Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy

John D. Dunne
FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKĪRTI’S PHILOSOPHY
Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism

This series was conceived to provide a forum for publishing outstanding new contributions to scholarship on Indian and Tibetan Buddhism and also to make accessible seminal research not widely known outside a narrow specialist audience, including translations of appropriate monographs and collections of articles from other languages. The series strives to shed light on the Indic Buddhist traditions by exposing them to historical-critical inquiry, illuminating through contextualization and analysis these traditions’ unique heritage and the significance of their contribution to the world’s religious and philosophical achievements.

Members of the Editorial Board:

Tom Tillemans (chair), University of Lausanne
José Cabezón, University of California, Santa Barbara
Georges Dreyfus, Williams College, Massachusetts
Janet Gyatso, Harvard University
Paul Harrison, University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Toni Huber, Victoria University, New Zealand
Shoryu Katsura, Hiroshima University
Thupten Jinpa Langri, Institute of Tibetan Classics, Montreal
Frank Reynolds, Emeritus, University of Chicago
E. Gene Smith, Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York
Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, University of Lausanne
Ernst Steinkellner, University of Vienna
Leonard van der Kuijpf, Harvard University
FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKĪRTI’S PHILOSOPHY

John D. Dunne
For Jane Chilson Dunne

Phalena saha sarvasvatyaṁgacītā jāne 'khile /
Dānapāramitā proktā tasmāt sā cittam eva tu //
Publisher’s Acknowledgment

The Publisher gratefully acknowledges the kind generosity of the Hershey Family Foundation in sponsoring the publication of this book.
Contents

Preface
Abbreviations
A Note on the Sanskrit and Tibetan Translations

INTRODUCTION
   A Question of Method: A Point of Departure
   Some Suggestions for the Reader

1  PRAMĀṆA THEORY:
   DHARMAKĪRTI’S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT
1.1 The Process of Knowing and Its Instrument
   Two Ubiquitous Instruments: Perception and Inference
   Shared Notions Concerning Perceptual Awareness
   Shared Notions Concerning Inference
      The Basic Structure of Inference
      The Evidence-Predicate Relation and Its Exemplification
      The Evidence-Subject Relation
      A Restatement
1.2 Prameya: The “Real”
   The Simplicity of the Real and a Fundamental Difference
1.3 Purpose as Context
1.4 Points of Divergence: The Action and Agent
1.5 Summary

2  DHARMAKĪRTI’S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY
2.1 The Scale of Analysis: Dharmakīrti’s Method
   External Realism as a Level of Analysis
      Divergent Interpretations of External Realism
2.2 Dharmakīrti’s Ontology
   The Two Prameyas—The Two Realities

2.3 More on Particulars
   The Perceptible as Ultimately Real
   The Ultimately Real as Inexpressible and Momentary
   Do Particulars Have Spatial Extension?

2.4 Universals
   Summary of Dharmakīrti’s Apoha-Theory
   Concerning Sameness of Effect
   Are Universals Permanent?
   Three Ways of Construing Apoha

3 Svabhāvapratibandha: The Basis of Inference

3.1 Relation through Svabhāva: Beyond “Co-Presence”
   The Two Senses of Svabhāva
   Svabhāva as “Property”
   Svabhāva as “Nature”
       Nature-svabhāva and the Causal Complex
       The Subject (dharmin) and Svabhāva as “Nature”

3.2 The Production-mode of the Svabhāvapratibandha
   Some Issues in the Application of the Production-mode
       Concerning Necessity
   The Determination of the Production-mode

3.3 On the Relationship between Property and Nature
   Some Heuristic Terms
   The Subordination of Property to Nature

3.4 Svabhāva-evidence and the Identity-mode
   A Few Problems

4 Instrumentality:
   Justifying the Sources of Knowledge

4.1 Prāmāṇya as “Instrumentality”
   Purpose and Instrumentality
   The Role of Scripture
   A Seeming Circularity
   Scriptural Inference and Dharmakīrti’s Rejection of Credibility
1.2 Dharmakīrti on Instrumentality: The Earliest Commentarial Account

Some Basic Definitions

“Telic Function” (arthakriyā)

Instrumentality (prāmāṇya) in Terms of Two Effects

Instrumentality in Terms of the Mediated Effect
Instrumentality in Terms of the Unmediated Effect

The Two Effects and the Two Senses of Arthakriyā

The Primacy of Puruṣārtha

Instrumentality in Terms of Human Aims: Some Problems and Solutions

A Disparity in Time
Obstructed Action

Perception and Confirmation

Perception as Motivator (pravartaka): The Question of Novelty

Inference, Error, and Trustworthiness

Ultimate and Conventional Pramāṇa

CONCLUSION

Nature, Perception, and Refinement

Appendix of Translations

A Note on the Translations

1. PVSV ad PV1.34–37
2. PVSV ad PV1.68–75
3. PVSV ad PV1.137–142
4. PVSV ad PV1.214–223
5. PV2.1–6 with Selections from PVP and PVT
6. PV3.1–10 with Selections from PVP and PVT
7. PV3.194–224 with Selections from PVP and PVT

5 BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX
Preface

When I first encountered Buddhist thought some twenty years ago, the Buddhist analysis of identity especially caught my attention, and this soon led me to a study of Nāgārjuna. As is perhaps common, my first attempts at reading Nāgārjuna were confused and confusing, but as is less common, I also was able to consult two fine Buddhist thinkers: Tara Tulku Rinpoche, a well-known scholar in the Tibetan Gelug (Dge lugs) tradition, and Robert Thurman, who had invited Tara Tulku to teach at Amherst College at the time. Both Thurman and Tara Tulku encouraged me to study the works of Je Tsongkhapa (Rje Tsong kha pa; 1357–1419), whose reading of Nāgārjuna forms the philosophical bedrock of the Gelug tradition.

On Tsongkhapa’s interpretation, the key to understanding Nāgārjuna lies largely in the proper use of a certain style of reasoning: namely, the system of inferential reasoning developed by Dharmakīrti, a renowned South Asian Buddhist of the seventh century (C.E.). Turning to Dharmakīrti’s works, I soon encountered a host of competing—even incompatible—interpretations among the numerous commentators on Dharmakīrti’s thought in Tibet. An attempt to account for these differences, along with the sheer interest and difficulty of the material, soon drew me into an intense study of Dharmakīrti during my graduate work at Harvard University.

Under the guidance of Masatoshi Nagatomi and M. David Eckel, the focus of my research on Dharmakīrti moved to the South Asian interpretations that precede and inform the highly disparate readings of Tibetan exegetes. I must admit that, at first, I sought to determine which Tibetan reading was “the correct” interpretation in light of South Asian precedents, but it did not take long for this approach to strike me as hopelessly naïve and, in the end, entirely uninteresting. Instead, I sought to contextualize the divergence of Tibetan opinion by understanding the history of the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s thought in South Asia itself—a shift encouraged by my graduate work with Charles Hallisey. A grant from the American Institute of Indian Studies enabled me to spend two years at the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, where I read
commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s works with Prof. Ram Samkar Tripāthi, and this period in India was critical to my research. Even in the Sanskrit works of South Asia, however, the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s thought develops and diverges to a wide extent; hence, with the concerted help of Tom Tillemans, I settled eventually on a focused account of the earliest South Asian interpretations of Dharmakīrti as the subject of my doctoral dissertation (1999), which is effectively the first draft of this book.

As I was completing my doctoral work, Georges Dreyfus’s Recognizing Reality, an extensive study of the Tibetan interpretations of Dharmakīrti, appeared in print. That work, along with numerous conversations with Dreyfus, aided me considerably in my research. While tremendously helpful, Dreyfus’s study of the Tibetan interpretations also highlighted the need for a similar, historical account that focuses on a specific South Asian interpretation. This book contributes to fulfilling that need.

My dissertation built on the work of numerous scholars, and in the course of the substantial revisions that led to this book, many responded with helpful comments and suggestions. Tom Tillemans continued to provide the sort of advice whose perspicuous practicality is matched by the keen philosophical insights on which it rests. Ernst Steinkellner, whose work figures prominently at crucial junctures of my argument, took the trouble to go through the entire text. His critiques, suggestions, and encouragement have added greatly to this book. Shōryū Katsura likewise provided a number of suggestions, some through an extended and entertaining debate about particulars. Brendan Gillon’s careful and detailed responses were especially helpful for clarifying my analysis of Dharmakīrti’s ontology. Eli Franco provided a comprehensive response to my discussion of justification or “instrumentality” (prāmāṇya) that helped me to clarify my interpretation. Helmut Krasser directed me to some important passages and provided welcome encouragement. And Richard Hayes’s pithy remarks proved especially helpful in reconceiving the overall context of my interpretation.

Many others who work on Dharmakīrti and related issues aided me in various ways. A few that come readily to mind are Takashi Iwata, Birgit Kellner, Horst Lasic, Parimal Patil, Ernst Prets, and Mark Siderits. In this regard, I must especially thank Marek Mejor and Piotr Balcerowicz of Warsaw University’s Oriental Institute for organizing in 2001 a most fruitful seminar where, amid the beauty of the Polish countryside, debates on Dharmakīrti (and much else besides) went on through the night. On that occasion, and on others as well, I am sure that some critical comment or quiet suggestion has proved helpful in ways that I have failed to notice. To all those that have gone unthanked, I apologize for my forgetfulness.

Having joined the faculty of the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1999, I began to work intensively with students, and although various responsibilities made it difficult to begin any serious revisions before 2003, I
managed to use the early version of my manuscript in a few of my seminars. Students, I have learned, are excellent teachers, and their questions and arguments added much to my thinking. As the manuscript moved more rapidly toward its final form, two graduate students assisted me as editors. Eddy Falls read the manuscript with an eye to the arguments, and his comments helped to sharpen my discussion on a number of points. Christian Haskett went through the whole work, including notably the Sanskrit and Tibetan citations, and his contribution was likewise welcome. Throughout all this time, my publisher Tim McNeill and editor David Kittelstrom—along with Tom Tillemans as series editor—exercised great patience. Let us hope that the delay was worthwhile.

Last and foremost, I must honor and thank the contributions of Sara McClintock, my chief editor, critic, supporter, and spouse: to her I owe more thanks than I could ever express. Despite being a new mother with an academic (i.e., overworked and somewhat erratic) husband, she somehow managed to complete her own dissertation, begin an academic career, maintain her equanimity and fundamental cheeriness, and still give me the most helpful comments on the manuscript. Perhaps I am spoiled by such excellent companionship, replete with the finest editorial advice and scholarly insight. But when in the care of a bodhisattva, how can one really be spoiled?

Madison, Wisconsin
May 19, 2004
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1, 2, 3, etc.</td>
<td>Immediately following any abbreviation, a numeral indicates a chapter or section number (for example, PV1 indicates the first chapter of PV). Verse numbers follow the chapter or section number (for example, PV1.25 indicates verse 25 in chapter 1 of PV).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-D</td>
<td>Following any abbreviation, “-D” indicates the Tibetan translation of the text in question as found in the Sde dge edition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>Abhidharmákośa as preserved in AKBh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS/EA</td>
<td>Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Bodhicaryāvatāra. See author Śāntideva.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKGA</td>
<td>Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Gnoli’s edition of Pramāṇavārttika, Svārthānumānapariccheda, and PVSV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB</td>
<td>Hetubindu. See author Dharmakīrti (1967).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBT</td>
<td>Hetubinduṭīkā. See author Arcaṭa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAAR</td>
<td>Journal of the American Academy of Religion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIABS</td>
<td>Journal of the International Association for Buddhist Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIP</td>
<td>Journal of Indian Philosophy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Karṇakagomin, author of Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttitīkā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPP</td>
<td>Laghuprāmāṇyaparikṣā. See author Dharmottara (1991c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMK</td>
<td>Mūlmadhyamakakārikā. See author Nāgārjuna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB</td>
<td>Nyāyabindu. See author Dharmakīrti (1994).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBh</td>
<td>Nyāyabhāṣya. See author Vātsyāyana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBT</td>
<td>Nyāyabinduṭīkā. See author Dharmottara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Nyāyasūtras. See author Gautama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV</td>
<td>Nyāyavārttika. See author Uddyotakara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Padārthadharmasamgraha. See author Praśastapāda (1994).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Pramāṇasamuccaya. For PS1, see author Dignāga (1968; edition by Hattori). For other chapters, see author Dignāga (1955–61a; translation of Kanakavarman and Dad pa’i shes rab).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSV</td>
<td>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti. For PSV on PS1, see author Dignāga (1968). For other portions of PSV, see author Dignāga (1955–61b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVin</td>
<td>Pramāṇaviniścaya. See author Dharmakīrti under the dates of these editions: PVin1 = Vetter edition (1966); PVin2 = Steinkellner edition (1979); PVin3 = PVin-D (1991b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVSV</td>
<td>Pramāṇavārttikasvopajñavṛtti; also called Svavṛtti. See author Dharmakīrti (1960).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVT-s</td>
<td>Sanskrit fragments of PVT. See author Śākyabuddhi (1992).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti. See author Manorathananandin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV-n</td>
<td>Vibhūticandra’s notes to PVV; included in Sāmkṛtyāyana edition of PV (1938–40).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Tattvasamgraha. See author Śāntarakṣita.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>Tattvasaṃgrahapaññijikā. See author Kamalaśīla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VN</td>
<td>Vādanyāya. See author Dharmakīrti (1991c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSTB</td>
<td>Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WZKS</td>
<td>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WZKSO</td>
<td>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YD</td>
<td>Yuktiḍipikā. See author “Unknown.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Note on the Sanskrit and Tibetan Translations

IMPORTANT PASSAGES FROM SANSKRIT and Tibetan texts appear throughout this book. Most of these translations are also included in the appendix, where they are embedded in the larger passages from which I have extracted them. For convenience, the titles of most Sanskrit and Tibetan texts are abbreviated in accord with the table of abbreviations, which is also a key to the various editions of Sanskrit and Tibetan texts that I have employed for the translations. As with most philosophical works in Sanskrit, Dharmakīrti’s texts often employ a dialogic model, whereby Dharmakīrti argues in response to critiques expressed in the voice of an objector (pūrvapakṣa), whether actual or hypothetical. To represent this convention, I have used quotation marks to indicate the beginning and end of an objection in a translated passage. Another feature of this textual tradition is the interweaving of texts, such that a commentator’s prose often includes phrases from the verse or commentary that he is discussing. In some cases, it is especially helpful to know which phrases in a commentary are supplied from a verse or another commentary, and in such instances, I have italicized the phrases in question. Finally, as explained in the introduction, I have avoided to the greatest extent possible the use of square brackets to indicate insertions in translations. Where brackets remain, the insertions are particularly lengthy, or they are less clearly supported by commentaries or grammar.
Introduction

Buddhist philosophers often speak of beginninglessness. It is claimed that the minds of living beings, for example, have no beginning, and that our current universe is only one in a beginningless cycle of expansion and decay. Some Buddhist thinkers would claim that even the most mundane task can have no true beginning. That is, if a beginning occurs, there must be some moment, some “now,” in which it occurs. For the present to exist, however, there must be a past and a future, for what would “now” mean if there were no time other than now? And of course, if there is a past, then how could now be a beginning? Now should instead be the end of the past. Each beginning, in short, must itself have a beginning.¹

In a more concrete sense, this book also starts from beginninglessness, for it arises from a need for a point of departure—a place from which to begin—in my work on the thought of Dharmakīrti, a South Asian Buddhist philosopher of the seventh century (c.e.).² That Dharmakīrti is worthy of our attention seems scarcely necessary to justify. Following upon the work of his predecessor Dignāga, Dharmakīrti addressed at length numerous questions that are of central concern to Buddhist thought and practice. The impact of his views on Buddhist theories of perception, inference, and language is difficult to overestimate. Indeed, it would not be outlandish to claim that his ideas are repeated in every Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophical work written after his time in South Asia. To this day, the Tibetan translations of his Sanskrit texts are recited, studied, and debated by Tibetan monastic scholars to such an extent that, in the central monasteries of the largest Tibetan tradition, a lengthy monastic holiday is devoted entirely to debate on the works of Dharmakīrti.³

The difficulty in beginning a conversation on the work of Dharmakīrti stems from a problem that often plagues systematic philosophy and theology: the elements of the system are so tightly intertwined that the first word of an argument appears to presuppose the system in its entirety.⁴ In Dharmakīrti’s case, two circumstances render this hermeneutical circle particularly vexing. First, the systematicity of his thought is matched by its complexity and extreme concision. And second, the Buddhist traditions of
South Asia and Tibet, in their reverence for Dharmakīrti, have reappropriated his works through successive generations of commentaries such that we encounter a sometimes dazzling variety of ways to read Dharmakīrti. As a result, we often find a striking lack of consensus on the most basic issues in the contemporary study of Dharmakīrti’s thought.

A lack of consensus is not itself a problem: Dominick LaCapra has noted that one frequently acknowledged sign of a great work is its resistance to definitive interpretation. Nevertheless, in the case of a systematic thinker such as Dharmakīrti, some of our most useful readings must emphasize the tightly woven nature of the web of ideas that constitute his thought, and without a consensus on even his most basic positions, such readings become impossible. Instead, we find ourselves arguing over the details of a particular position—such as his notion of an entity’s nature (svabhāva)—without ever coming to the point where we ask how theories about an entity’s nature relate to other issues, such as the questions of rational justification and authority. The central aim of this book is thus to contribute toward the development of a consensus by presenting the foundations of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy in terms of a consciously constructed starting point.

In speaking of the “foundations” of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, I mean those issues that repeatedly surface throughout his work: they are the fundamental elements of his conceptual system that, on my view, make all of his arguments possible. I have organized those elements under three broad categories: (1) ontology, (2) the “natural relation” (svabhāvapratibandha) in inference, and (3) the issues of justification and authority, which I place under the rubric of “instrumentality” (prāmāṇya). These broad categories, which structure this book, encompass all the elements that enable one to understand and appreciate any argument made by Dharmakīrti. At the same time, these categories include what is most difficult—and hence, most controversial—in Dharmakīrti’s thought. Thus, somewhat to my surprise, I have written a book that is both an in-depth introduction to Dharmakīrti’s philosophy and a detailed interpretation of certain difficult points in his work.

A Question of Method: A Point of Departure

The central concern of my approach to Dharmakīrti’s thought is my interest in developing interpretations that attend to its systematicity: the manner in which one theoretical position—such as the uniqueness of particulars (svalakṣaṇa)—is mutually constrained and enabled by numerous others, such as the ultimate irreality of universals (sāṃnyalakṣaṇa) or the role of habituation in perceptual judgment. Above all, one interpretive practice initially led me to read Dharmakīrti’s work in this fashion: namely, my ineluctable reliance on traditional commentaries. But while I learned this
valuable lesson from the style of reasoning employed by traditional commentators, their practices and certain features of their texts likewise posed a set of historical problems that compelled me to construct a starting point. In sum, I will focus on only Dharmakīrti’s earliest texts, the *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Svāvṛtti*, and I will resort only to the earliest commentators, Devendrabuddhi (ca. 675 C.E.) and Śākyabuddhi (ca. 700 C.E.). To understand my reasons for restricting this study in the aforementioned fashion, I should first explain why I was led to rely on commentaries.

In the several years of research that went into this book, two reasons compelled me to resort frequently to commentaries. First, in practical terms, any reader of Dharmakīrti’s Sanskrit texts knows that his elliptical and intricate statements often remain impenetrable without commentarial elucidation. Speaking in general of Dharmakīrti’s style, Richard Hayes refers to “the tortuous writings of this highly complex thinker.”7 And referring specifically to the *Svāvṛtti* (*PVSV*), a text that is especially important for my analysis, Hayes and Brendan Gillon together note, “Dharmakīrti’s style is so terse that it is not always immediately clear what philosophical points he intends to make.”8 I would add that, leave alone the question of its philosophical content, even the straightforward meaning of a sentence sometimes seem utterly obscure in Dharmakīrti’s sparse style. The result is that, unless one wishes to argue from highly conjectural interpretations, one must refer to commentaries, where missing phrases are supplied and the elegantly tortuous relations of Dharmakīrti’s grammar are plausibly restated. Thus, for purely practical reasons, commentaries become an inevitable companion on any foray into Dharmakīrti’s texts.

Beyond practical concerns, however, lies another compelling reason for my reliance on commentaries: my larger aim—one that extends beyond the present work—is not to understand Dharmakīrti’s thought in and of itself, but rather the subsequent use of his thought throughout the history of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Thus, even if one could somehow understand Dharmakīrti’s works in a manner that ignored the history of their interpretation, such an approach would thwart me in my goals. In part, an ahistorical reading would be useless because it is a fantasy masquerading as truth: my assumption here is that my own understanding is historically conditioned, and thus, an ahistorical reading of Dharmakīrti would be at best deluded. But setting aside questions of delusion, one of my central aims in attending to the use of Dharmakīrti’s thought in particular historical moments is to create an awareness of my own location by reflecting on the way others from a different time and place appear from my perspective to be conditioned by their circumstances. I do not envision that such an awareness will awaken me from the nightmare of history so that I might move beyond my own “contingent arrangements.” Instead, by gaining a greater awareness of that contingency, I hope to create a more effective
agency therein.\textsuperscript{9}

Thus, in consulting commentaries, I have not used them as uncontested restatements of Dharmakīrti’s texts. Instead, I have sought to learn and even to employ the style of reasoning that they bring to the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s thought.\textsuperscript{10} In doing so, I am not only able to use this work as a foil to the styles of reasoning available to me in my own milieu, but I also hope to have offered an interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s thought that readily enables one to more deeply appreciate its relevance in the history of Buddhism.

Having chosen to rely on commentaries, I eventually encountered three features of their style of reasoning that are especially relevant here. The first is the systematicity that we have already mentioned. Put simply, for traditional commentators, the best interpretation of the matter at hand is one that allows for the greatest coherence—or at least produces minimal tension—with any and all other issues addressed by Dharmakīrti. One upshot of this systematic approach is that it inadvertently highlights the pieces that do not fit readily into Dharmakīrti’s philosophical puzzle. Among the strategies used to cope with such inconsistencies is the second relevant feature of this style of reasoning, namely, that meaning resides in the author’s intention, not in his texts, and that in most cases the author’s intention remains the same over the entire corpus of his work. Finally, the third feature of the style of reasoning employed by traditional commentators is straightforward: Dharmakīrti, to put it bluntly, can never be wrong.

In combination, these three features—systematicity, the appeal to authorial intent, and Dharmakīrti’s inviolable correctness—lead to several concrete practices among traditional commentators. For our purposes, the most relevant practices concern the resolution of inconsistencies—cases where pieces of the puzzle do not perfectly fit. Specifically, if a commentator confronts an inconsistency for which he can formulate a solution, he will feel free to supply arguments that, if necessary, move beyond the text; from the commentators’ standpoint, movement beyond the text is justified because the locus of meaning is not the text but Dharmakīrti’s intention. Nevertheless, even though Dharmakīrti’s commentators feel free to move beyond the text, their arguments will not contradict the problematic or inconsistent passage at hand. Instead, commentators construct arguments in the semantic space that is left open by the text itself. In some cases, a passage’s ambiguity opens it to multiple readings, and this ambiguity constitutes the space where such arguments may be created. In most cases, however, the strict and highly inflected style of Dharmakīrti’s Sanskrit—along with a precisely defined technical vocabulary—leaves little room for such semantic maneuvering. As a result, commentators must often depart from the text altogether to compose, in effect, a statement of the unsaid that supplies the requisite argument. The
hermeneutical principle that enables a commentator to supply such addenda is the appeal to Dharmakīrti’s intention: one is simply revealing his intention.

For a contemporary academic interpreter, these various features and practices of traditional commentaries lead to two clear advantages and some notable problems. We have already touched on one advantage, namely, the attention to systematicity, which permits questions that are impossible if one attends only to minutiæ.\(^{11}\) As a second advantage, the commentarial practices offer the contemporary interpreter an opportunity to consider the regnant intellectual problems and contributions in each commentator’s historical era. That is, since the commentators are most concerned with resolving inconsistencies, and since resolutions to old problems lead to new critiques, each generation of commentators is thus responding to a new set of concerns typical of that era. Hence, by providing access to the concerns that are distinctive of each generation, the commentaries can serve as an important tool for the work of intellectual history.

While the traditional commentarial approach offers these advantages to the contemporary interpreter, the very same features and practices also prove problematic in a way that has led me to place strict limits on the present study. The attention to systematicity, inasmuch as it is coupled with an appeal to Dharmakīrti’s intention, permits commentators to move freely among Dharmakīrti’s texts, and since Dharmakīrti composed eight philosophical works,\(^{12}\) a contemporary interpreter would encounter significant problems if she were to uncritically accept the commentators’ approach. In practical terms, the sheer size of Dharmakīrti’s written corpus would require a contemporary historian to apply the current, highly focused standards of historical interpretation over an unmanageable amount of material. But more important, a failure to attend to the differences in Dharmakīrti’s texts effectively leads one to adopt the same stance as the traditional commentators, namely, that meaning resides in Dharmakīrti’s intention, not in the texts. In other words, if I choose to explain the meaning of a passage in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, for example, by recourse to any other passage in any other of Dharmakīrti’s texts, I must claim that something beyond that text itself links it to those other texts. For the traditional commentators, that link is provided by the intentions in Dharmakīrti’s mind, and unless I affirm an even more obscure linkage, I too will eventually resort to the notion of authorial intention. Beyond the problems attendant upon any attempt to uncover intention,\(^{13}\) the main difficulty here is that, in constructing my own version of Dharmakīrti’s mind, I will fail to see the version presented by the commentaries at hand. In other words, as the particularities of the texts themselves fade from consideration, so too will the distinction between my
own imagined Dharmakīrti and the commentators’ version.

My response to this problem is not to reject the commentaries in favor of some pure reading of Dharmakīrti, nor to reject altogether the intertextuality of Dharmakīrti’s work. Instead, I have chosen to restrict my focus to Dharmakīrti’s earliest and most extensive works, namely the Pramāṇavārttika and the Svaśṛtti, the lengthy prose commentary on the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika. In every case, I move beyond these texts only when the commentators themselves prompt me to do so. This technique allows me to avoid both the practical and methodological problems associated with an attempt to speak in terms of Dharmakīrti’s entire philosophical corpus.

Another challenge presented by traditional commentaries is the manner in which they are layered. As noted above, the reappropriation of Dharmakīrti in each commentarial generation makes it possible to appreciate the intellectual interests and contributions of each commentator, but we create that possibility only if we discern clearly the distinctions among commentarial strata. As is already evident, on my view each commentator constructs an imagined Dharmakīrti who replaces the text as the repository of meaning, and in this imagined Dharmakīrti’s mind, all systemic inconsistencies find their resolution. In many cases, commentaries from the same generation largely agree—their Dharmakīrti-s can be treated as one—and those commentaries therefore form a single commentarial stratum. When, however, one moves on to another generation (or to another line of interpretation), a new Dharmakīrti appears. And since Dharmakīrti’s texts are taken by the commentators to be the inviolable account of all that matters in regard to issues such as perception, inferential reasoning, and semantics, the history of Buddhist theories on these issues in South Asia is embodied by a line of imagined Dharmakīrti-s, each corresponding to the interpretation of a particular commentarial stratum.  

The chief challenge for a contemporary interpreter is the work of separating commentarial strata. In short, commentaries tend to build one upon the other, and they thus develop historical layers, often expressed in terms of the accrued repetition of key phrases or ideas from their predecessors. At least some interpretations—and even many phrases—of Devendrabuddhi, the first commentator on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, appear to be repeated in all subsequent commentaries on that work, no matter how late those commentaries might be. The next commentator, Śākyabuddhi, naturally repeats Devendrabuddhi’s commentary, since part of his work is a subcommentary on Devendrabuddhi’s text. But Śākyabuddhi also expands upon Devendrabuddhi’s work by adding his own insights. When we then come to later authors such as Śāntarakṣita (725–788) and Dharmottara (fl. ca. 800), we find that the ideas—and often verbatim phrases—of both Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi are repeated
in their works without any indication as to their origin. This trend continues even in Tibet, where ideas and phrases of South Asian commentators are repeated without identification by Tibetan authors.

It is worth reiterating that the layering of commentaries does not come about because commentators, in some slavish adherence to tradition, fail to be original. Indeed, the layering of commentaries indicates exactly the opposite: each stratum represents a new set of innovations and insights brought to the issue at hand by that generation’s commentators in response to the various developments of their times. Consider, for example, the following comment of Śākyabuddhi. Here he summarizes a passage from Dharmakṛtī’s Svavṛtti that addresses Dharmakṛtī’s philosophy of language:

The idea in this passage is that since expressions take as their objects a conceptual appearance that is excluded from other appearances, they are therefore established to have other-exclusions as their objects.

The basic point here is that an object (artha, viṣaya) of an expression (śabda) such as “cow” is actually a specific type of negation that Dharmakṛtī calls an “other-exclusion” (anyāpoha). Words, in short, have negations as their objects.

With this passage in mind, let us turn to the much later commentary of Karṇakagomin (fl. ca. 900). As is so often the case, he repeats verbatim this comment of Śākyabuddhi, but he makes an important change:

The idea in this passage is that since expressions take as their objects a conceptual appearance that is excluded from other appearances, they are therefore established to have affirmations as their objects.

For Dharmakṛtī, the position that expressions have affirmations (vidhi) as their objects is directly opposed to the claim that expressions take other-exclusions as their objects. Thus, when Karṇakagomin repeats Śākyabuddhi’s comment, he ends it with a conclusion that is exactly opposite to Śākyabuddhi’s. In altering Śākyabuddhi’s conclusion, Karṇakagomin clearly had a specific problem to address, but we can only become aware of that problem if we notice and take as significant Karṇakagomin’s modification of Śākyabuddhi. And we can only do so if we resist the apparent synchronicity of the commentaries.

Attention to commentarial strata—a kind of textual archaeology—is central to my interpretation of Dharmakṛtī. Specifically, I aim to present an interpretation that focuses on the earliest commentarial stratum as formed by the interpretations of Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi. The
particular version of “Dharmakīrti” presented here thus arises in dialogue with their version. It is only by developing a restricted interpretation in this manner that we can begin the painstaking task of separating commentarial layers so as to learn the insights that characterize each commentator’s work.  And, as noted above, my aim in doing so is to get some sense of the historical development of Buddhist thought as well as my own historical location. The archaeological metaphor that I have employed, however, can be highly misleading, in that it might suggest an almost naïve objectivity that belies my approach to reading Dharmakīrti.

To be more specific, the archaeological metaphor of “commentarial strata” usefully describes some constraints that I have placed on my interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s thought, but this metaphor does not capture the way I have attempted to read and think through the problems therein. That is, by constraining my approach in historical terms, my aim is not to uncover the meaning of the text as if it were an unearthed object. Rather, I hope to create the conditions that enable me to participate in the vibrancy of the Buddhist tradition’s reverence for such an influential thinker. I do not mean that I will bow unconditionally at Dharmakīrti’s feet—certain reservations about his thought prevent me from doing so. But by locating my interpretation within a particular historical reading from a particular style of reasoning, my goal is to enact in imagination the aporias found (if sometimes then obscured) by the systematic approach employed by the commentators on whom I have relied. Those often complex and intricate aporias are precisely the inconsistencies around which the chapters of this book have been organized: problems in ontology, inferential relations, and justification. Throughout I have attempted to employ a hermeneutics of charity that gives the best possible argument from within a historically located style of reasoning. I will not thereby resolve the inconsistencies that we encounter in Dharmakīrti’s thought, but I do hope that I have come to an interpretation that is “good” in that it “reactivates the process of inquiry, opening up new avenues of investigation, criticism, and self-reflection.”

Some Suggestions for the Reader

Because this book has various aims, it also has various audiences. My overall aim is to make the content and style of Dharmakīrti’s reasoning—as interpreted by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi—available to all my readers, and this goal thus applies to all audiences of this book. I also hope, however, to speak directly to specialists in an attempt to encourage a historically focused consensus on at least some central issues. Hence, I aim to present an argument that is of sufficient rigor and detail to maintain a specialist’s attention. In doing so, however, I wish to avoid the risk that, in its technicality and minutiae, my presentation will become impenetrable to
readers not actively engaged in this field.

Balancing the needs of specialists and more broadly interested readers has its dangers. Those engaged directly in research on Dharmakīrti or Pramāṇa Theory might occasionally ask for even greater abundance of detail and citation, while those not directly engaged in such research will find additional detail superfluous or even overwhelming. To allay some of this risk, I have taken several steps. First, I have placed all introductory material in the first chapter, where I present an overview of the style of discourse focused on Pramāṇa Theory. Second, when we turn in the remaining chapters to a detailed examination of Dharmakīrti’s own views, I offer a sustained but not overly technical argument in the body of the text, while providing greater technical detail in the notes. Third, to provide all readers with the most relevant primary source material, I have included an extensive appendix of translations from key passages in Dharmakīrti’s works. Finally, I have attempted to avoid to the greatest extent possible the use of square brackets in my translations of primary texts. In the academic study of Pramāṇa Theory, the use of [square] brackets has become a standard practice as a means to indicate words or phrases in the translation that, while implied by the source text or supplied by a commentary, are not actually present in the source text. This practice leads to an extremely literalist notion of translation, where the mark of an “accurate” translation is its ability to be read as a simulacrum of the original. By ignoring the way in which translation involves a dialogue with the text, such an approach produces translations that will not enable a reader to think through Dharmakīrti’s works in the way that I hope to encourage. Brackets, moreover, are obviously directed only at specialists, since only a specialist could sort out the philological implications of such insertions. For other readers, brackets are at best a distraction, and at worst they exclude nonspecialists by reminding them that the translation is simply a crib for the source text, rather than a translation per se. A crib—a tool to ease the reading of Sanskrit and Tibetan—may have its uses, but it obviously is irrelevant to those who cannot read these languages. For these reasons, I have decided to eschew brackets, except where the inserted text is unusually lengthy or not clearly implied. My assumption is that, even without brackets, specialists can readily determine which phrases and words have been supplied by context or commentary.

With the above procedures in mind, I am able to offer some practical suggestions on how a reader might best approach this material. For those actively engaged in the study of Dharmakīrti or Pramāṇa Theory, the overview of Pramāṇa Theory may provoke some useful reflections, but if these readers choose to move directly to the discussion of Dharmakīrti’s method and ontology (chapter 2), they will not lack any material essential to my interpretation. Second, I would remind specialists that many notes may be of particular interest to them, since the notes often contain
extended, technical arguments. Other readers may also find the notes of considerable interest, but I would suggest that if the annotative technicalia prove tiresome, the argument in the body of the text may remain both intelligible and useful, even if the notes are not consulted. Finally, I remind all readers that the appendix contains lengthy translations of some relevant primary texts. My interpretation succeeds only to the extent that those texts, perhaps initially daunting, become vibrant and intriguing sources of change.

1 For a cosmological model, see AKBh ad AK3.19 (433–434). A philosophical account is found in the Pūrvaparākataparākṣā and Kālaparākṣā of Nāgārjuna’s MMK.

2 The dates of Dharmakīrti are far from certain, but in the absence of anything more definitive, I follow Frauwallner’s well-known article (1961). Concerning Lindtner’s (1980) proposal of an earlier date, his treatment is based on the problematic attribution of the Madhyamarakaratnapradīpa to Bāhaviveka, and is thus dubious. It is crucial to note that, on my view, the precise dating of Dharmakīrti and his commentators is far less important than work that locates these figures in a relative sense. In this regard, Krasser’s work (1999) is a fine example.

3 I am referring to the 'jang dgon chos, the Dge lugs holiday of which Lobsang Gyatso provides a fascinating and moving account in his memoirs (1998). Georges Dreyfus gives an extended and evocative account of the event (2003:234ff), and he likewise discusses the overall place of Dharmakīrti in Dge lugs education.

4 G.W.F. Hegel, for example, begins the main body of his lectures on religion of 1827 with this caveat (1988:113):

   The question with which we have to begin is: "How are we to secure a beginning?" For it is of course at least a formal requirement of all scientific knowledge, and especially philosophy, that nothing should occur in it that has not yet been proved. At the beginning, however, we have not yet proved [anything] and we cannot yet appeal to anything antecedent.

5 LaCapra (1983:38).

6 In a secondary sense, I speak of the "foundations" of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy so as to allude to the way in which his relentless pursuit of certainty (niṣcaya) suggests an intriguing form of foundationalism that is nevertheless relativist. Such an interpretation, however, requires considerable attention to Dharmakīrti’s systematics, and it thus presupposes precisely the type of study that constitutes this book. Hence, I will touch on this issue explicitly only in the conclusion; otherwise, the question of Dharmakīrti’s seeming foundationalism must remain a subtext, albeit an important one, of this study.


8 Hayes and Gillon note (1991:1).

9 I draw the notion of "contingent arrangements" from Quentin Skinner (1969). Despite Skinner’s problematic emphasis on authorial intent, he eloquently encourages us to allow texts from other times to displace our own assumptions. In tone, Skinner’s approach thus resembles LaCapra’s (1983), and it contrasts with the monolithic (and somewhat hubristic) notion of one’s own historical location that is implied by the "re-education" required by Richard Rorty’s method of "rational reconstruction" (1984).

10 In using the notion of a style of reasoning, I am referring to the work of Ian Hacking (1982). In brief, Hacking’s point, which might be conceived as a middle way between incommensurability and indeterminacy, is that our concern with a style of reasoning does not concern truth value per se, but rather that which makes a proposition "up for grabs" as a "candidate for being true or false" (1982:48).

11 For more on this issue, see the conclusion to this book.

12 Dharmakīrti’s earliest work is probably the Pramāṇavārttika ("Commentary on the Instruments of Knowledge"), whose four chapters cover issues of inference, authority and justification, perception,
and argument, respectively. These topics cover the entire range of the usual issues addressed by Pramāṇa Theory, the style of discourse in which Dharmakīrti participated (see chapter 1). Another early work is the Svapnaavrtti or simply Svavrtti ("Autocommentary"), a lengthy commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika’s first chapter, which discusses inference. In terms of sheer size, the Svavrtti is probably Dharmakīrti’s largest work; it is certainly the most difficult. Two later texts, the Pramāṇaviniśaya and Nyāyabinī, cover the same topics as the Pramāṇavārttika, and as such they ostensibly cover the gamut of topics proper to Pramāṇa Theory, although the Nyāyabinī is quite short. To discuss further some topics addressed in these more general works, Dharmakīrti also composed four other texts: the Sambandhaparīkṣā ("Analysis of Relations"), Hetubinī (" Quintessence of Reasoning"), Śāntanātaratasiḍḍhi ("Proof of Other Minds"), and Vādanyāya ("Procedures for Debate"), which is probably his last work.

13 The argument presented by David Hoy (1978) is among the most lucid in this regard.

14 See the excellent discussion of commentary offered by Dreyfus (1997:3–10).

15 It appears that in each of his own comments on the verses of the Pramāṇavārttika, Manorathanandini (twelfth[?] century), the author of PVV, records verbatim many of Deven drabuddhi’s comments. And even Prajñākaragupta, whose work is striking for his apparently deliberate decision to avoid previous commentaries, uses Devendrabuddhi’s words from time to time. See, for instance, his use of the example of the twins at PV3.12 (Pramāṇavārttikālamaṅkāra: 193.15; PVVP:129a1) and the notion of universals as svatāntara (Pramāṇavārttikālamaṅkāra: 198.3; PVVP:132b4) in his comments on PV3.19–21.

16 Śāntarakṣita, for example, derives his notion of the three ways of construing the term anyāpoha (TS:1002–1003) from Śākyabuddhi (see below, 131ff, and also PV:142b–142a ≈ K:252). Dharmottara (PVV, Steinkellner and Krasser 1989:13.3ff) adopts Śākyabuddhi’s notion of intrinsic (svatāntara) and extrinsic (pratāntara) instrumentality (for an account of these notions, see below, 252ff). Dharmottara also (PVV, Steinkellner and Krasser 1989:9.1ff) adopts, albeit with some modification, Devendrabuddhi’s notions of pravarataka and pṛṣṭaka (for Devendrabuddhi’s view, see below, 266ff). These are only a few of numerous examples.

17 See, for example, Śākyabuddhi’s distinction between trustworthiness (avisamvāda) in terms of subject and object (Dreyfus 1997:289). This distinction is in fact first presented by Devendrabuddhi (PVVP:1b4ff), a point that Śākyabuddhi Mchog ldan does not raise. Of course when Tibetan commentators repeat the words of their South Asian predecessors, they do so in Tibetan translation.

18 PVT(78b4) ad PVSV ad PV1.64: gan gi phyir gzh an las log pa’i rnam par rtog pa’i sna ng ba’i sgra rnam kyi yul du byed pa de’i phyir [ro’i] gzh an se’i byul can nyid du grub po snyam du bsams pa yin no.

19 K(155.27–28) ad PVSV ad PV1.64: yataś cānyavārto vikalpatrīhānaḥ Śabdair vīsāyikriyate tato vidihiśayatam Siddham iti bhāvaḥ. Note that the emphasis in the translation is mine.

20 In general terms, his problem is the one first raised by Uddyotakara (NV ad NS2.2.66; 687.1–4; translated below, 137)—namely, that the content of an expression or concept such as “cow” is subjectively experienced as an affirmation, so how can the object of such an expression or concept be a negation?

21 Given their historical importance, it is ironic that, leave alone any details of their lives or institutional affiliations, we cannot even fix the precise dates of these two crucially important commentators on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika. We can only note that Devendrabuddhi precedes Śākyabuddhi, and that Śākyabuddhi must precede Kamalaśīla. Kamalaśīla, moreover, wrote commentaries on (and probably studied directly under) Śāntarakṣita. Since Tibetan sources allow us to plausibly claim that Śāntarakṣita was active in the mid eighth century, we thus have a relative dating that places Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi not before the seventh century, but not after the early eighth. This type of relative, approximate dating is typical of the case South Asian thinkers, but for our purposes, a historical analysis needs only the relative dates of these thinkers in relation to each other.

22 In addition to the historical considerations that underlie the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s work, one can also point to a practical outcome of approaching his work in this fashion. Specifically, it enables one to place limits on the secondary material to which one refers. It is precisely for this reason that we will pay relatively scant attention to some recent, laudable studies—such as those of Dreyfus (1997) and Krasser (1991)—that might otherwise be considered relevant, were we to study Dharmakīrti’s thought in an ahistorical fashion.

Paul Griffiths (1981:18), in his wry discussion of "Buddhist Hybrid English," puts the issue in stark terms: "There is absolutely no reason why Buddhology should become an hermetic tradition, sealed from the uninitiate and passed down from master to pupil by mystical abhisêkha; that way lies extinction, or at least self-banishment from the wider academic community." See also Cabezón (1995).
1 Pramāṇa Theory: Dharmakīrti’s Conceptual Context

If we are to engage with Dharmakīrti’s philosophy in a manner that enables us to think through his style of reasoning, then we must learn to speak Dharmakīrti’s language: that is, we must become skilled in the discourse that makes Dharmakīrti’s philosophical choices possible. Since that philosophical language is highly complex and precisely inflected, some readers may find it helpful to have a primer of sorts. With those readers in mind, I have provided in this chapter a basic overview of Dharmakīrti’s conceptual context. To do so, the chapter emphasizes some significant points of convergence among South Asian philosophers of Dharmakīrti’s era who participated with him in a style of discourse that I call “Pramāṇa Theory.” Thus, in a secondary sense, this chapter will also alert readers to some of my presuppositions, for any attempt at a synoptic overview inevitably reveals at least some of its author’s assumptions.

1.1 The Process of Knowing and Its Instrument

To understand Dharmakīrti’s conceptual context, we must appreciate that his location within the Buddhist tradition is only part of a more complex landscape. Although he clearly owes much to his Buddhist predecessors, his work also draws from other traditions. In some cases, Dharmakīrti appears to adopt others’ theories, but most notably he adopts a particular mode of discourse in which subject matter, technical vocabulary, rhetorical style, and approach to reasoning are all shared by numerous philosophers from several traditions. We can refer to this style of discourse as Pramāṇa Theory, or “theory of the instruments of knowledge.” It is the kind of philosophy practiced by the most important of Dharmakīrti’s principal interlocutors, including the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara, the Vaiśeṣika Praśastapāda, and the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila. The primary concern of Pramāṇa Theory is the determination of what constitutes indubitable or indisputable knowledge and the reliable means of attaining it. While many South Asian philosophers examine knowledge in a general fashion, Pramāṇa Theorists discuss this issue in great detail through a shared
technical vocabulary that permits and encourages dialogue across traditions.

That is, philosophers who focus on the study of pramāṇa deliberately engage with other philosophers—both from their own philosophical lineage (paramparā) as well as other traditions—over specific questions within a larger, shared context. To some extent, this larger context consists of a particular style of Sanskrit verse and prose, but it also stems from incessant attention to an ongoing dialogic context. Hence, these thinkers continually refer not only to previous texts within their own traditions, but also in others’ traditions. In employing such deliberate intertextuality, Pramāṇa Theorists do not simply note what had been thought in the past; rather, they attempt to justify a particular interpretation by responding to the criticisms of others, whether within or outside their own traditions. Each generation of philosophers thus represents a new layer of interpretation formed by new criticisms and rebuttals. Already by Dharmakīrti’s time, the debates between various traditions had gone back and forth several times, and his work is thus thoroughly ensconced in the context formed by earlier criticisms and his own attempt to justify what he sees as the Buddhist view. One upshot of all this is that, in some ways, Dharmakīrti shares more with thinkers from other traditions than he does with Buddhists such as Sthiramati or Candrakīrti, who do not engage in pramāṇa discourse.5

The general contours of Pramāṇa Theory that delimit Dharmakīrti’s own thought find their first systematic expression in the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama (ca. 150 C.E.).6 Even at this early stage, a notable characteristic of Pramāṇa Theory is the development of a technical vocabulary that all later Pramāṇa Theorists inherit and share. A central theme in this vocabulary is the use of what I call the “kāraka system,” a formulaic way of analyzing the “functional elements” or kārakas that contribute to an action (kriyā).7 Following Gautama’s lead, Vātsyāyana (ca. 475), the earliest commentator on the Nyāyasūtras, applies the kāraka system to the verb pramāṇa, “to know indubitably.”8 Of the possible kārakas or elements in an action, three are particularly relevant to the analysis of the act of knowing: the agent (kartṛ) who acts on an object or “patient” (karman) by means of an instrument (karaṇa). Adding to these three the action (kriyā) itself, Vātsyāyana and all subsequent Pramāṇa Theorists apply this kāraka analysis to the verb pramāṇa so as to derive four terms: pramāṇa, pramiti (or pramāṇa), prameya, and pramāṇa.9 These terms refer to the agent who knows (pramātṛ), the action of knowing (pramiti or pramāṇa), the object known (prameya), and the instrument used to acquire that knowledge (pramāṇa). Using these four terms, Pramāṇa Theorists developed a fourfold style of analysis to analyze knowledge events. That is, their overall analytical framework assumed that every knowledge event involved the event as an action, an agent engaged in that action, a means for the production of that action, and an object to which
that action is principally related. Analyses of the process of knowing through these four terms became standard among Pramāṇa Theorists.¹⁰

Before we continue with our discussion of these four facets of knowing, we must first recognize that readers familiar with the epistemological theories developed in the Euroamerican philosophical traditions may feel that our use of the term "knowledge" here is somewhat irregular. On most Euroamerican accounts, "knowledge" is a belief or attitude that is true (under some set of conditions or truth theory). As a belief or attitude, "knowledge" is dispositional, and it therefore cannot be an act in itself. But on the account of Pramāṇa Theory that we have given above, "knowledge" (pramiti or pramā) is the act (kriyā) of "knowing indubitably" that is constituted by a process involving the interaction of an agent, instrument, and object of knowledge. This model requires that the “action of knowing” (pramā or pramiti) be a cognitive event occurring in a particular person’s mind within a particular set of circumstances. A theory of knowledge must therefore take into account any relevant aspect of those circumstances that, for example, might distort a cognitive event in such a manner that we should not consider it knowledge. In examining distortions that prevent a cognitive event from being a knowledge event, these theorists shared a general conception of the relation between body and mind. Hence, they all think it relevant to discuss at length the way in which physical infirmities such as jaundice or cataracts might distort cognitive events: a person with jaundice will see conch shells as yellow; a person with cataracts thinks that his water-jug is filled with small pieces of hair. They also generally maintain that intense emotions such as intense anger or lust so strongly affect the mind that all cognitions occurring with those emotions are necessarily distorted. This way of approaching cognitive distortion—and numerous other such issues—clearly indicates that an account of the cognitive event or act called "knowledge" (pramiti or pramā) is concerned largely with the process of producing that event. And the model that we have cited—involving the interaction of agent, object, and instrument—provides the overall structure for Pramāṇa Theorists’ analysis of that process.¹¹

When Gautama, Vātsyāyana, and subsequent Pramāṇa Theorists used this model to give an account of knowledge-events, their works address especially the pramāṇas or “instruments of knowledge,” and it is for this reason that Matilal and others refer to this genre of philosophical literature as Pramāṇa Theory. But why take an analysis of the instrument as one’s thematic focus? Why not focus instead on the agent, object, or event itself?¹² To answer such questions in a somewhat speculative manner, we might give a historical argument that borrows a principle of Pramāṇa Theory itself: if two persons are to have an argument, they must first share many points of agreement. That is, if any two discussants are to disagree meaningfully on some point, their discussion must be framed within some area of agreement.¹³ When discussing the acquisition of indisputable knowledge, Pramāṇa Theorists generally agree on many basic notions
about the instruments of knowledge (pramāṇa), whereas they generally encounter fewer areas of agreement on other aspects of that process. Since they tend to agree more readily on issues related to the instrument or means in the process of knowing, the instrument naturally becomes the focus—the propositional subject—of their discussions. The difficult problem we face in making this type of argument is that we cannot readily explain why it is that these thinkers tended to agree more readily on issues related to the instrument of knowledge. We may suspect that some large pool of common assumptions underlies the emphasis on the instruments of knowledge, or perhaps that an emphasis on the instrument most readily affirms their approach by excluding other styles of discourse. Somewhat ironically, these suspicions require us to acknowledge that Pramāṇa Theorists would not explicitly discuss shared assumptions or covert exclusions, since all such issues would be obscured by their very givenness. Hence, due to the relative lack of research in this area, the subtler form of this historical argument can only be suggestive at this point.¹⁴

Putting aside covert notions, one can also point to arguments made by the theorists themselves. Among these are two distinct arguments that explicitly acknowledge an emphasis on the importance of the instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa), rather than the agent (pramārt), object (prameya), or the action of knowing itself (pramāti). The first argument is suggested by the comparatively early works of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara.¹⁵ This argument amounts to the claim that the emphasis on analysis of the instrument of knowledge derives from its primacy in the process of knowing. To use the analogy of a person cutting a tree with an axe: the person and the tree can be identified as the “cutter” and the “cut object” only when the action of cutting occurs, and that action can only occur when a cutting instrument—the axe—is employed. It is only by changing the type of instrument used that the action then becomes a different action. That is, if we replace the agent with some other person, or if we can direct the axe against some other object, the action is still the action of cutting. In short, neither the agent nor object can change the character of the action. If, however, some other kind of instrument, such as a yardstick, is used, then the agent (“the cutter”), object (“that which is cut”) and action (“cutting”) all take on a different character: they become the “measurer,” the “measured” and the action of “measuring.” Hence, inasmuch as the character of the instrument determines the character of the other three factors, the instrument is primary. This way of understanding the instrument as primary appears to have been widely accepted among Pramāṇa Theorists, including Dharmakīrti.¹⁶

The second set of arguments that explicitly acknowledge the emphasis on the instruments of knowledge are adduced only by Buddhist philosophers, beginning with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. These philosophers reject the notion of an agent, and on their view, the cognitive event identified as knowledge is ontologically identical to the instrument, which
they conceive to be a mental image. In some contexts, they also regard the object or patient as dependent in some sense on the instrument, either because it is not ontologically distinct from the instrument, or because the character of that object is determined by the character of the instrument itself. Hence, on their view, the instrument is clearly primary, since all of the other functional elements in a knowledge event are either unreal or determined by the instrument. In subsequent chapters, we will have an opportunity to examine Dharmakīrti’s views on all these issues in greater detail.

Finally, one can also note that the emphasis on the instruments of knowledge allows (or even requires) Pramāṇa Theorists to discuss at length the place of scripture (āgama) or verbal testimony as such an instrument. In all Pramāṇa Theories, scripture plays a special role, in that it is an instrument (pramāṇa) or means that enables one to obtain knowledge that is otherwise utterly beyond one’s ken. Many claims verifiable only by scripture often bear directly on the soteriological goals of the tradition in question. If we assume that Pramāṇa Theorists took those soteriological goals seriously, we would expect them to be especially concerned with knowledge derived from scripture, since scripture is the means to that soteriologically relevant but otherwise unobtainable knowledge. For this reason as well, Pramāṇa Theorists might be inclined to think that the instrument is the most important aspect in the process.

Regardless of the historical and philosophical reasons, two issues remain clear: first, that Dharmakīrti’s conceptual context is formed by an intensive analysis of the process of knowing as embodied by the aforementioned model; and second, that it is especially a knowledge-event’s instrument—and not its object, agent, or the event itself—that most concerned the theorists that Dharmakīrti directly addresses. As we have noted, it is likely that this shared emphasis on the importance of the instrument is encouraged by a host of covert and obscure assumptions. Nevertheless, we can still summarize a rather large number of quite clear and explicit assumptions offered by these theorists themselves.

With this in mind, I begin this sketch of the conceptual context of Dharmakīrti’s thought by discussing the pramāṇas or “instruments of knowledge” so as to highlight the notions that he shared with other Pramāṇa Theorists. I will move on to examine some shared notions concerning instrumental objects (prameya), and after highlighting the importance of purpose, I will conclude with some brief remarks concerning the agent (pramāttṛ) and knowledge-event itself (pramā or pramiti).

Two Ubiquitous Instruments: Perception and Inference

When speaking of the instruments of knowledge, the various traditions of South Asian philosophy and the individual philosophers within those traditions disagree considerably on exactly what ways of knowing should be
considered instrumental (i.e., instances of pramāṇa), and what forms are
spurious or faulty. They also disagree about the criteria through which one
can adjudicate whether a particular form of knowledge is instrumental or
not. Despite these and other disagreements, they find considerable common
ground on a number of other issues.\footnote{17} The foremost of these is simply the
notion that the instruments of knowledge must be investigated; for most of
these philosophers, this need stems from the centrality of knowledge in the
search for spiritual freedom or mokṣa. That is, to become free, one must rely
upon correct knowledge, but if one is unable to distinguish correct from
incorrect knowledge, how could one recognize one’s knowledge as correct?
\footnote{18}

With the renowned but comparatively sparse exception of the Lokāyata
or Cārvāka tradition,\footnote{19} all Pramāṇa Theorists respond to the need for a
means of obtaining indubitable knowledge by positing at least two basic
instruments: perceptual awareness (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna).\footnote{20}
Of course, the virtually ubiquitous acceptance of perception and inference
does not prevent these thinkers from disagreeing on exactly how these
instruments of knowing operate. Nevertheless, in accepting perception and
inference as instruments of knowledge, Pramāṇa Theorists share certain
presuppositions and basic doctrines concerning the instruments of
knowledge.

\textit{Shared Notions Concerning Perceptual Awareness}

When speaking of perceptual awareness, Pramāṇa Theorists agree, first of
all, that this way of knowing depends directly on the senses. Indeed, the
centrality of the senses in this way of knowing is implied by the term
pratyakṣa itself, which is often construed etymologically to mean “before
the senses.”\footnote{21} We must be careful, however, to recall that in addition to the
five senses familiar to Euroamerican traditions, these philosophers also
stipulate a sixth sense: the mental faculty (manas). Hence, any instance of
“perceptual awareness” may be an awareness of a mental object, rather
than a visible form, sound, smell, taste, or tactile object. Pramāṇa Theorists
nearly all agree on the stipulation of a sixth sense, and they all agree on the
centrality of the senses in perceptual awareness.\footnote{22}

Another general point of agreement concerns the manner in which
perceptual awareness occurs. All Pramāṇa Theorists agree that perceptual
awareness necessarily involves the contact (sannikarṣa, sparśa, etc.) of an
object (viṣaya, artha, etc.) with a sense faculty (indriya).\footnote{23} And except in the
case of mental objects, they generally assume it appropriate to consider this
contact to involve a relation involving matter (rūpa) or substance (dravya).
They also agree that physical (i.e., material or substantial) defects in the
sense faculties can contribute to certain types of errors in perceptual
awareness, as when a person with cataracts apparently sees small hairs or
bugs in front of their eyes. Another important point of agreement is that perceptual awareness is either the most vivid or the least mediated form of awareness, and that in this sense it takes precedence over other instruments of knowing, such as inference. Most of these philosophers also agree that the basic building blocks of matter are irreducible, partless atoms or “infinitesimal particles” (paramāṇu). According to the philosophers who accept this notion, infinitesimal particles are too small to be perceived by ordinary persons; instead, the matter perceived by ordinary persons consists of particles that have somehow been aggregated into an entity of perceptible size.

Although these points of agreement are certainly significant, it is important to note that Pramāṇa Theorists often disagree upon the precise content of perceptual awareness, either because their ontologies conflict, or because they differ over the degree to which perceptual awareness is determinate. We will consider some of these debates when examining Dharmakīrti’s particular theory of perception, but for now, let us turn to an overview of inference (anumāna).

**Shared Notions Concerning Inference**

Inferential knowledge and the topics related to it are particularly important to Pramāṇa Theorists. One can point to three basic reasons for the importance of inference: first, it provides access to entities that are to some degree unavailable to the senses, and such entities are often under dispute. Second, it is closely tied to the understanding of language, an issue that is essential to the success of the South Asian philosophical enterprise. And third, it provides the framework for formal disputation, an undeniably crucial aspect of South Asian philosophy.

As Matilal has noted, the earliest theories of inference probably arose out of a concern with the codification of philosophical debate, but properly speaking, what is meant by inference here is not a “syllogism” or some other argument. Rather, an inference produces or constitutes a knowledge-event that knows its object by means of knowledge about another object that is invariably related to that object. A stock example is the inferential cognition that knows fire is present in a particular locus by means of perceptual knowledge of smoke in that same locus. Inference clearly involves some steps, for in providing knowledge of one thing by means of knowing something invariably related to it, the act of inference requires a sequential structure, which we will discuss below. Nevertheless, the central concern for these thinkers is not the formalism of that structure itself; instead, they are most concerned with the way in which that structure supplies the necessary conditions for an inference.

Pramāṇa Theorists generally speak of two forms of inference: “inference-for-oneself” (svārthānumāna) and “inference-for-others” (parārthānumāna). The former is simply an inferential cognition: one looks
at a smoky room, for example, and (with other conditions in place), one infers that fire is present. In contrast, an inference-for-others is one that is stated verbally so as to induce an inferential cognition in another person. In other words, this latter “inference” (which is actually a series of statements and not an inference) is meant to result in another person having his own inference-for-oneself with regard to the question at hand. In this sense, inference-for-oneself lies at the core of these thinkers’ inferential theory. But ironically, the structural elements that are necessary for one to have an inference-for-oneself are primarily explored in discussions of inference-for-others. To avoid the confusion that this overlap incurs, below I will often speak simply of “inference,” with the understanding that our main focus is the examination of the conditions necessary for a correct (as opposed to a spurious) inferential cognition to occur.

**The Basic Structure of Inference**

As one might expect, the aforementioned importance placed on inference prompts considerable disagreement among Pramāṇa Theorists, but their analyses of inference always include the same basic, minimal structure. Schematically, I render it as follows:

S is P because E

A typical example of this type of inference is:

The hill (S) is a locus of fire (P) because of the presence of smoke (E).

Here, S is the “subject,” called the sādhya-dharmin or pakṣa in Sanskrit; P is the “predicate,” known as the sādhya-dharma; and E is the “evidence,” known as the hetu or liṅga. The first two elements, the subject and predicate, together form the “proposition” (pratijñā or pakṣa), “S is P.” Hayes and others have employed an alternative terminology, where the subject is called the “quality-possessor” and the predicate the “quality.” This terminology has the advantage of conveying more literally the sense of the Sanskrit terms (sādhya-)dharmin and (sādhya-)dharma, and it avoids any potential misunderstanding concerning the notion of a proposition. Nevertheless, “quality-possessor” is quite cumbersome, and inasmuch as the English term “quality” can also be misleading, “subject” and “predicate” appear to be the best choices.

**The Evidence-Predicate Relation and Its Exemplification**

According to Dharmakīrti and his fellow Pramāṇa Theorists, any theory of inference must contain at least the relations implicit in the basic model presented above. The first such relation is generally called the vyāpti or “pervasion”—it is the relation between the evidence (E) and the predicate
In our example, this is the relation between fire and smoke. Pramāṇa Theorists generally consider this relation to have two aspects: the positive concomitance (anvaya) and the negative concomitance (vyatireka). The positive concomitance is a state of affairs such that wherever the evidence (E) is present, the predicate (P) must be present. In our example, this would be stated, “wherever there is smoke, there is necessarily fire.” The negative concomitance specifies that the evidence (E) is present only in the presence of the predicate (P) and not in any other circumstances. Dharmakīrti often states the negative concomitance, or “restriction,” in an affirmative statement (i.e., a statement that involves no grammatical negation). In our example, the positive statement would read, “There is smoke only where there is fire.”

Most Pramāṇa Theorists, however, formulate the negative concomitance or restriction in negative terms; following our example, a negative statement of this concomitance would read, “wherever there is no fire, there is necessarily no smoke.” For Dharmakīrti and Kumārila—and probably also for Uddyotakara and Prāśastapāda—the positive and negative concomitance are in contraposition: if smoke is necessarily present when fire is present, then in the absence of fire, smoke is also necessarily absent.

According to these philosophers, in order to have an instance of inferential knowledge one must be aware of the pervasion—the twofold relation consisting of the positive and negative concomitance. So too, the pervasion must be general: it cannot be restricted to a single case, but must pertain to all cases of the kind in question. In the dialogical context of inference-for-others, these two requirements—that one have knowledge of the pervasion and that it be general—are reflected by a frequent claim: namely, that an inference-for-others must be accompanied by at least a supporting example (sādharmyadṛśṭānta). Most philosophers maintain that a counterexample (vaidharmyadṛśṭānta) may also be necessary, at least in some cases. The supporting example is drawn from the domain of “homologous instances” (sapakṣa)—namely, loci that are similar to the proposition to be proven (S is P) in that they are qualified by P. In an inference of fire from smoke, a kitchen (mahānasa) is the typical example. The aim is to appeal to a noncontroversial case that exemplifies the relationship between the evidence (E) and the predicate (P): one’s past experience of kitchens illustrates the positive concomitance of smoke with fire, in that one’s observations conform to a necessary relation between the presence of smoke and the presence of fire. The counterexample is drawn from the domain of heterogeneous instances—loci that lack P. A typical counterexample for the smoke-fire inference is a lake. Here, the point is to show that the presence of the evidence (E, the smoke) is not observed in the absence of the predicate, fire; or alternatively, that smoke is present only when fire is present, and not otherwise.

In part, the use of examples indicates the psychologism within pramāṇa
discourse. That is, these philosophers are not interested only in the formal aspects of inferential reasoning; rather, they wish to demonstrate the conditions necessary for the occurrence of a knowledge-event that is inferential in form. The distinction here is between the knowledge that smoke is always concomitant with fire, on the one hand, and the knowledge that a smoke-producing fire is present in a particular case, on the other. For Prāṇa Theorists, the positive concomitance is a relation that must pertain between the evidence (E) and the predicate (P) if we are to infer that the subject (S) is qualified by the predicate (P) because it is qualified by the evidence (E). But for these theorists, it is also crucial that the knowledge of the positive concomitance is a necessary part of the process that leads to an inferential cognition of fire in a locus by way of a perceptual cognition of smoke in that locus.

In addition to the psychologism underlying the use of examples, one can also point to certain ontological concerns that are implicit in claims for the necessity of examples in an inference-for-others. According to many South Asian philosophers, the twofold relation between evidence and predicate cannot be stated in abstraction from the substances that bear those predicates. When a disputant (let us call him “Devadatta”) attempts to induce another to infer the presence of fire on a mountain from the smoke on that mountain, Devadatta must demonstrate to his interlocutor that the presence of smoke is necessarily concomitant with the presence of fire. But he cannot do so by appealing to the case at hand—the smoke and fire on the mountain—precisely because this case is under dispute. Of course, Devadatta might simply state that relation in abstraction from any given locus or substance, but many Prāṇa Theorists, especially those from non-Buddhist traditions, resist this approach. This is due in part to the notion that, if the predicates in question are real, they must be instantiated in some substance or locus; and if one cannot appeal to any such undisputed instantiation, then the reality of those predicates remains dubious. Hence, for some Prāṇa Theorists, one of the reasons for insisting upon examples is that they serve to demonstrate the reality of the entities adduced as predicate and evidence. This ontological requirement also has a certain resonance with an epistemic requirement—namely, that the relation in question must have its final appeal in sense perception itself. In this sense, even if one can logically adduce reasons why some state of affairs must hold true, one’s arguments are generally considered unreliable if one cannot appeal to sensory experience to support that reasoning.

The Evidence-Subject Relation

So far we have discussed the basic form of inference, and we have discussed one of the key relations in this inference: the twofold pervasion (vyāpti) consisting of positive and negative concomitance (anvaya and vyatireka) that pertains between the evidence and the predicate. One other key inferential relation must also be discussed: the relation called upanaya (“application”)
or, as Buddhist thinkers tend to call it, *pakṣadhammatā* (“presence of the quality in the subject”). In some ways, this relation is straightforward: it simply consists of the relation between the evidence and the subject (the *dharmin* or *pakṣa*) of the proposition in question. In other words, for *pakṣadhammatā* to hold true, the evidence must be known to be a quality or predicate (*dharma*) of the proposition’s subject. In the example of inferring fire on a mountain from the presence of smoke, *pakṣadhammatā* would simply mean that the smoke used as evidence is present on the mountain. The need for this relation is probably quite obvious; after all, it would make little sense to prove that the mountain is on fire by noting that smoke is present in my pipe. An even more obvious example would be the inference: “Joe is a bachelor because of being unmarried.” *Pakṣadhammatā* here would simply mean that evidence adduced—the fact of being unmarried—pertains to him, not someone else. Otherwise, we might infer: “Joe is a bachelor because his dog is unmarried.” And this does not make any obvious sense. Thus, the basic point of *pakṣadhammatā* is that one must readily know that the evidence is a predicate or property of the subject. Some philosophers, such as the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara, claim that this relation must always be known through perception,

but Dharmakīrti and subsequent Buddhists maintain that this relation may be determined through another inference.

A Restatement

With the above discussion in mind, let us restate the basic elements of inference according to Pramāṇa Theorists. This restatement combines the elements of both inference-for-oneself and inference-for-others, and it is meant as a heuristic overview of inference, rather than the depiction of any philosopher’s theory:

**Proposition (pratijñā, pakṣa):** The mountain (*S*) is a locus of fire (*P*).

**Evidence (hetu, liṅga):** Because there is smoke (*E*).

*The Evidence-Predicate Relation (vyāpti, pervasion) and Its Exemplification:* Wherever there is smoke (*E*) there is fire (*P*), as in a kitchen. And without fire (~*P*), there is no smoke (~*E*), as on a lake.

*The Evidence-Subject Relation (pakṣadhammatā or upanaya):* This mountain (*S*) is a locus of smoke (*E*).

All of these elements figure explicitly or implicitly in every Pramāṇa Theorist’s analysis of inference. In the case of inference-for-oneself, the exemplification *per se* is superfluous, but the principle expressed by that exemplification—that the evidence-predicate relation be generalizable beyond the case at hand—is still required. In a sense, all the elements are also only implicit in an inference-for-oneself, in that they are not explicitly stated, whereas at least some of the elements must be explicitly stated in an inference-for-others. Numerous disagreements arise, however, on the
details of inference-for-others. We have already noted, for example, that these philosophers do not agree on the degree or type of exemplification necessary in an inference-for-others. Similar disagreements abound concerning which elements may be dropped as superfluous to a statement of inference, or whether some additional statements are required. But these disagreements focus primarily upon the explicit presentation or repetition of one element or another; the implicit presence of these elements in an inference is not a matter of contention.45

We have now covered the most salient views that Pramāṇa Theorists share about the two ubiquitous forms of instruments of knowledge: perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Let us now turn to some basic views concerning the instrumental object (prameya), the object of an instrument of knowledge.

