 44, 45, 48, 77, 81, 83, 89, 113, 122, 139, 153, 154, 159, 231, 251, 253, 255, 303, 332, 333, 336, 379, 398, 399, 583, 604, 609, 612
Dignaga 45, 77, 83, 139, 153, 154, 157, 159, 253, 263, 332, 333, 336, 339, 583, 604, 605
direct perception 6, 7, 62, 228, 233, 234, 251, 253, 262-64, 266, 275, 279, 297, 328, 331-33, 335-37, 339, 342, 423, 443-45, 545, 553, 560, 562, 569, 573
directly perceiving consciousness 156, 270, 271, 324, 371, 372, 393, 394, 482
discrimination 77, 78, 114, 148, 265, 266, 310, 317, 342, 394, 545, 555, 571, 593
Dragonetti 193, 198, 267, 353, 394, 604, 613
feeling 129, 252, 253, 331-36, 546, 564, 572
Fenner 96, 97, 582, 604
forbearance 464, 546, 556, 568
form 10-12, 62, 84, 85, 88, 91, 92, 102, 103, 108, 112, 114, 117-22, 130,
131, 135, 140, 141, 145, 156, 212, 219, 220, 252, 255, 271, 301,
304, 315, 316, 334, 337, 366, 385, 399, 437, 440, 456, 460, 465,
546, 548, 553, 556, 558, 562, 565, 567, 570
Form Body 219, 546, 558, 570
Form Realm 102, 103, 120, 456, 546, 558,
570
Formless Realm 83, 102, 103, 119, 120, 255, 399, 456, 546, 558, 566
Four Hundred 36, 199, 207, 260, 296, 307, 319, 354, 361, 421, 443, 577
future 46, 54, 83, 95, 99, 124, 158, 182, 188, 189, 192, 216, 218, 221,

Gendün Gyatso 13, 413, 414, 468, 586
Gönchok Jikmay Wangbo 13, 43, 54, 68, 69, 84, 86, 88, 107, 123, 154,
155, 183, 188, 195, 243, 349, 392, 398
Great Exposition of Special Insight 49, 293, 421, 584, 585
Great Exposition of Tenets 35, 45, 58, 61, 65, 66, 69-71, 73, 77, 111, 123,
127, 136, 137, 143, 151, 189, 210, 214, 221, 222, 225, 237, 244-46,
248, 261, 265, 267-69, 283, 285, 286, 289, 290, 292, 295, 296, 299,
300, 307, 310, 315, 317, 319, 320, 323, 325, 326, 328, 331, 336,
337, 339, 341, 349, 350, 353, 355, 357, 359, 360, 364, 369, 372-74,
391, 394, 397, 404, 405, 411, 414, 416, 419, 422, 427, 453, 477,
590
Great Exposition of the MiddleWay 34, 56, 65, 69, 112, 114, 117, 120,
122, 129-31, 137, 154, 155, 186, 201-205, 208, 210, 215, 217,
221-25, 227-29, 243, 256, 312, 344, 350, 364, 370, 382, 389, 400,
404-406, 420, 443, 452, 453, 475, 477, 494, 589
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path 50, 268, 280, 324, 408, 453,
494, 584, 585
Griffiths 77, 423, 603, 604
ground 32, 99, 101, 112, 121, 243-45, 295, 416-18, 459, 466, 546, 562,
566
Gungtang 13, 68, 77, 80, 107, 145-47, 307, 309
Gyatso, Tenzin (Dalai Lama XIV) 149, 272, 419-21
Gyeltsap 13, 58, 196, 259, 260, 320, 351, 396, 415, 466, 495, 577, 588,
612

Hattori 113, 139, 154, 155, 157, 583, 605
Heap of Jewels 207, 360, 483, 575
Hearer 34, 240, 245, 256, 257, 259, 275, 276, 316, 317, 397, 400, 403,
405, 416, 450, 459, 463, 546, 560, 572
Jaydzün Chögyi Gyeltsen 13, 247, 413, 468
Jñānaśīrbhadra 457, 591
Johnston 374, 407, 417, 594, 607
Kamalaśīla 75, 591, 598, 599
Kaydrup 13, 39, 114, 160, 167-69, 190, 202, 247, 249, 250, 296, 329, 330, 357, 358, 393, 401, 413, 466, 468, 592
Keith 41, 144, 607
Klein 2, 45, 50, 51, 139, 152, 155, 299, 427, 585, 591, 607
Kochumuttom 82, 91, 310, 607
Lamotte 54, 55, 94, 113, 129, 148, 188, 310, 349, 577, 578, 581, 600, 607
Lang 2, 26, 80, 165, 443, 575, 577, 603, 608
Lati Rinbochay 114, 129, 154, 156, 157, 170, 263, 333, 339, 444, 460, 589, 609
Lessing 296, 592, 609
Lindtner 126, 143, 193, 198, 300, 353, 370, 580, 594-96, 604, 609
Lokesh Chandra 65, 66, 428, 467, 590
Lopez 34, 35, 74, 76, 87, 103, 143, 144, 151, 242, 263, 292, 338, 427, 452, 591, 608, 609
Losang Dayang 13, 246, 247, 401, 402, 412, 414, 466, 468, 592
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nihilism</td>
<td>144, 145, 579, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nihilist</td>
<td>41, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-affirming negative</td>
<td>139, 184, 197, 208, 209, 219, 473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-associated compositional factor</td>
<td>308, 559, 573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-dualistic</td>
<td>155, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-existent</td>
<td>50, 93, 96, 162, 172, 196, 199-201, 226, 227, 240, 269, 272, 326, 351, 355, 360, 381, 409, 421, 436, 450, 463, 481, 548, 559, 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-thing</td>
<td>196, 204, 205, 214, 351, 356, 359, 366, 396, 549, 557, 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-virtuous</td>
<td>189, 307, 366, 436, 437, 549, 559, 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-wastage</td>
<td>236, 349, 366, 435, 549, 557, 566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obermiller</td>
<td>56, 79, 407, 417, 593, 594, 610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object of knowledge</td>
<td>83, 111, 144, 300, 324, 549, 563, 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object of negation</td>
<td>269, 285, 295, 316, 473, 488, 549, 557, 569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object of observation</td>
<td>235, 309, 549, 557, 566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obstructions to liberation</td>
<td>60, 233, 234, 243, 244, 258, 316, 317, 391, 397, 416, 466, 560, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obstructions to omniscience</td>
<td>90, 217-19, 244-46, 254, 398, 418, 466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obtainer</td>
<td>549, 564, 569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate</td>
<td>167, 202, 249, 329, 334, 357, 358, 393, 401, 442, 447, 466, 467, 478, 592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ornament for Clear Realization</td>
<td>78, 584, 593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other-powered</td>
<td>93, 489-91, 549, 558, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pañchen Sönam Drakba</td>
<td>14, 247, 269, 401, 402, 409, 414, 438, 468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandeya</td>
<td>148, 266, 310, 394, 593, 600, 610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partless particles</td>
<td>91, 97, 107-109, 123-27, 140, 293, 301, 304, 456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
past 15, 18, 46, 63, 82, 95, 124, 137, 145, 163, 164, 179, 182, 183, 216, 221-23, 225-29, 286, 344, 349, 384, 385, 442, 443, 476, 478, 593, 612

path of accumulation 265, 343, 549, 564, 571
path of meditation 244, 269, 397, 437, 549, 563, 566
path of preparation 6, 59, 128, 237, 238, 265, 266, 326, 327, 337, 341-43, 415, 418, 550, 563, 569
path of release 437, 550, 562, 573
path of seeing 243, 295, 415, 437, 445, 466, 550, 560, 566
Paul 26, 31, 90, 575, 602-604, 611-14
Perdue 46, 611
permanent phenomenon 157, 184, 190, 192, 197, 271, 345, 394, 472, 474, 550, 562, 568
potency 54, 88, 195, 303, 349, 550, 555, 572
Praise of Dependent-Arising 422, 586
Prāsaṅgika School, 44, 73, 77, 97, 134, 183, 184, 242, 254, 258, 281, 289, 303, 304, 316, 337, 387, 437, 452, 476, 482
pratyākṣa 6, 7, 59, 234, 251, 262, 269-71, 297, 299, 328, 331, 332, 342, 391-94, 444, 553, 562, 573, 610, 613
Precious Garland of Tenets 54, 69, 84, 123, 154, 155, 183, 188, 195, 243, 349, 473, 588
predisposition 88, 550, 555, 572
Presentation of Tenets 25, 35, 38, 67, 71, 74, 76, 77, 84, 93, 103, 105, 125, 126, 133, 147, 167, 173, 190, 208, 210, 226, 228, 236, 239, 242, 244, 246, 413, 420, 425, 427, 428, 439, 582, 588, 590, 600
probandum 160, 162, 240, 380, 381, 440, 441, 450, 550, 556

Questions of King Dhāraniśvara Sūtra 416, 576

Rabten 64, 162, 598, 611
referent object 240, 450, 460, 464, 550, 564
Refutation of Objections 36, 159, 248, 327, 328, 370, 373, 595
Repetition Sūtra 256, 400, 404, 405, 576
requiring interpretation 8, 102, 312, 432, 487, 557, 568
Rongta 14, 58, 598
rope 91
Ruegg 34, 36, 143, 611, 612

samāsāra 9, 33, 82, 181, 280, 544, 550, 555, 571
Sangharakshita 144, 611
Śāntarakṣita 34, 45, 75, 151, 598, 611
Sautrāntika-Svātantriḥa-Mādhyamika 431
Schmithausen 90, 109, 133, 611, 612
as example of disintegratedness 345, 347, 360, 365, 367
as example of disintegration 204, 206, 220
karmic 99, 187, 189, 316, 366, 367, 435, 466
self of phenomena 7, 60, 235, 430, 463, 465, 551, 556, 567
selflessness of persons 318, 319, 460, 463, 464, 570
selflessness of phenomena 7, 60, 258, 319, 459, 460, 463, 464, 489, 551, 556, 566


self-sufficient 140, 232, 258, 267, 303, 315, 463, 551, 561

Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness 36, 595
Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges 246, 412, 413, 468, 582

Sinha 153, 612

Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning 36, 193, 197, 267, 353, 394, 595

Snellgrove 74, 612

solipsism 145, 146, 151

Solitary Realizer 245, 259, 316, 317, 397, 416, 459, 464, 551, 561, 569

Sopa 43, 54, 84, 88, 123, 124, 154, 155, 183, 188, 195, 243, 272, 349, 392, 398, 420, 473, 551, 556, 606, 612

sound 117, 118, 162, 342, 439, 442, 551, 563, 572


space 62, 85, 86, 93, 95, 114-16, 119, 122, 132, 149, 192, 206, 224, 286, 438, 473, 551, 560, 566

special insight 49, 96, 263, 265, 266, 293, 339, 341-43, 421, 444, 551, 559, 573, 584, 585

Sprung 56, 138, 159, 238, 251, 268, 270, 289, 324, 328, 332, 372, 392, 408, 580, 605, 612

stabilization 99, 262, 263, 339, 547, 551, 564, 570

Stcherbatsky 82, 148, 251, 270, 332, 392, 393, 580, 593, 612

Sublime Continuum of the Mahāyāna 78, 257, 403, 407, 415, 417, 594

subsequent cognition 248, 297, 323, 329, 445, 551, 555, 568

substantial cause 177, 179, 347, 384, 551, 560, 572

substantial entity 51, 54, 88, 169, 166, 385, 440, 441, 463, 551, 561, 567

substantial existence 40, 122, 311, 312, 551, 561, 567

substantially established 161, 380, 567


Superior 37, 126, 179, 199, 215-17, 234, 263, 264, 266, 276, 295, 305, 326, 331, 339, 355, 364, 391, 394, 405, 415, 418, 423, 429, 481, 548, 551, 555, 566

Suzuki 12, 104, 406, 457, 575, 610, 613

Svātantrika 16, 34, 37, 45, 47, 54, 63, 73, 75, 102, 151, 154, 155, 188, 219, 233, 237, 239, 243, 248, 258, 277, 285, 290-92, 294, 295, 305,
Sutra on the Heavily Adorned 80, 576
Sutra on the Ten Grounds 80, 82, 87, 95, 100-103, 181, 193, 194, 196, 343, 346, 350, 456, 459, 472, 576

Takasaki 407, 594, 613

tantra 9, 31, 66, 67, 246, 285, 296, 335, 412, 469, 546, 552, 562, 565, 603, 605

Theravāda 67, 95, 602

Thirty Stanzas 80, 601

thoroughly established 86, 88, 93, 94, 139, 489, 491, 569

thoroughly established phenomena 491

Three Refuges 246, 412, 413, 468, 552, 563, 572, 582

three times 6, 7, 62, 155, 181, 190, 210, 211, 215, 220, 221, 223, 226, 228, 229, 297, 317, 341, 350, 364, 406, 430, 473, 475-77

Thurman 57, 161, 272, 279, 291, 294, 320, 325, 380, 382, 383, 388, 420, 421, 584-86, 613

Tola 193, 198, 267, 353, 394, 604, 613

Treatise on the Middle Way 15, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 43, 47, 54, 140, 159, 171, 196, 223, 276, 277, 291, 296, 351, 374, 377, 452, 584, 596

Trisambaranirdeśaparivartasūtra (see Chapter Showing the Three Vows Sūtra)

true establishment 306, 317, 326, 391, 552, 556, 570


Truth Body 219, 268, 409, 552, 556, 566

Tügen 14, 68, 599

Twenty Stanzas 80, 94, 96, 113, 124, 125, 601
Oba Losel 14, 58, 600
ultimate existence 48, 86, 131, 135, 140, 305, 552, 557, 568
ultimate truth 51, 110, 118, 124, 139, 140, 293, 303, 306, 326, 552, 557, 568
uncompounded phenomena 357
uninterrupted path 269, 437, 552, 555, 566
valid cognizer 327, 552, 564, 569
validly established 46, 552, 564, 569
vehicle 285, 310, 316, 404, 550, 552, 560, 564, 569, 573, 592, 594, 610
virtue 337, 366, 557
virtuous 189, 192, 307, 366, 436, 437, 549, 553, 557, 559, 565, 568
visible form 85, 117, 118, 553, 558, 570
Wangyal 422, 586, 614
Warder 78, 79, 614
Warren 181, 614
Watson 81, 614
Wayman 42, 296, 584, 592, 609, 614
Willis 90, 602, 614
Wilson 77, 80, 81, 85, 88, 139, 144, 145, 147, 307, 614
worldly convention 55, 178, 238, 256, 363, 384, 385, 399
Nagarjuna's dates are controversial, since the Tibetan tradition considers Nagarjuna to have been a master both of sutra and tantra who lived for 600 years. Most Western scholars postulate the existence of at least two different people named Nagarjuna, one who established the Madhyamika School and another who taught about tantra. The former probably lived in the first or second century C.E. To some extent, Nagarjuna's influence is also a matter of debate, since there is scant evidence that contemporary Indian thinkers reacted to his writings. On the other hand, the Madhyamika philosophy that claims him as its founder became the most important current of thought in the Mahayana world.

Richard Robinson (21-22) gives a summary that I have further condensed. The text on Nagarjuna is #2047 of the Chinese Tripitaka in the Taisho Shinshu Daiz5cyo published in Japan in the 1920s.

3 "Naga" is a word with several meanings. Its basic meaning is "snake," but it is used especially with regard to great serpents or serpent-people of Indian mythology such as the snake Ananta upon which Vi$nu reclines during the long sleep of the universe when it is in a cycle of dissolution. Nagas are also a class of beings that are half-human, half-snake, and live under the ground or at the bottom of the ocean; it is probably such a being that is meant in this legend, which is controversial even in the Buddhist tradition.

According to Gelukba exegetes, although it is true enough that Nagarjuna's critique undermines all erroneous tenets, it is not concerned merely with philosophical positions, which constitute mere "artificial" errors. Much more serious, and a universal problem rather than just a malady of philosophers, is the "innate" misconception of inherent existence which occurs simply through one's assent to the false manner in which ordinary things appear.

The three texts in question are Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom, "Commentary on the "Treatise on the Middle Way"(prajrnapradipamulamadhyamakavrtti, dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma), Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way "(buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavrtti, dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa buddha pa li ta) and Candrakirti's Clear Words, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle
Way"(mulmadhyamakavrttiprasannapada, dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba). For an extensive analysis of the Bhavaviveka / Buddhapalita / Candrakirti debate, see Hopkins (1983a: 441-530).

These are not terms that appear in the Indian literature. They are probably a Tibetan distinction, made in the late eleventh or early twelfth century, after Batsap Nyimadrak (pa tshab nyi ma grags, 1055-1158 [?]) and Jayananda translated the works of Candrakirti into Tibetan (Lopez 1987: 26). Also, see Karen Lang's article on Batsap. Mimaki notes, for instance, that Yeshayday, the disciple of the eighth-century Indian masters Padmasambhava and Santarakgita, never used the terms.

'Jamyang Shayba (Great Exposition of the Middle Way 424.2) glosses autonomous syllogism as that in which the "three modes exist from their own side" (tshul gsum rang ngos nas grub pa). The three modes of a sign are the presence of the reason in the subject, the forward entailment and the reverse entailment. For example, in the syllogism "The subject, a pot, is impermanent because of being a product," the first mode-the presence of the reason in the subject-is the applicability of the reason (product) to the subject (pot), i.e., that pot is a product; the forward entailment, roughly speaking, is that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent; and the reverse entailment, roughly speaking, is that whatever is not impermanent is necessarily not a product. Because the Svaatantrikas are said to hold that conventionally, phenomena do inherently or autonomously exist, the phenomena used in their syllogisms, and the relationships between them, are said to inherently or autonomously exist.

'On Buddhapalita and Candrakirti, see Ruegg (1981: 60-61, 71-81). Jamyang Shayba, whose works on the tenets of Indian Buddhism provide much of the basis for this book, is perhaps unique in considering Buddhapalita the actual founder of the school. However, Janggya claims that Jamyang Shayba privately also considered Candrakirti to be the founder. Janggya, Presentation of Tenets 288.20-89.5; see Lopez (1987: 256).


"These authors and their works are listed by Losang Gonchok in his commentary (218.1-19.3) on the root verses of Jamyang Shayba's ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa, 1648-1721) massive Great Exposition of Tenets. It is called Word Commentary on the Root Text of (Jamyang Shayba's) 'Tenets, "Clear Crystal Mirror (grub mtha' rtsa ba'i tshig tik shel dkar me long). In addition, he regards Asvaghosa (also, according to Taranatha [132], called Sura and Matrcea) and Nagabodhi as Madhyamikas who also had the view of the Prasangika, though they did not identify themselves in a partisan way. Jayananda wrote a large commentary to Candrakirti's Entrance and was instrumental in establishing Prasahgika in Tibet as the translator of the works of Candrakirti. His commentary on Candrakirti's Entrance is frequently criticized in Dzongkaba's commentary on the Entrance commonly called Illumination of the Thought (dgongs pa rab gsal); see Hopkins
(1980: passim). Nakamura (1987: 289) mentions some other later Madhyamikas who wrote in criticism of Cittamatra and who were apparently Prasangikas: Prajnakaramati (c. 950-1000), who wrote an extensive commentary on Santideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (the only one extant by an Indian author) and Advayavajra (eleventh century), who wrote short outlines of the Buddhist philosophical schools. See also Ruegg (1981: 58, 107, 116). Dzongkaba refers to Prajnakaramati on several occasions (Hopkins, 1980: passim).

"I have translated 'jug pa / avatara as "entrance" in accordance with most other translators. However, Hopkins (1983a: 868-71, n. 545) notes that according to former tantric abbot Kensur Lekden, the sense of "supplement" predominates in the Gelukpa literature. The basis for that may be Dzongkaba's discussion of the term avatara at the beginning of his Illumination of the Thought (adapted from Hopkins' translation [1980: 96-99]), which strongly suggests the translation "supplement." In what follows, each instance of 'jug pa has been translated as "supplement."

Our own system on this is that Candrakirti supplements Nagarjuna's Treatise in two ways, from the viewpoints of the profound and of the vast.

With respect to the first, Candrakirti says that he composed the Supplement in order to indicate that the meaning of the middle way that he ascertained is not shared with other Madhyamikas. Also, refutation of the Cittamatra system, which was not done at length in Nagarjuna's Treatise or in Candrakirti's Clear Words, is extensive here in the Supplement. Therefore, one way in which this book supplements the Treatise is through its good determination of the meaning of the Treatise from the viewpoint of these two purposes [i.e., distinguishing its real meaning from its Cittamatra and Svatantra interpretation].

It also supplements the Treatise from the viewpoint of the vast. Although Nagarjuna's Treatise, except for the topic of profundity, does not indicate the features of vastness in the Mahayana, his text was nevertheless composed in terms of the Mahayana rather than the Hinayana. Thus, Candrakirti thought that it would be very good to fill in the gaps in the paths explained in the Treatise on the Middle Way-supplying the other Mahayana paths of vastness by way of the quintessential instructions of the Superior Nagarjuna [as found in other of his works]. Thus, the second way that this text supplements Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way is in supplementing the paths of the Treatise from the viewpoint of the vast.

In short, Dzongkaba argues that Candrakirti aimed to clarify Nagarjuna's thought by explaining how Nagarjuna's middle way is not the one propounded by the Cittamatra or Svatantra Schools and by adding explanations of the Mahayana paths—clearly attempts at augmentation rather than introduction.
"The Gelukbas assert that all the major Tibetan sects are Prasangika, even if some of those sects do not explicitly identify themselves as such. For the Gelukba reasoning behind this assertion, see Hopkins 1983 (531-38 mostly a paraphrase of Janggya's Presentation of Tenets 291.9-99.8).

13Kaydrup (CabezOn 1992: 82) identifies eight great Indian commentaries on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way, for instance, but only those of Buddhapalita and Candrakirti made this list.

"However, Ngawang Belden defends Candrakirti on the grounds that he says elsewhere that Buddha's statement about the mind-basis-of-all in particular was made sheerly for the benefit of those not ready to hear about emptiness and was not an indication that the mind-basis-of-all conventionally exists. Candrakirti's basic statement is not in question: it is certainly true that since nothing substantially exists, statements about something that is held to be substantially existent must be interpreted in order to disclose the underlying thought of the speaker.

"According to Gelukbas, Nagarjuna meant by this statement only that he had no inherently existent theses, not that he had no theses at all. In fact, his works show that he has numerous theses. See Hopkins (1983a: 471-3, 847).

‘Keith (1979: 239-41). That Nagarjuna was a nihilist is the thesis of a more recent monograph by Wood (1994), based on translations from Sanskrit sources.


20Grub mtha' / siddhanta is literally "established conclusion"; Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo defines it as "a thesis decided upon and established in reliance on scripture and / or reasoning and which, from the perspective of one's mind, will not be forsaken for something else" (3.14-4.1; translated in Sopa and Hopkins 150]).

"This is the title of a small book by Dzongkaba: Explanation of the Eight Great Difficult Points of (Nagarjuna's) 'Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way Called 'Wisdom' "(rtsa pa shes rab kyi dka' gnas chen po brgyad kyi bshad pa; Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970).

nVaibha$ikas are so-called because they rely upon the Mahdvibhasa (bye brag
bshad mtsho chen mo—although it was not translated into Tibetan). There are generally held to be eighteen subschools, although different ancient authors had different lists. See Hopkins (1983a: 713-19). Historically, the most important school seems to have been the Sarvastivada.

23These Sautrantikas are followers of the views in Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge (chos mgon pa'i mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa, abhidharmakogakarika). On the translation of chos mgon pa /abhidharma, see my note in the next chapter at the point of discussion of the works of Vasubandhu.

"These Sautrantikas follow the views in Dignaga's Compendium on Prime Cognition (tshad ma kun las btus pa, pramanasamuccaya) and the works of Dharmakirti, the most famous of which is a commentary on Dignaga's work.

25These Cittamatrins embrace the views of Asanga.

26Like the Sautrantikas following reasoning, these Cittamatrins rely upon the works of Dignaga and Dharmakirti; however, they differ from Sautrantikas in that they reject the existence of external objects and assert that all sentient beings eventually become Buddhas (a teaching known as "one final vehicle").

27These Svatantrikas are those who follow the views of the Indian abbot Santarakṣita, who was instrumental (along with Padmasambhava) in establishing the first monastery in Tibet. As their name implies, they combine views identified as Madhyamika and as Cittamatra (which is also called Yogacara).

28These Svatantrikas are identified with the views of Bhavaviveka, who is also considered the founder of Svatantrika in general because of differences that Gelukbas have discerned between his and Buddhapalita's interpretations of Nagarjuna.


'tKlein 1994: 86.

31This seems to me to be true from my own limited experience; however, I am also replying on the judgements of Perdue (1992) and Hopkins (1983a, especially pp. 575-77).

32Autocommentary on the 'Entrance," 255.3-7 (P 5263, vol. 98, 166.2.1-5). This passage has been cited by Jamyang Shayba in the introduction to "unique tenets" as it has been altered slightly by Dzongkaba in his Illumination of the Thought; for a review of the alterations, see the list of emendations. It has been translated here in accordance with Dzongkaba's edition, on which Jamyang Shayba relies.

In other words, the Madhyamika School textual system of Nagarjuna and
Aryadeva is the only one that correctly sets forth the doctrine of emptiness (that phenomena are empty of inherent existence), and Candrakirti is the only one who correctly understands Nagarjuna's explanation of suchness (emptiness) in his Treatise on the Middle Way.

"That is, if Nagarjuna's doctrine were as the Svatantrikas have explained it, the supramundane doctrine of Nagarjuna, a doctrine that actually leads to passage beyond sorrow (myang Was, nirvana) would be no better than the mundane doctrine of other schools.

"Great Exposition of Special Insight (Dharamsala edition 405a.1-6b.4); the complete discussion can be found in Wayman's confusing translation (1978: 236-38).

According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden (Klein 1994: 46), these phenomena may include well-known things that don’t exist, such as water (in the case of a mirage) or the "horns of a rabbit" (a well-known non-entity).

37Kensur Yeshey Tupden (Klein 1994: 138) contends that "ultimate valid cognition" is a misnomer, since all valid cognitions are conventional, meaning that their objects are conventionally existent phenomena. Rather, this refers to ultimate analysis.

38As pointed out by Guy Newland (1992: 85).


40Kensur Yeshey Tupden (Klein 1994: 48) adds that, therefore, a consciousness directly realizing emptiness, which is not involved in analysis, is a conventional consciousness whose object is a conventionally existent phenomenon.

"The "mere I" is a mere imputation of "I" in dependence on the aggregates of mind and body, not a substantial entity like a mind-basis-of-all.

43Illumination of the Thought 200.2-4.


"Entrance (VI.25) 5b.5-6. This quotation and the next follow the translations of Newland (1988: 252, 253-54). Also translated in Huntington 160.

"According to Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo (Precious Garland of Tenets 21.14-22.2, translated in Sopa and Hopkins [193]), the Kashmiri Vaibhagikas and the Sautrantikas both identify the continuum of mind as the basis of infusion of predispositions (as do Svatantrika-Madhyamikas). Other Vaibha$ikas posit a vague factor, neither matter nor consciousness, called an "obtainer" as that which
prevents the loss of the karmic potency until it ripens into an effect. According to Dzongkaba (Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of the ‘Afflicted Mind and Basis-of-All’14b.6), Cittamatrins also refer to these latencies as obtainers. The five Saivmitiya sub-schools of the Vaibhagikas say that actions produce an impermanent phenomenon called "non-wastage" that prevents the loss of the action's potency (Lamotte, "Le traite de l'acte de Vasubandhu" 162-63).

"Entrance to the Middle Way 7b.9. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 159a.4-60a.4. Translated by Lamotte in Museon 11: 353 and by Huntington (166).

"Annotations 116b.

49P 5265, vol. 98,177.4.2. Toh. 3864, vol. 7, 8.3.6.

"Translated by Hopkins (1983a: 526). Also translated by Sprung (1979: 42): "The Buddhas themselves, out of concern for those they were guiding, who were ignorant of logic, made their points in terms of the conventional ideas of these people themselves." Sanskrit edited by Poussin 36.1-2.

51Bud6n (Obermiller 1931: vol. 2,135).

"For instance, Candrakirti, in his Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) `Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning," says that the four conceptions of the body as clean, blissful, as a self, or as permanent, are wrong even for a worldly perspective (cited in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 558). This is admittedly difficult to square with his general approval of the conventions of the world, since it seems that at least the first of these, that the body, if washed, is clean, is well accepted in the world. However, if what is meant by worldly perspective is conventional valid cognition, it can be argued that conventional valid cognition, establishing that the body always contains foul substances such as bile, phlegm, urine, and excrement, establishes that it cannot be made clean by superficial washing and hence, its cleanliness is not actually upheld in the world.

"Entrance to the Middle Way 5b.2-3. Also translated in Huntington (160).

53Thurman (1984: 79) translates a portion of Kaydrup's biography of Dzongkaba, found in volume ka, 3a.4, of the Ngawang Gelek Demo edition of the collected works of Dzongkaba.

The list of eight appearing in Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought is also found in two short works in the "Collected Works" (gsung 'bum) of Dzongkaba's close disciple Gyeltas (rgyal tshab, 1364-1432): Eight Great Difficult Points of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way "(dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i dka' gnas chen po brgyad) and Notes on the Eight Great Difficult Points, Preventing Forgetfulness of the Foremost One's Speech (dka' gnas brgyad gyi zin bris rje'i gsung bzhin brjed byang du bkod pa bcugs). They are also found in a short work by Rongta Losang...
Damcho Gyatso (rong tha blo bzang dam chos rgya mtsho, 1863-1917): Mode of Asserting the Unique Tenets of the Glorious Prasangikas, A Few Letters of Beginning, Moonlight by Which the Intelligent Distinguish Errors (dpal ldan phal 'gyur ba'i thun mong ma yin pa'i bzhed tshul las brtsams pa'i yi ge nyung du blo gros kun da 'byed pa'i zla 'od). As far as I can tell from my own search and from asking Gelukba scholars, these and the works that have been translated here are the only Gelukba works specifically commenting on the "unique tenets," but there may be others of which I am not aware scattered throughout Gelukba literature.

55Dzongkaba probably was the first to distinguish a group of unique tenets for the Prasangika School. For instance, in pre-Gelukba presentations of tenets such as the Treasury of Explanations of Tenets (grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bshad pa'i mdzod) of Uba Losel (dbus pa blo gsal, fourteenth century), a Gadamba (bka' gdams pa, the sect of Atiga and predecessor of Gelukba), these topics go virtually unmentioned.

Illumination of the Thought 124b.2-5.


"Explanation of the Eight Great Difficult Points 31.16-40.12.

'Explanation of the Eight Great Difficult Points 40.12-42.11.

"Explanation of the Eight Great Difficult Points 1.4.

"In his Ocean of Good Explanations, Explanation of 'Freedom from Extremes through Understanding All Tenets "(grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' brat grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho), itself an encyclopedic treatment of Buddhist philosophy.

'Illumination of the Thought 124b.2-5.

63See Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 176.5 ff.


5The following account of Jamyang Shayba's life and literary activities has been gleaned from Lokesh Chandra (1963: 45-49), who in turn relies on a sketch by a "Dr. Rinchen of Ulanbator."

"Study of this topic is based on Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition "(tshad ma rnatan 'grel, pramanavarttika).

67 on the Great Exposition of Tenets is from Geshay Tupden Gyatso, a contemporary Gomang scholar. According to him, the root text of the Great Exposition of Tenets was written at the behest of the Fifth Dalai Lama, and the
commentary was written ten years later at the urging of Sanggyay Gyatso, who was a student of Jamyang Shayba. However, the Fifth Dalai Lama died in 1682; his death was concealed by the regent, Sanggyay Gyatso, for fourteen years. Thus it must have been the latter, not the Dalai Lama, who asked Jamyang Shayba to compose the root text.

Biographical information on Ngawang Belden has been drawn from Lokesh Chandra (1963: part 2, 10-13, 282-84 and 1961: 22-24, 50-52).

'My summary of the Highest Yoga Tantra (rnal 'byor bla med kyi rgyud, anuttarayogatantra) section of this work, supplemented by Gelukba commentaries, was published by Snow Lion in 1986 as Highest Yoga Tantra.

70A portion of the latter was translated by John Buescher in "The Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths in the Vaibha*ika and Theravada Schools." Doctoral dissertation at the University of Virginia, 1982.

"Biographical information on Janggya can be found in Hopkins (1987: 15-35; helpful bibliography in note 1, p. 448), who draws on several sources, including Gene Smith's introduction to the Collected Works of Thu'u-bkwan Blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma, vol. 1, pp. 2-12, and a short biography in Lokesh Chandra's Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature (38-45). The present account gives a few details from the biography by Hopkins.

nlamyang Shayba's annotator, Ngawang Belden, wrote an entire book cataloguing those differences on the topics of the Prasar gika School and the Perfection of Wisdom, called Stating the Mode of Explanation in the Textbooks on the Middle Way and the Perfection of Wisdom in the Loseling and Gomang Colleges: Festival for Those of Clear Intelligence (blo gsal gling dang bkra shis sgo mang grva tshang gi dbu phar gyi yig cha'i bshad tshul bkod pa blo gsal dga' ston).

'Freedom from Extremes through Understanding All Tenets (grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa) along with his own commentary, Ocean of Good Explanations (legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho).

'Other than a single citation of Nagarjuna, the only Madhyamika prior to Candrakirti (seventh century) cited by the Gelukba authors in refutation of Cittamatra is Bhavaviveka (c. 490-570), who criticizes the Cittamatra interpretation of certain sutras.

'Interpreting Dzongkaba's statement, at the end of The Essence of the Good Explanations, that the path is "revealed by Buddhapalita," Jamyang Shayba calls Buddhapalita the "establisher" of the Prasangika School, although "for its chariot a great way was made by the honorable Candrakirti" (Great Exposition of Tenets 282.6 [DSK edition]; see translation of beginning of Prasangika chapter in Hopkins [1983a: 584]). Janggya feels that Jamyang Shayba has misconstrued Dzongkaba:
Some scholars of our own [Gelukba] sect say that this means that Buddhapalita is the founder of Prasangika. However, this is not the opinion of the foremost great being Dzongkaba. Although Buddhapalita did not use autonomous reasons and commented on the meaning of the text only through consequences, this alone is not sufficient to make him the founder of Prasangika. For in order to be designated as the founder of this or that system, one must clearly delineate proofs for the correctness of that system and [prove] why interpretation in any other way is unsuitable.

This is adapted from the translation by Lopez (1987: 254) of Janggya's Presentation of Tenets 286.16-287.2.

3Taranatha 203-6.

'Snellgrove (1987: 489-90). They were also accused of being crypto- Vedantins (Hopkins 1983a: 535).

'The most famous of the subsequent Prasangikas, Santideva, refuted Cittamatra just with respect to the existence of self-consciousness. See Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds IX.15b-29. There is not yet, to my knowledge, any indication that a post-Candrakirti Indian Cittamatra movement persisted. It would be interesting to see whether later Indian Cittamatrins responded to Candrakirti's criticisms; Cittamatrins such as the YogacaraSvatantrika-Madhyamika, ~antaraki~ita, and his disciple KamalaŚila seem not to have done so, at least in the Compendium of Suchness (de kho na nyid bsdus pa, tattvasamgraha) and commentary.

6See chapter 1, note on the title of Entrance.

'As Donald Lopez puts it, Buddha blazed the trail, but the chariot-way openers widened and smoothed it so that the way would be clearer and easier to follow (1987: 14).

'Presentation of Tenets 71.19 ff. It is interesting that Taranatha has no explanation for the appearance of Mahayana teachings other than that suddenly a sufficient number of teachers appeared (chapter 13).

9Presentation of Tenets 72.14-15.

"On Asanga's dates, see Nakamura (1987: 264). Some regard Maitreya (or Maitreyanatha) to be the founder of the Cittamatra School. Traditionally, the "Maitreya" who is the author of such works as the Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes (dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa, madhyantavibhaga) is considered to be the coming Buddha Maitreya, who dictated his books to Asanga. Modern scholars tend to consider Maitreya to have been a monk who lived in the third and fourth centuries (Nakamura [1987: 256] estimates his dates as C.E. 270-350). As Griffiths notes, it will take an extensive study of the style and content of the works ascribed to Maitreya in order to determine whether, say, "Maitreya" is
just an Asanga pen-name (1986: 174, n. 9).


'Janggya lists some of the many other works by authors such as Jna-naṣri, Sthiramati, Asvabhava, Gunaprabha, Jinaputra, Vinitadeva, Gunamati, Ratnakarasanti, Dignaga, Dharmakirti, Dharmapala, Suvarnadvipa, and Ratnakarasantipada, whom he considers to be Cittamatin, in his Presentation of Tenets 155.17-56.17. (I have been helped by a rough unpublished translation of those pages by Joe Wilson.)

"Jamyang Shayba, Great Exposition of Tenets II: 10b.2 (DSK ca 6b.7 ff.) Gungtang asserts that before Asanga, there were no Cittamatin (Explanation of the Difficult Topics of Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All 4a.1, translated by Joe Wilson [1984: 228]). He is probably following Dzongkaba’s lead, for Dzongkaba says that before Asanga and Nagarjuna there may have been proponents of the "Middle Way" and "Mind-only" but no one who laid out a system (Difficult Topics 3a.1-8, translated by Wilson [1984: 71-73]). B. K. Matilal (1974: 141) considers Cittamatra to be contemporaneous with the Mahayana though not systematized until Asanga and Vasubandhu and not a full-fledged philosophy until Dharmakirti.

"Warder 1980: 236.

"This is condensed from Taranatha 1980: 156 ff.

"Discrimination of Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena (dharmadhar-matavibhanga, chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa); Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes (madhyantavibhanga, dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa); Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras (mahayanasutralamkarakarika, theg pa chen po'i mdo sde'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa); Ornament for Clear Realization (abhisamayalahkara, mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan); and Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana (mahayanottaratantratastra, theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos).

'According to Warder (1980: 403), the Chinese tradition regards the Ratnagotravibhaga to have been written by Sthiramati (though not the person of that name who is a famous later Cittamatin).

This is commonly attributed to Asahga (e.g., Obermiller 1931:140), although Dzongkaba does not accept Asanga’s authorship.

20Vasubandhu's most famous work is the Abhidharmakoga (chos mngon pa'i mdzod), which I translate as Treasury of Higher Knowledge. "Higher knowledge" is being used as a translation term because the Treasury of Higher Knowledge speaks mainly of two kinds of abhidharma, both being kinds of knowledge: the wisdom that realizes nirvana and ordinary correct knowledge. See A. Hirakawa (1980: 159-75, especially 167). Many other translations are possible. Ngawang Belden, in his
commentary (Collected Works, vol. ga 5.3) on Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge gives four etymologies for chos mngon pa / abhidharma, their diversity reflecting the extensive range of meanings for mngon pa and chos: (1) "approaching nirvana," nirvana being the highest (mngon pa, abhi) of phenomena (chos, dharma); (2) "repeated examination of aggregates, constituents, sources, etc.,” an intensive or repeated (mngon pa) examination of phenomena; (3) "overwhelming the assertions of opponents"; and (4) "manifesting the meaning of the collection of discourses," that is, manifesting (mngon pa) the teaching (chos). According to Hirakawa, the Mahdvibadsa gives twenty-five meanings for abhidharma.

'This account is condensed from Taranatha (1980: 167 ff.).

21 For discussion of these sutras, see Nakamura (1987: 254-55). These are sutras listed by Gungtang. Wilson notes (1984: 42-43) that Daktsang and Janggya have similar lists, Janggya adding the Ratnakuta (Jewel Heap) sutras, among which is the Lion's Roar of Queen grimala, which Jacques May (1971: 274-79) adds to the list. The Cittamatra philosophers consider these sutras to be definitive, which for them means that they can be literally accepted; however, there are some passages in the Descent to Lanka Sutra and the Sutra on the Heavily Adorned that require interpretation for at least some Cittamatrins (Gungtang 10b.3-4, translated by Wilson [1984: 304-5]).

22 Nakamura (255, n. 15) regards this to be the oldest Cittamatra sutra, as he considers it to be post-Nagarjuna (who lived c. 150-250) and pre-Maitreya (who lived c. 270-350), i.e., late third century.

This is according to Janggya (158), who quotes Asariga's Compendium of Ascertainments (gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba, nirriyasamgraha) to demonstrate Asanga's reliance on it. See Janggya translation in Wilson (1984: 53-54). John Powers has recently published a fine new translation of the sutra under the title Wisdom of Buddha.

"Watson 1964: 45. Chuang Chou is the personal name of the "Master Chuang," i.e., Chuang-tzu, which is transliterated Zhuang-zi in modern Pinyin.

H. B. Acton 1967: 110. Thomas Kochumuttom (1982: 1) characterizes even Vasubandhu's Cittamatra thought as "realistic pluralism," because it recognizes a plurality of beings and phenomena. He seems to restrict the use of the term "idealism" to monistic idealism, perhaps because so many in the past (e.g., Stcherbatsky) have seen Cittamatra that way, but I see no need to do so.


Z'The Manifest (mgon gyur, abhimukhi) is the sixth of the ten Bodhisattva
"grounds" (sa, bhumi) or levels that Mahayanists pass over to attain Buddha-hood. The Sutra on the Ten Grounds is P 761.31, vol. 25; the passage in question is: "He thinks as follows, 'What belongs to the triple world, that is (of) mere mind.'" It is translated in Honda (189). Candrakirti’s passage is found in P 5262, vol. 98,103.1.8.

"In the sutras, the Buddha often said that attachment (sred pa, trsna) is the cause of suffering, but when he explained the twelve links in the chain of dependent-arising (rten 'byung, pratityasamutpada) it was ignorance that he identified as the root of suffering, with attachment, grasping (len pa, upadana), and existence (srid pa, bhava) acting to nourish and actualize potentials for suffering. Based on the mental condition of ignorance, sentient beings perpetrate intentional actions (las, karma) that create potentials for the manifestation of future environments and bodies. Thus, the mind is really the creator of the world as we know it.

For widely used definitions of idealism, realism, and anti-realism, see Acton (1967: 110).

'Sanskrit is uncertain. In Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo's presentation of the Sautrantika School, much of whose epistemology (from Dignaga and Dharmakirti) is adopted by the higher schools, an object of knowledge (shes bya, jrieya) is defined as "that which is suitable to be an object of mind" (blo'i yul du bya rung ba), and is a synonym for "existent." In the Collected Topics (bsdus gnoa) entitled Festival for the Wise written by Jambel Trinlay ('jam dpal 'phrin las) and used by young students of Drebung Monastic University's Loseling College, the definition of "existent" (yod pa) is "that which is observed by valid cognition" (tshad mas dmigs pa); an "established base" (gzhi grub) is "established by valid cognition" (tshad mas grub pa); an "object of comprehension" (gzhal bya) is "an object of realization by valid cognition" (tshad mas rtogs par bya ba), and so forth. (See p.3; there are eight synonyms altogether).

"Precious Garland of Tenets (40). Translated by Hopkins and Sopa (249). Janggya’s definition (Presentation of Tenets 157.7-8) is similar.

"These two qualifications are not necessarily held together. The Yogacara-Svatantrikas (real 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa) do not consider phenomena to be truly existent even though they also refute the existence of external objects (Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo, Precious Garland of Tenets [5556], translated in Sopa and Hopkins [283-85]). The Sagya scholar Daktsang is accused of arguing that some Cittamatrins-the so-called False Aspectsarians (rnam rdzun pa, aliikakaravadines)-actually assert external objects, but that view is refuted by Jamyang Shayba (Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 152.3 ff.). About the False Aspectarians, see Sopa and Hopkins (284-85).

33In the Entrance to the Middle Way, Candrakirti uses the example of a chariot to explore seven possibilities for the inherent existence of the chariot: the chariot
does not inherently exist because of not being its parts, not being other than its parts, not being in its parts, not being that in which its parts exist, not possessing its parts, not being the composite of its parts, and not being the shape of its parts. See Wilson (1980).

"Space" refers to the uncaused space which is nothing more than a lack of obstructive contact as opposed to space in the sense of what appears to the eye in a room or outdoors; the latter is visible form, hence, a dependent nature rather than an imputational nature

"Translation from Honda (189).


37P 775, vol. 29, 53.4.2. This is translated by Hopkins (1983a: 613).

Predispositions or latencies, seeds (sa bon, bija), and potencies (nus pa, Sakti / bola) are equivalent. They are neither form nor consciousness, but non-associated compositional factors (Idan min 'du byed, viprayuktasamskura), i.e., not associated with minds or mental factors in the way that a mind is always associated with mental factors or a mental factor is always associated with other mental factors or with a main mind.


"According to Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo, in the Cittamatra system a conventional truth is an "object found by a prime cognition that is a correct consciousness distinguishing a conventionality" (Sopa and Hopkins [1976: 264]), i.e., all existent phenomena except for thoroughly established natures. All conventional truths exist conventionally, and all except for imputational natures exist ultimately as well.

"According to Gelukba scholars, the Cittamatra School regards the conception of a self of persons-the conception of the person being a selfsufficient entity-to be the ignorance that prevents liberation from cyclic existence. Thus, according to them it is not necessary to realize the most subtle emptiness-the lack of a difference in entity between subject and object and of objects naturally being a basis of names-in order to achieve liberation, though it must be overcome in order to attain Buddhahood.

distinguishes between phases of Asahga's writings: earlier parts of the Yogacarabhumi are consistent with Hinayana ontology, whereas the later addition, the Bodhisattvabhumi, is a "Mahayana illusionism" that propounds epistemological (but not necessarily ontological) dualism.

'Harris (83) concludes that, in fact, Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti did deliberately misinterpret them, "taking issue with a point of view that was never held by classical interpreters." This is certainly possible; there are many cases in which Indian commentators engage in exaggeration and hyperbole, possibly out of habits formed in the debating courtyard. However, there is also quite enough textual evidence to justify the interpretation of these Madhyamikas.


'5159.

'648.

"Although he often speaks in such a way that it seems as though he is referring to only one mind, in his Twenty Verses (18-20), he is concerned to show that different beings can have an influence on each other. This is discussed toward the end of the present chapter.

This is Jamyang Shayba's thought as condensed by Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 153.5-54.2.

"Moreover, we would be very hungry, for "mental food and drink" would not be filling. Moore's famous objection to Berkeley's idealism was that the fire I remember does not warm me, nor the food I remember sate me.

50Presentation of 7i7iets 494.15-18.

"Section numbers correspond to those assigned by Lamotte (1973; Tome I [Tibetan]: 26-31, Tome II [French translation]: 92-107). A number of these arguments from the Compendium of the Mahayana are from a sutra not identified by Asanga but identified by Lamotte as the Mahayana Abhidharma Sutra (1973:19*-20*).

"As explained by Buddhaghosa in the Path of Purification (visuddhi- magga) for meditators in the Theravada tradition, kasina are circular patterns used as foci of concentration. Some are simply spots of intense color; others are circular sections, marked off in various ways, of earth, water, sky, fire, etc. One meditates on the external kasina itself until one achieves a "teaming sign," a clear mental image of it, at which point the external prop may be abandoned. The "learning sign" eventually develops into a "counterpart sign," an abstract, luminous image with which one can then practice "extension of the sign," enlargement of the image until it eventually fills all of space. The term "totality" conveys the meditator's
experience that the kasina is the totality of sensible reality.

53Past objects no longer exist, future objects do not yet exist, dream objects have never existed, and a reflection is not what it seems to be.

"'Dimness of sight'; it has also been suggested that this eye disease is ophthalmia, an inflammation of the eye (Fenner).

"For translations, see the French translation of La Vallee Poussin and the English translations of C. W. Huntington, Stephen Batchelor, and Peter G. Fenner. (These are cited in the bibliography under Candrakirti.)

This is another variation on the argument about the dream state. The Cittamattra School has argued that waking and dreaming objects are equivalent in terms of being able to produce consciousness.

57Candrakirti apparently does not deal with the additional wrinkle introduced by Dharmapala (530-61 C.E.), who spoke also of self-self-consciousness. See Nakamura (1987: 278).

"The analogies are in Candrakirti's Autocommentary 104.7-5.1. This is cited in the Jamyang Shayba / Ngawang Belden translation, chapter 7.

59To be precise, the question of definitive and interpretable sutras is quite a bit more complex than this, since sutra can mean a portion of a larger text; hence, there are parts of sutras that the other school finds generally authoritative that might be definitive rather than requiring interpretation, and vice versa. The Janggya translation, section C, discusses issues related to these.

60For a discussion of the criterion of truth as established by reasoning in the classification of Buddhist scriptures, see Cabezdn (1981: 7-23).

61The context in which this famous statement appears in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds suggests to me that Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti are correct, for it is followed by a statement that the twelve links of dependent-arising depend on the mind; that mind is ignorance, and it conditions the rest of the process (Honda 1968:189).

'The following translation of Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom, 'Commentary on the `Treatise on the Middle Way"(dbu ma rtsa ba'i grel pa shes rab sgron ma, prajrnapradipamulamadhyamakavrtti) is from Eckel (1980: 337). Also, see Lopez (1987: 312-13).

63Presentation of Tenets 482.9-13.

The Desire Realm ('dod khmas, kamadhatu), Form Realm (gzugs kham, rupadhatu), and Formless Realm (gzugs med kham, arupyadhatu), the realms of
rebirth for sentient beings.

"Entrance to the Middle Way 6b.2. Also cited in Jamyang Shayba, chapter 1; there is more bibliographic information there. For another translation, see Huntington 162.

"Entrance to the Middle Way 8b.6-8. The translation is from Hopkins (1983a:614).

67p 775, vol. 29, 34.3.5. This is found in chapter 2. Cf. Suzuki 44 (123). It is cited in Janggya, Presentation of Tenets 482.20-83.1.

"Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.92) 8b.5. Dzongkaba's commentary is Illumination of the Thought 175a.5 ff.; the material in brackets is from him.

'Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way is a direct source for the second (VI.48-53), third (VI.78-83), fourth (VI.72-77) and fifth (VI.32) arguments. Cf. Huntington 161,163,166-67. Janggya discusses the first, second, fourth, and fifth; Jamyang Shayba (or his commentators, Losang Gonchok or Ngawang Belden) the third through tenth. Gungtang, disciple of the second Jamyang Shayba, Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo, is the source of the eleventh.

'Some Western scholars, such as Schmithausen (1976: 247), have suggested that the philosophy of Mind-Only (which they feel may not mean that no external objects exist, but only that they cannot appear to the mind) stems from the meditative experience of having the object itself disappear at the moment of realizing its emptiness. I think it quite likely that the tenet followed the experience in this way; thus, although neither Asanga nor Vasubandhu leads off with this argument, it seems appropriate to use it to initiate our review since it may have been the one most important to them.

"Annotations 109a.2-3.

3Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 146.3-4.

'In Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 284.2-85.3.

6Jamyang Shayba (Great Exposition of the Middle Way 638.7), considering a hypothetical debate about a yogi's cognition of the ground being covered with skeletons, denies that all such appearances are just imaginary form, because to him it would absurdly entail that, "the actual appearance of such emanated by the two [types of Hinayana] Arhats and Bodhisattva Superiors on the pure grounds is [an imaginary form-source]."

Vasubandhu also refers to the seeing of pus, etc., by hungry ghosts (Twenty Stanzas, verse 3), but he does not mention any other beings and what they see. His point, however, is much the same as Asahga's: the hungry ghost's perception of pus is just of its own projection, not of an external object. Tibetan edited by Etienne Lamotte, La Somme du Grande Vehicule D'Asariga I: 31; translation into French, II: 105.


"In Vedic cosmology, pretas are spirits of the dead that have not yet become "fathers" (pitr), ghostly beings that make a long journey to the moon and are then reborn on earth. It was believed that during the year of "development" into a "father" it was very important to make daily food offerings to the preta to nourish it. Hence, the preta is by definition a being that has hunger, and if not fed by its former family would suffer from continual hunger and thirst. Translators rendered preta into Tibetan as yi dvags, "those who think of food." In Buddhist literature, these hungry ghosts are of various sorts, though all are "hungry" because they cannot obtain sufficient food and drink. Some have huge bellies and needle-thin throats, so that they cannot swallow what they find; others cannot find anything other than blood, pus, excrement, and urine; others are constantly fooled by visions that turn out to be mirages; and so forth. One of the peculiarities of hungry ghosts is that they apparently are affected differently than are humans, and so forth, by natural events. Dzongkaba notes that hungry ghosts are not warmed, but cooled, by winter sunlight and are burned by summer moonlight (Illumination of the Thought 153b.6). See also Lati Rinbochay (1983: 33-35). Nagarjuna refers to a number of their difficulties in his Friendly Letter (bshes pa'i spring yig, suhrllekha).

"P 5552, vol. 113. This passage is cited in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 639.3 and in Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought 153b.2-4.

"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 641.5. Jamyang Shayba's long treatment of this topic may be based on Kaydrup's long treatment (see Cabezon 1992: 334-45). Kaydrup adds that those appearances are individual. Not all of the desire-realm gods would see nectar, and not all of the hungry ghosts would see blood and pus (Cabezon 1986: 684).

"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 649.2-50.1.

14Cabez6n (1992:336) suggests a variant: in the dominant human realm, the substance is water, changing to nectar or pus as a god or hungry ghost approaches. In a heaven, the substances would be nectar, changing at the approach of a human, etc.

"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 647.448.1. To clarify this debate, I have prefaced the conflicting positions with "incorrect position" and "correct position,"
though no such terms are used by Jamyang Shayba.

16I have relied on an oral explanation of Amchok Rinbochay of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives for my understanding of the three circles of self-contradiction.

"Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium of Prime Cognition "is cited in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 652-57; this quotation seems to be 110.10-13 (Dharamsala edition). See also Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 146.5-47.2.

'gLosang Gonchok, Word Commentary 99.3-4. With respect to the Sautrantikas, Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo does not mention any Sautrantikas that do not assert partless particles (Precious Garland of Tenets 36.4-6, translated in Sopa and Hopkins [186]). However, Losang Gonchok, commenting on Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets, says that some assert partless particles, some do not. Of those that do assert partless particles, some say that they touch, some do not (Word Commentary 112.3-5).

"According to Geshay Gendiin Lodro, they could not be further reduced without disappearing (Hopkins 1983: 894, n. 758).

20Gonehok Jikmay Wangbo, Precious Garland of "Tenets 36.4-6, translated in Sopa and Hopkins 186.

"From Vasubandhu, Treasury of Higher Knowledge (chos mngon pa'i mdzod, abhidharmakosakarika) VI: 4 (P 5590, vol. 115, 124.2.1-2; translated in Poussin 139-40).

z2Sopa and Hopkins 186.

73Losang Ginchok (99.4) makes the general statement that Vaibha$ikas assert that particles do not touch, but according to other Gelukba authorities this is apparently a position only of the Kashmiri Vaibhagikas (Hopkins 1983: 337-38).

"These are the essential arguments from Vasubandhu's Twenty Stanzas (12-15) and its autocommentary. Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 144.5-45.

"Presentation of Tenets 482.3-5.

"According to Losang Gonchok (145.4-46.1), Daktsang is said to hold the position that both the Madhyamika and Cittamatra schools actually accept partless particles. I have not found such a passage in Daktsang, and it seems to be a rather extreme position for him to have taken. He would have been aware of Vasubandhu's Twenty Stanzas, which explicitly refutes partless particles, and of Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment, where Nagarjuna himself clearly denies partless particles in verse 18:
When divided into directions Even a subtle particle is seen to have divisions.

How could what is analyzed into parts Be feasible as a subtle particle?

The Tibetan translation of this passage (only Sanskrit fragments are extant) is in Lindtner (1986b: 38-39) along with his translation into English.

"Presentation of Tenets 482.1-8.

Z7Ngawang Belden, Annotations 109a.7-b.l.

29Great Exposition of Tenets 37a.2-3 Qamyang Shayba translation, chapter 3). Also discussed in Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 276.4-77.1. The passage Jamyang Shayba is commenting on is in Candrakirti's Clear Words, 9b.3-4 (Sanskrit in Poussin, 30.3-4):

The erroneous and the non-erroneous (phyin ci log dang phyin ci ma log pa dag, viparyasaviparyasa) are different [i.e., a dichotomy]. Therefore, like the falling hairs [seen by] one with cataracts / dimness of sight, and so forth, when what does not [inherently] exist is apprehended by [that is, appears to] an erroneous [consciousness] as just [inherently] existing, how could even a portion of an [inherently] existent object be observed?

This seems to be the only place in the works of Candrakirti where he can be construed to be saying that valid cognition can be mistaken.

30Asar ga, Mahayanasa.ngraha (II: 27.3); in Lamotte (1973 1: 38; French translation II: 123).

"Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 147.2. The status of these minds is controversial. Lati Rinbochay discusses the various possibilities in Mind in Tibetan Buddhism 112-14.

This is one of the five types of forms that are phenomena-sources (chos kyi skye inchad, dharniatyatana), i.e., forms that appear only to the mental consciousness (yid shes, manovijnana), according to Asanga's Compendium of Higher Knowledge (mngon pa kun btus, abhidharmasamuccaya, cited in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 634.2-3).

"One could argue with Asanga over the original meditation object, a patch of water or earth (or a skeleton, in the meditation on foulness), since even in the conventions of the world these are external objects. However, his point is that one begins with an object and mentally multiplies or expands it far beyond its original scope; this "extra" then is like the "second" moon in the double-moon example, or the mirror-image (for instance, one could set up several mirrors and multiply one's
There are eight hot and eight cold hells, and in several of these there are guards who inflict torture on those born there as hell-beings.

"Entrance to the Middle Way VI.37cd. Cf. Huntington 161-62. Also, see Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 636. Candrakirti's Entrance V1.67 also speaks of dream-objects as acting as external objects. Dzongkaba comments on this verse in Illumination of the Thought 149a.5-b.2. The cause of perception in dreams is called form (gzugs, rupa).

3 The passage is cited in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 637.5-6.

"Nakamura (1987: 279) says that Asanga, in his Compendium of the Mahayana, concludes that consciousness also is empty, that being the implication of the doctrine that all phenomena have three natures; so, for Asanga, both subject and object are empty. According to him, it is Dharmapala who shifts the emphasis to only consciousness being truly existent. Nakamura does not identify the passage in question; in any case, it seems to me that since Asanga would mean by "empty" only the mind's emptiness of being a different entity from the mind apprehending it, it would not be imputedly rather than truly existent. Perhaps this is similar to misunderstanding Asanga's commentary on the passage in Maitreya's Discrimination of the Middle Way and Extremes 1.3-4 which says that because there are no external objects, there are no awarenesses (that perceive external objects; this passage is translated in the Jamyang Shayba section, chapter 1). This could be read as saying that both objects and consciousnesses are equally false, but it seems to mean only that there are no consciousnesses actually engaged in the perception of external objects.

"Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.41) 6a.9-b.1. Cf. Huntington 162.

39 The Essence of the Good Explanations 171.6-11.

40 Schmithausen (1976: 247), among others, has suggested that the impetus for the philosophy of Cittamatra is the meditative experience of having the object itself disappear at the moment of realizing its emptiness. This seems quite plausible; indeed, the non-appearance of an object in meditative equipoise is one of the arguments given for the non-existence of external objects.

"Presentation of Tenets 483.2-9, translated in Janggya section chapter 4.

"Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.51-52) 6b.8-9. Cf. Huntington 163.

43 Candrakirti, Entrance to the Middle Way VI.53-55. Cf. Huntington 163.

"Entrance to the Middle Way 8b.5. Cf. Huntington 168. Dzongkaba's
commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 175a.5 ff.; the material in brackets is taken from him.

"Annotations 109a.2-3.

"Great Exposition of Tenets 36b.1 (DSK II: 202b.2).

"Great Exposition of Tenets 36b.2.

"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 701 if.


"Translated by Hopkins (1983a: 526). Also translated by Sprung (1979: 42): The Buddhas themselves, out of concern for those they were guiding, who were ignorant of logic, made their points in terms of the conventional ideas of these people themselves." Sanskrit edited by Poussin 36.1-2.

51Ngawang Belden, Annotations pha 109a.3-5.

52Dignaga, Compendium on Prime Cognition I: 9-10 and vrtti, translated by Hattori (1968: 28-29). Hattori's notes cite Dharmakirti's commentary. Dharmakirti also explains that subject and object are not simultaneous (see Wilson [1984:885, n. 33, and translation of Gung-tang 10a.21), but it must be understood that when Dignaga and Dharmakirti explain perception, they do it as though there were external objects. (This is Stcherbatsky's observation [1962:11: 71, as noted by Klein [1986: 43-441.)

One considerable difficulty with Dharmakirti's assertion, as Jamyang Shayba and Losang Gonchok understand it (Word Commentary 142-44), is that it implies the following: if one can establish, through the logical sign of definite simultaneous observation, that subject and object are not separate substantial entities, it is then established that they are the same substantial entity. This, of course, would mean that the thoroughly established nature or emptiness posited in the Cittamatra system, the absence of a difference in entity of subject and object, would not be a non-affirming negative (med dgag, prasajyapratisedha), i.e., a mere absence that implies nothing positive in its place. This would contradict the Sutra Unraveling the Thought.

53Candrakirti, Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.92) 8b.5. Cf. Huntington 168.

Annotations 109b.2.

5'Annotations 109a.5-7.

"Twenty Verses 18.
"The universally acknowledged "opener of the chariot-way" for the Madhyamika School, Nagarjuna, is traditionally said to have lived over six hundred years. If he actually lived for that period, then he would have seen his system challenged by the Mind-Only philosophy of Maitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu. But here Jamyang Shayba reverts to one (but only one) statement of Nagarjuna's as evidence that the founder of the Madhyamika School responded to the Cittamatra challenge by implicitly asserting the existence of external objects and rejecting any other position.

5BP 2665, vol. 61, 286.1.6. Oddly, Jamyang Shayba does not cite stanza 27, which seems to be a direct response to Cittamatra:

The Subduer's teaching that, All of this is mind-only" Is for the sake of removing the fear of the childish; It is not a statement of reality.

The Sanskrit is: cittamatram idam sarvam iti ya desana muneh / uttrasapariharartham balanam sa na tattvatah. The translation is by Lopez (1987: 444). This stanza is also cited in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets (see Hopkins translation [1983a: 614]). Nagarjuna's authorship of this work has been disputed by Ruegg (1981: 104) but upheld by Lindtner (1986: 248). Lindtner considers Nagarjuna to be responding to the idealism of the Descent to Lanka Sutra, to which he finds references in several of Nagarjuna's other works (349, n. 38). The sutra seems to be a loosely organized collection of smaller texts written at different times, so that some parts might antedate Nagarjuna whereas others do not. One portion even seems to have a reference to Nagarjuna! (Sangharakshita 1985: 208). See Lopez (1987: 444, n. 4) for a discussion of this and other passages from Nagarjuna.


'Of course, there are some (e.g., Thomas Wood, A. B. Keith) who claim that Nagarjuna himself was a nihilist, and would read the cited passage as clear proof.

"Entrance to the Middle Way 8b.5. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 175a.5 ff.; the material in brackets is taken from him.


'Explanation of the Difficult Topics of Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-ofAll 26a.6-26b.1. This is Wilson's translation (1984: 540).


66"Fruitional effect" refers to something in an individual's five aggregates, i.e.,
something that is unique to an individual, and hence could not be shared with anyone else. "Empowered effect" is a broader term referring to the effects of actions and thus is not limited to an individual's aggregates.

'Twenty Verses 18a. Sanskrit is: anyonyadhipatitvena vijriaptiniyamo mith-ah.


6RGungtang 17b.2-20a.6, translated by Wilson (1984). Eight proofs are given by Asanga, but most actually are a defense of the possibility that more than one consciousness can operate at one time, a necessity if one is to assert the existence of a mind-basis-of-all.

"Annotations 110a.3-5.

70The Essence of the Good Explanations, 174.16-20.


Entrance to the Middle Way VI.96. Cf. Huntington 168. In the same spirit, Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, said that he feels that the Mind-Only view can be helpful, removing the "grosser dirt." (Interview in Dharamsala, 6/15/84.)

'Entrance to the Middle Way (VI.79-80) 8a.3-4. Cf. Huntington 166-67.

"In Jamyang Shayba, Great Exposition of Tenets 16a.4-5 (DSK ca 10a.7- b.3). Cited by Lopez (1984: 20). I suggest that there may also be a concern with the devaluation of ordinary perception. The devaluation of worldly conventions might have been seen as leading to a devaluation of other persons also (since others could mistakenly be understood to be mere projections of one's own karma, the error of solipsism), resulting in the loss of compassion for others; or, simply, the devaluation of the world that might result from the Cittamatra view might cause people to take lightly their own worldly situations instead of working within them, resulting in their failure to make spiritual progress.