1.2 Prameya: The “Real”

As noted previously, the term prameya refers to the object of the indubitable knowledge derived from an instrument of knowledge or pramāṇa, and to clarify that a prameya is specifically an object of this kind of knowledge, I will generally translate prameya as “instrumental object.”46

For Pramāṇa Theorists, an instrumental object is necessarily what we might call “real” in English. I am thinking here especially of the Sanskrit term sat, a participle formed from the verb “to be/exist” (as). The connotations of sat converge on the notion of something that is present in a substantial fashion, be it directly or indirectly. Such an object is “real” because only “the real” can be the content of a correct or indubitable knowledge-event: for Pramāṇa Theorists, it makes no sense to speak of an indubitable cognitive event whose object is unreal.47 Clearly, this position rests on several assumptions, the most obvious of which is the notion that cognitive events always have objects. This is less trivial than it sounds, for these philosophers maintain that every mental state or form of consciousness is a cognitive event; in short, they espouse an intentional theory of consciousness. That is, all moments of consciousness necessarily have objects, and there are thus no instances of contentless awareness or moments of consciousness without objects. Pramāṇa Theorists thus claim that, even in instances where a cognition is mistaken, one must still account for the presence of an object, even though that object is somehow incorrectly cognized.48

In addition to claiming that instrumental objects (prameya) are real, these philosophers also maintain that the “real” is necessarily “knowable” (jñeya), and this is understood to mean that the “real” necessarily can be taken as an instrumental object.49 The overall epistemological implication here is that, for these thinkers, it is absurd to assert that some entity is real and yet utterly beyond anyone’s knowledge. Or, to put it another way, any
argument for the reality of some entity must ultimately rest on some means to know that entity indubitably.

Beyond this fundamental epistemological principle, Pramāṇa Theorists shared other basic assumptions about the real (sat). For our purposes, the most pervasive and relevant assumption is that “the real” is “simple” (eka). A brief examination of this shared issue will also allow us to appreciate a fundamental difference that distinguishes Dharmakīrti’s thought from that of his opponents.

The Simplicity of the Real and a Fundamental Difference

‘Simplicity” translates the Sanskrit terms ekatva and ekatā, which literally mean “singularity” or “oneness.” A thing that is qualified by simplicity is singular or “one” (eka)—it is a seamless unit. Simple things stand in contrast to those that are qualified by “multiplicity” (anekatā), a term that might also be translated as “nonsimplicity,” “complexity,” or “plurality.”

When Pramāṇa Theorists claim that the real is simple and hence nonplural, they adduce three general forms of arguments. The first are arguments from experience. Proceeding from the principle that a perceptual object is real, many philosophers argue that an object of perception is singular. If we take a water-jug, for example, as the object of our visual perception, the water-jug appears as singular in our perception. This first type of argument often occurs in conjunction with the second type: arguments from language. In claiming that a water-jug presents itself as singular in perception, many Pramāṇa Theorists appeal to perceptual judgment: the water-jug presents itself as singular because the perception leads to (or includes) a conceptual determination of that perceptual object as a single thing, namely, a water-jug. In short, our perception allows us to correctly think or say, “That is a water-jug.” Since the term “water-jug” here is singular, it must refer to a single object. These arguments rest on the claim that the grammar of expressions corresponds to the real properties of objects. More specifically, the singularity of an expression corresponds to the singularity (ekatā, ekatva) of the object to which it is applied. In short, in this regard at least, grammar and ontology stand in a relation of isometric correspondence.

When combined with the notion that the real is simple or singular, this alleged isometric correspondence between grammatical and ontological number leads to the second type of argument as an important corollary, namely, that a grammatically plural expression must in fact refer to multiple objects that are ontologically singular or simple. Thus, if it is meaningful, a grammatically plural expression or concept must correspond ontologically to numerous, ontologically simple entities.

This contingency of grammatical plurality on ontological singularity points to the third set of arguments in favor of the real as simple. These arguments rest on the use of reductive analysis (vibhāga, vicāra, etc.) and
the principle that the real is irreducible. That is, when we apply the appropriate form of analysis to a real entity, we should not be able to break or analyze it into smaller parts, since a real entity is simple. If that seemingly real entity can successfully be further analyzed—broken into parts, as it were—then its simplicity is only apparent; it seems to be simple, but in fact it is complex, and as such, it is not truly real. In this way, ontological simplicity corresponds to analytical irreducibility. Thus, if any real thing is necessarily simple or unitary, it is also necessarily irreducible under reductive analysis.

Many Pramāṇa Theorists use (or at least allude to) all three forms of argument to establish a real thing as simple, but throughout these arguments, the notion that the real must be simple remains uncontested for Dharmakīrti and his principle opponents. Their unanimity on the issue of simplicity, however, leads them to a shared problem, which we can illustrate in terms of the alleged whole that is a water-jug. We may claim that, when we see a water-jug, we are seeing a single thing, but we must also admit that we can readily see its parts—the base, the rim around the top, and so on—in the same fashion. We thus encounter an apparent antinomy: the water-jug is a single real thing located in a particular time and place and consisting of a certain amount of matter, and yet in that very same time, place, and matter, we also see (and can meaningfully speak of) multiple real things such as a base and rim. Thus, we must ask: are we seeing one thing or many things?

The possible responses are perhaps obvious: one can either choose to defend the simplicity of things that presuppose the existence of real parts, or one can insist that the simple is necessarily partless. The former position is characteristic of those South Asian philosophers such as Uddyotakara who stress the perceptual and linguistic approaches to simplicity: for these thinkers, any account must preserve the ontological intuitions that stem from the way we perceive and speak of things such as a water-jug. If a spatially extended object such as a water-jug appears to be one thing, and if we can speak meaningfully of it in the singular, then our ontological account of the water-jug must likewise show how a single, real, unitary water-jug does not lose its simplicity even though that single entity is distributed over multiple parts that are themselves simple and real. With this issue in mind, philosophers such as Uddyotakara speak of a real “whole” or “part-possessor” (avayavin): a real substance instantiated or participating in its real parts, and yet entirely distinct from them.

A theory of substantially existent, unitary wholes that are distinct from their parts may satisfy some intuitions about perception and language, but even on the view of its proponents it leads to some difficulties. For example, given these thinkers’ view of matter, they must admit that a whole water-jug should weigh more than the total weight of its parts. That is, before the two halves of a water-jug are conjoined, they have a certain weight, and when they are conjoined, a new, additional substance—the water-jug—comes into being. Since the conjoining of the halves creates a new
substance over and beyond the halves of the water-jug, one would expect there to be some additional weight from the presence of that new substance. Uddyotakara, in a rather undistinguished attempt to deal with this problem, claims that a whole does indeed weigh more than the total weight of all its parts but that the difference in weight is undetectable.\(^{54}\)

In contrast, South Asian Buddhist thinkers utterly reject the real existence of wholes; indeed, a mereological critique of wholes is one of the earliest and most paradigmatic forms of reductive analysis in Buddhist thought. In their critique of wholes, Buddhist thinkers maintain that entities such as water-jugs may seem to be simple, but in fact they are not because it is not possible for a real entity to be distributed over or participate in parts that are themselves simple. Many of the arguments that they adduce for this critique fall into a genre that Tibetan thinkers later called the “neither-one-nor-many” argument. This style of critique relies on \textit{reductio ad absurdum} to demonstrate that it is untenable to maintain that a whole is identical to its real parts or that a whole is distinct from its real parts. And since any real thing must be either identical to or distinct from any other real thing, if the parts are indeed real, then one must conclude that the whole is unreal.\(^{55}\) Hence, on the view of Buddhist thinkers, only partless things can be simple, which is to say that simple things cannot be distributed over or instantiated in other simple things. And since they agree that only the simple can be real, they must insist that only the partless—the undistributed—is real.

Although they reject the existence of real wholes, Buddhist thinkers understand that they must also account for our perceptual and linguistic practices, whereby we believe ourselves to be perceiving and speaking of wholes such as water-jugs that are distributed over their parts. This leads Buddhist philosophers to discuss two different types of reality: an apparent reality in which things can only be called “real” (or “true”) in conventional, contingent, or nominal terms (\textit{saṃvṛtisat} or \textit{prajñaptisat}), and a highest level of reality in terms of which things are ultimately real (\textit{paramārthasat}). This fundamental notion of the “two realities” or “two truths” occurs throughout Buddhist texts, and the works of Dharmakīrti are no exception. Within the Buddhist context that informed Dharmakīrti’s thought, the most relevant statement of these two levels of reality occurs in the \textit{Abhidharmakoṣa} (and \textit{bhāṣya}) of Vasubandhu.\(^{56}\)

That of which one does not have a cognition when it has been broken [into parts (\textit{avayava})] is conventionally real (\textit{saṃvṛtisat}); an example is a water-jug. And that of which one does not have a cognition when other [elemental qualities (\textit{dharma})] have been excluded from it by the mind is also conventionally real; an example is water. That which is otherwise is ultimately real (\textit{paramārthasat}).\(^{57}\)
Vasubandhu’s presentation of the two realities reflects the Buddhist mereological critique mentioned above. Although the *Abhidharmakośa* is not explicit on this point, Vasubandhu’s theory thus rests largely on a critique of spatial extension. In other words, if a thing is extended in space, then it necessarily has parts in that it at least has “sides”—top, bottom, left, right, and so on. Since that extended thing can therefore be reduced (through actual physical force or through analysis) to its parts, it is not simple. And since it is not simple, it is not truly or ultimately real. In contrast, the simple entities that remain after analysis are ultimately real. On the view found in the *Abhidharmakośa*, these simple entities are infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*) or irreducible mental entities and states. In a later text, Vasubandhu applies a mereological analysis to infinitesimal particles of matter themselves, and he leads his readers to the conclusion that even matter is not ultimately real because it does not withstand mereological analysis. Following Vasubandhu’s lead, Dignāga and especially Dharmakīrti also apply a mereological style of critique to temporal extension, with the result that all real entities—whether particles or mental states—are “momentary” (*kṣanīka*), in that they exist for only an infinitesimal amount of time.

As the critique of temporal extension suggests, a mereological analysis of wholes provides a paradigm for the critique of entities that are whole-like: that is, they exhibit “distribution” (*anvaya*). A whole is a distributed entity in that it is a single real thing that is somehow instantiated in other single real things that are its parts. The same may be said of a perdurant entity that allegedly endures over time: to be real, it must be a single thing distributed over numerous temporal instances. Dharmakīrti likewise extends this style of critique to universals: if a universal (such as *gotva* or “cow-ness”) is to be real, it must also be a single real thing that is distributed over all the individuals that we call “cows.” But perhaps the quintessential form of this style of argument is Dharmakīrti’s critique of relations.

Dharmakīrti presents his critique of relations in the *Sambandhapatraṅkāra*, where he responds to various positions that argue for the existence of ultimately real relations. Dharmakīrti systematically rejects all such claims, and on his view, a relation can only be real in a conventional or nominal sense. His argument rests on the uncontested claim that he shares with his opponents: namely, that an ultimately real thing must be simple. Hence, if a relation were to be ultimately real, then it too must be a simple, unitary entity. If a relation is hypostasized in such a fashion, the mereological style of analysis applies because the relation must now be conceived much as a whole: a single thing that, while existent in itself, is somehow distributed over its parts.

At various points in the *Sambandhapatraṅkāra*, Dharmakīrti relies on a “neither-one-nor-many” argument to make his point, and his argument moves back and forth across a central question: if a relation is a real thing,
then is it one with its relata, or is it different from them? Noting that a relation presupposes the presence of at least two relata, Dharmakīrti dismisses the notion that the relation could be a real thing that is one with (i.e., identical to) the relata over which it is distributed. In other words, if the relation and the relata are one, then how can we intelligently speak of two relata? And in response to the claim that the relation could be different from its relata, he offers a verse that is particularly helpful for understanding Dharmakīrti’s ontology:

If two things are related by virtue of their connection to one relation, then one may ask, “What relates those two relata to the relation?” The result is an infinite regress, and the notion of a relation is thus not correct.

Dharmakīrti’s point is that, if a relation is different from the relata, then it must still somehow be distributed over them in order to serve its function as a relation. Hence, one may ask whether, by virtue of being distributed over the relata, the relation is thereby one with the relata, or different from them. If it is one, then there can be no relation, since relations presuppose multiplicity or plurality. And if it is different from the relata, then we must argue that there is some second-order relation that connects the relation to its relata. We can thus again ask: is this second-order relation one with its relata, or different from them? The infinite regress from this point should be obvious.

I have cited Dharmakīrti’s argument by infinite regress because it so clearly points to a theme within his ontology, namely, the rejection of the notion that an entity could be at once one (and thus a simple real) and yet participate in what is many. Such alleged entities include: a whole participating in its parts; a universal participating in its particulars; a perdurant entity participating in its temporal instances; and a relation participating in its relata. Whatever motives we might attribute to him, it is clear that Dharmakīrti utterly rejects any possibility of unity within plurality, and as a result, all such entities must be ultimately unreal for him because they all can be reduced to the entities over which they are allegedly distributed.

The argument by infinite regress is also particularly helpful for understanding Dharmakīrti’s ontology in its wider context. In part, the argument is helpful because it presupposes a fundamental area of agreement, namely, that a real thing is simple or one. At the same time, however, the argument by infinite regress also points to an especially crucial point of disagreement. That point becomes clear when we recognize that the regress succeeds only under a certain condition. As Stephen Phillips notes:

The regress is set up by treating the relation as a term, as the
same sort of thing, logically, as the relata. Without an argument that a relation is a different sort of critter, it seems that if a third thing is required to relate two things, then the third thing requires equally a fourth and a fifth to tie it up with the first two, *ad infinitum.*

Phillips points out that Dharmakīrti’s critique of relations succeeds by treating the relation as the same kind of “critter” as the relata. Without this assumption, the critique might easily be evaded. We know that if the relation and the relata are real, then each must be one or simple (*eka*). Suppose, however, that number does not apply in the same way to these entities; that is, we can point to and count the relata, but we cannot count the relation in that fashion. This means that, although real, the relation and the relata exist in different ways: a real relatum cannot remain “one” and be distributed over another relatum, but the relation can remain “one” and be distributed over its relata. And not only can a relation be distributed over its relata, it is precisely the kind of thing that is distributed over its relata. Indeed, this is part of what we mean we say that it is “real” (*sat*) and an instrumental object (*prameya*).

If we respond to Dharmakīrti’s argument against hypostasized relations in this fashion, we come to a question over which he and his opponents fundamentally disagree: can we use the unqualified term “real” (*sat*) to refer to things that are not real in the same way? That is, if an entity is “real,” must it be real in the same way as all other real entities? Dharmakīrti’s main opponents will inevitably answer this question by affirming the diversity of ways in which an entity might exist and still be *sat* or real. Indeed, in some cases that affirmative answer leads to a plethora of terms for different ways of being real. Dharmakīrti, however, utterly rejects any such possibility. In the next chapter, we will see that, on his view, only spatiotemporally irreducible particulars are “real,” and on the most accurate account, they alone are instrumental objects (*prameya*). Everything else can be called real only in a conventional or spurious (*saṃvṛtī*) sense.

### 1.3 Purpose as Context

Beyond the ontological assumption of simplicity, Pramāṇa Theorists from all traditions share another area of considerable agreement: the notion of prayojana or “purpose” as forming the context within which an instrumental object is known. The first Pramāṇa Theorist to establish the place of purpose as a necessary component in the process of knowing was probably Gautama. Citing purpose at the outset of his *Nyāyasūtra* (NS1.1.1) as a central topic of his work, he later defines it: “the purpose is the *artha* aiming at which one acts.” In other words, it is with some purpose in mind that one seeks to act in a manner informed by the indubitable knowledge
that an instrument of knowledge provides. In this sense, purpose is a crucial context within which such knowledge occurs. Gautama’s definition, however, is somewhat difficult to understand, for it employs the ambiguous term artha, whose many meanings include “goal,” “thing,” and “object.” This ambiguity often causes confusion, but it also allows one to make a point: when a “thing” is being taken as an “object,” one does so because that “thing” will serve some “goal.” We see this in the commentary offered by the earliest Naiyāyika commentator Vātsyāyana:

Having apprehended that an artha is something to be obtained or eliminated, one then implements the means for obtaining or eliminating it. One should know that that artha is the purpose because it causes one to act. That is, one thinks “I will obtain this artha” or “I will avoid this artha”—this kind of apprehension of the artha is what is meant by “aiming at” the artha.66

Uddyotakara, one of Dharmakīrti’s main opponents, clarifies exactly what one is apprehending:

What is one apprehending? One is apprehending the causes (sādhana) of happiness and suffering. That is, having understood, “This is a cause of happiness,” one then strives so as to obtain happiness. And having understood, “This is the cause of suffering,” one acts so as to eliminate suffering. People are motivated (prayujyate) by the attainment of happiness and the elimination of suffering. Hence, their purpose is the attainment of happiness and the elimination of suffering.67

In short, one’s purpose is to obtain happiness and eliminate suffering; to do so, one implements the causes of the former and eliminates the causes of the latter. It is within this context that one employs the instruments of knowledge, and one does so in order to gain knowledge of those instrumental objects (prameya) that will enable one to obtain happiness and avoid suffering. An important corollary of this claim is that if an instrument of knowledge is necessarily used within the context of a purpose, then an instrument of knowledge must result in a determinate cognition—i.e., one in a propositional form, such as “This is a cause of happiness.” Without such determinate content, the cognition could not motivate and guide action, as Uddyotakara would have it do.

But is purpose truly a necessary factor in this process—can one not simply employ some means of knowledge—such as a formal logic—that is not tied to any purpose? In this regard, Uddyotakara remarks:

Also, it is incorrect to claim that purpose is not a contributing factor in reasoning (nyāyāṅga). Indeed, thought divorced from
purpose is not a contributing factor in reasoning. In contrast, purpose is the primary contributing factor (pradhānāṅga) for the process of investigation (pariksāvidhi), because the process of investigation is rooted in the purpose that it serves.68

By claiming that the “process of investigation” (i.e., the application of instruments of knowledge) is rooted in the purpose toward which one strives, Uddyotakara points to the psychologism within discourse on pramāṇa. If a person has no purpose in gaining knowledge of some object, then even if that object is available to some instrument of knowledge, she will not cognize it precisely because she has no reason to do so: she lacks the purpose or motivation that is a necessary factor in the knowing process.

Although Uddyotakara and his fellow Naiyāyikas are perhaps the clearest in their analysis of purpose, the same principle appears to be shared by most of Dharmakīrti’s fellow Pramāṇa Theorists. Praśastapāda, for example, does not offer anything approaching Uddyotakara’s analysis of purpose, but at the very outset of his text he makes it clear that the knowledge of reality that one obtains through a means of knowledge does indeed serve a specific purpose: it enables one to obtain spiritual liberation.69

In Kumārila’s philosophy as well, purpose figures prominently as a requirement of knowledge. It is true, of course, that Kumārila’s main concern is with the purpose that a treatise embodies, but this is merely a reflection of the fact that, for him, the only true means of obtaining spiritually relevant knowledge are “texts”: namely, the Vedas themselves.70 This point of view, however, does not prevent him from commenting frequently on the importance of purpose, as when he remarks:

Even a fool does not act without being directed toward a purpose. If he were to act in that fashion, what would he need his intellect for?72

As with Naiyāyikas, Kumārila ties purpose with action. One acts so as to obtain a purpose, and the role of knowledge is to enable one to determine both the purpose and the means to obtaining it. We find much the same sentiment in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, but in his case, purpose takes on a distinctive role in the determination of what constitutes an instrument of knowledge. That distinctive role is indicated by his use of the term arthakriyā. Below, we will have an opportunity to examine this term and its meaning in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, but here we can note that one of its meanings is simply the “accomplishment” (kriyā) of a “goal” (artha), or what I call “telic function.” Of course, for Dharmakīrti to speak in these terms is nothing new. The comments cited above clearly suggest that Uddyotakara also saw efficacy as a crucial component of knowledge.73 In Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, however, arthakriyā is not merely an aspect of knowledge: it is, from at least one perspective, the principal criterion in the determination
of some cognition as an instance of knowledge. This may give some readers visions of a precocious pragmatism predating Peirce by more than a millennium, but this interpretation would be overstating the case. Instead, we need only note that, while most Pramāṇa Theorists recognized the importance of purposes and goals in the process of knowing, Dharmakīrti is willing to place a much stronger emphasis on goals than any of his contemporaries or principal opponents.

1.4 Points of Divergence: The Action and Agent

Up to this point, we have examined certain common assumptions and concepts shared by most Pramāṇa Theorists in relation to the instruments of knowledge and the instrumental objects known thereby. When we examine the remaining two aspects of the knowing process—i.e., pramiti (the action of knowing through an instrument of knowledge) and pramāṭṛ (the agent of that action)—we find much less agreement among these thinkers.

In regard to pramiti, the “action of knowing” or knowledge-event that results from employing an instrument of knowledge, there is considerable disagreement between Dharmakīrti and his opponents. This disagreement focuses on two key issues: first, is the action (kriyā) of knowing distinct from its other aspects, especially the instrument (karaṇa)? Second, if action and instrument are distinct, do they stand in a causal relation, such that the instrument is the cause and the action is the effect? The Brahmanical thinkers to whom Dharmakīrti appears to allude—the unknown Sāmkhya author of the Yuktidīpikā, the Vaiśeṣika Prāśastapāda, the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara, and the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila—generally claim that action and instrument are distinct, although Uddyotakara does allow for their convergence in certain cases. These philosophers also generally claim that the relation between the action and instrument is causal; they do not, however, agree on how that causal process operates. Nevertheless, since the action of knowing is in most cases considered the result of the instrument, it is known as the pramāṇaphala—the “effect of the instrument” or “instrumental effect.” Thus, for these philosophers, pramiti comes to mean the knowledge that results from the functioning of an instrument of knowledge.

In contrast to this position, Dharmakīrti follows the lead of his predecessor Dignāga and rejects any actual difference between the instrument and the effect; hence, he also denies any causal relation between them. This comes to be one of the hallmarks of Buddhist Pramāṇa Theory: that the alleged “effect” of the instrument’s function is nothing but the instrument itself.

As for pramāṭṛ, the “agent” of knowing, the Brahmanical thinkers to whom Dharmakīrti alludes identify it with a self (ātman) or, in the case of
the Śāṁkhya author of *Yuktidīpikā*, with the Person (*puruṣa*). This issue receives varying degrees of attention from Dharmakīrti’s closest interlocutors, Uddyotakara being the most extensive in his remarks. Nevertheless, although all these Brahmanical philosophers discuss the agent as ātman or *puruṣa*, they disagree considerably on their interpretations.

The diversity of opinion concerning the ātman or *puruṣa* as the agent may help explain the fact that Dharmakīrti does not assay any direct refutation of this notion. But even without a direct refutation of an ātman or *puruṣa* as the agent, it is clear that Dharmakīrti collapses the grammatical category of agent (*pramātt*) in the process of knowing into the category of the action (*pramiti*), the “resultant” knowledge. This follows from the ultimate identity that he asserts of the action/instrument (*kriyā/karaṇa*) relation in all cases: if the categories of action and instrument are unreal, the reality of the agent also becomes untenable. For Dharmakīrti, this also means that, at the highest level of analysis, the reality of even the instrumental object is ultimately reducible to the instrument itself.

1.5 Summary

Since the main purpose of this chapter is to sketch some of the more salient aspects of Dharmakīrti’s conceptual context, let us conclude by reiterating some of the notions widely shared by Pramāṇa Theorists. Refreshing our memory here will aid us in our endeavors below.

- The main concern of Pramāṇa Theory is the investigation of the proper means or instruments (*pramāṇa*) of obtaining knowledge. The act (*kriyā*) of having such knowledge may be divided into four components: *pramāṇa* (the instrument or means), *prameya* (the object), *pramātt* (the agent), and *pramiti* (the action or knowledge-event itself).

- In terms of the instruments of knowledge, nearly all Pramāṇa Theorists accept at least two kinds—perceptual awareness (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

- Pramāṇa Theorists share several notions about perceptual awareness, including: the central role of sensory contact (*indriyasannikarṣa*); the vividness of perception; and the varieties of error, especially those caused by physical defects.

- In regard to inference, these theorists share a large number of theories, including the basic structure of an inference (“S is P because E”) and the types of relations among these terms (Subject, Predicate, and Evidence) that must pertain in order for an inferential knowledge-event to occur.

- In terms of ontology, one central point of agreement is that any real (*sat*)
thing is a knowable thing (jñeya), and that every knowable thing is (or can be) an instrumental object (prameya).

- Ontologically, a “real” thing must also be simple (eka): it is a singular, partless unit. The affirmation of singularity also leads to an important issue that distinguishes Dharmakīrti’s thought, namely, his insistence that a simple entity cannot be distributed over other simple entities.
- For all Pramāṇa Theorists, purpose (prayojana) forms a central context for all acts of knowing.

Finally, to close this chapter, we should note that by seeing Dharmakīrti’s work within the context of the concepts and assumptions that he shared with Brahmanical Pramāṇa Theorists, we can more clearly understand some of his philosophical choices. Our understanding is especially enhanced if we interpret Dharmakīrti as standing in two traditions: on the one hand, he is a Buddhist philosopher, but on the other, he is engaged in intertextual, intertraditional discourse on pramāṇa. As a Buddhist, Dharmakīrti’s soteriology commits him to a form of antirealism, but as a Pramāṇa Theorist, Dharmakīrti must uphold some basic claims, including the assertion that at least perception and inference give us accurate knowledge of the world. These two commitments—the commitment to critique realism and the commitment to defend the usefulness of perception and inference as trustworthy sources of knowledge—are often in tension. We have noted, for example, that Dharmakīrti’s brand of antirealism requires a rejection of distributed entities, while the prevailing South Asian Pramāṇa Theories of his time presumed commonsense, distributed entities as the objects of perception and inference. These issues point to the topic of the following chapter, namely, the ontology that we find in Dharmakīrti’s works.

1 Readers who seek a more extensive introduction may find Jonardon Ganeri’s Philosophy in Classical India (2001) to be especially helpful. A fine introductory work focused on the relevant Buddhist philosophical traditions is Paul Williams’ Buddhist Thought (2000). For another, somewhat different overview of the notions shared among Pramāṇa Theorists, see Matilal (1986:22–26, 29 and 35–37).

2 In speaking of “Pramāṇa Theory,” I am following Matilal (1986:22). As for the term “knowledge,” its use in this context is a matter of some dispute (see especially Potter 1984: passim). However, the central issue here is pramā rather than jñāna, and as Potter (1984:311) has indicated, a nondispositional use of “knowledge” is acceptable for pramā, especially if “knowledge” is used for the determinate content that is necessarily the result of a pramāṇa when it is taken to its fullest extent—that is, when it guides action (pravṛtti) relative to a human aim (puruṣārtha). See, for example, NBh 5 and 21 ad NS1.1.1. See also the discussion in chapter 4, where I also discuss at length the use of the term “instrument.”

3 The dates of these philosophers are uncertain, but they were all active at some point between 550 and 625. Their relative chronological order is: Praśastapāda, Uddyotakara, Kumārila.

4 Matilal understands Pramāṇa Theory to be based upon what he calls the “Nyāya method.” He notes that this method “aimed at acquiring evidence for supporting a hypothesis... and thus turning a dubiety to certainty” (1986:69). He also notes, “The goal of the Nyāya method is a nītya, a philosophic decision or a conclusion which is certain.” Even a cursory glance at the literature within this style of discourse shows that its philosophers were concerned with certainty (although we will
see in chapter 4 that certainty need not entail veridicality. It is important to note that for these philosophers, the pursuit of certainty requires some initial doubt (संसय) or desire to know (ज्ञाताम) as its motivation. See NBh (35) ad NS1.1.1, नन्दुपलाबद्धे न निर्देश र्थे न्यायेन प्रवर्त्ते किं तर्थि संसयिते र्थे. Dharmakirti (for example, PVSV ad PV1.46) also maintains this view. See also Matilal (1986:53) and Butzenberger (1996:364–366).

A clear example of such divergence is the approach to scriptural citation. Buddhist thinkers such as Sthiramati cite Buddhist sūtras on many occasions, and some Buddhist thinkers such as Candrakirti employ scripture with great frequency. This appeal to what are in effect literary sources is almost entirely absent in Dharmakirti's work, and he shares this general tendency with most Pramāṇa Theorists in non-Buddhist traditions.

Of course, the questions concerning the nature and means of attaining indubitable knowledge are easily traced to much earlier works, including some early Upaniṣads as well as Buddhist texts, and attempts have been made to examine the early history of this mode of thought (see, for example, Jayatilleke). For our purposes, however, what is of primary interest are the characteristics of such philosophy that directly form the context for Dharmakirti's work. For a historical summary of Nyāya authors and works, see Potter (1977:1–18).

7 The locus classicus of the कराक system is the कराकनिक of Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, 1.4.23ff.

8 This verb’s etymology yields meanings such as “to measure” or “to determine the extent of,” but in actual use it conveys meanings such as “to ascertain,” “to know indubitably,” “to know without the possibility of error,” and so on. See, for example, Matilal (1986:36).

9 NBh:22–24 and passim.

10 The ubiquity of this practice reflects the influence of Sanskrit grammar on Pramāṇa Theory. For an account of the role of grammar in this regard, see Matilal (1985:372–389). For a more specific study in relation to Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, see Biardeau (1964:30–63).

11 Matilal (1986:105) succinctly points to the process in question as causal: “In the term pramāṇa, the notion of ‘cause’ and ‘because’ merge into one.”

12 For those already familiar with Pramāṇa Theory, one may simply ask: Why does pramāṇastra sound like a reasonable moniker for this style of discourse, whereas pramīnastra and pramārṣastra sound ridiculous?

13 On a Pramāṇa Theory account, one can only argue about the truth of a proposition (प्रत्येक) if one begins by accepting (at least provisionally) the existence of that proposition’s subject (पद्ध, धार्मिन).

14 Potter’s Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies (1963) is one early attempt at examining some unstated assumptions. Ruegg (1964 and 2001) has engaged in a similar discussion through the motif of the “religious substratum.” In terms of assumptions, I am referring to the types of issues—concepts of matter, the body, the cosmos, and so on—that would bear directly on choices made in a philosophical argument. Hence, recent work on medicine (Zysk 1991 and 1993), for example, advances our understanding in this regard.

15 See NBh (430–445) and NV (430–445) ad NS 2.1.15–16 and especially NV (16–20). Vācaspatimīśra’s comments (NVT:16–20) are useful here, although they come much later in the historical development of Nyāya. A major concern of these passages is the contextuality of the कराकas and the definition of an instrument (कारता) as the “most prominent causal factor” (सद्हकतामा).

16 The argument for the primacy of pramāṇa that I have summarized here is from the uniqueness of the instrument (i.e., NV:19.7: प्रमाणम असद्धकतामकरतथाप्रधान्म; cf. the related argument at NV:20.1: प्रमाणकरतथाप्रधान्मयेवाभियोजयेककताम). This is only one of several proposed by Uddyotakara (18ff) in his analysis of सद्हकताम. Other arguments include: 1) variations on the basic theme that the agent and object can only be considered an agent and object when the instrument is functioning (i.e., bhवहववहवयतदत्तत्त्वा अरक्तिवमयदवहवव; and 2) variations on the claim that the instrument is primary because it comes just before the actual production of the action (i.e., caramabhववत्तित्र, pratipatīतानांताय)

17 Indeed, the Naiyāyikas, at least, explicitly discuss the notion that there are certain philosophical principles that are shared by philosophers; for them, all of these principles are aspects of Pramāṇa Theory (see NS1.1.28 with NV and NBh ad cit. (263)).
The claim that correct knowledge is indispensable for the attainment of liberation is made by a number of authors, including Praśāstapāda (PDS:2), Gautama (NS1.1.1), Vātsyāyana and Uddyottakara (NBh and NV:65–68 ad cit.), Dharmakīrti (PV2.273–274), and so on.

See Franco (1987) for one of the few in-depth works on this form of South Asian philosophy.

Many philosophers accept other forms of pramāṇa, such as arthāpatī (presumptive induction), upamāṇa (analogical induction), and āgama (knowledge through scripture). For an overview of the various forms of pramāṇa, see the respective chapters in Bhatt.

For example, NBh (85 ad NS1.1.3): akṣaṃ āksyasya prativistayam vṛttih pratyakṣam; PDS (234): tatrāksaṃ āksaṃ pratyoyapadyata iti pratyakṣam; and Nyāya-pravīcāra (4): āksaṃ āksaṃ prati varata iti pratyakṣam (cf. Tillemans 1990:274, n.367).

Although Kumārila in ŚV (pratyakṣa, 169) maintains that there are only five sense organs, Jha (1942:41–42) notes that in Sāstradipikā the mind is also posited as a sense. Gautama (NS:1.1.14) also spoke of only five senses, but Uddyottakara (NV:123 ad NS:1.1.4) and subsequent Naïyāyikas accepted the mind as a sense (see Dignāga’s criticism of this inconsistency in PS:1968:194 and 195; Hattori 1968:38–39).

See, for example: YD (I:150, 161; II:222), NV (94–97 ad NS:1.1.4), and ŚV (pratyakṣa:38–39 and 252cd–253). Dharmakīrti does not offer any extensive comments on the theory of sense faculty contact (indriya-samānikarṣa), but as is evident in other contexts (i.e., PV3.194), his theory of sense perception is largely based upon Vāsudhara’s work along with the (quite significant) modifications proposed by Dignāga (see PS1). If we assume that, in the contexts where Dharmakīrti admits external sense objects, he follows Vāsudhara’s work wherever it is not superseded by Dignāga, his theory of sense organ contact would be similar to the one found in Vāsudhara’s Abhidharmakośa (AK:3.30 and AKBh ad cit.).

For Vātsyāyana and Uddyottakara, perceptual awareness is what finally puts all doubt to rest and eliminates any further “desire to know” (jijñāśā) that object (NBh and NV:92–93 ad NS:1.1.4). For Dharmakīrti, only perceptual awareness is “vivid” (spāṣṭa; see chapter 2, 90 and n.58), in contrast to inference and other conceptual cognitions. This issue becomes particularly salient for Dharmakīrti in his discussion of yogic perception (PV3.281–287).

Kumārila does not endorse any notion of vividness, perhaps in support of his rejection of yogic perception (ŚV, pratyakṣa:26–37), which would otherwise supplant the Vedas as a means of knowing dharma. He does maintain, however, that other instruments of knowledge (such as inference) are necessarily preceded by perceptual awareness (ŚV, pratyakṣa:95–97). I see this notion of precedence, which is taken for granted by all Pramāṇa Theorists (Mohanty 1992:238–241), as an epistemic parallel to more psychologistic concerns with vividness.

See, for example, PDS (235), where the specifications mahatyanekadrayavattava are in part meant to distinguish the perceptions of ordinary persons, who cannot perceive infinitesimal particles, from that of yogins, who are described as being capable of perceiving them (PDS:241). See also NBh (497) ad NS 2.1.34: “Substance in the state of an infinitesimal particle is not the object of perception (darṣaṇa) because particles are beyond the senses.” [paramāṇa-saṃvasthānam tavya darṣaṇa-viśayā na bhavaty atindriyayatvād aṭṭhānām /]. Dharmakīrti, when speaking from the External Realist standpoint, expresses the same opinion (e.g., at PV3.194ff). See below, 98.

The vast majority of pramāṇa treatises give far more attention to inference and its related topics (such as the nature of conceptual cognition) than to perceptual awareness. Note also Mohanty’s observation: “In a work devoted to the concept of reason, a theory of inference must occupy a central place” (1992:100).

Many South Asian philosophers were aware that if one could not give an adequate account of language, the attainment of spiritual freedom (mokṣa), the explicit goal of nearly all known South Asian philosophers of this period, would be impossible. To a great extent, the crucial role of language in the attainment of liberation rests on its use as a tool that allows one to supplant false beliefs (mithyāśānāna, avidyā, etc.) with indubitable knowledge.

The disagreements among Pramāṇa Theorists focus on the way in which this basic structure must be supported and elaborated. This amounts to an argument about the elements (ārgha) of an inference. Bhatt (1989:209–214) offers a clear summary of the various positions on this issue. These
differences will be summarized below (n.45).

30 Specialists will note that the minimal structure I propose here is not per se stated in a form admitted by any Pramāṇa Theorist; rather, it is the type of inference one finds in commentarial literature, as exemplified by the oft-debated statement, Śabdasyānityatvatma kttakavā. My contention is that the structure of this statement is the basic core of anumāna properly construed.

31 Note that the term pakṣa has been used twice here: once to refer to the subject of the proposition, and once to refer to the entirety of the proposition. As Dharmakīrti remarks in his Svavṛtti (PVSV:11 ad PV1.1), in its primary sense pakṣa denotes the proposition, consisting of the sādhyadharmin and sādhyadharmar; however, since the sādhyadharmar is a part (ekadeśa) of that proposition, the term pakṣa (proposition) may be used as a metaphor (upacāra) for the sādhyadharmar or “subject.”

32 The use of the English word “proposition” for pratijñā or pakṣa has met with some criticism, most notably from Mohanty (1992:109–110, a reworking of 1985). Mohanty’s point is that “at least one of the senses of ‘proposition’” does not accurately characterize “the content of a mental act as understood in the Indian logics.” Specifically, on this sense of “proposition,” it is “that entity towards which many numerically as well as qualitatively different attitudes and acts, belonging to the same or to different selves, may be directed.” In other words, it is “an abstract entity towards which one may take different attitudes, or the same attitude at different times.” On his view, this sense of “proposition” is not appropriate to the “Indian logics,” because in comparison to the content of a mental act (as described by the Nyāya, at least) a proposition in this sense “is not as finely individuated across the range of varying propositional attitudes.” In other words, the Nyāya (and other systems concerned with Pramāṇa Theory) distinguish between the various modes in which the content of a mental act is presented, but despite their modal differences, all these mental acts would be equally directed to the same “proposition,” in the sense used above. Mohanty provides further support for this when he notes that a proposition, being “an abstract entity towards which a mental act is directed,” is “independent of, and transcends, any [mental] act directed towards it.” However, on the South Asian (by which he primarily means the Nyāya) view, the content of a mental act “is that act’s structure, not its object, not a transcendent entity.”

Part of Mohanty’s aim in this argument is to point out the useful aspects of the psychologism of Pramāṇa Theory. He notes that the above notion of a proposition is an impoverished way of examining mental content, and it thus impoverishes one’s approach to inference in general.

It is possible, however, to employ “proposition” in another sense. The sense Mohanty has focused on is extensional, but “proposition” may also be used in an intentional sense, where it no longer refers to an “abstract entity” that is somehow independent of a mental act’s content, but rather consists of that content itself with a particular structure. Rather than creating misunderstanding, this way of using “proposition” can be helpful when applied to the pratijñā/pakṣa of an inference, for it suggests the structure that is specific to such cases—namely, the dharmin/dharma structure—is parallel in important ways to a proposition construed as a premise. Moreover, in the works of Dharmakīrti and his Brahmanical counterparts, it is hard to argue for any “individuation” in the “range of propositional attitudes” applied to that structure. For these reasons, the use of “proposition” does not seem quite so problematic in the context of anumāna as Mohanty would have us believe.

33 See, for instance, Hayes (1988a: passim).

34 An additional problem here is that, in a Euroamerican philosophical context, “qualities” are understood to be repeatable, but the English term “quality” is often used to translate guṇa, which refers to a nonrepeatable quality-instance.

35 Although the Sanskrit term vyāpti and other, related terms (such as vyāpaka, vyāpya, and vyāpta) occur in the works of Uddotatakara (e.g., NV:144 and 285, etc.) and Praśastapāda (e.g., PDS:128), these philosophers do not always describe the relation between predicate and evidence as vyāpti; indeed, in many cases, they make only implicit reference to the relation. In contrast, both Kumārila (e.g., ŚV, anumāna: passim) and Dharmakīrti (PV, HB, PVin, NB: passim) use the term vyāpti systematically to describe the predicate-evidence relation, and following Dignāga’s lead, they appear to be the first Pramāṇa Theorists to employ vyāpti consistently—a practice that soon became the norm.

36 The unwieldy translations “positive concomitance” and “negative concomitance” have become standard for anvaya (vyāpti) and vyatireka (vyāpti). Despite their ineligence, I have chosen to employ these translations here so as to avoid the unnecessary confusion of introducing new terms. For anvaya, Oberhammer et al. (1991:67) recommend “Gemeinsames Vorkommen [von Grund und Folge].”
but it is not at all clear how this term would be distinguished from *sahabhāva* (co-occurrence). Although *anvaya* does indeed amount to mere copresence (*sahabhāva*) in its earliest use in the context of inference (cf. Oberhammer, et al., 1991:68), this interpretation of *anvaya* is applicable to relatively few texts, for it is rejected by the Pramāṇa Theorists of Dharmakīrti’s time, or even before (see below, n.38). My own preference for *anvaya*, when understood to mean *anvayasāthāh*, would be “entailment.” This term captures both the metaphorical sense (“following along”) and the logical sense (strict or necessary implication) of the term as it was used by Pramāṇa Theorists of Dharmakīrti’s time and after. For *vyatireka* (when used in the sense of *vyatirekavāyati*), I would recommend “restriction,” since the intention here is to show that occurrences of the predicate are necessarily restricted to occurrences of the evidence. One of the problems with translations that involve the English word “negative” (as in “negative concomitance”) is that *vyatireka* is not necessarily stated as a negation. See, for example, Dharmakīrti’s formulation of *vy atireka* in PVSV ad PV1.1 (G:2.13): *vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāvah (= HB:2*.7–8).

37 See the previous note for more on Dharmakīrti’s positive formulation of the negative concomitance.

38 I have chosen the English term “necessarily” and its related forms to convey two types of Sanskrit constructions: those that employ the restrictive particle *eva*, and those that employ an adverb such as *dhruvam* (e.g., *ŚV, anumāṇa*:124b) or *avaśyam* (e.g., PVSV ad PV1.28; G:19.3). The usage of *eva* (“just,” “only”) in the formulation of the evidence-predicate relation is an important development in Pramāṇa Theory in Dharmakīrti’s time, for it enables these philosophers to understand that relation as a necessary relation, rather than a mere copresence (*sahabhāva*, etc.). In his discussion of the historical transition from theories that posit a mere copresence of evidence and predicate to those that posit a necessary relation, Potter (1977:191–194) has argued that philosophers such as Uddyotakara and Praśastapāda represent an intermediate stage between the relation as copresence and the relation as necessary. While it is true that Praśastapāda’s work (PDS:247–248, 268) exhibits only a modest attempt to move beyond mere copresence, Uddyotakara, in his critique of Dignāga (NV:163–167 ad NS1.15; cf. Hayes 1980:149ff) and elsewhere, appears to understand positive and negative concomitance as contrapositional. The implication here is that the evidence-predicate relation is necessary on his theory. Uddyotakara’s recognition of the evidence-predicate relation as necessary is also suggested by the fact that, even in cases where only the negative concomitance or restriction can be exemplified, the evidence-predicate relation still contains both (NV:144–145).

Dharmakīrti’s recognition of the evidence-predicate relation as necessary is abundantly clear, and his distinctive contribution lies in the formulation of a *subhāvapratisandha* (see Steinkellner 1971:201–204 and also below, chapter 3). Dharmakīrti employs an even more precise use of *eva* (e.g., in his initial presentation of *vyārti* in PVSV ad PV1.1; G:2.12–13). His position has some similarities with Kumārila’s, whose descriptions of the positive and negative concomitance include the following:

> If the presence of smoke were pervaded by the presence of fire, then non-fire, being excluded from smoke, would be present only in the case of non-smoke. Thus, in this way, non-fire becomes that which is pervaded by non-smoke. Likewise, inasmuch as non-fire is pervaded by non-smoke, smoke is excluded from non-fire; as such, it is necessarily *dhruvam* pervaded by fire because it has no possibility of existing in some other non-fire locus. [dhūmābhāve ’*gnihāvona vyāpte ’*nagnis tataḥ cyutaḥ || adhīma eva vidyetety evaṃ vyāpyavatm adnute tathānagād vādīm adhūmena vyāpte dhūmas tataḥ cyutaḥ || anyatratnaniakśātāvādī vyāpyate dhruvam agniinā.ŚV, anumāṇa*:122cd–124ab].

39 Whether one or more examples needs to be cited in an inference-for-others (parārtthānumāṇa) depends in part upon the type of evidence being adduced and in part upon the views of the philosopher in question. Uddyotakara (NV:144–145), Kumārila (ŚV, anumāṇa*:118), and Dharmakīrti (PV1.26) all recognize that in some inferences only the positive concomitance can be exemplified because the domain of heterogeneous cases is empty; that is, there are no instances of entities that do not possess the property to be proven. Such cases are primarily those in which existence is impossible without the predicate in question. For example, for a philosopher who maintains that all real things are necessarily impermanent, an inference in which impermanence is a predicate has no heterogeneous cases—there are no existent, permanent things. In such cases, it is not necessary to present a counterexample. For Dharmakīrti and Kumārila, the superfluity of the counterexample stems from the contrapositive nature of positive and negative concomitance (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). Uddyotakara may also share this view (NV:144–145). Although Uddyotakara’s position is not entirely clear, it seems likely that for him positive concomitance is not a matter of mere copresence, since a
theory that permits well-formed inferences when only the positive concomitance is exemplified would not be successful if that relation were not necessary.

Uddyotakara (NV:144–145) maintains that in some inferences only the negative concomitance (vyatireka) can be exemplified and the positive concomitance (anvaya) cannot be. Here, the problem is that the domain of homologous instances (sapeka) is empty. However, unlike cases where the heterogeneous domain is empty, the absence of homologous examples does not have to do with an incompatibility between the presence of the predicate in question and the existence of the subject. Instead, in these cases all possible instances are included in the subject under disputation. In short, there are no noncontroversial cases in which the positive concomitance could be demonstrated. For different reasons, both Kumārila (ŚV, anumāna:131–133) and Dharmakīrti (PVSV ad PV1.13ab, G:13.1–11) reject this type of argument.

In addition to allowing that the counterexample is not necessary in all cases, Dharmakīrti (PV1.27–28, PVSV ad cit) goes as far as to say that one can dispense with examples altogether if the pervasion (vyātti) is already familiar to the interlocutors; in such cases, the pervasion does not need to be explicitly stated. For further sources and analyses on these and other related issues, see Tillemans (1990).


41 The claim that these philosophers “are not interested” in formal reasoning may seem a bit extreme, but given the abiding concerns with practical application (pravṛtti) and purpose (pravojana) in Pramāṇa Theory, developing a system of formal reasoning would probably appear pointless, inasmuch as formal systems deliberately divorce themselves from those concerns.

42 While Kumārila (ŚV, anumāna:133) clearly links the statement of a homologous example to ontological concerns, it is Uddyotakara who insists that inference must also be grounded in perception. His comments, which often go unnoticed, are worth citing in their entirety. The argument begins as a response to a Buddhist opponent who, through the consequences of the Buddhist critique of extended entities, has been pushed by Uddyotakara into claiming that all perceptions are inferential. Uddyotakara (NV:467) responds as follows:

If one were to take the position that all cognitions are inferential, then there would be no inferences at all because the subject would not have been cognized through perception. And if the subject is not cognized through perception, an inference does not occur. Some have said that one can have an inference of supersensible objects, but there are no such inferences, since it is not possible to infer supersensible objects. Why? Because, as I have just said, the subject has not been cognized. [sarvam evānunāman ity etasmin pakṣe 'numāntābhavat pratyakṣat

43 See the previous note.

44 Dharmakīrti makes this claim most notably in HB (2*.13).

45 Concerning which elements must be explicitly stated, Uddyotakara and his fellow Naiyāyikas stand at one end of the spectrum, while Dharmakīrti and his followers take a diametrically opposed view. According to the standard Nyāya view defended by Uddyotakara, the proposition must be stated not only at the beginning, but it must also be repeated at then end as a conclusion or “summation” (niṣagama). Hence, for Naiyāyikas, a full-fledged inference-for-others has five elements or “limbs” (aṅga):

1. The mountain is a locus of fire (the proposition: pratijñā)
2. Because it is a locus of smoke (the evidence: hetu)
3. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a hearth; without fire, there is no smoke, as in a lake (pervasion and exemplification: udāharaṇa)
4. The mountain is a locus of smoke (the application: upanaya or statement of paksadharmaṭa)
5. Therefore, the mountain is a locus of fire (conclusion or summation: niṣagama).

In its fullest form, this model includes both the positive and negative concomitance in the
exemplification, but as we have seen, Uddytakara also admits inferences that involve only positive concomitance (i.e., a kevalanvayin) or only negative concomitance (i.e., a kevalayatirekin). For additional remarks and views on the Naiyāyika approach, see especially Matilal (1986:77–78), Potter (1977:180–182), and Mohanty (1992:101–106).

In contrast to Uddytakara, Dharmakīrti, on his most mature view, prefers a parsimonious approach. This parsimony stems from his contention (inherited from Dignāga) that an inference should only contain the “means” (sādhana) for generating an inferential cognition in the interlocutor. As one might expect, on this basis Dharmakīrti rejects the restatement of the proposition as a conclusion, but he even rejects the need to state the proposition at all. His point is that the proposition is not actually a “means” to the intended inferential cognition; rather, the means is constituted by the “threefold evidence” (trairūpālaya), i.e., evidence characterized by its relation to the subject and by established positive and negative concomitance. For this reason, Dharmakīrti also rejects the need to state the reason separately (as in, “because it is a locus of smoke”). Instead, the only elements necessary are the statement of the pervasion (in most cases with at least positive exemplification) along with the statement of the evidence-subject relation (pakṣadharmaṇa). See Tillemans (1984 and 1999).

Kumārilas takes an intermediate position between Uddytakara and Dharmakīrti. He maintains that an inference-for-others should always include statements of the proposition, the pakṣadharmaṇa or evidence-subject relation, and the pervasion exemplified by at least a positive example. The proposition may be stated as either an initial “thesis” (pratijñā) or a conclusion (nigamana), depending on whether it is stated before or after the pakṣadharmaṇa and exemplified pervasion. See ŚV (anumāṇa: 107ff). For an ahistorical but useful account, see Bhatt (1989:203ff).

46 Similar to the translation “instrument of knowledge” (pramāṇa), “instrumental object” (prameya) is a convenient shorthand for “object of an instrument of knowledge.” See chapter 4 (223ff) for an extensive discussion of this choice of translation.

47 Butzenberger (1996:365) has noted: “As ‘knowable’ [i.e., prameya or jñeya] is, within most theories of pramāṇa, equivalent to ‘existent,’ ascertainment and determination equally serve as criteria for existence.” In his note on this remark (1996:n.14), he comments that “on this subject, there exists a vast literature from both Indian and Western authors.... The point here is that if a pramāṇa occurs, it necessarily has a real thing as its object. Hence, anything known by a pramāṇa is necessarily real. This is indeed a ubiquitous claim among Pramāṇa Theorists; in Dharmakīrti’s case, it is reflected in the claim, “To exist is to be perceived” (sattvam upalabdhir eva; PVSV ad PV1.3). For more on Dharmakīrti’s views in this regard, see chapter 2 (84ff).

48 I refer here to the notion of illusion or the problem of erroneous consciousness (bhrānti, viparītajñāna, pratyakṣabhāṣa, etc.). N.S. Dravid (1996:37) notes that “all Indian philosophical schools..., for all their doctrinal differences, are in agreement on one point, namely epistemological realism. The object of cognition can never be an unreal entity.” To say that this is true of “all philosophical schools” is an overstatement. For example, on Candrakīrti’s view, the content of an ordinary person’s perception is always an unreal entity (Madhyamakāvatārabhadraya: 107–108 ad Madhyamakāvatāra 6.28; cf. Tillemans 1990a:45–49). Nevertheless, Dravid’s basic point certainly applies to Pramāṇa Theorists: even in cases of error, one cannot claim that consciousness occurs without an object. For a study of some problems that an intentional theory of consciousness creates for Buddhist philosophers, see Griffiths (1986).

49 See Potter (1968–69) for more on this issue.

50 Among Dharmakīrti’s opponents, Kumārilas is the only philosopher who appears willing to make some concessions against the intuition that the real is simple (see especially ŚV, sūnyavāda: 217–221). It seems likely, however, that Kumārilas’ point here is that in terms of its cognition by various persons, a single entity may have many, even mutually contradictory qualities. This generally accords with his presentation of a “quality-possessor” (dharmin) as the perceptual object (see especially ŚV, pratyakṣa: 151–153). As is often the case, Kumārilas’s construal of relations in terms of “difference-nondifference” (bheda-bheda) makes a precise assessment of his position difficult.

Note that, unlike its usage in the context of inference, “quality-possessor” is probably the best translation of dharmin in this context, since dharmin is here roughly equivalent to the avayavin of the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika.

51 The English words “unit” and “unity” are tempting translation for eka and ekaṭva/ekatā, but only if one attends to their etymologies. In a related context, Matilal (1971:73) also uses “simple” for eka.
the discussion in chapter 2 (91ff).

58 The commentators Devendrabuddhi (e.g., PVP:80a and 189a ad PV3.194) and Śākyabuddhi (e.g., PVT:202b) frequently cite Vasubandhu as the source of some of Dharmakīrti’s theories.

59 For the ”neither-one-nor-many argument” in general, see Tillemans (1982 and 1983). Kapstein (2001:181–204) discusses some of the mereological versions of this style of analysis. It is worth noting that the success of such arguments presupposes a nondeviant form of logic.

60 Dharmakīrti makes this argument at various points in text, but perhaps the most obvious is in the secondary literature on Brahmanical Pramāṇa Theory places little emphasis on this important, common theme. This is perhaps because irreducibility is so strongly associated with Buddhist philosophical method.

AK6.4: yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat / ghṛtāmbuvat satvītisat paramārthasad anyathā. The bracketed phrases “into parts” (avayaavasaḥ) and “elemental qualities” (dharmaḥ) come from Vasubandhu’s own commentary, which reads (AKBh:890):

That of which one does not have a cognition when it has been broken into parts is conventionally real. An example is a water-jug, for when a water-jug is broken into shards, one does not have a cognition of it. And that of which one does not have a cognition when other elemental qualities (dharma) have been excluded (apohya) by the intellect (buddhi) is also to be known as conventionally real. An example is water, for when one mentally excludes its form and so on, one has no cognition of water. That is, conventional designations are applied to those things such as water-jugs and water. Hence, when we say, by the force of convention, “There is a water-jug and water,” we have spoken the truth (satya) [that is, we have spoken of what is real (sat)]; we have not uttered a falsehood. Hence, it is called a “conventional truth” [or “conventional reality”].

The existence of things in a way other than that is ultimate reality. That of which one still has a cognition even when it has been broken is ultimately real. And that of which one still has a cognition even when other elemental qualities are mentally excluded is also ultimately real. An example is form (rūpa). For when that form is broken into infinitesimal particles, one still has a cognition of that real thing (vastu) [namely, form]. And when other elemental qualities such as taste are mentally excluded from it, one still has a cognition of that whose nature is form. One should see that this is also the case with sensation and so on. Something is said to be ultimately real [or true (satyam)] because it exists ultimately. The previous masters have said that the ultimate reality exists in the way that it is apprehended by transcendent (lokottara) awareness or by the mundane awareness that is obtained subsequent to that transcendent awareness. And conventional reality exists in the way that it is apprehended by other forms of awareness. [yasmīn avayaavasaḥ bhinne na tadbuddhir bhavati tat satvītisat / tadyathā ghatāḥ / tatra hi kapālasa bhinne ghatabbuddhir na bhavati / tatra cānyāḥ apohya dharman buddhāḥ tadbuddhir na bhavati, taci cāpi satvītisat veditavam / tadyathā ambu / tatra hi buddhāḥ rūpaḥ dharman apohyāmbuuddhir na bhavati / tesa eva tu satvītisatam krteti satvītivaśāh ghatāḥ cāmbu cāssitī bruvaunāḥ satyam evaḥhur na mṛtāḥ ity etat satvītisatam / ato ’nyathā paramārthasatam / bhinne ’pi tadbuddhir bhavati / anyadharmāpohe ’pi buddhiḥ tatr paramārthasatam / tadyathā rūpaṃ / tatra hi paramārthābhinne vastumī rasāḥrhaṇ api ca dharman apohya buddhāḥ rūpasya svabhāve buddhir bhavaty eva / evam vedanādayo ’pi draśtvāyad / etat paramārthena bhāvāt paramārthasatyam iti / yathā lokottareṇa jñānena ghyate tatrā prsthuladbhena vā laukikena tatha paramārthasatyam / yathā nyena tatha satvītisatym iti pūrvāṃśīcāh].
then how can that be?” (rūpaśleśo hi sambandho dvitve sa ca katham bhavet). In his commentary, Dharmakīrti notes: “If the relata were to be one, then since there would not be two relata, what relation would there be? We ask this because a relation presupposes [at least] two relata” (256a: gcig pa gyur na yang 'brel pa can gnyis med pa'i phyir 'brel pa gang zhi gyi yin te 'di ni gnyis las gnas pa'i phyir ro).

Sambhāraparīkṣa k.4: dvavyor elābhīsambandhāt' sambandho yadi tadāvayoh / kāh sambandho anavasthā ca na sambhandhamatās tathā.

One likely motivation is Dharmakīrti's need to defend the Buddhist notion of selflessness (anātman or nairātmya), which is central to his soteriological project. Especially with Nāgārjuna, Buddhist arguments against the self (ātman) focus not on the impossibility of a self per se, but rather the impossibility of a whole class of entities, the self being within that class. Although Dharmakīrti himself offers no clear critique of the self, it seems likely that he too would see the self as akin to a whole class of entities, namely, those that are distributed. For an interpretation along these lines, see Franco (2001).


4 I am referring here to the use of the terms sattā, astitva, and bhāva by various Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers. See Potter (1977:140–142) for an excellent overview of this issue. For Dharmakīrti, things must be real (sat) “in the same way” in that any real entity must meet the same criterion of “telic efficacy” (arthakriyā).

Many of his opponents, however, are willing to apply diverse criteria: some things are real in that they are directly contacted by the senses, others are real because, for example, they are the objects of linguistic or conceptual cognitions. For a detailed discussion of related issues, see Dunne (1999:62–70).

55:140–142)

83 See, for example, NV (257).

97 Indeed, as Halbfass has noted (1992:70), Uddyotakara and his fellow Naiyāyikas also used the term arthakriyā. Franco (1997:66) makes the same observation.

153, PDS (243–245), NV (18–22 ad NS1.1.1), and ŚV (sūnyavāda:147–151; pratyatka:74–76).

See, for example, NV (89).

In Dignāga's work, the ultimate identity of pramāṇa and pramāṇopahalā is discussed at in PSV ad PS1.1.8cd–10 (Hattori 1968:28–29; cf. Hattori's notes, 1.55–67, pp.97–107). Dharmakīrti discusses the same issue at several points. See chapter 4 (268ff).
See, for example, PDS (242–245), ŚV (Ātmavāda: 7) and YD (152–153).

See NV (697–753 ad NS3.1.1–27). Uddyotakara’s lengthy discussion on Ātman actually extends beyond NS1.1.27, but the portion referred to here forms the core of the discussion.

For levels of analysis, see chapter 2 (53ff). The most important sources for the reduction of the instrumental object to the instrument are PV3.213–215 and PV3.306–320. I discuss this in chapter 4 (268ff).
2 Dharmakīrti’s Method and Ontology

When we examine Dharmakīrti’s ontology, we immediately encounter a problem: Dharmakīrti appears to employ multiple and even incompatible ontologies. It is only by understanding how this multiplicity serves his rhetorical and philosophical method that we can hope to avoid a dismissive and incomplete interpretation of his thought. Hence, we will first discuss that method, and with that discussion in hand, we will then study the details of his ontology.

2.1 The Scale of Analysis: Dharmakīrti’s Method

Dharmakīrti employs a philosophical method that has caused considerable confusion among his interpreters. In short, he employs more than one systematic description of reality, and it appears that these descriptions are mutually contradictory. Nevertheless, these descriptions are not in fact contradictory because they are not applied at the same level of discourse; instead, they fall into a hierarchy of discourses—what Sara McClintock has called a “sliding scale of analysis”—where more accurate descriptions of what we perceive and think supersede less accurate ones. Why would one ever employ a less accurate description? The general Buddhist answer is that in some cases a less accurate description is didactically or soteriologically preferable. For Dharmakīrti, the purpose of composing philosophical treatises is to eliminate confusion, especially the fundamental spiritual ignorance (avidyā) that perpetuates suffering. But a treatise that exceeds the abilities of its audience would not remove their confusion; hence, a composition that is superior in its analytical accuracy may be inferior soteriologically in relation to a particular audience.

The notion of a sliding scale of philosophical views is found in numerous sources before Dharmakīrti’s time, and it was particularly important to Mahāyāna thinkers. Early Mahāyānists such as Nāgārjuna clearly wished to identify themselves as Buddhists, but they also sought to introduce new views or descriptions of reality that they considered to be more accurate than those promulgated previously. The problem is that, if a Mahāyānist
supplants earlier views with allegedly more accurate ones, other Buddhists might argue that the Mahāyānist is effectively rejecting the Buddhist tradition as a whole. The solution to this problem is to accept earlier views provisionally: although they may be inaccurate in some regards, these views or descriptions help beings to free themselves from their confusion. That is, if deeply confused beings were presented with only the most accurate descriptions of reality, they would reject them out of hand, since those descriptions are so counterintuitive as to seem preposterous to most ordinary persons. Hence, to be most effective, Buddhist teachings should be tailored to the audience at hand. In such contexts, more accessible descriptions may be taught, if they help beings to eliminate at least some of their erroneous beliefs.

Mahāyāna thinkers defend this approach by claiming that the buddhas themselves have employed it as a reflection of their “skill in means” (upāyakauśalya)—their ability to speak or behave in a fashion that will be most beneficial for particular beings at a particular time and place. In this regard, Dharmakīrtī speaks of the buddhas as being like elephants who shut one eye. This metaphor takes advantage of the fact that an elephant’s eyes are located on the sides of its head; hence, if an elephant closes one eye, she will not see anything on that side. Likewise, although the buddhas have realized the ultimate nature of things, they “close one eye” to that ultimate reality when teaching beings, because ordinary persons (prthagjana, arvāgdarśin) cannot see the world in that fashion.

Following the paradigm of skill in means, Dharmakīrtī’s philosophy emerges from a hierarchy of views in which, as Dreyfus notes, “more commonsensical views are subsumed by more critical but more counterintuitive views.” This hierarchy amounts to a successive series of approximations that draw ever closer to the most accurate possible description. In each case, the inaccuracy of a description stems from its origin in an erroneous belief (viparītajñāna), whereby something that is non x is believed to be x (atasmīṁs tadgraha). It is superseded by a description that eliminates those errors, but which may itself still contain inaccuracies. Śāntideva, probably a contemporary of Dharmakīrtī, describes such a progression in this fashion:

In this regard, it is observed that there are two kinds of persons, the spiritual adept (yogin) and the ordinary person. Among these, the ordinary person is refuted by the yogin. And yogins are refuted by successively more advanced yogins through a distinctive quality of their understanding.

Although Dharmakīrtī himself never explicitly states his hierarchy of views, it is clear that he is following a model much like Śāntideva’s, and in examining the details of the progressive stages of analysis, we may derive
the following simplified hierarchy from his texts and early commentators:9

1. *The Beliefs of Ordinary Persons:* The most inaccurate descriptions of reality stem from attempts at preserving the naïve beliefs of ordinary persons.10 The most problematic belief is the notion that things composed of spatiotemporal components somehow exist in distinction from those components. In philosophical debate, the paradigmatic case of this commonsense belief is the notion of a “whole” (*avayavin*) that exists separate from its parts. For soteriological purposes, the most important form of this belief is *satkāyadrsti*, according to which there exists an ātman or absolute self that, while fully autonomous, is somehow related to or residing within the constituents of the mind and body. All Buddhist philosophers seek to eliminate *satkāyadrsti* and any beliefs, such as the notion of a whole, that are corollaries of it. Hence, this level of description is never accepted, even provisionally, by any South Asian Buddhist philosopher. It is mentioned only so as to refute it.11

2. *The Abhidharma Typology:* One can be dissuaded from the belief that some things truly exist in distinction from their spatiotemporal constituents by learning more accurate descriptions. According to these descriptions, which we will refer to as the “Abhidharma typology,” when we speak of things such as wholes or the ātman, we are just applying names to what are actually bundles of irreducible mental and physical elements (*dharma*). At least three basic errors, however, persist in these descriptions: a) some elements, such as colors, are said to have spatial extension; b) some elements are thought to have temporal extension (*sthiti*); and c) the elements are repeatable—i.e., they require conceptual extension, such that all earth particles, for example, have some objective sameness that enables one to identify them all as earth particles. For Dharmakīrti, the Abhidharma typology is best represented by Vasubandhu’s presentation of the Sarvāstivāda typology in the *Abhidharmakośa*. Although Dharmakīrti occasionally employs the typology of the *Abhidharmakośa*, he critiques the ontology that it presupposes.12

3. “*External Realism*”—the Theory of External Things as Unique, Momentary Particles: One can be weaned of the erroneous belief in spatial, temporal, or conceptual extension by demonstrating that only particulars, which lack all such extension, truly exist. The belief in spatial extension arises from a misconstrual of the relation between the mental image that appears in a perceptual consciousness and the entities that cause that image. The belief in
temporal extension is an error that occurs due to misconstruing a quick succession of discrete moments in which the previous moment causes the next moment in a causal continuum. As for conceptual extension, the apparent sameness implicit in our ability to identify any things as the same in kind or nature is just subjectively constructed on the basis of the observed causal characteristics of discrete particulars. One erroneous belief remains in this description: that any form of extra-mental matter—even infinitesimal particles—can resist a mereological analysis. Later commentators called this level of description the “Sautrāntika” view. However, the earliest commentators, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, often speak of it simply as the view that asserts that there are entities—most notably the objects of perception—that exist external to any mind (bāhyārthavāda). Along these lines, we will refer to this position as “External Realism.” This viewpoint is the one most often adopted by Dharmakīrti, apparently because it strikes a balance between depth of analysis and ease of comprehension.13

4. Epistemic Idealism—All Entities are Mental: The erroneous belief in the existence of extra-mental matter is eliminated through the realization that the subject/object duality apparent in awareness is actually due to the influence of ignorance (avidyā). As such, that duality is erroneous, and any determinations based upon it, such as the notion that the cause of the objective appearance in sensory awareness is due to extra-mental particles, is also false. Since this description is not itself based on any erroneous beliefs, it is the most accurate. All Tibetan commentators and some later South Asian commentators refer to this viewpoint as the “Yogācāra” view, but the early South Asian commentators often refer to it as “the view that objects of awareness are internal” (shes bya nang gi yin par smra ba≈antarjñeyavāda). Dharmakīrti, who refers to it as “the view that things are merely cognitive content” (vijñaptimātratā), employs this view consistently only in one significant section of his Pramāṇavārttika. To avoid the conflation of Dharmakīrti’s presentation with other philosophies identified as “Yogācāra,” we will refer to this position as “Epistemic Idealism.”14

As I have mentioned earlier, the explicit purpose of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy is to free beings from suffering, and when we relate his soteriology with the hierarchy of views discussed above, we can see how soteriological concerns inform Dharmakīrti’s philosophical method. On Dharmakīrti’s view, suffering arises from self-clinging (ātmasneha), a disposition caused by satkāya-dṛṣṭi, the belief that one’s psychophysical
aggregates (skandha) are the locus of an ātman or absolute self that exists above and beyond those aggregates. Thus, to eliminate suffering, one must eliminate self-clinging, and to eliminate self-clinging, one must eliminate satkāyadrṣṭī.¹⁵

For Dharmakīrti, when one speaks of satkāyadrṣṭī, one is actually speaking about ignorance (avidyā) in terms of the primary role it plays in the generation of suffering.¹⁶ Thus, when one eliminates satkāyadrṣṭī, one is eliminating a form of ignorance. If we attend carefully to Dharmakīrti’s approach to ignorance, we see that on his account ignorance is an ingrained cognitive habit that imputes a unity or sameness onto things that in fact have no such unity or sameness. Although Dharmakīrti does not put it quite in these terms, ignorance thus amounts to the belief that a real entity may be distributed (anvīta) over space and/or time.¹⁷ Dharmakīrti proposes that we eliminate ignorance (and, hence, satkāyadrṣṭī) by realizing that its alleged object—an entity distributed over space and/or time—is unreal. If this interpretation is correct, then Dharmakīrti’s soteriology rests upon a progressively subtler critique of all distributed entities.