"The theme of Ian Harris' recent monograph, for instance, is that there is substantial continuity between the two schools.


An entirely different interpretation of self-consciousness is given by Jadunath Sinha (1972: 33), who contends that "self-consciousness" just refers to the fact that
according to Cittamatra all appearances are mental; hence, any act of cognition is an act of self-consciousness, since what a consciousness apprehends is nothing other than itself. Sinha's conjecture both misunderstands the nature of objects according to Cittamatra and fails to fit Dignaga's use of the concept of self-consciousness to explain memory.

'This metaphor is employed by Hattori (1988: 49).

'There is no no consensus among Gelukbas as to whether Sautrantikas Following Scripture assert self-consciousness. Lati Rinbochay points out that according to Jamyang Shayba, they do not (and that is clear from Great Exposition of the Middle Way-see the next note), but that according to Jamyang Shayba's subsequent reincarnation, Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo, they do (Lati Rinbochay and Napper, [1980: 64-65]). However, Sopa and Hopkins, in the annotations to their translation of Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo's Precious Garland of Tenets in Cutting through Appearances, follow Jamyang Shayba when they repeatedly state that Sautrantikas Following Scripture do not assert self-consciousness. Also, Jamyang Shayba (Great Exposition of the Middle Way 714.1) says that some Cittamatrins Following Scripture assert the existence of self-consciousness. They are not following Asanga on this particular point.

'According to Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 694.5-6, Asariga himself does not assert self-consciousness, for it is not mentioned in his Actuality of the Grounds (sa'i dngos gzhi, bhumivastu) and when he enumerates types of consciousness, he either asserts only three types of direct valid cognition (sense, mental, and yogic), or does not include self-consciousness in his list of four, consisting of sense, mental, worldly (a category that includes the first two, i.e., sense and mental), and pure consciousnesses.

'In the Great Exposition of the Middle Way 714.6, Jamyang Shayba gives two definitions: (1) "an isolated phenomenon that has the aspect of the apprehender" (dzin pa'i rnam pa yan gar ba); and (2) "a consciousness that realizes only the solitary aspect of the apprehender" (dzin pa'i rnam pa ya rkyang tsam rtogs pa'i shes pa).

One problem that arises as a result of denying self-consciousness is that it would seem to deny the functioning of a Buddha's omniscient consciousness that, after all, knows all subjects and objects in all three times simultaneously. For a thorough discussion, see Newland (1992: 196-208).

'For a discussion of types of aspects, assertions on aspected perception, etc., see Klein (1986: 102 ff.).


'According to Hattori (1968: 101) self-consciousness is also asserted by the
Jainas, the Prabhakara-Mimamsaktas, and the Advaita-Vedantins, and rejected by the Samkhya and Naiyayikas. It is also refuted in Patanjali's Yoga-sutras.

'OA sense consciousness' empowering condition is its respective sensepower. Each of the five senses has a clear internal form that is its sense power. The empowering condition of a mental consciousness is a consciousness that precedes it. The other two conditions for perception are the immediately preceding condition (that there be a previous moment of consciousness) and the observed-object condition (the object observed). See Lati Rinbochay and Napper (1980: 68).


12 Lati Rinbochay and Napper (1980: 62). And like the spy, introspection must be as unobtrusive as possible, or risk the termination of the operation it is observing. Meditators know how difficult it can be to observe one's own mind without allowing the "observer" to become the "actor."

13 See Hattori (1968).

14 This sutra is P 47, vol. 24, 229-51. Stephen Batchelor (1979: 185) notes that this quotation is similar to a passage in the Descent to Lanka Sutra; he points to Tokmay Sangbo's commentary on ~antideva (Ocean of Good Explanations, Commentary to Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds 205), which quotes the Descent to Lanka Sutra for this point. Candrakirti quotes this in his Clear Words (Sanskrit in Poussin 62.4, translated by Sprung [55]).

75 P 5228, vol. 98, 15.3.1-2. Translation by K. Bhattacharya is on p. 34 of Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna, translation section; the Sanskrit is on p. 40 of the text section. This passage comes in the context of refuting all possibilities for establishment that would involve the positing of an inherently existent entity. For a validly cognizing consciousness to certify itself, it would have to be able to observe itself, whereby it would be self-conscious.

16 P 5226, vol. 95, 12.3.4.

"Note that he is replying to Dignaga; it is not clear that Candrakirti was aware of, or at least responding to, the work of his near-contemporary Dharmakirti.

"Annotations 116a.3-6.

"The sign "inherently established memory" is not established because there is no such thing.

"Fire and water crystals are believed to produce fire and water. However, the existence of water or fire does not entail the existence of these crystals, since there
are many other sources for those elements. Similarly, the mere existence of memory does not entail self-consciousness, since Prasangikas show that there are other explanations for the production of memory.

"Essence of the Good Explanations 175.14-76.1.

It would seem likely that this is from Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Entrance," but this passage does not appear there in exactly this way. Thurman (1984: 318) assumes this is Dzongkaba's statement based on Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way VI.72. Poussin's translation in Museon 11 (1910) of VI.72-76 is found on pp. 349-54.

The predicate of the probandum (bsgrub bya'i chos) is the term that is being predicated of the subject in a syllogism, the probandum being the thesis that is to be proved. For instance, the proposed syllogism here is: "The subject, self-consciousness, exists because memory exists." The probandum is: "self-consciousness exists." The predicate of the probandum is "exists."

"Entrance to the Middle Way 7b.9; other translations in Geshe Rabten (1983: 66), Huntington (166), and Poussin, Museon 11 (1910:353).

25As Ngawang Belden points out (based on Candrakirti), it is like the fact that in the world people have no conception of a seed and sprout as being inherently different; so, they say, "I planted that tree," when they mean that they planted the seed that grew into the tree; or they say, "I hurt," when it is their hand that hurts, without thinking "I am my hand." This is cited later in this chapter, in the context of the Prasangika rejection of ultimate analysis.

"Essence of the Good Explanations 176.18-20. This is cited by both Jamyang Shayba and Janggya.

"According to Janggya (478.13-19), who cites this, this is from Candrakirti's Clear Words. I have not yet located the passage in Clear Words, but the Tibetan (gzhal bya'i rnam pa'i rjes su byed pa tsam gyis tshad ma dag gi rang gi ngo bo rnam par 'jog pa'i phyir) roughly corresponds to Poussin's edition (p. 73, line 7): samasaditatmabhavasattakayoh pramanayoh svarupasya vyavastha-panah, which, according to Yamaguchi's index, should be P 5260, vol. 98, 13.3.4, and Derge, folio 25a.3 (thanks to Karen Lang).

28Annotations 116a.1-3.

"See Illumination of the Thought 158 ff.

30Presentation of Tenets 479.1 ff. That Janggya cites Kaydrup's explanation immediately after Candrakirti's and notes that it is "easier to understand" seems to be an indication that he finds Candrakirti's explanation unfathomable.
"The quotation has been expanded to include the first two lines of the stanza. The Sanskrit (V. Bhattacarya 191) is: yadi nasti svamsavintirviksanam smaryate katham►m/ anyanubhute sambandhat smrtirakhuvisham yatha. Cf. Batchelor's translation 136-7. Also, according to Geshay Belden Drakba, there is a very good commentary by Akya Yongdzin (Yangjen Gaway Lodr6).

An "other-experiencer" is just any consciousness, i.e., any consciousness other than self-consciousness. In this case, the "other-experiencer" is a body consciousness aware of the pain of the bite of a rodent.

33Kensur Yeshey Tupden said that it is not just inference of a previous eye consciousness, but experience of it.

34"Bear" is not present in the Sanskrit, but all of my informants assumed that it was the animal spoken of in the example.

35Kaydrup also found this explanation "extremely difficult to understand" (Cabezon 1992: 350).

'gsal zhing rig pa. See Jambel Sampel 1b.3, translated in Lati Rinbochay and Napper (1980: 45).

38P 5226, vol. 95, 12.3.4.


"Illumination of the Thought 158b.2-4.

37Kensur Yeshey Tupden.

"According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, a butter-lamp is self-luminous (rang gsal ba) in the sense that it has a nature of illumination and needs no other source, but it does not illuminate itself by itself (rang nyid gyis rang gsal ba), a formulation which implies that it requires illumination and that it illuminates itself in the same way it illuminates other things.

"Annotations 115b.4-7.

"According to Jambel Trinlay's textbook for Drebung's Loseling College (14.10-11), the definition of phenomena that are contradictory in the sense of not abiding together (lhan cig mignas 'gal) is: phenomena that do not have a common locus, that is, do not abide together harmlessly (gnod med du than cig mi gnas pa'i gzhi mthun mi sri pa'i chos). An example is hot and cold, which cannot exist together without harming each other. Phenomena that are contradictory in the sense of mutual abandonment (phan tshun spangs 'gal) are defined as: abiding in mutual abandonment in terms of objects of awareness (blo'i yul du phan tshun spangs
tegnas pa). An example is existence and non-existence, which are contradictory and cannot mutually appear as objects of awareness to a single mind. Technically, the former type of contradiction does not preclude the meeting of two things. For instance, a crow and an owl are said to be contradictory in the sense of not abiding together because of their natural mutual enmity, but of course these creatures could meet and fight. In general, however, except for meetings between living beings, things that are contradictory in the sense of not abiding together harmlessly cannot meet.

45'The "state of being produced" (skye bzhin pa) is the moment just before its production, when it still does not exist.

44P 5224, vol. 95, 4.4.2-4. Sanskrit is in Poussin, 152.10-11, 153.1-2.

46Nag5rjuna is exploring the possibilities for a meeting between a lamp and darkness: If they do not exist at the same time, how can light get rid of darkness? That is, if they do not meet, the production of a lamp would not cause the cessation of darkness. Or, if the lamp cleared away darkness without meeting it, then how could there be any darkness? On the other hand, if a lamp does exist at the same time as the darkness, how can it do away with the darkness? Dzongkaba explains the second stanza in Illumination of the Thought 164.5 ff.

"Ocean of Reasoning 163.19-64.5 (Varanasi ed.).

48Kensur Yeshey Tupden noted (12/14/83) that although conventionally a butter-lamp's state of being produced and darkness meet, they do not meet ultimately, for that would require that a butter-lamp would already exist (for something ultimately existent is never non-existent) entailing the absurdity that it would already exist at the time it is being produced. At that time, darkness is approaching destruction and the butter-lamp is approaching production. In the following moment, the butter-lamp is produced and darkness has ceased. There is no moment in which both exist; hence, they do not meet.

"Presentation of Tenets 476.3-4.

'Annotations 114b.5-15a.1.

"The term "inherently" has been inserted in brackets before "produced" in order to reflect the Gelukba explanation, stemming from Dzongkaba, that Nagarjuna and his followers do not mean to exclude even conventional production from other as a possibility, since that is the way things are actually produced. For instance, a sprout is produced from a seed, the seed being conventionally other than it. In other words, the reasoning is aimed at eliminating all possibilities for inherently existent production, including production from self and production from what is inherently other. As it happens, it is unnecessary to qualify production from self as just meaning inherently existent production from self because there is not even any conventionally existent production from self. Hence,
there is also no possibility of both production from self and other. The final option, production from neither, is rejected because there is conventional production from other.

52A problem with dispensing with this particular corner of the reason is that if one realized that there were no inherently existent others, one would already have realized emptiness. If that were the case, why continue with the reasoning?

"Annotations 116b.4-17a.2.

s"Daktsang is said to contend that it is contradictory that seed and sprout be different substantial entities but that there be no production from other. Gelukbas reply that production from other means inherently other, whereas a seed and sprout are only conventionally other.


ZP 761.31, vol. 25. For translation and context, see Honda (190).

3P 761.31, vol. 25.

4zhig pa is the past tense of 'jig pa ("disintegration").

5Throughout the book, "functioning" often precedes "thing" because the Perfection of Wisdom sutras often use the word bhava (dngos po) to refer to all phenomena-conditioned or unconditioned, impermanent or permanent. The term "functioning," therefore, excludes permanent phenomena. Vaibha~ikas are said to assert that even permanent phenomena perform functions-space, for instance, performing the function of allowing the movement of an object. However, Gelukbas limit "functioning" to the production of effects. Therefore, it must be understood that "functioning" is meant to imply that a thing has been produced and is able to act as a cause, whereas permanent phenomena are uncaused and have no effects.


'Technically, as will be seen, disintegratedness is part of the activity of disintegration, and hence, disintegration includes disintegratedness. Here, however, when disintegration is grouped with production and endurance, it refers only to something's "own time," its moment of being present, and does not include disintegratedness, which occurs in the subsequent moment.

'Annotations 113a.1-3.

9Geshe Gendiin Lodro said that most Buddhists accept that at the time of the
seed, a sprout exists as the entity of the seed; but a sprout itself does not exist then. This implies that, similarly, a sprout's disintegratedness exists at the time of its disintegration as the entity of disintegration.) The Vaibha~ikas are said to differ from other Buddhist schools in saying that a sprout actually exists at that time, a position similar to that of the non-Buddhist Samkhyas. For a discussion of Sarvastivada arguments, see Bastow.

10Daktsang Lotsawa was born in 1405, during the period in which Dzongkaba (1357-1419) was establishing the Gelukba order. He is infamous among Gelukba scholars for his scathing denunciations of Dzongkaba's views.

"Jamyang Shayba, Great Exposition of the Middle Way 628.5-29.2.

"For an extensive discussion of the divisions of negatives according to Gelukba sources, see Hopkins (1983a: 721-27).

"The Tibetan traditions follow ancient authorities such as Bhavaviveka in identifying eighteen Vaibhagika schools. For a survey of the various ways in which Bhavaviveka and others distinguished the relationships of the schools, see Hopkins (1983a: 339-41 and 713-19).


"Lamotte, 1936: 162-63. William Ames gave an interesting paper on "Death and the Non-Disappearance of Karma" on karmavipranaga according to the Sammityyas at the 1986 AAR meetings.


"Great Exposition of Tenets 39a.2-3. I have not found any place where Daktsang says something like this; it seems likely that Jamyang Shayba is attributing this position to him on the basis of his rejection of disintegratedness as a functioning thing.

18Janggya, Presentation of Tenets 487 (translation chapter 7), and Ngawang Belden, Annotations 113b (translation chapter 6).

"Illumination of the Thought 127b.2-6.

211 think that we might add the following points, though they are not explicitly indicated in this context by the Gelukba authors. (1) In principle, that an aspect of a thing could exist even when the thing itself does not exist is something accepted even by non-Prasangikas, for a sprout's futureness (its factor of not yet having
arrived despite the existence of its causes because its cooperative conditions have not yet been completed) exists at a time when the sprout does not yet exist. (2) It seems to me that Prasangikas might further object that if all of something's parts were destroyed along with it, it would not be able to produce an effect in the future. For instance, if all of a virtuous action's parts were destroyed along with it, there would be no way to connect that action to a future effect such as birth as a human being.

21P 5225, vol. 95, 11.4.1. Translations have been produced by Lindtner (1986b: 79) and Tola and Dragonetti (1983: 112).

12Dzongkaba, Illumination of the Thought 128a.1.


"Hopkins (1983a: 350), paraphrasing Ngawang Belden, Annotations. See the chart, later in this chapter, for all the possibilities of a single moment.

25P 5224, vol. 95, 10.1.5-6. The Sanskrit (Poussin 531) is: bhaved abhavo bhavas ca nirvanam ubhyam kathami asamskrtam ca nirvanam bhavabhavau ca samskrtau. The quotation has been lengthened by including the first two lines of the stanza. A similar passage from Gyeltsap can be found in the Jamyang Shayba translation, chapter 8, in the section on true cessations.

26Clear Words 356.2-3. Following upon this, Jamyang Shayba glosses "sprout's disintegratedness" by "dngos med of a sprout" which could only refer to a sprout's non-existence upon its disintegration, not non-existence, which, unlike disintegratedness, is not an impermanent phenomenon.

27Annotations, note ra, 113b.1.


"In Jamyang Shayba's text, this work is referred to simply as "the commentary on that" (de'i 'grel pa); since Nagarjuna's own commentary has not been preserved in any language (see Tola and Dragonetti [1983: 95, 177, n. 1]), it is assumed that this refers to Candrakirti's commentary, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"(rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa, yukti~tikavrtti), and a passage similar to this occurs there (P 5265, vol. 98, 177.2.4-5). However, this appears to be a paraphrase rather than a quotation. There is a debate on the consumption of the wick and butter in Candrakirti's commentary (Toh. 3864, vol. 7)15b.5 ff.

'Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way, "cited in Ngawang Belden's Annotations 113b.6.
In the same way, it seems, the disintegratedness of the impelling karma of a sentient being causes the death of that person. None of the authors under consideration explicitly makes this connection, but it seems to follow.


It seems to me that this also shows that causes are dependent on effects in the sense that it is through the production of an effect that something comes to be designated as a cause.

"Clear Words, 117.4-5 (59a.4-5). Sanskrit is in Poussin (1970: 174). The quotation has been restored to full length by filling in the middle, from "disintegration would be non-existent" to "Because of that."

"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 610.6-11.3.

Great Exposition of the Middle Way 609.6 ff.


"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 610.1.

"Cited in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 611.6-12.1. This indicates that the thing is impermanent—but does it show that disintegratedness is equivalent to impermanence? Perhaps disintegratedness, being something's not having endured, i.e., not having been permanent, is also something's impermanence.

"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 613.5.

"Clear Words, 117.7-18.1; Sanskrit is in Poussin, 174.2-4. The quotation has been lengthened by adding to first sentence, the objection, and filling in between, "For..." and "...in all respects."

"According to Ngawang Belden, Candrakirti considers disintegration and disintegratedness equally to be functioning things.

"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 614.1 ff.

"Clear Words 118.1. Sanskrit is in Poussin 174.5-6.

450n occasional permanent phenomena, see Hopkins (1983a: 216).

46P 5246, vol. 95, 136.3-5-6. The two lines prior to this are: ji Itar kla klo skad
An obvious objection would seem to be that it is a mere absence of water and of food—that causes the death of the wheat and the child. It could be the case that in those spots there was no water or food to begin with—that the wheat and/or child are abandoned in a rocky place, for instance. Thus, no "having been consumed" is involved. On the other hand, perhaps one could say that the dryness of the place has been caused through previous evaporation, making it a functioning thing that in turn can bring about the death of that which attempts to depend on it for life.

"Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" (P 5265, vol. 98, 177.4.2-4; also in chapter 6 of the Jamyang Shayba translation.

'Great Exposition of the Middle Way 625.5.

"In Illumination of the Thought, cited in the Great Exposition of the Middle Way 626.1.

Janggya, Presentation of Tenets 489.20.

"Illumination of the Thought 127b.6-28a.4.

"Janggya, Presentation of Tenets 488.

"This paragraph is based on the discussion of the three times in the Great Exposition of Tenets and Great Exposition of the Middle Way by Jamyang Shayba and the Presentation of Tenets by Janggya, which are summarized near the end of this chapter.

Ocean of Good Explanations 235.3-5.

"Illumination of the Thought 127b.2-6.

"Great Exposition of Tenets 38b.7-39a.1.

"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 628.3-5.

"Ocean of Reasoning, 191.6-12.

'Annotations 114b.3-6.

"As will be seen shortly, Jamyang Shayba apparently does not agree with Ngawang Belden that disintegratedness is a cause of total consumption or destruction, for disintegratedness preserves something's continuum of similar type and there is an effect to come out from it. That is apparently also why Jamyang
Shayba says that there is no disintegratedness of the obstructions to omniscience for a Buddha.

'Great Exposition of the Middle Way 628.3-5.

'Conversation, 6/6/84.

6S Janggya differs from Jamyang Shayba only in not beginning his definition of futureness with "a factor of."

'P 5266, vol. 98, 247.3.2.

67Jamyang Shayba, Great Exposition of Tenets 38b.4-5.

Great Exposition of the Middle Way 600.2-6 and 606.2 ff. In some debates Jamyang Shayba uses the short definition "produced but not ceased," (e.g., Great Exposition of the Middle Way 606.2 ff.) qualified by "itself"-i.e., it need not be specified that it is not those two factors if a presentness is "itself produced but not ceased."

69Great Exposition of the Middle Way 591.2.

70For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 606.2 ff. In Tibetan, the distinction is that even though something might be rang nyid skyes and rang nyid ma 'gag, it is not necessarily rang nyid skyes la ma 'gag pa.

"Cited in Great Exposition of the Middle Way 607.4; the passage has not yet been located in the original but is probably a commentary on a passage in the nineteenth chapter of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way, the chapter on time.

"For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 602.5.

73For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 603.4.

"For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 603.5.

"Cited in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets 38b.3-4.

76For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 605.3 ff.

"For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 607.5 ff.
For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 606.6 ff.

For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 616.6 ff.

Janggya, Presentation of Tenets 490.

Janggya, Presentation of Tenets 489.

"For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 604.1 ff.

For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 604.3 ff.

For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 604.5.

"This does not mean that those moments are past in relation to a pot, for in fact they are future in relation to that pot. Rather, when they are posited as pastnesses, it is in relation to that pot that they are so posited.

For a hypothetical debate in which this point is made, see Great Exposition of the Middle Way 600.6.

See Janggya, Presentation of Tenets 490.3-7. As we have seen, the present must also be posited by way of reference to the two other times.

"Cited in Great Exposition of the Middle Way 600.4. This seems to be inconsistent with the general Prasahgika School position that inference is as valid as direct perception.

"This passage is cited in Great Exposition of the Middle Way 601.4.

"This passage is cited in Great Exposition of the Middle Way 601.5-6.

"The preceding three assertions are mainly identified with the Svatantrika School (but are held by others as well).

Annotations 110a.2-3.

Presentation of Tenets 473.16-20.

"That an action has been accumulated means that a seed for a future experience of pleasure or suffering has been established.

Great Exposition of Tenets 37a.2.
The supreme mundane qualities path of preparation is the highest level of the path of preparation, where a yogi is still realizing emptiness conceptually but has not yet developed the ability to cognize it directly. Since even this consciousness is a conceptual consciousness, it is necessarily a mistaken consciousness because to it emptiness appears to truly exist.

'Clear Words, 9b.3-4. Sanskrit in Poussin, 30.3-4. This has also been translated by Hopkins (1983a: 613, 615) and by Sprung (1979: 41). The bracketed material is from Ngawang Belden's commentary.

'Presentation of Tenets 479.8.

9A correct sign (reason) must possess three modes or qualities: the presence of the sign in the subject, the forward entailment, and the reverse entailment. For instance, in the syllogism "The subject, a pot, is impermanent because of being a product," all three modes are established. There is presence of the sign in the subject because the sign, product, is a quality of the subject, a pot. Roughly speaking, there is forward entailment because whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent; there is reverse entailment because whatever is not impermanent is necessarily not a product.

10The probandum is that which is to be proved, i.e., the thesis. To again use the "pot" syllogism, the probandum is "pot is impermanent."

"Presentation of Tenets 480.13-20.


13The other party is "self" to himself or herself, "other" to us, and vice versa. Whichever of the two expressions is used, it can refer to a reason that the opponent holds. Since Prasangikas lead from an opponent's assertions, not from their own, they would in general not use reasons well known only to themselves but not their opponents. See Jamyang Shayba, Great Exposition of the Middle Way 418.2-5.

"Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo, Precious Garland of Tenets 63.13-17, translated in Sopa and Hopkins (291). The two branches of the Svatantrika School share this assertion except that Sautrantika-Svatantrikas do not contend that one finishes abandoning the two obstructions at the same time, for over the last three Bodhisattva grounds one removes only obstructions to omniscience.

"Presentation of Tenets 486.1.

"Great Exposition of Tenets 41a.3-4.

"In the Mahayana path structure, there are five levels called paths; the fourth of these, the last before Buddhahood, is the path of meditation, which is divided into ten Bodhisattva grounds.
"Illumination of the Thought 25b.1-2. Bracketed material comes from Dzongkaba's previous sentence. Also translated by Hopkins (1980: 147).

"Great Exposition of Tenets 40b.6.

20P 5263, vol. 98,164.1.5-7. The quotation has been lengthened by filling in material indicated by "etc." (sogs), beginning with, "This is like the fact..."

"Great Exposition of Tenets 40b.4-6.

22Candrakirti also mentions non-afflictive ignorance in his Brilliant Lamp, Commentary on the Guhyasamaja Tantra (rgyud 'grel sgron gsal, pradipoddhyotana), cited in Losang Dayang Grounds and Paths 119.2.

24P 5366, vol. 103,175.1.4.

"Janggya, Presentation of Tenets 486.17-87.14.

26None of the half-dozen scholars I asked knew who this was.

23P 5366, vol. 103, 175.4.5. No Sanskrit text is extant.

27Kaydrup (1385-1438) is one of Dzongkaba's two chief disciples; Jaydzun Chogyi Gyeltsen (1469-1546) is the author of monastic textbooks for Jay college of Sera Monastery; I have not yet found biographical information on Jamyang Gaway Lodro, except for his dates (1429/30-1503); Gendun Gyatso (1476-1542) is the second Dalai Lama; and Panchen Sonam Drakba (1478-1554) is the author of monastic textbooks for Loseling College of Drebung Monastery.

28He is the first Pan-chen Lama (1569-1662). Losang Dayang (Grounds and Paths, 119.4-5) calls him the All-Seeing Panchen Losang Chogyi Gyeltsen (pan chen kun gzigs blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan), and the name of his book is Answer to the Objections of the Translator [Daktsang] Shayrap Rinchen (sgra pa shes rab rin chen gyi rtsod Ian).

"Great Exposition of Tenets 37a.3.

30P 5228, vol. 95,15.1.3-4. The quotation has been expanded by adding the first two lines. Nagarjuna's commentary is P 5232, vol. 98, 61.1.6-2.2. Also found in K. Bhattacharya (1978: 25).

31If a valid cognition must be certified by another valid cognition, there would be an endless regress, in which case no valid cognition would be established-first, middle, or end.

33Annotations, note wa, 111b.1.

"Valid cognition is certified neither by self-consciousness nor by otherknowing
consciousness; it is certified simply by its own operation toward its objects (see introduction chapter 3 and chapter 7 of Jamyang Shayba).


"Illumination of the Thought 162b.5-63a.2.

36P 5266, vol. 98, 251.3.6-8 (202b.7-8, 203a.6). Variant readings: for "generated," P reads skyes for skye; for "aspect," P reads rnam par for rnam pa; for "second," P reads gnyis pas na for gnyis pa ni.

"Illumination of the Thought 163a.2-63b.1.327.2 in Peking ca.

Illumination of the Thought 163a.2-63b.1, 327.2 in Peking ca. This quotation immediately follows the preceding quotation.

"P 5265, vol. 98, 174.4.5. The second part of this quotation, the portion following the ellipses, seems to be a very loose paraphrase of the text following the first part.

4°This sutra is cited in Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, "but is not identified by him or by Nagarjuna, Dzongkaba or Jamyang Shayba. According to Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 188a.3 (Buxaduor edition), it is a sutra set forth by ~ariputra after his enlightenment. Perhaps it is the Repetition Sutra. Translated by Hopkins (1980: 170).


"This passage appears neither in Maitreya's nor Asanga's texts. It may be in Gyeltsap's commentary on Maitreya.

43V. Bhattacharya (195). The Sanskrit is: na vinanena margena bodhirityagam yo yatah. Stephen Batchelor identifies this 91oka as 40cd.


"Hearers (nyan thos, sravaka) and Solitary Realizers (rang sang rgyas, pratyekabuddha) are Hinayana practitioners who respectively depend and do not depend on the instructions of a teacher in their last lifetime prior to attaining liberation. Arhan was translated into Tibetan as dgra bcom pa, meaning, "one who
has destroyed the foes of the afflictions," i.e., become liberated. For a discussion of his translation of this as "Foe Destroyer," see Hopkins (1983a: 871-73, n. 553).

"P 5246, vol. 95, 135.2.8-3.1. The quotation has been expanded to include the last two lines. Cf. Sonam 156.

""Delusion" (gti mug, moha) is usually synonymous with ignorance. However, according to Geshay Tupden Gyatso, since Prasangikas assert non-afflicted ignorance, and delusion is an affliction, in their system the two are not synonymous.


'Iidentified by Geshay Tupden Gyatso.


52Annotations, note tsa,111a.2.

"Great Exposition of Tenets 36b.7-8.

53The definition of yogic direct perception (based on Dignaga and Dharmakirti) in Geshay Jambel Sambel's typical Gelukba text (4a.1-2; translated in Lati Rinbochay and Napper [61-62]) is: "a non-conceptual non-mistaken exalted knower in the continuum of a Superior that is produced from a meditative stabilization that is a union of calm abiding and special insight and that has become its own unique empowering condition." Obviously, Jamyang Shayba would delete "of a Superior," since he holds that even common beings can have yogic direct perception.

54The sixteen attributes of the four noble truths consist of the four attributes of true sufferings-impermanence, misery, emptiness, and selflessness; the four attributes of true origins-cause, origin, strong production, and condition; the four attributes of true cessations-cessation, pacification, auspicious highness, and definite emergence; and the four attributes of true paths-path, suitability, achievement, and deliverance (Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 258.4-59.1). For an explanation of each of these attributes and the manner in which they are contemplated in meditation, see Hopkins (1983a: 292-96).

'Illumination of the Thought 31b.5-32a.5. This is basically unaltered from Hopkins' translation (1980: 162-63).

Clear Words 342.4 ff. (Poussin's Sanskrit text is 516.5-18.6).

57On the justification for translating bcom Idan 'das (bhagavan) as
Supramundane (or Transcendent) Victor, see Lopez (1987: 196, n. 46).

"Great Exposition of Tenets 37b.2.

60From among the five paths comprising the spiritual course, the path of preparation (sbyor lam, prayogamarga) is the second, attained upon achieving special insight with emptiness as its object. Special insight is defined as "a wisdom of thorough discrimination of phenomena conjoined with special pliancy induced by the power of analysis" (Jamyang Shayba, Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 81b.3, cited in Hopkins (1983a: 92). Special insight may be directed at the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths such as the coarse selflessness of the person (thus, even ordinary beings can have yogic direct perception, as Jamyang Shayba argues in chapter 4). However, unless special insight has the subtle emptiness as its object one cannot use it to reach the path of preparation. Although Jamyang Shayba's college, Gomang, asserts that a coarse selflessness of the person is an emptiness, this is a coarse emptiness and the realization of it is not liberating. The "heat" path of preparation is the first of four parts of that path, the path over which one's conceptual realization of emptiness is deepened. Upon completing the remaining three parts of the path of preparation, one is brought to the point of non-conceptual direct realization of emptiness.

SeLosang Gonchok, Word Commentary 259.2.

61Maitreya, in his Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes (1.15-16) explains that the term chos dbyings (dharmadhatu) is synonymous with emptiness and etymologizes it as "the cause of the qualities (chos, dharma) of Superiors" ('phags pa’i chos kyi rgyu, hetutvaccaryadharma). Tibetan is P 5522, vol. 108, 30.4.4-5. For Sanskrit, see Pandeya (1971: 38-39). Dzongkaba explains that emptiness is the cause of the qualities of Superiors because meditation on it acts as a cause for becoming a Superior; his interpretation relies on Vimuktisena's Illumination of the 25,000 Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (see Hopkins [1980:178-79]; also see Ngawang Belden, Annotations dbu 8b.6 (Hopkins [1983: 383]).

"Great Exposition of Tenets 39b.5.

63P 5225, vol. 95,11.2.6-7. The citation has been expanded by adding the first two lines. The Tibetan, and the Sanskrit reconstruction by Uriutso Ryushin, reproduced in Tola and Dragonetti (98), are: yod pas rnam par mi grol tel med pas srid pa 'di las min. // idam bhavas ca nirvanam ubhayam naiva vidyate/bhava eva parijhato nirvanam iti kathyate.

'According to Candrakirti (Entrance to the Middle Way VI.220 [14b.1]), abhkva means uncompounded phenomenon ('dus ma byas kyichos, asamskrtadharma). In other words, the "great beings" understand all phenomena, impermanent and permanent.
Great Exposition of Tenets 40b.1.