If we apply Dharmakīrti’s soteriological model to the hierarchy of views discussed just above, we see that the hierarchy reflects the soteriology. In short, Dharmakīrti aims to elevate suffering beings from [1] the completely erroneous beliefs that arise from ignorance to [4] the elimination of all error, which enables the elimination of all suffering. The progression from [1] to [4] is characterized by a refutation of ever subtler forms of distributed entities, and it corresponds to a soteriological progression from the state of an ordinary person to the state of one who has attained spiritual liberation (mokṣa). Thus, along the lines of Śāntideva’s notion of successively more refined levels of understanding, the scale of analysis is also a scale of progression toward spiritual perfection.

While the motivation for moving up the scale is soteriological, the means for moving up the scale is a particular form of reasoning (yukti) that enables one to critique ever subtler types of distributed entities. At each level, this reasoning is used to analyze some entities that were taken to be ultimately existent according to the ontology of the previous level; the result of the analysis demonstrates that some kinds of entities that were thought to be ultimately existent at the previous level of analysis are found to be not ultimately existent at the next, subtler level of analysis. Generally, the entities mistakenly thought to exist are those that seem to be given in perception, or in some cases the existence of such entities is required to explain what seems to be given in perception. For example, at the first level of analysis, a water-jug exists as a whole in distinction from its parts, for it seems that when we see something that we call a “water-jug,” what we see is a single, whole, entire thing. But when we move to the next level of analysis, we discover that, in fact, all that truly exists are the components of what we would call a “water-jug”; no “water-jug” exists in distinction from these components. Reasoning (yukti) enables one to move from the first
level to the second in that one arrives at the rejection of truly existent wholes by systematically employing a specific form of yukti, namely, the mereological analysis discussed above. What is most important here is that this same form of reasoning moves one not just from the first to the second level, but indeed all the way to the top of the scale. That is, when one moves from one level to the next, in each case the style of argument used to critique the entities that were thought to exist at the lower level is the “neither-one-nor-many” analysis that lies at the core of the critique of wholes.

To see how this style of rationality moves one up the scale, let us briefly restate that movement. In moving from the first to the second level, one refutes the real existence of “wholes” and similar entities (such as the ātman). To do so, one argues that it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of a whole that is either truly distinct from or truly identical to its parts. This very inability to specify whether a whole is identical to or distinct from its parts is thought to be sufficient grounds for rejecting the existence of the whole. In moving from the second to the third level of analysis, the paradigmatic case is the universal, which accounts for conceptual extension in that it is allegedly distributed over the individuals that instantiate it. Similar entities include a temporally persistent entity that is meant to be distributed over its temporal instances; also included are entities that are thought to be distributed over a spatial extension. Here again, the inability to specify whether a universal is identical to or distinct from its instantiates is sufficient grounds for rejecting the true existence of universals; the same analysis applies to other distributed entities, mutatis mutandis. Only unique, momentary, and partless particles and mental components remain. Finally, in moving from the third to the fourth level of analysis, the inability to specify whether the image in perception is singular or multiple is the primary argument against the existence of extra-mental objects. In this way, various “neither-one-nor-many” arguments, which are permutations of the mereological critique of wholes, carry one all the way through the levels.

The style of reasoning employed, however, is not the only continuity in the levels. We have already noted that at each level the entities whose reality is critiqued are precisely those that were taken to be ultimately real at the previous level of analysis. Thus, the levels of the scale exhibit continuity, in that an ontological commitment at a previous level is taken to the next level, with the exception that the claim is affirmed at the previous level, but denied at the next level. An additional feature of this continuity, however, is that even when critiqued at a higher level, some aspects of the ontological commitment of a previous level may still be retained, but only as contingent or conventional. For example, at the second level of analysis (the Abhidharma typology) the existence of a water-jug will still be allowed, but now only as conventionally existent, rather than ultimately existent. In other words, the expression “water-jug” may continue
to be used, as long as we understand that it is merely a convenient term for a bundle of particles. And at the third level, the ultimate existence of universals is rejected, but one may continue to speak of them as conventionally existent. This way of relating the levels—where ultimate ontological commitments at one level are carried over to the next as conventional commitments—reflects the doctrine of the two truths, a central motif of Buddhist thought that we have discussed earlier.\(^\text{19}\)

While the doctrine of the two truths helps us to understand the continuity among the levels, that continuity still involves some significant complexities. One issue is immediately problematic. Specifically, it is sometimes difficult to separate ontological claims that are being relegated to a provisional status from those that are being rejected outright. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the same belief, such as “a water-jug exists,” may be preserved with one meaning of “water-jug” and “exists” but rejected with another meaning. If we consider this belief in terms of the movement from the first level (the beliefs of ordinary persons) to the second level (the Abhidharma typology), we find that at the second level one will completely reject the existence of a water-jug when, in accord with the naïve ontology of the first level, it is conceived to exist as an entity in distinction from its parts. However, the existence of a water-jug can also be provisionally accepted at the second level, but only if one construes water-jugs as conventionally existent entities that are in fact reducible to their parts.\(^\text{20}\)

Discriminating contingently preserved ontological claims from those that are rejected may at times be difficult, but we have just hit upon two principles that in all cases should guide our interpretations. We have noted that, when we critique but still retain an ontological commitment to some entities thought to be ultimately existent at a lower level, we only commit to the conventional existence of those entities at a higher level. Our first interpretive key is that the conventionally existent entities in question must always be reducible to the ultimately existent entities that are affirmed without reservation at that higher level. Our second principle is that, to constitute the final, transitional position that moves one from one level to the next, such entities must be at the furthest point of reduction at their own level. Thus, to the extent that the existence of a water-jug is preserved in the Abhidharma typology, the conventionally existent water-jug must be reducible to its ultimately real parts. To the extent that conventionally existent universals are preserved in External Realism, they must be reducible to ultimately real particulars. And to the extent that the conventional existence of apparently external sense objects are preserved in Epistemic Idealism, they must be reducible to ultimately real mind.

To put it another way, what is common about a level is the commitment to the ultimate existence of a class of things that exhibit two features: to the extent that any other entities can be accepted as conventionally existent, they must be reducible to these ultimately existent things; and in terms of a higher level, at least some of those same ultimately real things will be the
object of critique. We thus should not expect that the entities accepted as ultimately existent at any given level will require any further analytical reduction within that level before they become the objects of a critique at a higher level.

External Realism as a Level of Analysis

The question of the levels of analysis in Dharmakīrti’s thought becomes particularly important when we consider the third level, External Realism, for it is at this level that Dharmakīrti does the vast majority of his philosophical work. His accounts of perception, inference, and philosophy of language are presented almost exclusively in terms of External Realism. Part of what this means, of course, is that Dharmakīrti does the vast majority of his philosophical work from a philosophical standpoint that he knows to be false in the details of its ontology. And we can draw a crucial hermeneutical lesson here: if Dharmakīrti knows that not all of a particular standpoint is true, then he presumably also knows that he need not defend every aspect of that standpoint.

We will return to this peculiarity of Dharmakīrti’s method shortly, but Dharmakīrti’s use of External Realism begs another question that we must first address: how do we know what constitutes External Realism for Dharmakīrti? This question may seem a bit ingenuous, but it is far more perspicacious than it may appear at first glance. In most cases, when we examine the works of a systematic thinker such as Dharmakīrti, we get the clearest sense of that thinker’s philosophy—his coherent set of theories—when the thinker is obliged to defend the most problematic of his positions; and in most cases, such defenses requires the thinker to reconcile competing theories within his thought. But while Dharmakīrti has a predilection for systematicity, he is also almost always operating with a set of theories—External Realism—that he is not obliged to defend in all cases because, in important ways, he does not hold those theories to be true. And for much the same reason, tensions between competing philosophical choices within External Realism need not always be reconciled. As interpreters, we are left with an occasional but maddening vagueness: just when we expect Dharmakīrti to resolve a problem or reconcile a tension within External Realism, he glides over the issue as seemingly unimportant.21

If we were reading Dharmakīrti on the assumption that External Realism were his final view, then we would be quite right to object vigorously to this annoying vagueness. Since, however, arguments about External Realism are only a means to a soteriological end for him, we must instead attend carefully to the implications of using a philosophical view for purposes that transcend that view in such a way that one eventually acknowledges that the view is false. Our first issue is simply the question of how Dharmakīrti settles on External Realism as a level of analysis. To address this issue, we
should recall that a single style of analysis or reasoning is meant to carry us all the way up the scale of analysis. If such is the case we should ask why we would ever stop at a particular level. That is, if an intelligent person applies the analysis properly, should that person not simply continue the analysis to its final conclusion in Dharmakīrti’s Epistemic Idealism? It is true that one must shift from one paradigmatic object of negation to the next—first wholes, then repeatable or extended entities, then extra-mental objects. Each of these neganda is, in turn, the main object of critique at the various levels. We might thus expect that a shift from one negandum to the next would form an obvious caesura—a “stopping point” that delineates a level of analysis, one of which is External Realism. But if moving up the scale is simply a matter of applying the mereological style of critique to each object that we believe to be existent, then a systematic application of that analysis should compel us to move up the scale. We should, it seems, be swept along by the force of our reasoning, if we assiduously apply the analysis. The mere need to change the foci of our critique does not seem to give us such a pause that we must develop an entire ontology, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language at a particular level, but Dharmakīrti assumes a panoply of such theories at each level; and he especially works through such theories at the level of External Realism.

Clearly, then, the fact that the analysis pauses at each level is not just a matter of facilitating the switch of focus from one object of analysis to the other. Some other factors must be in play, but our greatest problem in interpreting Dharmakīrti is that neither he, nor any other Buddhist thinker, ever tells us what exactly might make us stop our analysis to such an extent that we develop a vāda—a more-or-less unified set of theories on perception, language, and the like—at that level. Certainly, if Dharmakīrti is consistent with the discourse of compassion that we find in other Buddhist thinkers, the general reason for stopping the analysis must be that maximal helpfulness to sentient beings would be impeded by not stopping. As Dreyfus notes, the problem here is that higher levels of analysis become progressively more counterintuitive: to put it another way, one can bend beings’ minds only just so far before they snap. But while we may charitably and plausibly attribute this general reason to Dharmakīrti, our most straightforward explanation is historical: Dharmakīrti inherits the levels from his (primarily Buddhist) predecessors. Indeed, most modern interpreters agree that Dharmakīrti presents his arguments in a manner that generally aims at compatibility with the widest possible Buddhist audience, and since most arguments are presented in the context of External Realism, that theory is presumably acceptable to the broadest audience.

While Dharmakīrti employs External Realism as a broadly acceptable theory in which he can do most of his philosophical work, we should reiterate that he is not obliged to defend (or even examine) all aspects of External Realism, since he begins with the understanding that the theory,
while heuristically useful, is fundamentally flawed. And by not being obliged to defend every aspect of the theory, Dharmakīrti reinforces the broad acceptability of the theory. That is, were he obliged to defend all aspects of the theory, he would find himself mired in details that would lead him to distinguish versions of External Realism. Defending just one detailed version, he would lose those members of his audience who prefer another version. In effect, by avoiding a complete account and defense of External Realism, Dharmakīrti likewise avoids any need to address details that are a matter of contention among External Realists.

As interpreters, however, we are still left with a fundamental problem: for Dharmakīrti, what in External Realism does need to be defended, and what can he let slide? As we have just noted, part of Dharmakīrti’s genius is his calculated imprecision about the views that he works with, in that this very imprecision allows him to encompass competing views that disagree on what must be for Dharmakīrti unimportant details of an ontological position. These details are unimportant in that they are not relevant to the analysis that moves one from one level to the next; in short, they are unimportant to the soteriological enterprise that the scale of analysis serves. And since the details of various actual (i.e., historically attested) or potential disagreements within External Realism are unimportant, Dharmakīrti can offer a presentation that is compatible with a broad range of actual and potential versions of External Realism—precisely by avoiding the unimportant details that would cause disagreement.

What, however, shall we do if we encounter what appear to be competing versions of External Realism in Dharmakīrti’s work? On the interpretation I have given here, truly competing theories would be those that offer divergent versions of what is ultimately real to such an extent that different arguments would be required to make the transition from External Realism to Epistemic Idealism. Especially problematic would be a case in which one version of External Realism asserts the ultimate reality of entities that, according to another version, are just conventional. In effect, we would be dealing with a version of External Realism whose ultimately existent things must first be further analytically reduced to the ultimately existent things of another version of External Realism before the Epistemic Idealist critique is applied. If such a reduction were indeed necessary, it would obviously be a case of an important difference among External Realist theories, not an unimportant one. The theory whose ultimate entities must be further reduced would be an incomplete version of External Realism; the theory that asserts entities that require no further reduction would be in the family of theories that are properly called External Realism, in that they represent the position that is critiqued by Epistemic Idealism.

Now it may seem that we are just picking nits here—after all, Dharmakīrti himself does not give a full account of External Realism. But as interpreters, we at least need to know what does not count as an External Realist theory for Dharmakīrti, since our interpretations will be markedly
affected thereby. If, for example, a water-jug can indeed exist for External Realism as an ultimately real particular without being reduced to its parts, then when Dharmakīrti presents his nominalist philosophy of language in terms of External Realism, he faces a fairly straightforward task. But if on External Realism a water-jug is in fact nothing but the infinitesimal particles that compose it, then the account of reference in the case of the term "water-jug" becomes far more difficult. Divining the External Realist account of a waterjug’s ontological status—be it ultimately real, conventionally real, or utterly unreal—is obviously crucial to our hermeneutical enterprise. We can add here that the presence of truly competing theories at the same level of analysis would also be disastrous to Dharmakīrti’s own enterprise. By the most charitable account, his aim is to lead us to Epistemic Idealism, and his method is to prepare us to accept that position by first convincing us to accept an ontology with a narrow and specific set of flaws that he will critique from an Epistemic Idealist perspective. If, however, he wishes us to accept an obviously contradictory and incoherent ontology, he will fail. And were he to present External Realism in a manner that openly acknowledges and argues equally for incompatible positions, it is not clear how he could avoid obvious contradiction and incoherence. On the other hand, if we can gain access to the Epistemic Idealist critique without a coherent version of External Realism, then Dharmakīrti’s use of levels of analysis becomes inexplicable. We could, for example, bypass External Realism altogether and move from the Abhidharma typology directly to Epistemic Idealism. We would need to find some other compelling—and probably less charitable—reason for Dharmakīrti’s use of External Realism. Nevertheless, while we may argue that Dharmakīrti’s External Realism should evince at least an ostensible coherence, subsequent interpreters of Dharmakīrti have often failed to agree on what that coherent position might be.

**Divergent Interpretations of External Realism**

As Dreyfus has skillfully explained, the history of the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s thought has witnessed some striking divergence in what counts as External Realism, where we understand External Realism to be that philosophical stance from which Dharmakīrti presents and defends most of his theories. As we will see below in greater detail, the crux of the issue here is what counts as particulars (svalakṣaṇaḥ), the sole ultimately real entities in Dharmakīrti’s presentation of External Realism. Among later Tibetan interpreters especially, the diversity of opinion on this issue is striking. Drawing on the analysis of the Tibetan philosopher Śākya Mchog Idan, Dreyfus sketches three overall positions:

... [Śākya Mchog Idan] shows that Dharmakīrti’s analysis of external objects is articulated around three levels of analysis: (1) At a commonsense level, objects such as jugs and so on are said to
exist. (2) At a deeper level, however, these preanalytical ideas cannot stand. When examined in relation to sense spheres (āyatana, skye mched), objects of commonsense disappear and the color of fire is distinguished from the fire. This is the level of analysis corresponding to what I describe as the alternate interpretation....The ontological analysis, however, cannot stop there, for even entities such as color are not real. Therefore (3) at the deepest level, only their infinitesimal components are real. The third level corresponds to what I have described as the standard interpretation.23

Śākya Mchog ldan’s analysis is useful because it covers the gamut of positions found not only among Tibetan interpreters, but also among more recent interpreters and possibly among some South Asian commentators. Speaking of the first three levels, Dreyfus goes on to note:

The different levels (1), (2), and (3) function at different levels of analysis. When discussing epistemology, the first level is usually preferred for it is the closest to the way we conceive of things. At this level, we conceive of ourselves as perceiving objects such as jugs. Such a description is not sustainable, however, for commonsense objects are not findable under analysis. Hence we need to move to a higher level, at which our epistemic practices are redescribed as involving only phenomenologically available entities such as colors. But further analysis reveals that even these entities, which we usually think we perceive, are fictional. Hence, we need to move to a yet higher view, according to which only momentary particles are real (the standard interpretation) following a strategy of ascending scales. It is important to realize that Dharmakīrti does not believe that these levels are equally valid. Rather, for him, each level has its own limited validity within its own proper context of use. Ultimately, none of these three levels is valid, for they all assume the existence of external objects, a presupposition that Dharmakīrti ultimately rejects.24

Dreyfus’ approach to the levels of analysis closely resembles my own; indeed, my presentation owes much to his thoughtful analysis. For the sake of clarity, the chart below outlines our two analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>According to Dreyfus</th>
<th>According to Dunne</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 Commonsense*</td>
<td>Beliefs of Ordinary Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 Alternative Interpretation*</td>
<td>Abhidharma Typology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 Standard Interpretation*</td>
<td>External Realism*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4 Yogācāra</td>
<td>Epistemic Idealism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A major point of convergence in our interpretations is the notion that these levels are not all “equally valid,” as Dreyfus puts it. In other words, a lower level is superseded by a higher level. For example, Dreyfus notes that entities considered real at level 1—namely, “commonsense objects” such as smoke or water-jugs—can be reduced to the entities considered real at level 2, namely, the spatially extended objects that are the sensible elements or āyatana of color and so on. In short, commonsense objects may be reduced to their spatially extended sensible components. On these occasions, says Dreyfus, commonsense objects are unreal. But he goes on to say:

These commonsense objects are presupposed...to be real at other times. For example, while discussing the way in which causal relations are understood [i.e., at PV1.34ff], Dharmakīrti shows how we understand the relation between fire and smoke by observing how smoke follows the presence of fire. In this discussion, causal relations are described as involving commonsense objects such as smoke that are thus assumed at this level of analysis to be real.25

Dreyfus makes it clear that this is a full-fledged commitment on Dharmakīrti’s part to the reality of commonsense entities (level 1), and not simply a recognition that these entities are contingently existent as conceptual constructions. In other words, the fact that level 1 (commonsense objects) is superseded by level 2 (sensible elements) does not lessen Dharmakīrti’s alleged commitment to the reality of level 1 (commonsense objects) in those portions of Dharmakīrti’s work where it is allegedly employed. Indeed, Dreyfus discusses at length some Tibetan thinkers such as Mkhas grub Dge legs dpal bzang who do not even recognize the reduction of commonsense objects to sensible elements. These thinkers maintain that, on any view that presupposes the existence of external objects, at least some commonsense objects are ultimately real particulars. The point, then, is that according to the Tibetan thinkers that Dreyfus discusses, the term “Sautrāntika” (the “External Realism” in terms of which Dharmakīrti does most of his philosophical work) may apply to any of the positions from level 1 up through level 3. This means that on some Tibetan interpretations, Dharmakīrti is willing to make a commitment to the ultimate reality of either commonsense objects (level 1) or spatially extended elements (level 2) for the purposes of arguing from the Sautrāntika standpoint. In contrast, I maintain that only level 3 should be considered “Sautrāntika” or, in my terminology, “External Realism.”26

As a presentation of Tibetan interpretations of Dharmakīrti, Dreyfus’ study is immensely helpful and keenly drawn, but Dreyfus also contends that these interpretations are at least “partly right” as depictions of
Dharmakīrti’s view. That is, he maintains that, especially when discussing epistemology, Dharmakīrti does indeed speak as if commonsense objects were ultimately real. As I see it, Dreyfus makes such remarks in order to defend the plausibility of the Tibetan interpretations. In other words, he is urging us not to dismiss these Tibetan views out of hand and instead to consider how Tibetan interpreters may have been able to read Dharmakīrti’s texts in a manner that supported the ultimate reality of commonsense entities. Nevertheless, while we should remain open-minded about the plausibility of Tibetan interpretations, a careful reading of Dharmakīrti’s texts shows that he never explicitly states that terms such as “smoke” and “fire” refer to any spatiotemporally extended entities that are ultimately real. In the absence of any such explicit statement, it seems far preferable to follow Dharmakīrti’s explicit description of the reference of such terms. That is, Dharmakīrti notes that a term such as “water-jug” (ghaṭa) is simply a linguistic convention employed as a convenient means to indirectly express multiple infinitesimal particles that, due to their proximity, causally support each other such that they together perform functions that are of interest to us. When we are thirsty, certainly it is easier to say, “Bring a water-jug,” than to say, “Bring some mutually supporting infinitesimal particles that, through that causal support, serve the functions associated with the concept ‘water jug.’” Dharmakīrti, especially when read through the earliest South Asian commentaries, goes to great efforts to show that words for commonsense entities should be interpreted in this fashion at the level of External Realism; in doing so, he is clearly distancing himself from any ontological commitment to such entities. And this makes good sense, since when he critiques External Realism from the perspective of Epistemic Idealism, he clearly assumes that External Realism reduces all seemingly extended material entities to unextended infinitesimal particles.

In a vein similar to these points of divergence with Dreyfus’ level 1 (the reality of commonsense objects), I also find myself in disagreement with Dreyfus’ claim that Dharmakīrti also accepts level 2—the “alternative interpretation,” whereby spatially extended sensible elements are considered real. My qualms here are more complex, but they focus on one basic question: does Dharmakīrti ever clearly admit that even minimally extended colors are particulars (svalakṣaṇa)? Dreyfus claims that the notion of this kind of spatially extended particulars is “not without support in Dharmakīrti’s works.” Dreyfus’ argument rests primarily on an analysis of PV3.194–207, but I will offer a different interpretation of these verses. In short, my position is that, especially when read through the early South Asian commentaries, this passage offers no evidence for the notion that particulars are spatially extended; indeed, the passage serves to confirm the opposite notion—i.e., that particulars must not be spatially extended. And again, it is this position—whereby seemingly extended matter is reduced to infinitesimal particles—that is the starting point of his Epistemic Idealist
critique.31

Should we then conclude that Dreyfus’ interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s levels of analysis is irrelevant to our study? Not at all. It would be foolish to discount Dreyfus’ analysis because the motivations behind his approach help to clarify our interpretive context. In terms of Dreyfus’ hermeneutical motivation, he sees a significant tension between the “Standard Interpretation,” which I take to be Dreyfus’ understanding of Dharmakīrti’s final position on External Realism, and the interpretations whereby entities with spatiotemporal extension can be taken as ultimately real. Dreyfus clarifies:

Despite its strength, I believe that the standard interpretation does not account for some of Dharmakīrti’s ideas concerning ontology. I am suggesting that Dharmakīrti’s account is not unified. Conflicting elements in his view contradict the Sautrāntika account that he adopts in some parts of his work. These elements suggest an alternative view according to which spatially extended objects are to be included within the purview of the real. According to this view, material reality is not reducible to its atomic components but also includes extended objects such as shapes and tangible objects. I am not arguing that this is Dharmakīrti’s view, but, rather, that this view is present in his work. It represents a level of his analysis which is often not recognized by scholars who tend to present his view as being more unified than it is.32

The most significant insight here is that our interpretation must not construe Dharmakīrti’s philosophy as fully unified, if such unity would mean that, for example, his entire epistemology and his entire ontology must fully support each other across levels of analysis. In other words, whatever Dharmakīrti’s final position might be, he need not argue in a manner that is fully consistent with that final position, so long as his arguments—through a kind of soteriological systematicity—lead one up the scale of analysis. Nevertheless, if we heed the interpretation of the earliest commentators, we also must not ignore the coherence or systematicity within a level that we discussed above. And if we do admit such systematicity within a level, then we will be hard put to find any clear instance in which “spatially extended objects are to be included within the purview of the real.” Why then would Dreyfus hold this position? He has two basic reasons. The first concerns a tension that he sees in Dharmakīrti’s thought:

I believe that there is a tension within Dharmakīrti’s ontology between an atomistic reductionism, which is in accordance with his overall ontological parsimony, and a less reductionistic delineation of reality, which allows for the reality of extended
objects. This tension is due to the very close connection between ontology and epistemology in Dharmakīrti’s system.... [Dharmakīrti] holds that perception offers an undistorted reflection of reality. Accordingly, what is perceived by perception must exist in reality. This creates a problem for Dharmakīrti’s ontology, for we do seem to perceive extended objects. Since this perception is an undistorted reflection of reality, the extended object we perceive ought to exist.³³

The dichotomy that Dreyfus highlights is one that runs throughout Buddhist thought: it is the basic tension between an appeal to the evidence of the senses, on the one hand, and the exigencies of reductive reasoning, on the other. This tension certainly is relevant to Dharmakīrti’s work, but I would maintain that, based especially on the earliest commentaries, Dharmakīrti’s thought conforms primarily to reductive reasoning, and not to the evidence of the senses. As we will see in greater detail below, when confronted with this tension in regard to an extended entity such as a water-jug, Dharmakīrti does not choose to somehow defend the commonsense intuition that water-jugs exist. Instead, he gives a detailed explanation that can account for the causal functionality required for the successful reference of the term “water-jug” without the existence of any single entity that is the referent. Rather than supporting a single, spatiotemporally extended referent, Dharmakīrti’s explanation accounts for the reference of a term such as “water-jug” only by appealing to infinitesimal particles. Moreover, when speaking of extended entities such as a water-jug, Dharmakīrti never calls them particulars (svalakṣaṇas). If, however, we examine the problem of reference to extended entities through the lens of later commentators writing in Sanskrit or Tibetan, then we do find an ever increasing tendency to make concessions to commonsense interpretations of the evidence of the senses, to the point that even entities such as water-jugs will be admitted as particulars prior to any reduction to infinitesimal particles. Since Dreyfus is engaged primarily in a study of the Tibetan interpretations of Dharmakīrti, it obviously makes good sense for him to heed closely this realist trend toward the acceptance of extended entities. And in doing so, he provides us with a renewed appreciation for the need to contextualize historically the commentarial interpretations of Dharmakīrti.

Beyond directing our attention to Tibetan commentators’ appeals for the reality of extended entities, Dreyfus also raises an issue based squarely on Dharmakīrti’s own way of speaking. Specifically, he notes that Dharmakīrti himself appears to speak of extended entities such as water-jugs as if they were indeed truly real. When speaking in this fashion, Dharmakīrti often uses the term bhāva, which we can translate as “entity,” “existent thing,” or just “thing.” We will not undertake here a detailed examination of this term, but we can agree with Dreyfus that when Dharmakīrti uses the term,
he seems to mean that bhāvas are causally efficient. And since (as we will see) only ultimately real particulars are causally efficient, it would certainly seem that bhāvas such as water-jugs should be counted as ultimately real particulars. This would, however, contradict our ontological dictum that ultimately real entities should not be reducible to other entities. Turning again to the Tibetan thinker Śākya Mchog Idan, Dreyfus remarks:

To solve this problem, Śākya Mchog Idan offers the following solution in parts of his works..., breaking down the dyadic structure of Dharmakīrti’s system through the creation of an intermediary category. In addition to real things [particulars] ... and ineffective conceptual constructions, is a third category, conventional things (kun rdzob pa’i dngos po). This category includes sensibilia such as color, taste and tangible objects as well as commonsense objects such as jugs and trees. These objects are generally characterized phenomena [i.e., universals] but are impermanent. They perform a function but only conventionally. All phenomena that have extension in space and time belong to this intermediary category. They are not really effective, for the performance of their function boils down to the functions performed by their constituent atoms.34

In general, the interpretation that I adopt in this study resembles that of Śākya Mchog Idan, since I too understand Dharmakīrti to use the term bhāva (“thing”) as way to speak of water-jugs and other such extended things that, in terms of the way we use language, appear to be causally efficient. I also agree that an extended bhāva is not actually causally efficient, especially since Dharmakīrti goes to great lengths to explain how the seeming causal efficiency of a materially extended bhāva such as a water-jug is to be explained only through the causal efficiency of infinitesimal particles, and not through the existence of a real, single entity that we would call a “water-jug.” On this interpretation, the term “water-jug” refers in a manner that enables one to causally manipulate the extra-mental world through the functions assumed by the term “water-jug,” but this in no way means that “water-jug” must refer to a single, real, extended entity that performs those functions.

As Dreyfus points out, Śākya Mchog Idan, faces some problems with his interpretation. Specifically, by speaking of a “water-jug” as a “conventional thing,” he immediately ensconces himself in a scholastic discussion of ontological categories. We might understand Śākya Mchog Idan’s interpretation as an attempt to resist several centuries of a move toward realism in the interpretation of Dharmakīrti, whereby the category of conventional reality is associated uniquely with universals whose (formerly contingent) reality becomes ever more affirmed. Part of this historical process is a trend toward attributing qualities to universals as if they were...
indeed real things, and by the time of Śākya Mchog Idan, his Tibetan colleagues believed universals to be permanent. Thus, for Śākya Mchog Idan to speak of a bhāva as a “conventional thing,” he necessarily associates any bhāva with universals, and he thereby appears to commit himself to a position whereby a bhāva is permanent. Dreyfus explains:

The problem with this interpretation is that it makes it difficult to account for the status of extended objects. Once we grant that they are unreal, we have to admit that they are permanent and ineffective (since being a nonthing, permanent, a construct and ineffective are equivalent almost by definition). While it is relatively easy to imagine a universal such as existence as permanent, it is more difficult to grant that colors and shapes are permanent as well! Most modern interpreters seem to have been unperturbed by this prospect, even though it seems to completely contradict our practical experience. They are ready to assert that for Dharmakīrti colors, tastes and smells are not causally produced and perform no function. Rather they are conceptual overlays and as such they are changeless!

As a distillation of Tibetan objections to Śākya Mchog Idan’s position, Dreyfus’ analysis is insightful. But if we take this interpretation and place it in a different historical context—namely, that of the earliest commentators—the problems mentioned by Dreyfus no longer apply. First, the need to ontologically categorize bhāvas simply appears to have been a non-issue to these early commentators. Certainly, Dharmakīrti himself seems unconcerned with such questions. The texts suggest that he and the early commentators, when discussing extended entities, adopt the category of the conventional from the Abhidharma typology, such that extended entities such as a water-jug would continue to be just conventional. Later commentators, especially in Tibet, apparently feel that this approach does not provide a sufficiently systematic account of the conventional. Instead, based on a passage in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV3.1–3), they see all conventional entities as formally identical to linguistic universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), and based on a strictly binary notion of definition whereby the conventional must be the contradictory of the ultimate, they insist that conventional entities must be permanent. Dharmakīrti himself, however, specifically denies that universals are permanent, since neither the unreal nor the abstract (i.e., the distributed) can bear qualities.

Let us now reiterate the main points of Dharmakīrti’s philosophical method and its impact on our study. First, in using a sliding scale of analysis, Dharmakīrti aims to move his readers up that scale, and we shall assume that even though the demands of systematicity might require the exploration of some issues, Dharmakīrti’s neglect of those issues is based on their irrelevance to this soteriological project. At the same time,
Dharmakīrti does argue at length from the standpoint of External Realism, even though that standpoint is one that he will ultimately reject. His presentation of External Realism is systematic to the extent that it comes to a final position that is the transition point to Epistemic Idealism. To sustain that degree of systematicity within External Realism, Dharmakīrti makes no ontological commitment to commonsense objects or even to spatially extended colors and such. In other words, positions that hold such things to be ultimately real particulars do not count as External Realism, and Dharmakīrti never argues from such a standpoint. To the extent they are discussed, they are represented merely to be refuted by another explanation that dispenses with any notion of extension. Thus, whatever might be the diversity within Dharmakīrti’s External Realism, the admission of extended objects—be they commonsense objects or just colors and such—is not included.

Given Dharmakīrti’s reliance on External Realism, much of our study will be concerned with that position. It is worth reiterating that, while he generally speaks from this stance, it is not one that he seeks to fully defend. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this point is by considering the fact that, although External Realist ontology is based on causality, Dharmakīrti quietly admits that even causality is just a matter of convention.37 But if we heed Dharmakīrti’s rhetoric, such radical anti-realism is not germane for us now. First, we must appreciate Dharmakīrti’s External Realist ontology, and to do so, we must turn to the basic elements in his ontology, namely, the “instrumental objects” (prameya) of the instruments of knowledge (pramāṇas).

2.2 Dharmakīrti’s Ontology

The Two Prameyas — The Two Realities

We have noted that Buddhist philosophers posit two levels of reality: the ultimately real (paramārthasat) and the conventionally real (saṃvṛtisat). On Vasubandhu’s formulation, irreducibility is what distinguishes these two levels of reality. Anything that can be reduced either physically or analytically into constituent elements is conventionally real; that which cannot be so reduced is ultimately real. Thus, on this theory the ultimately real must be an irreducible, partless, unitary entity.38

Following Vasubandhu in this basic formulation, Dharmakīrti maintains that the ultimately real is necessarily partless. And elaborating on Vasubandhu’s characterization of the External Realist position, Dharmakīrti further maintains that simplicity is also temporal. In short, on Dharmakīrti’s view the ultimately real cannot be distributed either spatially or temporally.39

Dignāga, Dharmakīrti’s predecessor in Buddhist Pramāṇa Theory, applies an additional stipulation to the ultimately real: it must be inexpressible.
That is, the ultimately real cannot be the object of conceptual thought or language. Dharmakīrti accepts this formulation, and as is implicit in Dignāga’s work, he adopts this requirement to exclude from ultimate reality the type of distribution associated with language. As noted earlier, all Pramāṇa Theorists maintain that the "object of language" (śabdārtha) necessarily includes a universal, and a universal is necessarily distributed over multiple instances. Thus, when Dharmakīrti maintains that the ultimately real is not the object of language, he means that it has no "continuity" (anvaya) or distribution over other instances. The ultimately real thus lacks the type of semantic distribution presupposed by South Asian philosophers in their theories of language, and this in part means that universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), the objects of thought and language, can only be real in conventional terms (saṃvṛtisat).

When taken together, this requirement—i.e., that the ultimately real be devoid of spatial, temporal, and semantic distribution—can be summarized by stating that the ultimately real is utterly unique. That is, each ultimately real entity is, as Dharmakīrti puts it, completely excluded or distinct from every other entity (sarvato bhinna, sarvato vyārtta, ekāntavyārtta, etc.).

Expressed in this fashion, uniqueness points to one of the two basic constraints on Dharmakīrti’s ontology, namely, that the real must conform to the dictates of reductive reasoning. That is, if an entity were distributed and thus reducible, it would not be unique, since it would share a spatiotemporal locus or semantic identity with the entities over which it is distributed. At the same time, the criterion of uniqueness also means that the ultimately real has a specific (niyata) or restricted spatiotemporal locus and nature: it occurs in a specific time and place with specific causal capacities. Expressed in this fashion, uniqueness satisfies Dharmakīrti’s second basic ontological constraint: that the real exhibit a kind of regularity (implicit in the term niyata) such that our perceptions do not appear to be simply random (ākasmika).

In terms of both irreducibility and regularity, the uniqueness of the ultimately real is reflected by svalakṣaṇa, the term that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti use to refer to ultimately real entities. In its earlier usage in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharma works, a svalakṣaṇa is a way of characterizing an object in terms of a property that is peculiar to the type of entity in question. When, for example, one “attends to the svalakṣaṇa” (svalakṣaṇamanaskāra) of “matter” (rūpa), one understands it to have “the characteristic of being disturbed [by contact, etc.]” (rūpanālakṣaṇa). On this usage, a svalakṣaṇa is not unique to a single individual, but is rather the defining characteristic of a single type of entity (dharma) in the Abhidharma typology. In contrast, when “attending” to a sāmānyalakṣaṇa, one is focusing on things in terms of the sixteen aspects (ākāra) of the Nobles’ Four Truths.

A sāmānyalakṣaṇa therefore characterizes numerous types of entities: form, sensation and so on have different svalakṣaṇas, but the same
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti make use of both the terms svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, but they use them differently. We have seen that, for them, svalakṣaṇa is a term for an utterly unique, ultimately real entity. Thus, unlike Vasubandhu’s svalakṣaṇa, on their view a svalakṣaṇa cannot be repeated across individuals. They also maintain that any object of language or thought is a sāmānyalakṣaṇa, regardless of whether it characterizes one or many types of entities. To reflect this usage, I will translate svalakṣaṇa as “particular” and sāmānyalakṣaṇa as “universal.”

In addition to drawing on Vasubandhu’s notions of simplicity and Dignāga’s comments on the inexpressibility of the ultimate, Dharmakīrti also introduces a new way of characterizing particulars: a particular must have “telic function” (arthakriyā), which for the moment we will treat only as a way of speaking about causal efficacy. At the most refined level of analysis, only particulars have telic function; that is, only particulars are causally efficient, and this appeal to causality accounts to a large degree for the non-randomness of perception. Here, it is important to reiterate that Dharmakīrti speaks of spatiotemporally extended bhāvas or entities (such as water-jugs) that are not particulars as if they too had telic function, and there is thus a rhetorical slippage between talk about particulars and talk about things (bhāvas) reducible to particulars. On our interpretation, Dharmakīrti intends that things such as water-jugs may be said to have telic function in that they are reducible to particulars. Since we will return to the question of telic function below, at this point we will just note that since only particulars have telic function, only particulars produce effects. Hence, things that produce effects are particulars (or they are reducible to particulars), and since only particulars are ultimately real, anything that fails to produce an effect is not ultimately real.

2.3 More on Particulars

The Perceptible as Ultimately Real

The principle that only particulars produce effects relates closely to Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception, for he maintains that perception is causal. That is, when a perception occurs, a sensory object acts as a contributing cause for the production of a cognition in which an “image” (ākāra) of that sensory object appears. Thus, in a basic sense, “perception” (pratyakṣa) simply refers to a cognition with such an image, and since the image is a mental event that occurs prior to any judgment or interpretation, the usage of the term “image” is similar to that of “sense datum” in Euroamerican philosophy. For Dharmakīrti, a perception is a source of accurate knowledge about the sensory object because the perceptual cognition’s image of the object corresponds to the object. That is, inasmuch as the image is caused by the object, the image may be said to
have “the form of the object” (artharūpa); and as such, the image has a “similarity” (sādrśya) to that object.\textsuperscript{50} This means that perceptions accurately reflect the way their objects exist, but it also means that a perception is necessarily the effect of its object.\textsuperscript{51} In combination with the claim that only the ultimately real is causally efficient, the causal nature of perception underlies an important theorem in his system: only particulars are perceptible, and only the perceptible is ultimately real. Although Dharmakīrti is typically elliptical in this regard, he implies the following argument: first, a perception is the effect of its object. Second, only ultimately real entities produce effects. Therefore, only ultimately real entities—particulars—can be the objects of perception, for only ultimately real entities—particulars—produce effects.\textsuperscript{52}

In relation to this issue, Dharmakīrti makes some additional comments that, on Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation, amount to a striking assertion: every ultimately real entity is perceived by some perceiver somewhere. Although Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation may not be beyond doubt, another important but weaker claim is explicit in the passage—namely, that the capacity to create a perception of itself is the minimal telic function of which any ultimately real thing must be capable.\textsuperscript{53}

Now, these claims about the relationships among ultimate reality, causality and perception suggest another implicit claim: anything that is perceived is ultimately real. That is, if a perception occurs, some object has acted as a cause. Only ultimately real entities can act as a cause. Hence, if a perception occurs, it necessarily has some ultimately real entity as its object. This seems to make good sense on Dharmakīrti’s view. Nevertheless, as it stands this claim is problematic, for it comes into conflict with his scantily developed theory of illusion.

As noted above, Dharmakīrti maintains that there are both conceptual and nonconceptual forms of illusion.\textsuperscript{54} In conceptual illusion, the problem lies not with the mechanism of perception, but with the subsequent interpretation—the perceptual judgment—of the pre-interpretive image in the sensory cognition. That is, on Dharmakīrti’s view perception is always devoid of conceptuality; interpretations or judgments such as “this is water” or “this is a mirage” must occur after the perception. In the most typical form of a conceptual illusion, the image in perception arises in such a way that an unschooled person is confused by the similarity between the perceived object and some other object. He thus “superimposes” (samā-vruh) some aspect of the similar object onto the perceived object. Hence, when a person unfamiliar with mirages sees a mirage, the similarity between the mirage and water confuses the perceiver, and he superimposes the fact of being “water” onto the mirage. The resulting judgment, “this is water,” is a case of conceptual illusion. For our purposes, the key issue here is that the nonconceptual content (i.e., the image) of that perception is not itself flawed. It is the perceiver’s inability to correctly interpret the image, and not the image itself, that is causing the error. On the basis of the same
kind of perceptual content, a person with the correct mental conditioning—familiarity with mirages—would not make that error. In other words, it is possible to distinguish a mirage and water merely by sight.\textsuperscript{55}

In contrast, in a nonconceptual error the mechanism of the perception itself is flawed in such a way that it becomes impossible to interpret the image correctly through a perceptual judgment about the issue in question. One example cited by Dharmakīrti is the appearance of hairs in the visual perceptions of a person with cataracts; his basic point is that, in regard to the question of whether one is seeing hairs, a judgment based on perceptual content cannot be correct.\textsuperscript{56} A correct interpretation through perceptual judgment is impossible because, with regard to the issue in question (“Are these hairs?”), a judgment that is consistent with the image will not enable the perceiver to act upon an object that can function in a manner consistent with that judgment. That is, in relation to whether the perceiver is seeing hairs, a judgment based on the image itself will lead the perceiver to conclude that she is indeed seeing hairs. Even if the perceiver determines through other means that she is not seeing hairs, the perceptual image will still appear to be hairs; hence, a judgment based just on the image will interpret it as an image of hairs. Nevertheless, while the content of the perception always seems to be hairs, if the perceiver tries to act on the judgment that they are indeed hairs, the perceiver will not be able to act on an object that has the causal characteristics expected of hairs: any attempt to brush those “hairs” away will fail. It is in this sense that a judgment consistent with the image will not enable the perceiver to act upon an object that can function in a manner consistent with that judgment.

In citing a case such as the appearance of hairs to a person with cataracts, Dharmakīrti reinforces the intractability of nonconceptual error: the distorted image (which leads to misleading interpretations) comes from a particular flaw, and as long as the flaw remains intact, it will always produce a distorted image.\textsuperscript{57} Without removing the flaw, no other factor—increased acuity, habituation, graduate studies in optometry—will prevent the distortion. To put it another way, even if an optometrist with cataracts gives an honest report of what she sees, the optometrist will say that she sees hairs. Thus, an expert in desert travel can distinguish a mirage from water just by looking at the spot in question; but a cataractous optometrist cannot distinguish between hairs and certain effects of cataracts just by looking at the hair-like images appearing in his visual perception.

To return, then, to the notion of the perceptible and the ultimately real, Dharmakīrti’s theory of nonconceptual error suggests that, despite the plausibility of consistent arguments to the contrary, some perceptual images have not been produced by ultimately real objects. But what then is the status of objects such as the “hairs” seen by a person with cataracts? If they are not ultimately real, they are not particulars. And since for Dharmakīrti, the only other type of object is universals, we should suppose that the “hairs” are universals. But in the case under consideration, the
hair-like image in cognition is vivid, and Dharmakīrti maintains that this is true only of perception of particulars: the perception of the color blue is vivid, but the content of the conceptual thought, “blue,” is not.\textsuperscript{58} Does this then mean that we must invent some third type of object, the object of flawed perceptions?

To solve this problem Dharmakīrti employs a philosophical technique that, as with the sliding scale of analysis, is crucial to his ontology. That is, from one perspective, certain entities are not ultimately real, but from another perspective, the same entities are ultimately real. In the case of the “hair” seen with the cataractous eye, Dharmakīrti notes that it appears vividly precisely because, even though wrongly interpreted as “hair,” the image itself is still a mental event, and as such, the image (not its cause) is a mental particular. But when construed as the perception of an external object that has the causal characteristics expected of hair, the image is not a particular. What is important about this technique is that Dharmakīrti also applies it to conceptually constructed universals. Construed as entities that are instantiated in multiple particulars, they are not ultimately real. But construed as mental events, they are ultimately real.\textsuperscript{59}

Although much more could be said on the notion of the perceptible as ultimately real, let us restrict ourselves to this final observation: even if (as Śākyabuddhi maintains) the nature of the relationship between perceptibility and ultimate reality is such that all ultimately real entities are necessarily perceived, this does not allow us to conclude that objects that are not perceptible to us are necessarily nonexistent. That is, although the object itself must act as a cause, a perceiver’s perceptual acuity is also a causal factor in perception. Hence, since that acuity varies, an individual perceiver cannot definitively conclude whether an entity that is beyond his perceptual abilities does or does not exist.\textsuperscript{60}

\textit{The Ultimately Real as Inexpressible and Momentary}

We have seen that the relationship between causal efficiency and ultimate reality is important to Dharmakīrti’s notion of perception: since perception is a causal process, only a causally efficient entity can be perceived. And in order to be ultimately real, an entity must be perceptible; hence, only causally efficient entities—particulars—are ultimately real.

The relationship between causal efficiency and ultimate reality also underlies two other, interrelated claims made by Dharmakīrti: first, that particulars are not the objects of conceptual thought or language, and second that particulars cannot endure for more than one instant. Particulars, in other words, must be inexpressible and momentary. These two claims stand in a straightforward relationship: on the one hand, an entity directly expressed by thought and language cannot change; on the other hand, a causally efficient entity must change. Hence, since particulars are perceptible, they must be causally efficient; and since causally efficient
entities must change, particulars cannot be what is directly expressed by conceptual thought and language. We must add here the further specification that if a particular changes, it must change at every instant and thus be momentary. We will discuss this point shortly, but first let us consider how it is that, for Pramāṇa Theorists, change is incompatible with conceptual thought and language.

For South Asian philosophers of Dharmakīrti’s era, the referential function (pravṛtti) of the concept or word “cow,” for example, would fail if an individual (vyakti) that we call a “cow” lacked an unchanging aspect that is the same in all instances. Without that unchanging sameness, the individual or entity that we call a “cow” would be one thing now, and after a change in which no sameness continues, that “cow” would no longer be a cow. In short, there must be some continuity (anvaya) that accounts for two facts: since we can correctly call that individual a “cow” over the entire duration of its existence, something about the individual must remain the same over time such that it can always be called a “cow.” And since we can also correctly recognize other individuals as being a “cow,” there must be something the same about all those individuals, despite their many differences, that allows us to correctly call each of them a “cow.” The alleged entity that accounts in both ways for this sameness is a “universal” (sāmānāya, ākṛti, etc.), and it is the fact that each cow-individual somehow instantiates the universal “cowness” that allows us always to call such an individual a “cow.” If we consider a universal such as “cowness” to somehow exist in distinction from the individuals themselves, we can easily allow for the many differences among individual cows, and we can allow for the many changes that an individual cow undergoes over time. Despite such changes and variations, the universal “cowness” that each cow instantiates remains the same, and inasmuch as each cow-individual always instantiates the universal “cowness,” each one can always be correctly called a “cow.” As long as we can assert universals in this fashion, the changes and variations among individuals will not vitiate the sameness required by thought and language.

Suppose, however, that the universal “cowness” itself were to change in such a manner that what was once “cowness” now became something other than “cowness.” In that case, an individual which a moment ago instantiated the universal “cowness” would suddenly instantiate some universal that used to be “cowness,” but now has become a non-cowness universal, such as “horseness.” Hence, what was a moment ago called a “cow” should now be called a “horse.” Neither Dharmakīrti nor any of his opponents would maintain that what was once correctly called a “cow” could in the very next moment be suddenly and correctly called a “horse.” For these and other such reasons, a universal cannot change precisely because it is through direct reference to a universal that thought and language can indirectly refer to the individuals that instantiate it.61

Implicit here is the assumption that any change in the universal must be
a change in its identity; that is, if the universal “cowness” changes in any way at all, then it has changed into something other than the universal “cowness.” We do not have the luxury here of claiming that the universal can change in some of its accidental properties and remain unchanged in its essential properties. We cannot opt for such a solution because universals can bear no properties at all, whether we consider them in terms of the substantialist ontologies of most non-Buddhist South Asian systems or in terms of Dharmakīrti’s nominalist theory of universals.62 Hence, since it cannot manifest change through some alteration in accidental properties, if a universal changes, it essentially changes, which is to say that it becomes something else. In short, if “cowness” changes, it becomes a universal that should be instantiated in individuals that were once cows, but now are no longer cows.

Thus, in order for the referential function of language and thought to succeed, universals cannot change. On Dharmakīrti’s view, however, if universals do not change, then they cannot have any causal efficiency because in order to function causally, an entity must change. That is, if an entity cannot change, then if it is not currently producing an effect, it will never produce an effect. It could not produce an effect because an unchanging entity that is not currently in the state of producing an effect cannot change from the state of not acting as a cause into the state of acting as a cause. Alternatively, if an unchanging entity were to produce effects, it would have to produce all of its effects simultaneously in every moment, since it could never leave the causal state. Hence, if an unchanging entity were to produce a perceptual image as its effect in one’s mind, then one would necessarily perceive that entity continuously for eternity. These absurdities indicate that unchanging entities, such as universals, cannot produce any effects, including perceptual images.63

We have seen thus far that, for Dharmakīrti, universals cannot be causally efficient because causal efficiency requires change, but universals cannot change. And since universals have no causal efficiency, they cannot be perceived, since the perceptual image (or sense datum) is an effect of the entity that is considered the object of perception. But unlike universals, particulars can be perceived because they can participate in the causal process that is perception; and since they are thus causally efficient, they must change.64 In this fashion, Dharmakīrti argues that particulars must change, but he wishes to do more than that: he also argues that the change in question is a complete change that occurs instantaneously. In other words, not only do particulars change, but they change entirely at every instant: they are momentary (kṣaṇīka).

To argue that change requires momentariness, Dharmakīrti resorts to a key theory: any properties (svabhāvas) predicable of a particular (or of an entity reducible to particulars) must actually be identical to the particular(s) in question. That is, we may correctly speak of a thing as having properties; we can correctly say, “This paper is white.” As we shall
later see, this type of statement is correct in that it conforms to the causal characteristics of the entity in question. Nevertheless, the statement is misleading in that it suggests a distinction between a property ("white") and the thing that possesses the property ("this paper"). In fact, that distinction is unreal; instead, properties are actually identical to the property-possessor that they qualify. Without going into detail, we can note that Dharmakīrti’s justification for this opinion rests on his critique of relations, inasmuch as one cannot specify whether hypostasized properties are the same as or different from the property-possessor that they allegedly qualify.

In rejecting any real distinction between a thing’s properties and the thing itself, Dharmakīrti holds that the apparent distinction between a thing and its properties is actually a result of the process of conceptual abstraction that we employ in order to speak about a thing’s causal characteristics. One conceptually abstracts and constructs the property “blue,” for example, from a blue-atom in order to focus on the blue-atom’s capacity to participate in the production of a blue image in a perceptual cognition. In fact, however, there is no property “blue” that is distinct from the atom itself. In terms of change, this theory of properties makes it impossible to claim that the atom could somehow remain the same atom and yet undergo a change in one of its properties: a blue-atom cannot become white and yet retain its identity as the same atom. The implicit argument here is that if any property of the atom changes, then the atom itself must change, because the property is actually identical to the atom. Hence, if the atom changes in causal terms—either because it starts to produce an effect or it stops doing so—then the atom itself must “change” in that it ceases to be the same atom; in this sense, a “change” in the atom actually means the cessation of the atom.

Before we explore the issue of change and cessation further, we should first note that when Dharmakīrti argues against any real distinction between properties and the things that possess them, he frequently mentions a corollary: that whatever causes the thing must also be the cause of all its properties, since the properties are nothing but the thing itself. This follows simply from the notion that, once the thing has arisen, whatever comes into existence after that thing must be something other than that thing. And since it is other than the thing, on Dharmakīrti’s view it cannot correctly be counted as a property of the thing, since the properties must be identical to that thing.

With all this in mind, let us schematically restate the relevant aspects of Dharmakīrti’s theory of properties: if we can correctly predicate property $x$ of thing $B$, then $x$ must be identical to $B$. Hence, if any property $x$ were to come into existence (be newly predicable of $B$), it is $B$ itself that must be coming into existence; and if any property $x$ were to cease to exist (no longer be predicable of $B$), then $B$ itself must cease to exist.

By restating Dharmakīrti’s theory of properties in this fashion, we can
more clearly see how it applies to the issue of momentariness. Let us assume Dharmakīrti is correct when he says that properties are not actually different from property-possessors. In that case, an entity that we can correctly say “perdures” (i.e., remains the same over time) must be one that initially arose in that fashion. Since the abstracted property called “perdurance” is actually not different from the thing itself, in order for the thing to no longer be correctly called “perdurant,” the thing itself must cease. But since the thing is perdurant, how could it ever cease? That is, to no longer be called “perdurant” the thing must cease, but since the thing has arisen as something that we can correctly call “perdurant” (i.e., continuing without change), it therefore cannot cease. And since it cannot cease, it cannot change. We know, however, that some things do indeed change, since we have perceptions of them only at specific times and places (and not at all times and places). Since those things change, they must cease; and since those things cease, they must not be perdurant. Moreover, if those things are not perdurant, they must arise as not perdurant (i.e., not unceasing). And since things arise as not perdurant, they cannot exist over time, which means that they must immediately cease. Therefore, all perceptible things—which means all causally efficient things—must be momentary (kṣaṇika): they endure for only an instant (kṣaṇa).68

If we construe these arguments about momentariness with the requirement for the constancy of an expression’s object (śabdārtha), we can see that, if particulars must be constantly in flux because they are causally efficient, then particulars cannot be the objects of thought and language precisely because they do not perdure. Thus, although Dharmakīrti may be less than explicit on this point, the causal efficiency of particulars underlies the claim that they are inexpressible.

Do Particulars Have Spatial Extension?

We have just seen that, since particulars are causally efficient, they must be inexpressible and momentary. This ontological requirement embeds particulars in the regularity of causality, and it thus guarantees that perceptions are not just random. Particulars, however, must also conform to the dictates of reductive reasoning, and they thus must be irreducible. Moreover, on our reading of the commentaries to Dharmakīrti’s work, the irreducibility of particulars requires that they lack spatial extension. In our discussion of Dharmakīrti’s philosophical method, we noted that other interpreters do not accept this view; Dreyfus, for example, maintains that what he calls the “alternative view,” which attributes spatial extension to particulars, is a position to which Dharmakīrti makes an ontological commitment in at least some contexts. We will now examine this issue in greater detail.

To recap some points made earlier, we should note that for Dreyfus, the “standard interpretation” is what he calls the “Sautrāntika” position: real
external objects (bāhyārthas) exist, and those objects have no spatial extension; they are, in short, infinitesimal particles (paramāṇus). This is what we have called “External Realism.” In contrast, Dreyfus also identifies an “alternative view,” whereby external particulars may have spatial extension. Dreyfus argues that, while the standard interpretation may be primary for Dharmakīrti, the alternative interpretation nevertheless forms part of his ontology. A curious aspect of Dreyfus’ approach to the “alternative view” is the claim that he is “not arguing that this is Dharmakīrti’s view, but, rather, that this view is present in his work.” Dreyfus does not mean that Dharmakīrti simply mentions this view, for Dharmakīrti frequently cites views specifically for the purpose of rejecting them. Instead, Dreyfus means that the alternative view is accepted (at least implicitly) by Dharmakīrti in some case where External Realism (the “standard view”) is somehow inadequate, and that in such cases, Dharmakīrti employs the alternative view without clearly rejecting or embracing it.

In the section on method, we noted that Dreyfus across levels of analysis reminds us to resist any temptation to formulate a systematic unity in Dharmakīrti’s work. Dharmakīrti’s method is such that he is not only permitted, but is indeed obliged to argue from positions that he will eventually abandon, if his soteriological project is to succeed. Nevertheless, we also argued that Dharmakīrti’s thought cannot be so disjointed that, when arguing from an ontological stance that he will abandon, that same ontological stance itself exhibits such a degree of incoherence that it is no longer clear what one should critique when making the transition to a higher level of analysis. In other words, even though Dharmakīrti’s External Realism does not provide a fully unified and systematic ontology, he nevertheless is quite clear on the issues that count when we move from External Realism to Epistemic Idealism.

And what issues do count? A full reckoning would require a close examination of what Dharmakīrti and his commentators mean by Epistemic Idealism, and we will not attempt that prodigious task here. Nevertheless, we can first note that, when Dharmakīrti applies an Epistemic Idealist critique to External Realism in his Pramāṇavārttika, he does so when presenting the External Realist response to a problem in the theory of perception. In brief, the problem is that the objects of perception seem to exhibit at least some spatial extension, but mereologically reductive reasoning suggests that only infinitesimal particles, which lack spatial extension, can be truly real. We will shortly see that in this context, Dharmakīrti as External Realist has every opportunity to resort to the alternative interpretation to solve that problem. Nevertheless, he chooses to avoid the alternative interpretation. What is most important here is that the very concerns that lead him to avoid the easy solution posed by the alternative interpretation are precisely the concerns that lead him to abandon External Realism altogether. In other words, we see a strong
degree of consistency in the move from External Realism to Epistemic Idealism: not a consistency of ontological commitment, but rather a consistency in style of reasoning.

Dreyfus agrees that the alternative view becomes relevant in the context of perception. That is, on the one hand, External Realism (Dreyfus’ “standard view”) operates on a principle of ontological parsimony that reduces all ultimately real physical entities to infinitesimal particles (paramāṇus), which have no spatial extension. But on the other hand, Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception maintains that individual infinitesimal particles are not perceptible to ordinary persons; instead, only “aggregated” (saṃcita) infinitesimal particles are perceived, and the content or appearance in perception is therefore extended. According to Dreyfus, Dharmakīrti deals with the problem by implicitly introducing the “alternative view,” whereby Dharmakīrti concludes that spatially extended, real physical entities do exist. Dreyfus notes that this issue becomes most acute in an argument that appears at PV3.194–224, although we will see that the Svavṛtī on PV1.137-142 is also particularly relevant. For Dreyfus, it is in the former passage that Dharmakīrti makes an alleged concession to extended entities. Ironically, we will argue that it is precisely this same passage that demonstrates Dharmakīrti’s rejection of the alternative view. Let us turn now to this passage.

In considering PV3.194–224, we should first note that the basis of Dharmakīrti’s difficulty is, as Dreyfus notes, an apparent lack of congruence between the phenomenal content (i.e., the image) in perception and Dharmakīrti’s account of what causes that content. This seeming incongruence—a lack of isomorphic correspondence—threatens to contradict the claim that the perceptual images generated by material objects reliably correspond to the way those material objects exist. The crux of the issue is numerical correspondence: in the case of perceiving material entities, the perceptual image is singular, but for an ordinary person, that singular image must be produced by multiple infinitesimal particles, since individual infinitesimal particles are not perceptible to ordinary persons. If we do not allow the reality of any extended entity made of infinitesimal particles, then those multiple infinitesimal particles must themselves be the objects of that perception because those particles cannot combine to form a single, real, spatially extended object that causes the perception. Hence, we may point to a seeming lack of correspondence between the image and the objects that caused the perception: the image is singular, but the objects are multiple. How then could perception provide us with information about reality by way of the perceptual image’s “similarity” (sādrṣya) to its object?

As Dreyfus notes, PV3.194–224 is the most important passage for this issue in the Pramāṇavārttika. The argument there concerns two closely related questions: can perception be conceptual, and given the incongruence that pertains between the singularity of a perceptual image
and the multiplicity of the infinitesimal particles causing the image, must we admit that wholes (avayavins) or conglomerates (samudayas) exist as the objects of perception in order to preserve the correspondence between image and object? According to most of Dharmakīrti’s interlocutors—most notably those who follow the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara and the Vaiśeṣika Praśastapāda—a perception can be determinate; in other words, it can have a determinate content such as “this is blue.” These philosophers also maintain that a material object of perception is in most cases a whole (avayavin) that is a distinct, singular, real entity created by (but not equivalent to) its parts. If, for example, one sees a blueberry on the table before one, the berry as a whole can be taken as the object of one’s perception. Following Dignāga’s lead, Dharmakīrti rejects both of these positions: that is, he maintains that perception is always nonconceptual, and wholes do not truly exist. The rejection of these positions is consistent with Dharmakīrti’s antirealist critique of distributed entities, for both of these claims involve the presupposition of such entities. This is obviously true of any assertion that a whole (avayavin) is real, since such an entity would be distributed over its parts (avayavas). In the case of claims for determinate perception, the distributed entity in question is a universal, since Pramāṇa Theorists maintain that the content of a determination such as “this is blue” is either wholly or partly one or more universal. Such entities cannot be admitted as objects of perception by Dharmakīrti, for he contends that the objects of perception are ultimately real; thus, if wholes or universals were admitted as objects of perception, Dharmakīrti would be obliged to admit the ultimate reality of at least some distributed entities.

In the first verse of the passage mentioned by Dreyfus (i.e., PV3.194), Dharmakīrti begins the argument with the voice of an objector who is attempting to point out inconsistencies in the Buddhist arguments against both the nonconceptuality of perception and the claim that wholes do not exist. The verse reads:

Someone objects, “That which is aggregated (saṃcitā) is a conglomerate (samudāya), and in that sense it is a universal (sāmānya). [According to Buddhists such as Vasubandhu], one has perception of such things. Furthermore, any cognition of a universal is necessarily associated with conceptuality.”

As we have noted, Dharmakīrti and his predecessors maintain that infinitesimal particles are not on their own perceptible (for ordinary persons); instead, they must be “aggregated” (saṃcitā) in order to be perceived. And since the term sāmānya (“universal”) can be applied to aggregated particles, the objector points out that Dharmakīrti has de facto admitted that perception can be conceptual, for Dharmakīrti himself maintains that universals are necessarily associated with concepts.

Dharmakīrti responds that “aggregation” here does not mean that the
particles are forming a single whole; rather, “aggregation” refers to a particular state of those particles, namely, that their proximity enables them to causally support each other such that they can cause an image in the perceiver’s mind. He remarks:

Due to a relation with other things [i.e., other particles], infinitesimal particles that are different [then their own previous moments] arise [from their own previous moments such that they can produce an awareness]. In that sense, they are said to be “aggregated,” and as such, they are said to be a condition for the production of awareness. Moreover, the distinctive quality that particles obtain does not occur without the other particles with which they are in proximity. Hence, since awareness does not have any necessary relation to a single particle, awareness is said to have a universal [in the sense of a group of aggregated particles] as its object.76

As Devendrabuddhi makes clear, Dharmakīrti’s point is that when the term “aggregated” is applied to infinitesimal particles, it does not refer to their formation of some single entity; instead, it is a way of expressing a distinctive property that each infinitesimal particle has obtained by virtue of its production being conditioned by the proximate presence of the other, surrounding infinitesimal particles. That distinctive property is the ability, when causally assisted by other infinitesimal particles, to participate in the causal complex (hetūsāmagrī) that produces a perceptual cognition. And since other infinitesimal particles are required for a particle to arise with such a property, a single perception is actually being caused by multiple infinitesimal particles that are simultaneously apprehended. Hence, a single perception is not related to a single infinitesimal particle, but rather to many infinitesimal particles.77

This response dispels the objection that Dharmakīrti is in effect admitting the existence of a distributed entity (such as a “universal” or a “whole”), for he has shown that the term “aggregate” does not mean that a single, physical entity exists; instead, it expresses something distinctive about each infinitesimal particle. And since no distributed entity is involved in perception, Dharmakīrti is not obliged to admit that perception is conceptual.

Although Dharmakīrti may be able to deny that the Buddhist External Realist theory involves the supposition of any distributed entity as the object of perception, that denial does not deal with the further claim that the assumption of such a distributed entity—specifically, the assumption of a whole in the case of a material, perceptual object—is required for the coherence of his theory of perception. Amplifying upon the comments of his predecessor Vātsyāyana,78 the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara makes this very point when he says:
One asks a person about the object of a perceptual cognition of singularity, as follows: Does a cognition in the form, “This substance is singular,” have a multiple object or an undifferentiated object? If it has a multiple object, then since it is not observed that one has a correct determination of singularity with regard to multiple entities, that cognition would not be correct. That is, with regard to multiple entities, a cognition in the form, “This is singular” is incorrect. On the other hand, if that cognition has an undifferentiated entity as its object, then the object of a cognition of singularity is a whole (avayavin).\(^{79}\)

Uddyotakara here raises the problem of numerical correspondence. That is, if the objects of perception are actually multiple infinitesimal particles while the image created by those infinitesimal particles is singular, then how can one claim that perceptual images correspond to their objects? If the perception is not to be erroneous, is it not necessary to suppose that those multiple particles are subsumed by a single entity—a whole—that is the object of perception?

In PV3.197–207, Dharmakīrti responds to this problem primarily by critiquing the alternative, namely, that an object can be singular and yet contain or encompass multiplicity. Choosing an especially striking example, Dharmakīrti focuses upon the perception of a butterfly’s multiple colors. For many of Dharmakīrti’s interlocutors, including Uddyotakara, this type of perception is especially problematic, for they must maintain that the content of such a perception is singular, even though it contains multiple colors. This leads to the assertion of a bizarre entity: the color called “multicolor” or “variegation” (citra), which is meant to be itself a single color, even though it contains multiple colors. Using “variegation” to stand for all forms of multiplicity, Dharmakīrti argues that it makes no sense to claim that an object can at once be singular and variegated.\(^{80}\)

To avoid unnecessary prolixity, we will assume that Dharmakīrti’s arguments against variegated singularity are convincing.\(^{81}\) The more pressing issue is that, even if Dharmakīrti correctly rejects the notion of a real, variegated singularity, he has not thereby solved the problem of numerical correspondence mentioned above. It is one thing to say that the others’ notion of a singular yet variegated entity is incoherent; it is quite another to explain how his own claim that a perception of singularity with regard to multiple infinitesimal particles is not erroneous.

One of the confusing aspects of the passage mentioned by Dreyfus (PV3.194–224) is that it does not explicitly unpack Dharmakīrti’s response to the problem of numerical correspondence. The early commentators Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi do, however, explain the solution, and they do so by apparently referring to another passage: Dharmakīrti’s Svavṛtti on PV1.137–142.\(^{82}\) In that passage, Dharmakīrti explains how an expression that appears to refer to a single entity is in fact a convenient
way to indirectly express multiple particulars on the basis of some commonality in their causal characteristics. An expression such as “water-jug,” for example, is used to express the fact that multiple infinitesimal particles are individually in a state that can be collectively referred to as a “conglomeration” (samūha); as such, they can work together to perform common effects by virtue of causally supporting each other. Hence, talk about a single “water-jug” is actually talk about the fact that those multiple particulars work together to produce common effects; there is thus no need to assume that there is a real, single entity called a “water-jug” or even a “conglomeration.” A single expression may also be used to express the fact that particulars that are actually multiple may, due to being in the same state (avasthā), produce common effects. Dharmakīrti remarks:

Likewise, those [particulars] which are effective (upayujyate) for some single function either separately or in combination are expressed by expressions that indicate a specific state; they are expressed in that way so that one might make them known all at once. Examples of such expressions are “visible” or “obstructive.” Those [particulars] can be expressed in that way due to the sameness of their difference (bhedaśāmānya) from others that are not occurring in that kind of state.

The analysis given by Śākyabuddhi makes it particularly clear that, on his interpretation at least, Dharmakīrti is referring to the issue of infinitesimal particles acting together to produce a single perception:

Concerning the use of a single expression for a state, Dharmakīrti says, Likewise, those…. Those means infinitesimal particles (paramāṇu) such as blue particles. Separately means particles such as blue and yellow ones that are not mutually depending on each other (paraparānapēkṣa). In combination means those that are together, one with the other. For some single function—that is, for the production of perceptual awareness, or for the prevention of another particle occurring in each individual particle’s locus. So that one might make them known all at once means: for the sake of definitively determining many particulars from a single expression. In this regard, those that are effective (upayujyante) for the production of ocular awareness are called “visible”; they are thus what is expressed by an expression for that particular state. And those that prevent the arisal of another particle in their locus are called “obstructive.”

“But particles of blue, yellow and so on are completely distinct (atyanto bhinnāḥ), so how can they be expressed with a single expression such as ‘visible’?”

It is due to the sameness of their difference (bhedaśāmānya) from
others. Their sameness [or universal] (sāmānya) is their difference from what is other than them—i.e., others that are not visible or obstructive. That is their sameness because they are all excluded from those others. It is for that reason that they may all be called “visible,” etc.\textsuperscript{85}

From Śākyabuddhi’s comment comes the solution that he and Devendrabuddhi attribute to Dharmakīrti in response to the problem of numerical correspondence. To be specific, the singularity of the perceptual image is not congruent to (i.e., has no isomorphic correspondence with) the singularity of its physical causes. Instead, the singularity of the image correlates with a singularity of causal function: multiple external causes are producing a single effect, the image. In other words, the singularity of the image corresponds to the fact that multiple infinitesimal particles are working together to produce a single effect. Thus, the fact of some atoms being “in aggregation” does not signify any actual, physical unity; instead, it signifies only the singularity of their effect. And indeed, this is not a singularity of all their effects, since each individual atom still produces individual effects, such as its own subsequent moment. Thus, as is strongly implied by Dharmakīrti and specifically stated by Śākyabuddhi,\textsuperscript{86} the actual objects of a single perception are multiple infinitesimal particles. Hence, if it is a physical object, the particular (svalakṣaṇa) must be an infinitesimal particle (paramāṇu), and an aggregate cannot be a svalakṣaṇa.\textsuperscript{87}

In her excellent dissertation on the particular, Keyt remarks upon Dharmakīrti’s strategy of looking to the nature of the correspondence between image and object in order to account for numerical correspondence.\textsuperscript{88} But although Keyt appears to have a fairly clear notion of Dharmakīrti’s solution, she nevertheless insists that the sensory object—and hence, the particular—is a real, single entity, namely, the aggregate.\textsuperscript{89} An argument, however, that appeals to singularity of effect as the basis for the image’s singularity in no way requires any such claim. In fact, on Keyt’s interpretation, Dharmakīrti’s roundabout means of accounting for numerical correspondence would be pointless because numerical correspondence would no longer be problematic: a single particular (namely, the aggregate) would isomorphically correspond through precise congruence to a single image, and the divergence between the multiplicity of the aggregate’s infinitesimal particles and the singularity of the image would be moot. While such a tack would indeed enable Dharmakīrti to avoid any problem of numerical correspondence, Dharmakīrti apparently believes that, since it involves the assertion of a distributed entity (i.e., a particular that is a spatially extended, single aggregate), such an approach would destroy his scrupulous critique of distributed entities. In other words, it seems that, for Dharmakīrti, once even one extended entity has been admitted, one cannot successfully deny the ultimate existence of some extended entities (such as universals and wholes) while affirming the
ultimate existence of others (such as particulars that are aggregates). It is probably this overriding concern with a critique of any form of distribution that underlies his rigorous denial of variegated singularity.

It should already be clear that Keyt’s proposal—i.e., that the aggregate is a particular—is inadequate, but we can confirm its inadequacy by considering the point in Dharmakīrti’s argument against variegated singularity (PV3.200ff) where he moves from an External Realist to an Epistemic Idealist perspective. We have already seen that this argument focuses on refuting the claim that the object of perception is a real, physical entity which, although ultimately singular, somehow encompasses physical components that are ultimately multiple. While it may make good sense to claim that such a notion is incoherent, the problem for Dharmakīrti’s External Realist argument is that, when leveled against the External Realist’s notion of a cognitive image, the critique of variegated singularity points to the same problem in his own system. In short, while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of perception rests upon the supposition of a variegated singularity that is material, the External Realist theory rests upon the notion of a variegated singularity that is mental.

Dharmakīrti makes this point at PV3.208, where, speaking in the voice of an objector, he says:

“If singularity is not possible in the case of objects such as a butterfly’s wing that have variegated appearances, then how can there be a single cognition whose cognitive appearance is variegation?”

Śākyabuddhi, referring in part to the comments of his predecessor Devendrabuddhi, amplifies on the latter part of Dharmakīrti’s verse:

“... then how can there be a single cognition whose cognitive appearance is variegated?” The objector thinks the following: “You who espouse this theory about perception also assert that cognitions occur with cognitive images. Hence, a variegated image is essentially the cognition itself (blo’i bda’g nyid du gyur pa); that being the case, you accept that cognition has a variegated cognitive appearance.” [And when Devendrabuddhi comments], “Therefore, it is inconclusive,” he means that the objector thinks the following: “The reason stated in the form, ‘that which is variegated does not have a single nature’ is inconclusive because even though cognition is of a singular nature, it can have a variegated cognitive appearance.”

As we have seen, Dharmakīrti’s External Realist critique of a physical variegated singularity requires him to account for the incompatibility between the multiplicity of infinitesimal particles and the singularity of
perceptual appearance. Speaking from an External Realist perspective, he deals with this problem by admitting real multiplicity at the physical level while deferring real singularity to the mental level. At the same time, he can still argue for correspondence by maintaining that the singularity of appearance at the mental level corresponds to singularity of effect at the physical level. On this External Realist position, one is thus free to deny the ultimate existence of any physical entity that is at once variegated and singular without harming one’s theory of perception.

When, however, this same analysis is applied to the mental level itself, the External Realist cannot employ the same motif: an image may have multiple colors, and it is presented with some degree of apparent spatial extension (sthūlatā), which is to say that it has regions, such as right, left, upper and lower. Thus, both in terms of phenomenal coloration and extension, a cognitive image is “variegated” (citra). But a cognitive image is also meant to be nothing but the mind itself, which is singular. Hence, the External Realist is obliged to admit that a cognitive image is both variegated and singular. And if a variegated singularity can be admitted at a mental level, why not admit it at the physical level? The central problem here for the External Realist position is that variegated singularity of a cognitive image cannot be explained away by admitting the actual multiplicity of the image and deferring the singularity to some other level, for there is no other level to which External Realism might turn. It is true that the External Realist might defer singularity to conceptuality, but since all cognitive images appear to have spatial extension (sthūlatā), this would be in effect an admission that all perceptions are conceptual; such an admission would render Dharmakīrti’s system unworkable.

In response to the intractable problem of the cognitive image’s variegated singularity, Dharmakīrti abandons External Realism in favor of Epistemic Idealism, and the turning point from External Realism to Epistemic Idealism comes at the verse cited above (PV3.208). There is, of course, much more that could be said here, but for our present purposes, the important issue is that, at least on the interpretation found in Śākyabuddhi’s commentary, this verse specifically shows us that the External Realist argument against variegated singularity rests upon a rejection of any such entity at the physical level, for it is precisely this rejection that makes the argument contradictory (and, hence, inferior to the Epistemic Idealist theory) at the level of the cognitive image. And since the External Realist critiques the notion of a variegated singularity at the physical level, he cannot defend the Buddhist view of perception by positing some single entity that is an aggregation of infinitesimal particles. Keyt is thus incorrect to claim that Dharmakīrti’s argument against variegated singularity requires him to accept an aggregate as a single particular.

As we conclude our discussion on particulars, we should now confidently be able to answer the question that gives the section its title, “Do
particulars have spatial extension?” If we restrict ourselves to Dharmakīrti’s own texts and those of his earliest commentators, our answer must clearly be “no.” And since only particulars are causally efficient, we can also conclude that any entity that arises from causes and produces effects must not be spatially extended. This point, however, raises a question that we touched upon earlier: how do we interpret those passages in which Dharmakīrti appears to speak as if extended entities such as smoke are produced by causes and have effects? A complete answer to this question would require more space than we have here, but in brief, we can return to the passage from the Svavṛtti mentioned earlier (PVSV ad PV1.137–142). That is, we should simply understand these as cases in which, for convenience, Dharmakīrti speaks of, for example, “the causes and effects of smoke” rather than “the common causal origin and potential for effects relevant to multiple infinitesimal particles that, when considered in terms of those common causal characteristics, may be called smoke.” Indeed, as we have noted Dharmakīrti occasionally uses the term bhāva (“thing”) as an expression for material things such as smoke that, although extended, are actually reducible to unextended particulars.95

2.4 Universals

We have observed that in addition to perception, which takes particulars as its objects, Dharmakīrti also admits inference as an instrument of knowledge. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, inferences rely upon a relation of “pervasion” (vyāpti) that pertains between the evidence (liṅga, hetu) and the predicate to be proven (sādhyadharma). Smoke, for example, is pervaded by fire such that in all cases where smoke is found, fire is present. This relation is a general one: it pertains in all cases where smoke is present. In part as a result of the generality of this relation, the predicate cannot itself be a particular, for a particular cannot be distributed over other instances. Instead, the predicate must be an idea or concept (such as “fire”). This idea or concept is what Dharmakīrti means by a universal, and he thus understands inferences to take universals as their objects.96

While Dharmakīrti maintains that universals are the objects of inference, we have seen that on his view, universals are not ultimately real because, unlike particulars, they lack telic function. We can understand this distinction between universals and particulars in a commonsense fashion—an assortment of particulars that we label “fire” actually produce heat, but that label or concept “fire” cannot boil our tea. On this basis, Dharmakīrti denies the ultimate reality of universals, and that denial is consistent with his antirealist project. We should thus note that Dharmakīrti’s notion of a universal differs significantly from the realist theories of philosophers such as the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara. Specifically, for realists such as Uddyotakara a universal exists in distinction from the conceptual cognition that apprehends it, but for Dharmakīrti a universal does not exist independent
of a conceptual cognition.  

In rejecting the ultimate reality of universals, Dharmakīrti is denying that an expression or concept refers “in an affirmative manner” (vidhirūpa) to its referent by virtue of the presence of the universal(s) to which that expression or concept is related. Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti does not thereby free himself from the obligation to account for how conceptual cognitions can still guide action in the world. This obligation stems in part from Dharmakīrti’s understanding of why we use concepts, whether they be within inference or simply within a linguistic context. To be specific, he maintains that we use concepts not simply out of some pernicious habit, but rather with a specific purpose or goal in mind. We might, for example, seek to heat ourselves in front of a fire, and we might then use the conceptual knowledge of fire acquired through an inference in order to obtain a real, particular fire that has the capacity to fulfill the telos (artha) that we seek. On this understanding of why we use linguistic and conceptual cognitions, Dharmakīrti is obliged to show how universals, even though unreal, can nevertheless yield information about particulars. That is, he must show how our words and concepts make sense, even without the presence or “affirmation” (vidhi) of any ultimately real universal.

To gain at least some sense of how Dharmakīrti deals with the problem of meaning in the absence of real universals, let us briefly examine his apoha-theory, which for him explains how we arrive at meaning through the construction of universals that are real only conventionally (not ultimately). We will begin with a summary, and then we will also inquire into two aspects of his theory: the notion of particulars having the same effect, and the question of whether conventionally real universals are permanent. Finally, we will raise some problems that the apoha-theory must address, and we will answer them by referring to three senses of the term apoha. Overall, our aim here is to raise the central issues and problems in the apoha-theory, and to avoid surpassing the scope of that goal, we must forego any detailed examination of the other analyses by modern interpreters, despite their importance to my understanding of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy of language.

**Summary of Dharmakīrti’s Apoha-Theory**

Dharmakīrti maintains that there are three different types of universals: those based upon the real (i.e., particulars), those based upon the unreal, and those based upon both. To simplify our task, let us consider only the type of universals that are based upon real things—i.e., universals constructed on the basis of perceptual content caused by particulars. A straightforward case is the universal that is the object of the concept “red” that occurs when, seeing first one and then another object, we recognize (pratyabhī-jñā) two objects as “red.” As we have noted, perception is causal, and for Dharmakīrti this means that in the case of our visual
cognition of those objects, the infinitesimal particles that constitute each of
them cooperate with other causal factors so as to create images that we
conceptualize as similar in their respective perceptual cognitions. Since
each image is an effect, it is as much a particular as those infinitesimal
particles. As a particular, each image is utterly unique, and it cannot be
distributed over other particulars. Hence, the images themselves cannot
account for the universal—the “sameness” (sāmānya)—that enables us to
call both objects “red.”

Nevertheless, each image, precisely because it is unique, can be the basis
for the construction of the appropriate universal. That is, a particular is
defined as that which is capable of telic function (arthakriyā), which means
that it must produce effects. But on Dharmakīrti’s view, any entity that
produces effects has necessarily arisen from causes; indeed, as we shall see
in the next chapter, the range of effects that the particular is capable of
producing is determined by the causes from which it has arisen. A
particular’s uniqueness thus amounts to the fact that it has arisen from
specific causes and that it therefore is capable of producing a specific or
restricted range of effects. If we consider an image that arises from what
we would call “red,” that image (a mental particular) is unique or
“excluded” (vyāvṛttta) from all other particulars in that no other particulars
arise from exactly the same causes or produce exactly the same effects. The
image, being the unique effect of the unique particulars that produced it,
thus serves as the basis for excluding the images produced by other
particulars.

The fact, however, that each image excludes all other images by virtue of
its uniqueness is not in itself adequate to account for our use of concepts
and language: we require a notion of sameness, and not just difference. We
must have some notion of sameness because we need to account for anvaya,
the “repeatability,” “distribution” or “continuity” applicable to any
cognition that seems to refer to multiple instances. The conceptual
cognition of “red,” for example, appears to assume a “redness” that is
present in multiple instances, and in this sense the concept of “red” has
anvaya. Dharmakīrti maintains that in order to construct the sameness
required by anvaya, we place “limits” (avādhis) on the causes and effects
upon which we focus. In other words, we have expectations in relation to
what we wish to obtain or avoid, and our concepts—which are
indistinguishable from universals for Dharmakīrti—are constructed in
relation to those expectations. In the case of the concept “red,” some set
of interests or other such dispositions prompts us to construe the image in
question as distinct from entities that do not have the causal characteristics
expected of what we call “red”; at the same time, we ignore other criteria,
such as having the causal characteristics expected of that which is “round”
or “sweet.” When we look at two objects that we will call “red,” the first
object produces an image that excludes all images that we would not call
“red,” and the image from the second object also excludes those images. If
we do not inquire further into the differences between those two images themselves, we can construe both images as mutually qualified by a negation, namely, their difference from non-red images. That mutual difference, which Dharmakīrti calls an “exclusion” (vyāvṛtti), thus becomes their nondifference. In short, that exclusion or nondifference pertains to all things that are different from those that do not have the expected causal characteristics—in this case the causal characteristics expected of that which we call “red.”

In this way, exclusions, being formed on the basis of the images in conceptual cognitions, are construed as negations that qualify those images. Thus, while the images themselves are completely unique—they do not have anvaya and thus are not distributed over other instances—they can be construed as qualified by a negation that does have anvaya, inasmuch as that negation applies to all the instances in question: all the instances in question exclude what is not red.

Through this approach, Dharmakīrti arrives at a theory of universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) that requires both the image and the exclusion. That is, strictly speaking, a universal is a combination of that which is not distributed (i.e., lacks anvaya) and that which is distributed. The image, as a mental particular, is not distributed, but the exclusion (vyāvṛtti), as a negation applicable to all the images in question, is distributed. Lacking distribution, the image alone cannot be the universal. But on Dharmakīrti’s theory of qualities, a negation cannot exist in distinction from that which it qualifies; therefore, the negation alone also cannot be the universal. The universal must therefore be an image that we construe in terms of a particular type of negation, namely, the exclusion of that which does not have the expected effects. As we have seen, for us to apply this negation to all the images in question, we must admit that all the images in question have the same effect. Let us examine this important issue in greater detail.

**Concerning Sameness of Effect**

Dharmakīrti claims that a universal is constructed on the basis of the exclusion of all the entities in question from those that do not have the expected causal characteristics. Dharmakīrti recognizes, however, that if certain things—such as those called “water-jugs”—are excluded from others because those others do not have the expected causal characteristics, one is also asserting that all the things we call “water-jugs” have the same causal characteristics: they all have the causal characteristics expected of a “waterjug.” For Dharmakīrti, this amounts to the claim that, in the case of all water-jugs, we may identify at least some of their causes as the “same” (eka), and most importantly, we may likewise identify at least some of their effects as the “same.”

Dharmakīrti’s focus upon sameness of effect becomes particularly salient when he presents his apoha-theory in terms of the act of recognition, as when a perceived entity or individual (vyakti), such as a lone water-jug, is
recognized to be the same as another individual. As noted earlier, when an individual is perceived, it produces a sensory cognition containing an image that corresponds correlatively to the particular(s) that produced it. That image, which is in fact identical to the cognition in which it arises, is a mental particular, and as such, it is no less unique than the individual that produced it. If Dharmakīrti were to claim that individuals are the same because those effects—the cognitive images they produce—are the “same” (eka), then it seems that he must contradict his ontology of particulars: if he says that two images, which are mental particulars, are the same, then how can he say that all particulars are unique? Speaking in the voice of an objector, and using “cognition” to refer to the cognitive image, Dharmakīrti puts the problem this way:

“But each cognition is an effect of those individuals, and cognition is different [PV1.108cd] for each real thing (pratibhāvam). That is, as with the individual that caused the awareness, the cognition in which it appears is distinct; therefore, how can all those specific individuals have the same effect? For the cognition is their effect, and it is different in each case. In other words, the single effect of water-jugs and so on, such as bearing water, is different for each substance because the substances are different. Hence, those individuals, being different, do not have the same effect.”

To avoid this problem, Dharmakīrti maintains that the cognitions—i.e., the cognitions with images corresponding through causality to their objects—are not what account for the sameness of those objects’ effects. Instead, those cognitions themselves act as causes for another cognition, a “judgment” (pratyavamarṣajñāna) that is the “same” (eka) for all the individuals in question. He explains:

This is not a problem, because the cognition produced by each individual in question is nondifferent since each cognition is the cause of a judgment that is the same for all the individuals in question. And since they are the causes of the same cognitions, the individuals are also nondifferent [PV1.109].

Dharmakīrti admits that the cognition—or more precisely, the cognitive image—produced by each individual is indeed unique. Hence, one cannot directly use those images as the warrant for the claim that the individuals are the same because they have the same effect. If those cognitive images are to be used to demonstrate that the individuals which produced the images are the same, then Dharmakīrti must first show how those images—the effects of the individuals—are themselves the same. To do so, he once again turns to the principle that entities are the same if they produce the same effect. That is, he maintains that those cognitive images are all the
same because they all produce the same effect, namely, a judgment (pratyavamarṣajñāna) that takes as its object the aforementioned cognitive image and construes that image in the same fashion in each case. For example, all the cognitive images can be the same because they all lead to the judgment, “This is red.” Dharmakīrti then maintains that, if those cognitive images are the same because they all lead to the same judgment, then one can also say that the individuals that produced those cognitive images in the first place are all the same because they too produce the same effect. Thus, the warrant for the sameness of the individuals is that they produce the same effect: the cognitive images. And the warrant for the sameness of the cognitive images is again that they produce the same effect: a certain type of judgment.

As we have described it so far, this theory leaves itself open to an obvious rebuttal: what warrants the sameness of the judgments? That is, Dharmakīrti’s initial problem is that individuals are unique, so the sameness required by language and concepts must be accounted for by sameness of effect. But if he turns to the cognitive images produced by those individuals, he has the same problems because those cognitions, like the individuals themselves, are unique. If he now turns to the claim that those cognitive images are the same because they produce the same judgment, then he appears to have fallen into an infinite regress. In other words, it would appear that we need, once again, to warrant the sameness of those judgments by appealing to the sameness of their effects; and of course, the sameness of the judgments’ effects will once again require the same warrant, and so on.110

Dharmakīrti’s response to this problem is expressed, if somewhat elliptically, in his commentary on the verse cited above. Note that here he uses the metaphor of an “overlap” or “mixing” (saṃsarga) of individuals whereby the nature of one is somehow partially present in the nature of the other. For Dharmakīrti, such an overlap is impermissible in the case of causally efficient things, since causally efficient entities are particulars (or are reducible to particulars), and they must be unique. With this and other such issues in mind, he comments on the aforementioned verse:

> It has already been explained111 that the natures of things (bhāva) do not overlap, and that a cognition of them in which the cognitive image presents a thing as if its nature overlapped with other things is an error. However, those distinct things indirectly (krameṇa) become the causes for concepts; as such, by their nature they produce a conceptual cognition in which they seem to overlap. Moreover, this is called their “nondifferent difference”—namely, their exclusion (viveka) from other things that by nature do not cause that effect; they are understood to be excluded in this fashion because they cause some same effect, such as a cognition [containing an image that leads to the same
In terms of the cognition that each individual produces, even though it is different for every substance, each cognition appears nondifferent from the others in question that by its nature it causes a judgment that overlays the image in the awareness with a nondifference. Moreover, the instances in question cause that thing (arthā)—namely, an awareness and such that appears nondifferent and that in turn causes that kind of judgment. Therefore, those instances through their nature produce a single cognition with an image that presents them as overlapping whose ultimate object is their difference in nature (svabhāvabheda) from all other things, as has been repeatedly stated. Therefore, the nondifference of things consists of the fact that they have the same effect.

Dharmakīrti’s solution to the problem of infinite regress is that sameness of effect does not act as the warrant for the claim that those determinations of sameness are the same. Instead, he cleverly shifts what he means by being “the same” (eka). The judgments in question are the same not because they have the same effect, but because they phenomenally present the “same” content: by overlaying the images in the cognition that produce them with a “nondifference” (abheda), each judgment takes the same form, such as, “This is red.” This amounts to an appeal to some unspecified combination of experience and mental dispositions: when we look at certain things, we just interpret them all as “red,” in the context formed by certain dispositions and the way that we use the term “red.” This appeal to experience and dispositions highlights the importance of mind-dependency or “subjective factors” in the process of constructing exclusions. That is, Dharmakīrti maintains that when we construct exclusions, we do not do so haphazardly or out of some pernicious habit; rather, we have some purpose in mind, and that purpose provides expectations and interests that form the context of our concept formation. Likewise, we learn how to use language and are habituated to that use. An apple and a strawberry, for example, will be different if we are concerned with their distinctive effects, but if we are only concerned with their coloration, we ignore that difference in light of the sameness constructed in terms of color. And of course, our use of “apple” and “strawberry” is dependent in part on our habituation to certain linguistic practices.

While Dharmakīrti’s appeal to experience and dispositions reflects the mind-dependent aspects of the exclusion process, it is coupled with something more: an appeal to the nature (prakṛti or svabhāva) of things themselves. That is, when several individuals produce cognitions that in turn produce the same judgment, “This is red,” it is not just my own expectations, conditioning and other relevant dispositions that go into the construction of that exclusion. Rather, beyond my own subjectivity, the
entities in question by their nature (svabhāvataḥ, prakṛtyā, etc.) produce cognitions whose content is capable of being construed as “red.” More than some appeal to experience, it is this assertion of the nature of things that puts an end to any infinite regress. We can pose the question, “But why do those individuals all produce cognitions that can lead to the same judgment?” And Dharmakīrti can answer, “Because it is their nature to do so.”

Some interpreters may feel rather dissatisfied with Dharmakīrti’s appeal to nature. In effect, he is saying that when we can call all red things “red,” for example, it is not that they all instantiate the universal “redness”; nor that they all possess some real, specifiable similarity; nor even that they all have the “same” effect in a way that we can ultimately specify in objective terms. Rather, all those things are just different from non-red things, and the reason for their difference is simply that by their nature they appear that way to us when we attend to what we mean by “red.” Even the seeming objectivity of this appeal to nature may disappoint some, for as we will see in the next chapter, a thing’s “nature” (svabhāva) is also conceptually constructed through the apoha-theory. On this interpretation of what Dharmakīrti means by nature, Dharmakīrti’s talk about the nature of things that we call “red” is best understood as a way of saying that, in ultimate terms, there is no metaphysically defensible reason for the fact that we call them “red.” Thus, if one is hoping for an ultimately defensible metaphysical reason, then Dharmakīrti’s answer to the problem of sameness is dissatisfying. On the other hand, one might suppose that we are engaged in a frustrating and fruitless enterprise when we yearn to specify in precise terms the metaphysical warrant for our use of the term “red.” In that case, Dharmakīrti’s answer is quite satisfactory, or perhaps even liberating.

**Are Universals Permanent?**

Whatever might be the degree of Dharmakīrti’s covert skepticism, it is clear that his apoha-theory is formulated largely as a reaction to realist theories of universals, and with that in mind, one might maintain that Dharmakīrti has not at all solved the problems he sees in those realist theories. Many of these problems focus upon the impossibility of a real, permanent universal having any intrinsic relation to its impermanent instances. We have already seen that, in Dharmakīrti’s philosophical milieu, a universal such as “water-jugness” (ghaṭatvā) must be perdurant, for if it were to change, entities that were previously called a “water-jug” could no longer be the referents of the term “water-jug.” But if the universal perdures even when one of its instances ceases, how can it be an essential property of that instance? Indeed, we have already noted that, if the universal perdures when its instances cease, then that universal is essentially different from its instances, and on Dharmakīrti’s view, if x is essentially different from y, then x cannot be intrinsic or essential to y. Thus, if water-jug-ness (ghaṭatvā)
is different from all individual water-jugs (gхаṭas), then water-jug-ness is not essential to any individual water-jug. Hence, no individual water-jug would really be a “water-jug.”¹¹⁶

One might suppose that this same problem applies to the anpaḥa-theory. That is, if the universal qua exclusion—the nondifferent difference pertaining to all water-jugs—accounts for the sameness of those water-jugs, then that exclusion must not change. But if it does not change, one might assume that it perdures. It would thus appear that Dharmakīrti has simply arrived at a disguised theory of real, perdurant universals, and that the criticisms he has raised against realism would apply to his own system. Indeed, many subsequent Buddhist philosophers, especially those in Tibet, assumed that Dharmakīrti did indeed mean for universals to be permanent, although they did not clearly explain how Dharmakīrti would avoid his own criticisms.¹¹⁷ Fortunately, an interpretation based on Dharmakīrti’s texts alone relieves us of any tedious need to confront Dharmakīrti with his own attacks, for Dharmakīrti clearly rejects the notion that the core of his version of universals—namely, exclusions—are permanent:¹¹⁸

A negation has no nature; hence, one cannot conceive of it as having “perdurance” or “non-perdurance.” [PV1.169ab] That is, there is no such thing at all as an “other-exclusion.” And concepts of that exclusion’s perduring or ceasing by its nature, which would follow from it having a nature, do not make sense (na kalpante).

In short, exclusions are negations, and as negations, they cannot bear any properties at all. Hence, how could one say that they are either permanent or impermanent? This same notion relates to Dharmakīrti’s claim that abstract predicates (such as “water-jug-ness” or “cowness”) cannot bear qualities. Dharmakīrti notes that it makes no sense to say, for example, “its cowness is white.”¹¹⁹ Presumably, this also means that one cannot sensibly assert, “cowness is permanent.” This principle parallels the opinions of many of Dharmakīrti’s opponents, for whom universals cannot instantiate qualities or other universals.

By denying that exclusions can be considered either permanent or impermanent, Dharmakīrti avoids the problems that would arise from the claim that his constructed universal changes, for if it is not impermanent, it does not change. At the same time, he avoids the problem of the universal remaining after its instances cease, for the universal is also not permanent, and thus cannot perdure. We have seen, however, that Dharmakīrti admits a cognitive image or appearance as the positive content in conceptual cognitions. Can we not say that this image is either permanent or impermanent? Dharmakīrti responds:¹²⁰

And also [an apparently distributed image] is the error that a cognition involving a universal has.¹²¹ For that reason as well, the criticism
concerning perdurance does not apply to other-exclusion. [PV1.169cd] Indeed, a conceptual cognition has no object; it is a false awareness (mithyājñāna) in that it presents a single image as instantiated in different instances. Since its object does not exist, it neither perdures nor does not perdure.\textsuperscript{122}

An image in a conceptual cognition, when construed as qualified by an exclusion, seems to be an entity repeated in multiple instances. Construed in that fashion, even the mental content of a conceptual cognition—the image that appears in that awareness—is unreal. Hence, it too cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent.

Should we then conclude that the mental image itself is unreal? No, we should not, for when considered simply as mental content, that image is a particular. In that case, however, it is no longer the combination of image and exclusion that is the universal, for it is not construed as repeated in multiple instances. In short, the image in a conceptual cognition is both real (as a unique mental event) and unreal (as an apparently distributed universal). We have seen this motif before in the case of the “hairs” in the visual perception of a person with cataracts. It is at that same point in the Pramāṇavārttika that Dharmakīrti notes that the image in conceptual cognition is both real and unreal. He does so by raising an objection and offering an answer:\textsuperscript{123}

“If a universal is also a thing (artha) in terms of having the nature of awareness, then you would have to conclude that it is a particular.”

Since we do indeed assert that a universal is a particular,\textsuperscript{124} your statement poses no problem for us. But in terms of having the nature of other objects, it is a universal in that it has the same form for all the objects that it seems to qualify. It has that same form because it is based upon their exclusion from other objects. But as a universal, that image in awareness is not a real thing (vastu) because it is that which is expressed by language.... [PV3.9cd–11a].\textsuperscript{125}

When we combine this explanation with the one presented above (PV1.169cd), we see that, when the image in a conceptual cognition is considered simply as a mental event, it is real. The implication is that, considered in that way, the image is impermanent: as with all particulars, it is in constant flux. But if the image is construed as a universal—i.e., construed to be qualified by a distributed exclusion—it is as unreal as that exclusion itself, and the unreal cannot be either permanent or impermanent.
Three Ways of Construing Apoha

One can perhaps already see that the interplay between image, exclusion and particular is crucial to the *apoha*-theory, but despite the importance of these three aspects of the exclusion process, Dharmakīrti himself did not offer perspicuous explanations of the precise roles that they play. The task of delineating the *apoha*-theory in terms of these three aspects was left to the early commentator Śākyabuddhi, whose explanation became a standard for some later Buddhist scholars.Śākyabuddhi remarks:

Concerning this theory, there are three kinds of other-exclusion. First, there is the excluded (*vyāvṛttta*) particular, because it is that from which are excluded this and that other [particular]. It is in terms of this kind of exclusion that Dharmakīrti said [at PV1.40]: “things are by nature qualified by their exclusions from all homogenous and heterogeneous things.” This kind of exclusion is established as the basis for practical action through language or inferential signs; however, it is not established as the object expressed by language.

The second kind of “other-exclusion” is mere other-excision (*anyāvya vacchedamātra*) because in this case “other-exclusion” is construed to mean the excluding of what is other. This is what previous savants established as the nondifference that applies to all cases because a mere negation is not distinct in any instance from any other instance.

The third form of “other-exclusion” is the appearance in a conceptual cognition because it excludes what is other. Hence, it is what the author of the treatise considers to be the object expressed by language. It is not reasonable to say that such is the case in terms of the other-exclusion that is the excluded particular. This would not be reasonable because, if the conceptual image had the nature of the [particular], it would cease to exist when the particular ceased to exist since they would be nondifferent; and what is present after a particular ceases is another particular that is accepted to be different from that previous particular.

Here we find Śākyabuddhi describing the particular, the exclusion and the image in terms of three different ways of understanding the Sanskrit compound *anyāpoha*. The particular is “that from which other is excluded” (*asmād anyad apohyate*). As such, it is the *vyāvṛttta*: the “isolated,” the “extracted,” or simply the “excluded.” In short, it is an utterly unique entity. The exclusion itself (*vyāvṛtti*) is the mere “excluding of other” (*anyāpohanam*). And the image is that through or on the basis of which one
excludes other (anyad apohyata ’nena). This threefold schema allows Śākyabuddhi to clearly separate three aspects of the exclusion process. To understand the full implications of this interpretation, let us see how it responds to four problems that the apoha-theory must address—namely, the problems of (1) the relation between a universal and particulars; (2) the distribution of a nonexistent; (3) the mental content of conceptual cognitions; and (4) the discontinuity between mental content and reference. In addition to unpacking Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation, our answers to these questions will also allow us to restate the analysis of the apoha-theory that we have given thus far.

(1) Universal-instance relation

This problem is the one that we cited at the beginning of our discussion on universals, and we can reiterate it in the form of a question: if there is no ultimately real universal instantiated in all its instances, how can the concept “fire” have any relation to the particulars that we call “fire”? On Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation, the claim that the particular is “that from which all others are excluded” justifies for Dharmakīrti the relation between a cognition that involves a universal such as the concept “fire” and a specific instance of a fire. That is, the universal “fire” refers to all fires because all fires are different from all other entities that do not have the causal characteristics expected of something we call “fire.” This differentiation of all fires from non-fires is not a mere whim, for it is based upon the uniqueness of each entity that we call a “fire”: each one is actually different in all ways from all other entities. Although we construct a universal by focusing upon only some of those differences, this does not vitiate the fact that the differences we do focus upon are based upon the utter difference of the entities in question. Thus, since the universal—which amounts to a selective difference or exclusion—is based upon the utter difference of each entity, the universal has an indirect relation to those entities.

(2) Distribution

This second problem concerns anvaya, the distribution or continuity that is necessary for a universal to apply to multiple instances. Here the question is: if there is no real universal instantiated in all instances of fire, what sameness could account for the fact that we can refer to all of them as fire? On Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation, Dharmakīrti accounts for distribution through the mere “other-excluding” that is the exclusion (vyāvaṛtṛti) itself. As a negation, the exclusion can be construed as continuous across all its instances because, as Śākyabuddhi notes, a mere negation cannot be distinct across instances. A negation is also not susceptible to the critiques that Dharmakīrti levels against the distribution of real universals. For example, some of his arguments rely on the claim that, if a universal such as “waterjug-ness” (gṛ̤taṭva) were a real entity, then it must be either
the same as or different from the instances in which it is instantiated. If "water-jug-ness" were identical to any specific water-jug, then as with that water-jug itself, it would not be distributed over other instances. On the other hand, if "water-jug-ness" were something essentially other than its instances, then once again it cannot be distributed. Among the many reasons cited by Dharmakīrti is the claim that a cognition of things as the same must also include the cognition of those things as different, but if the content of a conceptual cognition is just a universal distinct from its instances, the difference among the instances would not be included within that cognition. Implicit here is the notion that the final justification for the claim that an entity is distributed is a cognition in which that entity appears to be distributed (i.e., an anvayapratipatti). In contrast, when considered as a mere negation, a universal constructed through exclusion encounters no such difficulties, because as a negation, it cannot be said to be either ultimately the same as or different from its instances. In a sense, by relegating distribution to a negation, Dharmakīrti blocks any attempt at raising distribution (or a distributed entity) to the level of ultimate reality.

(3) Mental content

The problem of mental or phenomenal content arises when a universal is construed simply as a mere negation, since Dharmakīrti and his interlocutors all maintain that affirmative conceptual cognitions (i.e., those that are not negations) present some positive content as an object in cognition. For Dharmakīrti, this positive content would be an appearance or image in the mind. If, however, the universal is a mere negation, then a conceptual cognition—i.e., one that has a universal as its object—would involve no positive content at all, for how can a negation be presented in a positive form? This is the criticism leveled by the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara against the initial formulation of the apoha-theory proposed by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti’s predecessor. Uddyotakara remarks:

There is this notion that the object (artha) of the word “cow” is the other-exclusion, “is not a non-cow.” But is this other-exclusion an existent (bhāva) or a nonexistent (abhāva)? If it is an existent, is it a cow or a non-cow? If it is a cow, then we have no disagreement. But if the object of the word “cow” is a noncow, then, my goodness—such skill in semantics! On the other hand, it is not reasonable that the other-exclusion be a nonexistent because a nonexistent is not the object of either the act of conveying meaning nor the act of understanding what is conveyed. That is, through the word “cow” being heard, one neither conveys nor understands a nonexistent. In addition, the object of an expression is cognized by cognition, and no one cognizes a nonexistent as a result of hearing the word “cow.”
Uddyotakara’s point is that, regardless of whether Dignāga considers an other-exclusion to be existent or nonexistent, he cannot maintain his claim that the object of an expression (śabdārtha) is an other-exclusion. If an other-exclusion is an existent thing, and if the object of the word “cow” is an other-exclusion, then in order to avoid the absurdity of claiming that the object of the word “cow” is a non-cow, Dignāga must admit that the other-exclusion is a real thing instantiated in all cows. But if Dignāga were to assent to such a position, he would simply be upholding Uddyotakara’s own theory. The other option is to claim that an other-exclusion is a nonexistent (abhāva), but Uddyotakara rejects such a claim because experience tells us that when we use words such as “cow,” the objects of those words are presented affirmatively as existent, and not negatively as nonexistent.

On Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation, Dharmakīrti accounts for the positive content of such cognitions by pointing out that the cognitive image (ākāra), “that which excludes other,” is indeed part of what constitutes a universal formed through exclusion. But in the course of including the cognitive image within the exclusion process, Dharmakīrti goes beyond merely accounting for mental content. In addition, Dharmakīrti also claims that the cognitive image is that to which one applies the negation that is the exclusion itself. Indeed, this is precisely why Śākyabuddhi refers to it as “that which excludes other.” And since, as we have seen, the exclusion (vyāvṛtti) is what accounts for the sameness that allows for distribution, that sameness applies actually to the image itself, and not to the particulars that generated that image. Nevertheless, on Dharmakīrti’s view, one can still claim that exclusions have an indirect relation to particulars because the uniqueness of images corresponds causally to the uniqueness of the particulars that produced them.

The construal of the cognitive image as the basis for the selective negation that is the exclusion has an important implication that we have touched on earlier: when Dharmakīrti speaks of universals, he means a combination of image and the exclusion. The exclusion on its own cannot be the universal because it lacks mental content. But the image on its own cannot be the universal because, as a mental particular, an image cannot be distributed.

(4) Discontinuity between content and reference

The role that the cognitive image plays in the construction of universals leads to this fourth problem that the apoha-theory must address. That is, Dharmakīrti effectively maintains that the subjective experience of a conceptual cognition—i.e., a cognition involving a universal—is of a mental image or appearance. Likewise, the sameness established by exclusions actually applies to the cognitive images; hence, our conceptual cognitions are actually presenting an image as the same as other images, and not a particular as the same as other particulars. But if we are experiencing
mental images, and if the sameness inherent in conceptuality applies to images, why would we act on particulars? In other words, if I employ inferences that leads to the conceptual cognitions such as “there is fire over there” or “sound is impermanent,” then those conceptual cognitions are actually directing me just to images. And images do not perform any of the functions expected of the extra-mental particulars we would call “fire” or “sound”; hence, if my purpose is to warm my hands or to make a sound, the conceptual cognition has presented me with something that cannot fulfill that purpose.

Dharmakīrti cannot solve this problem by maintaining that conceptual cognitions—i.e., cognitions involving universals—take particulars as their objects, because, as we have already seen, Dharmakīrti denies any such possibility. One might appeal to the causal relation between image and particular, but while this may be true when such cognitions are analyzed, they do not in fact present themselves in that fashion in practice. That is, in practice we do not think, “There is fire” and then think, “The fire-image construed as universal in the conceptual cognition, ‘there is fire,’ has an indirect causal relation with some actual fire, so I should move toward the actual fire, rather than warming my hands at the image.” Instead, we simply move toward the fire.137

In effect, this fourth problem is psychological: there is a discontinuity between the subjective content of conceptual or linguistic cognitions and the reference of those cognitions to the telically efficacious particulars on which we act. Adopting the voice of an objector, Dharmakīrti puts the problem this way:

“Well, through this universal which you have defined as difference, does one cognize the particular as the same as other particulars, or does one cognize something else [—namely, a cognitive image—] as the same as other [images]? If the particular is what one cognizes as the same, then how can it be an object of conceptuality? And how could there be telic function (arthakriyā) through that other object [i.e., the image]? And [if the image were the object] then one would not cognize universals such as impermanence and so on in particulars. Thus, the particulars would not have impermanence and such as their nature, and impermanence and such would not be the qualities of real things.”138

Dharmakīrti’s response is to maintain that all conceptual cognitions involve a fundamental error (bhrānti): namely, that due to a beginningless imprint (anādivāsanā) in the minds of ordinary beings, those ordinary beings construe the images in conceptual cognitions to be the particulars that those images, having been construed as universals, represent.139 The specific content of each conceptual cognition is itself the result of another
imprint (vāsanā): the imprint left upon the mind by the perceptual experience of the particulars represented in that conceptual cognition.140

Dharmakīrti raises this theory at a number of points, but perhaps the most salient presentation occurs in his response to the objection raised just above. Since this passage combines all the elements that we have discussed, it is worth citing in full:

This fault [i.e., that conceptual cognitions would not guide one to particulars] does not apply because in relation to the appearance in conceptual awareness, we form conventions (vyavāhāra) for universals, co-referentiality, and the subject-predicate relation. Conceptual awareness arises in dependence on imprints that have been left by perceptual experience, which apprehends the natures of real things. Even though it does not have those real things as its object, conceptual cognition seems to have those things as its object—the nature of conceptual cognition is to imagine that its object has the nature of being an extra-mental thing. Conceptual cognition occurs in that fashion because it is by nature produced by the imprints that previous experiences of particulars have placed in the mind. Since conceptual cognition is [indirectly] produced by objects that have nondifferent effects, conceptual cognition seems to apprehend a nondifferent image of an object. That image is ultimately the same in that it is different from other objects that do not accomplish the intended function.

The image which appears to the conceptual cognition seems to be external, singular, and capable of telic efficacy, even though it is not. It appears this way because persons engaged in practical action (vyavāhin) proceed by imagining that an aspect of their concept is that way [i.e., external, etc.]. Otherwise, they would not engage in such activity. Because it appears as something that is capable of a telic function, the cognitive appearance seems to be different from that which does not have that telic function, but it is not ultimately real because it is not a factor in a practical test, as I will explain.

Those mentally experienced objects that come about through real things are apprehended to be the same by virtue of that universal because they appear in terms of an exclusion from some other things. But a particular is not what is apprehended as the same because it does not appear to a conceptual awareness. Those conceptual appearances, while appearing to be excluded from some other things, also appear to possess exclusions from those other things; as such, they appear to be nondifferent. Although those conceptual objects are not real in and of themselves, conceptual cognition presents (upadarśana) them as if they were. Hence, one forms conventions for universals to group many objects and co-referentiality to abstract multiple qualities from a
single object—the apparently distributed object of these conventions is false. Every convention, being constructed through the imprints left by experiences of particulars, is erroneous (vipālava). Nevertheless, conceptual cognitions whose production is connected to particulars are trustworthy with regard to those particulars, even though those particulars are not appearing in those conceptual cognitions. An example is the erroneous cognition of a jewel when one sees the glimmer of the jewel. Other cognitions are not trustworthy because, even though they also arise from a distinction of the thing, these other cognitions fail to determine the distinctive qualities of the thing in accord with the way in which it was experienced; having failed to make that determination, they superimpose some other distinction onto the thing by apprehending some slight similarity. An example is the cognition of a jewel when one sees lamplight.

To overcome the discontinuity between mental content and reference in conceptual cognitions, Dharmakīrti here presents what amounts to a “theory of unconscious error,” as Tillemans has called it. In other words, “A type of error (bhrānti) is always present in conceptual thought. Specifically, an essential feature of such thought is that it involves a false determination (adhyavasāya) of the apprehended fiction as being a real particular, and thus, by an unconscious error, this thought can make us reach (prāpaka) a particular in the world.”

Thus, for Dharmakīrti, conceptual cognitions lead us to real things only because we make a fundamental error when we have such cognitions: we mistake their content, the cognitive image, for the particular that it represents. As Dharmakīrti puts it elsewhere, the conceptual construct is “ignored” (avadhīrita) in the sense that it is construed as if it were identical to the particular. One of the more important outcomes of this theory is that, strictly speaking, universals should not be counted as the instrumental objects (prameya). The most straightforward reason for this claim is simply that, as Dharmakīrti indicates in the above passage, if a conceptual cognition were to lead one only to the combination of image and exclusion that is a universal, then that cognition would not direct one toward an entity capable of telic function (arthakriyā). And as we shall see in chapter four, a cognition that cannot direct one toward an entity capable of the desired telic function cannot be instrumental on Dharmakīrti’s view.

We can thus think of universals as having a twofold character. When analyzed in terms of the Dharmakīrti’s criterion for ultimate existence, universals are ultimately unreal, for they are incapable of telic function. With this in mind, Dharmakīrti himself maintains that, strictly speaking, there is only one kind of instrumental object: particulars. But universals may nevertheless be used to guide one toward particulars, and they also are presented in conceptual cognition as if they were real. From these two
latter points of view—the practical and the psychological—universals may be granted a type of provisional existence. And by assuming that type of provisional existence, one can employ conceptual cognitions—especially inferences—to accomplish one’s goals, most notably the spiritual goal of liberation (mokṣa).\footnote{146}

The claim that inference can enable one to accomplish one’s goal—even a mundane goal such as obtaining fire by inferring its presence from the presence of smoke—raises other problems. In particular, one must be able to demonstrate that an invariant relation pertains among the concepts employed in inference, specifically, the concept adduced as evidence and that presented as the predicate to be proven (sādhyā). To see how Dharmakīrti attempts to provide such a guarantee, let us move on to a consideration of one of his most significant innovations, the notion of the svabhāvakratibandha.

\footnote{1} McClintock (2002:68–76), in her discussion of Śāntarakṣita’s thought, builds on Dreyfus’ notion of Dharmakīrti’s “ascending scale of analysis.” Dreyfus notes that the choice here is largely a “pragmatic” one that focuses upon both the audience and the purpose of discussing such issues (1997:83, 99, and 104).

\footnote{2} For the position that the purpose of a treatise is to dispel confusion, see PV2.5b (śāstrasya mohaniyavartanam). Confusion (moha) is explicitly identified as ignorance at PV1.222–223 and PVS ad cit. (G:111.11ff), where it is also explained that ignorance is the underlying cause of suffering.

\footnote{3} Nāgārjuna, whom I take to be the author of the Rāmatva (see Walser 2002), was probably the first to defend an explicit hierarchy of views in a systematic context. See his Rāmatva (4.67–97) and MMK (18.6). Candrakīrti’s commentary on MMK18.6 (Prasannapāda: 356–363) is a mine of quotations that he uses to defend this method. In the verse from Rāmatva mentioned here, it is also clear that Nāgārjuna is concerned with attacks against the Mahāyāna. The last few verses of the section are worth quoting in their entirety:

A grammarian will make some students recite even the alphabet. Likewise, the Buddha taught the Dharma in accord with his disciples’ abilities. The Dharma he taught to some is for the purpose of stopping negativity. To some, it is aimed at the practice of virtue. And to some, he taught one that is based upon duality. He taught to some a Dharma not based on duality. And to a few, he taught a profound Dharma that terrifies the timid; its essence is emptiness and compassion, and it is the means to attain awakening. Hence, the wise should cease to despise the Mahāyāna, and they should become more faithful so as to attain true, complete awakening. (Rāmatva 4.94–97; trans. in Dunne and McClintock 1997:71). [yāthaiyā vaiyākaraṇo maṛkāṃ api pāthayet/buddhdo ‘vadat tatāh dharman vinayānām yatāḥ samam // kesaṃ quit avadadv dharman pārebyo vinītytAYe // kesaṃ quit putyasiddhyartham kesaṃ quit dvayamśritam // dvayāniśritam ekem gambhirām/bhirubhyaṃ / sūnyatākarunāgarbhāṃ ekeśaṃ bodhisādhanaṃ // iti sadbhir mahāyānE kartavyah pratighaṣkāyaḥ / prasādoś caḥṣikah kāryah samyaksambodhisāddhayey // (Hahn 1982:128–130)].

\footnote{4} In speaking of upāyakauśalya, I refer to the general usage of the term in the Mahāyāna, especially in Vaiśūla Sūtras. De Breet (1992) argues for a slightly different usage specific to the earlier layers of the Āṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāparamitā. As Pye has pointed out, the basic theme of tailoring one’s teaching to the abilities of beings occurs throughout such Sūtras, the best known example being the “burning house” metaphor of the Sādhanapuruṣarātika (Pye 1978:1–5, 37–41). The notion of buddhaśāsana as a merely a means to an end is already present in early material, an obvious example being the snake and raft metaphors of the Alagaddhāpamasutta (Majjhimanikāya 22:227–229).

\footnote{5} Cf. Dreyfus (1997:104). The relevant passage in Dharmakīrti’s work is PV3.218–219:

The ultimate nature of the cognitive content (vijnāpatti) in perception is not known by those
whose vision is not supreme because it is impossible for them to experience it without the error (vipālava) of subject and object. Therefore, the buddhas, ignoring the ultimate (upekṣitatattvārtha), close one eye like an elephant and propagate theories that involve external objects merely in accord with worldly conceptions. [asamviditatattva ca sā sarvāparadarśanaḥ / asambhavād vinā teśāṃ grāhīyagṛhakaviplavāḥ // tad upekṣitatattvārthaḥ kṛtvā gajanimilanaṃ / kevalaṃ lokabuddhyaiva bāhyacinā pratanyate].


7 Dharmakīrti employs the phrase atitasmiḥ tadgraṛaḥ at PVin2.1c. This and other such phrases provide, as Katsura puts it, “the time honored definition of error in India” (1984:229). Disagreements about this definition begin when one inquires into the basis for the error. For Dharmakīrti, a conceptual erroneous cognition is one that “superimposes” (samāropa) a type of functionality onto an object that does not in fact have that functionality (see below, 79, and also PVSV ad PV1.98–99ab; G:49–51). South Asian philosophers from other traditions often assume that error is based upon a real similarity constituted by a universal whose location in space and time has somehow been misconstrued. For the various approaches, see Schmithausen (1965) and Franco (1984).

8 BCA 9:3–4ab: tatā loka dvidhā dṛṣṭo yogyo prākṛtakas tathā / tatā prākṛtako loko yogilokena bāhyate // bāhyante dhīvīśeṣaḥ yogino ‘py uttarottaranāḥ // Note that Prajñākaramati provides the gloss of loka as “person” (jana).

9 While Dharmakīrti does not explicitly state these levels, Śākyabuddhi and Devendrabuddhi do offer clear divisions, especially of the third and fourth levels. For a fine example, see the translation of PV3.194–224 in the appendix.

10 Here, my use of the term “ordinary person” is meant to reflect especially the usage arvāgarṣin (“one who is short-sighted”), which implies not only a lack of insight into reality, but a certain resistance to such insight. Buddhist thinkers often distinguish between the unelaborated beliefs of ordinary persons and the more elaborated beliefs of theoreticians, but at the same time, certain traditions of thought, especially the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, are seen to be rooted in those unelaborated, commonsense beliefs that Buddhists take to be mistaken. See Dreyfus (1997:51–59).

11 One might be tempted to consider the oft-maligned Vātsiputriyās as an exception, but only if one were to equate pudgala with ātman. Such Buddhist thinkers, however, understood themselves to be rejecting ātman and ātmiya. To get a sense of their uncompromising tone in this regard, consider these verses of praise to the Buddha composed by an unknown author:

When the mind contains the notion “I am” (ahaṁkāra), the continuity of births will not be pacified. “I am” does not leave the heart when there is belief in the self. And since no other teacher in the world is a proponent of selflessness, there is no path other than your view, the way to peace. [ahaṁkāre manasi na śamān yāti janmaprabandho / nāhaṁkāre kaliti hdayād ātmadṛṣṭau ca satyām // anyah śāstā jagati ca yato nāsti naṁbhavvantāḥ / nānaya tasmad upaśamavilhes tammataṭā asti mārgaḥ //]. (Recorded in Yaśomitra’s Abhidharmakośasūpaḥtārthāvākhīyāḥ 1189).

12 The Abhidharmakośa (AK) presents a Sarvāstivāda view (although AKBh, Vasubandhu’s own commentary, includes positions identified as Sautrāntika). Dharmakīrti refers to the Abhidharma typology in several contexts. In the context of ignorance, for example, he alludes to Vasubandhu’s discussion in AKBh. Here his concern with the typology is indicated by his efforts to demonstrate that the equation of satkāyadrṣtī, moha, and avidyā need not contradict that typology, where such an equation is not always explicit (see especially PVSV ad PV1.221–223; see also PV2.135–136ab, 185c–186b, 189–190ab, 192, and 196cd–198ab). In addition, Dharmakīrti also uses the Abhidharma system for the classification of both mental and extra-mental elements (see, for example, PVSV ad PV1.137–142). His rejection of spatial and temporal extension is described below (98ff).

13 For a lucid and refreshing approach to the term “realism,” see Cortens (2000). In External Realism, the term “realism” refers just to the local ontological commitment that some perceptual objects exist outside the mind. Hence, when speaking from this perspective Dharmakīrti can be a “realist” about extra-mental things and yet a “nominalist” in that he rejects the existence of universals. Some may claim that we should just use the term “Sautrāntika,” which the early commentator Devendrabuddhi does use on at least one occasion (219b). But using “Sautrāntika” in this fashion can lead to both historical and philosophical confusion. In a historical context, the term may obscure the complex relationship among three distinct brands of thought: the explicitly “Sautrāntika” theories expressed
in Vasubandhu’s Akṣh, the External Realist theories of Dharmakīrti’s successor Śubhagupta, and Dharmakīrti’s own External Realist theories. In short, it may be heuristically unwise to equate “Sautrāntika” with all post-Vasubandhu External Realism (bāhyārthavādā), even if that External Realism is qualified as not Sarvāstivāda and not Madhyamaka. This lack of historical clarity underlies the potential for philosophical confusion, for if External Realism cannot be easily equated with explicitly Sautrāntika positions, an interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s External Realist arguments in terms of Sautrāntika philosophical motivations will be misleading. It is perhaps for this reason that both Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi clearly prefer the term bāhyārthavāda.

14 Here, the term “epistemic” is meant to reinforce the notion that Dharmakīrti’s critique of extra-
mental entities arises in the context of determining what it is that we know in perception (I admit that “Epistemic Idealism” is a somewhat awkward neologism, but it is the most suggestive and least misleading terminology available). Dharmakīrti employs this view in his lengthy discussion of the instrumental effect (pramāṇaphala) at the end of the third chapter, starting with the prologue at vv. 194ff. Concerning the term shes bya nang gi yin par smra ba (śantarījeyavādā), Śākyabuddhi uses it in several places; examples include nye 76a3 and nye 206a5. Vinītadeva also uses the term frequently (Saṁtāntarasiddhāntikā = passim). The Sanskrit antarījeyavāda is ex. conj. The equivalent term antarījeyanayaya occurs in Karṇaṅkagomin (210.15) for which we would expect the Tibetan equivalent shes bya nang gi yin pa’i tshul; unfortunately, the latter phrase is corrupt in PVT (114b2). As for Dharmakīrti’s use of vijnaptimatrāta, see PVin-D (166a1–2).

15 See PV.1.222–223 and PSV ad cit. (G:111.11ff; translated in the appendix); PV.2.183–186b; PV.2.191cd–192; PV.2.201cd–202ab. The mechanism of suffering is summarized at PV.2.217cd–219ab:

One who believes [literally, “sees”] the self will always cling to it as “I.” Due to this clinging one thirsts for pleasures, and that thirst hides the faults [of those things that are imagined to bring pleasure]. Seeing those things as having positive qualities, one yearns for them, and doing so, one appropriates as “mine” those means of accomplishing the desired pleasures. Therefore, as long as one is attached to the self (atmabhīnivesa), one will remain in saṁsāra. And when there is a notion of self, there is a notion of other. From the distinction between self and other comes attachment and aversion. [yath apārayati ātmānātmata tatrāhām iti sāvvatā snehaḥ // snehāḥ sukheyavat tṛṣyati tṛṣṇā duśams tirakurute / guṇadarśi paritṛtyan mameti tat sādhanāyany upaṭṭate // tena atmabhīniveso yāvat rāvat sa saṁsāre / atmanti sati parasaṃśa jāvat parigrahadveṣu //].

Note that the identification of satkāyadrṣṭi as the fundamental cause of self-clinging is only implicit. See, for example, PV.2.135–136ab:

The antidote for the cause of suffering is established by understanding the essential nature of that cause. Suffering’s cause is clinging that takes conditioned things as its objects; that clinging is created by one’s fixation on the notions of self and mine. The realization of selflessness, which contradicts those notions, stops the clinging. [sādhya tadvipaśo pi heto rūpāsāvatodhataḥ / ātmānīyāgrahakṛtā snehaḥ saṁskāragocaraḥ // hetur virodhi nairātmyadarsanām tasya bādhakam //].

16 Dharmakīrti’s soteriology exhibits a deliberate terminological imprecision that stems from an attempt to accommodate at least two different ways of defining the cause of suffering, i.e., either as satkāyadrṣṭi or as confusion (moha), where both may be interpreted as ignorance (avidyā). The explicit equation in question (satkāyadrṣṭi=moha=avidyā) is made at several places, including PV.1.222–223.

17 I base this interpretation of ignorance upon Dharmakīrti’s explicit statement that ignorance is the conceptuality (PSV ad PV.1.98–99ab; G:50.20: vikāla eva hy avidyā). This is supported by the claim that ignorance is the source of all faults (PV.1.222a–c1: sarvāśām dośaṁ jām ātśē satkāyadrṣṭi / sāvidyā), and that concepts are also the source of all faults (PSV ad PV.1.220; G:110.20–21: te [े= dośā] hi vikālaprabhavāḥ). The clear implication is that ignorance can be equated with conceptuality. The focus of Dharmakīrti’s attack on conceptuality is its imputation (samāropā) of an unreal image (ākāra) —most particularly that of sameness (ekatva)—onto things that are in fact utterly distinct (see, for example, PV.1.68–70 and PSV ad cit., translated in the appendix; see also below, 2.4). The elimination of ignorance can thus be understood as an elimination of the tendency (vāsanā) due to which one compulsively imputes sameness onto entities that are in fact not the same. For example, even though all the aggregates are in fact not the same, one construes them as the same by using the single term “the self” to refer to them.
See the translation of PV3.194–224 and also the discussion on spatial extension below, 98ff. Another argument in the transition from External Realism to Epistemic Idealism is the notion that an External Realist cannot specify whether a cognized object is identical to or distinct from the subjectivity cognizing it, but this argument appears to be secondary.

This is the point made in AK6.4. See above 40–42.

A striking example is the appeal to ekapratyavamarṣaṇāna ("judgment of sameness") as a central motif of his philosophy of language. While appealing to this concept, Dharmakīrti never explains it. See below, 119ff.


Dreyfus is clear that, in his view, Dharmakīrti allows for conflicting accounts within the Sautrāntika (i.e., External Realist) view: “Through most of his works Dharmakīrti presents himself as a realist concerning the existence of the external world. He defends a so-called Sautrāntika position. Within this view, he also seems free to move between conflicting accounts. Sometimes he follows the view described previously, reducing reality to the interaction of partless particles and moments of awareness. At other times, however, he includes extended objects such as colors or taste or even commonsense objects” (1997:86). See also 1997:106ff.


This interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s ontology seems to be best suited to the earliest commentators. In Dharmakīrti’s works, the most important passage that discusses this issue is found at PVSV ad PV1.137–142. A complete translation and notes from Śākyabuddhi’s commentary are found in the appendix (353).


To this date, I have found only one passage in either PV or PVSV that might be understood to support the spatial extension of particulars. I am referring to Dharmakīrti’s refutation of the Śāmkhya version of sāmānyā and viśeṣa (PVSV ad PV1.163–180, passim) where at one point (PVSV ad PV1.171cd–172; G:86.28–87.4) he equates the opponent’s notion of viśeṣa with his notion of the particular (svalakṣaṇa). Since Śāmkhya philosophers would understand an extended entity such as a water-jug to be what they call a viśeṣa (YD:164.5ff), this might suggest that Dharmakīrti is also accepting such an extended entity. However, since those same philosophers do not accept the notion of infinitesimal particles (see YD:155.15ff), it seems best, in the absence of other compelling evidence, to see Dharmakīrti’s equation of viśeṣa and svalakṣaṇa merely as a means of making his point to his interlocutors. See also the next chapter, n.43.


This conclusion [concerning spatial extension] is certainly surprising, for it goes against Dharmakīrti’s tendency toward a maximal ontological sparsity. It also contradicts other passages, where Dharmakīrti seems to imply that material reality is reducible to atomic components... This apparent inconsistency is due, as I argued earlier, to a tension within Dharmakīrti’s thought arising out of the double perspective that orients his thought: the ontological and the epistemological. Ontologically, ... extension is reduced to infinitesimal particles. Epistemologically, however, such a reduction is harder to sustain. According to his fundamental thesis that perception accurately reflects reality, extension would seem to exist. Extension appears, after all, to perception. This seems to lead Dharmakīrti to accept at some level a minimal notion of extension.


Ibid.
36 We address this in detail below, 126ff.
37 This quiet but striking admission is the main point of Dharmakīrti’s response to an objection (at PV3.4) that all production is just conventional. Such an objection clearly undermines the ultimacy of particulars, but rather than defend causality, Dharmakīrti laconically responds, “asti yathā tathā,” for which David Eckel in a private communication (via T-shirt) has proposed the highly suggestive translation, “Whatever.” See PV3.1–10, translated in the appendix.
38 See the discussion above in chapter 1 (37ff). In addition to AK6.4 and AK Bh ad cit., see also Vasubandhu’s argument from simplicity in the Viṃśatikārīti (6–9 ad k.11–15), where it is used in a Yogācāra context to refute the reality of external objects. Note that it does not appear that Vasubandhu’s discussions of “sense sphere particulars” (āyatanasvāladhāna) (AK Bh:36–37 ad AK1.10) and “conglomerated particles” (saṃghaṭhaparamāṇu) (AK Bh:180 ad AK2.22ab) are to be taken as characteristic of the Saṃtṛāntika position sketched in AK Bh. It is this latter position that appears to be the primary point of departure for Dharmakīrti’s External Realist ontology.
39 Dharmakīrti mentions the partlessness of particulars—the sole ultimately real thing—in several places, including PSV ad PV1.44 (G:27.1). The unrepeatability of particulars is stated, for example, at places, including PVSVī39 Dharmakīrti discusses momentariness at several points in the (cited by Dreyfus 1997:62). Dharmakīrti generally avoids any discussion of particulars, but rather than defend causality, Dharmakīrti avoids any discussion of particulars. Concerning the conventional reality of universals, Dharmakīrti explicitly rejects the possibility of randomness (G:99.12ff: na ca svabhāvanīyam ‘rthānām
40 Dignāga claims that particulars are inexpressible in passages such as PSV ad PS1.1.2cd and especially PSV ad PS2.2ff (27a7ff).
41 Dharmakīrti sums up this basic premise in the phrase “... individual entities never produce a distributed awareness without depending on a universal” [na kadaśad vyaktātāḥ samānānirūpekṣā anayai vijñānānum janayanti (PSV ad PV1.104; G:53.4–5)]. Below we will discuss further Dharmakīrti’s notion that a universal, being a distributed entity, cannot be ultimately real. Dharmakīrti also remarks:

Only that which is capable of telic functions is an ultimately real thing (pāramārthikho bhāva). For, as I will explain, what defines real things and unreal things is their capacity or incapacity for telic functions. And that thing (artha) that is capable of telic functions is not distributed over many things; there is no production of an effect from what is distributed [PV1.166]. Therefore, since they are incapable of telic functions, no universal is a real thing. Rather, only a unique particular (viśeṣa) is a real thing because the [desired] telic function is fulfilled only by those unique particulars. [PSV ad PV1.166: sa pāramārthikho bhāvo eva arthakriyāḥ kṣaṣā [166ab] / idam eva hi vastavastunor lakṣaṇam yad arthakriyāyogayogaya eva ceto śāyām / sa ca / arthakriyā yogyo ‘rthānāṃ nīveti yo ‘nveti na tasmā kāryasambhavāh / [166cd] / tasmā sarvam samānāya anarthakriyāyogayogayāvastu / vastu tu viśeṣa eva teteva tama śiddhate].

In addition see PV1.68–70 and PSV ad PV1.71ab (G:39.17–21, translated in the appendix). Concerning the conventional reality of universals, Dharmakīrti generally avoids any discussion of this claim, but he does state it explicitly in PV3.3. That universals are conventionally real is also clearly implied by other statements, such as the assertion in PV1.70 that universals are “commonly said to be real” (sat prakārtatam) even though they are “ultimately unreal” (asat paramārtatā).
42 For ekāntavyāriṣṭa and a related use of ekāntabheda in the Pramāṇavārttika and Śvārttī, see PSV ad PV1.67 (G:38.7) and ad PV1.181 (G:89.26). For sarvato bhīma, sarvato vyāṃtita and related terms, see PV3.108 and 231.1.40, and PSV ad PV1.48 (G:28.13); ad PV1.57 (G:31.26); ad PV1.58 (G:32.03); and ad PV1.91 (G:45.18). See also PV in (152b7–153a1 ad 1.1), where the particular is defined as “having the nature of a unique real thing” (thun mōng ma yin pāi dōng pōi rāng bzhin = asādhyāvastavastuḥpā
43 Important sources include HB (26*.12ff: tām ca deśākālasvabhāvān vasthānāyataṃ taddīmanopalamabhānāmbhānā buddhis tathātva-vyakhyātāṃ asya vyavacchānti) and HBT (196.10ff) where Arcaṭa construes this statement in terms of uniqueness. This basic notion that real entities have a specific spatiotemporal locus also underlies statements in PSV, such as ad PV1.75f, (G:42.4: kaladhaṃ samānyavāsa vishottapatayo visteśvar kāryam) and ad PV1.195, one of several places where Dharmakīrti explicitly rejects the possibility of randomness (G:99.12ff: na ca svabhāvanīyam ‘rthānām
ākasmiko yuktāḥ / anapekṣasya deśakāladravyaniyamāṇāyaśe). Another account of this issue in PVSV is ad PV1.35 (G:22.20ff). See also the discussion by Dreyfus, following the Tibetan author Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge (1997:67–69).

44 For the definition of rūpa as rūpanālakṣaṇa, see AKBh 44–45. As for the usage of sāmāṇyālakṣaṇa, see the description of the three forms of “attending” (manaskāra) in AKBh (370) ad AK2.72c: trayo manaskāraḥ svalakṣaṇanāmāpyaśe dharmakāraḥ tadyathā rūpanālakṣaṇoḥ rūpaṃ ity evaṃāḥ / sāmāṇyālakṣaṇanāmāpyaśe dharmakāraḥ / adhimuktimanaskāraḥ adhiḥpāramāṇāpyaśe dvibhāvyatanaṃsāmyatanaṃśu.

45 The following passage (AK6.14 and AKBh ad cit. (902)) is illustrative of the way in which svalakṣaṇa and sāmāṇyālakṣaṇa are used as paired terms in the Kośa:

Having attained quiescence, one should meditate on the four foci of mindfulness [AK6.14ab]. One does so in order to perfect one’s insight (vipaśyanā). How should that be done? By analyzing the two types of characteristics of the body, sensation, mind and things [AK6.14cd]. The body is analyzed in terms of its particular and universal characteristics, and so too are sense, mind and things (dharma). A particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) is the nature (svabhāva) of these entities [i.e., the body, etc.]. The impermanence of the conditioned, the painfulness of the contaminated, the emptiness and selflessness of all elemental things—these are universal characteristics. What is the nature of the body? It is the fact of being composed of the elements and elemental matter,... [rīpani māsamāh kuryāḥ smṛtyupasthānābhināyānāṃ vipaśyanāyāḥ sampādanārtham / kathām ca punāḥ kuryāt / kāyaviccitadharmanām dūkṣaṃnaparīśanāt // jáyam svāsāmāṇyālakṣaṇaṃḥ yam pārīśevedanāṃ caitam dharmanāṃ ca svabhāva evaśām svalakṣaṇam / sāmāṇyālakṣaṇaṃ tu antiyatā sasaktanāṃ duḥkhānāṃ sāśravānāṃ suṇyatānāṃ mate sarvadharmanāṃ / kāyasaya puraṇāḥ kah svabhāvah / bhūtabhautikatvam...].

46 Dreyfus (1997: passim) and others have translated svalakṣaṇa and sāmāṇyālakṣaṇa as “specifically characterized phenomenon” and “generally characterized phenomenon,” respectively. One problem with these translations is the use of “phenomenon,” since this term implies a phenomenalist position incompatible with External Realism (bhāyārthavāda). Strictly speaking, external objects are not “phenomena” in that they are not mental content; nevertheless, they are svalakṣaṇas. A second problem is that “specific” and “general” have more in common with Vasubandhu’s use of these terms as a way to differentiate the scope of an entity’s properties without any reference to their expressibility. While there is some continuity with this notion in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, it is clear that the question of classifying properties according to their scope is subordinate to concerns about distinction based upon perceptibility, expressibility and, for Dharmakīrti, efficacy. This is concisely demonstrated in the locus classicus for the usage of the terms svalakṣaṇa and sāmāṇyālakṣaṇa in Dharmakīrti, PV3.1–3.