‘Clear Words 220.3. The Sanskrit is in Poussin 340.6-7: ddhyatmikabahyagesavastvanupalambhenadhyatmam bahi§ca yah sarvathahamkaramamatarapari-jnaya idamatra tattvam. Also translated by Sprung (165).

67Dzongkaba, Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, 371b.2-3.

The "suchness to be attained" is the adventitiously pure Nature Truth Body (ngo bo nyid sku, svabhavika-kaya), the emptiness of the Buddha's omniscient consciousness and the ultimate true cessation.

"According to Geshay Belden Drakba, this is the position taken in Panchen Sonam Drakba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament for Clear Realization."

"Great Exposition of Tenets 39b.2.

7P 5266, vol. 98, 259.3.4.

‘Clear Words 48.1-3. The Sanskrit is in Poussin 71.10-11. The quotation has been restored to full length. Translations by Sprung (61) and Stcherbatsky (1927: 244).

73There are several etymologies for the term pratyaksa. Poussin gives sources (1970: 71-72, n. 4); Stcherbatsky (1927: 250, n. 2) says that Vasubandhu's definition in Nyavartini (42-edition unspecified) is quite different from Dignaga's in his Compendium of Prime Cognition (pramana-samuccaya) 1.15 (P 5700, vol. 130, Toh. 4203). The etymology followed by the Prasangika School appears to be "before the eyes" (prati, before, + aksa, eyes), in the sense of objects obvious to the senses.

74Annotations, note cha, 117b.2-3.

'Annotations 119a.2.-3.

75P 6087, vol. 153. Thurman (1982) identifies the first part as Dzongkaba Collected Works, vol. kha, 230b.4-31b.5. This translation follows that of Hopkins in Tenzin Gyatso, Dalai Lama XIV (1984:148,153). First part also translated by Hopkins and Sopa (101-2) and by Hopkins (1987: 22). Janggya cites this passage (see Hopkins, 1987: 348-49) and explains that it means that the more one comes to understand emptiness, the better is one's understanding of phenomena as being merely dependent imputations, and vice versa.

'Dzongkaba's biography is summarized and elucidated by Thurman (1984: 65-89); this episode is recounted on p. 79.

ZDharamsala edition of the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path 408b.1.

'Hopkins 1983.
'For a concordance of these three editions, see Mimaki (1982: 257-67). The Gomang and Ngawang Gelek printings of the Drashikyil edition are essentially identical although it is likely that the former was copied from the latter. The orthography is obviously different and the Gomang scribe sometimes finishes his copying before the end of the corresponding page in the Ngawang Gelek version and has to use ellipses or has to squeeze a bit more on the next page because he was not able to get a few words into the space available. The pagination of the two versions is different because in the Ngawang Gelek version each folio side in the entire volume has been counted separately, though it also has the usual folio numbers. The "unique tenets" are found in the Gomang edition, cha 48a.2-55a.1, in the Musoorie edition cha 36a.3-41a.6, and in the Drashikyil edition part II 201b.6-11a.1, enumerated as 1014.6-33.1 in the Ngawang Gelek printing.


'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 36a.3.

2Autocommentary on the "Entrance" 255.5; also, P 5263, vol. 98, 166.2.5-6. This is a citation of the Entrance to the Middle Way 17b.9 (epilogue). Cf. Huntington 196.

3"This system" can be taken as either the Madhyamika of Nagarjuna or the Prasangika School, for Candrakirti certainly saw no difference between Nagarjuna's thought and his own. Candrakirti justified his own rejection of autonomous syllogisms (svatantra-prayoga) and use of contradictory consequences by Nagarjuna's example. See Clear Words 24.7-5.2; translation by Sprung (1979: 38-39). As Dzongkaba notes in the beginning of his Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Candrakirti's) "Entrance "(6.3.-8.2), Candrakirti wrote his Entrance to the Middle Way in order to demonstrate the unsuitability of interpreting Nagarjuna, the founder of the Madhyamika system, according to other tenet systems (such as Cittamatra and Svatantri-ka) and to fill in gaps on the Bodhisattva practices.

'Although Jamyang Shayba refers to Dzongkaba and Candrakirti in connection with eight pairs of tenets, only he himself has composed such a list. Candrakirti had no list of "unique Prasangika School tenets" (of course, he would not have applied the term "Prasangika" to himself or Buddhapalita). Dzongkaba's list of unique tenets had only eight items, not eight pairs. See the Introduction for a comparison of the lists of Dzongkaba, Jamyang Shayba, and others.

'When Jamyang Shayba says that the Prasangika School tenets should be known from Dzongkaba's Illumination of the Thought, and so forth, he means that those texts are important sources for these unique tenets, not that there is a list of points as such or that all of those topics are necessarily extensively discussed in those works. As will be seen, Jamyang Shayba often cites Candrakirti and Dzongkaba and then expands upon their themes. Jamyang Shayba has mentioned some of these points earlier in the book, particularly in the "Introduction to the
Madhyamika School" chapter (chapter 10) where he refutes some of the assertions he has found in Daktsang (or at least has imputed to Daktsang). That what follows is considered a "mere textual commentary" (gzhung 'grel tsam) seems to indicate that he will not digress into hypothetical debates, as he often does elsewhere in the Great Exposition of Tenets.

'Note pa, 108a.5.

'Illumination of the Thought 264a.4-b.3.

'Commentary on the Entrance 255.3-7 (P 5263, vol. 98, 166.2.1-5). This passage appears similarly in these two editions and the Sarnath edition of Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations (140), where this passage has also been cited, but here in Illumination of the Thought Dzongkaba has considerably edited it: for "Madhyamika School textual system" (dbu ma'i gzhung lugs), P (etc.) reads 'Treatise on the Middle Way "(dbu ma'i bstan bcos); for "other" (gzhan na), P reads gzhan las (same meaning); for "not expressed" (brjob pa med pa), P reads mi brjod pa (same meaning); for "this system appearing here" (dir 'byung pa'i lugs kyang), P reads lugs 'di nas 'byung pa de yang (same meaning); for "certain Madhyamikas" (dbu ma pa kha cig), P reads just "someone" (kha cig); the sentence concerning Sautrantikas and Vaibhavas $ikas is a combination of two nearly identical sentences in P; and for "do not understand the suchness" (de kho na nyid ma shes pas), P reads don gyi de kho na nyid mngon par mi shes pa kho nas (same meaning). Dzongkaba's substantive alterations appear to be for the sake of clarifying Candrakirti. He has altered dbu ma'i bstan bcos to dbu ma'i gzhung lugs, perhaps to indicate that in addition to Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way there are other Madhyamika School treatises that express the doctrine of emptiness correctly, for Candrakirti certainly would not denigrate Nagarjuna's other works on emptiness by suggesting that only the Treatise on the Middle Way is correct. He has also specified the persons who are mistaken about the Madhyamika School's presentation of the ultimate and conventional as "certain Madhyamikas"-in other words, the Sva-atantrika-Madhyamikas. This is an important source for Dzongkaba's argument that the recognition of distinct branches of the Madhyamika School is based on Candrakirti's own assessments. See his The Essence of the Good Explanations 139.18 ff. (translated by Thurman [1984: 288]).

In other words, the Madhyamika School textual system of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva is the only one that correctly sets forth the doctrine of emptiness, that phenomena are empty of inherent existence, and Candrakirti is the only one who correctly understands Nagarjuna's explanation of suchness (emptiness) in his Treatise on the Middle Way.

10That is, if Nagarjuna's doctrine were as the Sva-atantrika-Madhyamikas have explained it, the supramundane doctrine of Nagarjuna, a doctrine that actually leads to passage beyond sorrow (myang Was, nirvana) would be no better than the mundane doctrine of other schools.
"The "two proponents of truly existing external objects" are the Vaibhagikas and Sautrantikas, who, according to Gelukbas, consider it impossible for an object to exist if it does not exist ultimately, i.e., is not established by its own character. The Cittamatrins also are proponents of true existence, and the Svaṭaṇṭrika-Madhyamikas are proponents of inherent existence, but they assert inherent existence only conventionally, not ultimately. It is a unique Prasangika School tenet that objects lack inherent existence not only ultimately, but even conventionally.

12 The Prasangika School also diverges from other Madhyamikas, viz., the Svaṭaṇṭrika-Madhyamikas, on this point, because the Svaṭaṇṭrika-Madhyamikas assert that phenomena are established by their own character conventionally, though not ultimately. The sources for this in Indian Buddhist literature are few in number and without any clear, strong expression; it is a distinct contribution of later scholars in Tibet to have explored the differences between Candrakīrti and Bhavaviveka, the founder of the Svaṭaṇṭrika-Madhyamikas. For a discussion of the issues see Lopez (1987) and Hopkins (1983a).

13 Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are called "Protectors" because of protecting the kingdom of doctrine and conquering the foe of cyclic existence. Nagarjuna is called Naga-Arjuna, because like Arjuna he protects and destroys enemies (Hopkins 1983a: 356-57, paraphrasing Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets 4a.2 ff. [Musoorie ed.]).

"Great Exposition of Special Insight 402a.1-2.

"Directionally partless particles and partless moments of consciousness are asserted by Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas Following Scripture (those who follow Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge (abhidharmakośa) instead of Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition). For them, an ultimate, or ultimate truth, is something that cannot be reduced or analyzed in such a way that one's apprehension of it is cancelled. It is a "building block" out of which are made conventions or conventional truths, objects that cannot bear such analysis. They contend that the ultimate unit of matter is a particle too minuscule to be further divided, and the ultimate unit of consciousness is a moment too brief to be divided. Madhyamikas (and Cittamatrins) accept neither directionally partless particles nor partless moments of consciousness, maintaining that no directionally partless particle nor partless moment can bear analysis; thus these are not asserted even conventionally. This will be discussed at greater length in chapter 1.

16 Both Madhyamikas and Sautrantikas, for instance, assert the existence of tables and chairs. Thus, Madhyamikas do assert the conventional existence of phenomena such as forms and sounds that Sautrantikas and Vaibhaṣikas assert to be truly established. They simply do not assert that those phenomena truly exist.

17 Ngawang Belden seems to imply that there is a conflict between Dzongkaba's
texts by introducing them with "however" (kyang). But there seems to be no contradiction, and Ngawang Belden surely realized this; although objects which are truly established do not exist even conventionally, objects which are merely asserted to be truly existent but which are in fact not truly existent do exist conventionally. The only objects not included are those which have no basis whatsoever, such as a mind-basis-of-all, self-knowing consciousnesses, partless particles, and so forth. It must be understood that in the first quotation Dzongkaba's referent is simply phenomena such as forms, considered without any qualification such as "truly existent"; however, in the second quotation his referent is truly existent forms, and so forth. As Kensur Yeshey Tupden said, his instances (mtshan gzhi) are different.


19Sautrantikas and Vaibhagikas assert objects that are established by their own character, but the Prasangika School rejects propounding such objects even conventionally. However, although the Prasangika School cannot assert objects such as tables and chairs in the same manner as the Sautrantikas and Vaibhagikas, they can assert them in the manner of existing as mere imputations by thought.

20As Kensur Yeshey Tupden said, if one does not understand ultimate truths, one does not understand conventional truths, and vice versa. Others cannot posit ultimate truths because they assert inherently existent objects; they say that conventional truths are found upon analysis, whereas the Prasangika School says that they are found without analysis and investigation.

"Great Exposition of Tenets 36a.5.

"'Only the Cittamatra and Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika (Middle Way Autonomist Yogic Practice) Schools (the latter "founded" by ~antaraki- Wita) deny the existence of external objects, and only Cittamatrins Following Scripture (the followers of Asanga) assert the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. Thus, there are many schools in addition to the Prasangika School that reject these Mind-Only positions.

25Only the Prasangika School bases its criticism of the tenets of others on a standpoint of rejecting inherent existence, asserting that phenomena exist as mere imputations by thought, designated in dependence on their bases of designation.

"The Prasangika School standpoint is set forth by Candrakirti, who draws it from Nagarjuna, who in turn is said to be expressing Buddha's thought in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras.

"'Superior" is one of the epithets of Nagarjuna and translates 'phags pa (arya). For a discussion of this translation, see Hopkins (1983a: 840, n. 495). Superiors are those who have attained the path of seeing (mthong lam, darsana-marga) and first
bodhisattva ground (sa, bhumi), i.e., who have experienced a direct realization of emptiness.

22Nagarjuna’s system is (1) unique in relation to the ultimate because the object of negation is unique and (2) unique in relation to the conventional because inherently existent objects do not exist even conventionally.

"Entrance to the Middle Way 17b.9. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 264a.3 ff. Cf. Huntington 196.

"Huntington translates this just as "Madhyamika texts," but I assume that Jamyang Shayba would follow the explanation of Dzongkaba (Illumination of the Thought 264a.3), who identifies the quintessential instructions as those of Nagarjuna. This would seem to indicate that Dzongkaba regarded Candrakirti as Nagarjuna’s actual student (which implies that he regarded Nagarjuna as having a six-hundred-year lifespan). Candrakirti, in his Clear Words (P 5260, vol. 98, 92.2.3), says:

And having seen the Four Hundred and so forth [by Aryadeva, etc.] and likewise many profound sutras as well as the commentary done by Buddhapalita, I have gathered together the good explanations of Bhavaviveka [and those of these masters] which were transmitted from one to another [and the texts of Sūra, Jnanagar-bha, etc.] as well as what I received from [Nagarjuna’s own] analysis [of the meaning of his words] and have expounded this in order to please those of great intelligence.

The material in brackets is from Great Exposition of Tenets DSK II.70b.6-71 a.1; it is translated in Hopkins (1983a: 591-92, 862-63). Some scholars think that the analysis Candrakirti refers to is his own; others, like Jamyang Shayba, that it was Nagarjuna’s. Kaydrup, Dzongkaba’s student, says that the view that Candrakirti was Nagarjuna’s actual student is supported by Guhyasamaja Tantra masters, scriptural citation, and reasoning (Lessing and Wayman 91).

""This doctrine" is the doctrine of emptiness, according to Kensur Yeshey Tupden (3/10/83).

30This is a possible reconstruction of the Sanskrit.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 36b.1 (DSK II: 202b.2).

'A conventional validly cognizing consciousness (tha snyad pa'i tshad ma) is a directly perceiving or inferential awareness. (This twofold division of valid cognition comes from the Pratyakga chapter [1 ff.] of Dharmakirti’s Commentary on (Dignaga’s) 'Compendium of Prime Cognition.' It is (1) valid because it is not invalidated by any cause of error and (2) conventional because it is not involved in ultimate analysis, such as searching for an object among its bases of designation, e.g., trying to find a chair that is either the same as or different from its parts. Its
objects include all phenomena except for ultimate truths (don dam bden pa, paramartha-satya), which in the Prasahgika system are the emptinesses (stong pa nyid, sunyata) of conventional truths (kun rdzob bden pa, samvrti-satya, literally "truths for concealers"), which comprise all other phenomena. (Kensur Yeshey Tupden considers even emptinesses to be objects of such a consciousness, since emptinesses conventionally exist. See Klein [1994: 48, 138].) Jamyang Shayba intends to show that there is no validly cognizing consciousness that establishes the non-existence of external objects and no validly cognizing consciousness that establishes a mind-basis-of-all.

4Annotations, note pha,108b.6.

5P 2665, vol. 61, 286.1.6; see Great Exposition of Tenets cha 48b.5. Also translated by Lindtner (1986b: 47). According to the Gelukba tradition, Nagarjuna lived for six hundred years and therefore was still alive at the time of Asanga's "founding" of the Cittamatra system; for evidence, they point to the Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment, which seems to be a reply to Asanga. (See Hopkins [1983a: 359]. Of course, it is possible that Nagarjuna is responding to an earlier variety of Mind-Only thought. Some scholars (e.g., B. K. Matilal [1974:141]) assume that Mind-Only arose simultaneously with the Mahayana, though there is no clear evidence for its existence prior to the "Mind-Only" sutras and their elucidation by Asanga and Vasubandhu.

'Entrance to the Middle Way 8b.5. Cf. Huntington 168. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 175a.5 ff; the material in brackets is taken from him.

7The Cittamatrins are said to apply analysis to external objects made of partless particles (it being assumed that all physical objects are made of such) and thereby demonstrate, through denying that anything is indivisible, that such external objects cannot be found. Gelukba Prasarigikas agree that external objects cannot bear such analysis, but add that if such reasoning were applied to a consciousness, it also would be unable to bear analysis.

'There are passages similar to this one in Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations 172.6-12, and in his Illumination of the Thought 176a.3 ff. The passage indicates that Buddha refutes inherent existence for all five aggregates, signifying that the mental aggregates are no different from the physical aggregate in not being truly existent. The scriptures of abhidharma agree in the sense that
they hold that the five aggregates share the general characteristics (spyi mtshan, samanyalaksana) of being impermanent, unsatisfactory, and selfless, but all have their own specific defining characteristics (rang mtshan, svalaksana).

10 Conventional valid cognition-direct perception or inference-certifies external objects. Only a consciousness analytically searching for an object, i.e., a validly cognizing consciousness distinguishing the ultimate, fails to find an external object. However, this failure to find an external object that can bear analysis refutes only the existence of truly existent external objects, not the existence of external objects conventionally. There is no non-analytical, conventional awareness that establishes the non-existence of external objects.

"Whenever one searches analytically for an imputed object, it is unfindable. For instance, if one looked among the parts of a table for the table, one would not be able to find any part that is the table. In the same way, consciousness is unfindable when sought.

"In this chapter, the position of the Cittamatra School that the objects that are apprehended by consciousnesses are one entity (ngo bo gcig, eka-bhava) with those consciousnesses is sometimes abbreviated, "one entity with consciousness." This should not be construed to indicate that apprehended objects are one entity with consciousness in some larger sense, like the monistic idealism of an Absolute Mind into which everything coalesces; rather what is meant is that objects are only one entity with exactly that consciousness that apprehends them and is produced with them from a single potency of the mind-basis-of-all. That they are one entity indicates that they are necessarily produced simultaneously or necessarily observed simultaneously; nevertheless, they can be distinguished conceptually.

13 Dharmakirti refutes external objects by reasoning that if an object and the consciousness which realizes it are observed to necessarily occur simultaneously they could not be separate entities. In the statement "The subject, the two, an apprehending subject and an apprehended object, are not different entities because they are observed to necessarily occur simultaneously," the sign (the reason, "because they are observed... simultaneously") of definite simultaneous observation (Than cig dmigs nges) serves to cause one to realize that an apprehending subject and an apprehended object are not different entities. Simultaneous observation is possible because of the existence of self-consciousness (rang rig, svasamvedana), that consciousness that knows a consciousness that in turn apprehends an object (see chapter 7). That reasoning consciousness would be an instance of valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate because its object, the lack (or emptiness) of a difference in entity of subject and object, is an ultimate truth, or suchness, in the Cittamatra system itself. According to Jamyang Shayba, in the Cittamatra system, ultimate truths are (1) the person's emptiness of being substantially existent or self-sufficient, (2) an object's emptiness of naturally being the basis of names, and (3) the emptiness of object and subject being different entities.
"According to the Prasaligika School, since objects do conventionally exist, if they are not external objects they must exist as "mental things" (shes pa'i dngos po) in the sense of being objects that are the same entity as the minds apprehending them. According to the Cittamatra School, such objects are truly established and are conventional truths. But the Prasahgika School maintains that "mental things" could not appear to a conventional validly cognizing consciousness; hence, only a validly cognizing consciousness distinguishing the ultimate could establish a chair as a mental thing. The reason is that an ordinary conventional awareness does not distinguish a chair as a mental thing, but just as a chair. Going beyond that point requires ultimate analysis.

"One would be forced to this conclusion simply because if objects conventionally exist and are not external to consciousness they are perforce one entity with consciousness.

16If forms, etc., were findable under analysis, they would be established by way of their own character. According to the Prasaligika system, objects are not established by way of their own character even conventionally.

"From the point of view of the Prasangika School, it is true (1) that both the Sautrantika School and the Cittamatra School assert that impermanent phenomena are truly established and (2) that it is better to assert external objects than to deny their existence. Nevertheless, it is better to refute external objects than to assert "partless particles" which are found upon analysis, as the Sautrantikas do. Partless particles are conceived to be basic units of matter so tiny that they cannot be physically subdivided, and they assert that these units can be found upon analysis. For Prasangikas, the Cittamatra analysis of such "partless particles" demonstrates that external objects cannot withstand analysis in the sense that, at the very least, they must be designated in dependence on their parts. Someone who understands the Cittamatra analysis can then agree with the Prasangika School that external objects are not findable upon analysis and be in a position to understand that they are merely imputed by thought.

18From the Prasangika School's point of view, the Cittamatrins make two critical errors: they do not limit the scope of their analysis to ultimate existence, thereby refuting even the conventional existence of external objects; and they do not extend their analysis from external objects to internal consciousnesses.

"The Essence of the Good Explanations 161.14-18. The quotation has been expanded to include the entire sentence.

20The Essence of the Good Explanations 171.6-11.

Z'Dzongkaba is speaking here of "other Madhyamikas," i.e., SvaatantrikaMadhyamikas. According to Gelukbas, this school asserts that whatever exists must conventionally be established by way of its own character, i.e., be
inherently established. Therefore, all Svetantrikas would be forced to say that if external objects lack inherent existence even conventionally, as the Prasargikas contend, they could not exist.

'If one knows that both minds and external objects can be posited without being inherently existent, it is easy to understand that objects and subjects are similar in not being inherently existent and in being conventionally existent. Svetantrikas do not share this view, contending that if something does not exist by way of its own character it cannot exist at all. Hence, although Prasangikas and some Svetantrikas (the Sautrantika-Svetantrikas) agree that external objects exist, they differ because these Svetantrikas are unwilling to affirm external objects that do not exist by way of their own character.

23Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way 8b.6. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 176b.1-2.

"The Cittamatra School contravenes conventional truths because in refuting external objects it negates the valid convention of the world that external objects exist. It contravenes ultimate truths because in asserting the true establishment of mind it negates the ultimate truth of minds, their lack of true existence.


"Four Hundred (P 5246, vol. 95, 140.2.3-4). Sanskrit (Bhattacharya 295) is: ekam sadasadekum ca naidam tattvam na laukikam / tenedam sadidamasad vaktum eva na gakyate. This g1oka is found near the end of the Four Hundred and is interpreted by Dzongkaba to show that it contravenes Nagarjuna's presentation of the ultimate to assert, as the Cittamatra School does, that there is any difference between minds and external objects in terms of true existence. Cf. Sonam 299 (stanza 399).

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 36b.2 (DSK II: 202b.3).

28A mind-basis-of-all is asserted only by Cittamatrins Following Scripture (lung gi rje su 'brangs pa, agamanusarin), the followers of Asanga. It is distinct from the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness, and its function is nothing more than to bear the seeds or latencies of actions. It does not distinguish objects, is neither virtuous nor non-virtuous, and is undefiled by the accompaniment of any afflicted mental factors. See Wilson (1984) for an extensive explanation of these characteristics according to Gelukba sources, especially Gungtang.

According to Gelukbas, the mind-basis-of-all as described in the Cittamatra School's texts is an object that can be found by an analyzing consciousness. As a consciousness, it must be truly existent; as a truly existent phenomenon, it can be found by analysis. It is said to be a "different entity from the six collections of consciousness," for instance, suggesting its findability apart from them. Indeed, if a
mind-basis-of-all were not asserted to be findable under analysis, other than the fact that it is a consciousness there would be no essential difference between it and the "mere I" (nga tsam, a non-associated compositional factor [ldan min 'du byed, viprayuktasamsku- ral] that Prasangikas posit as the bearer of karmic latencies from one lifespan to another and which is asserted to be merely imputed in dependence on the aggregates. According to Prasangikas, whatever can be found by an analysis that searches for it is not established by a conventional reasoning consciousness and therefore does not conventionally exist. (Emptiness is "found" upon analysis, but is not found as the result of a search for it; rather, emptiness is what one realizes upon searching analytically for something else.) The "mere I," on the other hand, is posited without investigation and analysis. Here, a "conventional reasoning consciousness" means only conventional valid cognition of some sort; the point is that no conventional valid cognizing consciousness certifies a mind-basis-of-all. Some scholars reserve the term "reasoning consciousness" for ultimate valid cognition.

'Annotations 109b.7.

"According to Kensur Ngawang Lekden, (? -1971), former abbot of the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa (rgyud smad grwa tshang) and a geshay of Gomang College, consciousnesses are called "collections" because there are many examples of each type according to their objects of experience or apprehension. (Oral communication from Jeffrey Hopkins.)

"The mind-basis-of-all as described in those texts would have to be truly established, and thus findable under analysis.

"The Cittamatrins assert that the mind-basis-of-all is the illustration of the person, as it is the basis for bondage and liberation, and that it is that which is found by an analysis that seeks the person. (This is an argument made by the Gelukba scholar Gungtang; see chapter 3.) The Prasangikas contend that nothing is findable under analysis; rather, the "mere I" is the illustration of the person, being merely imputed in dependence upon one or more of the five aggregates. That it is a mere imputation by thought means that it cannot be found upon analysis.

'There would be no need to assert a mind-basis-of-all if external objects existed, since they, not latencies deposited on the mind-basis-of-all, would be the causes of consciousnesses which perceive external objects.

35The Essence of the Good Explanations 174.16-20.

36P 5522, vol. 108, 19.4.6-7. The material in brackets has been inserted to reflect Dzongkaba's understanding of the passage. The Sanskrit in Pandeya (1971: 13 and 194) is: arthasattvatmahijriaptipratibadsam prajayate/vijrianam nasti casyarthastadabhavattadapyasat. For other translations, see Stcherbatsky (1971: 64-5) and Kochumuttom (1982: 46-7 and 236-7). There is a similar statement in

"That is, minds that apprehend the objects of the senses, the sensepowers, and the mind-basis-of-all-all of which are appearances generated from karmic latencies with the mind-basis-of-all-are all truly existent and have no external objects.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 36b.3.

39Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way 8b.5. Cf. Huntington 168. The quotation has been restored to full length. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 176a.4 ff. and is the basis for the bracketed material.

'Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way 6b.2. (P 5262, vol. 98, 102.2.6). Candrakirti's commentary is P 5263, vol. 98, 127.2.4 if. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 132a.4-134b.1 (P 6143, vol. 154, 55.5.8). Cf. Poussin (MusEon 11: 322). The material in brackets follows Ngawang Belden's explanation, with "inherently" substituted for its synonym, "substantially," for the sake of consistency. Ngawang Belden's citation of the same quotation has been deleted to avoid redundancy.

41Prasahgikas regard the sutras in which a mind-basis-of-all is mentioned either to have been taught for the sake of persons who are for the time being incapable of penetrating the subtle Madhyamika view or to be referring to something other than a latency-bearing consciousness.

'Annotations 110a.6.

4'Candrak-uti, in making this statement, did not distinguish between the conventional existence of the person and the aggregates and the total nonexistence of a mind-basis-of-all. He simply said that none of those three can literally be said to substantially exist, since for him (according to Gelukbas), substantial existence is equated with inherent existence and cannot be predicated of any object. Therefore, statements that something substantially exists require interpretation to reveal the thought underlying them. Because Candrakirti did not distinguish between the person and the aggregates, which conventionally exist, and the mind-basis-of-all, which does not exist even conventionally, Dzongkaba and later Gelukbas had to clarify this point.

"The three criteria of Prasangika hermeneutics are: (1) the basis of thought (dgongs gzhi), (2) the purpose (dgos pa), and (3) the damage to the literal teaching (dngos la gnod byed). The basis of thought is what the speaker, usually S'akyamuni, had in mind-was aware of-when he spoke. For a scripture requiring interpretation, the basis of thought is not something that is communicated either directly or indirectly, for the speaker does not intend to talk about it. For instance, Candrakirti says that when Buddha spoke about the mind-basis-of-all, he was
thinking about emptiness (in the sense that emptiness is the basis of all phenomena and is to be minded well). In other words, emptiness was the basis of his thought. See Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 814.

'However, Buddha's intention was just to communicate provisionally the idea of a mind-basis-of-all, in the sense of a basis for holding karmic latencies, for those trainees not yet ready to hear about emptiness. It is said to be clear that Buddha's intention must have been to teach the mind-basis-of-all only provisionally and that the basis of his thought was emptiness, for the literal teaching of a mind-basis-of-all is contradicted by the faults outlined earlier: a mind-basis-of-all cannot be established by conventional valid cognition, and once it is established that external objects exist, a mind-basis-of-all would have no function. When Buddha said that the person and the aggregates substantially exist, the basis in his own thought from which he was speaking was the conventionally existent person and aggregates, but since he was speaking to people who would not understand non-substantial existence, he spoke of a substantially existent person and aggregates. It is not necessary to analyze the meaning of "person" and "aggregate" in Buddha's own thought. However, when Buddha spoke of a mind-basis-of-all, he could not have had a conventionally existent mind-basis-of-all as the basis from which he was speaking since the mind-basis-of-all does not exist even conventionally; therefore, it was necessary for Candrakirti to explain that Buddha taught a mind-basis-of-all to persons not ready to hear about emptiness even though he knew that a mind-basis-of-all did not exist. Jamyang Shayba discusses the differences between Candrakirti and Bhavaviveka on this point in the Great Exposition of the Middle Way 814.2 ff.:

Candrakirti says that for Buddha, "mind-basis-of-all" means emptiness, whereas Bhavaviveka says he meant that the mind is the world-creator.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 36b.4.

'Afflictive obstructions are, in brief, the afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance and the predispositions established by them. Ignorance is the principal affliction and desire and hatred are merely secondary because desire and hatred occur in dependence upon ignorance. The most important sense of ignorance is not mere not-knowing, but rather is the consciousness that conceives persons and other phenomena to inherently or truly exist.

There are two levels of ignorance, coarse and subtle. Coarse ignorance occurs only with respect to the person and is the conception of a self-sufficient person; the subtle ignorance with respect to both persons and other phenomena is the conception of inherent existence. Coarse ignorance, the conception of a self-sufficient person, is the conception that "I" am autonomous and like a master over my mind and body. This misconception is not merely coarse, but is also artificial, i.e., merely the result of false teachings, if it takes the form of conceiving of the I and aggregates to be separate entities, like a lord and his subjects; it is innate if
there is no such further misconception, the aggregates being conceived to be like salesmen and the I being conceived to be like the head salesman, in charge of but not a different type than the other salesmen. (However, this latter conception would also be artificial if it were the result of false teachings rather than merely arising naturally.) Subtle ignorance, the conception of inherent existence, is that "I" exist from my own side; the "I" just seems to be fused with the aggregates. According to Gelukba scholars, Svaatantrikas wrongly identify the conception of true existence as the obstructions to liberation, the seeds established by former actions. In fact, in their presentation of the Prasaingika School, both levels of ignorance are obstructions to liberation, for one cannot be liberated without realizing the most subtle selflessness. The second point that Jamyang Shayba is making is that the two selflessnesses-the absence of inherent existence with respect to the person and the absence of inherent existence with respect to all other phenomena-are different only with respect to the basis of selflessness, not with respect to the subtlety of the object of negation.

3V. Bhattacharya (195). The Sanskrit is: na vinanena margena bodhirityagoma yatah. Stephen Batchelor identifies this 9loka as 40cd.

'Annotations, note 110b.1


6'That is, one must definitely overcome subtle ignorance, the conception of inherent existence, realizing the emptiness of inherent existence with respect to persons and all other phenomena.

'Hearers (nyan thos, gravaka) and Solitary Realizers (rang sang rgyas, pratyekabuddha) are low vehicle practitioners who respectively do and do not depend on the instructions of a teacher in their last lifetime prior to attaining liberation. "Foe Destroyer" is the Tibetan translation of arhan (for which the nominative singular form is Arhat), etymologized as "one who has destroyed the foes (ari + han) of the afflictions," i.e., become liberated. For a discussion of this translation, see Hopkins (1983a: 871-73, n. 553).

81n other words, "enlightenment" (byang chub, bodhi) does not refer only to the final enlightenment of a Buddha, which is unexcelled because it is a complete, final abandonment of both the obstructions to liberation and the obstruction to omniscience. It also refers to the enlightenment of a Hearer Arhat or Solitary Realizer Arhat, who have abandoned only the obstructions to liberation.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 36b.5.

"For the other schools, a person is considered to have overcome the afflictions
of desire, hatred, and ignorance obstructing liberation from cyclic existence through realizing a selflessness that is the absence of a self-sufficient person. The Prasangika School would label this only a "coarse" selflessness, enabling one only to suppress manifest forms of the afflictions; it might seem even to oneself that one has overcome hatred and desire, but since these would not have been removed from the root (ignorance), it is possible for them to return. According to the Prasangika reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, one cannot attain any enlightenment without realizing the subtle selflessness that is the emptiness of true existence.

10bden 'dzin (satyagraha) is being translated not as "the conception of true existence" but as "consciousness conceiving true existence" in order to emphasize that "conception" refers to a consciousness actively misconceiving reality.

12 Entrance to the Middle Way 13a.2. Cf. Huntington 179. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 230b.1-31b.3.

"Illumination of the Thought 230b.1-4.

13Annotations, note ma, 110b.4.

'SDzongkaba seems to be saying that Hearers and Solitary Realizers need only to realize the selflessness of the person to be liberated from cyclic existence, but from several other statements in the same book it is clear that this is not what he intends. He shows that Hearers and Solitary Realizers must realize subtle selflessness-the absence of inherent existence-to be liberated, and there is no difference in subtlety between the selflessnesses of persons and phenomena. What is probably meant is that Buddha's teaching of the selflessness of persons was particularly helpful to Hearers and Solitary Realizers, who are not as sharp as Bodhisattvas, because the selflessness of persons is easier to realize than the selflessness of phenomena. Still, both selflessnesses need to be taught for anyone to achieve liberation. Also, it seems that Dzongkaba implies that Bodhisattvas attain liberation only upon attaining omniscience, i.e., Buddhahood; however, it is clear from many other contexts that this is not what he intends. Possibly, he is referring to the Bodhisattva's vow to become omniscient for the sake of all sentient beings, or "liberation" here means both liberation from cyclic existence and liberation from the obstructions to omniscience.

"Great Exposition of Tenets 36b.7.

"P 5246, vol. 95, 135.2.8-3.1. The quotation has been expanded to include the last two lines. Cf. Sonam 156 (stanza 135).

18The body sense power is the physical basis for touch. It is said that where it is absent, such as in most of the hair, the ends of the nails, etc., no other senses may operate. In the same way, desire and hatred are absent or inoperable in the absence of the consciousness conceiving true existence.
"Delusion" (gti mug, moha) is usually equated to ignorance. However, according to Geshay Tupden Gyatso, since Prasar gikas assert non-afflicted ignorance, and delusion is an affliction, in their system the two are not equivalent.

20Annotations, note ma (continued), 110b.7.


"In fact, it seems to me that neither of these works explains this even as extensively as Gyeltsap just has. See Illumination of the Thought (26a.6- 31a.2, translated in Hopkins, 1980: 150-60, especially 158), and The Essence of the Good Explanations (165.1-66.1, translated in Thurman, 1984: 308-9).

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 36b.7.

14 The three poisons are desire, hatred, and ignorance.

"According to Jamyang Shayba, Prasangikas assert not only that there is desire based on consciousnesses conceiving true existence, but desire that is a consciousness conceiving true existence in the sense that desire and ignorance are conjoined. That is because just as there are coarse and subtle levels of ignorance, so there are coarse and subtle levels of desire and hatred based upon those.

"Identified by Geshay Tupden Gyatso.

27Geshay Tupden Gyatso said that there are consciousnesses conceiving true existence that are desires ('dod chags yin mkhan gyi bden 'dzin), but desires ('dod chags) are not necessarily ignorance (ma rig pa). According to him, the process of the occurrence of an action involving desire is that first, one conceives that an object truly exists; second, one has desire for that object; and third, one acts (las, karman). The point here is that Prasangikas claim that there are coarse and subtle afflictions such as desire based on coarse and subtle ignorance, respectively.


29Annotations, note tsa, 111a.2.

30Arhats are those persons who have abandoned ignorance and thus all of the afflictions such as desire that are based on it. A controversy arose over the status of certain persons who some regarded as Arhats, but who still manifested a kind of craving. Santideva admits that the so-called "Arhats" do not have afflicted craving based on a coarse conception of self (the misconception of a self described in the abhidharma texts). However, he wants to make the point that they do have afflicted craving based on a subtle conception of self. He does this by arguing that the lower schools should admit that the so-called "Arhats" still have craving, and
invites them to call it "non-afflicted craving," since that is the only conceivable kind of craving that could exist in the continuum of an Arhat. However, Santideva considers this to be absurd: craving is craving; "non-afflictive craving" is an oxymoron. For him, the fact that these "Arhats" have craving indicates that they are not Arhats at all, for they retain at least a subtle level of ignorance. Therefore, what the proponents of the abhidharma texts call "non-afflictive" ignorance is in fact just a subtle level of afflictive ignorance.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 36b.8.

ZJamyang Shayba has two points to make in this section. The first is that all consciousnesses of childish persons-ordinary beings who have not realized emptiness and thereby become Superiors-are mistaken in the sense that they are not unpolluted by the appearance of true existence. This is an understatement because, in fact, all instances of conventional valid cognition, whether those of childish persons or of Superiors, are mistaken in the sense that their objects appear to be truly existent. Only ultimate valid cognition, the direct realization of emptiness in meditative equipoise, is unimistaken cognition. Second, subsequent cognition, a category that includes all valid consciousnesses other than those which occur in the first moment of cognizing an object, is prime cognition (tshad ma, pramana) because new realization" is unsuitable to be the definition of prime cognition; in other words, since prime cognition need not be new realization, even subsequent cognition may be prime cognition. The Prasangika School interprets the nra of `pramana "as meaning "prime," but not in the sense of first; rather, it is in the sense of main. Hence, all valid awarenesses are pramana.

'Clear Words 9b.3-4. Sanskrit in Poussin 30.3-4. This has also been translated by Hopkins (1983a: 613, 615) and by Sprung (1979: 41). The bracketed material is from Ngawang Belden's commentary.

"Sometimes "erroneous and non-erroneous" are taken as referring to objects of knowledge, as in Dzongkaba's The Essence of the Good Explanations (192); sometimes as consciousnesses, as in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (448b.3 of Shes rig par khang edition). Ngawang Belden takes it according to the former, Dzongkaba's later work.

'Annotations, note tsha,111a.4.

6These are equivalent to conventional truths, which comprise all objects of knowledge except for emptinesses and are truths only in a special sense, since they do not exist as they appear. One problem with this is that even an emptiness does not exist as it appears to a conceptual reasoning consciousness (although it does exist as it appears to a directly perceiving consciousness). So, according to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, whose position is that of Loseling College, in one sense it too is a falsity. (See Ngawang Belden, Stating the Mode of Explanation in the Textbooks on the Middle Way and the Perfection of Wisdom in the Loseling and
Go-mang Colleges 469.2; see also Newland 1992.) Conceptual consciousnesses are always mistaken because what appears to them is a generic image or concept (don spyi, arthasamanya) of an object, which appears to be the object itself. However, although a conceptual consciousness realizing emptiness does not conceive that the generic image of emptiness is emptiness, the generic image appears to be emptiness. Thus, it is mistaken with regard to its appearing object even if it is not wrong with regard to its apprehended object. However, emptiness is not generally said to be a falsity; it is a truth in the important sense that it exists in the way it appears to its uncommon certifying awareness, a consciousness directly realizing emptiness. Emptiness is not a falsity merely because it can be cognized falsely by a mistaken consciousness.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37a.2.

'Entrance to the Middle Way 5b.8-9. Cf. Huntington 160-61 (he translates the first line as "spontaneously perceives what is real"). Jamyang Shayba's citation has been expanded to include the first line of this stanza. Dzongkaba's commentary in Illumination of the Thought is 109a.4-10a.5, with "dispelling objections" continuing to 113a.3.

9Dzongkaba comments on this in his Middling Exposition of Special Insight (translations in Hopkins, unpublished ms., p. 98, and Thurman [1982: 159]). Just as a person with good eyes will not see falling hairs in the place where they are seen by a person with cataracts (or amblyopia), so one who has destroyed all the taints that cause the false appearance of true existence will not "see" inherent existence in the places where such is seen by ordinary persons and Superiors who have not overcome the obstructions to omniscience.

"Annotations 111a.5.

"The predispositions of ignorance are latencies for the appearance of inherent existence that have been established by ignorance-the conception of inherent existence. By causing phenomena to appear in a way different than they actually exist, those predispositions are like cataracts that cause the appearance of falling hairs wherever one looks. Just as a person without cataracts not only is not obscured by the appearance of falling hairs but can also validly establish the non-existence of falling hairs, so a Buddha not only is not obscured by the appearance of inherent existence but can also establish the non-existence of inherent existence. There is no appearance of inherent existence to a Buddha except by way of the appearance of inherent existence to beings whose minds the Buddha knows. Although a Superior other than a Buddha can also establish non-true existence, it is necessary to specify a Buddha in this example because only a Buddha is capable simultaneously of cognizing both conventional phenomena, such as the aggregates, and ultimate phenomena, emptinesses. Other Superiors are incapable of cognizing anything other than emptiness when in meditative equipoise on emptiness. Moreover, because non-Buddhas have yet to abandon the obstructions
to omniscience (the predispositions of ignorance), phenomena continue to appear to them to be inherently existent, even if they no longer assent to that appearance.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37a.2.

"Among the consciousnesses of sentient beings (= non-Buddhas) only a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, the direct realization of emptiness, is a non-mistaken consciousness. The beginning of this statement seems to imply that after one becomes a Buddha, one will have nonmistaken consciousnesses which are not also exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise. However, because Buddhas are omniscient they have no consciousnesses that are not also continually in meditative equipoise on emptiness. The supreme mundane qualities path of preparation is the highest level of the path of preparation, where a yogi is still realizing emptiness conceptually but has not yet developed the ability to cognize it directly because emptiness still appears to truly exist. Because even this consciousness is conceptual, it is necessarily a mistaken consciousness.

"P 5228, vol. 95,15.1.3-4. The quotation has been expanded by adding the first two lines. Nagarjuna's commentary is P 5232, vol. 98, 61.1.6-2.2. Also found in K. Bhattacharya (1978: 25).

"If a valid cognition must be certified by another valid cognition, there would be an endless regress, in which case no valid cognizer would be established-first, middle, or end.

"Valid cognition is certified neither by self-consciousness nor by otherknowing consciousness; they are certified simply by their own operation toward their objects (see chapter 4 of the introduction and chapter 7 of the Jamyang Shayba translation).

"Annotations, note dza,111a.8.

"In note ma (Ngawang Gelek edition, vol. ca 17a.5 ff.), an annotation to Jamyang Shayba's polemical attack on Daktsang at the beginning of the Madhyamika chapter, Ngawang Belden says:

Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections says: "If your objects / Are well proven by valid cognition, / How also are your valid cognitions / Well established in just that way?" With respect to certifying valid cognition, in answer to the question, [Nagarjuna says]: "If it is thought that [valid cognition] is established / By other valid cognitions, it would be endless. / Moreover, the first is not established, / Nor the middle, nor the last." If it is thought that valid cognition is established by a different factuality, valid cognition would be endless [i.e., an infinite regress], and if it is endless, the first would not be established; and if the first does not exist, the middle is not established and the last also is not established. The meaning has been set forth in Nagarjuna's Commentary on the 'Refutation of Objections' to be
thus. Here, [Jamyang Shayba's] saying that it is refuted that the meaning of prime cognition is new realization should be analyzed.

In other words, Ngawang Belden doubts that this passage can be used to prove that prime cognition need not mean new realization.

19Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37a.4.

20I have found no passage yet in Clear Words that states this. However, Candrakirti says in 49.6-7 (Sanskrit is in Poussin 74, translated in Sprung [1979: 63]) that there is no conception in the world that direct perception (mngon sum, pratyaksa) is a consciousness free from conceptuality (rtog pa dang brel pa'i shes pa). If this is the passage that Jamyang Shayba is thinking of, the bracketed material is inappropriate, since this passage supports the idea that it is unsuitable to analyze whether direct perception is conceptual or nonconceptual, not whether prime cognition is new realization or not. (The assertion that there is conceptual direct perception is explained in the next chapter.) Still, Candrakirti's point is that it is contrary to the conventions of the world to analyze prime cognition, and that would include an investigation into its newness.

"Material in brackets from Kensur Yeshey Tupden.

22Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 257.2-4, says that the proofs for pramana being new realization in the texts of the proponents of true existence are a case of analyzing for an imputed object and are therefore unsuitable.

23Annotations, note wa,111b.1.

24Kaydrup says that conventional valid cognition does not establish that prime cognition must be a new awareness; thus, Ngawang Belden thinks, if an instance of prime cognition which must be newly incontrovertible does exist, it must be established by ultimate valid cognition, in which case it would be findable through analysis by a reasoning consciousness. Likewise, Kaydrup also notes that prime cognition is not found by ultimate valid cognition either; indeed, in the Prasangika system, nothing is findable upon analysis by ultimate valid cognition.

"An ordinary awareness would designate a consciousness as prime cognition simply because it is incontrovertible with respect to its object. It would not engage in investigation to determine if that consciousness was the first or a subsequent moment of a continuum of perception. To investigate the relationship between the object imputed-the consciousness-and the basis of imputation-the moments of a continuum of consciousness would be ultimate analysis. According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, the "logicians" (rtog ge pa) are tenet-holders of Svatantriika and below. In all of their statements about prime cognition, they presume that prime cognition is findable under analysis because their general position is that objects are findable under analysis.
'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37a.4.

ZI have expanded the passage cited by Jamyang Shayba by depending on Dzongkaba's larger citation in Illumination of the Thought 163a.2-3 (296 in Varanasi edition). The context of Dzongkaba's citation is distinguishing sense and mental consciousnesses: sense consciousnesses directly know their objects whereas mental consciousnesses know their objects indirectly through the power of sense consciousnesses. Explaining Candrakirti, Dzongkaba says he shows that feelings are distinguished by internal experience.

4Annotations, note zha,111b.5.

SPramanika is a possible construction for tshad ma pa. This refers to the followers of Dignaga and Dharmakirti.

`The Epistemologists, followers of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, assert that in mental direct perception of an object, the object is directly known without conceptuality. That is the "mental direct perception indicated here." "Indicated here" (skobs 'dir bstan) refers to a sutra passage, "Consciousnesses of forms are of two types, those depending on the eye and those depending on the mind" (Lati Rinbochay and Napper [1980: 54]). This is taken to indicate the cognition of forms, and so forth, by a mental consciousness in dependence on prior cognition of those objects by sense consciousnesses. Jambel Sampel (3a.2-3b.4, translated in Lati Rinbochay and Napper 56-57) distinguishes three systems for explaining the relationship of the mental and sense direct perception; (1) alternating, where moments of mental and sense direct perception alternate; (2) simultaneous production of three types, that there is simultaneous production of the second moment of sense direct perception, the first moment of mental direct perception, and the second moment of self-consciousness; and (3) production of a moment of mental direct perception at the end of a continuum of sense direct perception. For a summary according to Dharmakirti see Jackson (1994: 123). Jamyang Shayba considers the third type to be the one explicitly indicated by Dharmakirti, but does not consider a single moment of mental direct perception to be viable (Lati Rinbochay and Napper [1980: 165, n. 35]). According to Prasar gikas, mental direct perception subsequent to sense direct perception is a conceptual mental consciousness engaging in recollection of the object. For the followers of Dignaga, mental direct perception is necessarily non-conceptual and thus it is not possible that it be a memory consciousness.

As will become a little clearer in Ngawang Belden's subsequent citation of Dzongkaba, the main meaning of feeling is the mental factor that is an object of experience. It is unusual to consider feeling to be mental direct perception. In fact, Jamyang Shayba may not be arguing that feeling is mental direct perception, but that the mental direct perception of feeling must be conceptual, since feeling is not an object experienced by a sense consciousness first-it is an object of "internal" experience.
With regard to the second reason, the principal meaning of "feeling" is the mental factor that accompanies either a sense or mental consciousness. However, here "feeling" refers to a mental factor that accompanies a conceptual consciousness that experiences pleasure, pain, and neutral feeling. Since such a mental factor accompanies a main conceptual consciousness, it also is a conceptual consciousness.

'Illumination of the Thought 162b.5-63a.2 (Dzongkaba's sentence begins before what is cited here). 326.4 in NG edition.

8P 5266, vol. 98, 251.3.6-8 (202b.7-8, 203a.6). Variant readings: for "generated," P reads skyes for skye; for "aspect," P reads ream par for rnam pa; for "second," P reads gnyis pas na for gnyis pa ni.

'Illumination of the Thought 163a.2-63b.1. 327.2 in Peking ca. This quotation follows the immediately preceding quotation.


"I am not certain as to the meaning of "ordinary state." In tantra, there is discussion of the basic or ordinary state, the path state, and the effect (Buddha) state; or it could refer to one's lifetime with the exclusion of the birth state and intermediate state between death and rebirth, or to waking life as opposed to dreaming and deep sleep. Either way, the point is that we experience, through the mental consciousness, not just sensory information but also internal feelings.

"The quotation has been expanded to include, "Because it is not explained...is not asserted," and the last sentence.

"Self-consciousness (rang rig, svasamvedana) is a mind that observes another consciousness simultaneously with that consciousness's observation of an object. It is mainly the followers of Dignaga and Dharmakirti among the Sautrantikas and Cittamatrins and the Yogacara-Svatantrikas who assert the existence of self-consciousness. The Prasaingika School regards self-consciousness to be logically impossible (see chapter 7). The questioner thinks that since the mental consciousness experiencing pleasure, etc., apparently knows its own entity (since it has been said that feeling is a mental consciousness, an instance of mental direct perception) it would be an instance of self-consciousness. In other words, if feeling is pleasure, pain, etc., then it must know itself. Dzongkaba will reply that since we say "I experience pleasure and pain," it obviously is the case that this awareness is not nondualistic self-consciousness.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37a.6.

"in Santideva's text, a hypothetical Vaibha$ika, a Hinayanist, maintains that there are persons who, following the Hinayana abhidharma texts, have destroyed all craving and become Arhats (see chapter 2). Santideva replies that these persons have only temporarily suppressed the manifest form of their afflictions and therefore have not attained freedom from rebirth. As Jamyang Shayba will add below, these persons have abandoned only the conception of a permanent self, etc., which, according to the Prasangika School, is merely an artificial, learned conception and not the innate ignorance that conceives phenomena to inherently exist. Therefore, they could not have abandoned any afflictions from the root, though their success in suppressing them has led them to believe they have won final deliverance. The Sagya scholar Daktsang considers it contradictory to have yogic direct perception realizing impermanence without having reached the path of preparation and contradictory that clairvoyance is only mental direct perception whereas realizing the four noble truths is yogic direct perception. See his Ocean of Good Explanations 238.1-3.

"it is a measure of the destructive capacity of doubt that it apparently is capable of destroying great virtue. Perhaps what is assumed is that these persons come to hate the Buddha for having "deceived" them.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37a.7.

"Annotations, note za, 112b.1.

20Annotations, note 'a, 112b.2.

"Illumination of the Thought 31b.5-32a.5. I use Hopkins' translation (1980: 162-63).

'dClear Words 342.4 ff. (Poussin's Sanskrit text 516.5-18.6).

On the justification for translating bcom ldan Was (bhagavan) as Supramundane (or Transcendent) Victor, see Lopez (1988: 196, n. 46).

24These persons not only do not realize emptiness, they are conceiving true existence in their meditation on impermanence, and so forth. This brings out an important point: it is not possible to cause the consciousness conceiving true existence to become non-manifest through any type of meditation other than meditation on emptiness. It is possible only temporarily to abandon coarse afflictions.

"In other words, one should read bdag gis shes for bdag gis bshad shes (37a.8). See the note for the earlier passage where this was quoted.
"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37b.1.

'The definition of yogic direct perception (based on Dignaga and Dharmakirti) in Geshay Jambel Sampel's typical Gelukba text (4a.1-2; translated in Lati Rinbochay and Napper [61-62]) is: "a non-conceptual non-mistaken exalted knower in the continuum of a Superior that is produced from a meditative stabilization that is a union of calm abiding and special insight and that has become its own unique empowering condition."

Note that none of the sources cited above—the sutra, Santideva, or Dzongkaba—explicitly said that these persons had yogic direct perception. Jamyang Shayba seems to assume that these persons have been able to realize subtle impermanence (phra ba'i mi rtag pa) directly, which would indeed require yogic direct perception. Dzongkaba's discussion above merely says "impermanence," but it would not require anything more than ordinary reasoning to realize coarse impermanence. According to Jamyang Shayba, then, it is not necessary that yogic direct perception be in the continuum of a Superior.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37b.2.

In the root verse, mngon sum gyis could be taken either as "by direct perception" or "directly." Jamyang Shayba's commentary makes it clear that he takes mngon sum gyis in the root verse to mean just "directly"; Ngawang Belden, in his word commentary on Jamyang Shayba's root verses found in the Three Commentaries (509.4), glosses it as "by mere direct realization" (mngon sum du rtogs pa tsam gyis).

3Gelukbas say that since the Sautrantikas do not accept the possibility of direct realization of a mere negation such as emptiness, for them, yogic direct perception that realizes the selflessness of the person is realization by direct perception (mngon sum gyis rtogs pa) but is not direct realization (mngon sum du rtogs pa) because it only realizes the selflessness of the person implicitly. Therefore, in that system it may make a difference whether mngon sum gyis means realization by direct perception or merely means direct realization. Madhyamikas are said to have no such problem, since they contend that there is yogic direct perception that directly realizes a nonaffirming negative such as emptiness. Still, even for Madhyamikas, not all cases of realization by direct perception are instances of direct realization. That is because they consider conceptual realization subsequent to inferential realization-such as realizing that sound is impermanent upon realizing that sound is a product and that all products are impermanent-to be direct perception (mngon sum, pratyak4a) after its first moment, but since such an inferential realization depends initially upon a reason, it is not considered direct realization (mngon sum du rtogs pa).

'From among the five paths comprising the spiritual course, the path of preparation (sbyor lam, prayogamarga) is the second, attained upon achieving
special insight with emptiness as its object. Special insight is defined as "a wisdom of thorough discrimination of phenomena conjoined with special pliancy induced by the power of analysis" (Jamyang Shayba, Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 81b.3, cited in Hopkins [1983a: 92]). Special insight may be directed at the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths such as the coarse selflessness of the person (thus, even ordinary beings can have yogic direct perception, as Jamyang Shayba argues in chapter 4). However, unless special insight has the subtle emptiness as its object one cannot use it to reach the path of preparation. Although Jamyang Shayba's college, Gomang, asserts that a coarse selflessness of the person is an emptiness, it is a coarse emptiness and the realization of it is not liberating. The "heat" path of preparation is the first of four parts of that path, the path over which one's conceptual realization of emptiness is deepened. Upon completing the remaining three parts of the path of preparation, one is brought to the point of non-conceptual direct realization of emptiness.

The sixteen attributes of the four noble truths consist of the four attributes of true sufferings-impermanence, misery, emptiness, and selflessness; the four attributes of true origins-cause, origin, strong production, and condition; the four attributes of true cessations-cessation, pacification, auspicious highness, and definite emergence; and the four attributes of true paths-path, suitability, achievement, and deliverance (Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 258.4-59.1). For an explanation of each of these attributes and the manner in which they are contemplated in meditation, see Hopkins (1983a: 292-96). These sixteen attributes have both coarse and subtle aspects; e.g., coarse sufferings arise from the coarse actions and afflictions established by the coarse conception of self, subtle sufferings from the subtle conception of self (Losang Gonchok 259.2). Hence, it is possible for one to directly realize the coarse sixteen attributes of the four noble truths without having reached the path of preparation, i.e., without having had special insight with respect to the subtle emptiness. Hypothetically, this could be done without reaching even the first path, the path of accumulation (tshogs lam, sanibharamarga), though it seems unlikely that one might realize impermanence or selflessness without having generated the spirit of renunciation. The point being made here is that although there are some persons who claim to be Arhats (dgra bcom pa, arhan) on the basis of having realized the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, it is easy to see that they have not attained special insight that realizes the subtle emptiness and hence the heat path of preparation because they are boastful whereas real Arhats are not. This is the same point as was made in the last chapter, where persons who considered themselves to be Arhats were obviously mistaken since they, upon having realized the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, generated doubt with respect to the Buddha's enlightenment, demonstrating that they had only temporarily suppressed the manifest afflictions.

6p 761.31, vol. 25. This is also cited in Janggya and in the next chapter. For translation, see Honda (1968: 190).

'A sentient being's death, "deadness," or "having died" is also that sentient
being's disintegratedness, having disintegrated, or pastness. Whatever is caused is necessarily impermanent and a functioning thing. The Prasangika School holds that death, disintegratedness, or pastness are caused and therefore are functioning things.

BAs will be seen in chapter 6, section 3, pastness is a functioning thing because of being caused, and a futureness—a thing's factor of not having yet come, despite the existence of its causes, due to the incompleteness of its cooperative conditions—is also caused because it exists due to the nonaggregation of those conditions.

9Annotations, note ya, 112b.8.

"An existing pot's aspect of disintegration is its inability to endure past its own time, i.e., the present moment (for all impermanent phenomena are destroyed every moment) or, put another way, its inevitability of not enduring. A pot's disintegration, then, is concurrent with it. On the other hand, a pot's disintegratedness is its aspect of not having endured, the fact of its having disintegrated. A pot's disintegratedness, then, occurs after it has disintegrated, when the pot itself no longer exists. The non-Prasangika systems, except for the Vaibha$ika School, maintain that this disintegratedness is a mere absence and conclude from this that disintegration and disintegratedness are mutually exclusive, but the Prasangikas hold that disintegratedness is itself an impermanent phenomenon which, therefore, itself disintegrates. Thus, they maintain that the two are not mutually exclusive.

"Buddha said that compounded phenomena are characterized by production, abiding, and disintegration (Jamyang Shayba, Great Exposition of the Middle Way 610.4-5). An impermanent phenomenon such as a chair is momentary in the sense that it disintegrates moment-by-moment. However, even though in each moment there is a new chair, it is not impossible to posit a continuum of chair; that is, even though in each moment the chair simultaneously is produced, endures, and disintegrates, the phenomenon chair is nevertheless validly imputed in dependence on the continuum of moments that comprise its existence. The manner in which the chair is in one moment created, endures, ages, and disintegrates is: its production is its being the new creation of what did not exist; its enduring is its similarity to what preceded it; its aging is its being a different entity from the previous moment; and its disintegration is its not lasting another moment.

A pot's disintegration is its quality of not enduring after the moment of its "own time," the moment it endures, the moment in which it is present. Disintegration is something that the pot has at the present time, part of its nature; hence, it is an impermanent phenomenon, and from among the five aggregates of impermanent phenomena would be included in that of compositional factors ('du byed, samskara).
Gelukbas say that except for the Vaibha$ika and the Prasangika-Madhyamika schools, Buddhist schools assert that a pot's disintegratedness is its absence after having disintegrated. Being a mere negative, it is a permanent phenomenon, one that is not compounded-put together-like impermanent phenomena.

12A thing's "own time" is just the moment in which it is present, so the following moment is not its own time, but rather is the moment of its disintegratedness.

13Prasahgikas find that a pot's disintegratedness, its "not having endured," is part of the activity of a pot's disintegration, its "not enduring." Like disintegration, then, disintegratedness is an impermanent phenomenon. The other Buddhist schools hold that a pot's disintegration is just its approaching to disintegratedness, which is simultaneous with a pot's own time and does not include its disintegratedness, which occurs in the moment after its own time. (Geshe Gendiin Lodr6 said that most Buddhists accept that at the time of the seed, a sprout exists as the entity of the seed; but a sprout itself does not exist then. This implies that similarly, a sprout's disintegratedness exists at the time of its disintegration as the entity of disintegration.) The Vaibha$ikas differ from other Buddhist schools in saying that a sprout actually exists at that time, a position similar to that of the non-Buddhist Samkhyas. It should be noted that disintegratedness (zhig pa) and disintegration (jig pa) are not synonymous, for although disintegratedness is disintegration because of being part of the activity of disintegration and of course because of being impermanent, disintegration is not necessarily disintegratedness. For example, the disintegration of a pot at its own timeits nature of disintegration even when it is present -is not its disintegratedness, its not having endured.

"That is, approaching to disintegratedness and disintegratedness are parallel to approaching to production and production.

"Illumination of the Thought 127b.6-128a.4.

"Clear Words 59a.5 ff. Sanskrit is in Poussin 174.10 ff.

"Even though it is said that a compositional phenomenon needs no cause other than its production for its disintegration, Geshay Gonchok Tsering (6/16/84) said that disintegratedness is the cooperative condition (lhan cig byed rkhyen, sahakaripratyaya) of disintegration; the substantial cause (nyer len, upadana) of a thing's disintegration is its production. In general, a cooperative condition is a necessary but not sufficient cause. For instance, water, sun, and nutrients are cooperative conditions of a plant, but its seed is its substantial cause. In the case of the exhaustion of a butter-lamp, the substantial cause of its exhaustion is its own production, and the cooperative condition of that exhaustion is its disintegratedness. With regard to death, Kensur Yeshey Tupden pointed out that first, one dies ('chi ba), then one is dead (shi ba). (There is no person who is dead, for that which is dead is not a person, but a corpse.) The first (dying) causes the
second (death), which is a disintegratedness of a person and the cause of the non-
severance of the continuum of ignorance, etc. The substantial cause of dying (=
approaching death) is birth, the cooperative condition, disintegratedness (deadness).

"The present moment of a thing, its existing but not enduring for another
moment, is the cause of its own disintegratedness, its not having endured. In other
words, moment A is the cause of the disintegratedness of moment A, which occurs
in moment B.

"Just as both birth and death are caused and hence are functioning things, so
also both disintegration and disintegratedness are caused and hence are
functioning things. Moreover, there are the parallels that with respect to birth,
being born is like not enduring for another moment and having been born is like
not having endured for another moment, and that with respect to death, dying is
not enduring for another moment and having died is not having endured for
another moment.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37b.5.

'These are different entities posited by various schools to explain the
transmission of karmic latencies such that future effects can arise from past
actions. According to Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo (Precious Garland of Tenets 21.14-
22.2, translated in Sopa and Hopkins 193-94), the Kashmiri Vaibha~ikas and the
Sautrantikas both identify the continuum of mind (Geshay Tupden Gyatso
identified "continuum" as the continuum of consciousness) as the basis of infusion
of predispositions (as do Svatantrika-Madhayamikas). Other Vaibha$ikas posit a
factor, neither matter nor consciousness, called an "obtainer" as that which
prevents the loss of the karmic potency until it ripens into an effect. The five
Sammitiya subschools of the Vaibha$ikas say that actions produce an
impermanent phenomenon called "non-wastage" that prevents the loss of the
action's potency (Lamotte 1936:162-63).

'The last sentence of the root text does not make Jamyang Shayba's point as
forcefully as his commentary does. If, as Daktsang is held to say, actions do not
disintegrate over time, then there are the absurdities that not only would one's
mind be flooded with the awareness of everything one had ever done, but those
actions would still be occurring since they had never disintegrated. This is
discussed in the final section.

'In his Great Exposition of the Middle Way (609.1), Jamyang Shayba says that
this is taught in all three (gsum ga) scriptural collections, whereas in both editions
of the Great Exposition of Tenets he says that it is taught in the third (gsum pa).
Certainly the abhidharma-pitaka would be a likely place to find a discussion on
death and birth, but the sutra-pitaka certainly would have many passages as well.
The argument against "all three" might be that a discussion on death and birth is
not likely to be found in the vinaya-pitaka.

The Sutra on the Ten Grounds is P 761.3.1, vol. 25. This passage is translated in Honda (1968: 190), and cited by Candrakirti in his Clear Words (118.4), by Dzongkaba in his Ocean of Reasoning (190.6-8) and his Illumination of the Thought (127b.7; see chapter 5), and by Jang-gya (see chapter 8). Part of the quotation is missing in the Sanskrit (174.12; see Poussin's note).

'Death, the last of the twelve links of dependent-arising (rten ‘byung, pratityasamutpada), is caused by birth, the eleventh link, and is the cause of ignorance, the first link (of another round of dependent-arising). See my earlier note on this passage in chapter 5.