47 The characterization of particulars as capable of telic function is made at several points, including PV3.1–3 and PVSV ad PV1.170–171 (G:87.1–5). See also below, 84ff.

48 See below, 98.

49 The characterization of particulars as capable of telic function is made at several points, including PV3.1–3 and PVSV ad PV1.170–171 (G:87.1–5). Cf. Nagatomi (1967–68). See also, for example, PVSV ad PV1.171c–172ab (G:87.1–4):

Therefore that unique individual (viśeṣa) alone is the object [of perception], and other things [i.e., apparently repeatable properties] are actually exclusions; a unique individual is what is called an ‘effect’ or a ‘cause,’ and we claim that it is a ‘particular’ (svalakṣaṇa). All actions of persons are undertaken so as to result in the acquisition or avoidance of themselves [PV1.171c2–172]. It has already been stated that only that which is capable of telic function is a real thing. It is a unique individual [according to others’ terminology]. [ato viśeṣa eva / sa evaḥ tasya vyaviṣṭtayo ‘pure / tat kāryam kāraṇam coktam tathā svalakṣaṇam iṣyate / tattvāntaṭṭhpadāḥ sarvāḥ puruṣānāṃ pravṛttīyate // [PV1.171c2–172] // yad arthahkritārtha tad eva vastv ity uktam / sa ca viśeṣa eva /].

50 Dharmakīrti does not directly describe the process of perception, but his causal theory with its principle of correlational correspondence can be gleaned from various verses and passages, including: PV3.109, PV3.247–248, PV3.301–319, PV3.333–341. See also PVin ad PVin1.34 (80.5–6): shes pa’i don dang ’brel pa ‘di don dang ’dra ba las gzhan las ni srid pa ma yin no.

51 See, for example, PV3.224:
Except for being a cause, there is nothing else that that could constitute an entity’s being the apprehended object. Among the causes of awareness, that cause in whose image awareness arises is called the apprehended object of that awareness. [hetubhāvād tte na anya grahyata nama kācana / tatra buddhir yaadākāra tasyaś tadgraḥyam ucyate]. I have followed Manorathandin’s gloss for tatra (PVV:196 teṣu hetasū; Devendrabuddhi (PVP:197a6) provides the gloss, ṛgur byed pa’i don de la, which should perhaps read ... de las].

Dreyfus (1997:336) appears to argue that when Dharmakīrti shifts from External Realism to Epistemic Idealism, he abandons the causal model of perception. But in fact, Dharmakīrti simply denies that the cause of perception need be external; he does not actually deny that some cause must be posited. On the Epistemic Idealist theory, that cause is the imprint (vāsanā) in awareness (see, for example, PV3.335–336).

52 Perhaps Dharmakīrti’s most concise statement of this point is: “Existence is just perception” [PVSV ad PV1.3, G:4.10: sattvam upalabdhir eva; cf. Steinkellner 1994a:384]. This claim, which might even be rendered “To exist is to be perceived,” indicates the close relation between perception and the ultimately real in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy. To this we add passages that specify that: [1] only particulars produce effects; [2] the object of a perceptual awareness is a particular; [3] a perceptual awareness is related by positive and negative concomitance to its object in that it is caused by its object; and [4] a universal is unreal in that it is incapable of causing an effect. PV3.1–3 is the locus classicus for [1] and [2]. Passages relevant to [3] and [4] include:

PV3.59: There is independent apprehension [i.e., perception unmediated by concepts] of that object with which, due to the causal capacity of that object, that awareness is related through positive and negative concomitance. A thing that is other than that [i.e., one that is not concomitant with awareness in that fashion] is beyond the senses. [buddhir yatārthasāmarthyād anvayāyatirekīti / tasya svatantram grahanam ato nyad vastv aṭīndriyam].

PVin ad 1.1 (152b7–153a1): There are two kinds of objects (artha): the directly perceptible (pratyakṣa) and the remote (parokṣa). Of these two, the directly perceptible is that to which the form (bdag nyid ≈ rūpa) of the image in awareness conforms through positive and negative concomitance. It is a unique, real thing, namely, the particular. The other does not have the capacity to directly place its own form in awareness, so it cannot be [directly] perceived (rtoogs pa ≈ upalabhī). [don ni rnam pa gnyis nyid de mngon sum dāng / ldog tuayar pa’o / de la gang zhig shes pa’i snang ba bbag nyid kyi tjes su ‘gro ba dang ldog pa’i tjes su mthun par byed pa de ni mngon sum ste / de ni thun mong ma yin pa’i dngos po’i rang bzhin te rang gi mthshan nyid do / gzhan ni blo la dngos su rang gi ngo bo ’joq pa’i nus pas stong pa’i phyir rtoogs par mi ’thad pa nyid do/].

PV3.50: A universal cannot even perform the telic function of simply producing a sensory awareness of itself. And precisely (eva) because it is incapable of that, it has no nature (arūpa) [i.e., it is unreal, cf. PVP:143a5], for this incapacity for telic function is the definition of unreal things. [jenamārthārthakaranā ‘py ayoṣya ata eva tat / tad ayoṣyatārūpam tad dhy avastuśi lakṣaṇam].

53 Note that part of what is at stake here is the general issue of what is meant by “perceptible” (dṛṣya), for which see Kellner (1999). The notion that the perceptibility is the minimal telic efficacy required of a particular comes from Dharmakīrti’s comments in PVSV ad PV1.282 (G:149.21–150.2), where he argues that an existent thing’s cessation is not caused, but is inherent to that thing itself. The passage reads:

We say the following: For those existent things that, having been known [i.e., perceived] at some time by someone, are not now known, their cessation is invariably concomitant with their existence. They, being produced, are established to be impermanent. The reason for this is that the following is not possible: [1] that those things have the nature of producing an awareness of themselves yet later (punah), not having ceased, no longer produce such an awareness; or [2] that they would depend upon something else in order to produce that awareness. Neither of these is possible because they are established to have the nature of producing that awareness. And inasmuch as those things are thus not dependent on others to produce such an awareness, no awareness of them would ever cease. And there is no such real thing because every real thing is known by some knower at some time and place. If the thing in question were not capable of even the telic function of producing an awareness, then it would not be a real thing (vastu). For, as I will explain [in the Pratyakṣpariccheda], real things have that [ability to produce an awareness] as their defining characteristic. [ye kācit kvacit kenačidj
Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:5a6ff ≈ K:534.29ff) interprets the underlined phrases as a response to the objection, “such would not be the case with a produced entity that is not an object of knowledge” [on kyang byas pa shes bya ma yin pa de ltar mi ‘gyur ro; K: yat tarh ajnīyam kṛtakam aktaṁkam vā tān naṁv bhavijñāṭṝ]. He thus understands “there is no such a real thing” to mean “there is no such a thing that is not an object of knowledge” [PVT (nye:5a6); de lta bur gyur pa shes bya ma yin pa (PVT: zhes bya ba ma yin pa, PVT-p (nye:6a1): zhes bya ma yin pa, but K:534.30): na caivamvītum ajñīyam kīṃcid asti]. Hence, the reason, “because every real thing is known by some knower at some time and place,” indicates a basic requirement of real things; in effect, a real thing must be perceived. However, these two dotted phrases can be read this way only if the objection raised by Śākyabuddhi is supplied. Otherwise, the phrases are construed more naturally with the preceding phrase, and they would therefore mean: “there is no such [a real thing, i.e., one of which the perception never ceases] because every real thing is known by some specific person at some specific time and place.” The next statement—that a real thing must at least be capable of creating a perception—would then mean simply that one cannot explain the cessation of the perception by recourse to its transition from a manifest to an unmanifest (but still existent) state.

Note also that Devendrabuddhi (PVP:143a ad PV3.50) repeats the assertion that the ability to produce a perception of itself is the minimal telic efficacy that real things have: “Things at least have the telic efficacy of producing an awareness of themselves” [rang gi yul la shes pa skyed par byed pa gang yin pa ’di ni don byed pa’t ma gyur pa yin no; ≈ PVV ad cit.: antyā hiyam bhāvāni arthakriyā yaduta svāfānājananam].

The three forms of conceptual spurious perception mentioned in the verse are: “erroneous awareness” (bhāntiṣaṇā), “conventional/linguistic awareness” (āmsaṃataṇā), and “inferential awareness and so on” (anumānī). These categories are based upon Dignāga’s brief treatment of error (PS1.1.7cd–8ab). We are concerned here only with “erroneous awareness,” which is actually a form of perceptual illusion. All cases of nonconceptual spurious perception correspond to what we would call perceptual illusions. For more on Dharmakīrti’s theory of error, its relation to Dignāga’s theory, and its subsequent interpretation, see Funayama (1999).

54 Conceptual and nonconceptual perceptual illusion are included under the general category of “spurious perception” (pratyakṣābhāṣa), described by Dharmakīrti at PV3:288: “There are four kinds of spurious perception: three kinds of conceptual awareness and one that is a nonconceptual awareness that arises from disturbances in the physical basis [i.e., the faculty].” [trividham kalpanāṇānam āsrayopapāvatāhavam / avikalpakam ekam ca pratyakṣābhām caturvidham //].

55 Dharmakīrti describes conceptual error in PVS ad PV1.98–99ab (G:49–51). For the notion that habituation conditions the determinations that follow upon a perception, see, for example, PV1.58 and PVS ad cit. (G:32.1ff), translated in the next chapter (n.59).

56 This case is the most frequently cited, but other cases include: the perception of a lightcircle made by a quickly whirled torch, the perception of trees as moving from the perspective of a person traveling on a boat, and various perceptual effects caused by the imbalance of the body’s humors. See NB1.6.

57 This point is made in PV3.359–362, where Dharmakīrti discusses the reasons for claiming that the subject/object duality in our perceptions is actually unreal. Note here that the kind of cognition that arises from “internal distortion” (antarupaplava) is compared to more familiar illusions (i.e., the cataract-hairs illusion), and that distortion must therefore amount to a defect in the mind or mental faculty itself, rather than a mere misconstrual of its object. The verses in question read as follows:

Things do not ultimately have the nature [such as being an apprehended object (grāhīyacādi)] that they are perceived to have because they have neither a singular nor a multiplicitous nature [PV3.359].

“But according to worldly convention (loke), due to experiencing some similarity, an illusion arises because one determines that which does not have such-and-such a nature as having that nature. But in this case, that is not possible because on your view not even one entity in the world is observed to have that nature [of being an apprehended external object and such]”
See, for example, PVSV ad PV1.144a (G:69.21ff): the entity they adduce as the object is permanent, while the other entity is impermanent. It is thus incapable of producing that cognition, then it is always incapable of doing so.

See below, 126.

Records two sides to the debate: Vākyažyana's statement, kalpanāpi svamamvitāv istā nārthe vikalpanā (PS1.1.7ab). Note also the slippage here between object and image. Usually, in speaking of perception we consider the object to be a particular because it is the cause of the image. Here, however, we are speaking of the image itself, and not its cause, as a particular.

Cf. Tillemans (1995a). And see PVSV ad PV1.198, where Dharmakīrti notes:

It is claimed that a universal is permanent because if it were impermanent, it would not be the same (aneka) in all instances because one thing [i.e., the universal] would arise [in the first moment] and another [i.e., something different than the universal] would arise [in the next moment]. Therefore, the cognition of its instances as the same would not be possible, just as the instances (bheda) cannot themselves induce such a cognition. [nityaṃ hi sāmānyam īṣyate / anityatve 'parāparotpatter anekatvāḥ bhedavad ekapratyayāyogyāt'].

The view that a universal must in some sense be constant or unchanging runs throughout the different strands of South Asian philosophy. It appears to begin with the grammarians, as in Kātyāyana's well-known phrase from the first Vārttika, "If the relation between expression and object (arthā) is established [siddhe ṣabdārthasambandhe]..." (cf. Biardeau 1964:35). In the various interpretations considered by Patañjali in his subsequent commentary, the common theme is that "is established" (siddha) must mean "is permanent" (nitya). In terms of the object (arthā), Patañjali records two sides to the debate: Vājapāyana, for whom a class property (ākṛti) is the object, and Vyādī, for whom the object is a substance (dravya) (Scharf 1996:48ff). As depicted at the outset of the Mahābhāṣya (see the translation in Biardeau 1964:44ff), each side supports its claim by noting that the entity they adduce as the object is permanent, while the other entity is impermanent. It is thus clear that, if Patañjali's debates reflect early grammatical concerns, the issue of the object as permanent was central to the earliest layer of philosophy of language in South Asia.

See below, 126.

See, for example, the argument against the perception of permanent universals in PV3.18ff. The pivotal verse (PV3.21) in this argument reads: "That permanent universal that is capable of producing a cognition of itself is only [i.e., always] capable. If, on the other hand, it is sometimes incapable of producing that cognition, then it is always incapable of doing so." [ātmani jñānajananā yac chaktaṃ suktam eva tat / athāsuṣṭam kādía ced eṣuṣṭam sarvaḍaiva tat //].

Arguments about change and causal efficacy are also prominent in Dharmakīrti's critique of a "permanent" (nitya, "eternal," "unchanging") God as world-creator (PV2.8–9 and 23–30). These arguments often rest not only on the notion that permanent things cannot be modified by the addition or subtraction of qualities, but also that production is sequential and that sequentiality presupposes change; I have assumed these latter two axioms for the presentation here. See PV2.43ab
the argument for momentariness from existence (i.e., the so-called "continuity"
[naḥkramat kramino bhāvāḥ nāpy āpekyāvāḥśeṣāḥ]). See also PVSV ad PV.259 (G:135.14ff) [kim punar 
calitāvasthāsabhāvāṇāṁ akṛtaṁkām kathatcit sthitāṁ pūrvaśāhāyāgam 
antaraḥnyathābhāvāyogāt)]. Other passages include PV1.35 ad PVSV ad cit. (G:22.20ff) and HB (e.g., 

64 Below we will see that, on Dharmakīrti’s view, a universal is constructed by construing a cognitive 
image in terms of a negation. The image accounts for the phenomenal content in conceptual and 
linguistic cognitions; the negation accounts for the distribution required by thought and language. 
On this theory, the universal qua image is indeed causally efficacious, and as such, it is a particular. 
But when conceived in this way, it is not distributed, and it is therefore not actually a universal 
because it lacks distribution. See below, 113ff.

65 The general style of critique employed by Dharmakīrti to refute hypostasized entities has been 
discussed above, 37ff. Dharmakīrti’s specific position on the non-distinction of properties and 
property-possessors is found, for example, at PV1.43 and PVSV ad cit. (G:26.2ff) and ad PV1.52–55 
(G:29.10–31.4). This theory is a crucial element in his argument for the use of one property (svabhāva) 
as evidence for another property. See the next chapter.

66 Some details of this process of abstraction are discussed in the next chapter; the most relevant 
passage in Dharmakīrti’s work is PV1.59–60 and PVSV ad cit., translated below (ch.4, n.24).

67 Dharmakīrti makes this point at a number of places, including the discussion of momentariness at 
PV1.33 and PVSV ad cit., where he remarks, for example, "It is not correct that a quality which is not 
established when some thing is established is a property of that thing; nor can one say that a quality 
whose causes are different from the causes of some thing is a property of that thing." [G 20.20–21: na 
hi tasmin niṣpanne ‘niṣpanne bhinnaḥhetu vā tatsvabhāvo yuktah].

The fact that all the properties predicative of a thing come into existence with that thing is 
the ontological basis for Dharmakīrti’s claim that one property can serve as invariable evidence for 
another property, and it is implicit in the oft repeated phrase bhāvanārūṇodhīna (i.e., that the 
property to be proven is "invariably concomitant with the mere presence" of the property adduced 
as evidence). See the extensive discussion below in chapter 3.

68 Cf. PVSV ad PV.1.282 (G:149.11ff). In this section I have presented the argument for momentariness 
in a way that is meant to bridge the argument concerning the causelessness of cessation (vināśa) with 
the argument for momentariness from existence (i.e., the so-called sattvānumāna; see especially 
Oetke 1993 for an extensive treatment). Steinkellner (1968) has suggested that the argument from 
existence is more prominent in Dharmakīrti’s later texts, but he clearly does not mean to vitiate the 
strong continuity that runs between the refutation of any cause for cessation, on the one hand, and 
the argument from existence, on the other. That continuity springs from Dharmakīrti’s theory of 
properties as it relates to causality and perception. It is in this regard that we see both arguments in 
PV and PVSV, where Dharmakīrti not only refutes caused cessation, but he also makes extensive use 
of the argument from existence (PVSV ad PV1.192–197; G97.18–100.26). Other, less extensive 
passages include:

PV1.186: upāddhībhāddapeko vā svabhāvāḥ kevalo ‘thavā / ucye ādhyāsidhyartham nāśe 
kāryatvasattvavat // and PVSV ad cit. (G:93.12–13): sāmāṇyaṇa yathānityatva eva sattvam kvacit 
svabhāvabhūta dharmaviśeṣaparigraheṇa yathā tatraśvātāt. See also PVSV ad PV1.187 
(G:93.17): yadī sattvam anityatve anyatra vā hetuḥ syāt /; and PVSV ad PV1.251ab (G:129.23–25): 
anityam yatnasambhūtām pauruṣyam kathāṁ na tat / āvasyam hy anityam utpattimata kāśicād 
bhavati / tathaḥ hy ākāsmikate sattvavasyā devaśāṇaśya na syāt ity uktam.

Note also that Dreyfus (1997:64–65), citing Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan Sa skyā paṇḍita, refers to 
Dharmakīrti’s use of “two contradictory meaning of disintegration [=vināśa] to ‘trick’ his orthodox 
adversaries into assenting to his argument.” These two meanings are “a thing being in the process 
of disappearing” and “the more usual connotation of the concept, that is, that a thing has already 
ceased to be.” However, if there is such an ambiguity, it appears to be much exacerbated by the 
Tibetan translations, which often fail to distinguish adequately between different terms and 
grammatical forms in Sanskrit. See, for example, the Tibetan translation of PV1.193 and PVSV ad cit. 
(G:98.6–9; PVSV-D:316a4–5) where vināśa is translated as ‘jig pa, and vināśyantaḥ, vināśvāra and 
naśvara are all translated as ‘jig po’i ngang tshul can.

70 Both of these passages are translated in full in the appendix.

71 We could also raise other equally pressing issues, although they seem to have been less significant for Dharmakīrti and his earliest commentators. For example, suppose that 1) a conglomerate is a particular; 2) commonsense objects such as a football are therefore particulars; and 3) particulars, as Dharmakīrti maintains, are partless (anumaṇa). In that case, when we see a football, we should see the entire football, since a football as a particular is partless. Thus, no part of the football is unseen when we look at it. This would absurdly require that we see that we can see all sides of the football simultaneously, even the part of the football that is pressed against the ground. Or, we may wish to allow that a minimally sized color-patch is a particular, and not a commonsense entity such as a football. But in that case, we would have to account for the fact that, for example, when I put on my reading glasses, a conglomerate of atoms that was a moment ago not a particular has now become a particular because I can now see it. In effect, we would be making particulars dependent upon the various sense faculties and minds of different persons: that which is a particular for one person would not be a particular for another. This type of subject- or mind-dependency contradicts the basic motivation of External Realism—namely, the assertion of a mind-independent objectivity.

72 I borrow from Tillemans (1999a:9) the helpful use of the term “congruence” in the context of correspondence. Drawing on Kirkham (1995), Tillemans distinguishes between “correspondence as congruence” and “correspondence as correlation.” He notes that “both types are correspondence theories in that a certain fact must exist if the relevant proposition, statement or belief is to be true. The first type, congruence, involves an added condition, viz., that there be a structural isomorphism, a type of mirroring relation between the truth-bearer and a fact. The second type, i.e., correlation, is a weaker type of correspondence, where there is no such isomorphism, but where it suffices that the fact exist for the statement or understanding to be true.”

73 See above, 39.

74 Uddyotakara’s discussion of the śabda-rtha (NV:659–694 ad NS2.2.59–69) is a useful source for the range of theories concerning the degree to which a universal or class-sign (jātis) is the object of conceptual and linguistic cognitions. See also Biardeau (1964), Scharf (1996) and Much (1994).

75 PV3.194: saṃcitāḥ samudāyaḥ sa sāmānyam tatra cāksadhiḥ / sāmānyabuddhiḥ cāvaśyam vikalpaṇaḥubadhyate //.


77 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:189b1), commenting upon the verses cited above, clarifies how the latter particles gain a distinctive property-svabhāva by virtue of the proximity of the previous particles in the same continua. He remarks (words from the verses are italicized):

Due to a relation with other things—i.e., due to the presence of conditions which create the property-svabhāva that is the capacity to produce an awareness—other infinitesimal particles—those that have the capacity to produce an awareness—arise from their substantial causes, namely, previous infinitesimal particles [in the same continuum] that do not have that capacity. The word ‘aggregated’ expresses those particles that have their respective capacities which are attained when they are in proximity with this and that other particle. [don gzhan dang ni mgon ‘drel phyir / rnam par shes par skyped par byed pa’i nus pa’i rang bzhiṃ skyped pa’i rkyen nye ba’i phyir / rdul phra rab nye bar len pa’i rgyu sngar nus pa med pa dag las rnam par shes pa skyped par byed pa’i nus pa / rdul phran gzhan dag skye ’gyur ba / de dag gzhan dag gzhan thag nye ba’i gnas skabs thob par gyur ba’i so sor nus pa rnams bsags pa’i sgras bshad do].

Devendrabuddhi (PVP:189b,4ff) also notes an objection raised earlier by Dignāga (Hattori 1968:26) whereby the notion of an āyatanasvalakṣaṇa is raised as evidence for the claim that the Buddhists are actually positing a whole as the object of perception:

... in regard to this objection concerning āyatanasvalakṣaṇa, the special quality of producing awarenesses that arises in infinitesimal particles due to their relation with other arthas arises from the transformation of their former respective continua that are in mutual conjunction (phan tshun nye bar ‘gro ba). That distinctive quality will not arise without other particles that are occurring without interstice because that kind of particle on its own does not have the
nature of producing awareness. Hence, since awareness does not have any necessary relation to a single particle—since awareness does not have the property-svabhāva of being necessarily related to the establishment of a substance which is a single particle, and since the capacities of those particles together produces a single awareness as their effect, they are said to be the common object of an awareness. As a universal (spyīr = sāmānya), they are all the object of the awareness, but the awareness is not necessarily related (nges pa = niyata) to any single one of them. In other words, that awareness is the common effect of all of them. [... ‘di la yang rūḍh prīnaṃ kṛṣṇa guṇaṃ dhanam dāng ‘brel ba la rṃam par shes pa skye bar byed pa’i khyad par skye bar ‘gyur ba’i khyad par de yang gal te yang de dag phan tshun nye bar ‘gro la la sos pa la rten pa can bdag nīdy iī la ba bzhin dū ruvgū dṣṇa ma yongs su gyur pa las skye bar ‘gyur ba de na yang / de yul chod pa med pa la sos pa la gnas na / rūḍh prīnaṃ dhan pha dag med pa ni / med par ‘gyur te / de ’dra ba ni skyed par byed pa’i rang can nīdy ma yīn pa’i phīrol / de ba na de gcig nges med phīry / shes pa de ni rūḍh prīnaṃ gyi rdzas kṛṣṇa ma rṇam par ‘joq pa nges pa’i rang bzhin can ma yīn pa niyid kyi phīry dāng / de dag gi lhan cig pa’i nus pa rṃams ni’bras bu rṇam par shes pa gcig skyed par byed pa’i phīry shes pa mthungs pa’i spyod yul can du bshad / spyīr de dag tham cad ni de’i spyod yul can yīn kyi / shes pa de re re la so sor nges ma pa yīn te / de dag thams cad kṛṣṇa de ni thun mong gi’bras bu yīn no zhes bya’i don to].

78 NBh (499–500) ad NS2.1.35–36:

How is one to question a person who, denying the reality of a whole and thinking, “perception should not be lost,” claims that the object of perception (darsanaviṣaya) is a heap (saṃcaya) of infinitesimal particles? One should ask about the object of a cognition of a perceived object as singular, as in the cognition, “This substance is singular.” That is, one should ask, “Does a cognition of singularity have an undifferentiated entity as its object, or does it have a differentiated entity as its object?” If it has an undifferentiated entity as its object, then since awareness does not have the property-svabhāva of being necessarily related to any single one of those particulars that in conglomeration (samastāḥ) perform a single effect have no distinction from each other in that they perform that effect. Therefore, it would be pointless to express any such distinction. For this reason, in order to refer (niyojana) to all of them at once, people apply (niyuktā) one expression to them, such as “water-jug” (ghata). Those particulars that form a water-jug are all equally (aviaśa) different from their respective homologues and heterologues, but since they contribute to the fulfillment of that purpose [such as containing water], they are distinguished from others that do not fulfill that purpose.

79 NV (500) ad NS2.1.35–36 (cited also by Keyt:190): ekabuddher viṣayam paryayovijñānaḥ kim anuyogtāvaya iti / ekam idam dravyam ity ekabuddher viṣayam paryayovijñānaḥ kim anuyogtāvaya iti / yadā nānāviṣayā yathā nānāviṣayā, bahuśv adarśanād ayuktā na ca bahuśv ekam idam iti yuktāh pratyayam / athāḥbhumārtha-viṣayetāḥ sa ev ekabuddher viṣayāḥ sa ‘vayaviṣṭā.  

80 PV3.200–207. Although the term citra literally means “multicolor,” Dharmakīrti and his followers employ the term metaphorically to refer to any type of multiplicity that is meant to be attributed to a single entity. See, for example, the use of the term by Devendrabuddhi (PVP:192bff) and Śākyabuddhi (PVT: nye, 200bff).

81 Readers who wish to examine these arguments can consult the appendix, where they are translated in full.

82 Neither Devendrabuddhi (PVP:189b1ff, translated above, 77) nor Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:198a6ff) explicitly cite PV1.137–142, but that passage appears to be the source of their interpretations.

83 See PVSV ad PV1.137–142 (G:68.7–12):

For instance, those particulars that in conglomeration (saṃastāḥ) perform a single effect have no distinction from each other in that they perform that effect. Therefore, it would be pointless to express any such distinction. For this reason, in order to refer (niyojana) to all of them at once, people apply (niyuktā) one expression to them, such as “water-jug” (ghata). Those particulars that form a water-jug are all equally (aviaśa) different from their respective homologues and heterologues, but since they contribute to the fulfillment of that purpose [such as containing water], they are distinguished from others that do not fulfill that purpose.
Hence, due to that nondifference, they are cognized (pratyāyante) without distinction from each other. [ye samastāḥ kintu kāram kurvanti tathāṃ tatra viśeṣāḥ śāhāvād aśāhūkā viśeṣaśodaneti saktārṣēṃṇīyogārtham ekām ahyam lokāḥ śābām teṣu niyantakate ghatā iti / te 'pi sajñāyad anyatā ca bhedaśeṣe 'pi tatreśayogāṇāgatāyad tadyanēbhya bhidyanta ity abhedāḥ tato viśeṣaḥ pratyāyante /].

84 PVSV ad PV1.137–142 (G:68.21–24): ye 'pi prthak samastā vā kvacid upayuṣyante ta avasthāviśeṣaśābānādhiḥ śraddhā eva śābānāḥ pratyāyārtham khyāyante sanidrānāḥ sarpratīkāḥ vetti tadyanēbhya bhedaśāmānyena.

85 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:163a4ff-K:272.31ff): avasthāśābādaḥ adhikṛtyāḥ / ye 'pi prītyāḥ / ye 'pi nīlāḍaḥparamānaḥ / (273)prthāg itī niślapitaṇḍayāḥ parasparānakeśāḥ samastāḥ vetti parasparasaṃsātah / kvacid iti caksuṛśājñāne svadeśe paraśyaṭpaṭitprātibandhe / svākhā eva pratyāyārtham / ekasāṃc chāhūhām nīśagārhām / tatra ye caksuṛśājñāne upayuṣyante / te 'väśaṭī śāvāśācārināḥ sanidrānāḥ ity ucyante / ye svadeśe paraśyaṭpaṭiṃśa prātighnānī / te sarapratīkāḥ iti / nanu nīlapitādayo 'tṛantabhinnāms te kathām elena sanidrānādīśadabocanācyanta iti ata 'āha / tadyanēbhya bhedaśāmānyeneti / tadyanēbhya 'nīdarṣaṇaḥpratigṛhībhya yo bhedaḥ sa eva teṣāṃ sāmānyam sarveṣāṃ tato vyāvīttatvāt / tena hetunā. / PV163a4ff: gnas skabs kyi sgra’l dbang du byas nas gang yang zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / gang yang zhes bya ba ni sgon po la sogs pa’i rūdul phra rab dag go / so zhes bya ba ni sgon po dang ser po la sogs pa phan tshun llos po med pa dag go / sūd pa zhes bya ba ni gi cga li gcig ‘dus pa dag go / ‘yā’ zhi ‘gcs bya ba ni mig gi rnam ran shes pa’am / rang gi yul du gzh "% byung ba’i leds byed pa la’o / ci gcig shes pa nyid kyid don du zhes bya ba ni sgra’i gcig gcigs ’byung ba’i leds byed pa gan yin (163b) pa de dag la ni thogs pa dang bcas pa zhes bstan to / sgon po dang ser po la sogs pa dag ni shin tu tha dad pa ma yi nam / de dag bstan du yod pa la sogs pa’i sgra’i gcig gcis ji tita brjod ce na / de’i phyir de dag gzh and dag las la tha dad pa’i spyi nyid du zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos de / ni gzh bstan du med pa dang thogs pa med pa dag las la tha dad pa gan yin pa de nyid dag gi spyi yin te / thams cad de dag las zlog pa nyid kyi phyir ro / gtan tshigs de bas na.’

86 Just before the passage cited above, Śākyabuddhi remarks: “Moreover, in the third chapter, [i.e., at PV 3.194ff] he will explain how it is that, even though there is no part-holder [or ‘whole’], the object of sense perception is just infinitesimal particles.” [ji itar yel lag can med par yang rūdul phra rab kho na mnog sm yi yul yin par de ni le’u sūm la pa ‘chad par ‘gyur ro (161a7–b1); Skt. preserved in K (272): yathā vāntaraṇāpya avayavānaya pariṇāmya eva pratikṣāyā visāya tathā tūṣye [sāmbhyānyāna reads: dvīfye] pariccheda pratipādayāt.yate. Note here the typical inversion of subject and predicate in the Tibetan translation.

87 McClintock (2003:168–69, n.85) notes that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla, following Dharmakīrti, also hold this position. She translates the relevant verse (TS 583): “Those infinitesimal particles which arise as mutually supportive are not beyond the senses, because they are the objects of the senses” [anyonyābhisaśā caivaṃ ye jāraḥ paramānaḥ / naividrītyāḥ teṣāṃ aksānāṃ gocaratvataḥ //]. And she also translates Kamalāśīla’s remark on the verse: “It is not established that infinitesimal particles are beyond the senses, because those particles that have attained a particular state are apprehended by the senses” [asidham anuṣṭāṇā atīdvirajāvā eva paramānāṃ aksānāṃ invyāvāyāvattām]. The notion that infinitesimal particles are perceptible in this sense described here is also supported by Saṅgābhadrā as recounted by Collett Cox (1988:74, n.23). From the perspective of the Abhidharma Typology, this interpretation bypasses āyataṇavālakṣaṇa altogether in favor of dravyasvālakṣaṇa. An important desideratum here is the question of the historical antecedents of Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception. While the allusion to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma is fairly clear in this section, we do not know whether Dharmakīrti had any particular set of Sarvāstivāda theories in mind. Many thanks to Shōryū Katsura for directing me to Cox’s work.

88 Since Keyt’s dissertation (1980) has never been published, it has perhaps become shrouded in a certain degree of obscurity. But it is, in fact, one of the more outstanding recent studies of Dharmakīrti, and I recommend it highly to my readers.

89 See, for example, Keyt (1980:190). Dreyfus (1997:88) adopts Keyt’s analysis of particulars, but neither he nor Keyt herself addresses adequately the contradiction in maintaining, on the one hand, that aggregated atoms do not form a whole, and on the other, that an aggregate is a single, ultimately real particular.

90 It can be argued that in the passage under consideration (PV3.200ff), Dharmakīrti does not adequately address the crux of Uddyotakara’s defense of wholes, namely, that a whole does not in
91 PV3.208: citrabhabhāṣeṣv artheṣu yady ekatvam na yujyate / saiva tāvat kathām buddhir ekā citrabhabhāṣinī//

92 PVP:193a2.

93 PVT (neye:201a2ff): re zhig blo de gcig nyid la / ji ltar du ma snang bar ‘gyur / zhe bya ba ni ‘di snyam du sens te / grub pa’i mtha’ sma ba khyod kyang blo rnam pa dang bcsas pa nyid ’dod do / de ltar na sna tshogs pa’i rnam pa de blo’i bdag nyid du ‘gyur pa yin pa de lta na blo sna tshogs pa’i [m.: s] snang ba can khas blangs pa yin no / de’i phyir ma nges pa yin no zhes bya ba ni gang zhig sna tshogs pa yin pa de ni gcig gi rang bzhin ma yin te zhes bya ba ’bcu’i gtan tshigs ma nges pa yin te / blo gcig gi rang bzhin nyid yin na yang sna tshogs par snang ba nyid kyi phyir ro.

94 That is, Dharmakīrti would no longer have access to particulars, the sole ultimately real entities in his system. And without such access, there would be no means to distinguish concepts that refer (indirectly) to particulars and those that do not, for such a determination is ultimately based upon the telic efficacy that characterizes particulars alone.

95 Some of the many examples include: the use of bhāva to describe smoke (PVSV ad PV1.35; G:22.22ff); the adduction of the ocular faculty as an instance of a multiplicity of its parts. See, for example, NV (472.1ff)

96 That inferences take universals as their objects is evident from PV3.1–3, as well as Dignāga’s statement (cited by Dharmakīrti in PVSV ad PV1.1, G:22.22–24): sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāre buddhārthēdha buddhārthāsūtraḥ dharmadharmihedhena. Note that here buddhi refers to a conceptual cognition. See also the discussions at PV4.80 and PV4.176.

97 The most concise statement of the causal inefficiency—and hence irreality—of universals is found in the Svavṛtti (ad PV1.166, G:84.10): tasmāt sarvam āṃśānyam anarthakriyāyogyatvād avastu. See also PV3.1–3 and the amusing metaphor of the eunuch (PVSV ad PV1.210–211, G:106.27–107.9; translated in chapter 4, 310).

98 See PVSV ad PV1.93 (G:45.32–46.9):

People, however, act upon those things which are able to accomplish their [intended] goal in order to accomplish that goal; it is for this reason that signifiers are applied to objects. [PV1.93] The fact that people would encounter considerable difficulty if they were not to form significations or use expressions is not simply a matter of some pernicious habit (vyasana). Rather, everything that people can cognize, whether an expression or something else, is an undertaking—a practical action—for the sake of some goal. This is so because fruitless undertakings will be ignored. Therefore, it makes sense that a person who is applying expressions to something should have a desired effect in mind. And all goals are defined as either the attainment of what one desires or the avoidance of what one does not desire. Therefore, since such is the definition of a goal, a person uses expressions or pays attention to the use of expressions with the intention, “I should act on that”; or “I should avoid that”; or “I should have someone act on that”; or “I should have someone avoid that.” Otherwise, one would pay no attention to language. [api pravarteta pumāni viṅgāryarthakriyāksamāni/ tat sadhanāyety artheṣu satyojante bhidhāyokāḥ /93/ na khalu vai vyasanam evaital lokasya yaḥ ayam asamketayann aprayuñjāno vā śabdān dukkhām āśā / kim tarhi / sarva evaśyāvadhaya ārambhāḥ phārthāḥ / nīphādamabhamadhyopacaiṇyāyaḥ / tad ayam śabdān api kvacin niyuḍānaḥ phalam eva kimcid iva linam yuktā / tac ca sarvantam āpravatām śāntavat / tenām āntavat / śabdhām adhānānaḥ ca api pravartitavāk kuryām kārayeyann vedaś cā pi duṇḍān niyuḍīti niyoge vādāyita / anyahopekṣaṇāyñātavat/]

99 The work of Siderits (1985, 1991 and 1999) has been especially helpful, despite my disagreement with some of his conclusions. While focusing primarily on Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla, Siderits is nevertheless quite right to note that much of their approach to the apoha-theory is to be found in Dharmakīrti, especially as read through the commentary of Śākyabuddhi. Other modern works of

fact contain or encompass parts, but is rather a distinct entity created by its parts. For Uddyotakara, it is thus illegitimate to point to some incompatibility between the singularity of the whole and the multiplicity of its parts. See, for example, NV (472.1ff) ad NS:2.1.32. But Dharmakīrti’s argument here rests upon his earlier critique of Āśrayāśrayabhāva (PVSV ad PV1.143cddff; G:69.16ff), which undermines Uddyotakara’s defense.
importance to my interpretation especially include those of Tillemans (1999) and Katsura (1991).

On the three types of universals, see PVSV ad PV1.191 (G:95.19ff) and PV3.51cd: sāmānyaṃ trividham tat cabhāvāhāvabhavaniḥśayat. Concerning recognition (pratyabhijñāna), Dharmakīrti’s most thorough account is found in PVSV ad PV1.98–99ab (G:49.16–51.15). The notion that an image itself, being undistributed, cannot be a universal is expressed at, for example, PV3.165–167 and PVSV ad PV1.71cd (G:40.3–12), translated in the appendix. The notion that several entities may be considered the same in that they are all equally different from other entities occurs throughout PVSV. See especially PVSV ad PV1.73 (translated in the appendix).

See, for example, PVSV ad PV1.166 (G:84.22–85.2) and the next chapter (161), where this issue is discussed.

The notion that uniqueness of particulars is ultimately the basis for constructing universals through exclusion is expressed at, for example: PVSV ad PV1.70 (G:38.17ff; see the appendix); PV1.72cd and PVSV ad cit. (G:49.16ff; see appendix); PVSV ad PV1.64 (G:35.2–3); and PV3.169.

The basic role of expectations in the construction of universals is indicated by the repeated use of the term abhinata (“expected”) with relation to the causes and effects on the basis of which a universal is constructed. See PVSV ad PV1.93 (cited earlier, n.98). See also the reference to abhiprayā in PV1.68–70 and PVSV ad cit. (G:39.8; see the appendix for a complete translation). The notion of the negative “limit” (avadihi) in opposition to which an exclusion is constructed appears to occur only once in the Śvaśrtti (i.e., PVSV ad PV1.185), where Dharmakīrti remarks (G:92.23–93.3):

Therefore, it is established that all expressions and concepts have exclusions (viveka) as their objects. Even though these co-referential expressions and concepts depend upon the same real thing, they have different objects; they have different objects because expressions and concepts are established (upalayanādupalayanāḥ) in terms of exclusions that appear in cognition as if they were different; and those exclusions appear different due to those exclusions’ differences that are constructed through the differences in their delimiters (avadihi).

Thus, siddham etat sarve Sābdā vivekaviśayo āvikalpaś ca / ta ete ekavastupratisṛṣatā api yathāsvam avadhibhedopakalpitair bhedair bhinnaväyasyā eva./] Śaṅkyabuddhi (PVT:213a;PVT-s:Pa3–4≈K:347.28–30) defines “delimiter” (avadihi) as follows:

An exclusion’s delimiter is that from which one establishes there to be an exclusion. For example, the delimiter of the exclusion called “product” is “non-product.” Likewise, for the exclusion defined as “impermanence” the delimiter is “permanence,” and so on [i.e., the same is applicable to all other concepts]. [vā vyāptiyāt yato vyavasthāpyate sā tasya avadihiḥ / yathā kṛtakāṅkhyasya vyavachedasyāt kṛtakah / evam anityatvalaṅkaṇasya vyavachedasya nitya ityādi].

The notion that certain entities may be considered nondifferent because they are all different from other entities is emphasized at several places, including PVSV ad PV1.75d (G:42.6ff), PVSV ad PV1.95cd (G:48.4) and especially in PVSV ad PV1.137–142 (see the appendix).

Following Dharmakīrti, we will speak of “things” (bhāvas) such as a “water-jug” (ghaṭa) in a manner that glosses over the more precise treatment whereby the macroscopic water-jug is in fact nothing but microscopic infinitesimal particles. As we have already seen (98ff), this procedure greatly simplifies Dharmakīrti’s task, in that he need not refer constantly to infinitesimal particles.

Although Dharmakīrti specifically discusses the construction of universals in terms of entities having the same types of causes, he tends to focus upon sameness of effect. Passages that mention both ways of constructing sameness include PVSV ad PV1.137–142 (G:68.24–69.2):

Some particulars have the same effect. In order to express that they have that effect, one expresses them with expressions such as “water-jug” provided that the linguistic convention that governs such expressions has already been formed. One can [indirectly] express particulars in that fashion because they are different from particulars that are other than them. Likewise, in terms of having the same cause, one can express what is nonsingular with a single expression in order to facilitate practical action. Examples are “Hereford,” “Jersey cow,” or “a sound arises immediately after effort” or “sound is causally produced.” [yathātakāryās tatkāryacodanāyām tadanyabhedena ghatādi/saṅdāhā kṛtasamayāḥ / tathā kāraṇāpekṣāyāpy aneka...
Other examples include: PVSV ad PV1.40–42 (G:25.19–23): *api tasya bheda ‘sūti / tasmād ekasya bhāvasya yāvantī paramārthaṁ rāvat yasy tadāpyaśāya vyāvyāstayaḥ / tadadhipatiḥkāryasasya tadbhedāt / yāvat yā ca vyāvyāstayas rāvat yāḥ śrutayo ‘tattvāryakaraṇaparīhāreṇa vyāvahārīrthāḥ / yathā pratyāntantaryakah Śābhedaḥ Śābhedaḥ ity atātyāryakaraṇaparīhārthāḥ; PVSV ad PV1.64 (G:35.2–4): asadartha ‘pi / arthaṁ abhinnatāḥ / tasya sarvasyā tatātyakaraṇatayanyeybhyaḥ bhūdyamānāḥ arthaṁ nāvaratī dvantaṃ śāntaparīhāreṇa pra-vartayaity anyahpavasya uktaḥ; and PVSV ad PV1.75d (G:42.5–8): tadadhi arthaḥ api kecit svabhāvabhade ‘pi ekapratyabhijñānādikām arthahāryaṁ kuryantvas tadādyabhād abhinnāṁ ity ucyante ekenā vānākṣa janito ‘tajjanyeybhyaḥ bhedār.


113 PVSV ad PV1.109 (G:56.15–57.7): naiṣa dūṣāḥ / yamṣṭāḥ / ekapratyabhijñānam ānantaraḥ samūḥyataḥ api abhinātā [PV1.109].

111 Although Dharmakīrti could be referring to a number of passages, a likely candidate is PVSV 1.68.57 (K:228.27–30): āpi dhīḥ abhinātā eva tasmāt dhīḥ abhedinī / ekādyātavatābhāvena vyāktīṁ api abhinātā [PV1.109].

112 I have translated svabhāvabheda in accord with the context here, especially as provided by the following verse. As I understand it, the term paramārtha is here meant to convey the notion that ultimately, the Svabhārtha is a non-entity; it is the mere negation that consists of a difference in nature (svabhāvabheda) that distinguishes particulars which perform the "same" function from those that do not. This "difference" is an exclusion (vyāvyāsti), a form of negation, and as such it cannot be a real entity distinct from its instances. This is the most "negative" interpretation of the apoḥa-theory in the sense that little attempt is made here to account for the positive aspects of conceptual cognitions: namely, 1) conceptual cognitions do not present themselves as negations, but are instead experienced with some form of mental content (the word or concept "cow" occurs with some kind of image in the mind); and 2) to be useful, concepts and expressions must bring one into contact with (or simply refer to) particulars; this "referential function" is positive, in that one ultimately gains knowledge of particulars, and not negations.

More "positive" interpretations, which begin immediately after Dharmakīrti and gradually become more pronounced, affirm some positivity in one or both of these ways: a) they stress the importance of words to lead one to particulars. Both a and b are present in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, so these interpretations are not entirely unfailureful, they simply add a degree of emphasis that I understand to be unwarranted.

In his gloss of the compound svabhāvabheda-paramārtha, we find such a case of the “positive” interpretation b in Śākyabuddhi. In a basic sense, the important question here is: what is really the Svabhārtha? A negative interpretation is to say that the Svabhārtha is really nothing at all: it is a negation, and negations do not exist. A positive response is to say that the Svabhārtha is really the particular, but only indirectly so. It is this latter interpretation that colors Śākyabuddhi’s remarks when he glosses svabhāvabhedar-paramārtha (PTV:127a1=Śākyabuddhi): svabhāvabheda ‘nyasyāvantām rūpaṁ sa eva paramārtho ‘nuparcito ‘syeti vigrahāḥ / pāramārthena vyāvyāstva-svabhāvabheda-vyāvyāstavād vilākulpasya (rang gi ngo bo’i khyad par gzhan las leg pa’i ngo bo de nyid don dam pa yin gyi nye bar brtag pa’i ma yin pa yad pa zhes tshig rnam par sbyar te / rnam par rtogs pa ni brig yad pa rang gi mtha’na nyid leg pa’i sgo nas’ongs pa’i phyir ro).

As is clearly seen, svabhāvabheda is taken to be the particular (svālakṣaṇa); bheda is here used much as viśeṣa in expressions such as vṛkṣaṇa-svāhā, “a particular kind of tree,” or even “a particular tree.” In short, svabhāva is here taken to be synonymous with svālakṣaṇa. This is the interpretation taken by Steinkeller (1971:190 and passim). However, since the entire context of the discussion focuses on bheda as difference, and since the next verse stresses not the particulars, but the unreal exclusions, Śākyabuddhis’s interpretation does not seem warranted here.
This appeal to the nature of things becomes apparent when, in a related context, Dharmakīrti remarks:

Indeed, it is not correct (na ... arhati) to question (paryanuyoga) the natures of things, as in “Why does fire burn? Why is it hot, and water is not?” One should just ask this much, “From what cause does a thing with this nature come?” [PV1.167ab (G:84.19–21): na hi svabhāva bhāvanāṃ paryanuyogam arhanti kim agnīr dahaty uṣṇo vā nodakam iti / etāvat tu sāyā kuto 'yaṃ svabhāva iti/].

See above, 94–95.

See above (86) and PV1.168b–c and PVSV ad cit. (G:85.11–13): “An alleged propertysvabhāva that perdures when one instance that it qualifies goes out of existence is not a quality of that thing.” [ya ekasmin vīnasyati / tiṣṭhāty ātmā na tasya / bhedā/].


PV1.169ab and PVSV ad cit. (G:85.21–23): nivṛttār nīsvabhāvatvān na sthānāḥsthānakalpanāḥ / na hy anyāpyoḥo nāma kīm iti tasya ca svabhāvānāmānāyāḥ svabhāvasthitipraøyakalpanāḥ na kalpante.

Dharmakīrti (PVSV ad PV1.61, G:33.5–33.21) draws a distinction between predicate-expressions (dharmavācīśabda) and subject-expressions (dharmivācīśabda). In the course of doing so, he notes that a predicate-expression, which expresses just the mere exclusion itself, cannot allow for the application of other predicates to that exclusion. The passage reads:

“But there would be no difference in the semantic conventions used for the subject and predicate because without the presence of real, distinct things, there is no purpose for it.”

But there is a purpose. To be specific, the basis (pada) for the difference in linguistic conventions for those two expressions [i.e., predicate expressions such as “cowness” and subject expressions such as “cow”] is that the former precludes other differentiating qualities (bheda), while the latter does not. This difference in semantic convention (sāṃketa) conforms to the expectations of the person who is to cognize one’s statement [PV1.61]. When a cognizer [i.e., a listener] who has no expectations concerning the presence of other exclusions wishes to know whether or not the mere exclusion of horse is applicable to a specific gross object, the speaker, in order to inform the listener that that kind of mere exclusion is applicable, makes it known with an expression for which the semantic convention has been constructed in that fashion; that is, the speaker says, “Non-horseness pertains to this” (anaśvatvam asyāt). On the other hand, when a listener who is not without expectations concerning exclusions other than non-horseness wishes to know that applicability of the exclusion of horse, then the speaker employs an expression for the exclusion of horse construed in a manner that does not disallow other exclusions in order to make that object known in that way. That is, the speaker says, “This is a non-horse.” Hence, since in the former case the use of the expression disallows other differences, such an expression can be used to express neither co-referentiality, nor the quality/qualified relation. For example, one cannot properly say, “Its cowness is white.” A predicate-expression such as “cowness” or “horseness” cannot express co-referentiality because the image in awareness, arising as the qualification of the object by the mere exclusion, “non-horseness,” does not appear to be the locus of other predicates by virtue of being the same as the subject it qualifies. And predicate expressions also cannot express the quality/qualified relation because there is no expectation of other exclusions. But in the second kind of expression, namely, a subject-expression, there is the possibility of co-referentiality and the quality/qualified relation. A subject-expression may indicate co-referentiality because, in accord with the semantic convention governing the expression, it indicates that the qualities, which are exclusions, are conjoined to a quality-possessor or subject. Since the subject thus seems to be a unitary thing that possesses various parts, it therefore appears that way in cognition. A subject-expression can also express the quality/qualified relation because one expects other exclusions.
[prayajanābhāvaḥ tu samketaḥbhedo na syāt / tad apy asty eva / tathā hi / bhedaṁtara-pratikṣepat-pratikṛtāḥ tayor dvayoḥ / samketaḥbhedasya padaṃ jñāntarānuruddhināḥ
[PV1.61] yadāyam pratipattā tadanyav-vyavacchedabhañānepektōḥ pindaviśeṣeśvavyavacchedadārmaṁ jñānāt deśe dharmarthe prajñānātraparānārthe prajñānātraśajñānena śabdana prabodhyata anāvatvam asyādityi / yadā punar vyavacchedantaraṁ nirākāraṇaṁ satt kṣetraṁ ichchati tādāpratiprayyavacchedāntare tatraivāsvavyavacchade tathāprakāśāya prayujjate 'naśvo 'yaṁ iti / ata eva pūrvatara pratikṣepatbhedaṁtaraṁvāc chābdavṛttver na sāmānātikāraṇyena viśoṣyate/śyaḥśabhaḥ vā / gotvam asya śūklaṁ iti / tammānāvivṛttena buddhes tādāśrayabhūhāya ekavtenāpratibhāsanāt / nirākārānātvaḥ ca / dvitiye tu bhavati / tathā samketaḥmaṇe na samātattosakalyavacchedadharmaṁ vibhāgavata ekasya samārṣaṇena pratibhāsanāt / vyavacchedāntāraśākāraṇātvaḥ ca /].

Śākyabuddhi (74a7ff) and Kartānakomīn (149.12ff) confirm that in the above passage, the example, “Its cowness is white,” is meant to illustrate an absurd statement. See also Manorathānandin (PVV ad cit.), who remarks that in this case “in that case [i.e., when a predicate-expression is to be used], one says, ‘Its cowness,’ but one does not say, ‘Its cowness is white’” (tādā gotvam asya ity ucyate / na tu gotvam asya śūklaṁ iti).

120 PVSV ad PV1.169cd (G:85.24–25): upapālaṁ ca sāmānyadhiyaṁ tenāpy adūṣanā // nirvīṣayam eva khalav idum mithyaṁjñānām yad anekatvākāream iti na tadāvyaśayaḥśabhaḥvāt sivilī asthitir vā.

121 The interpretation of the “error” (upapāla) as the image itself is provided by Śākyabuddhi (201a1ff; PVT-sj:5b5ff):

And also the other-exclusion that is characterized as the cognitive image in a conceptual awareness is the error—it is the mistake—of a concept involving a universal, that is, of a conceptual cognition. Therefore, that form of other-exclusion also does not exist [PVŚ-s externally (bahir)]. [naṁ par rtog pa ’bod ’boi rnam pa mtshan nyid can gzan ldag par ’gyur ba gang yin pa de ni spyi’i blo ste rnam pa par rtog pa can blo yang bslad cing ’khrul pa yin no / de bas na ’on kyang de yang yod pa ma yin no. PVŚ-s: yāpi vipalaḥ-buddhiḥ-ākāraḥ-samānyayavyavṛttiḥ / sā upapālaṁ ca vibhramāḥ ca sāmānyadhiyaḥ vipalikāyaḥ buddher atah sā ’pi bahir nāsti eva].

Kartānakomīn (327.23) confirms the gloss of error as the image itself: “And also ... error. That is, the universal-image that appears as the same in all the many instances [of the type of entity in question], neither perdures nor does not perdure. Why? Because the object of that false cognition does not exist.

This would yield the translation:

Why is it a false awareness? [Dharmakṛtī says] because... Because a conceptual cognition’s object, a universal which is an image presented as the same in all the many instances [of the type of entity in question], neither perdures nor does not perdure because that object does not exist.

122 Note that Śākyabuddhi (PVT-sj:5b4) would have us read the second part of the comment slightly differently:

Why is it a false awareness? [Dharmakṛtī says] because... Because a conceptual cognition’s object, a universal which is an image presented as the same in all the many instances [of the type of entity in question], neither perdures nor does not perdure because that object does not exist.

123 PV3.9cd–11a: jñānarakṣatayaṁ ’rūthate sāmānye cet prasajye // tathāstātvaḥ adesa ’rtharūpatvena samānataḥ / sarvatva samarūpatvāḥ tadvyaḥārtisamānāyaḥ // tad avastv abhīdayataḥ... See also the appendix (395).

124 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:127a6) remarks:

Since the universal also is by nature awareness itself, we accept that it is a particular. Hence, there is no contradiction raised by the opponent’s objection. [śhes pa’iṅ no bo nyid yin pa’i phyir sphyi yang rang gi mtshan nyid yin par ’dod pa de lite na ’gal ba med do/ cf. PVŚ ad cīt: jñānarakṣatayaṁ sāmānyasyāpi svalaksanātāyaḥ / [stātvaḥ adesaḥ].

125 Summarizing the point here, Devendrabuddhi (PVP:127b1–2) remarks:

Since it is based upon the exclusion, it is the same—that is, it is the same because the cognition appears in that fashion by virtue of depending upon the exclusion of other objects. It does so since it is produced through one’s experience (mthong ba = darśana) of the excluded real thing.
Appearing as such, it is the universal of that object. In this way it is defined as [both] a particular and a universal. [de ldog pa la brten phyir te / mtshungs pa nyid do / don gzhan las ldog pa la brten pa’i sgo nas blo de ltar snang ba’i phyir te / ldog pa’i dngos po mthong ba las skyes pa’i phyir ro / der snang ba de’i spyi yin no / de de ltar rang dang spyi’i mtshan nyid rnam par gnas pa yin no /].

126 This is most notably the case for Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalaśīla. Their account of the three forms of apoha appears to be based upon Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation (See TS:1002–1009 and TSP ad cit.:390–392). Cf. Dreyfus (1997:235ff) and Siderits (1999).

127 PVT-s reads, “three objects that are...”

128 This sentence poses a few philological problems. The first problem concerns sel bar byed, which would suggest an active construction (i.e., kartari prayoga) in the original Sanskrit. This would, however, seem quite odd, since we would be required to account for a kartṛ in that case. I have thus chosen to interpret this as a passive construction. The probable Sanskrit for this gloss of anyāpoha would therefore read: asmadh anyad anyad apohya (note that this construction does not require a plural conjugation).

The second philological problem is the ablative las (‘di las gzhan dang gzhan...). Although this reading is confirmed by the other editions of the Tibetan text, the ablative las is frequently confused with the particle la, which would here stand for a locative case ending. Such a reading would yield the Sanskrit gloss: asmin anyad anyad apohya. This gloss is in some ways preferable to the one given above, for it more clearly shows that the particular is the basis for the formulation of exclusions. This latter gloss also relates more easily to the verse cited by Śākyabuddhi (PV1.40). However, Ratnakṛiti (Aphosadīdhī: 58) and Ṣīnāsrāmirita (Aphapārakāraṇa: 202), who refer to a similar (but not quite identical) threefold formulation, both associate this gloss with vyavacchedamātra, and not with the excluded particular.

Finally, the third problem concerns the meaning that we wish to derive from this gloss. That is, it is clear that Śākyabuddhi wishes to have this way of construing anyāpoha refer to the particular as a unique entity. This would suggest the gloss idam anyasmadh apohya, recorded by Ratnakṛiti and abbreviated to anyasmadh apohya by Ṣīnāsrāmirita. Ratnakṛiti and Ṣīnāsrāmirita are probably referring to some later permutation of Śākyabuddhi’s presentation, and this is one reason for hesitating in adopting their reading. In addition, their gloss requires us to emend the ablative particle las to a ni, and since these are not often confused, our emendation would have to be made on semantic grounds alone. Thus, although idam anyasmadh apohya may well best convey the meaning intended by Śākyabuddhi, I have elected to leave the text as it stands.

129 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:200b3ff,PVT-s:2b2ff):

‘dir ni gzhan sel ba ni rnam pa gsum yin te / re zhig gcig ni ’di las gzhan dang gzhan sel bar byed pa’i phyir rang gi mtshan nyid bzlag po kha na yin no / gang gi dbang du mdzad nas / mthun dngos gzhan gyi dngos dag la / ldog pa la ni brten pa con / zhes bya ba gsums so / ’di yin gyi sras brjod par bya ba nyid du ni ma yin no / gnyis pa ni gzhan good pa’i mtshan rnam par gcom pa tsam yin zhing sngon gyi slob dpon (P: slob ma) dag gis thams cad la khyad par med pa rnam par gzhag pa yin te / thams cad la dags pa tsam la khyad par med pa’i phyir ro / gsum pa ni ’di ’gnas sel bar byed pa’i phyir rnam par rto gni bar las snang ba’i phyir te / gang bstan bcos mdzas pas sara’i brjod par bya ba nyid du bzhed pa zhes bya ba ’di yin no / de la gal te rang gi mtshan nyid ldog pa’i dbang du byas nas brjod par de mi rigs te / de’i bdag nyid du ’gyur ba yin na de zhig pa ’jig pa kha nor ’gyur te / thad pad med pa’i phyir ro / rang gi mtshan nyid gnas pa ggang yin pa de yin de las gzhan nyid du ’dod do/.

{[b2]} ayam atrārthas trividho hy anyāpohā / ekas śāva[d] ... y {[b3]} ... ha / svalbhavaparabhābhūthyāh yasmad vyavahāryāh [ibhājṇāḥ]... yam ca saubalāsāvṛṣayāsva vyavahāraśṛṣayatvena vyavasthāpyate / na tu saubāvṛṣayataḥ / anyāvyavacchedamātraṁ dvitiyaḥ / anyāpohanan anyāpohā iti kṛtvā / yaḥ sarvātṛkābhyyaḥ pūrvācyāryaḥ vyavasthāpyate / pratīṣhādhamātraṁ sarvav... i... śār... vikalpa... {[b4]} [k] sārasaḥ saubāvṛṣayatābhimahāḥ / [ta] ... [ya] ... āhrtān / svalbhāsāvṛṣayābhūthān / tasmān vināśyatā evābhādṛhi / yac ca tathātā bhāṣayānāntaram tat tasmād anyad iyṣeta eva.

130 This is a conjectural reconstruction based upon the Tibetan (PVT:200b4): ’di las gzhan dang gzhan sel bar byed pa’i phyir. See the philological remarks in the previous note.

131 The notion of a “selective” difference or exclusion can be seen in, for example, the following passage (PVSV ad PV1.98–99ab; G:49.16–49.23), which refers to the difference among ultimately distinct things being “glossed over” (samsrṣa) in the act of recognition:
Having seen that things (arthas), although different, accomplish the same telic function (arthakriyā) such as the production of consciousness, one conjoins those things with expressions that take as their object the difference from things that are other than those which accomplish the aforementioned telos. Having done so, one can then recognize that some thing is the same as the aforementioned things, even when one sees another previously unexperienced thing of the same type. [PV1.98–99ab] It has already been said [at PV1.75] that even though things, such as the eye and so on, are distinct, they accomplish the same telic function. A person sees that among things, some accomplish the same telic function, such as the production of an awareness; as such those things are conceptually distinguished from other things that do not do so. Those things thus produce by their very nature a false awareness in that person; that awareness is associated with expressions that have as their object the exclusion of those things from that which does not perform the aforementioned activity. This false awareness is thus the recognition, “This is that.” This recognitional awareness arises because the imprint placed in the mind by that person’s previous experience has been activated [by what s/he is presently seeing]. In this act of recognition the difference between those unique things is glossed over (samarthabhide).

[Janārādhyarthakriyām tām tām drṣṭā bhedāṃ ‘pi kurvataḥ / arthāṃ tadanyavieśa śvayayair dhvanibhiḥ saha / saṁyogya pratyabhijñānāṃ kuryād apy anyadaraśane [PV1.98–99ab] / uktam etat bhedāṃ ‘pi bhāvas tulyarthakriyākāram caḥkṣaśāḥaved iti / tām etkām jñāṇāśāṃ ardhrakriyām eva paśyate vastadharmayāvānēbhyo bhidyamānānāṃ bhāvas tadvyavātivayadhvanisaṃprastām tad evetam iti śvānubhavaḥavisānāṃprabhodhena samarthabhideṇa mithyāpratayanā janayanti].

132 These and other arguments are found at PVSV ad PV1.99cd–107ab. See also PVSV ad PV1.110 (G:57.7–15):

... the nondifference of things consists of the fact that they have the same effect. And that sameness through effect is only the exclusion of that which does not have that effect. It is only that [and not some separate universal] because a real thing which is other than the instances that it modifies and which is distributed over many instances is not observed; it has also been already refuted. [PV1.110a–c]. Indeed, there is no such universal that, although perceptible, does not appear to be different from its instances. I have already stated this [for example, at PVSV ad PV1.99cd–107ab]. If, or if there were such a universal, it would not be located in any of its instances. How could it be the cause of an awareness? And we have already presented a proof for the refutation of such a universal. Therefore, the construction of that type of universal is wrong.

[ekalakṣyataiva bhāvāśāṃ abhedāḥ / sā cānātāravyāśās / eva tadanayāśānuwartanāḥ / vastunāḥ adṛṣṭas prativedhāc ca / na hi drṣṭāṃ vidadvāmāṃpratibhāsanām asati uktam etat sati va kvacid anāśātum katham jñānāhetur iti / prativedhāca vidadvāmāṃ pratikāpānāyukti].

133 For a relevant passage, see PVSV ad PV1.68–70, translated in the appendix. See also the following (PVSV ad PV1.128; G:63.16–64.16). Note that in this passage, I have inserted the example of “tree” and “non-tree” so as to clarify the argument:

The difference [that is the direct object of expressions] has no essential nature (arūpa), That we see it as having an essential nature (rūpavattvena) is simply a case of cognitive confusion. Therefore it is not ultimate. If one maintains otherwise, then one must admit that a real thing cannot have an exclusion which is a real thing because people say, “This has a difference from that.” [PV1.128] An essential nature (rūpa) is what a thing is in terms of the ultimate. If a difference [such as the difference from non-tree] were to have an essential nature, then it would either be essentially the instance that it qualifies [i.e., a specific tree], or else it would be essentially what is not that instance [i.e., it would not be that tree]. If it were in essence that instance itself, then just that instance would be differentiated from those other entities [i.e., non-trees]; no other instance [of a tree] would be differentiated [from non-trees] because what has the nature of that being instance does not have the nature of being something else. Hence, the essential nature of the difference is not to be just that [specific tree], and its essential nature is to be something other than [that tree-instance]. But in that case, therefore, the thing [i.e., the tree-instance] would be excluded from that [difference from non-tree]. Hence, one could not say that the instance [i.e., the specific tree] has a difference from those [i.e., non-trees]. For that which is excluded from something is precisely that latter thing. That is a difference that is one thing cannot pertain to some other thing because they would have no relation between them. If there were a relation, it would have to be the cause/effect relation [because the two entities are different]. In that case, the difference would be an essential property that is produced by the particular. Hence, since things called “differences” and things called “effects” would not be distinct, all effects
would be exclusions that pertain to their causes.

Moreover, if the difference [from non-tree] were in essence something other [than the tree-instance it seems to qualify], then the [difference from non-tree] also would have a difference from that [tree-instance that it qualifies]. Thus, since [the difference from non-tree] would have as its delimiting quality (upādhi) a difference [from that tree-instance], it would not be a difference pertaining to that instance, just as an entirely difference substance does not pertain to that instance. But [the difference from non-tree] is not itself delimited by a difference [from its instances]. Instead, one qualify [the tree saying], “This is [this tree’s] difference from that [non-tree].” Hence, inasmuch as it has no delimiting quality, the difference does not exist. Therefore, the difference is not distinct [from the instance that it appears to qualify], and since there is no third possibility for a real thing [other than being the same as or different from some entity], the difference is not ultimately real. [sa caiyam bheda ṛṇuḥ / ṛṇavattvena tv asya dārṣaṇam kevalam buddhihiplaya eva / tenaivāparamārthaś saṁvāry na hi vastunāḥ / vyāvttīr vastu bhavati bheda Syāsmāt itīrāthā //128//ṛṇaṇḥ hi paramārthaḥ / bhedaś ced ṛṇaṇaṃ syāt / tadvṛṛmaḥ vā syād atadṛṣṭā vā / tadvṛṛye tad eteti nāṁyas tato bhidyeta / na hi tasya ṛṇaṃ anyasya syāt / na tad eva bhedasya ṛṇaṃ / ṛṇaṃ ca niyānyad eva syāt / tataḥ ca bhāvas tasmād vyāvarteta / tataḥ svāmī rasya bheda iti na syāt / yat kalu yadbhedād vyāvartate tad eva tad bhavattii so 'ya bheda iti ca na syāt / na hy anyonyasya bheda bhavati / sambandhābhavyāḥ / sati vā sa kāryakaranāhāvāḥ iti ṛṇaṃ tajjanitaḥ bheda ity aviśeṣāḥ / sarvakāryāni svaśākāraṇāni vyāvartayāḥ vyāh / ṛṇāntaratve ca bhedasya tato 'py asya bheda iti bhedopādhiśvārād vyāvartaravān na bhedaḥ syāt / na hi bhedaṃdhīr eva bheda 'yam ata iti vyāsmindeśāḥ / tataḥ copādhyābhavye bhedaśāvābhavyāḥ syāt / tasmānaḥ vyātiriktaḥ / tathānayataghyābhavacya vastunāḥ na paramārthaḥ /].

134 NV:687.1–4 ad NS2.2.66: yaś caiyam anyāpohāḥ agaur na bhavatii gośabdasāyārthāḥ, sa kim bhāvo 'thābhāva iti {/} yadi bhāvo kim gaur agaur iti {/} yadi gaut naṃstyīnāhāvāḥ {/} atābhau gośabdasāyārthāḥ aho śādārtthakaukaśalām / aśabhās tu na yuktah praśāsampratipattayor avyāyatvāḥ {/} na hi gośabdāravanād abhāvē praśā na vā sampratipattikhā śādārtthā ca pratipattāḥ praśāyate, na ca gośabdaśābhaṃ kaścit pratipadyata iti.

135 See, for example, PVSV ad PV1.68–70, translated in the appendix.

136 This formulation applies only to universals formed on the basis of real things, which are the only types of universals that we are considering here.

137 In addition to PVSV ad PV1.93 (cited above, n.98) see also, for example, the arguments in PVSV ad PV1.94ff against an ultimately existing class-sign (jāti) as the object of expressions (Śādārthā). The point of these arguments is that if the actual content of one’s cognition is a universal, then one will act upon the class-sign, and not upon the particular.

138 PVSV ad PV1.75d (G:42.8–12): kim punar anena bhedalakṣaṇena sāmānyena svalakṣaṇam samānāh iti pratīyeyam athānyay eva / kim caṭāḥ / yadi svalakṣaṇam kathāṁ vikālaṣaya viśayaḥ / anyato vā kathām arthaśrayaḥ / svalakṣaṇa cānityvatādyāpratipātīr atārūpyam teśāṁ cāvastudharmaṁ.

139 On the notion of the beginningless imprint, see, for example, PVSV ad PV1.64 (G:34.23–27):

Someone objects, “But since one excluded thing is not repeated in other things, how can its other-exclusion be a universal?”