P 5224, vol. 95, 10.1.5-6. The Sanskrit (Poussin, 531) is: bhaved abhavo bhava§ca nirvanam ubhyam katham I asamskrtam ca nirvanam bhavabhavau ca samskrtau. The quotation has been lengthened by including the first two lines of the stanza. This stanza forms a portion of Nagarjuna's refutation of the four extremes concerning nirvana: that it is a [functioning] thing; that it is a non-thing [i.e., a thing's having become non-existent, its disintegratedness, which is also a thing]; that it is both a thing and non-thing; or that it is neither. Here he says that nirvana is not both a thing and non-thing because those are both caused whereas nirvana is uncaused. This unusual interpretation of the term "non-thing" as a disintegratedness, and hence a functioning thing, rests on Candrakirti's comments (Clear Words 356.2-3) that a thing is caused and thus is a compounded phenomenon, but so also is a non-thing (dngos po med pa), since it arises in dependence on a thing and a sutra passage says that aging and death are caused by birth. A similar passage from Gyeltsap can be found in chapter 8 in the section on true cessations.

Annotations, note ra,113b.1.

Illumination of the Thought 127b.2-6.

"It is necessary to add this because Svatantrikas do not agree that disintegratedness is a functioning thing.

"Concerning the disintegratedness of a blue pot, neither a part or quality of the pot, such as blue, nor the pot itself (the whole comprising many parts) is suitable to be an illustration of disintegratedness. They conclude from this that there is no functioning thing that can be a disintegratedness, and hence, disintegratedness must be permanent.

"In other tenet systems it is felt that for something to be a functioning thing there must be an illustration that one can point to, as is the case with a patch of blue or a pot. For them, a mere nominal designation could not be a functioning thing. For Prasangikas, who assert that all phenomena are mere nominal designations, there is no such problem. Just as it is possible to designate a person
named Upagupta in dependence on a certain collection of the aggregates of mind and body, even though Upagupta is not any of the aggregates, their collection, or a different entity from them (being a mere nominal designation in dependence on those aggregates), so it is possible to designate the phenomenon disintegratedness even though it is not the thing which has been destroyed or some other thing like it. An illustration of something must be that thing. The difference is that Upagupta is merely designated in dependence upon his aggregates, not to those aggregates.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 37b.7.

"More will be said on this topic later. Here, it is implied that while the disintegratedness of the person is the cause of the non-severance of the continuum of ignorance upon a person's death, the cause of the person's death is also disintegratedness, that is, the disintegratedness of a person's life-impelling karma, just as the consumption of a wick is the cause of a butter-lamp's extinguishment.


"In Jamyang Shayba's text, this work is referred to simply as "the commentary on that" (de'i 'grel pa); since Nagarjuna's own commentary has not been preserved in any language (see Tola and Dragonetti [1983: 95, 177 n.1]), it is assumed that this refers to Candrakirti's commentary, and a passage similar to this occurs there (P 5265, vol. 98,177.2.4-5). However, this appears to be a paraphrase rather than a quotation. There is a debate on the consumption of the wick and butter in Candrakirti's commentary (Toh. 3864, vol. 7) 15b.5 ff.

"Annotations, note la, 113b.6.

19I speculate that this passage is somewhere in chapter 7.

20P 5246, vol. 95,136.5.7. P reads: 'bras bu yi ni rgyu bshig pa / des na rgyu ni rtag ma yin ("Effects destroy causes. / Therefore, causes are not permanent") which is how Ruth Sonam (210; stanza 218ab) translates the line. Ngawang Belden's version, translated here, is quite different: 'bras bu yis ni rgyu bshig pa/des na med pa skye mi 'gyur. The context of the quotation is that Aryadeva is refuting Vaisegika assertions of permanent, minute particles (that serve as "building blocks" for coarse objects). Here he says that when a particle becomes an object, it no longer exists (just as a seed ceases upon production of a sprout). We can make sense of Ngawang Belden's version if we understand it to mean that when an effect is produced, it causes (or "produces") a functioning thing-namely the ceasedness/disintegratedness of the cause-not a non-existent.

"P 5265, vol. 98,177.3.34.

21That is, using the same reasoning, it is possible to show that futureness is
caused and acts as a cause.

22Great Exposition of Tenets cha 38a.2.

"Clear Words 117.4-5 (59a.4-5). Sanskrit is in Poussin (1970: 174). The quotation has been restored to full length by filling in the middle, from "disintegration would be non-existent" to "Because of that."

It would be causeless not in the sense of being a permanent phenomenon, but in the sense of being non-existent, because none of these momentary things would require disintegration. However, if they did not require disintegration, they would not be momentary or compounded. A "skyflower" is a famous instance of a non-existent (like "son of a barren woman," "cloak of turtle hairs," or "horns of a rabbit").

"Even for Prasangikas, disintegration is causeless in the sense that something disintegrates with no further cause than its production, whereas disintegratedness is caused. So, disintegration occurs in the same moment as production, disintegratedness subsequently. (Vaibha$ikas, on the other hand, say that disintegration occurs in the next moment.) The characteristics of compounded phenomena are their production, endurance, and disintegration. In addition, all phenomena are empty of inherent existence. But unlike the characteristics of production, etc., emptiness does not characterize something as a compounded phenomenon in addition to being a characteristic of a compounded phenomenon, for even uncompounded phenomena are empty.

"Annotations, note sha,114a.1.

"According to the Prasahgikas, if zhig pa is uncaused, then 'jig pa would absurdly be uncaused; if that is true, how could things be momentary? Prasangikas assert that disintegratedness does not depend merely on a thing's own causes, but has later causes (i.e., 'jig pa), just as the production of a thing does not depend merely on the causes of approaching to production, but has its own causes. It is held to be absurd in either case that the "approaching" is caused but the result is uncaused. This raises the problem: what is the direct cause of the pot's disintegratedness? The pot's disintegration (i.e., the previous moment)?

28As Kaydrup is about to point out, it is absurd to say that disintegration, the state of approaching to disintegratedness, has causes but that disintegratedness does not. He contends that if disintegratedness does not have causes, then disintegration would not have causes, and it would then absurdly follow that things would not disintegrate and that they would not be momentary.


"Although disintegration does not depend on causes in the sense of causes
other than those for the thing's production, disintegration, a characteristic of compounded phenomena, has those causes.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 38a.2. Jamyang Shayba interprets Candrakirti's statement to mean that it would not be suitable to assert both that disintegration is a characteristic of compounded phenomena and that disintegratedness is causeless because the latter implies that disintegration is causeless whereas whatever is a characteristic of a caused phenomenon must itself be caused. Selflessness also is a characteristic of compounded phenomena, but does not characterize them as compounded phenomena, since it is also a characteristic of uncompounded phenomena. Production, endurance, and disintegration, on the other hand, characterize something as a compounded phenomenon; if something has those characteristics, it is necessarily a compounded phenomenon.

"According to Kaydrup, the meaning of the passage in Candrakirti's Clear Words is that if disintegratedness were caused, things would not disintegrate, whereby they would not be momentary, not that disintegratedness could not be a characteristic of compounded phenomena (although that certainly would also be true).

33In other words, Jamyang Shayba has mixed together this reasoning and a scriptural passage that comes later.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 38a.3.

"Clear Words 117.7-18.1; Sanskrit is in Poussin 174.2-4. The quotation has been lengthened by adding to first sentence, the objection, and filling in between, "For..." and "...in all respects."

'BAs can be seen in the discussion below, Ngawang Belden considers Candrakirti to be referring to disintegratedness.

37Annotations, note sa, 114a.6.

"That is, if disintegratedness is said not to require causes because it exists (as a non-thing), then things that have not disintegrated also absurdly would not need causes.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 38a.4.

"Annotations, note ha, 114b.2.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 38a.5.

43This is a chapter of the Heap of Jewels Sutra (dkon mchog btsegs pa'i mdo, ratnakuta-sutra).
'Clear Words 118.1. Sanskrit is in Poussin 174.5-6.

46P 5265, vol. 98, 177.4.2-4.

"This sentence ("Moreover, since all the conventions... investigation") presumably is Jamyang Shayba's own conclusion, although he has indicated it as included within the quotation from Candrakirti. It is not found in the Peking recension of the canon. According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, "reasoned investigation" is ultimate analysis. Nothing can withstand ultimate analysis. On the other hand, one can use conventional analysis on something "renowned in the world," that which is established by conventional valid cognition. One avoids ultimate analysis by not investigating matters, such as a thing's relation to its causes or bases of designation, that bear on whether or not that thing exists from its own side or exists as a mere nominal imputation. This still leaves open the possibility of eliminating many perceptual and logical errors through conventional valid cognition.

4°P 5246, vol. 95,136.3.5-6. I have expanded the quotation by including two lines prior to Ngawang Belden's translation. They are: ji Itar kla klo skad gzhan gyis /gzung bar mi nus de bzhin du. Cf. Sonam 196 (stanza 194).

45P 5265, vol. 98,177.4.2. Toh. 3864, vol. 7, 8.3.6. The following citations have numerous small differences with the texts as they appear in the canon.

"Affirming negatives (ma yin dgag, paryudasa-pratisedha) are existent phenomena that are expressed in a manner involving a negation, but which suggest a positive phenomenon in place of what is negated, such as "treeless plain" or "non-partisan committee." Non-affirming negatives (prasajya-prati- sedha, med dgag) such as emptiness, the negation of a phenomenon's inherent existence, are mere negatives, negatives that imply nothing positive in their place. They are also permanent phenomena, neither caused nor capable of producing an effect. Because "food having been consumed" and so forth are affirming negatives rather than non-affirming negatives, they can be posited as impermanent phenomena, having causes and causing results.

49Non-desire, non-hatred, and non-obscuration are affirming negatives, as these terms imply positive moral attributes. "Endless life" and "endless light," of course, imply the positive phenomena of life and light. Jamyang Shayba is probably making a pun on two names of the Buddha Amitabha. According to Chandra Das, the Buddha Amitabha has three names, Amitabha being his name in his aspect as an Emanation Body (sprul sku, nirmana- kaya) and Amitayus as a Complete Enjoyment Body (longs sku, sambhogakaya).

50Daktsang "acts astonished" at Dzongkaba because Dzongkaba has said that disintegratedness is a functioning thing, but had to use reasoned investigation to reach his conclusion, asking, for instance, "What is the cause of the child's death?"
Jamyang Shayba's reply is that this sort of analysis is not ultimate analysis, merely analysis involving subtle (as opposed to coarse) worldly conventions. It is not ultimate analysis because it is not a search for an inherently existent entity among its bases of designation, such as would be done (or assented to) by proponents of the lower schools. The difference between subtle and coarse worldly conventions is not one made in the Prasangika literature, except perhaps for this very instance. The half-dozen or so scholars I asked knew of no source for making such a distinction, although several made educated guesses themselves. For instance, Geshay Gonchok Tsayring told me that subtle worldly conventions are those that are conventionally existent but which ordinary people know nothing about. For instance, impermanence is a mere coarse worldly convention, but subtle impermanence, the moment-by-moment disintegration of things, is a subtle convention.

"Ocean of Reasoning, 191.6-12.

53As will be seen, Jamyang Shayba apparently does not agree with Nga-wang Belden that disintegratedness is a cause of total consumption or destruction, for disintegratedness preserves something's continuum of similar type and there is an effect to come out from it. That is apparently also why Jamyang Shayba says that there is no disintegratedness of the obstructions to omniscience for a Buddha.

51Annotations, note a, 114b.3.

'Great Exposition of the Middle Way 628.3-5.

55Jamyang Shayba appears to mean that disintegratedness, which is a pastness, is not a disintegratedness of itself. It itself is a functioning thing that can produce an effect. Elsewhere (in the section on the Svatantrikas) he points out that although, when something is destroyed, it itself no longer exists, its continuum of similar type is not destroyed. Disintegratedness is that continuum. Thus, while the thing itself is destroyed, perhaps it could be said that it is merely destroyed, not totally destroyed.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 38b.3.

"This appears to be a paraphrase of P 5265, vol. 98,177.3.1-2.

Because the factor is itself a thing, that of which it is a factor is a different thing than it.

f0P 5266, vol. 98, 247.3.2.

61P 5266, vol. 98, 247.3.2.

62Kensur Yeshe Tupden felt that a sprout that is future (ma 'ongs pa'i myu gu) and the futureness of a sprout (myu gu ma 'ongs pa) are probably different. A
A sprout that is future is not a sprout, for it is not present, and whatever is a sprout is necessarily present. A futureness of a sprout comes before that sprout, a pastness of a sprout after. The futureness of a sprout exists as the entity of the seed.

`Virtuous and non-virtuous actions that have been completed are said to be "accumulated" because they leave seeds and predispositions that will come to fruition at a later time. However, only if one clearly intends to perform an act of virtue or non-virtue is a "path of action" or karmic path established-one that can result in future good or bad rebirths. For instance, angrily swatting a fly is definitely an action that causes the accrual of seeds and predispositions for bad states, one aspect of karma, but unintentionally squashing an ant while walking is an act of killing that bears only minor consequences. There is also a category of acts not done but for which karma is accumulated, such as when one intends to swat a fly but misses. One does not accumulate the type and degree of karma that one might have if one had oneself successfully completed the act of killing, but bad karma is accumulated because of the anger/harmful intent that was produced in one's mind. These examples were suggested by Geshay Sonam Rinchen and Geshay Gonchok Tsayring.

Ma"Continuum" (rgyun) was identified by Kensur Yeshey Tupden as the continuum of virtuous and non-virtuous karma. However, since this passage concerns various means for holding and transmitting karmic potencies, it seems that the author probably meant the mental continuum, which even the Prasangika School identifies as at least the temporary basis for seeds.

"See note on root verse at the beginning of this chapter.

This is all a reply to Daktsang's objection that finding "disintegratedness that is different from the continuum of similar type of the action" (las ranggi rigs 'dra'i rgyun las gzhan pa'i zhig pa) is like finding a pot among its parts, i.e., ultimate analysis. (See Ocean of Good Explanations 235.3-4.) Jamyang Shayba says that disintegratedness is posited without analysis, being simply designated to a basis of designation, the later continuum of similar type of the action (not something found apart from it). If making such a mere designation were ultimate analysis, then Daktsang's supposed assertion that disintegratedness is not a functioning thing (which in fact he never makes) would also involve ultimate analysis.

Daktsang has been interpreted by Jamyang Shayba to hold the idea that actions themselves persist without disintegrating in some manner over time until their effects issue forth. It would then absurdly follow that those actions would exist now, and we would see (experience) them, remember them, and endlessly relive them. It seems that there is little difference between what is called the "seed" established by an action, an impermanent phenomenon that can later "ripen" into an effect, and the disintegratedness of an action, which is also an
impermanent phenomenon and said to be the cause of an action's later coming to fruition. Perhaps it could be said that a "seed" established by an action is that action's disintegratedness.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 39a.3.

'Both autonomous syllogisms and self-consciousness are asserted by those schools that regard those entities to be able to withstand analysis, i.e., to inherently exist. Prasangikas show that no phenomenon can withstand analysis, but they do assert that there are entities that exist in a merely nominal way. However, autonomous reasons and self-consciousness do not exist even nominally.

'This is a very important topic in Prasrigika literature, since it is the issue that provides the basis for the division of the Madhyamika School into Svatantrika and Prasrigika branches. Jamyang Shayba barely mentions the topic here, certainly because he has already discussed it in great detail earlier in the Prasrigika chapter. For a critical analysis of Jamyang Shayba's presentation and a translation of relevant texts, see Hopkins (1983a: 441-530).

'The quotation has been restored to full length. Hopkins translates this passage (1983a: 475; 818, n. 374, for information on texts he used). Sprung's translation (1979: 7) is: "It is meaningless for a Madhyamika, because he cannot accept his opponent's premises, to propound a self-contained argument from his own point of view (svatantra-prayoga)." This translation reflects a commonly held view that Prasangikas reject syllogisms of all types since they have no tenets of their own. However, Dzongkaba and his followers do not at all object to syllogisms per se, but only to those which are held to exist under their own power (rang dbang du grub pa, svairisiddhi), i.e., to be inherently established. Also, see Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 423.4. For a discussion of the importance of these issues in Gelukba monasticism, see Hopkins (1983a: 846-47).


'Illumination of the Thought 124b.5.

'One mode of ultimate analysis is an inquiry into the relation between an object and its basis of designation. With regard to the production of a sprout, it is not ultimate analysis merely to observe that a sprout is produced from a seed, and that the two are different. However, if we search for those two entities among their parts or for their relationship, we will not find them. Is the seed the hull, or the germ, or the bran? (etc.; Candrakirti goes through seven possibilities). Is a sprout inherently produced from a seed? If so, if a seed exists, a sprout must exist, and if it
already exists, there is no need for it to be produced-and so forth. Similarly, a consciousness is conventionally different from the later recollection of it, but is it inherently different? If so, the two are utterly unrelated and hence it is impossible for the previous consciousness to be remembered.

'Annotations, note kha, 115a.1. What follows is a slightly expanded paraphrase of Nagarjuna's Commentary on "Refutation of Objections," P 5232, vol. 95, 62.3.4-8. Here, Nagarjuna demonstrates the non-inherent existence of valid cognition by refuting all possibilities for the establishment of inherently existent valid cognition.

Annotations, note ka, 114b.7.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 39a.4.

"This sutra is P 47, vol. 24, 229-251. Stephen Batchelor (1979: 185) notes that this quotation is similar to a passage in the Descent to Lanka Sutra; he points to Tokmay Sangbo's commentary on Santideva, Ocean of Good Explanations, Commentary to Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (205), which quotes the Descent to Lanka Sutra for this point. Candrakirti quotes this in his Clear Words (Sanskrit in Poussin 62.4, translated by Sprung 55).


"Annotations, note ga, 115a.5.

"Illumination of the Thought 155a.2-4. This is virtually identical to Candrakirti's Autocommentary on the 'Entrance "51b.7-52a.1.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 39a.6.

16P 5228, vol. 95,15.1.6-7. His own commentary is P 5232, vol. 95, 61.3.3- 8. The quote has been restored to full length. Missing in this edition, but present in the NG edition, were the first two lines of stanza XXXVI. The Sanskrit (from Johnston a Kunst 131) is: yadi ca svatmanamayam tvadvacanena prakagayatyagnih paramiva navatmanam paridhaksyayapi hutagah. (35) /yadi ca svaparatmanau tvadvacanena prakagayatyagnih pracchadayisyati tamah svaparatmanau hutagaha iva. (36) According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, an unlit butter-lamp is not a butter-lamp, just a cup of butter. But Geshay Tupden Gyatso felt that the unlit lamp could still be called a lamp, for that is the name given even to a cup of butter.

"Annotations, note nga, 115a.7.

'BNgawang Belden is referring to note ma on p. 26 of dbu ma in this edition (NG vol. ca: 35).
Ngawang Belden, in the annotation just referred to, notes that Jamyang Shayba skipped several lines in his citation of Nagarjuna.

Great Exposition of Tenets cha 39a.8.

p 5224, vol. 95, 4.4.4. Sanskrit is in Poussin 154.8-9: pradipah svaparatmanau samprakasayate yadi / tamo 'pi svaparatmanau chadayisyatyasamsayam. Candrakirti’s commentary is in Clear Words 103.

"P 5226, vol. 95, 12.3.2-4. No Sanskrit text is extant. The quotation has been expanded. This passage will be quoted again by Ngawang Belden 31.7-8.

"According to Geshay Belden Drakba, this refers to a paralysis-like affliction caused by contact with (the rays of) the eighth planet.

P 5226, vol. 95, 12.3.4.


"Illumination of the Thought 158b.2-4.

Annotations, note ca, 115a.7.

"According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, a butter-lamp is self-luminous (rang gsal ba) in the sense that it has a nature of illumination and needs no other source, but it does not illuminate itself by itself (rang nyid gyis rang gsal ba), a formulation which implies that it requires illumination and that it illuminates itself in the same way it illumines other things. Also, if darkness obscured itself, then absurdly darkness could not be seen. Darkness would obscure itself just as it obscures objects like pots in unlit places.

See the previous citation in the Jamyang Shayba section.

Neither a meeting nor a non-meeting of a lamp and darkness can be found analytically. Nagarjuna shows (see below) that if they meet, then absurdly light and dark exist in one place simultaneously. If they do not meet, how can one harm the other? Or, if darkness is cleared away even though they do not meet, how could there ever be any darkness? Rather, their "meeting" is just an imputation in dependence upon the absence of light in the presence of darkness, and vice versa. Moreover, a lamp and darkness do not meet even conventionally, since they do not exist at the same time. As the Prasangika will say, they are never found together, being contradictory in the sense of not abiding together harmlessly.

I have searched biographical material on the Devadatta who was the Buddha's cousin, but have found no episode that would indicate that this is a reference to a legend about him.
"According to Jambel Trinlay's textbook for Drebung's Loseling College (14.10-11), the definition of phenomena that are contradictory in the sense of not abiding together (lhan cig mi gnas 'gal) is: phenomena that do not have a common locus, that is, do not abide together harmlessly (gnod med du than cig mi gnas pa'i gzhi mthun mi sri pa'i chos). An example is hot and cold, which cannot exist together without harming each other. The import of this category is that wisdom and the consciousness conceiving true existence, being contradictory in this way, do not meet.

33P 5224, vol. 95, 4.4.2-4. Sanskrit is in Poussin 152.10-11, 153.1-2.

34The "state of being produced" (skye bzhin pa) is the moment just before its production, when it still does not exist.

35Nagarjuna is exploring the possibilities for a meeting between a lamp and darkness: if they do not exist at the same time, how can light get rid of darkness? That is, if they do not meet, the production of a lamp would not cause the cessation of darkness. Or, if the lamp cleared away darkness without meeting it, then how could there be any darkness? On the other hand, if a lamp does exist at the same time as the darkness, how can it do away with the darkness? Dzongkaba explains the second stanza in Illumination of the Thought 164.5 ff.

'Ocean of Reasoning 163.19-64.5 (Varanasi ed.).

37Kensur Yeshey Tupden noted (12/14/83) that conventionally, a butter-lamp's state of being produced and darkness meet. They do not meet ultimately, for that would require that a butter-lamp would already exist (for it is the basis of the activity of being produced) entailing the absurdity that it would already exist at the time it is being produced. At that time, darkness is approaching destruction and the butter-lamp is approaching production. In the following moment, the butter-lamp is produced and darkness has ceased. There is no moment in which both exist, hence they do not meet.

Entrance to the Middle Way VI.72-76. His commentary is 51b.6-54a.3. Cf. Huntington 166.

39See Illumination of the Thought 158 ff. According to Dzongkaba, both the Prasangika and Cittamatra Schools maintain that we ordinarily are able to remember not only objects such as a patch of blue that we have previously experienced, but also the awareness such as an eye consciousness which apprehended that patch of blue. For Cittamatrins following Dharmakirti it is necessary that the original eye consciousness apprehending blue have been self-conscious; to them, unless that consciousness was in some way itself experienced at the time it occurred, there could be no memory of it. Prasangikas, on the other hand, have several ways of accounting for memory of a consciousness without resorting to the explanation of self-consciousness. These means are explained later
in this chapter. Kensur Yeshey Tupden (12/14/83) defined "self-experience" as "experience of itself by itself." Self-experience is impossible, just as a lamp cannot illuminate itself by itself nor an eye see itself by itself. In other words, "self-experience" (rang myong ba) is not parallel to "self-illuminate" (rang gsal ba), which, as was seen earlier, means only that fire has a nature of illumination, not that it illumines itself by itself. Instead, the term parallel to "self-illuminate" is "mere experience" (myong ba tsam), meaning only that a consciousness does have an experience of an object. It is discussed later in this chapter. The Opponent mentions two consequences stemming from identifying the experiencer of an earlier consciousness as an other-experiencing consciousness: (1) there would be an infinite regress of consciousnesses and (2) that consciousness would be unable to distinguish another object. This person thinks that if one remembered an earlier consciousness apprehending blue, one would need yet another consciousness to apprehend that remembering consciousness while it apprehended the consciousness apprehending blue, and another to apprehend that consciousness, ad infinitum. Moreover, it is thought that this remembering consciousness would not be able to distinguish blue because it would be full of its apprehension of the eye consciousness apprehending blue. Kensur Yeshey Tupden took this to mean: if this consciousness were an other-experiencer, it and the eye consciousness apprehending blue would be different substantial entities, whereby they would not be simultaneous (and thus according to this opponent it would not be able to cognize the eye consciousness apprehending blue, since according to Cittamatra, a mind and its object must be simultaneous).

The sign "inherently established memory" is not established because there is no such thing.

"Fire and water crystals are believed to produce fire and water (the fire crystal is a magnifying glass). However, the existence of water or fire does not entail the existence of these crystals, since there are many other sources for those elements. Similarly, the mere existence of memory does not entail self-consciousness, since Prasangikas show that there are other explanations for the production of memory.

The Prasangikas refute all possible ways in which memory might serve as a sign for self-consciousness. In the first formulation, "self-consciousness exists because inherently (or substantially) established memory exists," the sign-inherently established memory-and the probandum (what is to be proved)-self-consciousness-are equally non-existent according to the Prasangika School. Inherently established memory is excluded because nothing inherently exists, and
self-consciousness does not exist at all. With regard to the second formulation, "self-consciousness exists because memory exists," because memory does not depend on or is not contingent on selfconsciousness, it is not entailed that if memory exists, self-consciousness necessarily exists. Just as the existence of fire does not entail the existence of a fire-crystal, the existence of memory does not entail the existence of selfconsciousness. In both of these "proofs," memory has been put as the sign and the existence of self-consciousness, the probandum (what is to be proved). In particular, memory has been an effect sign, one which is held to be an effect of the probandum, self-consciousness. Similarly, in the example "On a smoky pass, fire exists because smoke exists," smoke, the effect of fire, is an effect sign indicating the existence of fire.

45 The opponent now admits that there is no instance of self-consciousness to serve as an example in his proof, which would not be as much in dispute as the thesis and therefore could not serve as an example, which is supposed to be easier to understand than the thesis. In what follows, he argues for self-experience rather than self-consciousness.

"This is the third of four arguments made by a hypothetical Cittamatin, the first two having been disposed of above. They were "Self-consciousness exists because inherently established memory exists" and "Self-consciousness exists because memory exists." This argument might be expressed, "A self-experiencer of an eye consciousness apprehending blue exists because a memory of that consciousness exists." Once again, the Prasangikas will not find the entailment-that the existence of memory entails the existence of a self-experiencer-to be acceptable. Jamyang Shayba says, in his Great Exposition of the Middle Way (711.2-3) that self-experience does not exist, even though there is a consciousness-a Buddha's omniscient consciousness-that directly realizes itself by itself. This is because it is not inherently established, whereas self-experience involves inherent establishment.

47The example is an instance of the recollection of blue. The sign-later memory-and predicate-an experiencer of an eye consciousness apprehending blue-exist in the example; that is, in the recollection of blue, there is a later memory and there is a recollection of the eye consciousness apprehending blue. However, as Dzongkaba will show, this person means by "experiencer" a self-experience (i.e., self-consciousness); hence, the entailment-that if later memory exists, a [self-]experiencer of it necessarily exists-cannot hold. It is exactly the same as the previous example.


49The quotation has been expanded to include the first two lines of the stanza. The Sanskrit (V. Bhattacharya, 191) is: yadi nasti svamsavittir vijnanam smaryate
katham /anyanubhute sambandhat smrtirakhuvisham yatha. Batchelor's translation is on 136-37. According to Geshay Belden Drakba, there is a very good commentary by Agya Yongdzin (Yangjen Gaway Lodro) on this, but I have not yet located it. In ~antideva's theory, when one originally cognized an object, the consciousness that saw, etc. the object was only subliminally experienced, not actually experienced. Later, remembering the original object, one remembers the consciousness that apprehended it. No mediating element such as self-consciousness is necessary. In the present example, a bear bitten by a rodent in winter becomes aware of the infection ("poison") in the spring, and that in turn causes it to remember having been bitten, something that it did not notice at the time.

50An "other-experiencer" is just any consciousness, i.e., any consciousness other than self-consciousness. In this case, the "other-experiencer" is a body consciousness aware of the pain of the bite of a rodent.

51The Essence of the Good Explanations 176.6. Material in brackets from Geshe Rapten 350.4. Translated by Hopkins (unpublished; chapter 4: 10) and Thurman (1984: 319), who says that the zin bris he used says that the opponents do not give formal proofs for self-consciousness in any case, because it is so unique that there is no concordant example to posit.

'Entrance to the Middle Way 7b.9. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 159a.4-160a.4. Cf. Poussin Museon 11: 353 and Huntington 166.

Seed and sprout are conventionally different substantial entities, but in the world they are not ordinarily conceived to be so. They are ordinarily not even conceived to be other, as when we say, of a tree, "I planted this," when in fact we planted a seed. Similarly, we do not ordinarily conceive that the blue we experienced in the past and the blue of our current recollection are different. Here it should be noted that there is a difference between what is renowned to the world (jig rten la Brags pa) and what is renowned to an ordinary worldly awareness (jig rten rang 'ga' ba'i blo la grags pa). The first category is broader, including everything established for conventional valid cognition except emptiness, i.e., all conventional truths. The second category, however, precludes anything not obvious to an ordinary person; for example, that there is a difference between the seed that is the substantial cause of a tree and the tree itself is renowned to the world but is not renowned to an ordinary worldly awareness because an ordinary person does not conceive of the seed and tree as different.

54When we utter statements such as these, we are not being strictly correct, but on the other hand we are not saying them within thinking that we are identical to ourselves at the time we previously saw the object, that the blue of the past and the blue of the present recollection are the same, or that I am my hand, etc. We are being correct, but within the context of no analysis. For instance, Kensur Yeshey Tupden noted that there is no innate conception of the present self.
and self of the past as a single substantial entity in the awareness of an ordinary being. Thus, "I saw that" does not indicate a wrong consciousness. Nor is there a conception that one's hand and oneself are different substantial entities (they are conventionally different entities because the hand is form and the person is an impermanent compositional factor which is neither form nor consciousness). Gelukbas tread a fine line by saying that we ordinarily have neither a conception that, for instance, seed and sprout are different substantial entities nor that they are the same substantial entity, even though we must be very close to the latter. Daktsang is said to contend that it is contradictory that seed and sprout be different substantial entities but that there be no production from other. Gelukbas reply that production from other means inherently other, whereas a seed and sprout are only conventionally other.

55Candrakirti's words are referred to as "scripture" (lung, agama), for Candrakirti is so revered that his words do indeed have the force of scripture.

The quotation has been expanded; it is the same one cited at the beginning of this section. Cf. Huntington 166. Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 157.

57Candrakirti's statement of a syllogism would be wrong if his stanza refuted that there is no memory without previous experience, for of course there can be no memory without any previous experience (though of course there can be memory without previous experience of the subject, as Santideva points out). In the syllogism, the reason (that the previous apprehension and later memory are not inherently different, etc.) is established—it is taken right from the verse—but there is no entailment (that because the previous apprehension and later memory are not inherently different it is not contradictory that there be later memory without previous experience), for it does not prove that there is no previous experience. If the assertion of the opponents at the beginning of the paragraph were refuted by Candrakirti's statement, it would be established that there is generation of memory without previous experience. Thus, Candrakirti would be advancing a syllogism that would demonstrate the possibility of memory without previous experience. However, such a syllogism would be senseless because the reason would not establish that there could be memory without experience, merely that the previous apprehension of blue and the later memory of blue are not inherently other (which would preclude any relationship) and that they engage in a single object, the previously existing blue, assertions with which Prasangikas are in agreement. Therefore, Candrakirti's statement refutes only that memory is dependent on a consciousness experiencing itself by itself, i.e., being self-conscious.

This is not a wrong conception. It would be wrong if he were trying to eliminate it.

59Geshay Belden Drakba strongly disagreed with saying that this passage does not eliminate that conception. He thought it was a scribal error and that later
commentators struggled to get around it. Geshay Gonchok Tsayring argued that this is a wrong conception because according to the Prasangika School, it is possible to have memory without previous experience, e.g., memory of a subject (that is Santideva's argument). It is not possible to have memory without mere experience, however, that is, without any experience whatsoever; what would one remember?


"In other words, Candrakirti does not intend to propound that memory is feasible without any previous experience. Rather, he means that it is possible to remember one's previous seeing of an object, as in "I saw that earlier," without it being the case that the earlier eye consciousness was a case of selfconsciousness. Kensur Yeshey Tupden said that Candrakirti does eliminate the conception that it is contradictory that memory be generated without self-consciousness because he shows there is memory without self-consciousness. On the other hand, he does not eliminate the reason here in the sense that he does not eliminate production of memory without previous experience. Thus, there is no fault in the printing. The memory consciousness realizes both blue and the eye consciousness realizing blue.