It is a universal because it appears that way in the cognition of it, although there is actually no universal per se. A linguistically based cognition occurs in such a way that it associates (sāmānyatāḥ) elemental things that are not [actually] associated, and it does so under the influence of a beginningless propensity to combine cognitive images in this fashion. [kathāṁ idānīṁ ekasya vyāvttīrāṇānyamamād anyavyāvttīrī śāmānyam / tadbudhau tathā pratībhāvaḥ / na vai kārītī śāmānyāḥ nanāśti / śādārthāḥ buddhir anādīśvānādāmnāthīyād asatōṣṭānām api dharmān sāmānyatījāyate /].

See also PV1.205:

The object of an expression is situated in a conceptual cognition that has arisen due to beginningless cognitive imprints; it is one of three kinds of entities (dharma) inasmuch as it is based either upon real things, unreal things, or both. [anādīśvānādāmnāthīvākṣaraparinīṣṭhitah / Śādārthas trivijdo dharma bhāvābhāvobhayābhārayah //].

And PV3.29:
The appearance of an essential nature with regard to a class-sign or the apprehension of an object as if the universal were its essential nature is a cognitive error. That error is caused by the mental conditioning that comes from seeing things that way since beginningless time. [tasyāṃ rūpāvabhāso yas tattvenārthasya vā grahaḥ / bhrāntiḥ sānādikāśīnadarśābhīyāśanirmitā //].

In addition to the passage cited just below, see also PVSV ad PV1.70 (G:38.17–22), ad PV1.72 (G:40.20–21), and ad PV1.98–99ab (G:49.22).

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:96a = K:183) glosses anusaraṇa as niścaya.

PVSV ad PV1.75d (G:42.13–43.7):

naśa doṣaḥ / jñānapratibhāsīny arthe sāmānyasāmānādihikaratvadarmadharmivyavahārāḥ / yad etaj jñānam vastusvabhāvagrāhānubhavānāhītām vāsanām āśritya vikalpakam upadāyate 'tadviṣayam api tadviṣayam iva tadanubhavāhitavāsanāprabhavapratikṣer adhyavastatatadbhāvasvarūpam abhinnaṃkāryapadārthasānter abhinnaṃārthagrahīvā tadanyabheda paramārthasāmānakāram tatra yo 'rthākāraḥ pratibhāti


See PVSV ad PV1.210–211 (G:107.4); translated in chapter 4 (310).

See PV3.53–55 with Devendrabuddhi’s comments (144a–b).

See below, chapter 4 (310ff).
3 Svabhāvapratibandha: The Basis of Inference

In the previous chapter, we have seen that both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti admit only two forms of instrumental objects (prameyas), namely, particulars (svalakṣaṇas) and universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇas). Both philosophers take the existence of only two instrumental objects as the warrant for admitting only two forms of awareness as instrumental: perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Their argument rests in part on the claim that particulars are inexpressible and universals are not causally efficient: being inexpressible, particulars cannot be taken as the objects of thought and language; and since inference involves conceptuality, particulars cannot be the (direct) objects of inference. Likewise, since universals are expressible, they cannot exhibit change. Hence, they cannot create effects, and as such, they cannot be the objects of perception, which is causal.\(^1\)

While this “disjunction” (viplava) between perception and inference distinguishes Dignāga and Dharmakīrti from Brahmanical philosophers, admitting only two forms of instruments of knowledge is not necessarily a significant departure from non-Buddhist South Asian traditions. It is true, of course, that many other traditions do admit more than perception and inference as instrumental. Naiyāyikas such as Uddyotakara accept two additional instruments: analogy (upamāna)\(^2\) and language (śabda/śābda). Mīmāṃsakas who follow Kumārila accept all of these, while also admitting presumption (arthāpatti)\(^3\) and an instrument that they call “nonexistence” (abhāva).\(^4\) But in denying instrumentality (prāmāṇya) to these alleged means of knowledge, Dharmakīrti and Dignāga are often just rejecting the claim that these additional means should be categorized separately. In the case of language, for example, both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti freely admit that language can be a trustworthy source of certain types of knowledge, but their claim is that, in cases where a linguistic cognition is functioning as an instrumental awareness, it is actually a type of inference.\(^5\) Dignāga and Dharmakīrti also admit certain instances of presumption (arthāpatti) as well formed inferences, and one might argue that the same would be true for some instances of reasoning by analogy.\(^6\) The point, then, is that by
accepting only two forms of instruments, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are not necessarily rejecting in toto the other forms of knowledge admitted by their Brahmanical counterparts, they are simply subsuming some forms of knowledge in inference. Indeed, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti share this opinion with one of their Brahmanical counterparts, namely, Praśastapāda.\(^7\)

Of the two forms of instruments of knowledge admitted by Dharmakīrti, we have already covered the most salient issues in Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception in the course of the previous chapter’s discussion of particulars, the objects of perception. In the present chapter, we shall focus upon Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference.

Dharmakīrti follows the basic structure of inference discussed in chapter 1.\(^8\) He accepts two overall categories that bear the name “inference”: they are “inference-for-oneself” (svārthānumāna) and “inference-for-others” (parārthānumāna). Strictly speaking, “inference-for-others” is not actually an inference at all; rather, it consists of proof statements adduced with the intention of inducing another to infer what one already knows. It is an “inference” inasmuch as its goal is an inferential cognition; so too, it employs the basic theory of inference described in the context of “inference-for-oneself.” As before, “inference” here will be used to refer to “inference-for-oneself,” unless otherwise noted.\(^9\)

3.1 Relation through Svabhāva: Beyond “Co-Presence”

In contemporary scholarship on the topic, it is generally agreed that one of Dharmakīrti’s major innovations lies in his approach to the relations among the members of an inference, and that this innovation stems from his attempt to solve a central problem in the theory of his Buddhist predecessor, Dignāga. In brief, the problem is that, on Dignāga’s theory, the presence of the evidence (hetu, liṅga) does not necessarily entail that the property to be proven (sādhya-dharma) is also present.\(^10\) Although one can point to two technical issues in the way Dignāga structured his theory that create this lack of certainty,\(^11\) the basic source of this doubt is the epistemic problem of induction: how can we arrive at a general rule—such as the fact that smoke always indicates fire—by extrapolating from a finite number of observations? Despite all of our previous experiences and all that we can now observe, is it not possible that the case at hand (or some future case) does not (or will not) conform to those experiences and observations?\(^12\)

We can understand Dharmakīrti’s response to this problem as an attempt to move away from the grounding of the pervasion relation (vyāpti) in any appeal to “mere observation and nonobservation” as the bases for establishing the two aspects of pervasion, namely positive and negative concomitance (anvaya and vyatireka).\(^13\) That is, on Dharmakīrti’s view one cannot establish the positive concomitance by merely seeing that in every
case where, for example, smoke is observed, fire is also observed; nor can one establish the negative concomitance merely by the fact that one has not observed a case where smoke is present even though fire is absent. Instead, in order to draw a well formed inference, one must be able to specify the manner in which the evidence (smoke) is related to the predicate (fire), such that every instance of the former must be accompanied by the latter.\textsuperscript{14}

Although Dharmakīrti does not put it this way, the specification of this relation involves two separate tasks. First, one must show what would constitute the type of relation sought here, namely, a pervasion relation (vyāpti) that guarantees our ability to infer the predicate from the evidence. Second, one must have a procedure for determining cases in which that relation is in place. Of these two tasks, I will focus upon Dharmakīrti’s formulation of the pervasion relation between evidence and predicate. Besides being an area that requires clarification, his views on pervasion—or more accurately, the more fundamental relations on which pervasion is based—are particularly innovative.

On Dharmakīrti’s view, the relation (the vyāpti or “pervasion”) between evidence and predicate cannot be a matter of mere co-presence or cooccurrence (sahabhāva).\textsuperscript{15} Instead, that relation must always amount to an avinābhāvaniyama: a nomological “rule” (niyama) or restriction whereby the evidence (hetu, liṅga) does not occur (na bhavati) without (vinā) the predicate (sādhya).\textsuperscript{16} This type of relation will never be “misleading” (vyabhicāra); that is, since our rule (niyama) tells us that the evidence (such as smoke) cannot occur without the predicate (such as fire), the evidence must be an indicator (gamaka) of the predicate (e.g., smoke will always indicate fire). In short, Dharmakīrti argues for a necessary relation between evidence and predicate, and he calls this relation a svabhāvapratibandha, a term that I will leave untranslated, although it may be rendered as a “natural relation.”\textsuperscript{17}

On Dharmakīrti’s view, a svabhāvapratibandha comes in two forms or modes. It may be a case of “production-from-that” (tadutpatti), which I will call the “production-mode,” or it may be relation of identity (tādātmya), which I will call the “identity-mode.” These two relations provide the basis for Dharmakīrti’s two forms of affirmative evidence (vidhi). They are respectively: kāryahetu, “evidence consisting of an effect” or simply “effect-evidence”; and svabhāvahetu, “evidence consisting of a svabhāva” or “svabhāva-evidence.” Dharmakīrti first delineates effect-evidence and svabhāva-evidence in this concise explanation at the outset of the Pramāṇavārttika:

An effect is evidence for a cause in terms of that number of svabhāvas without which it could not occur (avinābhāvi). Also, a [sva] bhāva is evidence for a svabhāva that is invariably
Dharmakīrti here states that one may use either an effect (kārya) as evidence for its cause, or a svabhāva as evidence for a svabhāva. The reliability or “accuracy” (avyabhicāra) of these two modes of evidence are based respectively upon the two modes of svabhāvapratibandha, production and identity. That is, an effect can serve as evidence for its cause because, on the relation by production, certain svabhāvas of the effect (such as smoke) cannot occur without certain svabhāvas in the cause (such as fire). Likewise, a svabhāva can serve as evidence because, on the identity relation, the svabhāva adduced as the evidence (such as “being a sugar maple”) necessitates the presence of the svabhāva to be proven (such as “being a tree”). In other words, it is not possible for the entity in question to “be a sugar maple” if it is not also “a tree.”

The Two Senses of Svabhāva

One can perhaps already see that a proper understanding of the two forms of evidence admitted by Dharmakīrti—namely, effect- and svabhāva-evidence—must be derived from an understanding of the two forms of svabhāvapratibandha. A proper understanding of svabhāvapratibandha rests in turn upon an understanding of the term svabhāva. Unfortunately, svabhāva cannot be explicated merely by recourse to a translation, for as Steinkellner has pointed out, svabhāva is extremely difficult to translate accurately, in part because it has at least two senses. On one of its senses, svabhāva may express the “nature” of an entity, and on this meaning, the term is applied singularly to a subject (dharmin). One may speak, for example, of the svabhāva of smoke in the sense of the “nature” of smoke. On the second sense, svabhāva expresses an entity’s characteristics or properties, and on this usage, a subject is understood to have multiple svabhāvas. One can say, for example, that “composed of matter,” “substantial,” and so on are svabhāvas of smoke, and in the previous chapter, much of our talk about “properties” reflected the term svabhāva in our primary sources. What is common to both of these meanings of svabhāva is the notion that it is essential to the entity in question: on Dharmakīrti’s way of putting it, no further causes are required for that entity to possess a svabhāva.

Since an understanding of svabhāvapratibandha requires an understanding of the term svabhāva in both of its senses, part of our task in the following pages will be to unpack both meanings of the term. As we do so, however, two points must be kept in mind. First, as Steinkellner notes, Dharmakīrti himself does not provide a complete account of the distinction and relationship between svabhāva as property (or “property-svabhāva”) and svabhāva as nature (or “nature-svabhāva”). Indeed, he does not even
provide any clear demarcation for the usage of the term in one sense or the other. Hence, if we are to attempt some explication of svabhāva, we will at times be obliged to derive arguments and positions that are only suggested by Dharmakīrti’s thought. Second, we must also recall a crucial point raised in the previous chapter: namely, that although Dharmakīrti speaks of spatially extended things such as a water-jugs as being entities (bhāvas) that have effects, he does not mean that they are particulars (svalakṣaṇas). Instead, as we have seen, Dharmakīrti specifies that, on the External Realist view (bāhyārthavāda), spatially extended entities such as water-jugs are actually aggregations of multiple infinitesimal particles whose proximity enables them to produce effects that they would not produce otherwise. Talk about extended entities such as water-jugs and the effects of those entities is simply a matter of convenience and convention. In the context of the term svabhāva, this point is crucial, for svabhāva as nature and svabhāva as property can both be applied either to spatially extended entities, which are only conventionally real, or to nonextended particulars, which are ultimately real. The potential confusion here is that, as we shall see, both senses of svabhāva rest upon notions of causal functionality, which is restricted to particulars in Dharmakīrti’s ontology. Hence, if one were not to keep in mind that talk about the causal functionality of extended entities is simply a matter of convenience, one might believe that Dharmakīrti’s use of svabhāva as property and svabhāva as nature in the context of extended entities would imply that such entities themselves have causal functionality, and that they are therefore particulars. We have already seen that this is not the case, and below we will see that the causal functionality implicit in both senses of svabhāva is actually reducible to the causal functionality of particulars. To avoid complexity, however, we will follow Dharmakīrti and focus primarily on the use of the terms as applied to extended entities such as water-jugs.

**Svabhāva as “Property”**

When Dharmakīrti uses the term svabhāva in the sense of “property,” he means for it to be a dharma (a “property” or “predicate”) applied to a specific dharmin (a “property-possessor” or “subject”). This should immediately prompt us to turn to Dharmakīrti’s apoha-theory, for as we have seen, on Dharmakīrti’s view any property or predicate is actually an exclusion (vyāvṛtti); specifically, it is an exclusion that excludes those entities that do not have the expected effects or causes. To speak of a rose, for example, as having the property of “being a flower,” we construct an exclusion whereby that entity is excluded from all entities that have not arisen from the causes that produce flowers and that do not have the effects expected of flowers.

In short, on Dharmakīrti’s view to be a property is to be an exclusion.
Hence, when the term svabhāva is used in the sense of “property,” it simply stands for an exclusion. It is crucial, however, to note that, since a property formulated as an exclusion is constructed in terms of only one aspect of that subject, the subject in question still has numerous other aspects for which exclusions are possible. In other words, the subject in question may be considered to have numerous property-svabhāvas.  

Svabhāva as “Nature”

As with svabhāva as “property,” to understand the usage of the term svabhāva in the sense of “nature,” we are best served by returning to the apoha-theory. Previously we have seen that one of the fundamental motivations for the formulation of the apoha-theory is to account for the fact that we have “distributive cognitions” (anuvṛttipratyaya): we can look at several entities and recognize them all as “the same” (eka) in that they are all water-jugs, for example. For other South Asian philosophers, this type of cognition is easily accounted for by appealing to the presence of a single universal, “water-jug-ness” (ghaṭatva), instantiated in all of those entities. Thus, one can cognize them as the same and call them all “water-jugs” because one’s various cognitions quite literally contain the same object, namely, that universal.

For Dharmakīrti, however, this option is not available, for it is a form of realism that he rejects. Instead, he must find some other explanation for our cognition of all those individuals as the same. Dharmakīrti does so by formulating a “nondifference” (abheda) that pertains to all the entities in question. Specifically, he claims that although all the individuals in question are actually unique, they are all nondifferent in that they are all different from those entities that do not have the potentials to produce the expected effects and that have thus not been produced by the expected causes.  

In the previous chapter, we have seen that, when Dharmakīrti discusses exclusions, he places particular emphasis upon the sameness of the effect (and not the sameness of the causes) that is asserted of all the entities to which the same exclusion is to apply. We have also seen that this appeal to a sameness of effect can lead to a number of problems, the most obvious of which is an infinite regress. To resolve these problems, Dharmakīrti appeals to the notion of a “judgment of sameness” (ekapratyavamarṣajñāna). On this argument, the claim that all the entities in question have the same effect rests ultimately on the fact that they eventually produce a second-order cognition—a judgment—in which the individuals in question are identified as the same type of entity. All the entities we call “blue,” for example, produce perceptual images that, when the proper conditions are in place, will lead to the judgment, “This is blue.” In speaking of this “judgment of sameness,” Dharmakīrti appears to appeal in part to mind-dependent factors, such as the interests, expectations and other relevant dispositions.
of the person in whose mind the determination occurs. But if subjective factors were solely responsible for the arisal (or absence) of the same judgment in various instances, then Dharmakīrti’s philosophy would lack the certainty for which he strives: there would be nothing about things themselves that warrants our application of one or another term to them. Instead of this semantic anomie, Dharmakīrti maintains that, once we understand terms such as “water-jug” and “elephant,” our correct application of those terms is not just a matter of whim: entities that have certain effects are indirectly called “water-jugs,” while those with certain other effects are called “elephants,” and without changing the meanings of these terms, we cannot be correct if we literally call some water-jugs “elephants” and some elephants “water-jugs.”

Thus, Dharmakīrti’s *apoha*-theory is based in part on the way things are, and this is expressed by his usage of the term *svabhāva* (or a synonym such as *prakṛti*) in the sense of “nature.” That is, it is “by their nature” (*svabhāvena, prakṛtyā*) all the entities that we indirectly call a “water-jug” have the same effects. For the *apoha*-theory, perhaps the most important “same effect” that each of the entities in question produces is the aforementioned “judgment of sameness” (*ekapratyavamarśajñāna*). But Dharmakīrti also means for the notion of *svabhāva* as nature to explain not just that judgment, but *all* the effects or functions of which an entity is capable. This clearly suggests that an entity’s nature-*svabhāva* is the warrant for all of the exclusions that can be constructed for that entity. If we can say that a waterjug is “blue,” what we mean is that it is excluded from all that we would not call “blue.” The basis for formulating those exclusions is that those other entities do not have the causal characteristics expected of entities that bear the property of being “blue.” And the grounds for the claim that the entity in question does have the expected causal characteristics is that entity’s nature: by its nature, that entity has arisen from the types of causes that enable it to have, by its nature, the potentials to produce all the effects expected of something we call “blue.” This means, of course, that an entity’s property-*svabhāvas*, being equivalent to an exclusion, are subordinate to its nature-*svabhāva*. Below, we will explore the implications of this relationship between property-*svabhāva* and nature-*svabhāva*.

For the moment, we need only remark that an entity’s nature-*svabhāva* must act as the warrant for all terms applied to that entity. And since the application of a term to an object is warranted both by its causes and its potential effects, an entity’s nature-*svabhāva* must be what we may call “the totality of its causal characteristics”: the causes and conditions from which it must have arisen, and the corresponding effects that it is capable of producing.

**Nature-*svabhāva* and the Causal Complex**
Veiled within Dharmakīrti’s notion of svabhāva as nature is a strong rejection of random (ākasmika) causality and thus a strong commitment to the regularity of causality. He expresses this regularity primarily through various forms of the verb ni yam, to “restrict.” In terms of an entity’s ability to produce effects, he affirms a “restriction in causal potentials” (śaktiniyama), which is to say simply that any given entity by its nature is only capable of producing some effects: an apple seed cannot produce an elephant. And in terms of an entity’s causes, he claims that an entity’s causal potentials are restricted precisely because they have arisen from certain causes: it is impossible for an apple seed to produce certain types of effects because it is impossible for it to arise from certain kinds of causes.

While these notions of restriction are negative in character, they amount to positive claims: an entity has the potentials to produce certain types of effects because it has arisen from certain types of causes. There is thus a beginningless chain of causes and effects: the range of an entity’s causal potentials are determined by its causes and conditions, and those causes and conditions are themselves effects whose range of possible causal potentials is likewise determined by their causes and conditions. It is precisely for this reason that, even if Dharmakīrti stresses the sameness of effect as the warrant for the application of the same term to multiple entities, he is in the end also appealing to a sameness of cause. In other words, if we can call certain entities “water-jugs” because they have the same type of effects, we are at the same time saying that those entities have come from the same type of causes. In short, we are appealing to those entities’ nature-svabhāva: the totality of their causal characteristics.

This emphasis upon causality leads one naturally to suppose a close relationship between the notion of svabhāva as nature and Dharmakīrti’s theory of causality. Steinkellner points particularly to the relationship between Dharmakīrti’s notion of nature-svabhāva and his theory of the “causal complex” (hetusāmagri), the nexus of causes and conditions that are required for the production of an effect. Indeed, some passages in Dharmakīrti’s work suggest a relationship between an entity’s nature-svabhāva and its participation in a present causal complex or its arisal from a past causal complex. Nevertheless, although such a relationship does exist, an entity’s nature-svabhāva should not be equated with a causal complex, whether it be a present causal complex in which it participates or the past causal complex from which it arose.

Concerning the interpretation of an entity’s nature-svabhāva in terms of its participation in some present causal complex, we should remark two relevant points about Dharmakīrti’s notion of a causal complex. First, when Dharmakīrti uses the term, he means for it to refer to all the causes and conditions that contribute to the production of a particular effect. This notion itself rests on pre-Dharmakīrtian analyses of causality according to which the entities that contribute to the production of an effect are
classified in terms of the role they play in the causal process. Without going into detail, we can note the general distinction between a primary cause (hetu, upādānahetu, etc.) and its supporting conditions (sahakāripratayaya). In the case of the production of a sprout, for example, the seed will be considered the primary cause, while soil, water, and such will be supporting conditions. In this case, if the term "causal complex" is to apply to the totality of causes and conditions necessary for the production of a sprout, then it must apply not just to the seed (primary cause), but also to all of those supporting conditions (the soil, water, and so on). One can speak neither of just a seed nor even of just a seed and soil as being the causal complex for the production of a sprout.

The second relevant point concerning the notion of a causal complex is that an entity may participate in several causal complexes, and that these causal complexes are not identical. In some cases, an entity may simultaneously participate in more than one causal complex: a seed, being momentary, can participate in the causal complex for the production of the next moment in the continuum of its existence, but at the same time, it may participate in the causal complex for the production of a sprout. Clearly, the causal complexes in these two cases are not the same: the seed in question may be the primary cause in both cases, but the supporting conditions will clearly differ. Soil, for instance, may be necessary for the seed in question to produce a sprout, but it is irrelevant to the production of the subsequent moment of the seed’s continuum. In addition to the simultaneous participation in multiple causal complexes, it seems likely that an entity may have the potential to participate in contradictory causal complexes, although it will actually participate only in a causal complex for which the other supporting conditions are present. For example, some seeds, in addition to having the capacity to produce sprouts, may also be crushed to produce oil. As with the case of a sprout and a subsequent moment of the seed, the effects—a sprout and oil—require different causes and conditions, but unlike that previous case, the causal complexes in question are incompatible. This incompatibility does not, however, mitigate the potential for the seed to participate in either complex.

With these points about the notion of causal complex in mind, it should be evident that one should not equate an entity’s nature-svabhāva with its participation any specific, present causal complex. The primary reason for avoiding this equation is that, while an entity’s nature-svabhāva stands as a marker for the totality of that entity’s causal characteristics, the causal complex in which that entity is actually situated will not necessarily include all those possibilities. A sesame seed has the potential to produce a sprout or oil, so if our interpretation of svabhāva as nature is correct, the notion of that seed’s nature-svabhāva must subsume both of these potentials. We have already seen, however, that both of these potentials cannot be actualized in a single causal complex, since those complexes are incompatible.
A similar argument can be made without appealing to the case of contradictory causal complexes. We can note that a water-jug, for example, has the potential to be seen (i.e., it can produce an image in visual awareness), and it also has the potential for carrying water. These two potentials must be subsumed by its nature, and if nature is equivalent to causal complex, then those two potentials should necessarily occur in the same causal complex. This would mean then when one effect occurs, the other should necessarily occur, but this is clearly not the case. When water is present in its hollow interior, a water-jug fulfills its potential to contain water, but if it happens to be in the dark, it will not fulfill its potential for producing an image in visual awareness. Likewise, if light and the other required supporting conditions are present, the water-jug fulfills the potential for producing an image in awareness, but if there is no water in its interior, it will not fulfill its potential to contain water.

Thus, if an entity’s nature were equivalent to the causal complex in which it is presently participating, then a water-jug in the dark is not a water-jug, or else a water-jug is not by nature visible. Likewise, a water-jug without water would not be a water-jug, or else a water-jug does not by its nature have the capacity to contain water. So too, a sesame seed being crushed in an oil press would not be a sesame seed, since it is not part of the causal complex for the production of a sprout; or else a sesame seed planted in fertile and watered ground would not be a sesame seed, since it is not situated in the causal complex for the production of oil.

It should thus be clear that the totality of the causal characteristics that constitutes the nature-śvabhāva of an entity such as a seed or a water-jug is not equivalent to that entity’s participation in one or more present causal complexes, primarily because the number of causal complexes in which an entity actually participates could never equal the number in which it could potentially participate. In other words, its actual functions will never exhaust its potential functions, but the notion of a śvabhāva as nature must account for all those potential functions.\(^{40}\)

In addition to the problematic equation of an entity’s nature-śvabhāva with its participation in some present causal complex, we should also note the temptation to equate an entity’s nature with the causal complex that produced that entity. At first glance, this would make some sense, since we have seen that an entity has a certain nature precisely as a result of the causes and conditions that produced it. Nevertheless, despite a close relationship between an entity’s nature-śvabhāva and the causal complex that produced it, Dharmakīrti’s system does not allow us to equate the two. For example, since Dharmakīrti maintains that causes are momentary entities distinct from their effects, the equation of an entity’s nature with the causal complex that produced it would obliged us to admit that: 1) a water-jug’s nature is something different from the water-jug; 2) a water-jug’s nature exists before the water-jug exists; and 3) a water-jug’s nature no longer exists when the water-jug exists. None of these conclusions are
compatible with Dharmakīrti’s philosophy.

**The Subject (dharmīn) and Svabhāva as “Nature”**

Up to this point, our interpretation of svabhāva as “nature” may be summarized as follows: an entity’s nature-svabhāva is the totality of an entity’s causal characteristics, and this amounts to a restriction upon the kinds of effects that it has the potential to produce and the kind of causal complex from which it has arisen. If this interpretation is correct, one aspect of this meaning of svabhāva should be immediately obvious: a subject (dharmīn) can have only one nature-svabhāva, and the nature-svabhāva of that subject cannot apply to subjects of another kind: the nature of smoke is not the nature of a water-jug. This aspect of svabhāva as nature stands in contrast to svabhāva as property, for as we have seen, an entity such as a water-jug may be conceived as having multiple property-svabhāvas.41

But in specifying that a subject may have multiple property-svabhāvas but only one nature-svabhāva, two key issues must be kept in mind. First, we have already seen that Dharmakīrti critiques the ultimate reality of distributed entities such as water-jugs. In other words, on Dharmakīrti’s view a water-jug is not ultimately real, and there is no single particular (svalakṣaṇa) that is in and of itself a water-jug. Rather, in the context of our interests concerning the relevant causal characteristics, a “water-jug” is itself conceptually constructed on the basis of particulars that, due to arising from certain causes and conditions, have gained certain distinctive causal potentials, in this case due to the mutual proximity of their previous moments. There is likewise no collective “causal potential” (śakti) that exists separate from those particulars themselves. Rather, each particular interacts with the other particulars in its proximity in such a way that they function together to produce certain effects. Thus, Dharmakīrti maintains that “water-jug” is merely a convenient fiction that is imagined to be distributed over all the particulars in question. This suggests that the “nature of a waterjug” must also be conceived as distributed over those particulars. Every infinitesimal particle of the “water-jug” is equally a locus of the “nature of a water-jug” in that they all arise from the causal complex that produces what we identify as a “water-jug,” and they likewise all participate in the production of the effects of that water-jug. Hence, the nature-svabhāva of a water-jug, like the water-jug itself, obviously cannot refer to some ultimately real, single entity that is distributed over all the infinitesimal particles that form what we call a “water-jug.”42

The second issue concerns the particulars themselves. That is, when certain particulars, due to the conditions of their arisal, have acquired certain distinctive causal potentials, we are able to call those particulars a “waterjug” by excluding other particulars that do not have those distinctive potentials, since those other particulars have not arisen with the aforementioned conditions such as proximity. In this sense, those particulars may be conceptualized (by way of their exclusion from other
particulars) as property-śvabhāvas of a water-jug. But we may also treat each particular—in this case, each infinitesimal particle—on its own as a subject (dharmin). In short, we can, at the same time, speak of the “nature” of an infinitesimal particle. Now, on the External Realist view, an infinitesimal particle is itself a particular, so one might suspect that the distinct nature-śvabhāva of each infinitesimal particle could itself be a particular. This would be supported by the plausible notion that the subject to which the nature-śvabhāva applies involves no distribution in this case: it is the infinitesimal particle itself. But even if this is true, a particular’s nature-śvabhāva is still not itself a particular. The most straightforward reason for this is simply that a nature-śvabhāva is necessarily treated as a dharma—a qualifier or attribute—distinct from the infinitesimal particle which is its dharmin, the entity that possesses or is qualified by that dharma. This is best illustrated by a genitive construction such as, “The nature of the infinitesimal particle.” Dharmakīrti maintains that in such expressions the dharma is actually identical to the dharmin itself. The apparent separation of the dharma from the dharmin is simply part of the exclusion process, and is hence conceptual. How then should we treat nature-śvabhāva? It seems best to consider it a special case of śvabhāva in the sense of a property. That is, when we speak of some of the properties of a “water-jug,” such as its “impermanence” or its “materiality,” we construct those properties, which do not exist even conceptually before their construction, by abstracting just a few of the causal characteristics from within the totality of possibilities that is the water-jug’s “nature.” This suggests, of course, that the water-jug’s “nature” is a composite entity consisting of possibilities. Indeed, we have thus far spoken of it in this fashion for ease of explanation. But if we wish to be more precise, we must not consider the water-jug’s nature as itself a cluster of possibilities, but rather as a seamless unity from which, through the exclusion process, we abstract the various possibilities that underlie or even correspond to its property-śvabhāvas. The point here is that the causal characteristics of an entity do not actually exist as real, distinct entities whose aggregation constitutes its nature-śvabhāva, but rather that they too must be abstracted from the unity that is the nature-śvabhāva. We can thus consider the nature-śvabhāva to be the seamless totality of causal characteristics that is the subject itself, even if that subject itself is one constructed through the process of exclusion. We will return to this issue below, but first let us examine the two modes in greater detail.

3.2 The Production-mode of the Śvabhāvapratibandha

The two basic notions of śvabhāva that we have summarized above enable us to describe the production-mode of the śvabhāvapratibandha—i.e., what it is about cause and effect that enables us to infer infallibly the former from
the latter. In brief, one can simply say that the effect’s nature-\(svabhāva\) and the cause’s nature-\(svabhāva\) mutually “restrict” each other: for the effect to have the nature-\(svabhāva\) that it has, it must come from that specific kind of cause, and for the cause to have the nature-\(svabhāva\) that it has, it must have the capacity to produce that specific kind of effect. Although Dharmakīrti clearly understands this restriction that constitutes the productionmode of the \(svabhāvapratibandha\) to be one that pertains mutually between cause and effect, he expresses his theory by explanations that emphasize either the cause or the effect. In both cases, his theory is expressed quite elliptically, but when presented primarily in terms of the effect, his statements amount to the following:

_Production-mode expressed primarily in terms of the effect:_ if some entity \(y\) can be called “\(S\),” then it has the nature of an \(S\), which means that it has arisen from the cause that produces an \(S\) such that it has the potentials to produce all the effects expected of an \(S\). In short, it bears all the property-\(svabhāvas\) of an \(S\). It is known that being a product of \(F\) is a property-\(svabhāva\) of an \(S\). Hence, if some individual is an \(S\), it must have arisen from another individual that is an \(F\). To use the example of smoke, if some individual can be called “smoke,” then it has the nature-\(svabhāva\) of smoke: it has all the property-\(svabhāvas\) of smoke. The fact of being a product of fire is a property-\(svabhāva\) of smoke. Hence, if some individual can be called “smoke,” it must have been produced by a fire.\(^{46}\)

Dharmakīrti employs _reductio ad absurdum_ to express these arguments for the production-mode in terms of the cause. In the _Svaśṛtti_ he notes that, if smoke by its nature arises from fire, then it cannot arise even once from something other than fire. If it were to arise from something other than fire, then smoke would be causeless, since it can occur even when its cause (fire) is absent. To avoid this unacceptable conclusion, one cannot claim that some other, non-fire entity causes smoke, because the same unacceptable conclusion would apply: smoke can occur even when that other, non-fire entity is absent. In response, one might attempt to hedge one’s argument by allowing for some type of “fuzzy” production, whereby something similar to smoke comes from something other than fire. But, assuming that “similar” means “having the same effects,” Dharmakīrti responds that one could not account for the smoke’s difference from other entities because differences in causes account for differences in effects. His point is that it is precisely by appealing to difference or nondifference in their effects that we say that some entities are similar or dissimilar. Having abandoned any such notion of “fuzzy” production, if one simply insists that smoke is causeless, then one could not account for the observed fact that, rather than occurring haphazardly, smoke occurs in specific times and
places. These three unacceptable conclusions from the Svavṛtti—i.e., that smoke would be causeless, that the difference in causes accounts for the difference in effects, and that spatiotemporally restricted occurrence does not apply to causeless entities—also appear in the Hetubindu. There, however the argument concerning difference is replaced by a more specific argument: namely, that if smoke can be produced both by that which by its nature produces smoke and that which by its nature does not produce smoke, then smoke itself would be by its nature both smoke and nonsmoke.

As with the presentation that is stated primarily in terms of the effect, Dharmakīrti’s explanation of the production-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha in terms primarily of the cause is also elliptical. One can, however, derive the following presentation from his arguments:

*Production-mode expressed in terms of the cause:* if some individual can be called “F,” then it has the nature of an F: it has arisen from the causal complex that produces an F such that it has the potentials to produce all the effects of an F. In short, it has all the property-svabhāvas of an F. It is known that the potential to produce S is a property-svabhāva of an F. Hence, if some individual is an F, then it must have the potential to produce S. To use the example of fire, if some individual can be called a “fire,” then it has the nature of a fire: it must come from the causes that produce fire and thus it must have the causal potentials of fire. It is known that fire has the potential to produce smoke. Hence, if some individual can be called “fire,” it must have the potential to produce smoke.

In the Svavṛtti, the arguments used to defend these claims that focus upon the cause are summarized in the following brief passage:

... a particular property-svabhāva of smoke is that it is produced by that [i.e., fire]. Likewise, the cause, fire also has the property-svabhāva of producing that kind of effect. If smoke were to come from something else, then the capacity to produce smoke would not be a property-svabhāva of fire. Hence, fire would not produce smoke even once. Nor can that which comes from some other cause be smoke, for it has come from an entity that does not have the property-svabhāva of producing smoke. And if that other entity actually does have the property-svabhāva of producing smoke, then that other thing must be fire. Hence, the relation between an effect and a cause is not misleading.

Combining the perspectives of both cause and effect, Dharmakīrti concludes his argument with these verses:
A termite tower is fire if it has the nature of fire. If it does not have the nature of fire [which includes the property-svabhāva of producing smoke], how could smoke arise in the presence of just a termite tower? Smoke could not arise in that case because fire has the property-svabhāva of being the cause of smoke; its distinguishing characteristic (bheda) is to have the causal potential to produce smoke. If smoke were to come from that which is not the cause of smoke, it would be causeless.\footnote{51}

In short, by virtue of its nature-svabhāva, smoke has the property-svabhāva of being an effect of fire, and by its nature-svabhāva, fire has the property-svabhāva of being capable of producing smoke. In this sense, smoke and fire are related through their respective natures. At this point, however, it is important to recall that the relation between an effect (such as smoke) and its cause (such as fire) must act as a warrant that guarantees the trustworthiness (avisaṃvāda) of inferences based upon effect-evidence (as when we infer fire from smoke). When examined in this light, Dharmakīrti’s theory evinces some problems and lacunae. Let us now examine a few.

\textbf{Some Issues in the Application of the Production-mode}

To see how the theories we have discussed so far are applicable to inference, we should perhaps begin by recalling that the production-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha is meant to account for the pervasion relation (vyāpti) in an inference from effect to cause. As noted earlier, that relation consists of a pervader (vyāpaka), which is here the cause, and the pervaded (vyāpya), which is here the effect. As has been explained, this means that any locus of the effect must also be (within certain spatiotemporal limits) a locus of the cause. But it does not mean that any locus of the cause must be also a locus of the effect. Indeed, Dharmakīrti specifically rejects the notion that effects can be reliably inferred from causes, and in the specific case of the fire-smoke inference, South Asian philosophers generally claim that some fires do not produce smoke.\footnote{52} The relationship between pervader and pervaded is thus asymmetrical: wherever the pervaded (smoke) is present, the pervader (fire) must be present, but it is not the case that wherever the pervader (fire) is present, the pervaded (smoke) must also be present. Dharmakīrti’s objective in the formulation of the production-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha is to ground the pervasion relation in a type of necessity: smoke is necessarily the product of fire, and fire is necessarily what can produce smoke.

With the pervasion relation in mind, let us now examine four basic issues that, in one way or another, could indicate problems in Dharmakīrti’s arguments for the production-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha. My intention in raising these issues is to demonstrate the problems that Dharmakīrti must explicitly or implicitly resolve if his arguments are to be
actually applicable to inferences from effect to cause. The four issues are:

1. Smoke is not the only product of fire.
2. Only some fires produce smoke.
3. Only fire is capable of producing smoke.
4. Fire is not the only entity that may be called “smoke-producing” (dhūmajanana).

1. Smoke is not the only product of fire.

In his arguments presented in terms of the effect, Dharmakīrti claims that smoke necessarily has the property- \( \text{svabhāva} \), “product of fire.” But while this property- \( \text{svabhāva} \) may be necessary to smoke, it is not necessary to only smoke. If this were not the case, then ashes, which are an effect of fire, would also be smoke. Hence, as with the pervasion of smoke by fire, the relation of “smoke” to “product of fire” is also asymmetrical: “product of fire” pervades “smoke,” but the opposite is not true. This amounts to the claim that the correct determination of some entity as being “smoke” is a sufficient condition for one to correctly apply the property- \( \text{svabhāva} \) “product of fire” to that entity, but the correct determination of some entity as possessing the property- \( \text{svabhāva} \) “product of fire” is not a sufficient condition for one to properly identify that entity as “smoke.” This is the most typical way that Dharmakīrti formulates a property- \( \text{svabhāva} \), and we will explore it further under the rubric of \( \text{svabhāva} \)-evidence. At this point, we can briefly characterize it as follows: if \( P \) is a property- \( \text{svabhāva} \) of \( S \), then the total causal characteristics that must be in place if an entity is to be correctly called “\( S \)” will necessarily include the causal characteristics required to call that entity “\( P \)”.

2. Only some fires produce smoke.

The asymmetrical nature of the pervasion relation requires that only some fires produce smoke, but in the \( \text{Svavṛtti} \), Dharmakīrti’s arguments for the production-mode of the \( \text{svabhāvapratibandha} \) speak of fire as necessarily having the property- \( \text{svabhāva} \) of producing smoke. This is, in fact, a misstatement that Śākyabuddhi and other commentators correct on the basis of a parallel passage in the \( \text{Hetubindu} \). The problem here is that, if fire were necessarily to have the property- \( \text{svabhāva} \) of producing smoke, then any fire that did not produce smoke would not be a fire. This discrepancy is corrected by noting that, although only some fires produce smoke, all fires are \textit{capable} of producing smoke. In effect, Dharmakīrti appeals to an implicit distinction between necessary, nondispositional properties and necessary,
dispositional properties. That is, the property-\textit{svabhāva} of "being a product of fire" is a necessary, \textit{nondispositional} property of smoke in that all instances of smoke are \textit{actually} produced by fire. But "capable of producing smoke" is a necessary, \textit{dispositional} property of fire in that all fires are \textit{capable} of producing smoke, but do not necessarily do so. The fact that some fires \textit{actually} produce smoke is then accounted for by the fact that the instance of fire in question is participating in a complete causal complex for the production of smoke. Indeed, Dharmakīrti explicitly maintains that in an inference from effect to cause, one is actually inferring the causal complex.

3. Only fire is capable of producing smoke.

When Dharmakīrti defends the production-mode of the \textit{svabhāvipratibandha} with arguments in terms of the cause, he adduces a specific, dispositional property-\textit{svabhāva}, such as "capable of producing smoke," as a property of the cause, such as fire. In adducing this property, he does not assume an asymmetrical relationship between that property-\textit{svabhāva} and the cause. That is, unlike the relationship between "smoke" and the property-\textit{svabhāva} "product of fire," the implicit relationship between "fire" and the property-\textit{svabhāva} "capable of producing smoke" is symmetrical: the correct determination of some entity as being "fire" is a sufficient condition for one to correctly apply the property-\textit{svabhāva} "capable of producing smoke" to that entity. Likewise, the correct determination of some entity as possessing the property-\textit{svabhāva} "capable of producing smoke" is a sufficient condition for one to correctly identify that entity as "fire." Thus, it is necessarily the case that if an entity is a fire, it is capable of producing smoke, and if an entity is capable of producing smoke, it is a fire. This suggests that, if property-\textit{svabhāva} \textit{P} is the type of property-\textit{svabhāva} adduced here and \textit{F} is the cause qualified by that property-\textit{svabhāva}, then either: 1) the total causal characteristics that must be in place if an entity is to be correctly called "\textit{F}" will necessarily be \textit{identical} to the causal characteristics required to correctly call that entity "\textit{P}"; or 2) an entity has the causal characteristics required to correctly call that entity "\textit{P}" if and only if that entity possesses the total causal characteristics that must be in place if an entity is to be correctly called "\textit{F}". This way of understanding the presence of property-\textit{svabhāva} \textit{P} as a sufficient condition for identifying the subject that it qualifies as being \textit{F} stands in contrast to the more familiar interpretation applied to "product of fire" as a property-\textit{svabhāva} that is necessarily applicable to smoke, but not a sufficient condition for the determination of its subject as being smoke.

The reason to interpret a property-\textit{svabhāva} such as "capable of producing fire" in this fashion should be fairly obvious: to take the example of smoke and fire, if the argument for the production-mode of the \textit{svabhāvipratibandha} in terms of the cause amounts to an argument from the
property-svabhāva “capable of producing smoke” to fire as the subject (dharmin) qualified by that property, and if something other than fire (such as a termite tower) can also possess that property, then an entity that produces smoke is not necessarily a fire. As we have seen, Dharmakīrti goes as far as to say that, if a termite tower is actually producing smoke, then it must be a locus of fire.

4. Fire is not the only entity that may be called “smoke-producing” (dhūmajanana).

If the property-svabhāva “capable of producing smoke” is not only necessarily applicable to all fires, but is also a sufficient condition for the entity to which it applies to be a fire, and if the wood and such in a causal complex that produces smoke are also “smoke-producing,” then one would be forced to conclude that wood and such are fire. Alternatively, to use the example of a seed and a sprout, if the property-svabhāva “capable of producing a sprout” is a sufficient condition for that entity to which it applies to be a seed, and if soil and such also participate in the production of a sprout, then soil and such are a seed.54

Dharmakīrti himself does not address this problem directly in the Svāvṛtti, but he does appear to recognize it to some extent. His recognition of the problem is suggested by the claim that the causal complex is what one actually infers through an inference,55 but if this claim were interpreted strictly, his arguments for the production-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha in terms of the cause would fail: that is, the determination of an entity as having the capacity to produce smoke would not be a necessary and sufficient condition for applying the concept “fire” to that entity, since the entity in question could as easily be wood. It thus seems likely that in claiming that the causal complex is inferred in an inference, he also means to preserve some distinction between the primary cause (upādānahetu) and the supporting conditions (sahakārin). In short, the property-svabhāva “capable of producing smoke” must somehow apply to the primary cause in a way that differentiates it from the secondary cause. Dharmakīrti’s Svāvṛtti contains some arguments that might supply this restriction, but overall his presentation there is incomplete in this regard.56 His Hetubindu offers more extensive comments on the distinction between primary cause and supporting conditions, but he does not appear to address directly the problem of restricting the property-svabhāva “capable of producing smoke” in a manner that would support his arguments for the production-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha.57

Concerning Necessity

In our examination of the four issues addressed above, we have seen that Dharmakīrti implicitly relies upon some notion of necessity. Although it is incomplete, Dharmakīrti’s inchoate theory of necessity is probably what
prompts many contemporary interpreters to translate property-\textit{svabhāva} as “essential property.” This translation may be suggestive, but it must be employed with caution. Specifically, the notion of an “essential property” must not be allowed to introduce an unwarranted form of essentialism—and its attendant problems—into Dharmakīrti’s system.

In this context, if we are to think in terms of necessity, it may be helpful to draw from the Euroamerican philosophical traditions and introduce the distinction between the predication of a property as being necessary \textit{de re} and the predication of a property as being necessary \textit{de dicto}. If a property is predicated \textit{de re}, then the subject in question necessarily has the identity in question as a subject. If we claim, for example, that “being smoke” is predicated \textit{de re} of some individual, then the identity of that individual is necessarily smoke. In other words, it is not possible for us not to treat that individual as “smoke.” The necessity here concerns the relation between the individual and a particular property, and not the relation between properties themselves. In contrast, when we claim that “being smoke” is predicated \textit{de dicto} of an individual, we mean that, if we predicate “is smoke” of some individual, only then will we assert that other properties (concomitant with smoke) are necessarily predicable of that individual. For example, on Dharmakīrti’s view, if one predicates “is smoke” of an individual, “produced from fire” must also be predicable of that individual: it is necessarily the case that anything which “is smoke” is also “produced from fire.” In this case, the necessity is \textit{de dicto} in that it concerns the relation among properties, and not the relation of properties to an individual.\textsuperscript{58}

Now, my contention is that, at least in the context of the \textit{svabhāvatāpratibandha}, Dharmakīrti’s system does not allow for \textit{de re} necessity, and if the translation “essential property” for property-\textit{svabhāva} implies that type of necessity, then that translation should be avoided. We can most easily see that \textit{de re} necessity does not work for Dharmakīrti by recalling that, before an individual can be construed as a subject (\textit{dharmin}) \textit{qua} “smoke,” the property-\textit{svabhāva} of being “smoke” must be predicated of that individual. With this in mind, we can then note that, if being “smoke” were predicated \textit{de re} of that individual, it would not be possible for that individual to not bear that property. In simple terms, one can say that that individual would be \textit{in essence} smoke. But Dharmakīrti’s theory of \textit{niścaya} (“definitive determination” or “correct judgment”) belies any such \textit{de re} essentialism.

Dharmakīrti claims that, in a correct judgment immediately subsequent to a perception, the predications one makes of an individual are markedly conditioned by mind-dependent factors such as expectation, need, context, perceptual acuity, habituation and so on. Thus, when a child who studies under his father sees him coming from afar, he will first conceive of that person as “father” rather than “teacher.” Or, in a more gruesome example, when a dog, a libertine, and a yogin gaze upon a dead woman’s body, the dog
sees it as food, the man sees it as a woman, and the yogin sees it as a corpse. Dharmakīrti’s point in adducing these examples is that the individual may be construed in multiple ways with little overlap: the minddependent factors that underlie the manner that a dog interprets his perception of a woman’s body will have little to do with the factors that underlie a libertine’s interpretation of such a perception. In other words, the example suggests that the dog will never conceive of the body as his lover, and the libertine will never conceive of it as food.

Now, if these property-svabhāvas—“being a lover” and “being food”—were de re necessary of the individual in question, then that individual must bear those predicates, regardless of any other predications that may have been made. In Euroamerican philosophy, one typical way of demonstrating that a predicate $P$ is not de re necessary of determinate individual $x$ is to demonstrate that in at least one possible case, $x$ is not-$P$, which is understood to be equivalent to demonstrating that it is not true that in all cases it is not possible for $x$ to be not-$P$. For example, if one wished to show that the color of my coat is not de re red, one demonstrates that in at least one possible world I could own the very same coat, but the coat would not be red. Being red is thus not de re essential to that thing’s identity as my coat.

This procedure, however, may not be feasible in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy for various reasons. Some of these reasons have to do with the fact that the aforementioned Euroamerican analysis rests upon some notion of a trans-case or transworld identity in which a change of predicates is possible. In the example of my coat, the analysis assumes an ability to posit an individual that is my coat in two different cases, which are most often understood to be two possible worlds, and then to apply the predicate “is red” in one case and “is not red” in another case. But for Dharmakīrti, a predicate is constructed on the basis of an entity’s nature, and an entity’s nature is the totality of its causal characteristics. A change in predicates—whereby a formerly applicable predicate is no longer applicable—thus requires a change in causal characteristics. Hence, if predicates change, causal characteristics change, and if causal characteristics change, identity changes. It is thus not clear whether Dharmakīrti would be willing to entertain even hypothetically the notion of a trans-case individual that bears different predicates. This is in part demonstrated by the fact that, in the examples cited above, Dharmakīrti probably does not mean for all the predicates to be contradictory: the entity in question has the “nature”—the causal characteristics—required for the respective perceivers to identify it as, for example, “food,” a “lover” or a “corpse.”

The resistance to a trans-case individual bearing different predicates in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy could even suggest that he espouses a de re essentialism. That is, if we cannot talk about some individual that occurs with different predicates in multiple cases or worlds, it seems that we will be unable to deny that, if $x$ is $P$, then it is not possible that in any case $x$ does
not bear the predicate \( P \), even if the case where \( x \) does bear \( P \) is restricted to a single possible world. But we would be incorrect to ascribe de re essentialism to Dharmakīrti, for even if we cannot show that in one case \( x \) is \( P \) and in another case is not-\( P \), his system readily allows us to demonstrate that even if in some case \( x \) has the property-\( svabhāva \) \( P \), it is possible that in some other case \( x \) does not bear the property-\( svabhāva \) \( P \). The key point here is that, unless some cognizer constructs those property-\( svabhāvas \) on the basis of the nature-\( svabhāva \) of that individual, that individual cannot be said to be bearing any predicates at all. Thus, in the example mentioned above, in the case where a dog is present but the libertine is not, the body bears the property-\( svabhāva \) “being food,” but it does not bear the property-\( svabhāva \) “is a lover.” And when the libertine is present but the dog is not, the body bears the property-\( svabhāva \) “is a lover” but does not bear the property-\( svabhāva \) “is food.”

Now, this may seem to be an inadequate way to show that individual \( x \) does not de re bear \( P \), which is the same as saying that the identity of \( x \) is not necessarily (or does not necessarily include) \( P \). One might maintain, for example, that even if the property \( P \) is not constructed, \( x \) still has the causal characteristics that make it capable of bearing \( P \); hence, since the causal characteristics can themselves be construed as amounting to a predicate, Dharmakīrti’s position still rests upon de re essentialism. But such a response would be ignoring the fact that the “causal characteristics” themselves do not actually exist: for example, in terms of the individual’s capacity to produce certain effects, there are no separate causal potentials (\( śakti \)) distinct from the individual itself, nor is there even one single, unconstructed nature or undifferentiated causal potential from which the other potentials might be constructed. Instead, all these entities are constructed, and in the case of spatially extended or distributed entities such as a water-jug, the individual itself is constructed. Of course, on Dharmakīrti’s view we can say that, in the case where an individual \( x \) is \( P \)—when, for example, the student sees a person and identifies him as his father—it is not possible that \( x \) does not bear \( P \) in that case. But this does not commit Dharmakīrti to de re essentialism, for it is the same as saying that, in the possible case or world where my coat is blue, it is not possible that my coat is not blue.

Since Dharmakīrti’s system does not allow de re predication, and since some notion of necessity is at least implicit in the \( svabhāvapratibandha \), we might assume that Dharmakīrti’s system involves an inchoate notion of de dicto necessity pertaining among property-\( svabhāvas \). But while we may usefully make this claim for heuristic purposes, we must do so with extreme caution. The first reason to exercise caution has already been pointed out: an entity does not actually bear a property-\( svabhāva \) until that property-\( svabhāva \) has been constructed in relation to a mind, and if mind-dependent factors such as interest are not in place, then the property-\( svabhāvas \) in
question will not be constructed, even if they *de dicto* stand in a necessary relationship to some other property-*svabhāvas* that have been constructed. In Dharmakīrti’s discussions of inference, this issue is transparent, for it is naturally assumed that one is indeed interested in knowing, for example, whether or not there is a fire in one’s room.⁶³ Hence, upon seeing something identified as smoke, the property-*svabhāva* “produced from fire,” which is *de dicto* necessary to smoke, will be readily constructed. But there are other *de dicto* necessary properties, such as being momentary (*kṣanika*), that may not be constructed, since they are irrelevant (or even antithetical) to the concerns of the person drawing the inference. In short, if we wish to claim that Dharmakīrti’s system involves an implicit notion of *de dicto* necessity, we must temper that claim with the considerable emphasis on the relationship between psychologism and ontology in his system.

An additional reason to be cautious concerning any claims for an implicit *de dicto* necessity in Dharmakīrti’s system concerns his failure to formulate and provide adequate terminology for a distinction between necessary and accidental properties, even though some such distinction is clearly required by his theory of inference. If we consider, for example, the case of seeing something that I identify as smoke billowing from my room, my ability to infer the proximate presence of fire from that perception relies upon the fact that “produced from fire” is *de dicto* necessary to smoke. But any given instance of smoke, such as the one I see billowing from my room, has numerous property-*svabhāvas* that, although not necessary to smoke, can be and may actually be constructed of that particular instance of smoke. I may notice that the smoke is reflecting a blue light, or I may see that it is swirling quickly, or the shape of its cloud may resemble a rhinoceros. But these properties are not *de dicto* necessary to smoke: I cannot say that, if something is smoke, then it necessarily resembles a rhinoceros.

Indeed, on a few occasions Dharmakīrti himself does recognize a need for such a distinction. For example, in the basic formulation of inference cited earlier,⁶⁴ Dharmakīrti specifies that for effect-evidence, one is concerned with that number of property-*svabhāvas* in the cause without which a some other number of property-*svabhāvas* in the effect could not occur. In giving a quantitative specification (with the term *yāvad*) of property-*svabhāvas*, Dharmakīrti answers the objection that, since all the properties of fire, for example, participate in the production of an effect such as smoke, and since all the properties of smoke are equally effects, one might suppose that any property-*svabhāva* of the effect can be used as evidence for any property-*svabhāva* of the cause.⁶⁵ As Śākyabuddhi suggests, this objection points to the problematic case in which, by focusing upon the substantiality of smoke and the brightness of some individual fire, one reduces the inference of fire from smoke to an inference of brightness from substantiality. Glossing the beginning of Dharmakīrti’s response, Śākyabuddhi notes that such an inference would clearly not be reliable because the properties in question—substantiality and brightness—do not provide the kind of restriction
necessary to form a trustworthy inference. That is, since substantiality can be a property-\textit{svabhāva} of entities other than smoke, it can occur even when fire is absent. And since not all fires are bright, a fire can be present even if brightness is absent. Thus, as Śākyabuddhi describes this argument, the basic point here is that some property-\textit{svabhāvas} are not relevant to the inference of fire from smoke: in the case of smoke, the irrelevant properties are those that, even if common to all cases of smoke, are also present in nonsmoke entities. And in the case of fire, the irrelevant properties are those that, even if applicable to some fires, are not applicable to all fires.

On Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation, this argument already refers to some inchoate notion of accidental and essential property-\textit{svabhāvas}: specifically, if one claims that certain properties of individual fires must be ignored because they are not present in all fires, one has \textit{de facto} identified those properties as accidental—and not essential—to fire. As for smoke, Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation is problematic, since our analysis of the production-mode of the \textit{svabhāvapratibandha} has already shown that Dharmakīrti’s formulation of the causal relation is based upon a property—i.e., the property-\textit{svabhāva} of being “produced from that [cause]” \textit{(tajjanya)}—which is common to other, nonsmoke entities, such as ashes. Instead, as Dharmakīrti indicates, his point is to eliminate properties that are not construed in terms of the effect. Thus, unqualified “substantiality” cannot act as evidence for fire, but when construed as a property-\textit{svabhāva} of smoke, it can act as evidence. If we assume that at least part of Dharmakīrti’s intention is to refer to property-\textit{svabhāvas} that are necessarily concomitant with the mere presence of smoke, then this again points to an inchoate distinction between essential and accidental properties.

Although the interpretation we have just suggested indicates an inchoate accidental/essential distinction in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, that distinction remains vague and undeveloped. That Dharmakīrti did not fully recognize an accidental/essential distinction is best illustrated by what appear to be two overall contexts for the use of the term \textit{svabhāva} in the sense of property. In one type of context, the term \textit{svabhāva} expresses a property of a determinate subject—one construed as a subject \textit{qua} one of its property-\textit{svabhāvas}—such that the property in question is \textit{de dicto} necessary to the property in terms of which the individual is construed as a subject. This is the familiar case of where an individual construed as a subject \textit{qua} smoke necessarily has the property of being produced from fire. In the second type of context, \textit{svabhāva} expresses a property of an indeterminate individual—that is, an individual that is a subject \textit{qua} individual, and not \textit{qua} one of its property-\textit{svabhāvas}. In both cases, the term \textit{svabhāva} conveys some notion of necessity: for a determinate subject \textit{qua} smoke, its \textit{svabhāvas} are those properties that all instances of smoke
must have. But for an indeterminate individual, its svabhāvas are simply all its properties. In the former case, an accidental/essential distinction is clearly relevant, but in the latter, no such distinction is possible.69

Regardless of how we construe a property-svabhāva in relation to an indeterminate subject, our problem as interpreters of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy is that he often does not clearly distinguish between that context and the context of a determinate subject. This raises a difficult question: is this simply a failure of clarity on Dharmakīrti’s part (who seems to have only had an inchoate notion of an accidental/essential distinction), or is this a consciously employed rhetorical technique intended to undermine the notion that there are real properties (such as dhūmatva, “smokeness”) that constitute the essences of things? I find no easy answer to this question.

Of this much, however, we can be sure: for the purposes of the svabhāvapratisāmānyatā, the predication of “smoke” is not essential to any individual, but if an individual is construed in terms of one of its property-svabhāvas as a determinate subject “smoke,” then it must be possible to reliably construct other property-svabhāvas as well, including “product of fire.” The same restriction applies mutatis mutandis to an individual construed as a subject qua “fire.”

In sum, then, the production-mode of the svabhāvapratisāmānyatā amounts to a necessary relation between the svabhāvas that are necessary for the correct application of the concept (such as “smoke”) adduced as the effect and the svabhāvas that are necessary for the correct application of the concept (such as “fire”) adduced as the cause. This relation is necessary simply because the concept of the effect (“smoke”) is correctly applied only if the entity in question is produced from that cause—in other words, the fact of being produced from that cause is implicit in the concept of the effect.

The Determination of the Production-mode

Despite the problems and lacunae that remain in Dharmakīrti’s formulation of the production-mode of the svabhāvapratisāmānyatā, it is not absurd to claim that he has made a good start toward clarifying the type of relation that must be in place if we are to solve the problem of induction in an inference from effect to cause. It should be obvious, however, that despite the potential usefulness of his analysis, Dharmakīrti has clearly not solved the problem of induction in its entirety. For he is still left with the second task that is involved in specifying that relation: he must be able to formulate a reliable procedure for determining whether that relation is indeed in place. The procedure proposed by Dharmakīrti relies upon a combination of perception and nonperception, and it is understood to involve either three or five steps.70 Focusing on the five-step method, Brendan Gillon gives a synopsis that points to the basic problem in Dharmakīrti’s method:
... Dharmakīrti seems to believe that a sequence of five simple non-relational observations results in relational knowledge. For example, one observes (1) first that a place has neither smoke nor fire; (2) then, when fire is brought, that the place has fire yet no smoke; (3) next, that the place has both smoke and fire; (4) then, when the fire is removed, that the place has smoke yet no fire; and (5) finally, that the place has neither smoke nor fire. The problem is that this sequence cannot discriminate between genuine causes and spurious correlations. Suppose one observes that a place has neither a donkey nor smoke, then when a donkey is brought, one observes that the place has the donkey but still no smoke, but a moment later, one observes the place to have both the donkey and smoke. Later, when the donkey is removed, one observes that the place has no donkey but still has smoke. And finally, when the smoke dissipates, the place has neither a donkey nor smoke. But the donkey, even though it satisfies the conditions for being the cause of smoke, is not its cause. Moreover, further observations will never eliminate the possibility of spurious correlation. But this is just the induction problem again.

Were we to supplement Gillon’s evaluation with a more detailed account, we would examine the relevance of Dharmakīrti’s theory of perceptual judgment (pratyakṣapraśtalabdhanīścaya) in this context. Nevertheless, even without such details, Gillon leads us to the crux of the problem, namely, that this procedure does not in itself indubitably establish the production-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha. More precisely, the procedure does not give us reliable grounds for limiting which exclusions, such as “produced-from-fire,” are necessary to the formation of the concept “smoke.” A parallel (and more acute) problem will become evident as we consider the other mode of the svabhāvapratibandha: identity (tādātmya).

3.3 On the Relationship between Property and Nature

Up to this point we have focused on effect-evidence, which is based on the production-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha. As we turn to svabhāva-evidence, which is based on the identity (tādātmya) mode, we will see that most of the points we have made are still relevant. Before, however, applying these points to svabhāva-evidence, we need first to examine more closely the relationship between nature-svabhāva and property-svabhāva. To do so, let us begin by reviewing an important contemporary interpretation of these two senses of svabhāva.

The interpretation I have in mind is the one proposed by Ernst Steinkellner, and it is an interpretation that I have followed in large part. Steinkellner has argued that the two senses of svabhāva—as “nature” and as “property”—correspond to an “ontological” usage and a “logical” usage in
Dharmakīrti’s works. For Steinkellner, the “ontological” usage of svabhāva (what I call the “nature-svabhāva”) is connected to the causal complex (hetuśāmagrī), or more particularly, “the power of things to function as a principle of their existence.” When he first discusses the ontological sense of svabhāva, he begins by citing Dharmakīrti’s claim that the ultimately real is that which is capable of telic function. He then notes:

... this suitability of the thing [to fulfill a function] is based on the svabhāva. Whether a thing fulfills a function [Zweck] depends on whether it has the corresponding svabhāva. That which has no svabhāva cannot fulfill a goal and it is therefore not real.

Steinkellner’s point here is that svabhāva in the ontological sense refers to the causal capacity of the entity in question. As he puts it, “the svabhāva [i.e., the nature-svabhāva] of a thing is its power (śakti) to bring about an effect (kāryotpādana).” And since a thing is ultimately real only if it produces effects, this sense of svabhāva (i.e., as nature) can be called “ontological,” inasmuch as an entity devoid of causal capacity, being incapable of effects, would be unreal. It is important to note that Steinkellner’s “ontological” interpretation stresses the notion of nature-svabhāva as an entity’s causal potentials. It might therefore appear that he has not taken account of the fact that an entity’s nature-svabhāva must be the warrant for property-svabhāvas such as “produced from that [cause]” (tajjanya) which are based upon an entity’s causes, rather than its effects. Nevertheless, although Steinkellner does indeed stress the notion of causal potential, he clearly means that an entity’s nature-svabhāva also encompasses an entity’s causes.

In addition to noting that an entity’s nature-svabhāva must account for property-svabhāvas related to its causes as well as its potential effects, we have also seen that an entity’s nature-svabhāva should not be construed as an ultimately real entity: there is no nature of things distinct from the things themselves. Instead, a nature-svabhāva is simply a special case of an exclusion (vyāvṛtti). At first glance, Steinkellner’s use of the word “ontological” might suggest that he would not agree with this formulation. But in fact, Steinkellner maintains that even in its “ontological” sense, svabhāva does not refer to some ultimately real causal power, and he cites arguments from Dharmakīrti’s work that demonstrate that point. Steinkellner goes on to say that, rather than corresponding to some ultimately real entity in the world, the “ontological” svabhāva “...can only be meant in a figurative sense in order to express the state of affairs that many causes, which are conditioned through their own respective causes, produce one and the same effect.” In the case of an entity such as a water-jug, a nature-svabhāva is thus “a mere, convenient sign [Sigel] for the fact
that the apparent ‘working together’ of the causes for the production of a single effect is to be grounded exclusively on the beginningless preconditioning [of those causes] by [their] respective determinate causes.  

Since Steinkellner maintains that there is no ultimately real nature-svabhāva of things, he would presumably agree that this svabhāva must also be constructed in some fashion. And in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy construction always involves the process of exclusion described in his apoha-theory. Of course, this does not mean that, in constructing a thing’s nature-svabhāva, the mind of the perceiver alone simply creates the causal characteristics that correspond to the thing’s nature. Things arise from restricted causes and produce restricted effects regardless of whether their “capacity” to do so has been conceptualized.

We have understood Steinkellner to mean that a nature-svabhāva is itself an ultimately unreal entity constructed through exclusions, and on this basis I am largely in agreement with him on the distinction between the two senses of svabhāva. One aspect, however, of Steinkellner’s presentation needs further explanation. That is, in describing nature as the “ontological” meaning of svabhāva, Steinkellner could be misinterpreted as suggesting that an entity’s “ontological” svabhāva (its nature-svabhāva) is somehow “more real” than its “logical” svabhāvas (its property-svabhāvas).

Now, as Steinkellner has shown (and as we have also noted), many passages in Dharmakīrti’s works do indeed indicate that an entity’s property-svabhāvas are ontologically subordinate to its nature-svabhāva. The clearest of these are passages in which Dharmakīrti justifies the construction of exclusions as the warrants (pravṛttinimitta) for words. That is, even without a real universal—such as “blueness” (nīlatva)—instantiated in all the entities in question, one can correctly and usefully apply a word such as “blue” to all those unique particulars because the exclusion in question is formed on the basis of the fact that each entity has “by its nature” the “same” (eka) causal function.

In this way, the reality of the property-svabhāva, “blueness,” for example, is subordinate to the distinctive nature-svabhāva of each entity that produces an effect that can be conceptualized as “blue.” But we have seen that neither a property-svabhāva nor a nature-svabhāva can be an ultimately real particular qua svabhāva, and it is thus not at all clear that these terms should be treated with different degrees of ontological commitment. If we do so, we effectively posit a third type of reality: first, the ultimate reality of particulars; second, the conventional reality of property-svabhāvas (such as “blueness”) constructed through exclusions; and third, some quasi-ultimate reality of an entity’s nature-svabhāva, which is not a particular but is somehow “more real” than an entity’s property-svabhāvas. There is no evidence for such a threefold schema in Dharmakīrti’s work, but it would surely be inevitable if we differentiate the
ontological commitments applicable to property-svabhāvas and nature-svabhāvas.

But if neither a nature-svabhāva nor a property-svabhāva is ultimately real, how are we to explain what seems to be the ontological grounding of an entity’s properties in its nature? To attempt such an explanation, let us begin with a few heuristic terms.

**Some Heuristic Terms**

Earlier, I remarked that a clear explanation of the distinction and relationship between property-svabhāva and nature-svabhāva cannot be derived directly from Dharmakīrti’s own works. We could, of course, stop our inquiry at this point and simply note the incompleteness of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy. But I believe that we can profitably examine these ideas further by formulating an explanation that, while based on his philosophy, highlights ideas or theories that are only implicit in his work.

It seems that the best way to attempt an explanation is to coin a handful of heuristic terms. Although they have no clear Sanskritic equivalents, these terms will prove useful for seeing how certain aspects of Dharmakīrti’s apoha-theory are relevant to interpreting the senses of svabhāva in his philosophy.

The first term is abstraction, which we can define as concept-formation through the exclusion process. The process of abstraction is based upon an entity construed as a subject. That is, when we abstract “having branches” from the concept “tree,” we are “selecting” or abstracting certain causal characteristics from within the totality of the causal characteristics that is the nature-svabhāva of a “tree,” and we construct the predicate “having branches” on the basis of those abstracted causal characteristics.

Abstraction, however, can also rest upon another process that Dharmakīrti clearly discusses, although he provides no single term for it. To describe this process, I will introduce a second heuristic term, conceptual coalescence. Through the process of conceptual coalescence, individuals that are actually distinct are construed as if they were all constitutive of a single individual. Hence, in the case of “having branches,” the formation of that predicate is implicitly preceded by the conceptual coalescence of the infinitesimal particles in a manner that construes them in terms of the totality of causal characteristics that is the nature-svabhāva of what we call a “tree.” This “coalescence” must be conceptual, because although the physical characteristics of those infinitesimal particles allow us to consider them as arising from certain causes and conditions so as to have certain common effects, we are not obliged to consider those infinitesimal particles in that fashion; we can, if we choose, consider each infinitesimal particle individually.

Hence, when we abstract properties such as “having branches” from a “tree,” we are not starting with a “tree” as a given. Instead, the “tree” must
also be conceptually constructed. This means that the formation of the predicate “having branches” as applied to a “tree” actually has two aspects: first, one conceptually coalesces those infinitesimal particles by considering them in terms of certain causal characteristics (i.e., those restricted to what we call a “tree”), and second, one abstracts the predicate “having branches” from that totality of causal characteristics itself.