62 Kensur Yeshey Tupden (12/14/83) reiterated that fire being self-luminous or consciousness being self-knowing (in the sense of having a nature of being clear and knowing) are acceptable; but fire does not illuminate itself by itself and consciousness does not know itself by itself. A butter-lamp must be self-luminous, having no other source of illumination.

'See Illumination of the Thought 160a.6 ff.

"Great Exposition of the Middle Way 709.2 ff.

`See the citation of the same verse earlier in this chapter.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 39b.2.

2 Jamyang Shayba does not explicitly connect the assertions that true cessations are the element of a [Superior's] qualities and that Superiors of all types realize emptiness. Probably, he means that since it is necessarily the case that Superiors realize true cessations (a Superior being a person who has completely destroyed every vestige of the obstructions to liberation), then if true cessations are indeed emptinesses it necessarily follows that those Superiors realize emptiness. Losang Gonchok, by his use of an instrumental grammatical particle after the first phrase, "True cessations are the element of a [Superior's] qualities," (Word Commentary 263.1-2), interprets Jamyang Shayba that way; on the other hand, Ngawang Belden's commentary links the two phrases only by "and" (Three Commentaries 511.2) and says nothing in his Annotations to indicate any causal relationship. It
seems to me that it must be assumed that Jamyang Shayba sees a causal relationship, since he presents the two thoughts as a single topic, not as separate topics.

"Directly" has been interpolated from Ngawang Belden, Three Commentaries 511.2. It is possible to realize the absence of true establishment in phenomena even before becoming a Superior, but only Superiors realize it directly.

5P 5266, vol. 98, 259.3.4.

'Clear Words 48.1-3. The Sanskrit is in Poussin 71.10-11. The quotation has been restored to full length. Translations by Sprung (61) and Stcherbatsky (1927: 244).

"In general, minds themselves are manifest phenomena or manifest objects. A manifest object is one that need not be realized in dependence upon a logical mark or sign (Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo 58.9, translated in Sopa and Hopkins [232]). For instance, an eye consciousness seeing blue is a manifest object for a subsequent mental consciousness remembering it.

There are several etymologies for the term pratyaksa. Poussin gives sources (1970: 71-72, n. 4); Stcherbatsky (1927: 250, n. 2) says Vasubandhu's definition in Nyayavarti (42-edition unspecified) is quite different from Dignaga's in Pramanasamuccaya 1.15 (P 5700, vol. 130, Toh. 4203) but I have not had access to the former to compare. The etymology followed by the Prasahgika School appears to be "before the eyes" (prati, before, + aksa, eyes), in the sense of objects obvious to the senses. In general, the Prasangika School does not consider consciousnesses to be pratyaksa. However, a consciousness that has its objects "before the eyes," that is, a directly perceiving consciousness, is also often called pratyaksa. Candrakirti explains that they come to have that name only by way of their association with their objects. Just as fire in the instances of a hay-fire or grass-fire has been given the name of its object, the substance being burned, so consciousnesses are given the name pratyaksa ("manifest") because their objects are pratyaksa ("manifest").

'Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate 496.6 says that an eye consciousness is a mngon sum; however, Kaydrup later says that the fully-qualified mngon sum is the object, not the subject (502.2).

"In other words, there appears to be a contradiction. Ngawang Belden, pondering Jamyang Shayba's statement that in general, even consciousnesses are manifest objects, wonders how to reconcile this with other statements that sense objects are synonymous with manifest objects. The problem is that consciousnesses such as eye or ear consciousnesses are not themselves sense objects because they cannot be apprehended by any of the five sense consciousnesses. Rather, they are objects of the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness.

8Annotations, note cha,117b.2.
"Ngawang Belden himself thinks that not only is pratyaksa not restricted only to sense objects (which would have excluded consciousnesses), but that all phenomena are pratyaksa to awarenesses that clearly, i.e., directly realize them. This would imply that for Ngawang Belden, even a permanent phenomenon such as an emptiness can be considered a pratyaksa in relation to the wisdom consciousness of meditative equipoise directly realizing it.

Maitreya, in his Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes (1.15-16) explains that the term chos dbyings (dharmadhatu) is synonymous with emptiness and etymologizes it as "the cause (= dbyings, dhatu) of the qualities (chos, dharma) of Superiors" ('phags pa'i chos kyi rgyu, hetutvaccineadharm). Tibetan is P 5522, vol. 108, 30.4.4-5. For Sanskrit, see Pandeya (1971: 38-39). Emptiness is the cause of the qualities of Superiors because meditation on it acts as a cause for becoming a Superior. Dzongkaba explains it this way in reliance on Vimuktisena's Illumination of the 25,000 Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (see Hopkins [1980: 178-79]; also see Ngawang Belden, Annotations dbu 8b.6 Hopkins [1983: 383]).

"P 5225, vol. 95, 11.2.6-7. The citation has been expanded by adding the first two lines. The Tibetan, and the Sanskrit reconstruction by Uriutso Ryushin, reproduced in Tola and Dragonetti (98), are: yod pas rnam par mi grol to / med pas srid pa 'di las min. // idam bhavas ca nirvanam ubhayam naiva vidyate/bhava eva parijnato nirvanam iti kathyate.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 39b.5.

"According to Candrakirti (Entrance to the Middle Way VI.220 [14b.1]), abhava means non-conditioned phenomena ('dus ma byas kyi chos, asamskra- dharma). In other words, the "great beings" understand all phenomena, impermanent and permanent.

"It appears that this is not a direct quotation, but rather is a paraphrase of P 5265, vol. 98, 172.5.6-7 (= Toh. 3864, vol. 7, 3.3.2-3), which reads: "The thorough understanding [by Superiors] that those two [i.e., things and nonthings] do not inherently exist, which has a nature of not conceiving a self-entitiness, and so forth, of things and non-things, is the non-erroneous thorough knowledge of things and non-things in that way. Through such thorough understanding the great beings posit [phenomena]. Therefore, they abide in the exalted wisdom of non-apprehension which totally transcends childish beings, whereby because just they are great, they are called 'great beings' and 'Superiors.'" (de gnyis dngos po med par yongs su shes pa dgnos po dang dngos po med pa'i rang gi ngo bo la sogs yongs su mi rtog pa'i rang bzhin gang yin pa de ni de Itar dngos po dan dgnos po med pa phyin ci ma log par yongs su shes pa ste /de Itar yongs su shes pa des bdag nyid chen po rnams kyis rnam par gzhag go / de'i phyir de dag Skye bo byis pa rnams las shin to Was pa dmigs pa med pa'i ye shes la gnas pas de dag nyid the ba'i phyir bdag nyid chen po zhes bya ste 'phags pa zhes brjod do.)
"Kensur Yeshey Tupden. One of the great qualities is their thorough understanding of emptiness. He also thought that "great essence" might mean emptiness.

"According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, Superiors realize that things and non-things are mutually related, hence dependently arisen; because of that they realize that those are not inherently established. All Superiors realize this directly. Jamyang Shayba does not attempt here to justify his identification of true cessations with emptiness; his point in using these two quotations seems to be to bolster the Consequentialist tenet that liberation depends upon realization of emptiness. Since true cessations are emptinesses, and Superiors necessarily realize true cessations, they must perforce realize emptiness.

"Annotations, note ja, 117b.4.

20Collected Works, vol. 5, 407.5-8.1. Gyeltsap also wrote a memorandum (zin bris) on this text, Collected Works, vol. 5, 461-82. There is a similar statement in Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) \Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning," P 5265, vol. 98,172.5.5-6.

"According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, sometimes it is also said that what is "not observed" is non-emptinesses, that is, positive phenomena and affirming negatives, which do not appear to the minds of non-Buddhas at the time they directly realize emptiness.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 39b.6.

ZA nirvana is an emptiness in the mind of one who has completely and forever abandoned all the afflictions comprising the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence. It occurs for Hearer Arhats and Solitary Realizer Arhats after the end of their paths of meditation and for Bodhisattvas at the beginning of the eighth of ten grounds of their path of meditation. An "uninterrupted path" realizing emptiness that is simultaneous with the cessation of the last of the afflictive obstructions is followed by a "path of release" in which they have nirvana. The nirvana experienced in meditative equipoise is a nirvana without remainder because at that time there is a nirvana but there is no remainder of appearance of mistaken dualistic appearances, that is, the appearance of true existence. It is followed by a nirvana with a remainder of the appearance of true existence because until one removes the obstructions to omniscience, phenomena appear to be truly existent.

3Jamyang Shayba says "certain" Cittamatrins because he does not include Dharmakirti and his followers among those Cittamatrins who propound "three final vehicles," the doctrine that not all sentient beings eventually attain Buddhahood. Dharmakirti and the Madhyamikas assert that all beings eventually attain Buddhahood and that there is never a time when the continuum of mind is irrevocably cut off. Therefore, they cannot admit the position of the lower schools
that the continuum of the aggregates is cut off in a nirvana without remainder.

For example, Vaibha~ikas. See Gonchok Jikmay Wangbo, Precious Garland of Tenets 28.12, translated in Sopa and Hopkins (217).

Jamyang Shayba adduces two faults to the definitions of nirvana with and without remainder in the lower schools: first, if nirvana without remainder involved the utter extinction of the mental and physical aggregates, there would be no one to experience the nirvana. Second, the sutras that say that Arhats extinguish their aggregates should be interpreted to mean that those aggregates are primordially extinguished into emptiness, not that they are utterly extinguished. Otherwise, there would be no way to explain how Sariputra repeated a sutra after having actualized nirvana. (I have split the second objection into two parts for clarity.) See Candrakirti, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas' 10b.3, for more.

bP 5265, vol. 98, 174.4.5. The second part of this quotation, the portion following the ellipses, seems to be a very loose paraphrase of the text following the first part. Perhaps it is based on a different translation into Tibetan.

'No person would be able to actualize a nirvana without a remainder of aggregates because the mental and physical aggregates are the basis of imputation for persons. A person whose aggregates had been destroyed would be dead. In most Mahayana systems (the Madhyamika School and the followers of Dharmakirti in the Cittamatra School) there is no instance in which the aggregates of a person are completely extinguished in the sense of irrevocably cutting their continuum (although the form aggregate is temporarily absent in the case of persons born in the Formless Realm). All sentient beings eventually attain Buddhahood. Those who have attained nirvana have purified their aggregates of afflictions and are no longer powerlessly reborn in cyclic existence, but the process of transformation from ordinary being to Arhat and from Arhat to Buddha does not disturb the basic continuum of the aggregates.

The lower schools would probably answer that there is after all an attainer of their version of nirvana without remainder—one in which the continuum of the aggregates is cut off—because the person who is about to attain that nirvana in the next moment may be designated as the attainer of a nirvana without remainder. Such a designation would be a coarse worldly convention, analogous to the way in which the world refers to persons and death. For example, although it is not possible to posit a person who is dead (because persons are imputed in dependence on their aggregates, and a corpse has neither a living body nor a consciousness associated with it) people in the world often speak as though such a person could be posited. To Jamyang Shayba this is not a satisfactory answer. It is no more admissible to talk about persons who have attained a nirvana in which the aggregates have been utterly destroyed than to talk about persons who are dead.
This sutra is cited in Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" but not identified by him or by Nagarjuna, Dzongkaba, or Jamyang Shayba. According to Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 188a.3 (Buxaduor edition), it is a sutra set forth by Sariputra after his enlightenment, perhaps the Repetition Sutra. Translated by Hopkins (1980: 170).

10Annotations, note nya,117b.6.

"This Hearer sutra is apparently used by proponents of the lower schools of tenets to show that the continuum of the aggregates of an Arhat who has attained nirvana is utterly cut off at the time of death (the meaning ably at the time of meditative equipoise on emptiness) is a shared nirvana without remainder. Panchen's analysis fails, it seems, because there could not actually be a shared nirvana without remainder. That is because a nirvana without remainder for the lower schools entails the total annihilation of the aggregates whereas in the upper schools there is never an irrevocable extinguishment of the aggregates. See Losang Dayang, Grounds and Paths 128.1-5. Panchen Sonam Drakba clearly does not fall into the camp of the proponents of the lower tenet systems because he recognizes that the system of the Prasangika School uniquely defines nirvanas with and without remainder and that is also unique with regard to the order in which those nirvanas are actualized.

9P 5265, vol. 98, 174.4.6-5.2.

"Illumination of the Thought 35b.5-6. Translated in Hopkins (1980: 170).

of "nirvana without remainder" for them). However, Candrakirti and Dzongkaba argue that because the sutra uses the term "this" it is referring to suffering, i.e., aggregates, in the continuum of someone who is alive. Thus it cannot be referring to a nirvana without remainder in the sense that the lower schools use that term. Dzongkaba later explains that the first part of the sutra refers to the primordial extinguishment of the aggregates into emptiness, that being the fact that all phenomena have a nature of emptiness and are primordially empty of inherent existence. According to Kaydrup, it specifically refers to the primordial extinguishment of the aggregates which is realized in meditative equipoise by someone who has attained nirvana. Losang Dayang's Grounds and Paths (126.7-127.3) quotes Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate:

Since there is no remainder of the appearance of true existence for the perspective of a meditative equipoise which has actualized the cessation that is the primordial extinguishment of the aggregates, it is called a nirvana without remainder; since there is a remainder of the appearance of true existence of the aggregates, and so forth, for the perspective of an [exalted wisdom of] subsequent attainment arisen from that [meditative equipoise], it is called a nirvana with remainder.
It is possible that Dzongkaba means that the entire sutra concerns primordial extinguishment into emptiness. However, it seems that Candrakirti and Dzongkaba are distinguishing two parts to the sutra, the first concerned with primordial extinguishment and the second actually concerned with the cessation of all the afflictions upon attainment of nirvana. It is difficult to tell what is meant because neither of them comments on the second part of the sutra and because the Tibetan of the sutra gives no justification for their bifurcation. The first is a nirvana that all phenomena have and that is experienced in the direct realization of emptiness. This nirvana is not one brought about by the path. The second is the abandonment of an affliction due to the development of a path consciousness capable of permanently extinguishing an affliction.

Ngawang Belden considers Panchen Sonam Drakba to have a position similar to proponents of the lower tenet systems on nirvana with remainder and without remainder. He probably bases this criticism on a passage from Panchen Sonam Drakba's Commentary on the General Meaning of (Dzongkaba's) illumination of the Thought °(dbu ma'i spyi don; see Losang Dayang 127.3-5, 127.7-28.1) that discusses a common mode of positing the two nirvanas for the upper and lower tenet systems. Panchen Sonam Drakba implies that a nirvana in the continuum of an Arhat who has a remainder of aggregates and a remainder of the appearance of true existence is not only a nirvana with remainder for the lower tenet systems but also a nirvana with remainder for the Prasangika School. Similarly, he says that a nirvana without a remainder of either aggregates or the appearance of true existence (presum-

"In their commentaries above, Candrakirti and Dzongkaba replied to those who find the sutra under consideration to be referring to a nirvana without remainder in the sense of a nirvana involving the irrevocable extinguishment of the aggregates. The present opponent takes an opposite tack, implying that the sutra concerns a nirvana with remainder in the sense of a nirvana involving a remainder of aggregates. He thinks that perhaps "sufferings" and "aggregates" refer here only to the afflictions (of desire, hatred, and so forth); in that case this sutra refers neither to the primordial extinguishment of the aggregates nor to the severance of the continuum of the mind and body of an Arhat at the time of that Arhat's death. Dzongkaba answers that it is not necessary to twist the literal meaning of "this which is suffering" and "all aggregates" because those phrases refer only to the fact that these phenomena have a natural extinguishment (that is, they are naturally or primordially without inherent existence). Dzongkaba's explanation follows.

"Illumination of the Thought 35a.2-5. Also translated by Hopkins (1980: 170-71). The differences between this translation and that in Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism reflect Hopkins' subsequent reinterpretation of the passage.

'5This passage appears in neither Maitreya's nor Asanga's texts. It may be in Gyeltsep's commentary.
"Since the Proponents of True Existence—the proponents of the lower tenet systems—interpret this sutra as being concerned with a nirvana without remainder in the sense of an irrevocable extinguishment of the aggregates, they would not interpret it as Dzongkaba has done or as Maitreya would, as being concerned with the primordial extinguishment of the aggregates into emptiness. In the section in which the quoted passage occurs, Maitreya speaks about the natural purity of the mind and the adventitious nature of the afflictions defiling it; he does not mean that the afflictions are removed by the path from beginningless time. They would then have the problem of explaining how there could be an actualizer of that nirvana (since the aggregates would have been abandoned at the point of attaining the nirvana), or, vice versa, how there could be an actualized nirvana without remainder if there were a person who had actualized it.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 40a.5.

18 A search of the bka' 'gyur revealed no sutra of this name or containing the term "repetition" (which Ngawang Belden spells rjes bzlas). Its Sanskrit title might be anuvipsasutra. Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (343.5) says that according to "just that commentary" ~ariputra spoke this sutra after having attained enlightenment. Jamyang Shayba may be referring to Candrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning "which he has quoted a little earlier.

19Annotations, note ta, 118a.4.

20 P 5265, vol. 98,175.1.3-6. The quotation has been expanded to include the previous phrase.

"Tibetan: Datul (rta thul). See Mahavyupatti, vol. 1, n. 1037. He is identified as a Hearer.

'It is possible that Ngawang Belden is correcting Jamyang Shayba, or that he is making a reply to a hypothetical objection. What he says shows that nirvana with remainder even in the Hearer sense of the term is an actual nirvana. Hearers would otherwise have to deny that Sariputra attained a full-fledged nirvana, and they presumably would not want to do that. If it were thought that there is no actual nirvana when there is a remainder of aggregates, one would have to deny that ~ariputra was able to explain a sutra after having actualized nirvana. Gyeltṣap's commentary may confirm that the stanza that is cited as proof of S`ariputra's continued existence after actualizing nirvana was indeed uttered by Sariputra, not Asvajit.

"Great Exposition of Tenets cha 40a.5.

"According to Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (342.5), a nirvana with remainder is: "a nirvana of remainder that, although the afflictions have been abandoned, [involves] a mere remainder of the appearance of true
existence of an object to any of the six manifest operating consciousnesses."

"According to Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (342.5-43.1), a nirvana without remainder is: "a nirvana in which not only have the afflictions been abandoned, but a remainder of the appearance of true existence to any of the operating consciousnesses and all the sufferings of the three times are extinguished in emptiness and which involves a meditative equipoise into which such appearances, manifest feelings, and so forth, are pacified." He mentions that all the sufferings of "the three times" are extinguished because of the reference to "future suffering."

26P 5658, vol. 129, 181.1.4. The quotation has been restored to full length. It has been translated in reliance on Hopkins (1975: 75).

27The Hinayana sutras that teach that sufferings are extinguished and the Mahayana sutras that teach that phenomena are unproduced are both referring to emptiness. The first is interpreted to refer to the natural or primordial extinguishment of all phenomena in emptiness, and the second is interpreted to refer to the utter non-production of anything inherently existent. Buddha explained in the Descent to Lanka Sutra (lahkavatārasutra) that when he said, "no production," he meant, "no inherently existent production." See Suzuki (1932: 67).

28P 5525, vol. 108, 24.3.5. The Sanskrit, from E. H. Johnston (1950: 14): prathavattajjagacchantadharmatavagamat sa ca prakrteh parisuddhatvdt kleśasya- diksayeksanat. The quotation has been lengthened. See Obermiller (1931: 138) for this quotation and the Asanga quotation following it. Sems, which I have translated as "mind," is translated by Obermiller as "Spirit," which could easily mislead one into thinking that what Maitreya asserts is a permanent soul or self rather than a basically pure but adventitiously defiled impermanent continuum of mind.

29Takasaki's reading (174) is that Superiors realize phenomena as having a nature of quiescence-of being empty of their own nature-because the mind is pure and because they perceive the afflictions as being primordially extinguished. That is, he thinks that Superiors realize emptiness because they realize the primordial extinguishment of the afflictions. However, I think this puts the cart before the horse: because the afflictions are primordially extinguished, the mind is naturally pure; therefore, it is possible for Superiors to realize emptiness. If the mind were not naturally pure, it could not be transformed into a wisdom consciousness. The primordial extinguishment of the afflictions is not what they realize, but rather what enables them to realize emptiness (the quiescent nature of phenomena).

31P 5526, vol. 108, 35.4.1. Takasaki notes (7) that although the Tibetan tradition assumes that the commentary in which Maitreya's verses are embedded is Asariga's, there is no textual evidence that he is its author. The Sanskrit is (Johnson: 15) atha ca punarbhagavan prakṛtīparisuddhāsya cītasya- paklegartho dusprativedhyah. Asarlga says that Superiors realize the selflessness of persons
and (other) phenomena for two reasons: (1) because the mind is seen to be naturally luminous and (2) because the afflictions are primordially extinguished. It is not clear whether one realizes selflessness in the dependence on these two reasons in the sense that realizing the luminous nature of the mind and the primordial extinguishment of the aggregates is itself realization of selflessness, or whether it is just meant that these two factors make possible the realization of selflessness. Obermiller's translation (38) implies the first, it seems.

"Emptiness is the reality of phenomena and their total quiescence, meaning that all phenomena are "extinguished into emptiness" in the sense that they are primordially and forever devoid of inherent existence. Maitreya and Asanga explain that Superiors are in an important sense able to realize emptiness because the mind is naturally pure or luminous and because the afflictions are primordially empty of inherent existence. If the mind were not naturally pure with the afflictions being mere adventitious defilements staining it, it would not be possible to transform the mind. Also, if the afflictions were not empty of inherent existence, they could not be removed, for if something existed inherently it could not be eliminated. Asanga may also mean that the suchness of persons and phenomena is realized because Superiors see that the mind is naturally luminous and that the afflictions are primordially extinguished into emptiness. Those two facts make realization of suchness possible, and realizing them is realization of suchness. Jamyang Shayba's purpose in citing Maitreya and Asanga seems to be merely to provide more examples of writings in which extinguishment of the afflictions or aggregates refers to primordial extinguishment into emptiness rather than utter extinguishment.

'Clear Words 220.3. The Sanskrit is in Poussin 340.6-7: adhyatmikabahyage~avastvanupalambhenadhyatmam bahigca yah sarvathahamkaramamakarapari- jriaya idamatra tattvam. Also translated by Sprung (165).

33Dzongkaba, Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, 371b.2-3.

The "suchness to be attained" is the adventitiously pure Nature Truth Body (ngo bo nyid sku, svabhavika-kaya), the emptiness of the Buddha's omniscient consciousness and the ultimate true cessation. "Suchness," i.e., emptiness, is explained to be the elimination of the object of the conception of an inherently existent I and mine. Thus, emptiness is being explicitly indicated by Candrakirti and Dzongkaba to be a true cessation. This is an important source for establishing the Gomang College position that true cessations are emptinesses (in contradistinction to the Loseling College tenet that true cessations are ultimate truths but not emptinesses), and it is puzzling that Jamyang Shayba places it here instead of in the previous chapter. According to Jamyang Shayba, true cessations are ultimate truths and emptinesses and have both existent and non-existent objects of negation. On the other hand, Panchen Sonam Drakba of Loseling College held that true cessations, though ultimate truths, are necessarily not emptinesses.
because their objects of negation—the consciousness conceiving true existence—were not nonexistent.

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 40b.2-3.

ZP 5263, vol. 98,164.2.1-2. This portion was not translated by Poussin. The quotation has been lengthened by filling in material indicated by "etc." (sogs), beginning with "...and the existence of predispositions [established by] desire..." There is no available Sanskrit text.

The line before this quotation (164.1.8) mentions Arhats "who formerly were monkeys, who go about jumping" and mang mor bjod pa-"one who formerly was a Brahmin, calling someone a low-caste woman." These are people who have predispositions from former lives as a monkey or Brahmin that cause them to act in strange ways, despite the fact that they have irrevocably destroyed the afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance. Just as predispositions established by ignorance—the obstructions to omniscience—continue to exist even though ignorance itself has been destroyed, so also the predispositions of desire and hatred exist despite the cessation of desire and hatred.

4P 5263, vol. 98, 164.1.3.

S Candrakirti also mentions non-afflictive ignorance in his Brilliant Lamp, Commentary on the Guhyasamaja Tantra (rgyud 'grel sgron gsal, pradipoddyotana), which is cited in Losang Dayang 119.2.

6P 5366, vol. 103, 175.4.5. No Sanskrit text is extant.

'P 5366, vol. 103, 175.1.4.

s Annotations, note tha, 118a.8 if. By citing Janggya, who disagrees with Jamyang Shayba about the existence of obstructions to omniscience that are consciousnesses, Ngawang Belden also obviously expresses his disagreement with Jamyang Shayba.

9janggya, Presentation of Tenets 486.17187.14.

"Kaydrup (1385-1438) is one of Dzongkaba’s two chief disciples; JaydzUn Chogyi Gyeltsen (1469-1546) is the author of monastic textbooks for Jay college of Sera Monastery; I have not yet found biographical information on Jamyang Gaway Lodro, except for his dates (1429/30-1503); G enddn G yatso (1476-1542) is the second Dalai Lama; and Panchen Sonam Drakba (1478-1554) is the author of monastic textbooks for Loseling College of Drebung Monastery.

"None of the half-dozen scholars I asked knew who this was.

"He is the first Panchen Lama (1569-1662). Losang Dayang (Grounds and Paths
119.4-5), calls him the All-Seeing Panchen Losang Chogyi Gyeltsen (pan chen kun gzigs blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan), and the name of his book is Answer to the Objections of the Translator [Daktsang] Shayrap Rinchen (sgra pa shes rab rin chen gyi rtsod Ian).

"Great Exposition of Tenets, 40b.6.

"Annotations, note da, 118b.5.


"Irreversibility (phyir mi ldog pa), a definiteness as to attainment of liberation, is, according to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, attained even as soon as the path of preparation if the person's realization is strong, on the path of seeing if it is weaker.

"Gyeltsap, Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana,' 102.2-3. This quotation shows that "impediments" (thogs pa) are to be understood as obstructions to omniscience. The bracketed material comes from the context of the passage in Maitreya under discussion, which is cited in the next section of this chapter.

"The realm of sentient beings is seen by these Bodhisattvas to be pure because all beings have a "nature of omniscience," that is, a Buddha-nature, the capacity to develop into Buddhas. This is the subject of stanzas 13 and 15 of the first chapter of Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Mahayana, P 5525, vol. 108, 24.3.3-5.

19Great Exposition of Tenets cha 40b.6.

"In general, the antidote for obstructions to omniscience is the same as for obstructions to liberation, but one needs an enhancement of method, the power of compassion. Prasangikas assert that it is not possible to get rid of any of the obstructions to omniscience until all of the afflictive obstructions have been eliminated, because it is absurd to think that even before ignorance is entirely eradicated it would be possible to overcome the subtle predispositions causing things to appear as if truly existent.

22This sutra is part of the de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying rje chen po nges par bstan pa (tathagatamahakaruna-nirdega), P 814, vol. 32, 300.5.4 ff.

IT 5263, vol. 98,164.1.5-7. The quotation has been lengthened by filling in material indicated by "etc." (sogs), beginning with, "This is like the fact..."

23P 5525, vol. 108, 24.3.6-7. The quotation has been lengthened by adding the last line, "Are refuges for all beings." Thus lengthened, it comprises the last two lines of the seventeenth stanza and all of the eighteenth stanza. The first two lines of the seventeenth stanza read: "Thus what is realized / Is seen with their distinct
I have taken the exalted wisdom consciousnesses of Superiors to be the antecedent of "pure" because the stanza suggests it and because Asanga's commentary says that the awareness that realizes the supramundane path is the Superiors' supramundane wisdom that is distinct in the sense of being unshared with others. The quotation seems to suggest that the exalted wisdom of Bodhisattvas is free both of attachments and of obstructions to omniscience. However, if that were the case, there would be no difference between Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Rather, according to Ngawang Belden's comment following this series of quotations, it means only that these Bodhisattvas have overcome at least some of the obstructions to omniscience.

The Sanskrit has been edited by E. H. Johnston, Ratnagotravibhaga-Mahayanottaratantra4stra, 16.2, 16.9-10: tacchuddhiramale dhatavasangapratigha tatah (17) / jrianadarsanasuddhya buddhajrianadanuttarat avaivartyadbhavantyarah saranam sarvadehinam (18). English translation by Obermiller (141).

24P 5526, vol. 108, 35.5.4-5. Bracketed material has been taken from Gyeltsap's commentary.

"P 5526, vol. 108, 35.5-7-8. The quotation has been lengthened by completing the sentence, beginning with "...comes into proximity..."

In an earlier note I cited Kensur Yeshey Tupden as saying that irreversibility—a definiteness with regard to liberation—could be obtained as early as the path of preparation. However, it appears that one does not attain the ground of irreversibility until the eighth Bodhisattva ground, when a Bodhisattva actually has become liberated.

"Illumination of the Thought 25b.1-2. Bracketed material comes from Dzongkaba's previous sentence. Also translated by Hopkins (1980: 147).

'Great Exposition of Tenets cha 41a.4.

This is based on Dzongkaba's statement in his Three Principal Aspects of the Path (cited in Tenzin Gyatso, Dalai Lama IV [1984: 153], translated by Hopkins): "Further, the extreme of [inherent] existence is excluded [by knowledge of the nature] of appearances [existing only as nominal designations] / And the extreme of [total] non-existence is excluded [by knowledge of the nature] of emptiness [as the absence of inherent existence and not the absence of nominal existence]." The Dalai Lama adds (153): "Among all four Buddhist schools of tenets ...it is held to be true that the extreme of non-existence-misidentification of what exists as not existing—is cleared away by appearance and the extreme of existence-misidentification of what does not exist as existing—is cleared away by emptiness. However, according to the uncommon view of the Prasarigika-Madhyamika School, the opposite also holds true: by way of appearance, the extreme of [exalted wisdom] consciousness."
existence is avoided, and by way of emptiness, the extreme of non-existence is avoided. This doctrine derives from the pivotal point that the meaning of dependent-arising is the meaning of emptiness and that the meaning of emptiness is the meaning of dependent-arising."

'It is not clear whether by dbu ma Jamyang Shayba is referring to the great texts of the Madhyamika School or his own extensive treatment of several of the unique Prasangika School tenets in his commentary on Chandragupta's Entrance entitled Great Exposition of the Middle Way, the title of which could be abbreviated as dbu ma. The first seems more likely, since Jamyang Shayba's commentary contains a list of the great texts of the Madhyamika School. Also, Ngawang Belden takes the referent of dbu ma to be the Madhyamika School texts of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva and commentaries on them (Three Commentaries 512.4). Also, see Annotations 262.4. On the other hand, Losang Gonchok (Word Commentary 273.3) interprets dbu ma as the Great Exposition of the Middle Way and other works by Jamyang Shayba, as did Geshay Tupden Gyatso, a contemporary scholar from Jamyang Shayba's own Gomang College, when I asked him about this in March 1985.

5Only the Prasatigika School says that the extreme of conceiving of inherent existence is eliminated through the appearance of dependently arisen phenomena and the extreme of annihilation through the realization of emptiness. This is also stated by Janggya in Presentation of Tenets 451.1-4, translated by Hopkins (1987:332-33, 418).

"Annotations, note na,119a.1.


'All Buddhist schools say that the extreme of existence is avoided through realizing selflessness and that the existence of non-existence is avoided through the appearance of conventional phenomena, but the Prasangikas are asserting that the opposite also is true. It seems that by switching these terms, the Prasangikas are emphasizing the compatibility of emptiness and dependent-arising. The observation of dependent-arisings is a sign of their lack of inherent existence, and the realization of emptiness makes possible one's understanding of conventionalities as conventionalities. Similarly, Dzongkaba says in the beginning of the sixth chapter of his Illumination of the Thought that understanding that phenomena are merely imputed by thought assists one in understanding emptiness, whereas usually it is said that until one has realized emptiness one is unable to understand conventionalities as mere conventionalities, imputed by
thought.

9P 823, vol. 33. This sutra is a development of the Great Wisdom Perfection Sutra (maha-prajnaparamita-sutra), according to Nakamura (1987: 165). This passage is cited in Dzongkaba's Middling Exposition of Special Insight, translated by Thurman (1982:143). It is also cited in Clear Words 504.1 (Poussin ed.), and in Dzongkaba's Great Exposition of Special Insight (Dharamsala ed. 410a.5-6), along with an explanation. The point of the quotation seems to be that understanding emptiness assists one in understanding conventional appearances, thus avoiding the extreme of annihilation.


"Translation uncertain.

13Ngawang Belden doubts the prevailing Gelukba opinion that even proponents of the lower schools say that the extreme of existence is eliminated by the appearance of dependent-arisings and the extreme of annihilation through the realization of emptiness.

Great Exposition of Tenets cha 41a.5.

"The absorption of cessation is a state of meditative equipoise that is the absence of the manifest activity of the six consciousnesses. It is a state achieved only by Superiors (see Hopkins [1983a: 207, 269]). Elsewhere, Jamyang Shayba explains that it is the unique Prasangika assertion that one can realize emptiness even within the absorption of cessation (according to Losang Gonchok, Word Commentary 272.5). For a discussion on some problems involved with the concept, see Griffiths 1986.

16Regarding the "unique tenets" not listed, Ngawang Belden says they include unique Prasangika assertions on the absorption of cessation, the mode of generating the profound view (of emptiness), the basis of infusion of predispositions, the way to posit the illustration of the person, and so forth (Three Commentaries 512.2). Losang Gonchok explains that the other unique tenets are (1) one realizes even in the absorption of cessation that objects are not established from their own side; (2) an inferential consciousness realizing suchness is generated in dependence on a mere contradictory consequence (without the need for an autonomous syllogism to be stated); and (3) although inference meets back to direct perception, it is sufficient that the experience of that direct perception be incontrovertible-it need not be non-mistaken (i.e., it is not invalidated by the fact that objects appear to it to be inherently existent), etc. (Word Commentary 272.5-73.3).
"In Knowing, Naming, and Negation (1991).

"In A Study of Svatantrika (1987).

"In Emptiness Yoga (1987). The bulk of the book is his own commentary on Janggya's text, but it includes a running translation.

"Unpublished ms.

I have not seen an edition that Mimaki (1982: xlvii) identifies as no. 8285 in the Catalogue of the University of Tokyo, labeled "Ser byas," i.e., Jey College of Sera Monastery, n.d. Mimaki has compiled a concordance to these three editions (1982: 268-72). I have also heard about but have not seen an edition published by gam bcar phan bde legs bshad gling grva tshang dang rgyud rnying slar gso tshogs pa in the royal year 2109.

"According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden, these have been taken from Santideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, but such a statement is common in Gelukba literature on the Prasangika School.

"Illumination of the Thought 124b.2-5.

"The basic division of the Prasangika chapter is into topics concerning bases, paths, and fruits. Janggya is indicating that this list of topics is being gleaned just from the "bases" section, and not from the path and fruit sections, which come immediately after the portion of the book translated herein. In fact, the fifth topic could be a "path" topic, and Dzongkaba, in another list (from his short text on the eight difficult points) adds a "fruit" topic concerning the qualities of a Buddha.

4"Mind-basis-of-all" translates kun gzhi rnam par shes pa/alayavijriana. I usually render rnam par shes pa / vijnana as "consciousness," but in this phrase it will be translated as "mind" for the sake of brevity. According to Gelukbas the mind-basis-of-all is asserted by only the Cittamatra School.

SGsal bar byed pa, an "illuminator" or "indicator" placed at the end of a list which is intended to apply equally to all members of that list. In Dzongkaba's list of eight chief difficult topics, "unique system of refutation" (gog lugs thun mong ma yin pa) appeared only after the statement of the second topic, but referred both to it and to the first topic; and "unique way of positing" (jog tshul thun mong ma yin pa) appeared only after the eighth topic but applied to all of the last six topics.

These are theories set forth by various other schools. See note 2 of the Jamyang Shayba translation, chapter 6.

"That an action has been collected means that a seed for a future experience of pleasure or suffering has been established.
3This is the basic theory of karman, i.e., that effects of actions can arise even eons after their cessation. That is because the disintegratedness of an action-its cessation upon completion-is not inherently established.

If the disintegratedness inherently existed, it would be permanent and therefore would not cease upon issuing forth its effect; thus, its fruition could occur endlessly. Secondly, there is no reason why the effects of actions could not occur in an appropriate way, with virtuous actions leading to happy fruitions and non-virtuous actions leading to suffering, even though there is no inherently existent disintegratedness of an action to produce them.

'According to Kensur Yeshe Thupten (2/12/82), bong bu'i rva ("horns of a donkey") is equivalent to ri bong rva ("horns of a rabbit"). This is a famous example of something non-existent, since rabbits do not have horns (postcards from Wyoming of apocryphal "jackalopes" notwithstanding).

'The idea is that the Buddha taught the mind-basis-of-all provisionally, for the benefit of those who could be helped by believing in its existence but who would be harmed by hearing the teachings about emptiness. In his own mind, the basis of his teaching was emptiness.

'This is because the purpose of positing a mind-basis-of-all is supposed to be to provide a basis for experience without positing external objects.

8A11 schools must posit a place for karmic latencies to abide. The beginning of the chapter refers to some of the alternatives of other schools, e.g., "non-wastage." In the Prasarigika School, the basis for the infusion of the latencies is the "mere I," the unanalyzed "I" of ordinary experience. When we refer to ourselves, saying "I," we do so without thinking that "I" is one with or different from the mind and body, etc., and this "mere I" is accepted as the basis of the latencies. Why the mental continuum is only an "occasional" basis is a mystery, since at least a subtle form of the mental consciousness always exists.

9The path of seeing is the designation for the initial direct realization of emptiness and the subsequent state of having abandoned the artificial conceptions of inherent existence (derived from parents, teachers, etc.). It has two parts, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise (mnyam bzhag ye shes, samahitajrfana) and the exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment (rje thob ye shes, prsalabdhajriana). The former has three parts: an uninterrupted path (bar ched med lam, anantarya-marga), a path of release (ream grol lam, vimukti-marga), and a path which is neither. On the uninterrupted path one is completely absorbed with realization of emptiness; it is said that emptiness and the mind realizing it are fused, like fresh water poured into fresh water.

10Kensur Yeshey Tupden (2/12/82) maintained that at that time, a consciousness that could be the basis of such latencies cannot be posited as
existing, whereby the person (gang zag, purusa) must be posited as the basis of the infusion of latencies. Jambel Shenpen (6/9/82) added that although the Gomang College position is that predispositions do not exist at that time, according to Sera Monastery textbook author Jaydzunba, they exist with the mere I (nga tsam). He also says that the Mahayana mind-of-enlightenment generation exists then but is mgon du gyur med (non-manifest). I have not yet found sources for these positions, but Panchen Sonam Drakba, the textbook writer for Drebung Loseling College, says that the mere I is the basis of latencies because the self-isolate (rang ldog) of the bodhisattva (i.e., the mere I) is imputedly existent whereas according to Cittamatra the mental consciousness which is the basis-isolate (gzhi ldog) is substantially existent and hence would not exist at that time. See his General Meaning of Madhyamika (dbu ma'i mtha' dbyod), 232.3-4 and 233.2-3.

"The question is: if one is absorbed in a non-conceptual realization of emptiness, is it possible to not lose one's mind of compassion?

'This is one of the formless absorptions (gzugs med kyi snyoms 'jug, arupayasamapatti), a meditative state and also a place of rebirth for those who have attained it. According to Jambel Shenpen (6/9/82), Panchen Sonam Drakba, textbook author for Loseling College, says that you are no longer of that level, whereas Sera's Jaydzunba says that you still are. I have not searched the texts.

13Nagarjuna and Asanga are called chariots or "openers of the chariotway" for having respectively opened up the Madhyamika and Cittamatra "chariot-ways." Buddha found the path, but they prepared, through their teachings, a broad, smooth way to travel on it.

14Presentation of Tenets 225.5-30.18.

"If the proof of sound as an impermanent phenomenon used as its sign (reason) "object of apprehension by an eye consciousness," it would be stated: "The subject, sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being an object of apprehension by an eye consciousness." Of course, such a "proof" would have no correlation of the subject and the reason, no "presence of the reason in the subject" (phyogs chos, paksat-dharma), because sound is not an object of apprehension by an eye consciousness. The correlation of the subject and the reason is one of the three modes (tshul gsum) of a correct sign (rtags yang dag, samyakliriga). Only a sign possessing all three modes, including this, serves as a proof. Similarly, there would be no correlation of subject and reason in a "proof" of the form "the subject, self-consciousness, exists because inherently other later memory [of an awareness] exists." That is, a later memory does not depend on self-consciousness. This example is used by Dzongkaba in Illumination of the Thought 158a.2-3.

16These are crystals that are believed to produce fire and water. The mere existence of water does not entail the existence of a water-crystal, nor the existence of fire a fire-crystal, since many other causes for water or fire exist. Just so, the
mere existence of memory does not entail the existence of self-consciousness, since there are other ways of accounting for memory.

"For euphonic reasons, Janggya actually reads: "...memory and self-consciousness as cause and effect." I have reversed the order of "memory" and "self-consciousness" so that it would not be thought that memory is the cause and self-consciousness the effect, when what is under discussion is the reverse.

"According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden (2/19/82), by "other-experience" they mean that a consciousness that is a different substantial entity from the original awareness apprehends it, and by "self-experience" they mean self-consciousness, which is one substantial entity with that awareness. Both are untenable, the first because in their systems they assume the inherent existence of phenomena, which Prasarigikas reject; the second because self-consciousness is rejected.

14The probandum is that which is to be proved, i.e., "self-consciousness exists." Previously, Janggya has just been concerned with showing (1) that there is no memory that is an effect of self-consciousness and that there is no inherently established memory; and (2) that "self-experience" means an awareness that is one substantial entity with an awareness, and therefore not possible. He has not yet actually dealt with the notion of self-consciousness itself.

2Ofhere is no directly perceiving valid cognition that can certify the existence of self-consciousness; therefore it will have to be logically inferred, if it exists at all.

"If consciousness operated on itself, there could be no distinction of agent, action, and object. This is supposed to imply absurdities such as that fire would bum itself as it burned something else.

That is, they are not inherently different. If they were inherently different, there could be no way that one could perceive the other. This is a precondition for the other two reasons.

"Based on Entrance to the Middle Way VI.74-5 (7b.8-9). His own commentary is 53a.6-b.7 of Autocommentary to the `Entrance'; Dzongkaba's commentary is in Illumination of the Thought 158a.2-59a.4.

"Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds 190 (IX.23) explains: "If self-consciousness does not exist, / How would a consciousness be remembered? / Memory [of consciousness] comes about from its relation to experiencing another object / Like [the example of experiencing] a rodent's poison." ~antideva apparently does not assert that a former consciousness is directly remembered; rather, through remembering the past object, one is able to put together something else that happened at the time. This concludes the section on self-consciousness, though Janggya has more to say about self-consciousness toward the end of the next section. Here, he has set forth arguments from Candrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way and Santideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds; in the next section he will
set forth arguments from Candrakirti's Clear Words and Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate.

ZJamyang Shayba (Great Exposition of the Middle Way 803.6-804.1) explains that "valid cognition through belief" is equivalent to "scriptural valid cognition" (lung gi tshad ma) and "valid scripture" (lung tshad ma) is equivalent to "scripture free from the three analyses" (dpyad gsum gyis dag pa'i lung). Valid cognition through belief is an "inferential cognition that is incontrovertible with respect to the very hidden phenomenon that is its object of the way of apprehension." In other words, when the subject matter is a "very hidden phenomenon"-one that cannot be established through direct perception or by reasoning that does not depend on scripture, such as the subtle workings of karma and effect-one must rely on scripture that is not contradicted by direct perception, by reasoning, or by other scriptures. The scripture serves as one's reason. For instance, with regard to the scripture "From giving, resources; from ethics, a happy [migration]," one could reason, "it follows that good resources come from past giving, because such is stated in scripture." Valid cognition of comprehension through an example is nothing other than inference in which an example is used in the sign, e.g., "the [domesticated] ox (ba lang) has horns because of being like the wild ox (ba men)." (See Great Exposition of the Middle Way 804.5 ff.) As Janggya says, this division of valid cognition into four types is merely a terminological division, one that accounts for different expressions that people use; valid cognition can be condensed into two types, direct perception and inference, with valid cognition through belief and valid cognition of comprehension through an example being included in inference.

"Manifest objects are those that can be comprehended through ordinary sense perception; the hidden are those that are accessible to reasoning without having to rely on scripture; and the very hidden are those that can be realized only by the power of belief in scripture. See Lati Rinbochay and Napper (78-79).

27Because it is inference, its object is a hidden or very hidden phenomenon; since it is not a case of inference through belief, its object is merely hidden, i.e., not obvious to the senses but accessible to reasoning (without requiring recourse to scriptural authority). It realizes something in dependence upon seeing the similar attributes of two things; e.g., even if one has never seen a ba-men (a wild ox), one can understand what it is like if someone says that it is basically like a domesticated ox, but different in minor ways-smaller or larger, shaggier or less shaggy, with longer or shorter horns, etc.

"Sense direct perception depends on physical sense powers—the eye, ear, nose, etc., sense powers—whereas mental direct perception depends on a mental sense power. A mental sense power is not the brain or anything like that, but merely a moment of any consciousness that causes the mental direct perception to be an entity of experience.
In other words, they assert that it necessarily occurs only upon attaining a path of seeing.

This topic is discussed by Jamyang Shayba and Ngawang Belden; see chapter 4 of translation.

"Buddhas are omniscient and therefore can realize objects without their own experience, since they know the experience of others.

"Whereas to a self-consciousness, they appear to be the same; or perhaps better, to a self-consciousness there is no appearance of difference.

Something that is generally hidden, such as emptiness, can be directly realized; hence it is not always necessarily realized in dependence on a sign, even though it could only be realized initially in dependence on a sign.

34 Kensur Yeshey Tupden (2/19/82) felt that this statement needed qualification because according to the Prasangikas, a consequence (prasariga) is sufficient to cause another to make an inference—one does not need to state a syllogism.

35 The Sanskrit equivalents are possible reconstructions.

'According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden (2/19/82), this is a variety of inferential cognition through the power of the fact; it is just an instance of the latter that involves an example in the sign.

"According to Kensur Yeshey Tupden (2/19/82), one does depend on a reason (rgyu mtshan) to realize the point of the example, but it is not stated (i.e., is just implicit).

"Merely by having an appearance cast to it, an eye consciousness becomes a validly cognizing consciousness with respect to itself.

39 This would appear to be just as difficult as Candrakirti's explanation, but Janggya finds it "easier." He is saying that my present memory has been induced by my previous experience without any mediation. That is, my eye consciousness seeing my friend ten years ago is the direct cause of my memory of that friend today. There is no mention of the concept of "disintegratedness" (zhig pa) here, but the notion seems to be the same; just as it is not necessary that an intermediary entity be produced in order for an action to cause an effect years later because the mere disintegratedness of the action can cause the effect, so it is not necessary that there be an intermediary entity between the eye consciousness and the later memory, because the disintegratedness of the previous eye consciousness can cause the later memory.

40 A correct sign (reason) must possess three modes or qualities: the presence of the sign in the subject, the forward entailment, and the reverse entailment. For
instance, in the syllogism "The subject, a pot, is impermanent because of being a product," all three modes are established. There is presence of the sign in the subject because the sign, product, is a quality of the subject, a pot. Roughly speaking, there is forward entailment because whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent; there is reverse entailment because whatever is not impermanent is necessarily not a product.

"That is, the subject, predicate, and reason (e.g., pot, impermanence, and being a product in the syllogism "The subject, a pot, is impermanent because of being a product") must be inherently existent and inherently related. In the Gelukka presentation of the Svaṭantra School, Svaṭantrikas are held to propound that conventionally, objects inherently exist; i.e., objects do exist the way they appear to non-defective sense consciousnesses. Prasangikas reject this, saying that even conventionally, nothing inherently exists. As will be seen later, Svaṭantrikas do not want to have to say that all sense consciousnesses, to which things appear to be inherently existent, are mistaken, for then how could objects be validly posited? Prasangikas take the plunge of asserting that even though sense consciousnesses are mistaken, they can validly posit objects (though not as existing the way they appear).

"The probandum is that which is to be proved, i.e., the thesis. To again use the "pot" syllogism, the probandum is "pot is impermanent."

43For them, a phenomenon cannot be a mere imputedly existent nominality, as for the Prasangikas; it must have its own inherent nature (rang bzhin, svabhava).

For them, the stater and the hearer of a syllogism must agree on the way of existence of the subject of the syllogism. Therefore, the subject must be inherently existent, because objects appear to them and to their hearers alike as if they were inherently existent, and their hearers assent to that appearance, conceiving of the objects as inherently existent. Prasarigikas do not need to posit this, since their method is to reveal contradictions that arise from their opponent's convictions, without insisting, as the non- Prasaṅgikas do, that the two systems agree that the inherent existence of objects is certified by the validly cognizing consciousnesses that certify the subject, etc. Therefore, for Prasarigikas there need not be, nor could there be, a commonly appearing subject.

45According to Svaṭantrikas, in general, objects exist in terms of their inherent existence in the way they appear to non-defective sense consciousnesses, conventionally. However, some, such as a mirage, are unreal. Prasangikas assert that all appearances are unreal in the sense that they appear to inherently exist whereas they do not, so there are no real conventionalities. However, from the point of view of the world they also say that most objects, with the exception of those of consciousnesses affected by superficial causes of error such as those that appreheud mirages as water, are real in relation to a worldly consciousness. See

The other party is self to himself, other to us, and vice versa. Prasati-gikas lead from an opponent's assertions, not from their own, so they would never use the expression "self-renowned" to indicate their own position; whether the expression is "self-renowned" or "other-renowned," it will refer to the opponent. See Jamyang Shayba, Great Exposition of the Middle Way 418.2-5.

"This would seem to be an implicit criticism of Jamyang Shayba, who in both the Great Exposition of Tenets and in the Great Exposition of the Middle Way explains these topics extensively.

"It is interesting that Janggya cites this sutra, since this is the very text from which Asanga draws Cittamatra arguments. It is even more interesting that he does not point out this apparent contradiction.

"Me general characteristics of the aggregates are such shared qualities as their impermanence, etc. Their specific characteristics are their defining qualities; for instance, the aggregate of consciousness is clear and knowing, and so forth.

The two truths are conventional and ultimate truths. The Cittamatra School is accused of destroying the conventional truths by denying the existence of external objects conventionally as well as ultimately.

"The Vaibhāṣikas assert the existence of particles so subtle that further physical division is impossible; these are "ultimates" in their system. The refutation of such particles is a major plank in the Cittamatra denial of the existence of external objects.

"This is because for them only sense consciousnesses that apprehend partless particles or objects composed of them could be non-mistaken, since these consciousnesses apprehend external objects that would have to be composed of partless particles.

53The Desire Realm ('dod kham, kamadhatu), Form Realm (gzugs kham, rupadhatu), and Formless Realm (gzugs med kham, arupyadhatu), the realms of rebirth for sentient beings.

54uL9vara" ("lord") is a general term for a high god and a particular term in theistic Yoga for the supreme puruṣa ("soul" or "Self").

-P 775, vol. 29, 53.4.2. This is translated in reliance on the oral explanation of Kensur Yeshe Tsend (3/5/82) and differs little from Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness 613. Cf. Suzuki 133 (33). For commentary, see Jnanagribhadra, P 5519, vol. 107, 138.1.8. Bracketed material is from Ngawang Belden's Annotations dngos 104a.8 ff.
"Persons with an eye disorder (amblyopia) see wavy lines in the air.

"The very examples intended by Cittamatra to demonstrate the nonnecessity of external objects serve as a very powerful example to refute the true existence of consciousness and make Candrakirti's point—that both subject and object are equally not truly existent yet are conventionally existent.

"This is discussed by Dzongkaba in Illumination of the Thought 26a.6 ff. (translated in Hopkins [1980: 150 ff.]). This establishes that at least some Hearers and Solitary Realizers have realized the emptiness of inherent existence, since even a first ground Bodhisattva has realized emptiness.

60Absurd because the afflictions are the very "foes" that an Arhat (literally, in Tibetan, a "foe destroyer") has vanquished.

61Kensur Yeshey Tupden (3/19/82) noted that it is easier to realize the emptiness of the person than of other phenomena, but it is not possible to realize the fully qualified selflessness of the person until one realizes that the aggregates, the bases of designation for a person, are not truly existent. The implication is that whoever realizes the selflessness of persons has already realized the selflessness of the aggregates. His Holiness the Dalai Lama told me (6/19/84) that one cannot realize the selflessness of the person while thinking that the aggregates are truly established—that superimposition cannot be present. Their understanding is that Nagaquna wanted to negate the possibility of understanding the selflessness of the person without understanding the selflessness of phenomena-to realize the selflessness of the person one must be fully prepared to realize the selflessness of phenomena.

'T P 5658, vol. 129, 174.3.6-7. The quotation has been lengthened by adding the last three lines and translated in reliance on Hopkins and Lati Rinbochay (1975: 22).

That is, the non-Mahayana scriptures. Thus, even in the non-Mahayana scriptures, the selflessness of phenomena is taught, not only the selflessness of the person as non-Prasangikas maintain.

6"They are saying that even in the Hearer scriptures there is mention of a fully qualified, or subtle, selflessness—the emptiness of inherent existence, as Janggya showed in the previous chapter—not merely a coarse selflessness such as the lack of the person being a self-sufficient substantial entity.

"The preceding chapter implies that one understands the subtle selflessness of phenomena (to the extent that one does not superimpose its opposite) even before one realizes the selflessness of persons.
"According to Jambel Shenpen (3/2/81), the doctrine of non-production is the doctrine that nothing is inherently produced or inherently not produced. One needs forbearance with respect to this doctrine because it is frightening. Those who have directly seen emptiness—Hearer Arhats, Solitary Realizer Arhats, and some Bodhisattvas—are able to bear it. Kensur Yeshe Tupden added (3/19/82) that non-production indeed refers to emptiness, but that it could also refer to the non-production of afflictions for those who have attained liberation.

"Since they do not teach the subtle emptiness of inherent existence, one cannot be liberated by following them.

Although usually the terms "predispositions" and "seeds" are synonymous, the obstructions to omniscience are predispositions but are not seeds of the afflictions. They predispose one to have dualistic appearance (the appearance of the objects of one's experience as inherently existent) but do not ripen afflictions, etc.

Kaydrup argues that if there were artificial obstructions to omniscience they would have to be abandoned on the path of seeing, in which case one would abandon some obstructions to omniscience even before the eighth ground, that is, even before one finished abandoning the obstructions to liberation. That would contradict a major Prasangika School tenet. See Grounds and Paths 120.7-21.2. According to Kensur Yeshe Tupden (3/19/82), the term "artificial" is reserved for consciousnesses, and obstructions to omniscience are not consciousnesses (but Jamyang Shayba disagrees).

According to Losang Dayang (Grounds and Paths 120.5-6), Gyeltsap describes the "artificial obstructions to omniscience" as the awarenesses (and their seeds) that conceive that the appearance of true existence to a sense consciousness is logically correct.

According to Geshay Tupden Gyatso, a contemporary Gomang scholar, "Prajna" was the epithet of a scholar named Aku Shayrap Gyatso (Shayrap [shes rab] is the Tibetan translation of prajria). Looking into this, I found that there is an Akhu Rinbochay whose name was Sherap Gyatso and who was known mainly by his Sanskrit name, Prajnasagara; however, he lived after Janggya, from 1803-75. According to Lokesh Chandra (1963: 60, n. 5), there is an earlier Shayrap Gyatso who was a Mongolian and collaborated in the translation of the Mongolian canon (a project supervised by Janggya). It is quite possible that this person was known also as Prajna.

Like Jamyang Shayba, "Prajna" thinks that there must be consciousnesses, not merely non-associated compositional factors (the predispositions established by the afflictions) that are obstructions to omniscience. As evidence, he adduces a statement of Dzongkaba in which there is a description of something included in the obstructions to omniscience as being "mistaken," a term he thinks could only
apply to a consciousness.

"That is, there is no source stating that for the perspective of the Prasangika School there are artificial obstructions to omniscience to be abandoned on the first seven Bodhisattva grounds.

'None of the half-dozen scholars I asked knew who this was.

Thus, according to Kensur Yeshey Tupden (3/19/82) they are named "ignorance" but are not.

76 Kaydrup Gelek Belsangbo (1385-1438) is one of Dzongkaba's two chief disciples; Jaydzun Chogyi Gyeltsen (1469-1546) is the author of monastic textbooks for Jay college of Sera Monastery; other than his dates, I have not yet found any biographical information on Jamyang Gaway Lodro (1429/30-1503); Gendun Gyatso (1476-1542) is the second Dalai Lama; and Panchen Sonam Drakba (1478-1554) is the author of monastic textbooks for Loseling College of Drebung Monastery.

"He is the first Panchen Lama (1569-1662). Losang Dayang (Grounds and Paths 119.4-5) calls him the "All-Seeing" Panchen Losang Chogyi Gyeltsen (pan chen kun gzigs blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan) and the name of his book is Answer to the Objections of the Translator [Daktsang] Shayrap Rinchen (sgra pa sties rab rin chen gyi rtsod Ian).

'BI have not yet determined the difference between these transmission; perhaps this refers to teachings on sutra and tantra, or, within tantra, to the lower and higher initiations of tantras of the Highest Yoga Tantra class.

79 The point that is being made, rather obliquely, is that even though something's disintegratedness is not a thing like a patch of blue, it is possible to posit a disintegratedness as a thing because it is not necessary that a thing be something found upon analysis.

80 761.3.1, vol. 25. A similar passage in the sutra has been translated in Honda (190).

81 761.3.1, vol. 25.

"In other words, just as death, the disintegratedness of the last moment of a sentient being's life, is both caused and acts as a cause, so also the disintegratedness of any other moment of a thing is both caused and acts as a cause. This disintegratedness has an effect, though it may be nothing more than to act as the cause of another moment of disintegratedness, etc.

In other systems, since disintegratedness is regarded as a permanent phenomenon, it does not itself disintegrate. In the Prasafigika School explanation, since disintegratedness is a functioning thing, it necessarily disintegrates; hence,
disintegration and disintegratedness are not contradictory.

84A negative phenomenon (dgag pa, pratisedha) is one that must be realized through the explicit elimination of something, an object of negation. For instance, "treeless plain" must be realized through eliminating trees from the conceptualization of the object. See GSnchok Jikmay Wangbo's Precious Garland of Tenets 34.3-5 (translated in Sopa and Hopkins [230]).

Both mere eliminations and eliminations that are functioning things are negative phenomena, but a mere elimination is a non-affirming negative (med dgag, prasajyapratisedha), a negative that implies nothing else in place of its object of negation. For instance, space, the mere absence of obstructive contact, or my lack of ability to speak Russian are negative phenomena, for they must be realized through the route of negating something, but they do not affirm anything else. "Treeless plain," however, which also must be realized by the route of a negation, implies a positive phenomenon, a plain, and is therefore an affirming negative. What is being argued here is that, for instance, "sprout's disintegratedness" implies something that has been caused. (In the next chapter, Janggya states that it implies that a sprout's disintegratedness occurs in dependence on a sprout.)

"The Vaibhāṣika School asserts that whatever is an ultimate truthsomething that cannot be destroyed by physical breakage or mental analysis into parts, such as moments of consciousness too brief to be further subdivided (and thus called "partless"), or permanent phenomena, such as space substantially exists (rdzas yod, dravya), meaning that it is findable upon analysis. Hence, disintegratedness, which in their system is both a permanent phenomenon and a thing (a "permanent thing," which in other systems is an oxymoron), is substantially existent. Prasangikas, on the other hand, say that nothing substantially exists since all phenomena merely imputedly exist.

"A thing's "own time" is the moment in which it is present; the moment after its own time is the moment of its disintegratedness, when the thing itself does not exist and hence has no "own time."

87Such as Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge; see Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 604.1.

"This is Dzongkaba's interpretation; his Ocean of Reasoning is cited in Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 604.5 ff.

"Concerning non-affirming and affirming negatives, see my note in chapter 7.

90With the further qualification that the causes for the sprout's production already exist.

"The material in brackets has been added to make these definitions identical to the definitions of the three times given in both Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition..."
of Tenets and his Great Exposition of the Middle Way, which may, in any case, have been Janggya's source.


For example, a sprout's pastness is yet to come at the time of a sprout; that is, since a sprout has not yet disintegrated, its factor of disintegratedness is yet to come. On the other hand, if something has passed at the time of a sprout—for instance, the seed from which the sprout came—it is just a pastness that exists at the time of the sprout but is not that sprout's pastness.

'A Superior's wisdom consciousness is capable of determining the final nature of phenomena; if phenomena existed inherently, it would have to perceive those phenomena. However, when a Superior's wisdom consciousness analytically searches for an inherently existent phenomenon, it does not find it; it "finds" only emptiness, and thus it is clear that phenomena lack inherent existence. The Svatatrtikas might object that a Superior's wisdom consciousness is not looking for inherent existence as such, but rather is looking for ultimate inherent existence (in their system, nothing ultimately exists, but all existents must inherently exist). They might say that since the Superior was not searching for inherent existence, the failure to find it does not disprove its existence.

'Conventional truths, like production, cannot withstand analysis by a reasoning consciousness looking for a case of inherently existent production, that is, production in which a seed and sprout, for example, are either inherently one or inherently different. If they were inherently one, there would be no need for production. If they were inherently different, it would be impossible for them to be related as cause and effect.

'The Prasar gika School, contrary to the Svatatrtika School, asserts that there is no inherent existence not only ultimately but even conventionally. Inherent existence is not established either by ultimate valid cognition—a reasoning consciousness or directly perceiving consciousness realizing emptiness—or by conventional valid cognition, such as an eye consciousness apprehending a table. It is true that to the eye consciousness, the table appears to inherently exist, but only the table, and not the inherent existence of the table, is certified by that eye consciousness. Also, Prasangikas do not distinguish between inherent existence and ultimate inherent existence, for whatever would be inherently existent would have to be ultimately established.

4This is a chapter of the Heap of Jewels Sutra (dkon mchog brtsegs pa'i mdo, ratnakuta-sutra).

'Sutras are interpreted in terms of the basis in (Buddha's) thought, his purpose, and damage to (i.e., refutation of) the literal teaching. For instance, when Buddha
teaches the existence of a mind-basis-of-all, emptiness is the basis in his thought. However, because the person listening could not understand the presentation of the absence of inherent existence, he teaches the mind-basis-of-all instead. Thus, the purpose would be, for instance, to lead a person gradually to a more subtle level of understanding. Finally, one shows that the literal teaching is faulty—for instance, how a mind-basis-of-all could not exist. Phenomena also are divided into those requiring interpretation and those that are definitive. Conventional truths require interpretation whereas emptinesses are definitive. This means that conventional truths require interpretation in order to get at their final mode of subsistence, whereas such is not the case with emptinesses.


'The three natures are the usual Cittamatra rubric for the discussion of phenomena. The Prasangika interpretation of them is found at the end of this section.

'The Cittamatra School says that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are not posited by terms and conceptions. This is because they are truly established (which is equated with being established by their own character but not with being inherently established or being established from their own side, which is true of all phenomena). Being posited by terms and conceptions is thus not equivalent to the Prasangika formulation "merely imputed by thought," since that includes all phenomena. In the Prasangika system, all three natures are posited by terms and conceptions, but even Prasangikas would agree that otherpowered and thoroughly-established natures are not posited by terms and conceptions as the Cittamatra School uses that phrase.

'Because Hinayana practitioners also must realize the subtle emptiness in order to be released from cyclic existence, there are statements in first wheel sutras concerning emptiness. Nagarjuna, for instance, quoted those sutras to show that emptiness was taught even to Hearers. Janggya has discussed this in chapter 5.

'What is said in the sutra is the meaning of the sutra in the sense that it is the meaning for the intended trainees but it is neither Buddha's underlying thought nor the meaning of the thought of the sutra.

'Janggya will not admit that the words Buddha says which require interpretation are his thought or the thought of the sutra even if not the final thought. Janggya is opposed to inherent establishment being the thought of the sutra even if it is said not to be the final thought of the sutra.

The Sarnath (Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press) edition has been compared to the Sharada Rani (SR) edition.