It is important to distinguish conceptual coalescence from another fundamental conceptual process in the apoha-theory. I will call this process identification, the construal of discrete instances of, for example, a “tree” as the “same” (eka). In conceptual coalescence, the discrete entities in question are construed as forming a single individual or instance; they are all the “same” in that they all constitute a single (eka) thing. In “identification” the discrete entities are themselves instances, and their sameness consists merely of the predication of the same universal to them without their necessarily participating in any single entity: all tree-instances are the “same” in that one predicates “treeness” of them. This means, of course, that conceptual coalescence can justify identification: if individual infinitesimal particles are understood as constitutive of a “tree,” the infinitesimal particles may be treated individually as the “same” in that each is an “infinitesimal particle of a tree.” It is important to note that identification plays a central role in Dharmakīrti’s apoha-theory, for any concept that is construed as referring to more than one instance must involve identification.

The Subordination of Property to Nature

If we turn now to the application of the aforementioned heuristic terms to the two meanings of svabhāva, we find that they enable us to explain how an entity’s property-svabhāvas are subordinate to its nature-svabhāva without having to suppose some greater ontological commitment to nature-svabhāva. The key point here is to take account of the relationships among concepts, causal characteristics, particulars and ontological claims.

We have already noted that for Dharmakīrti, a property-svabhāva, such as “being composed of matter,” is a concept based upon real things. Thus, he is effectively making a claim for some type of ontological reality underlying the correct application of that concept. He supports that claim by appealing to the notion of a nature-svabhāva, which we can understand as a predicate that refers to the totality of the causal characteristics of the subject to which that predicate is applied. But that subject’s nature-svabhāva is not in itself a real entity; instead, it is a concept based upon individual particulars “working together” to have the effects in question. Hence, if an appeal to an entity’s nature-svabhāva is successful in explaining the ontological basis for formulating its property-svabhāvas, we must be able to demonstrate how a nature-svabhāva is itself reducible in all cases to particulars.

We can do so by applying the terms discussed above. Consider, for
example, the property “having branches” as applied to a “tree.” The ontological basis for the predication of that property is that a “tree” by its nature (svabhāvena) is capable of producing the effects that are the basis for the abstraction of that predicate. By conceptually reversing this process of abstraction, we can see that the property-svabhāva “having branches” is reducible to the nature-svabhāva of the subject that it qualifies. Thus, we can understand that property-svabhāva as subordinate to that nature-svabhāva.

That nature-svabhāva itself, however, is nothing but the totality of causal characteristics that is the tree itself. Thus, for an appeal to the “tree’s nature-svabhāva” to serve as the ontological ground for applying the predicate “having branches,” we must demonstrate the ontological grounds for the “tree” itself. We do so by noting that the concept of a “tree” is formed by conceptually coalescing individual infinitesimal particles that have gained certain causal potentials due to the manner in which they have been produced. In this way, by reducing the concept “tree” itself to the causal potentials of particulars that have been produced in a certain fashion, we can ground our ontological claims in particulars—the only ultimately real entities in Dharmakīrti’s system—without hypostasizing some real nature-svabhāva of the “tree.”

In the end, what we have formulated is a principle of ontological reduction that appears to underlie Dharmakīrti’s system. Properties can be reduced to the nature-svabhāva of the subject (dharmin) that they qualify. This amounts to a reduction of the properties to the subject itself, since its nature-svabhāva is a marker for the totality of the causal characteristics that is that subject. And if Dharmakīrti’s ontology does not allow that subject itself to be a particular, a consistent ontology would require that it be reduced to the particulars that, by arising from a certain type of causal complex, account for the causal potentials of that subject.

One of the advantages of this way of interpreting Dharmakīrti’s use of svabhāva is that it also enables us to account for an implicit notion of “levels” or “orders” of concepts in Dharmakīrti’s work. A concept at the lowest level, which we might call a “first-order” concept, is one that involves only one of the conceptual processes mentioned above. One can argue that “infinitesimal particle,” for example, is a first-order concept. On the External Realist view, an infinitesimal particle is itself a particular, so conceptual coalescence is not part of the formation of that concept: unlike the concept “tree,” the concept “infinitesimal particle” does not require us to construe multiple particulars as constituting a single entity. And if we treat an “infinitesimal particle” as a subject, this concept is of course constructed, but not through abstraction. Indeed, the only conceptual process applicable to “infinitesimal particle” would be identification, for that concept does present each infinitesimal particle as the same (eka) as all other infinitesimal particles.

If Dharmakīrti’s philosophy is to remain coherent, this notion of “levels”
or “orders” of concepts seems inevitable, for it appears to be the only solution to the problem of the subject-shift discussed earlier. This shift is the one that occurs between the nature-svabhāva of, for example, a “water-jug” and the nature-svabhāva of an individual that can be construed as a particular instance of a “water-jug.” This problem becomes most obvious when we choose to translate this usage of svabhāva as “essence.” To be specific, we will find it difficult to account for why an individual identified as a “water-jug” appears to have two natures or “essences”: on the one hand, as an instance of a “water-jug,” that individual has the “essence” of a water-jug, which accounts for the fact that we can correctly abstract properties such as “impermanence” from it. But on the other hand, that individual bears other properties, such as “being made in Kāśī,” that are accidental to a “water-jug.” If these other predicates are correctly applied to that individual, then they must be warranted by its essence: by its essence (svabhāvena) that individual must have the effects that enable us to abstract the property “made in Kāśī.”

Now, since “made in Kāśī” is accidental to being a “water-jug,” we cannot say that it is the nature-svabhāva or “essence” of that individual qua water-jug to be made in Kāśī, for water-jugs are not necessarily made in Kāśī. But it is the nature-svabhāva or “essence” of that individual qua individual to be made in Kāśī. This “double-essence” would lead us to conclude that that individual is “essentially” or “by its nature” (svabhāvena) both “made in Kāśī” and not “made in Kāśī”!

By appealing to some implicit notion of orders or levels of concepts in Dharmakīrti’s thought, we can avoid this contradictory imposition of two nature-svabhāvas or “essences” in two ways. First, by understanding even nature-svabhāva or “essence” as an exclusion, we can see that both of these nature-svabhāvas or “essences,” although not identical, could apply to the same individual without contradiction. We can claim that we are actually dealing with two different subjects involving different conceptual processes in their formation. Second, by employing the notion of “orders” of concepts, we can see that a water-jug’s nature-svabhāva (the total causal characteristics expected of a “water-jug”) is at a higher order than an individual’s nature-svabhāva (the total causal characteristics of that individual). The water-jug-nature is abstracted from the individual-nature, and by not choosing to conceptualize the individual as a subject qua water-jug, one effectively reduces the water-jug-nature (the total causal characteristics of any water-jug) to the individual-nature (the total causal characteristics of that individual).

Finally, the interpretation of svabhāva as “nature” presented here prevents certain problems in the interpretation of svabhāva in the compound svabhāvapratibandha. Steinkellner has noted that, although we can point to no clear gloss for the compound in Dharmakīrti’s own works, svabhāva in this context should mean what he calls “essence” and I prefer to call “nature-svabhāva.” The basic point here is that if svabhāvapratibandha is
meant to provide a basis “in reality” for the indubitability of well-formed inferences, then we should expect the term to refer in some way to the causal functionality on the basis of which the terms of an inference are constructed. We can supplement this explanation by noting that the “essence” of a distributed entity such as a “tree” is reducible to the particulars that participate in that causal complex. We are thus not left with the postulation of some third level of reality between particulars and universals.

This interpretation allows us to take account of Shōryū Katsura’s initial response to Steinkellner’s presentation of svabhāvapratibandha. In 1986, Katsura remarked:

Although Steinkellner explicitly states that svabhāva in this compound [i.e., svabhāvapratibandha] can only have the ontological meaning, viz. essence, I would rather take it to mean “concept,” the second meaning of svabhāva used in logical contexts as pointed out by Steinkellner himself. According to Dharmakīrti’s ontological conviction that everything is momentary, a relation or connection is possible not in reality but only in the conceptual universe because only concepts, being understood as “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha), can have the nature of the “universals” (sāmānya) of other systems of Indian philosophy. Thus svabhāva in svabhāvapratibandha primarily denotes “universal” as exemplified by smoke-ness or fire-ness conceptually constructed by anyāpoha; in other words, the concept of smoke or fire.91

In a subsequent article, Katsura recounts a discussion that he held with Steinkellner on this issue:

During the second International Dharmakīrti Conference held in Vienna, June 1989, we [i.e., Steinkellner and Katsura] had a debate on this topic and came to realize that there were at least two opposing positions; namely, one held that svabhāvapratibandha represented the state of affairs in reality (how things are and how they are connected with each other) and the other held that the term meant a logical concept, i.e., the necessary connection between the probans and the probandum (thus, somewhat synonymous with avinābhāva/vyāpti). Steinkellner playfully named the former sambandhavāda and the latter vyāptivāda.92

Katsura goes on to confess that his research on PV4 had “converted” him to the so-called sambandhavāda. This conversion makes good sense, for Katsura’s earlier position did not take adequate account of the ontological appeal implicit in the notion of svabhāvapratibandha. Nevertheless, some of
his earlier suspicions were indeed well founded, for as we have seen, svabhāva (“nature”) in svabhāvapratibandha cannot itself be a particular; hence, it must be an exclusion, as Katsura argued in his earlier article. With the presentation I have given here, we can follow Katsura’s initial intuition while noting that, since property-svabhāvas are necessarily higher order concepts than the nature-svabhāva on which they are based, svabhāva as nature can still amount to an appeal to some underlying ontological reality.

3.4 Svabhāva-evidence and the Identity-mode

In the interpretation of svabhāva that I have just presented, one notion appears to be commonly assumed by interpreters of Dharmakīrti—namely, the principle of ontological reduction. But while some such notion is clearly implicit in Dharmakīrti’s work, the exact role it plays can be particularly difficult in one context: namely, the identity relation that underlies svabhāva-evidence. Let us begin by stating the basic form of such an inference based on Dharmakīrti’s usual stock example:

This is a tree because it is a sugar maple.\(^{93}\)

Or, to use another typical example:

A water-jug is impermanent because it is produced.

As we have noted, Dharmakīrti’s formulation of the svabhāvapratibandha aims to provide an invariable rule (niyama) for the pervasion relation that must pertain between the predicate and the evidence in any well-formed inference. If in the first example such a relation is in place, we should always be able to say that if a thing “is a sugar maple,” it also necessarily “is a tree.” And likewise in the second example, such a relation guarantees that if a thing “is produced,” it necessarily “is impermanent.”\(^{94}\) For Dharmakīrti, our ability to invariably infer the predicate from the evidence in such cases is warranted by this kind of relation: namely, a svabhāvapratibandha in the mode of “identity” (tādātmya). But what is meant by “identity” here?

Over the years, Steinkellner has admirably culled from Dharmakīrti’s texts all of the passages relevant to interpreting Dharmakīrti’s use of the term “identity.” Given Dharmakīrti’s reliance upon causality as a means to ground his ontology, it is not surprising to find that in many of these passages, the notion of “identity” is also based at least partially on causality. In the case of “is impermanent” and “is produced,” for example, Dharmakīrti claims that the causes that give rise to an entity that “is produced” are exactly the causes that give rise to that entity’s “impermanence.” In other words, if an entity “is produced,” no further causes are needed for its “impermanence” because the causes that make it “produced” also make it “impermanent.” Indeed, if both “is produced” and
“is impermanent” are to be property-śvabhāvas of the entity in question, they must be there from that entity’s inception, for otherwise a thing would have to change its nature-śvabhāva, which is by definition unchangeable. In other words, if the totality of the causal characteristics (i.e., the nature-śvabhāva) of that entity cannot provide the warrant for the construction of the properties “is impermanent” and “is produced,” then those properties will never be applicable to that individual.

How is this an argument for the “identity” of “is impermanent” and “is produced”? It would seem that, thus far, Dharmakīrti appeals to something quite similar to the principle of ontological reduction that I have coined above. That is, the causes that give rise to an instance of a “water-jug,” for example, can be used as the basis for correctly abstracting the concepts of both “is impermanent” and “is produced” from that “water-jug.” Thus, these abstracted properties can be reduced to the subject or property-bearer (dharmin) from which they have been abstracted. The two properties are thus “identical” in that they are in fact nothing but that dharmin itself. The same analysis can be applied to the case of “is a tree” and “is a sugar maple.” If we can correctly say of an individual that it “is a sugar maple” and also that it “is a tree,” then what we mean is that no further causes are necessary for us to apply one of these predicates to it. In short, both of these predicates are ontologically reducible to the subject that they qualify.95

Now, if this ontological reduction were all that Dharmakīrti meant by “identity,” then we could raise numerous criticisms against this notion. One obvious criticism is that, on this theory, the inference could be interpreted as a tautology.96 If the predicate to be proven (sādhya) and the evidence are in fact ontologically identical, and if we make no specification beyond this statement of ontological identity, then we are in effect saying “This is a tree because it is a tree.” Dharmakīrti takes this criticism seriously, and his entire excursus on the apoha-theory in the Svaśṛtti can be understood as a response to this issue. His argument comes down to the claim that, in an inference by way of śvabhāva-evidence, the evidence and predicate are indeed ontologically identical, but they do not have the same meaning (artha) because they are formed on the basis of excluding different “delimiters” (avadhi).97 Although we do not have the space to evaluate Dharmakīrti’s argument fully, the basic treatment of the apoha-theory that I have presented earlier should suggest that this aspect of his philosophy is not implausible.

Tautology is indeed a problem that Dharmakīrti must avoid, but it is probably not the most serious criticism that ensues when the identity-mode is understood to consist merely of ontological reduction. To be specific, if all we mean by the identity-mode is that the evidence and the predicate are ontologically reducible to the subject (dharmin) that they qualify, then this would justify a bevy of flawed inferences. For example, mere reduction would enable us to say, “This is a tree because it is existent.” After all, the
property-svabhāvas “existence” (sattā) and “treeness” (vrkṣatva) are both reducible to the subject (dharmin) that they qualify.

An obvious response to this point is to say that such an inference would not pass the test for negative concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti). That is, one would observe that “existence” can be present where there is no “treeness.” But the problem here is that this is falling back on “mere observation,” which on Dharmakīrti’s view cannot provide a basis for the type of necessary relation between subject and predicate that he seeks. Dharmakīrti rejects such cases by noting that one can formulate spurious inferences that do pass the test for negative concomitance and yet do not guarantee the presence of the predicate with the evidence.98

To see how one can formulate a spurious inference of this kind, we must first recall that the subject (dharmin) of the proposition to be inferred (pratijnā) cannot itself be the basis for formulating the two forms of concomitance: we must appeal to cases other than those included in the proposition to be proven.99 With this in mind, Dharmakīrti asks us to consider a case where we have some fruits of a certain kind before us, and we are seeking those that have a particular taste. Let us assume, as Dharmakīrti implies, that the taste we seek is a particularly delicious taste that this kind of fruit can have when ripe. Dharmakīrti then asks us to consider two different contexts. The first context is the practical situation of deciding which fruits on a particular tree will have that special taste. We are unconcerned with other fruits, and thus the fruits on this tree form the entirety of our induction domain. With this in mind, we taste a few fruits from all the branches of the tree, and we find that the fruits we selected from a particular branch all have that delicious taste, while all the others we have tasted do not. Pointing to that one branch, we then infer, “all these fruits have that delicious taste because they come from that same branch, like the ones we have tasted, and unlike all the others.” Now, it just so happens that only that branch does have delicious tasting fruits (perhaps only that branch received enough light). Hence, when we make our test for negative concomitance, we will de facto fail to find any instance that contradicts our inference: any fruit that fails to be on that branch will also fail to have that taste. But does this mean that all the fruits on that branch do have that taste?

In the second context, we are attending to the color of the fruits in front of us. Let us suppose that they are blueberries, and that we seek sweet ones. We taste a few of various hues, and our observations suggest that all blueberries with a particular blue-black hue are sweet, while others do not. Selecting the remaining berries of that color, we claim, “all these blueberries are sweet because they have that same blue-black shade.” Now, only blueberries of that shade can be sweet, so we have selected all of the possible candidates as part of our proposition to be proven. For this reason, de facto the inference passes the test for negative concomitance: in the sample available for observation, all non-blue-black blueberries are not
sweet. Thus, in both this context and the one above, we might assume our
inferences to be well formed.

Any blueberry-gourmand, however, knows that even a blue-black
blueberry can be brusquely bitter. But if we posit an identity relation on the
basis of ontological reduction, we would have no way of avoiding this type
of fallacious inference. The color and taste may be “identical” in that they
are both reducible to the subject that they qualify. But if we happen to
initially formulate the positive concomitance of the pervasion relation
between color and taste on the basis of blueberries that are both blue-black
and sweet, we would have no reason per se to reject that formulation. One
might claim that the sample should be broadened before we draw our
inference, but broadening the sample does not in itself guarantee the
reliability of the pervasion relation. We could be unlucky (or lucky?) and
encounter only delicious, blue-black blueberries.\textsuperscript{100} It is for this reason that
Dharmakīrti goes as far as to say that even a single observation can be
sufficient to establish a pervasion relation between the evidence and
predicate. For Dharmakīrti, the vicissitudes of the sample are irrelevant if
one knows that a svabhāvapratibandha is in place, and without a
svabhāvapratibandha, broadening the sample would be useless.\textsuperscript{101}

Thus, Dharmakīrti’s explicit rejection of the type of improperly formed
inference we have just discussed strongly suggests that ontological
reduction cannot in itself be what he means by the identity-mode of the
svabhāvapratibandha. With this in mind, we can return to Dharmakīrti’s
definition of svabhāva-evidence and see that, in a subtler form, the same
concern is evident. That is, the definition itself is crafted in a manner that
aims to move beyond the simple ontological identity of evidence to
predicate. Let us recall the definition as found in Pramāṇavārttika:

Also, a svabhāva is evidence for a svabhāva that is invariably
consequent from its mere (mātra) presence [PV1.2cd].\textsuperscript{102}

For the purposes of moving beyond the ontological identity of predicate
and evidence, the key term in this definition is mātra (“mere” or “just”). In
employing this term, Dharmakīrti points not only to the ontological unity of
predicate and evidence, but also the way in which the evidence is an
invariable “indicator” (gamaka) of the predicate. Iwata, in contrast to my
interpretation, has argued that the term mātra (“mere” or “just”) should be
understood such that it refers just to the ontological identity of predicate
(sādhyā) and evidence (sādhana):

From this [definition] it is evident that the sādhyā’s occurrence in
accordance with the mere existence of the sādhana does not
t entail the logical proposition that the sādhyā is always restricted
by the sādhana and hence pervaded by the latter, but it refers to
the factual relation in which the sādhyā arises always from the
I instead argue that the term “mere” does indeed have a “logical” function, in the sense that it restricts the evidence to the predicate by preventing both overextension (atiprasaṅga) and under-extension (nyūnatā). Consider the case of a thing that we identify as a “sugar maple.” On Dharmakīrti’s formulation of svabhāva-evidence, if we wish to say that this thing “is a tree” because it “is a sugar maple,” we must maintain that the “mere” (mātra) presence of the property-svabhāva adduced as evidence (“is a sugar maple”) is sufficient to demonstrate the presence of the property-svabhāva to be proven (“is a tree”). The qualifier “mere” has two functions. First, it tells us that other property-svabhāvas are irrelevant to our inference. The sugar maple we adduce as an example may be ten meters tall, or its leaves may be red; but these property-svabhāvas are irrelevant to our concern. We need only abstract from the thing in question the property-svabhāva, “is a sugar maple.” This prevents an under-extension: if we believe that along with “is a sugar maple” we must supply “is ten meters tall” in order to establish that a sugar maple is a tree, then short sugar maples will no longer be in the domain of similar cases. Thus, if the individual that is the subject of the inference happens to be short, we will not be able to infer that it “is a tree.” For this reason, allowing the property-svabhāva “is ten meters tall” to be a part of or a supplement to the evidence “is a sugar maple” incurs an under-extension because it improperly excludes some “sugar maples” from consideration as “trees.”

Second, “mere” tells us that if we must supply other property-svabhāvas before we can affirm the presence of the predicate, then our evidence is not in itself sufficient to demonstrate the presence of the predicate. For example, if in lieu of “is a sugar maple” we use the property-svabhāva “is leafy,” we might attempt to infer: “This is a tree because it is leafy.” We would find, however, counterexamples, such as ivy, which are leafy, but not a tree. Thus, “is leafy” would require supplementation with other properties before it could serve as evidence for “is a tree.” In other words, “is leafy” includes too many cases, and if we use it as evidence, we incur an overextension.

If my interpretation of “mere” in the definition of svabhāva-evidence is correct, then we have already moved a considerable way toward an understanding of the identity-mode that does not rest on simple ontological reduction of evidence to predicate (or both to the subject). Dharmakīrti’s answer, in short, is to place a restriction (through the qualifier “mere”) on the type of property-svabhāva that we can adduce as evidence. Even though the various sugar maples that we see may have many divergent qualities—height, leaf color, sweetness of sap—these qualities will be excluded by “mere” because they are irrelevant to inferring “is a tree,” either because they improperly exclude some individuals from the domain of “is a tree,” or because they improperly include some individuals in that domain.
As we shall see, this close reading of Dharmakīrti’s definition of svabhāva—evidence suggests the way that we must understand the identity-mode, if we are to avoid accusing Dharmakīrti of an egregious logical error. But even if our reading of “mere” is helpful, we must face the problem of understanding Dharmakīrti’s own statements in relation to the identity mode. Particularly important—and particularly troublesome—are the many passages where Dharmakīrti describes the relation of “identity” (tādātmya) by employing the compound tatsvabhāva—literally, “that svabhāva”—or some equivalent compound (tadbhāva, tadātman, etc.). Most commonly, he specifies that the property adduced as evidence (“is a sugar maple”) can be qualified as “that-svabhāva” in relation to the property to be proven (“is a tree”). The twofold question that arises here is: how do we construe the relationship between the compound’s two members (i.e., “that” and “svabhāva”) in these cases, and what is the relevant meaning of svabhāva?

Without going into great philological detail, we can note that there are only two viable alternatives for the interpretation of “that-svabhāva.” The compound either means “the svabhāva of that” (tasya svabhāvaḥ), or it means “having that as its svabhāva” (yasya tat svabhāvavah). Thus, if we are speaking of the evidence, and we say that it is “that-svabhāva” in relation to the predicate, then we mean either that the evidence is the predicate’s svabhāva, or that the evidence has the predicate as its svabhāva. With these possibilities in mind, we can then interpret the meaning of svabhāva as either nature-svabhāva or property-svabhāva. Combining these factors, we arrive at four possibilities for the interpretation of a statement in the form “the evidence is tatsvabhāva in relation to the predicate.”

Option 1. The evidence is the predicate’s nature-svabhāva.
Option 2. The evidence is the predicate’s property-svabhāva.
Option 3. The evidence has the predicate as its nature-svabhāva.
Option 4. The evidence has the predicate as its property-svabhāva.

In his comments on the compound tatsvabhāva, Steinkellner has argued that the term svabhāva should generally be interpreted as “essence,” i.e., nature-svabhāva, and this leaves us with just option 1 and option 3. Applying this to our example and using the term “essence” for nature-svabhāva, we would say for option 1: “being a sugar maple” is the essence of “being a tree.” Or, if we restate this in more ordinary language, “to be a sugar maple is the essence of being a tree.” In contrast, if we favor option 3, we would say that “being a sugar maple” has “being a tree” as its essence. Again, in ordinary language: “to be a sugar maple is in essence to be a tree.”

In much of his work on the topic Steinkellner appears to favor option 1, and on this reading, Dharmakīrti would claim that “to be a sugar maple is the essence of being a tree.” While such a reading is philologically
possible for at least some cases of the compound tatsvabhāva, from a logical
doctrine, this interpretation is potentially disastrous.

To see what is disastrous here, it is important to recall a few points. On
Dharmakīrti’s view, a predicate (such as “is a sugar maple”) is constructed
on the basis of the causal characteristics of things. And if a predicate is
properly applied to its subject (dharmin), then that subject must have the
causal characteristics required for the construction of that predicate. In
short, if we call something a “sugar maple,” that entity must have all the
causal characteristics expected of a “sugar maple.” And when we speak of a
nature-svabhāva or “essence” (svabhāva) of a tree, we are referring to the
totality of the causal characteristics that an individual qua tree-instance
must have. By drawing together these notions, we can derive the following
equivalencies:

“is a sugar maple” = the causal characteristics required for the constructi
of the predicate, “is a sugar maple.”

“the essence of a tree” = the total causal characteristics that any tree-instance
must have.

“being a sugar maple” is the
essence of a tree” = the causal characteristics required is for the
construction of the predicate “is a sugar maple” is th
totality of causal characteristics that any tree instance
must have.

Thus, if the evidence (“is a sugar maple”) is the essence of the predicate to
be proven (“is a tree”), we are actually claiming that all trees are sugar
maples, which leaves us with a number of sticky problems. For example,
either maple syrup can be made from the sap of an oak tree; or oaks are not
actually trees; or if oaks are trees but do not produce maple sap, then the
ability to produce the sap for maple syrup is not one of the causal
characteristics required for an individual to be called a “sugar maple.” The
problem here is an inversion of the relation between pervaded (vyāpya) and
pervader (vyāpaka). To use the language of extensions, we expect the
evidence to be of smaller or equal extension with the predicate, such that
all instances of the evidence are included in the extension of the predicate:
as in the claim, “all sugar maples are trees.” But in fact, by saying that the
evidence is the essence of the predicate, we have inverted this relationship,
which amounts to the claim, “all trees are sugar maples.”

A possible response to this criticism is to maintain that it improperly
construes an abstract predicate (such as vṛkṣatva, “is a tree” or “treeness”) as
having an essence. Since such predicates are in fact exclusions, they
cannot be said to have an essence at all. Although I agree with this
criticism, one must be careful about interpreting its implications. Clearly, if
“treeness” cannot itself bear an essence, then we must modify our
interpretation of the claim that the evidence is characterized as *tatsvabhāva* relative to the predicate. Instead, we should understand the compound *tatsvabhāva* not in terms of the evidence and predicate themselves, but rather in terms of instances that instantiate the evidence and predicate. Thus, in lieu of saying, as in option 1 above, “To be a sugar maple is the essence of being a tree,” we could more accurately say, “an instance of a sugar maple is the essence of an instance of a tree.” But even though this way of expressing option 1 guards against the reification of predicates or essences, it does not solve the basic problem at hand: we still are saying that if some individual is a tree, then it is in essence a sugar maple. Hence, oaks produce the sap for maple syrup, or oaks are not trees, or sugar maples do not produce the sap for maple syrup.

Thus, it should by now be clear that in statements about the identity mode of the *svabhāvapratibandha*, the compound *tatsvabhāva* and its equivalents cannot mean that the property adduced as evidence is the “essence” (i.e., the nature-*svabhāva*) of the property to be proven. If at all possible, we should interpret the compound as option-3, according to which the evidence has the essence of that predicate. Or, to be more precise, we should say, “That which instantiates the evidence-property has the essence or nature-*svabhāva* of that which instantiates the predicate.”

Stated in this fashion, it may appear that we are talking about two different instantiates here: that which instantiates the evidence, and that which instantiates the predicate. This is where “ontological reduction” becomes relevant. That is, although an ontological identity does not exhaust the meaning of all statements involving *tatsvabhāva*, it is clearly part of what these statements mean. The property serving as evidence and the property to be inferred are reducible to the very same entity: “being a tree” and “being a sugar maple” are ontologically identical, for they are not actually distinct from the individual in question. Thus, an individual that instantiates the evidence (“being a sugar maple”) is itself an individual that instantiates the predicate (“being a tree”), but in the specific sense that, by virtue of instantiating the evidence (“being a maple”), it has the essence of the predicate-instance (i.e., it has the essence of a “tree”).

With the equivalencies sketched above, and with the proviso that we are speaking here of instances and not just abstract predicates, we can modify our table as follows:

| the subject of “is a sugar maple” | an individual that has the causal characteristics required for the construction of the predicate, “is a sugar maple.” |
| the subject of “essence of a tree” | the total causal characteristics that any tree-instance must have. |
| the subject of | an individual that has the causal characteristics |
“is a sugar maple” has the essence of a tree required for the construction of the predicate “is a sugar maple” has the total causal characteristics that any tree instance must have.

Thus, to state this point slightly differently, on our example the identity-mode of the svabhāvataprabandha means that, if we can correctly apply the predicate “is a sugar maple” to some individual, then that individual necessarily has the causal characteristics required for the construction of the predicate “is a tree.”

If this is indeed what Dharmakīrti means by the identity-mode of svabhāvataprabandha, it seems to make good sense. Since concepts are constructed on the basis of an entity’s causal characteristics, if we infer from the correct predication of one concept that another concept is also correctly predicable of the same entity, then presumably we are saying that the causal characteristics necessary for the predication of the former concept include all the causal characteristics necessary for the predication of the latter concept. We could thus argue that, in this regard, Dharmakīrti is employing a different kind of reduction, namely, a conceptual reduction whereby more complex concepts that are based upon a wider range of causal characteristics are reducible to simpler concepts that are based upon a narrower range. Thus, since “is a sugar maple” can be reduced in this way to “is a tree,” we can infer that any given individual is a tree if it is a sugar maple.

Fortunately, this analysis of the compound tatsvabhāva (i.e., option 3: the evidence has the predicate as its nature-svabhāva) accounts for the vast majority of cases in which Dharmakīrti employs it to describe the identity-mode, and it conforms to a careful reading of the term “mere” in his definition of the svabhāva-evidence. Option 3 also avoids attributing to Dharmakīrti a position that is completely untenable from a logical point of view, whereby the desired logical relation between evidence and predicate is inverted. Nevertheless, option-3 cannot account for every use of the compound tatsvabhāva. Iwata points to a number of instances that some of Dharmakīrti’s later commentators interpret as option 1 (the evidence is the essence of the predicate), but most of these instances can as easily be taken as option 3. Iwata cites one case, however, that is unambiguously not amenable to option 3. It is a verse from the third chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika:

At certain times [i.e., when using an inference] one has an established cognition of one thing through some other thing which serves as evidence. That evidence through which one has that cognition is necessarily (avaśyam) either produced from that thing or the svabhāva of that thing. //PV3.70//
What we have translated here as “the svabhāva of that thing” is actually the compound tatsvabhāva in the original Sanskrit. The grammar here is such that we cannot possibly interpret tatsvabhāva to mean “has that thing as its svabhāva” (option 3). And if we interpret svabhāva as nature-svabhāva or essence, then we have clearly arrived at option 1, “the evidence is the essence of the predicate.” But perhaps we should first consider the verse that comes next in the Pramāṇavārttika:

It is not possible for a thing to occur without its own cause or svabhāva. And that character (rūpa) that is observed in these two cases is precisely the definition that applies to other reliable evidence. //PV3.71//

For Dharmakīrti the main point of this verse is the assertion that the “character” of effect-evidence and svabhāva-evidence must apply to all cases of reliable evidence; in other words, all forms of reliable evidence must conform to these two in some fashion. For our purposes, however what is most interesting here is that he again uses the term svabhāva, but now svabhāva refers not to the evidence, but to the predicate. Thus, in PV3.70, he says that the evidence is the svabhāva of the predicate, but in PV3.71, he says that the evidence cannot occur without its svabhāva, namely, the predicate! This usage may surprise us, but it should not. Instead, we should recall that in the definition of svabhāva-evidence, the term svabhāva is used to describe both the evidence and the predicate. That is, on Dharmakīrti’s formulation one svabhāva stands as evidence for another svabhāva in the case of the identity-mode.

Now, the meaning of svabhāva in the second verse we have cited (PV3.71) should be fairly obvious: when we say that the evidence (“is a sugar maple”) cannot occur without its svabhāva (“is a tree”), it seems clear that svabhāva must mean nature-svabhāva. Thus, something cannot be a sugar maple if it is not in essence a tree. But what then do we do with the compound tatsvabhāva in the previous verse (PV3.70)? Do we say that the evidence is the essence of the predicate, even though we will then immediately say (in PV3.71) that the predicate is the essence of the evidence? This interpretation introduces a stunning degree of conceptual incoherence into Dharmakīrti’s thought, and we would be forced to conclude either that he was truly ignorant of how to work with qualities and essences, or else that he was extraordinarily inept at doing so.

Charitably, we do have another option: we can decide that in PV3.70, the term svabhāva must be treated as “property-svabhāva.” In other words, in that verse Dharmakīrti is simply saying that the evidence is a property-svabhāva of the predicate (this formulation is option 2 in our list). In relation to our example, Dharmakīrti would be saying that “is a maple” is a property-svabhāva of “is a tree,” or in ordinary language, “being a maple is a property of being a tree.” At first glance this may appear equally
incoherent, but if we understand both of these properties to be identical to a single individual, Dharmakīrti would in effect be reminding us that the property “is a sugar maple” is identical to the individual that “is a tree.” In ordinary terms, he would be saying, “being a maple is a property of this individual that is a tree.” In short, he would be reinforcing the importance of the principle of ontological reduction. We have already seen that ontological reduction is not in itself sufficient to justify the type of relation required between evidence and predicate for a successful inference of this kind, but in reminding us of that reduction Dharmakīrti is not committing any great error.

As interpreters of Dharmakīrti’s thought, the lesson we can learn here is that, while we have numerous textual reasons to see two different meanings in the term svabhāva, we should not forget that Dharmakīrti never clearly states that he is using the term in two distinct ways. Often the context of a usage forcefully indicates the preferred meaning of svabhāva (as “property” or “nature”), but in many crucial cases, including the verses that we have just considered, Dharmakīrti’s words offer no unequivocal choice. We need to keep this ambiguity in mind, for it may suggest that Dharmakīrti has deliberately hidden some specific purpose in this equivocation—a purpose that modern interpreters of Dharmakīrti have yet to detect. But it may also indicate that Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference through svabhāva-evidence simply was not very well worked out. With this in mind, let us examine some potential problems.

**A Few Problems**

Along the lines of our discussion above, we may be able to come to an interpretation of svabhāva-evidence and the identity relation that we would find easily defensible, but even so, a number of problems remain. The most striking difficulty is simply that, although Dharmakīrti does appear to recognize the insufficiency of mere ontological reduction as a basis of inference, he never explicitly explains how the identity-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha does not amount to a reduction of the properties in question to the individual they qualify. In other words, while the additional stipulation of a “conceptual reduction” is probably the most consistent possible way of interpreting the svabhāvapratibandha’s identity-mode, the vagueness and incompleteness of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of this topic makes it impossible to definitively defend the interpretation I have proposed. And although some later commentators may have suggested a similar interpretation, at this point I cannot say whether such is the case.113

My inability to definitively establish how Dharmakīrti moves beyond mere ontological reduction is in part a result of the ambiguity of his statements, but it also seems to reflect certain lacunae in Dharmakīrti’s thought. Perhaps the most salient of these is the distinction between accidental and essential properties, for although such a distinction is
implied by both modes of the svabhāvapratibandha, to my knowledge Dharmakīrti never directly proposes a means for formulating such a distinction.

The absence of a clear theory concerning essential and accidental properties is particularly problematic in the case of the identity-mode. That is, it seems that the correct predication of “is a sugar maple” invariably allows the correct predication of “is a tree” to the same individual because the causal characteristics required for the former predicate include all the causal characteristics required for the latter. Now, talk about “causal characteristics” is always convertible to talk about property-svabhāvas, because the latter are constructed on the basis of the former. Hence, understanding property-svabhāvas to be “essential properties,” we should be able to say that an individual that is a sugar maple is necessarily a tree because the essential properties of a sugar maple include all the essential properties of a tree. But this presumes that those properties of the individual in question that are necessary for it to bear the predicates “is a sugar maple” and “is a tree” are distinguished from those that are not necessary for those predications. If the particular entity in question has a certain height, we must be able to specify whether that height is essential to either a “sugar maple,” a “tree,” or both. Dharmakīrti, however, does not even use consistent terminology for speaking in this fashion, for we have already seen that svabhāva, which probably should not be rendered as “essential property,” is not used in a way that clearly distinguishes the accidental from the essential.

Even if we assume that Dharmakīrti does present a clear accidental/essential distinction (along with consistent use of some requisite terminology), this would not solve another problem: we still need a way to determine what is essential and what is not. Since the pervasion relation in an inference by svabhāva-evidence is based upon identity (tādātmya), we can think of this problem in terms of verifying the pervasion relation when we employ an inference using svabhāva-evidence. Although he offers no clear procedure in the Pramāṇavārttika or Svātṛtī, in later texts Dharmakīrti proposes a procedure whereby that relation is affirmed by “an instrumental cognition that demonstrates the incompatibility of the presence of the evidence in the contradictory of the predicate to be proven” (sādhyāvīparityṣayate bādhakapramāṇa).

In the description of this procedure, a key term is “the contradictory” (vāpyaya). Steinkellner has convincingly argued that in using this term, Dharmakīrti is not merely referring to the absence of the predicate (sādhyābha), but rather to a “contradictory,” i.e., an entity that contradicts the predicate in such a way that any third possibility is excluded. Thus, in our example, this cognition would need to show that the predicate “is a sugar maple” is not merely absent where trees are absent, but rather that the predicate could not be correctly applied to an individual that bears the predicate “is a non-tree.” Steinkellner has further shown,
especially on the basis of a discussion in Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya, that this test is accomplished by appealing to a particular kind of nonperception (anupalabdhi). Specifically, when we examine an individual that instantiates the contradictory of the property to be proven, we do not perceive a property that pervades (vyāpakadharma) the evidence. In a convincing extrapolation from Dharmakīrti’s chosen example (i.e., inferring momentariness from existence), Steinkellner suggests that in our type of example, the pervading property for which we would test would be “having branches and such.”

Now, the notion of a “pervading property” (vyāpakadharma) can be consistently used in the sense of an “essential property” of that which it pervades, for as we have seen in chapter 1, a pervader is present in all cases of the pervaded (vyāpya). Indeed, vyāpakadharma is one term in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy that could be equated in all its contexts with the notion of an “essential property.” But even if we have thus found a consistent way to speak of essential properties, the nonperception of a sugar maple’s pervading property in an individual that is a non-tree is not in itself sufficient to show that an individual that “is a sugar maple” is necessarily an individual that “is a tree.”

Consider, for example, an inferential cognition in the form, “This is a cat because it is a sugar maple.” Let us assume that we can somehow determine that a pervading property of a sugar maple is “having branches and such” (śākhādimattva). On this basis, we would verify the pervasion relation in our inference by the nonperception of “having branches and such” as a correct predicate of non-cats. We know that the range and vicissitudes of our observations should have no impact on the outcome of this test, so we just examine three non-cats that happen to be at hand: a dog, a car, and a hooligan. We find that the causal characteristics necessary for predicating “branches and such” are not perceived in any of these cases, so we thus conclude that the sugar maple in front of us is a cat. Obviously, something is not quite right here.

The problem, of course, is that we have failed to establish that “having branches and such” is an “essential” or pervading property (vyāpakadharma), not only of a sugar maple (the evidence), but also of a cat (the predicate). In other words, before testing for the nonperception of that pervading property, we first need to know whether “having branches and such” is a pervading property of cats such that its predicability is relevant to deciding whether the items we test are indeed contradictories of a cat.

But if Steinkellner’s account is correct (and I think it is), then the procedure offered by Dharmakīrti does not give us any means of determining how to select the pervading property for which to test. This is not terribly surprising, for the only way we could determine whether, for example, “having branches” is a pervading property of a cat is by using svabhāva-evidence, as in: “This has/does not have branches and such because it is a cat.” In short, we would fall into an infinite regress. Perhaps
it is for this reason that Dharmakīrti does not include a way to determine which pervading property is relevant to our test, but in not doing so, the test obviously remains inconclusive.

Thus, it appears that Dharmakīrti has once again failed in the second part of his task. That is, although his formulation of the identity relation that underlies the use of svabhāva-evidence may provide a theoretical guarantee for the accuracy of such inferences, he has not provided us with a reliable procedure for determining when that relation is in place. This failure is not, however, particularly damning, for it rests on an intractable problem: namely, the distinction between the essential and the accidental.

One possible response to this problem is to fall back upon an appeal to worldly convention (vyavahāra, lokaprasiddha, etc.) as the basis for the identity relation. In effect, an inference by svabhāva-evidence becomes an exercise in learning the proper definition of the terms involved. While this probably is part of the identity relation, it does not entirely solve our problem. First, we must determine which properties of any given individual are germane to the predicate in question: is height, for example, relevant to being a tree, and if so, how short might a tree be? This amounts to the thorny problem of describing exactly what constitutes a worldly convention. Second, if we base identity wholly on convention, we lose the ontological appeal implicit in Dharmakīrti’s notion of svabhāvapratibandha. In short, the exercise of reasoning from the fact of “existence” to “momentariness” would be reduced to a mere word-game of learning the accepted rules for applying these terms, and it would ignore the question of whether those conventions are based upon the causal characteristics of ultimately real particulars. On Dharmakīrti’s view, to ignore that question would be disastrous, for if svabhāvapratibandha is, as we shall see, to act as the warrant for the trustworthiness of inference, it must enable inference to lead us to things that we can use to accomplish our goals. It must, in other words, lead us to particulars that are capable of the telic functions that we seek. This brings us to the question of the instrumentality (prāmāṇya) of inference and even of perception: why should we believe that either is a trustworthy means of knowledge? In the next chapter we will examine such questions.
1 See the previous chapter (91).

2 See NS1.1.6: prasiddhayādharanyat saṁbhavanaṁ upamānam. Analogy is most closely associated with learning linguistic conventions, as when one is told “that cow-like creature over there is called a ‘gavaya.’”See also Uddyotakara’s comments (NV:168–172), which closely parallel Vātsyāyana (NBh:168): prayuktaṁ samāñjīnantā prajñāpanīyasya prajñāpanam upamānam; and especially (169–170): yadā bhāvaya gavā saṁbhavādhanam pratipadyate tadā pratyakṣatatas tam arthaṁ pratipadyata iti, saṁbhavyāṁsambhandhapratipattir upāmānārtha ity āha / yathā [170] gaur evaḥ gavaya ity upamāne prayukte gavā saṁbhavādhanam artham indriyārthasamnikarṣāḥ upalabhāmāno ‘syā gavayaśabduḥ saṁjñīti samāñjīnaṁsambhandham pratipadyata iti.

3 In “presumption,” one presumes the existence of an entity without which some already determined state of affairs would be impossible. Śabara (Śabarabhāṣya: 30 ad Jaiminisūra: 1.1.1), citing the opinion of the Vṛttikāra, gives the example of presuming that Devadatta must be somewhere outside because one knows that he is alive, but one does not see him anywhere in the house. The potential problems with this type of knowledge are illustrated by Kumārila’s example of presumption based on inference: by inference one can observe that the sun has moved; hence, one presumes that it has the capacity to move.

Śabara’s citation of the Vṛttikāra’s definition reads: arthaṁ pratipattir api dṛṣṭāṁ ārthaṁ vārtho ‘nyathā neṣapadyetetārthakalpanāḥ; yathā śruti devadattasya gṛhāṃvadānena bahirbīmāvyāśātāyasya parikalpanāḥ.

Kumārila (ŚV, arthaṁprattir: 1) gives: pramāṇasamāṅkavijñātā yatraṁ arthāḥ bhavet / adṛṣṭāṁ kalpayet anumāṇaṁ arthaṁ pratipattir adhikāra iti.

4 For a recent treatment, see Kellner (1997).

5 Dignāga states this clearly at PS5.1 (cf. Hayes 1988:252). Dharmakirti’s opinion is found at numerous points, including PV2.1cd–2. The specific type of inference intended here is an inference from effect (see below), since there is a causal relation between the image in a listener’s mind and the utterance of the speaker. See, for example, PVSV ad PV1.227 (G:113.25–27):

A statement is prompted by the speaker’s intention (samāñjīna) to communicate a specific meaning/object (artha); for a person who knows, “This statement is coming from that intention,” that statement indicates the meaning/object (artha) that is the mental appearance [namely, the intention,] which is the statement’s cause. There is thus a relation of producer and produced pertaining between a mental entity [namely, the intention] and the speech-act (vāsajñāṇa). [arthaṁ pratipattir api dṛṣṭāṁ arthāṁ bhavet / samāñjīnavat artho bhavati //].

6 Dignāga (PSV:40a2ff ad PS2.49) specifically discusses presumption (arthaṁprattir), and he argues that some forms of presumption are actually inferences. Dharmakirti (PSVSV ad PV1.236ab; G:117–118) mentions an argument for the existence of the sense faculties (indriya), and while he does not specify it as such, this argument is clearly an instance of presumption (arthaṁprattir).

As noted above, Naiyāyikas such as Uddyotakara discuss analogy primarily in a linguistic context, where one learns the referents of new words, such as “gavaya” (a bovine species), by analogy to the referents of already known words, such as “cow.” Hattori (1968:79) has located this specific example in Dignāga’s work, where it is used to show that some forms of analogue reasoning are actually a form of inference. It is possible that Dharmakirti would consider such an argument to be based on a svabhāvahetu (see PVSV ad PV1.3cd; G:4.23–24).

7 See PDS:256–262. The historical relation of Prāśastapāda and Dignāga is difficult to establish with any reasonable accuracy, so the question of any influence or exchange between the two cannot be answered at this point.

8 See chapter 1 (26ff).

9 Dignāga notes that parārthānāmāna is only metaphorically called inference (PSV:40b1–2 ad PS3.1):

Just as for oneself there arises a cognition of the inferendum from a cognition of evidence replete with the three aspects, so too, desiring to generate a cognition of the inferendum in another, one states evidence replete with the three aspects; [that type of statement] is called inference-for-others since one metaphorically applies the name of the effect to the cause. [ji
our conditional holds whenever implication. That is, when we reduce response to the above example, Dharmakīrti would ask, "Why should I think that being a tetrahedron

Following Dignāga, Dharmakīrti also maintains that parāraṇamāna is only metaphorically called an inference (NB3.2: trīrūṣāvākhyānam parāraṇam anumānaṁ / kārāṇe kāryopacārāt. Cf. PVin3.1). See also Tillemans (1984) and Prets (1992).

10 As Steinkellner has pointed out (1991:314–315), Dharmakīrti’s focus on this problem may well be due to his association with Īśvarasena, an interpreter of Dignāga who was probably one of Dharmakīrti’s teachers. Īśvarasena is generally credited with detecting this problem in Dignāga’s theory, although he proposes a solution that Dharmakīrti does not accept. Oetke (1991) has given a plausible account of the background that leads up to Dharmakīrti’s concerns.

11 The first problem is that if we assume Dignāga to be seeking a theory of inference that leads to indisputable knowledge in all cases, then we are obliged to include in his system a “form of inductive assumption, that is, the assumption that whatever relations hold in the inductive domain also hold in the subject class of the inference” (Hayes 1988:160). The second problem is that Dignāga does not provide an adequate means of determining the negative concomitance (vyatirekāśūnyāpti) (Steinkellner 1991:314). The upshot of these difficulties is that Dignāga has accounted for only some necessary conditions, but not sufficient ones, for drawing a trustworthy inference. Hayes (1988:158ff) argues that Dignāga’s has not thereby "failed" in his theory of inference, but rather that the uncertainty implicit in Dignāga’s theory is an expression of his skepticism. Regardless of whether this is the case, Dharmakīrti’s own theory is clearly aimed at eliminating those uncertainties.

12 See Oetke (1991:248–249). Siderits objects to using “induction” as a philosophical tool to present the issues that prompt the formulation of the svabhāvatīpratibandha, but his argument is based on the assumption that “there is only one ... truth-preserving relation in the logical assessment of any inference” (2003:310). I would instead argue that there is more than one way to preserve truth because there is more than one way to understand the vyāpti relation (for example, is it primitive or reducible?). What makes Dharmakīrti’s problem an inductive one is that he seeks a relation whose truth depends on the natures or identities of the relata themselves, whereby the structure of the relation cannot be divorced from its content, even if we understand the relata to be terms that do not refer to real things in the world.

13 From Dharmakīrti’s perspective, Īśvarasena’s attempt at solving the gaps in Dignāga’s philosophy relies heavily on mere observation and nonobservation, and Dharmakīrti’s critiques of this viewpoint are probably directed primarily at Īśvarasena’s interpretation. In the Svāttti, the critiques occur at PV1.12–32 (G:9.1–20.17), where much of the argument focuses upon the impossibility of establishing vyatireka through nonobservation. For the parallel discussion in HB, see Steinkellner (1967).

14 This point is summarized at PV1.31–32:

The fact that things stand in the relationship of cause and effect or that one thing is a property-svabhāva of some other thing are restricting relationships (niyāmakā); therefore, effect- and svabhāva-evidence are qualified by the rule (niyama) of unaccompanied non-arising. That rule is not determined from not seeing the evidence in heterogeneous cases and seeing it in homologous cases. Otherwise, how could one arrive at the rule that one thing, namely a cause, necessarily exists because certain others, which are the effects, exist? Or how could one arrive at that principle if an attribute that is a svabhāva of the evidence has a cause that is different from the evidence’s cause? This would be like inferring that something is red because it is a cloth. [kāryakāryabhāvaḥ svabhāvaḥ niyāmakā / avināśavaniyamādh na na dūrtānīṃ / avasāyabhāvaṇīyamāḥ kah parasyāntathā pariḥ / arthāntaranimitte vā dharme vā saṃśasī rājāvataḥ /].

15 It may be helpful to think of mere co-presence in terms of the so-called paradox of material implication. That is, when we reduce p → q to ¬(p ∧ ¬q), we arrive at the counterintuitive result that our conditional holds whenever p is false. Hence, “if all apples are tetrahedrons, then all apples are fruits” is a true conditional, but it is true only because we have reduced the conditional to a conjunction. This makes no sense for Dharmakīrti, since he places a high value on the intuition that, when we use conditionals in reasoning, if we properly understand the meaning of the conditional’s antecedent, we are compelled to accept the consequent, if we wish to remain rational. Thus, in response to the above example, Dharmakīrti would ask, "Why should I think that being a tetrahedron..."
has anything to do with being fruit?” This question should prompt us to realize that the pervasion relation cannot be represented as a material conditional, and likewise that Dharmakīrti’s theory of svabhāvapratibandha is not merely a matter of coming up with the epistemic practices that allow us to determine when a pervasion holds. For a contestatory treatment of related issues, see Siderits (2003).

16 In glossing this compound, some philological issues become apparent. The meaning that I have suggested would be derived primarily from an interpretation of the compound as a karmadhāraya (avinaśīhāvaḥ ca sam niyamaḥ ca), although an analysis of it as an instrumental tatpurṣa would also yield the desired meaning. It is important to note, however, that in the context of the initial presentation of the types of reasons in HB (ad kā.1, ...tīrthāhīva saḥ / avinaśīhāvanyāmād dhētvabhādās / tato ‘pare’ /), Dharmakīrti provides a gloss that amounts to a genitive tatpurṣa (avinaśīhāvasya niyamaḥ). More specifically, his interpretation reads (HB:5*:7–9):

avinaśīhāva means that the predicate pervades the attribute of the subject adduced as evidence. That avinaśīhāva means that the predicate pervades the attribute of the subject adduced as evidence. Hence, it is said to be restricted to just these three. [pakṣadharmaśya yathoktā vyāptir avinaśīhāvaḥ; sa trividhād heter anyatra nāsti ity atraiva niyata ucyate].

The compound avinaśīhāvanyāma thus means the “restriction (niyama) of avinaśīhāva” to those three forms of evidence, and we see the same gloss provided by Śākyabuddhi (PVT:45a7 = K:8.25–26) in his comments on PV1.1. This use of the compound as a genitive tatpurṣa, however, is peculiar to the specific context of specifying the number of types of reliable evidence. Elsewhere, the compound is best understood as a karmadhāraya or an instrumental tatpurṣa. For example, latter two readings seem far preferable in the case of PV1.31. First, a reading of avinaśīhāvanyāma as a genitive tatpurṣa in PV1.31 would require us to carry forward (through anuvṛtti) the reference to only three reliable forms of evidence from PV1.1, for the discussion surrounding PV1.31 itself does not allow for even an implicit reference to the restriction (niyama) of avinaśīhāva to only three forms of evidence. Second, while Śākyabuddhi’s own comments are ambiguous, they clearly do not support a genitive tatpurṣa reading of avinaśīhāvanyāma at PV1.31. His comments (PVT:45a6–45b1) read: gang gi phyir de lmar ’brel pa’i dbang gis rtogs pa byed pa nyid yin pa de’i phyir / rgyu dang’bras bu lta’ dang po nges par byed pa’i bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pa dag mi ’khirul par sgrub par byed pa’i mā rang bzin nges par byed pa de’i ldag nyid ki mtshan nyid las’bras bu dang rang bzin gyi rtags bsgrub par bya ba med na mi’byung bar nges pa yin no.

We can recover much of the Sanskrit of these comments by extracting the appropriate phrases from Karṇākagomin (87.6–9) as follows: yata evam pratibandhavaśad gamaktvā / kāryakāravyabhāvād vā nīyamakāt sadhyasādhanyor avyabhācarādhaṃ / kāryakāravyabhāvād vā / tadāmyalakṣaṇān nīyamakāt kāryasya svabhāvasya ca liṅgayināvinaśīhāvāḥ sadhyayā[ṃ] vinā na bhaṅgaḥ / nges pa yin no. Although the exact equivalent of the Tibetan nges pa yin no cannot be indubitably determined from Karṇākagomin’s Sanskrit, it is nevertheless clear that Śākyabuddhi is not here employing his earlier gloss of tṛṣṇa eva hetuṣy avinaśīhāvasya niyamaḥ. If he were following that gloss, and if we preserve the gloss of avinaśīhāvasya as sadhyāṃvinā / liṅgasyāna bhaṅgaḥ, the latter portion of Śākyabuddhi’s comments should read something along these lines: ‘bras bu dang rang bzin gyi rtags la de dag bsgrub par bya ba med na mi’byung bar nges pa yin no = kārye svabhāve ca liṅge tasya / sadhyayāvinā na bhaṅgaḥ / nges pa yin no. Of course, we are still left with the problem of interpreting the final nges pa yin no, but in doing so, we must be cautious not to assume that this Tibetan phrase necessarily represents some form of ni yam. Karṇākagomin’s own comments employ forms of niṣṇ ca (87.9, 88.11–15, and especially 88.23), and if Karṇākagomin is expanding upon the final word[s] of Śākyabuddhi’s comments, the final nges pa yin no may represent an original niṣṣa. Although Karṇākagomin’s historical position (not to mention the quality of his commentary) makes his own, independent remarks less relevant, he explicitly adopts a karmadhāraya reading. See, for example: avinaśīhāva eva hi niyamaḥ sadhyāṃvinā na bhavati kṛtva; and 88.10–11—niyama hi tadāyattāntvā (1) sa ca / tatāmyataduttaptivaṃśaḥ / tena tatāmyataduttaptaṃśaḥ eva niyamaniṣcayo na punar / darśanaḥ sūryabhyān niyamaniṣcayo vyabhācārāḥ. It is this usage suggested by Śākyabuddhi and confirmed by Karṇākagomin, whereby avinaśīhāvanyāma is understood as a karmadhāraya, that is most relevant to the discussion of svabhāvapratibandha.

17 This translation is the choice adopted by Hayes and Gillon (1991). Although Steinkellner presents arguments for a particular analysis (vijraha) of the compound svabhāvapratibandha, he himself says (1984:60): “Is it possible to deduce Dharmakīrti’s intentions with the term svabhāvapratibandha, i.e., the ‘correct’ interpretation of the compound, directly from any of his statements? As far as I can see, Dharmakīrti expresses himself nowhere in a way that such a deduction is possible.” To this very helpful observation I would like to add that the analysis of the compound does not in itself clarify the
philosophical issues in question.

18 PV1.2: कर्ययु tva svabhāvair ṣwavadhi bhr avināśāhe kuva ya / hetuḥ svabhāve bhāvo ’pi bhāvanāṁ kāraṇe kāraṇaḥ / hetuḥ svabhāve bhāvo ’pi bhāvanāṁ kāraṇe nurodhini. Cf. the translation by Hayes and Gillon (1991:5). While incorporating Dharmakīrti’s comments in PVSV (G:3.13–4.3) on this verse, I have translated it as if it were composed separately from the prose text in which it is embedded in PVSV, although the prose may have been integral to the verse from the outset. The key difficulty in rendering this verse is the phrase svabhāvair ṣwavadhi, which Dharmakīrti clearly construes with both the effect (कर्यय) acting as evidence and the cause (कारण) inferred from that effect. Dharmakīrti’s verse enables him to apply the phrase svabhāvair ṣwavadhi to both the effect (कर्यय) and the cause (कारण) because the instrumental case of svabhāvair ṣwavadhi may plausibly be construed with either. I have attempted to convey this ambiguity with the English phrase “in terms of”, the advantage of this translation is that, as with the Sanskrit itself, it applies more clearly to the cause than the effect.

If translated as embedded, the first two पदas and first word of the third पदa should be rendered slightly differently. Here is my translation of that portion of the verse including the immediately surrounding prose from PVSV. Words of the verse are underlined:

An effect is evidence for that number of essential properties (svabhāva) in the cause without which it would not arise because that entity is restricted to being the effect of that cause, but only in terms of those properties of that effect that would not occur without those properties of the cause....Also a property (bhāva) is evidence for an essential property that is invariably consequent from the mere presence of that property. [कर्ययु tva svabhāvair ṣwavadhi avināśāhe kuva ya / hetuḥ svabhāve bhāvo ’pi bhāvanāṁ kāraṇe kāraṇaḥ / hetuḥ / tatkāraṇyavānāṁ tair eva dharmair ye tair vinā na bhavati / ... svabhāve bhāvo ’pi bhāvanāṁ nurodhini / hetur iti vartate ].

Note here that I have followed Sākyabuddhi’s reading (PVT:11b7) of the locative in kāraṇaḥ as a substratal locative (i.e., ghṛhi bdun pa = ādhihārasaptamī (K:27.21)). Kartānakomin copies PVT, but first (27:19–20) offers an alternative construal of the locative as kāraṇaṅvaye, enabling him to interpret the instrumental as ithambhīṇādāśaṇā (P:2.3.21). This latter suggestion is intriguing, but it ignores the relation of the instrumental to avināśāhe. I have also not followed KarKartānakomin’s suggestion of construing the phrase tatkāraṇyavānām with both the cause and the effect (K:27.23–24 and 28.2–5), as this seemed unnecessarily repetitive.

19 Based on the usage of the term bhāva and not svabhāva in the verse cited here (PV1.2), Hayes (1980) has argued that there are significant differences between the position found in the Pravītaśāntikī and that of Dharmakīrti’s later texts. Steinkellner (1996), however, has demonstrated convincingly that this concern is misplaced. As Steinkellner notes, even within PV and PVSV Dharmakīrti makes it clear that both gamya (the “indicated” or property to be proven) and gamaka (the “indicator” or evidence) are svabhāvas. See PVSV ad PV1.39 (G:24.14) and PV1.192 with PVSV ad cit. (G:96.25–97.7).

20 Steinkellner (1971) was the first to draw a distinction between two different senses of svabhāva. The fact that svabhāva as nature can only be applied singularly to any given entity is best illustrated by cases when the term occurs in instrumental singular (svabhāvena) or with the tāsi suffix (svabhāvatāḥ). For examples in PVSV, see ad PV1.33ab (G:21.16); ad PV1.40–42 (G:25.14); ad PV1.73; ad PV1.98–99ab (G:50.20). Used in this sense, svabhāva is a synonym of prakṛti, which is sometimes used as a gloss for svabhāva as nature. For examples of this type of usage of prakṛti in PVSV, see: G:40.22 ad PV1.73; G:41.4 ad PV1.73; G:50.3 ad PV1.98–99ab; G:57.2 ad PV1.109 (compare this instance of prakṛti with the nearby usage of svabhāvatāḥ at G:56.200; G:60.23 ad PV1.121; G:70.16 ad PV1.144).

When used in the plural, svabhāva does not necessarily stand for the property-svabhāvas of a single entity; instead, the plural often occurs when many entities are being discussed, as when one speaks of many things whose natures are different or not different (in PVSV see: G:16.7 ad PV1.21; 67.4 ad PV1.137–142; G:132.23 ad PV1.255). In contrast to these cases, plural usages of svabhāva as property include svabhāvair ṣwavadhi in PV1.2 and tatra ghaṭasya ṣuṇḍaryo ity api ghaṭasvabhāvaḥ in PVSV ad PV1.137–142 (G:68.12–13). Similar usages are found in HB (e.g., 2.11: कर्ययवहाववतन्नम kāraṇaṁ svabhāvaḥ vaktavyād). In addition to this type of plural usage, many instances of svabhāva in the singular are also in the sense of “property.” Pace Steinkellner, in some contexts compounds ending in janyasvabhāva and -jananasvabhāva are good examples.

21 As Steinkellner (1974:123) says, a “svabhāvaḥ is that property (dharmaḥ, bhāvaḥ) of something which is not caused by something else, but is thus given with the thing itself.” The notion that a svabhāva is intrinsic or essential to an entity in that that entity does not require any further causes to
be qualified by that svabhāva is made at several points in PVSV, including ad PV1.7 (G:6.26); ad PV1.26 (G:17.20–22); ad PV1.28 (G:19.25–20.2); ad PV1.31–32 (G:20.20–21; 21.6–7); ad PV1.43 (G:26.7–8); ad PV1.166 (G:84.22); ad PV1.195 (G:99.10–11); ad PV1.268 (G:141.20–21); ad PV1.275 (G:145.8–9); ad PV1.276 (G:145.14–15). All of these statements may be understood as grounded in the basic gloss of svabhāva as bhyāvatāryānurodhin in PV1.2, and the claim in the commentary on that verse that an entity would not necessarily possess a quality that requires further causes for its arisal (G:4.3–4: ‘bhyātasya paścāb bhāvaniyāmbhāvār / kāraṇānām kāryayabhiśayaṛāṛī’).

22 See the previous chapter (98ff). It is important to reiterate here that in employing terms such as aggregation, Dharmakīrti does not mean to adopt the position of realists such as Uddyotakara, who maintains that the substances that are the parts (avayava) of a waterjug come together to form an entirely new substance, the “whole” (avayavin) that is the water-jug.

23 Cf. Steinkellner (1974:n.24). The subject-predicate or property-possessor-property relation (dharmin/dharma) is particularly important for understanding the usage of the term svabhāva. Specifically, although the predicate is indeed a property—sāmcoḍya—ad svabhāva in PVSV refers to an objector referents have the same effect. But in his explanation of the objector obliged to speak of no distributed to discuss the notion that the sameness of a group of entities is constituted by...

In addition to the conventions of co-instantiation and the like, the distinction of subject and predicate pertaining to the cognitive appearance in a conceptual cognition is also not contradictory in the way that it is cognized. It is possible that a cognitive appearance be distinct from various objects (arthaś). That being the case, when some questioner wishes to know whether that cognitive appearance is established or rejected as distinct from one of those objects (arthaś), the respondent indicates that mentally occurring real thing having expressed it (sāmcoḍya) as if it were a predicate separate from the subject—since it appears that way in cognition—by means of a predicate-expression (dharman) that precludes other distinctions [i.e., other predicates]; he does so having established another property-svabhāva of that mental entity as the subject without the distinction of precluding other predicates. To this extent, subject and predicate are slightly different; hence, a conceptual cognition [i.e., one involving a subject/predicate construction] appears in such a way that it seems to be differentiated. Cognition is not, however, differentiated due to some differentiation in the real thing because this would entail the above discussed problems. [dharman]bhāvadeda paścāb (yathāpratīti na virādyante) / anekārthabhavedasamabhave tadārthabhavedavidhirpratīthajñāntāī tad eva vastu pratikṣaṇabhedāntarata dharmadharmena sāmcoḍya buddhes tathāpratibhāvanāṃ yātirikṛmaṇ dharmam ivāśeṣeṣeṣeṣaṃparam asya svabhāvaṃ dharmiṣṇaṃ vyavasthāpya pradaṣyate / tāvāṃ cābhāva dharmadharmaṇitor bhedaḥ bhedavāva buddhiḥ pratiḥāṭaḥ na vastubhedāḥ / yathoktadāsārī.]

The “above discussed problems” are probably those presented by Dharmakīrti in PVSV ad PV1.71ff. For other textual notes on this passage and an alternative translation, see the appendix (346).

24 See chapter 2 (116ff). For the subject-predicate relation expressed in terms of vyāvṛttī/vyāvṛttī, see PVSV ad PV1.59 (G:32.12ff). It is important to note that Dharmakīrti nowhere makes a specific statement to the effect that when svabhāva is used in the sense of “property,” it refers to an exclusion. This is in part due to the fact that Dharmakīrti himself did not clearly delineate the two senses of svabhāva under discussion here [i.e., svabhāva as property and svabhāva as nature]. Nevertheless, some passages in PVSV do suggest such an equation of property-svabhāva and vyāvṛttī. An example of such an equation is found in PVSV ad PV1.163. Just before that passage, Dharmakīrti denies that an expression could refer to an ultimately real property-svabhāva distributed over all the instances to which that expression refers. An objector responds at PV1.163, and PVSV explains the objector’s qualm that such a distributed svabhāva would be necessary to explain that all those referents have the same effect. But in his explanation of the objector’s position, Dharmakīrti is obliged to speak of no distributed svabhāva “other than an exclusion” (G:82.28: vyāvṛttīm muktvā). This suggests that a vyāvṛttī may also be considered a svabhāva.

A somewhat less explicit equation of vyāvṛttī with svabhāva also occurs in PVSV ad PV1.137–142 (translated in the appendix). There, Dharmakīrti uses vyāvṛttī (or the related term parāvṛttī) in various compounds (G:66.17: atatkāryavāvṛttī; G:66.20: atatkāryaparāvṛttī; G:67.22: atatkāryavāvṛttī) to discuss the notion that the sameness of a group of entities is constituted by
their difference from what does not have the expected effect. This motif is used to explain how the multiple constituents of a water-jug can be called the same even though they do not actually form a separate entity that is the water-jug. In the course of that explanation, he speaks of the “matter and such that are the svaabhāvas of a water-jug” (G:68.13: ghataśvabhāvāḥ rūpādayāḥ). Unless we understand ghataśvabhāvāḥ to be a bahuvrīhi (in which case the phrase would mean “the form and so on that have the nature of a water-jug”), the statement “svabhāvas of a water-jug” (ghataśvabhāvāḥ) is quite clearly meant to be a construction based upon “the exclusion of what does not have the effect [expected of] that” (atakāryavyāvṛtti). Thus, this passage too would equate property-svabhāvas with exclusions (vyāvṛttis).

25 If the equation of property-svabhāvas with exclusions (vyāvṛttis) is indeed accurate, then the number of possible property-svabhāvas is theoretically limitless. This is the implication of PV1.50–51, where Dharmakīrti considers the specific case of properties constructed for an entity through a definitive determination (niścaya) subsequent to a perception. Dharmakīrti’s main concern here is to show that such determinations do not refer to their objects “positively” (vidhirūpena), but rather refer negatively: that is, they take exclusions as their objects because “exclusion” actually means the removal or prevention of false imputations (samāropa) onto an object. But when Dharmakīrti summarizes the argument in the two verses below, he also points out that those imputations—and hence, properties constructed through exclusion—are as numerous as the number of false imputations, which suggests that they are theoretically limitless:

The definitive determinations and expressions that serve to remove the imputation of predicates wrongly attributed to a subject are as numerous as the imputations of incorrect predicates. Hence, those expressions and definitive determinations all have distinct objects. Otherwise, if a single expression or conceptual cognition [due to referring affirmatively] were to pervade a single real thing, there would be no object other than the thing itself to which it would refer. Therefore, all expressions would be synonyms [and all conceptual cognitions would have the same content]. [yāvanto 'māsamapopās tanniśāṃ viniścayaḥ / āvanta eva śabdaḥ ca tena te bhinnagocarāḥ // anyathākena śabdena vyāpta ekatra vastuni / buddhyā vā nānyaviśaya iti pavyāyatā bhavet //]. While these verses suggest a theoretical limitlessness of possible property-svabhāvas, the actual number constructed depends upon the context formed by expectation, habituation and so on. See PVSV ad PVSV 1.58 (discussed below, n.59).

26 See, for example, PVSV ad PV1.73 (translated in the appendix). See also the discussion of sameness of effect in the previous chapter (119ff).


28 The notion that terms are fixed within conventions is expressed at a number of places in PV and PVSV, including Dharmakīrti’s initial statement of his apoha-theory at PV1.40–42:

All entities (bhāvas), because they are established in their own natures (svabhāva), by nature (svabhāvāḥ) possess bhāga) exclusions (vyāvṛtti) from all homogenous and heterogeneous things (svabhāvaparabhāvānyām). Therefore, objects (arthas) are conceived as having different kinds of qualities (jātibhedā) that are indicative (avajāhin) of those objects’ distinctive properties; those qualities are based on this and that from which there is the exclusion of those objects. Therefore, that distinctive property which is cognized by means of some predicate (dharma) cannot be known by means of any other predicate; hence, the presentation (vyavasthi) [of ultimately identical predicates abstracted from the same subject] is different [for each predicate]. [sarve bhāvas śvabhāvānā svasvabhāvyavasthitāḥ / svabhāvaparabhāvānyām yasadā vyāvṛttinā / tasmād yato yato ‘rthānām vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāḥ / jātibhedāḥ prakalpyante tadviveṣvāvajāhinā // tasmād yo yena dharmena viśeṣ sampratijāyate / na sa śakyaṃ tato ‘nyena tena bhinnā vyavasthitā //].

Saṅkyabuddhi (PVT:56b = K:108) glosses bhāga as bhajate; and he glosses the compound vyāvṛttibhāga as “possessing exclusions” (Idag pa dang lañ man pa = vyāvṛttitam; not recorded in K). K (108.20ff) construes it as ghinaḥ (P:3.141–145), i.e., as vyāvṛttim bhajante.

Saṅkyabuddhi (PVT:56b–2 = K:112.3–4) glosses jātibheda as dharmabheda, and he offers the example of impermanence and so on (rigs dbye zhes bya ba ni chos kyi bye brag ste mi rtag pa nyid la sos pa’; ... dharmabhEdā anityayaktādāyaḥ ...). The translation “indicative” for avajāhin is meant to capture the gist of the gloss offered.
by Śākyabuddhi (PVT:56b: rtogs ’gyur ba) and Kartākagomin (K:112: tadbhe’dvabhāvāsanāśiṣṭa).

Grammatically, the first member of tannibandhanāh should be construed with the relative pronouns of yato yato ... vyāvṛttv, and I have translated accordingly. Śākyabuddhi (PVT:56b2), however, understands tannibandhanāh as vyāvṛttinibandhanāh, “based on the exclusion,” and Kartākagomin (K:111.30ff) offers vyāvṛttvadhiyāvyāvṛttinibandhanāh, “based on the excluded, the limit and the exclusion.”

In addition to the passages cited in the previous chapter, see, for example, PVSV ad PV1.73 (G:40.22–41.6; included also in the appendix):

“You maintain that different things have a nondifferent effect, whereby those things are said to share a nonidentity in that they can all be characterized by a difference from things that are other than those that have the aforementioned effect. But how can this be the case?”

The nature (prakṛti) of things is such that although they are different, by their nature (svabhāva) some of them are restricted to the accomplishment of the same telos (artha) such as producing the same judgment (ekapratyavamarṣaṇī) or producing an awareness of an object; the sense faculties and so on are examples. [PV1.73] For example, the sensory faculty, the object, light, and mentation (manasikāra)—or [according to other philosophies], the self, the faculty, mind, the object, and contact—produce a single effect, namely, an awareness of a visible form. They produce this one, same effect even though they do not instantiate a universal that is restricted to having the nature of producing that effect. Likewise, distinct instances of trees such as Śīmavās and so on by their very nature produce the same effect, namely, a recognitional awareness that has an image of each instance as the same as the others, i.e., as a “tree.” All treeinstances have those same effects even though they are not distributed the one over the other. Or they accomplish some other telic function that is to be done by wood, such as combustion, housing, and so on, in accord with the conditions. But even though water and such are also distinct from trees in that any entity is different from all others, water and so on nevertheless do not perform the aforementioned telic functions, just as the ear and so on cannot produce an awareness of visible form. [kathām punar bhīmānām abhimānām kāryām yena tadanyebhyo bhedābhedā ity ucyate / prakṛtir eva bhāvānām yad ekapratyavamarṣaṇe yate kṛtān āhate / bhedā ‘pi niyomāhe kecit svabhāvanendriyādiyāv [PV1.73] // yathāendriyavāsyāvalokamanaskārā ātmendriyāyamānā ‘rtatatsamvakṣānaṃ vā atasy api tadbhāvaniyate sāmānye rūpaṇiṇānām evaṃ janayanī evaṃ Śīmavāyā ‘pi bhedāh parasparanavanaye ‘pi prakṛtivaikāmākārahāṇyāṇām janayanī api dhanagṛhādikām kāṣṭhasādyāṃ arthakārāṃ na tu bhedāvise ‘pi jalādayāḥ śrotārdvād rūpaṇiṇāṃ/].

I base the phrase “totality of causal characteristics” on Steinkellner’s notion of the “totality of causal possibilities” as his gloss for svabhāva as nature. He remarks (1984:459), “The meaning of the word svabhāva in the compound svabhāvapratinibandha—when used as a term to indicate the reason of the logical nexus—can only be ‘essence,’ Dharmakīrti’s denotation for the real being as a totality of causal possibilities.”

The compound Śaktiniyama or an equivalent construction is used at several points in PV and PVSV, including: PVSV ad PV1.34 (G:22.15); PVSV ad PV1.195 (G:99.11); PVSV ad PV1.255 (G:132.27); PV1.257; PVSV ad PV1.282 (G:149.12–13); PV1.295 and PVSV ad cit. (G:157.6–8).

The most succinct statement of this point is found in PV1.282ab: “From the restriction in the nature–svabhāva of the cause comes the restriction in the nature–svabhāva of the effect.” [svabhāvaniyamād dhetoḥ svabhāvaniyamāḥ phale].

See, for example, PVSV ad PV1.167a–c (G:84.14–85.2; cited by Steinkellner (1971:188, n.33 and 34); see also above, chapter 2, n.114). Here, Dharmakīrti responds to a Sāṃkhya objection that, without some repeatable essence or property, it would not be possible to say that many individuals, which are all essentially different, cause the same effect:

This is not the case, since, although all entities are different from all other entities, some cause the effect in question, while others do not; this is the nature of the entities that cause that effect. [PV1.167a–c] If those entities considered causes of the effect in question were not to have any distinction from other entities, then all entities would either be producers of anything whatsoever or none would be a producer of anything at all in that they are all equally different from any one entity’s nature–svabhāva of being the producer of the effect in question. But even though all
other entities are not distinct in their difference from that one entity’s nature-svabhāva, since some have some special property (ātmārthaśaya), some of them are producers of that effect, while others are not. For that special property is the nature of [just] those entities, and nothing else. Indeed, it is not correct (na arhati) to question (paranuyogā) the natures of things, as in "Why does fire burn? Why is it hot, and water is not?" One can just ask this much, "From what cause does this svabhāva come?" For if the svabhāva were to be a nondependent entity that had no causes, then one would incur an overextension because there would be nothing to restrict certain causes to certain effects. Hence, we say that the nature-svabhāva that pertains to an entity that is considered the cause arises from the cause(s) of that entity. And the nature-svabhāva of that entity’s cause which produces that entity [in such a fashion that it has the nature-svabhāva of producing the effect in question] itself comes from some other cause. Thus, the sequence of causes is beginningless. For, by the very nature of the causes and the effects, different things have some things that are their causes, while other things are not their causes. There is no inherent cognition whatsoever that contradicts this. Indeed, while Steinkellner (1971) cites this passage as an instance of (kanyayatrī) svabhāva of a thing is the power to function as a principle of their existence … (kāryaśakti) for if to become a kāṣcid na ca pariḥ / svabhāvo 'yam / ekasya janaśād ātmāna bhidyāmatāh sarve samam janaśā na vā kāṣcid iti syād etad yady eṣām na viśeṣāḥ sambhavet / tato bheda vṛseṣe 'pi kutaścid ātmārtraśayā kāṣcī janaḥ nāparājya / sa hi tasya svabhāvo nāparasya / na hi svabhāva bhāvaḥ paryanyogām arhanti kim agraḥ daḥaty uṣṇo vā nodakam iti / etāvat tu syāt kuto 'yam svabhāva iti / nirhetukatake 'napāksaśa niyamābhāvāṃpi sambhavāt / tasmat svabhāvo 'syasvahetor ity ucyate / tasyaśī tajjananārmatā tadanyasmat ity anādir hetuparamparā bhimānaḥ hi kāṣcid dhetur nānyaḥ svabhāvād ity atra na kumād bhādākam /].

Although the case endings of kāṣcid and so on are singular, a plural sense is conveyed by an implicit – ādi (see Śākyabuddhi PVT:198b3 [elided in PVTs:1b3]=K324.15).

34 Perhaps the most representative such passage is the one mentioned and translated by Steinkellner (1971:185–186). My translation (PVSV ad PV1.7; G6.24–29) reads:

The arisal of an effect that is inferred by way of a causal complex is characterized as a svabhāva of that causal complex because the [capacity for] the effect’s production does not depend on anything else. [PV1.7] That [capacity for] the production of an effect does not depend on anything other than such a collocation of the entities in the causal complex. Therefore, that [capacity], which is invariably consequent from the mere of that collection of causes, is a svabhāva of that entity, [namely, that causal complex]. But in this case, one can infer only the possibility of the arisal of the effect from the causal complex because one [only] infers the capacity (yogayā) of the causal complex to produce the effect. That ability, since it is invariably consequent with the mere presence of the complete complex of causes, is just a svabhāva, and that is what is inferred. [hetuṃ yaḥ samagreṇā kāyotpādaḥ 'numiyate / arthāntaraṇapekṣaśvratā sa svabhāvo 'nuprāciṣeta [PV1.7] aśāv api yathāsaṁkṣiṁitaḥ nānyam apeksata iti tannāraṇābindhi svabhāvo bhāvasya / tatra hi kevalaṃ samagriḥ kāyotpattisambhavo 'numiyate samagreṇāṃ kāyotpādanayogayatānumānāt / yogayā ca samagreṇārṇaṇaṁbhāvaḥ vahītaivaśānumīyate /].

Note that in this passage, I have chosen to render svabhāva without specifying whether it is a nature- or a property-svabhāva. Indeed, while Steinkellner (1971) cites this passage as an instance of nature-svabhāva, the capacity (yogayā) referred to here might as easily be understood as a property of the causal complex, as Steinkellner notes in a later work (1991b:717). This ambiguity should remind us that Dharmakīrti does not himself make a formal distinction between the two meanings of svabhāva that I have adopted from Steinkellner, and that talk of causal efficiency may as easily be associated with an entity’s property-svabhāva as with its nature-svabhāva.

35 It is not entirely clear whether Steinkellner himself means to equate nature-svabhāva with causal complex, or alternatively to construe nature-svabhāva only in terms of causal potential, and not in terms of an entity’s effects. Although Steinkellner probably did not intend either of these interpretations of nature-svabhāva, both might be derived from his analysis, as is demonstrated by the following passages:

1971:183: "The [nature-] svabhāva of a thing is the power (śakti) to bring about an effect (kāyotpāda)" ["Svabhāva eines Dinges ist die Kraft (Sakti), eine Wirkung hervorzubringen"].

1971:209: In [Dharmakīrti’s] ontology, [nature-] svabhāva signifies the power of things to function as a principle of their existence…. [In der Ontologie bedeutet svabhāva die Kraft der Dinge, zu wirken, als Prinzip ihres Seins….] 1971:210: In ontological contexts svabhāva means the power of things as the principle of their being, in logical contexts the word means the
concept, that is the definite notional construct (vikalpa) that is related to real things. 1974, n.24: [For nature-svabhāva,] ... the translation "essence, Wesen" would be quite appropriate in ontological contexts, as it would stand for the yet indistinct totality of the various possibilities, powers of a thing to be or become part of different causal complexes.

36 See, for example, AK2.49ff and AKBh ad cit. (279ff).

37 Vasubandhu (AK2.61 and AKBh ad cit.; [341–342]) refers to a basic distinction between primary cause (upādānaḥhetu) and supporting conditions (sahakārin). Dharmakīrti’s earliest commentators allude to this basic distinction at various points, including, for example, in Devendrabuddhi’s comments on PV3.533–534 (PVP:267a3): tshogs pa gcig po ’dil la gnas pa dmiśs pa’i ngo bor nye bar sbyor bar nram pa shes pa skyed par byed pa de la yang nram par shes pa nye bar len pa’i rgya yin zhing mig la sosgs pa ni lhan ciq byed pa’i rkyen yin no .... For another example, see Śākyabuddhi’s comments on PVSV ad PV1.170a (PVT:201a3ff; PVTs:ja6ff).

38 Dharmakīrti’s use of the term “causal complex” (hetusāmagrī) is sometimes rather confusing, since it involves three different situations: an “incomplete causal complex” (vikalā ṭhetusāmagrī), a “complete causal complex” (sakalā ṭhetusāmagrī), and a “causal complex” (hetusāmagrī). The term “incomplete” (vikalā) usually stands for a causal complex that lacks some of its causes or supporting conditions. A seed and soil, for example, would be an incomplete causal complex for the production of a sprout. This usage would lead one to suspect that a “complete causal complex” should refer to the case where no supporting conditions are lacking. But despite this suggestive correlation between “incomplete” (vikalā) as “lacking some causes and conditions,” and “complete” (sakalā) as “not lacking any causes and conditions,” a causal complex with all causes and conditions in place is still not “complete.” To be complete, a causal complex must not only have all the required causes and conditions; in addition, the causal potentials (śaktis) that those various causes and conditions gain through their proximity must also have undergone development (parināma) in a continuum (santāna) such that they are now fully capable of producing an effect. Thus, in the case of the production of a sprout, the seed and all its supporting conditions are not complete when the seed is first planted, and they do not become complete until that causal complex develops to the point of actually producing its effect. In short, the complete causal complex is the one that occurs in the moment prior to the effect. It is worth noting that this notion of “complete” accounts for Dharmakīrti’s claim that one cannot infer the arising of an effect from a cause, even if that cause is accompanied by all the necessary supporting conditions.

To reiterate, an “incomplete” causal complex is one that lacks some causes or conditions, and a “complete” causal complex is one in which all required causes and conditions are present and fully developed. What then do we call a causal complex with all causes and conditions present but not fully developed, as when one first plants a seed? Dharmakīrti uses the unadorned term, “causal complex.”

In this regard, Dharmakīrti’s use of the term “causal complex” (hetusāmagrī) is well illustrated by the following passage (PVSV ad PV1.195; G:98.16–99.1). Here, Dharmakīrti raises the issue of the causal complex in the context of establishing that an entity does not require any further causes or conditions in order for it to cease:

For it is not necessarily the case that causes have effects since it is possible that their conditions be incomplete or that there be a hindrance [to the development of their potentials]. And through this argument the following is stated to those who maintain that destruction is caused: namely, that all the alleged causes of an entity’s destruction are misleading as evidence of that destruction because that effect [i.e., the entity’s actual destruction] is not established [to necessarily occur even when its causes are present] [PV1.195]. This is an intermediary verse.

Thus, an entity that is not dependent on something else in order to have that nature [i.e., of being perishable] is restricted (niyata) to having that nature, as is the case with a complete causal complex in relation to the production of its effect inasmuch as it cannot be obstructed.

“But some causal complexes, even though they are not dependent upon the presence of any other causes or supporting conditions, do not necessarily have that nature [i.e., of producing their effect] in some cases because even when there is the causal complex of earth, seed and water, there sometimes is no production of a sprout.”

This is not an argument against our position, because in that case as well, the causal complex depends upon the development of that complex of causes and conditions in a continuum. But in order to perish, a thing does not depend upon any future development. Moreover, in that continuum of causal complexes, the final one, which is not interrupted by a further instant in the continuum for the production of the effect, definitely has that effect. Within that continuum of causal complexes,
only that final causal complex is the sprout’s cause. Each previous moment of the continuum’s development is other than the final causal complex; each such moment is just for the purpose of that final moment in the continuum. And nothing can prevent the continuum’s final moment from producing its effect. [api / na hy avaṣyati hetavaḥ phalavantō vaikalyapratibandhasambhaviḥ / etena vyahicārānām uktām kāryāvayavasthitāḥ / sarvēṣām naśāhetunāṃ hetumannāsvadānāṃ [PV1.195] ity antaraślokaḥ / tad ayam bhāvo ‘napēkṣas tadbhāvam prati tadbhāvanīyate ’sambhavatpratibandheva kāmavābāryaḥ / kāryopadane / nanv anapekṣā api kālicc kvaśī navāsyām tadbhāvo bhūdibijodasamagryāṃ api kālicc anākunānaptattāt / na tatrāpi samāna pariṇāmaapeksavatī / naivaṃ bhāvasya kālicc apekṣā / tatrāpy āntyāṃ kāryopadane sa phalavaty eva / saiva ca tatrānākunārahetuḥ / anyas tu pūrvāḥ pariṇāmas tadartha eva / na ca tāṃ tatra kaścit pratibandhum samarthaḥ].

39 To my knowledge, Dharmakīrti does not explicitly discuss the notion of contradictory causal complexes, but it seems implicit in his theory. He does discuss the notion of an entity participating in multiple, different causal complexes. See, for example, PV3.533–534:

Even though it has neither-one-nor-many [separate] causal potentials, a thing is still said to produce multiple effects by its very nature.

“This is not so, for multiple effects should not arise from a single thing.”

It is not the case that a single effect arises from a single cause. Rather, all the various effects of a thing arise from a causal complex. And one thing may be in two [or more] causal complexes. Hence, it is said that that thing produces multiple effects.

[nānaiṣaṣṭākṣayābhāve ‘pi bhāvo nānaiṣaṣṭākṣayakṛt / prakṛtyaiveti gacatam nānaiṣaṣṭān na ced bhavet // na kimcid ekam ekasmati sāmagryān sarvasambhavāḥ / ekam syād api sāmagryor ity uktaṃ tad anekaṅkṛt /].

Note that the claim that an entity possesses neither a single causal potential nor multiple potentials is meant to refute the reification of a causal potential as an ultimately existent entity.

40 Yet another, related argument against the equivalence of svabhāva as nature with the notion of a causal complex is that, in the case of an entity such as a water-jug, entities that we would not intuitively construe as aspects of a water-jug’s nature would be de facto included in that nature. For example, the causal complex for the production of the image of a waterjug in visual awareness includes elements such as light and sensory contact (sparśa). If the nature-svabhāva of a water-jug is equivalent to that causal complex, then entities such as light and sensory contact are part of a water-jug’s nature.


42 See above, chapter 2 (98f) and PVSV ad PV1.137–142 (translated in the appendix). Commenting on part of the latter passage, Kartānakagomin notes that there is no single causal potential (śakti) that exists in the distinct entities that, due to working together to produce certain effects, are called a water-jug (see K:272: na punas teṣu ekā śaktir vidyate). As Steinkellner (1971:186) has noted, Dharmakīrti (PV1.164 and PVSV ad cit.; G:83.7–11) explicitly rejects the notion of a single causal potential or nature-svabhāva that, being distributed over certain entities, accounts for their capacity to produce the same effect(s).

43 In addition to the previously cited presentation in PVSV ad PV1.137–142 (see the appendix for a complete translation), the notion of a particular construed as a property-svabhāva can be found in the two following, related passages. It is important to note that the context of both passages is the demonstration that, while the universals constructed as the objects of concepts must be considered the direct objects of those concepts, those universals must ultimately be constructed on the basis of causally efficient particulars. The first relevant passage is PVSV ad PV1.171c–172 (G:86.28–87.7), which reads:

Therefore that unique individual (viśeṣa) alone is the object [of perception], and other things [i.e., apparently repeatable properties] are actually exclusions; a unique individual is what is called an “effect” or a “cause,” and we claim that it is a “particular” (svalakṣaṇa). All actions of persons are undertaken so as to result in the acquisition or avoidance of them [PV1.171c2–172]. It has already been stated that only that which is capable of telic function is a real thing. It is [what the sāmkhyas call] a viśeṣa; a universal is just the difference of the viśeṣa from [all] other things. For if the universal were a real thing, then it would not be reasonable for it to be imperceptible, because the cognition of different things as nondifferent should be caused by the perception of it as
Dharmakīrti is here addressing Sāmkhya philosophers, and since those same philosophers do not accept paramāṇas (see YD:155.15ff), his equation of viśesas with svalakṣaṇas is best understood as a polemical stance, rather than a precise definition of svalakṣaṇa. This equation of svalakṣaṇa with viśesa does, however, apparently lead to an equation of property-svabhāva in the following passage (PVSV ad PV1.179–180; G:88.26–89.4), where the term ātman is used as an equivalent of property-svabhāva:

The differences and nondifferences that are investigated are those that are based upon that essential property (ātma) through focusing upon which a person acts, that person being one who wishes to obtain or avoid an effect which that property accomplishes. That property is by its own nature different from everything else, and its sameness [with regard to things of the same class] is due to an exclusion. A real thing is not distributed over any other real thing because otherwise, one would have to conclude that one would act [upon which that does not accomplish the expected effect]. [PV1.179–180] To accomplish some goal all persons inquire into the differences and nondifferences between objects, such as by inquiring about the ways that a cow is different from a horse and the ways that it is not. Inquiring in this fashion, all persons then act with regard to just the everything else, and its sameness [with regard to things of the same class] is due to an exclusion. A real thing is by its own nature different from other-exclusion, it is not

44 For the subject-predicate relation see PVSV ad PV1.75 (translated in n. 23 and in the appendix). See also the following passage (PV1.59–60 and PVSV ad cit.; G:32.13–33.5):

In terms of the theory of other-exclusion, there are expressions and determinate cognitions of the form, "the exclusion is one thing and the excluded entity is another." But such expressions and determinate cognitions conform just to semantic conventions. [PV1.59] On the theory of other-exclusion, it is not the case that the exclusion is one thing and the excluded thing [that the exclusion qualifies] is another. This cannot be so because one would be forced to conclude that the excluded thing [such as a cow] is also excluded from its exclusion [i.e., it would be excluded from the exclusion from noncows. In that case, the excluded thing [such as a cow] would be that [from which it was excluded, such as a horse]. If that were the case, then there would be no exclusion [of "cow" from "horse"]. Therefore, the exclusion is just the excluded thing itself. The difference in the expressions for and linguistic cognitions of the exclusion and excluded come from the difference between the semantic conventions applied to them. There is no actual difference in reference (vācyabheda).

"Since there is no difference in reference, a difference in the semantic conventions makes no sense because the expressions for subject and predicate would denote (abhidhāna) the same thing. Likewise, a grammatical case-relation [such as the genitive of "the cowness of a cow"] that involves a distinction between the elements related also makes no sense because it depends on a difference between the elements."

Although both denote the same thing, a grammatical relation that distinguishes its elements indicates the predicate that is the object (artha) as if it were different from the subject due to a subtle difference in what is to be expressed (vācyā). [PV1.60] It is not the case that any use of language is restricted to the essence of an object because one would be forced to conclude that whimsical (icchāras) usage would not occur. Those types of usages are asserted to refer to two distinct things whether the things are actually distinct or not. Being employed in that way, they easily point out the referent as if it were two different things. Therefore, even though both "cow" and "cowness" refer to the same object (artha), different semantic conventions are constructed so that one might know that some attribute is predicated of some subject. When such semantic conventions are constructed, a case-relation whose members are distinct appears in cognition in such a fashion that it indicates the predicate as if it were different from the subject, even though it is [in fact] not different from it. This occurs because one is habituated by repeatedly observing that the grammatical relation is used in that way. That usage of a grammatical
relation does not itself constitute in every case an actual distinction because there is nothing to prevent the use of such a relation in some cases just in accord with a person’s desires and intentions (puruṣecchāvāsā). For instance, in certain contexts a single thing is expressed in the singular, while, in order to show respect, it is still a single thing. [tātāpi cānyāvṛttir anyāvṛttīta ity api / Sabdāb ca nīcāvṛttī caiva samketaṃ anurundhate [PV1.59] tātāpy anyāpore na vyāvṛttī anyāna eva vyāvṛttīs tadvyāvṛttīs nirvatāmānya sakhyāvāprasaṅgāḥ / tathā ca vyāvṛttīs abhāvāḥ / tamadā yaiva vyāvṛttīs eva vyāvṛttīs / Sabdā pratipattibhedas tu samketaḥbhedaḥ / na va vyāvahedo ‘sti / nanu ca vācyavivekābhāvāḥ samketaḥ bhedaḥ ‘py ayukto dvayor ekābhādhanāḥ / tathā ca vyatikṛtyāḥ vibhakter ayojas tasyāḥ bhedaśrayavāḥ / dvayor ekābhādhānāḥ ‘pi vibhaktr vyatyakṛtyāḥ / bhinnam artham ivāvetti vācye leśavāsataḥ [PV1.60] na vai Sabdābhānāḥ kācid viṣayavābhāvānāt vṛttīr ichhāṃ vṛtyavābhavaprasaṅgāḥ / te yathā vyatikṛte vyatikṛte pratyoktum iṣyante tathā niyuktāḥ tam artham apratibandhena prakāśayanti / tena gaur gotvam ity ekābhādhanām ‘pi kasyacid viśeṣā yo pratyapārthām kṛte samketaḥbhedaḥ vyatikṛtyāḥ vibhaktr arthāntaram ivādāryayantī pratibhāty anarthāntare ‘pi tathā pratyogaravatarāḥbhāvāḥ / na bhavati sarvatra bhedāḥ / anyatāpi puruṣecchāvāśaḥ pravṛtottaya pratibhāvabhedāḥ / yathākāmāk eva kacord ekavacanena khyāyate tadasvisē ‘pi gauravaḥ khyāyāpanārtham bhauvacanena /.

"The translation of this phrase ("the exclusion is one thing and the excluded object is another")=anyāvṛttār anyāvṛttīta ity) incorporates the interpretation of the verse given by Dharmakīrti in PSV, where anyāvṛttītāḥ is glossed as vyāvṛttī anyā and anyāvṛttā as anya eva vyāvṛttāḥ. However, if this phrase is translated naturally according to the Sanskrit, it would read, "other-exclusion and other-excluded."

1In Dharmakīrti’s own commentary below, anvety is apparently glossed as Ādāryayanti pratibhāti. This is confirmed by Śākyabuddhi (PVT:72b = K:146) who glosses it as ārṣayati.

45 The fact that a subject (dharmin) is a constructed property-svabhāva construed as a subject has been discussed above (n.23).

46 See PSV ad PV1.34=37 (translated in the appendix).

47 In addition to the passage translated in the appendix (PSV ad PV1.34=37), see also PSV ad PV1.195 (translated above, n.38).

48 In HB (20*.4=17), Dharmakīrti offers the following, more concise argument:

Effect and cause are mutually defined as having the property-svabhāvas of being produced and the producer. In this regard, if smoke were also to come from something other than the causal complex of fire and such, then it would not have the property-svabhāva of being produced by fire. Hence, it would not arise even once from fire, just as it does not arise from something else [such as water]. Nor would the causal complex of fire, etc. produce smoke [even once] because it would not have the property-svabhāva of producing smoke, as is the case with other complex causes. And since smoke has but one nature, it does not make sense for it to have the property-svabhāvas of being what is produced by both fire and non-fire. In other words, coming both from that which has the nature of producing smoke and that which does not have the nature of producing smoke, smoke would have the nature of both smoke and nonsmoke, because an effect’s property-svabhāvas are caused by the property-svabhāvas of its cause. And if the effect’s property-svabhāvas were not dependent upon the property-svabhāvas of its cause, then one would be forced to admit that the effect’s property-svabhāvas are causeless. Therefore, that which produces smoke is a particular type of causal complex of fire and such. And that which is produced from that particular type of causal complex of fire and such is smoke. Since the cause and effect are in this fashion restricted in their nature-svabhāvas, there is no production of the effect from that which is different than the cause of that kind of effect. Hence, an effect is not misleading about its cause. Therefore, if the relation of cause and effect is established, the pervasion of the effect by the cause is also established. [parasparaṃākṣaya janayajanakasvabhāvalakṣāṃ kāryakāraṇe. tatra yadi dhūma ‘ṛṇādeviṣamagāya anyato ‘pi bhavet, tasya tajanyāḥ svabhāvaḥ na bhavatiḥ saktaḥ api tato na bhaved arthāntaravat, nāpi sāmāgri tām janayet, atajayanaśvabhāvavatāḥ sāmāgyāntaravat. na ca dhūmasya tadajayanaśvabhāvavatāḥ yuktaḥ, ekasvabhāvavatāḥ. Dhūmaś ca dhūmājananāsasvabhāvāḥ bhavato dhūmādhūmaśvabhāvāḥ syāt, kāryasvabhāvānām kāryasvabhāvākṣaṇāt vā akṣaṇākṣaktānām caṇḍhetuvaprasaṅgāḥ. tasmād yo dhūmahajanaḥ, so ‘ṛṇādeviṣamagāyaḥ yo ‘ṛṇādeviṣamagāyaḥ caṇḍhitaḥ so dhūma iti kāryakāraṇyo evaṃ svabhāvaniyamāṃ tadvijñāyād]
uputtir na bhavati. tat kāryaṃ kāryatāṃ na vyabhicarati. tena siddhe kāryakāraṇabhidhāve kāryasya kāraṇena vyāpaṛṇa siddhā bhavati.

49 See PVSV ad PV1.34–37 (translated in the appendix).

50 PVSV ad PV1.35 (G:23.9–13): tajjantō hi svabhāvaviśeṣo dūhma iti / tathā hetur api tathāhūrakāryajaranasvabhāvah / tasyānyato 'pi bhāve na sa tasya svabhāva iti / saktaḥ api na janayet / na va sa dūhma dhūmaticanasaṃsvabhāvad bhavāt / tatsvabhāvate ca sa evānīr ity avyabhācāraṃ.

51 PV1.36–37: agnisvabhāvo śakrasya mūḍdāḥ yady agnir evaḥ / athāagnisvabhāvo 'saḥ dūhmas tatra katham bhavet // dhūmaticetatsvabhāvo hi vahnīc tachaktibhedavan / adhūmāhetor dūhmasya bhāve sa syād ahetukāh //.

52 We must note, however, that under certain, highly restricted conditions, one may indeed infer an effect from a cause, according to Dharmakīrti. See Steinkellner (1999).

53 See below, 194.

54 The problem mentioned here—i.e., the question of the scope of the property-svabhāva, “capable of producing smoke”—is similar to one noticed by Öetke (1991).

55 PVSV ad PV1.37 (G:23.20).

56 The discussion of primary cause and supporting condition in PVSV ad PV1.195 may provide the type of restriction that is necessary here, for Dharmakīrti there suggests that the primary cause is what determines the type of effect that is produced by a causal complex. In short, his argument suggests that even though soil, water and such may occur in both the causal complex that produces a barley sprout and the causal complex that produces a rice sprout, they nevertheless do not have the svabhāva of producing a rice sprout when in a causal complex that includes a barley seed (and not a rice seed). The reason for this is that the soil, water and other conditions in the complex gain the svabhāva of producing a rice sprout from the presence of the rice seed. The most relevant part of the passage, which responds to arguments against the notion that an entity’s destruction (vināśa) at every moment is not intrinsic or essential to that entity, reads as follows (G:99.4–14):

“But, in the case where a rice sprout is to be produced, a barley seed and such may not be in need of anything additional because all of the supporting conditions such as soil for the production of the rice sprout may sometimes be in the proximity of even the barley seed and such.”

How is it not in need of something? That is, inasmuch as they [i.e., the barley seed and such] do not have the svabhāva of producing the rice sprout that a rice seed has, they are in need of that svabhāva.

“In that case, some fabricated or existent entities may also not have that svabhāva that makes them decay.”

A rice seed and such have that svabhāva of producing a rice sprout due to their own cause[s]. Hence, that which does not have those causes does not have that svabhāva. And it is perceived that a cause [of a rice seed or a barley seed] has a restricted causal potential. Nor is it reasonable to claim that the restriction in svabhāva that pertains to things (arthaḥ) is random (ākasmika) because that which does not require causes and conditions for its existence cannot be restricted in space, time, and substance. [nanu yavabhādaya ‘pi śālyākkure janye na sāpekṣāḥ / taduttattipratyayānāṃ kaścit tatrapi samāyānāt / katham na sāpekṣāḥ / yāvārā sa evaisāṃ svabhāva nāsti yas taduttāpānām ṣālībījasyaṃ tatvabhāvaṃ śepkṣāh / evam tarhi kṛtakānām api keśamācit satām va sa eva svabhāvo nāsti yo vināśaṃ / tasmāṃ tatvabhāvaṃ śepkṣātvaṃ na vināśaṃ / śailījāyādāmi api sa svabhāvah svahetor iti yo na taddhetor so ‘svabhāvaṃ śyaḥ / nīyataśaktīś ca sa hetuḥ svartuṣṇa praṭīt eva / na ca svabhāvaniyam ‘ṛśānyām śākasmikā yuktaḥ / anapekṣya desahādralavayaniyāṃyogatā.

57 In noting that the arguments in HB do not “appear” to address this problem, I mean to leave open the possibility that a thorough analysis of HB—an analysis that is beyond the scope of the present work—might uncover a solution.

58 The presentation here of de dicto and de re modalities is modified to account for the manner in which Dharmakīrti approaches the relation between a dharmin (a "subject") and a dharma (a “predicate”). Technically, in de dicto modality necessity applies to a whole proposition (i.e., "it is necessarily true that the object of a definitive determination of blue is blue") as opposed to de re modality, in which necessity applies to the individual (i.e., "it is true that the object of a definitive
determination of blue is necessarily blue”) (cf. Plantinga 1974:9–13). As I see it, these notions are convertible to Dharmakīrti’s way of conceiving “propositions” (dharmin/dharma structures) by claiming that, in de dicto modality, the necessity pertains between two dharmas (“it is necessarily true that the dharmin taken as the object by the definitive determination of ‘blue’ possesses the dharma ‘blue’”), while in de re modality, the necessity pertains between the dharmin and its dharma (s) (“it is true that the dharmin taken as the object by the definitive determination of ‘blue’ necessarily possesses the dharma ‘blue’”). For more on necessity, see the oft-cited (if sometimes controversial) presentation in Plantinga (1974). See also the brief but lucid discussion of essence by Sosa (1995).

59 The passage in question is PVSV ad PV1.58 (G:31.26–32.11). In addition to focusing generally upon definitive determination (niścayā), Dharmakīrti here concludes his argument that, even though any perception necessarily contains all the data that the object can provide to the perceiver, the determinations that the perceiver draws from that data are dependent upon the perceiver’s dispositions. In the example of the woman’s body, Śākyabuddhí (PVṬ:70b2ff = K:142.12ff) provides many of the details, i.e., that the object is a dead woman’s body, and that the perceivers are a yogin, a dog and a libertine. The passage reads:

“But why is it that, even though one has had a perceptual experience of the nature of a real thing (vasturūpa) that is distinct from all other things, one does not have a mnemonic determination of it as such?”

Because the supporting conditions are lacking. And therefore, even though one has apprehended through perception a distinct entity (viṣeṣa) that is [ultimately] devoid of parts, one cognizes that distinctive aspect (viṣeṣa) for the determinative cognition of which there is the supporting condition. [PV1.58] Although one has experienced an entity that has no parts and whose nature-svabhāva is distinct from all other things, one does not thereby determine all its distinctive qualities (bhedā) because such a cognition depends on other causes. That is, perceptual experience produces determinate cognitions (niścayapratyaya) in accord with one’s mental conditioning for favoring the formulation of certain concepts. For example, even though there is no difference in that they are all seeing matter, [when a yogin sees the body of a dead woman], he conceives it to be a corpse; [a lustful man] conceives it to be a woman; and [a hungry dog] conceives it to be food. In such cases, the acuity of the intellect, the conceptual imprints to which one is accustomed, the context, and other such factors are the supporting conditions that account for the arsil of different determinations from a perceptual experience. And because of their varying degrees of association (pratyāsattī) and priority (tāratamya), some determinations occur before others. For example, even though there is no difference between the fact that the person one is seeing is one’s parent and the fact that he is one’s teacher, upon seeing one’s father coming, one thinks, “my father is coming”; one does not think, “my teacher is coming.” [kim punaḥ kāratam sarvato bhīne vasturūpam ‘nubhavotpattav api tathaiva na śmaṣṭi niścayo bhavati / saha kāvīkalyāniḥ / tatu ca / pratyakṣena grhitam ‘pi viṣeṣam ‘msavardvijite / yadvāsvāsāya ‘sti pratyayam sa pratyayam / ‘yady api am ‘m sarvato bhīnasvabhāvam bhāvo nubhūtas tathāpi na sarvabhedaśe tāvat niścayo bhavati / kāratāntaraśakṣāvi / anubhavo hi yathāvikalpahyāsaṁ niścayopratyayam janayati / yathā rūpadaḥ śāsāvivaśe ‘pi kṣaṭapakāminihakṣavikalpāḥ / tatra buddhataṃ tadvāsanābhāṣāḥ prakaraṇam ity ādayo ‘nubhavād bhedam niścayoptatipasahākārīnaḥ / tēṣām eva ca pratyāsattī tāratamyaś dibhedār puruṣāparyam / yathā yanakatvāhāyāpakativāśe ‘pi pitaram āyāntam ērṣṭvā pirā me āgacchati nepādhyāya iti].


61 Up to this point I have skirted the question of whether all three of these determinations (“lover,” “food,” and “corpse”) must be considered correct (samyaka). In a private communication, Steinkellner has suggested that no more than two could be. For example, if the body in question is that of a dead woman, the yogin and the dog would be correct. Barring an improbable reference to necrophilia, the libertine’s perceptual judgment would have to be ubhayāśraya, i.e., based on both what is real (the woman’s body) and the no longer real (his past relationship with her). In any case, we can probably agree that at any configuration at least two of these judgments must be deemed as bhāvāśraya (based on real things), and hence, the multiplicity of correct but at least aethetically incompatible judgment still applies. Probably part of Dharmakīrti’s point here is that these three interpreters—the dog, the libertine and the yogin—are actually living in different karmic worlds (loka), and as a result, their interpretations differ radically. Indeed, the notion of the perceptions of perceivers located in
different karmic worlds (as in the case where water can be correctly perceived as a home by fish, a slaking drink by humans, or a noxious substance by pretas) may have functioned as a philosophical tool akin to possible worlds in the Euroamerican traditions. I allude to this issue below in the Conclusion.

62 See above, n. 42.

63 As with most Pramāṇa Theorists, Dharmakīrti recognized that doubt (samanāya) or desire to know (jñāna) are a necessary prerequisite for the formulation of an inference. See, for example, PVSV ad PV1.46 (G:27.22–28.1: tadākārasāmāropasāmayaratāḥ ca tatpratipattau na lītyam anusaret) and, in a related context, PV4.19 with the discussion in Tillemans (1987:142–149). See also chapter 1, n.4.

64 See above, 152 and n.18.

65 This is the gist of the objection (PVSV ad PV1.2; G:3.9–11): “Since if the effect is indicative of the cause because it arises from the cause, then since cause and effect are in terms of all their aspects (sarvarthā) the producer and what is produced, they would be the indicated and the indicator in terms of all their aspects.” [yadi tadutpateḥ kāryaṃ gamakam sarvathā gamyagamakabhāvah sarvathā janyajanakabhbāvār].

66 See above, 152 and n.18.

67 Cf. Karṇakagomin (K:27.6ff), who builds on Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation by noting that the irrelevant properties are the “common attributes” (sāmānyadharma) of smoke and the “individual attributes” (vīrśadharma) of individual fires. See also the discussion in Hayes and Gillon (1991:51–55).

68 I am referring to the continuation of Dharmakīrti’s commentary on this verse when he remarks that the general characteristics of the effect may also act as evidence provided that they are qualified as properties of the effect (G:3.17–18: tajjayavāśesaagrahate ‘bhimataśvāli liṅgavisopādhiṁśa ca sāmānyānāṃ).

69 One can point to several examples in PVSV, but an obvious case is that we have been discussing (PV1.2: kāryaṃ svabhāvair yāvadbhīr avinābhāvi kārata netuḥ / svabhāve bhāvo ’pi bhāvamāraṇṇurodhini //). Here, the svabhāva in the phrase svabhāvair yāvadbhīh must refer to properties of individuals, since the specification yāvadbhīh would otherwise be superfluous. But in the latter part of the verse (svabhāve bhāvo ’pi bhāvamāraṇṇurodhini), when Dharmakīrti refers to svabhāva-evidence, the property-svabhāva in question cannot be construed in terms of an individual, as we shall see in our discussion of svabhāva-evidence.

70 For an account of both the three- and five-step methods, see Kajiyama (1989).


72 Horst Lasic (1999) argues that Gillon’s criticism “misses its object” because it does not accurately depict Dharmakīrti’s method for determining causality. I am inclined to agree that Gillon’s treatment, especially his step 4, requires improvement; Lasic’s own account (1999:237) is a much more precise reading. Nevertheless, Gillon’s analysis is useful in its stark presentation of the basic problem, one that remains even on Lasic’s version: namely, that a sequence of perceptions and nonperceptions cannot provide evidence of a causal relation without the tautological assumption that the perceptual judgments in question are already correct about the causal characteristics of the entities in question. Without that assumption, Gillon’s donkey will continue to be a most unwelcome ass.

73 Steinkellner (1971:209): “In der Ontologie bedeutet svabhāva die Kraft der Dinge, zu wirken, als Prinzip ihres Seins....”

74 PV1.166ab and PVSV ad cit. (G:84.5–6): “That which is capable of telic function is an ultimately real thing, for this alone is the characteristic that distinguishes the real and the unreal, namely, that the former has the capacity for telic function and the latter does not have that capacity.” [sa paramārthiko bhāvo ya evaarthakriyāsthānam / idam eva hi vastavavastunor lakṣāṇam yad arthakriyāyogyatā ’yogyatā ca] Cf. the translation by Steinkellner (1971:183, n.10).

75 Steinkellner intends that Zwack be taken in both the senses he attributes to artha, i.e., as both “goal” and “function.” See 1971:182–183, n.9.

76 Steinkellner supports this claim with the following translation from PVSV (1971, n.12): “Also that alone brings about the fulfillment of a function/goal only because it possesses the corresponding svabhāva.” [Auch das eine vollbringt die Erfüllung des Zweckes nur, weil es den entsprechenden
Svabhāva besitzt; G:89.19ff: *eko 'pi tāṁ arthakriyāṁ tattsvabhāvatvād eva karoti*.


78 Steinkellner (1971:183): "Svabhāva eines Dinges ist die Kraft (śaktī), eine Wirkung hervorzubringen."

79 See Steinkellner’s discussion of PVSV ad PV1.167a–c (1971:188, n.33 and 34). See also above, n.33.

80 See Steinkellner (1971:186) and his citation of Dharmakīrti (PV1.164 and PVSV ad cit.; G:83.7–11).

81 Steinkellner (1971:186): "...kann dies nur in übertragenem Sinne gemeint sein, um die Tatsache zu bezeichnen, daōmehrere Ursachen, die aus ihren eigenen Ursachen heraus entsprechend bedingt sind, ein und dieselbe Wirkung hervorbringen."


83 It is important to recall that “cause” and “effect” are already concepts. We cannot escape this circle.

84 Cf. Steinkellner (1984a:472–473). See also the discussion of sameness of effect in the previous chapter (119ff).

85 The qualification *qua svabhāva* is meant to account for cases where the infinitesimal particles of a water-jug, for example, might be considered property-*svabhāvas* of a water-jug. But while this is indeed a case where “property-*svabhāva*” refers indirectly to a particular, to construe the infinitesimal particles in this fashion, one must conceptualize them as properties by way of an exclusion (i.e., the exclusion of those infinitesimal particles that do not have the causal characteristics of the infinitesimal particles that are the property-*svabhāvas* of a water-jug). See above, n.43.

86 Clearly, the three forms of exclusions—bī́hāvāśraya, abhā́vāśraya, and bhā́vābhāvāśraya—are not candidates for the threefold reality required here, since both property-*svabhāva* and nature-*svabhāva* are bhā́vāśraya.

87 Here we should recall Franco’s observations on Dharmakīrti’s reductive method (Franco 2001).

88 Katsura (1979 and 1991) argues that a hierarchy of universals is clearly required at least by Dignāga’s version of the *apoha*-theory.

89 The problem of the subject-shift and the general problem of the construction of a subject as an excluded entity (vyākytta) suggests that Matilal overstated the matter when he claimed that the “concept of *dharmin*...was regarded as neutral to the ontological beliefs of the [South Asian] logicians” (1985:274; cited by Dreyfus 1997:500, n.19).

90 Note that, since both the essences are attributed in terms of the totality of the entity’s causal characteristics, this contradiction cannot be resolved by appealing to a category-shift, such as the Madhyamaka technique of applying two “essences” to things from the perspectives of the two realities.

91 Katsura (1986:27).


93 I have chosen here to change Dharmakīrti’s usual example of śūrṣapā to “sugar maple,” which should be more familiar at least to readers in North America.

94 The inclusion of “is” in these predications (i.e., “is a tree” rather than is a “tree”) serves two functions. First, I mean to show that “tree,” even if represented by a substantive in nominative case (vṛśah), is nevertheless acting as a predicate or property (*dharma*) applied to a subject (*dharmin*) in a statement “expressive of the subject” (*dharma-vācin*; see chapter 2, n.119). Second, the inclusion of “is” serves to mark a use of an abstract suffix (*bhava-prataya*). We can thus avoid awkward neologisms, such as “productness” (*ktukatva*), “śūrṣapā-ness” (*śūrṣapāva*), and so on. Although this usage does eliminate the distinction between statements “expressive of the subject” and those “expressive of the predicate” (*dharma-vācin*), the semantic difference between these statements is not in fact directly
relevant to the Dharmakīrti’s inferential theory. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that Dharmakīrti treats the following statements as logically interchangeable: anityāḥ Šabdāḥ and Šabdasyāniyatvāṃ (see PVSV ad PV1.75; G:43.11; translated in the appendix).

95 See Iwata (2003) for a discussion of some relevant passages.

96 This problem is expressed through the term pratijñāraithakadeśa (PVSV ad PV1.39).

97 See chapter 2, 117–118.

98 The passage in question is PVSV ad PV1.18ab (G:12.14–25):

“The exclusion of the evidence in heterogeneous cases is established because it is not perceived when the predicate in question is not present.”

If the negation of the evidence in heterogeneous cases is established through nonobservation, then why would remainder-evidence (सेवतव) be misleading? [PV1.18ab] For example, someone might infer, “These pieces of fruit are ripe because they are not different in color [from the tested one]” or “These are sweet because they come from the same branch [as the tested one]”; the supporting example is that they are ripe or sweet “just like the one I have just eaten.” In this inference, all the sweet or ripe fruits of which one wishes to speak have been included in the subject under discussion (पक्ष). That being the case, when the predicate in question (sādhyā) is not present, the evidence is not perceived. How then could the inference be misleading?

Some [philosophers such as इवारसेन] claim, “In this type of situation, the absence in heterogeneous cases of the property added as evidence is inconclusive because one suspects that it might be countermanded by a perception of one of the fruits in question.”

But this cannot be the case because there is no such countermanding perceptual judgment of an object that has been taken as the subject of an inference.

“But at some later time one might have a perceptual awareness of the taste that will countermand that exclusion of the evidence in heterogeneous cases.”

If one suspects that such might be the case, then one is committing the fault of overextension because there would be no necessary restriction (niyama) that guarantees the absence of a countermanding perception in other situations as well. [Without admitting a svabhāvapratibandha,] one can admit only that, a currently active instrumental awareness countermands this faulty exclusion of the evidence. If some not yet active awareness were to countermand the evidence, then inference would be unreliable in all cases [because any evidence might eventually be countermanded].

Instead of relying on simple nonobservation, the exclusion of the evidence from the heterogeneous cases requires the kind of certainty (niścaya) expressed in the determination, “there is the establishment of the evidence only when the probandum is established.” One needs this kind of certainty because, although one may establish through nonobservation (anupalambha) that the evidence is absent in some heterogeneous cases, it is not thereby proven that the evidence, which is not [shown to be] related to the probandum [by way of svabhāvapratibandha], is absent in all heterogeneous cases. Hence, due to doubt, there is no exclusion of remainder-evidence in heterogeneous cases, and this makes it misleading. [namu tadabhāve 'nupalambhāḥ siddhāḥ vyāvṛttiḥ / yady adṛṣṭaḥ nivṛttiḥ yāc cheṣavad vyaḥbicāri kim /18ab/ yathā palaṇya eti phalana eva rasaṇā eva / anupalambhad eva utuṣadhya eva / praṇavaḥ pratibandhā āh / upayuktava iti / atapi vivaśakaś uapaśikaraṇe hetā sādhyāḥ śāvad vyaḥbhicāri kim / pratyāk samāḥāraḥ śāvad vyaḥbhicāri ity eke / na / prakāraṇaye bhāvā / kaścid bhaved iti cet / tathābhyām atiprasāyaḥ / anyataḥ abhāvenyām śāvad śāvad / vṛttasya prema pumān

99 Cf. Tillemans (1990:54 and n.6).

100 I have simplified the discussion here. If we wish to be more accurate, we must first note that, for Dharmakīrti (PV1.9–10 and PVSV ad cit.; G:7.12–8.15), this type of inference actually employs effect-evidence, kāryayahu. Dharmakīrti is obliged to interpret this type of inference as based upon kāryayahu because, according to the Abhidharma typology that he adopts and adapts to External Realism, infinitesimal particles of color are distinct from infinitesimal particles of taste. But as Hayes and Gillon have shown (1991:69), this type of inference (which at PV1.9–10 is an inference from taste to color) implicitly relies on the use of svabhāva-evidence, whereby one infers the capacity (yogavyād) of the color-atoms to act as supporting conditions for the taste-atoms. The difference in the present
case—the inference from color to taste—is that we are not only inferring a capacity, but also the fact that that capacity is fully activated. Thus, to state the present example more precisely, we should note that the two property-śvabhāvās in question are not pertaining to the blueberry, but rather to the color-atoms of the blueberry. Specifically, the perception of color allows one to determine that those color-atoms are actually located in a causal complex whereby that potential is activated. Hence, the property-śvabhāva acting as evidence in our fallacious inference of taste from color is the property of “having an activated potential to produce a dark-blue color.” Using this property-śvabhāva as evidence, another property-śvabhāva is fallaciously inferred, namely, the property-śvabhāva, “having an activated potential to act as the supporting condition for the production of a delicious taste.” The complexity of this inference should make it clear why Dharmakīrti rarely chooses to present his analysis at an atomic level. It is worth noting that, unlike the inference from color to taste, the inference from color to “ripe” is more directly an inference by śvabhāva-evidence, since “ripeness” refers to a transformation applicable to all the atoms construed as the blueberry.

101 This is the gist of claims such as:

... nothing other [than an effect or a property-śvabhāva] can serve as evidence because the restriction of unaccompanied non-arising does not pertain to that whose nature is not related to the probandum. [PVSV ad PV1.10; G.8.12–13: tena nāṇyo hetur gamako Śti // apratibaddhasvabhāvasyaśāvināśāvāniyamābhāvamīpi].

and:

... one who accepts that, by reason of the negation of one entity [such as fire], another [such as smoke] is negated, must also accept that there is some śvabhāvapratibandha pertaining between those two entities. [PVSV PV1.14; G.10.23–24: ... ekāṇvittītyāyanītyāttim icchata tayoḥ kaścit śvabhāvapratibandho ‘py eṣṭanyāh].

102 PV1.2:cd: hetuḥ śvabhāve bhāvō ‘pi bhāvamābhāvānurodhī // In my translation I have supplied the sva for bhāvō ‘pi, which has simply been elided for metrical reasons. See Steinkellner (1996), who points out that the various śvabhāva-evidence definitions found in Dharmakīrti’s text are all semantically equivalent.

103 Iwata (2003:64).

104 On the use of tattvāsābhāva and its equivalents (especially tadbhāva), see Steinkellner (1984) and Iwata (2003). Cases where these compounds are applied as descriptions of the evidence are the most relevant to our discussion, but these compounds may also serve as descriptions of the predicate to be proven (śāhyadharma). The latter usage is particularly common with the compound tadbhāva. For a paradigmatic case, see PVSV ad PV1.27–28; G.18.5–9:

When the predicate to be proven is in that way established to be either the [sva]bhāva of the evidence or the cause of the evidence, then one can reason as follows: if impermanence is absent in a certain thing, then that thing is not constructed; if fire is absent, there is no smoke. One can reason in this way because (hi) the predicate in question is the evidence’s śvabhāva or cause. And how could the evidence occur without its own property-śvabhāva or cause? Hence, even without a locus (āśraya), the negative concomitance can still be demonstrated in the contrary example. [tathā prasiddhe tadbhāve hetubhāve vāṁityatvābhāve krtakatvam na bhavati dahanābhāve ca dhūmāḥ / tathā hi sa tasya svabhāvo hetur vā / kathāṃ svātāḥ śvabhāvāṃ hetum vāntareṇa bhaved ity āśrayam antareṇāpi vaidharmyadṛśante prasiddhyati vyatirekāḥ].


And he [Dharmakīrti] adds in explaining this definition: “Although the two properties are different by virtue of that difference which consists in the differentiation (yāvṛtti = apha) from the respective other [property] [the inferring property] is factually (vastuḥ) nothing but the essence (svabhāvaḥ) of the indicated [property] (liṅgā).” [HB:5.11ff: aprāparavāyāvritthibhedena dharmabhede ‘pi vastuto liṅgisvabhāva eva].

107 Hayes first made a point of this issue (1987:321–322), and Iwata (2003) has clarified a number of its ramifications.


109 Iwata likewise recognizes that in most cases option 1 (i.e., tatruruṣa) is not necessarily required
by the grammar of the passage in question. Commenting, for example, on an occurrence of tattsvabhāva in HB (7.6–8), Iwata notes, "Of course, it is also possible to interpret tattsvabhāva as a bahu-vṛti compound [i.e., option 3]."

110 PV3.70: yatāḥ kāsācit siddhāḥ asya praśātir vastunāḥ kvacit / tad avāyam tato jārāḥ tattsvabhā沃’pi vā bhavet //. Cited by Iwata (2003:83, n.33). I have translated this and the following verse in accord with the interpretation of Devendrabuddhi (150b2ff).

111 PV3.71: svanimittaṁ svabhāvaṁ vā vinā nārthasya sambhavaḥ / yac ca rūpam tayor dṛṣ, ṣaṁ tad evānyatra lakṣaṇam //.

112 This argument is made elsewhere in PV and PVSV. See, for example, PVSV ad PV 1.27–28; G:18.5–9 (translated above, n.104).

113 For a presentation of other, related problems in inferences by way of svabhāva-evidence, see Oetke (1991). For a very useful study that examines the positions of later commentators, see Iwata (2003).

114 It is worth noting that, even though Dharmakīrti does not explicitly formulate this procedure in PVSV, an inchoate form of it is found at PV1.192 and PVSV ad cit.

115 Steinkellner (1991) points out that, properly speaking, the test by way of sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāna is described by Dharmakīrti in VN only in terms of the inference (by way of svabhāva-evidence) of momentariness from existence. He proposes (321), however, an "experiment in interpretation" whereby the procedure used in that case is applied to the inference of "being a tree" from "being a sāṃsāpā" (or, to use our example, "being a tree" from "being a sugar maple"). I understand Steinkellner's experiment to be fully successful in the sense that he has correctly depicted the type of procedure that is meant to apply universally to all inferences by svabhāva-evidence. In any case, even if one were not to accept Steinkellner's exercise, the argument presented so far—based upon the property-svabhāvas "being a tree" and "being a sugar maple"—would apply just as well to "momentariness" and "existence," mutatis mutandis.

116 Steinkellner (1991) derives this property from brief comments in PVSV ad PV1.23 (G:16.30–17.1).

117 Cf. Quine's well-known critique of this distinction (1951).

118 See, for example, the passage from Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā cited by Steinkellner (1991:n.58). Here, Dharmottara clearly understands the correct usage of conventions to be crucial to inference by svabhāva-evidence. The passage (NBT:58.19–25) reads (cf. the translation by Steinkellner, ad cit.):

In this regard, suppose that, in a place abundant in sāṃsāpās, someone shows a tall sāṃsāpā to a dimwit who is unfamiliar with the term (vyavahāra) "sāṃsāpā" and then tells him, "this is a tree." When that happens, the dimwit, because of his stupidity, believes that the sāṃsāpā's tallness is also a semantic cause (nimitta) for the term "tree." This dolt is then introduced by the other fellow to the fact that that tall sāṃsāpā's mere sāṃsāpā-ness is the semantic cause for applying the term "tree" to it. The other fellow says: "There are no other semantic causes, such as the indicated sāṃsāpā's tallness and such, for the application of the term 'tree' to this individual. Instead, its mere sāṃsāpā-ness is the semantic cause." In other words, the semantic cause is the fact of possessing branches and such which is included in the concept "sāṃsāpā." [tatra pravṛtta sāṃsāpāde deśe 'vidita sāṃsāpāvyavahāro jātō yaśā kacchā uccatām sāṃsāpām upādāyavoyocatayam ucyta samvrtāḥ / samvṛtāḥ sāṃsāpāvamantam iti saṃsāpāvānimmittam avasyati / sa me avatsāyavahārasya nimittam avasyati / sa me avatsāyavahārasya nimittāntaram iha vṛkṣappayābhārasya / api tu sāṃsāpāvamanimittam / sāṃsāpāgataśākhānimittam ity arthah].
4 Instrumentality: Justifying the Sources of Knowledge

So far we have examined some issues in Dharmakīrti’s ontology by way of his views on instrumental objects (prameya); we have also discussed svabhāvapratibandha as the basis for his theory of inference. In this chapter, we will inquire into the foundations of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. More specifically, we shall examine what it is that justifies the claim that perception and inference are each an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa). In the language of Pramāṇa Theory, this is the question of “instrumentality” (prāmāṇya), an issue that Pramāṇa Theorists generally treat as a topic of discussion in and of itself. It concerns not the workings of an alleged instrument of knowledge—be it a perception, an inference, the sense faculties, a sacred text, or some other candidate—but rather what it is that justifies the claim that one or another of these is indeed an instrument of knowledge. To introduce the central issues at stake in discourse on instrumentality (prāmāṇya), we will first discuss some critical problems of translation. In doing so, we will clarify the manner in which Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality is tied to his conception of the ultimate goal of Buddhist practice. The relevance of Dharmakīrti’s ultimate goal will lead us to the problem of a seeming circularity in Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality, which in turn will prompt us to consider the implicitly axiological context of Dharmakīrti’s thought. With all these issues in hand, we will then assay a close analysis of Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality itself.

4.1 Prāmāṇya as “Instrumentality”

As mentioned previously, I translate prāmāṇya as “instrumentality” so as to indicate that all discussions of prāmāṇya must take account of the Sanskrit grammatical concerns that frame this discourse across all South Asian traditions. Specifically, Pramāṇa Theorists across all traditions recognize that the grammatical form of the word pramāṇa (“instrument of knowledge”) is indicative of an instrument (karaṇa) in a verbal action. For example, in the sentence, “I cut the tree with an axe,” the term “axe” would
be in the instrumental case in Sanskrit. Likewise, Pramāṇa Theorists universally understand the issue of pramāṇya as related to the claim that the thing in question—the sense faculties, scripture, an act of inference, or some other candidate—is the instrument (pramāṇa) in an act of knowing (pramā or pramiti). Thus, when arguing for the pramāṇya of one or another candidate, these philosophers inevitably turn to the question of whether that candidate manifests the properties of a grammatical instrument. In extended discussions on pramāṇya, this concern leads inevitably to the ubiquitous citation of sādhakatamata, the widely accepted defining characteristic of a grammatical instrument as the “most prominent causal factor” in an action.¹

While the status of a pramāṇa (an “instrument of knowledge”) as a grammatical instrument clearly frames all extended discussions of what constitutes a pramāṇa, a Pramāṇa Theorist is not thereby obliged to argue that grammatical instrumentality—i.e., the fact of being the “most prominent causal factor” (sādhakatama) in an action—is our best or only way to establish that the candidate in question is a pramāṇa. As we will see, Dharmakīrti is a thinker who resists this standard approach, and he proposes the quality of “immediacy” (avyavahitatva) as an alternative mark of instrumentality. Nevertheless, the manner in which Dharmakīrti makes this argument presumes that the grammatical issue of being the “most prominent causal factor” cannot simply be ignored; in other words, the innovative move toward immediacy is only made possible by the need to contest what is meant by the grammatical instrumentality of a pramāṇa. Our interpretive lesson here is thus that, if we are to appreciate fully what it means for Dharmakīrti to claim that certain kinds of cognitions are instruments of knowledge, we must keep track of the grammatical concerns that frame that discussion.

Scholarly communities tend to develop terminological habits, and the new translation of pramāṇya as “instrumentality” may not be well received by some specialists. One objection might simply be that the term is unfamiliar, but on my view, the term’s unfamiliarity speaks strongly in its favor. My point is that the grammatical frame in which we encounter discussions of pramāṇya is unique to South Asian thinkers working in Sanskrit. Hence, in ways that we may not immediately recognize, Pramāṇa Theorists deploy arguments about familiar issues such as justification, truth, and knowledge in a manner that, from the perspective of Euroamerican traditions, creates new possibilities for working through old problems—at the very least we will find opportunities to become more acutely aware of our own peculiarities in framing such issues. If instead we choose a more familiar term such as “truth” or “validity” to translate pramāṇya, those possibilities and opportunities, which arise from the very unfamiliarity of the context, will prove scarce. Indeed, we may instead decide that South Asian thinkers were simply rather confused about “truth” or “validity” and dismiss their efforts as unworthy of serious consideration.
The two terms I have just mentioned—“truth” and “validity”—have been proposed and frequently used as translations of *prāmāṇya*, and their particular inadequacies add significantly to the need for an alternative translation. One obvious problem with the translation “truth” is that, as Tillemans has noted, Dharmakīrti himself does not offer any clear theory of truth; Dharmakīrti’s discussion of *prāmāṇya* is more closely allied with questions of justification, and such may well be the case for most Pramāṇa Theorists. But the lack of a clear-cut theory of truth is a relatively minor issue compared to other problems that we confront when we translate *prāmāṇya* as “truth.” For example, according to all Buddhist Pramāṇa Theorists, we can identify many cognitions that we would consider “true,” and yet those same cognitions would not be considered instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇas*). For example, a correct perceptual judgment is “true” in that its contents correspond to some actual state of affairs in the world. Nevertheless, we will see that such a cognition is not an instrument of knowledge for Dharmakīrti; hence, it manifests “truth” as correspondence, but not “truth” as *prāmāṇya*. Moreover, on Dharmakīrti’s peculiar view of yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*), the content of some yogic cognitions are false in that their contents are no more “true” than a hallucination. Nevertheless, such cognitions do have *prāmāṇya* because they predictably lead to desired outcomes. In another context, Dharmakīrti discusses the well known position that, in the case of sensory perception, the sensory organ is the instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and as such, it has *prāmāṇya*. Dharmakīrti rejects this position, but he is obliged to take it seriously because it is a plausible approach to the issue of *prāmāṇya*. Can we, however, plausibly maintain that a sensory organ has “truth”? How can a physical object that does not have anything like a propositional or sentential structure be considered either “true” or “false”? Clearly, then, we run the risk of considerable confusion when we translate *prāmāṇya* as “truth.”

When we turn to “validity,” another common translation for *prāmāṇya*, we encounter many of the same problems. On this translation, a *pramāṇa* is a “valid cognition” or “means of valid cognition,” and although the exact meaning of “valid” here is not often clarified, in most cases “validity” in part means “veridicality.” Again, in the case of a perceptual judgment, we would think that “validity” should apply: if I see the color blue, and on the basis of that perceptual content I form the judgment, “that is blue,” should we not consider this judgment “valid”? Even though it seems veridical in itself, for Dharmakīrti that judgment is not “valid” because it is not a *pramāṇa*. On the other hand, an adept (*yogin*) can induce a mental perception in which he directly intuits the concept of impermanence, but since the concept “impermanence” does not truly exist, the phenomenal content of his vision is no more “valid” than an obsessed lover’s hallucination of his beloved. Yet a *yogin’s* seemingly hallucinatory
experience of impermanence is indeed a pramāṇa, and if we use the term “valid” to refer to such cognitions, then it will be valid. And finally, in the case of a sense organ, what could it possibly mean to say that, for example, one’s ocular faculty is “valid”? A far greater problem, however, confronts the use of “valid” in this context: it is a term already in use among Euroamerican philosophers, and its technical meaning is such that we create tremendous confusion when we employ it as a translation of pramāṇya. In its philosophical usage, “validity” refers almost exclusively to the structure of an argument whereby truth is always preserved. Most commonly, philosophers speak of deductive arguments as “valid” in that, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. In the context of Euroamerican philosophy, validity is thus wholly divorced from content, and an argument can therefore be valid in terms of its structure but unsound in terms of its content. This distinction clearly will not do for any theory of inference (anumāṇa): how could one have an unsound but valid anumāṇa? The matter is even worse in the case of perception. Given the aforementioned and widespread usage of “valid” among contemporary philosophers in the academy, the notion of “valid perception” is literally nonsense. Indeed, talk about “valid perception” is probably sufficient in itself to end any comparative philosophical endeavors, in that the phrase presents such a terminological mismatch that one might wrongly believe it impossible to find common ground on fundamental issues of epistemology. If we think it valuable to make the works of Pramāṇa Theorists available within an expanded notion of what one might profitably study in a department of philosophy, then clearly “validity” is not a useful translation of pramāṇya. And for the same reason, “valid cognition,” “means of valid cognition,” and other such choices are also unhelpful translations of pramāṇa.

The problems cited above may in themselves be sufficient to warrant the translation of pramāṇya as “instrumentality,” for in doing so one at least avoids the most obvious difficulties associated with “validity” or “truth,” especially the mistaken equation of pramāṇya with veridicality. But following Karl Potter, I would further suggest that “instrumentality” captures an important component of the pramāṇya debate that often escapes attention. In a bid to “accommodate what all Indian systems...can agree on as a meaning for pramāṇya,” Potter has argued that a central element must be the notion of purpose. On Potter’s analysis, a characteristic of any cognition that has pramāṇya is that it apprehends an object in accordance with the purpose that motivates the cognition. With this analysis in hand, Potter proposes that in every context, Buddhist or not, we translate pramāṇya as “workability,” a term inspired by the pragmatism of William James. In choosing this translation, Potter may well be deliberately overstating the case in a rhetorical attempt to counter the frequent use of
“truth” for prāmāṇya. In a less polemical context, we might judge that the blatant pragmatism implied by “workability” stacks the deck against those theorists, such as the Mīmāṃsakas, who do maintain that prāmāṇya must entail veridicality. Likewise, “workability” does not elicit the peculiarities of the grammatical issues that are the typical point of departure for extended discussions on prāmāṇya. Nevertheless, Potter’s basic point should not be lost: purpose does indeed play a significant role in all theories of prāmāṇya. Hence, with both the notion of purpose and the importance of grammatical concerns in mind, we will translate prāmāṇya as “instrumentality”—that which warrants the claim that perception, inference, or some other candidate is an instrument of knowledge or pramāṇa.

**Purpose and Instrumentality**

When we focus on the role that purpose plays in discourse on instrumentality, we are in effect asserting that any instrument of knowledge must be “good for something”—it must contribute to the attainment of the goal that one seeks. As such, an instrument of knowledge occurs in the context of a cognizer’s desire to accomplish the human purposes of obtaining the desirable and avoiding the undesirable. In speaking of instrumentality, Pramāṇa Theorists often frame their discussion in terms of a general notion of mundane purposes. For example, in discussions of inference, one ubiquitous example is the inferential knowledge of fire gained when the perception of that fire’s smoke is adduced as evidence. And when discussing the distinction between perception and perceptual illusion, Pramāṇa Theorists frequently cite the mistaken belief that one is seeing water when one is in fact seeing a mirage. The purposes suggested by these and other such examples are clearly mundane: to obtain warmth, to slake thirst, and so on. Buddhist thinkers in particular present their arguments for what constitutes instrumentality almost uniquely in relation to these and other such mundane goals.

Nevertheless, for Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, discussions of purpose in general presuppose an overriding concern with a specific type of purpose: namely, the ultimate purpose or goal whose obtainment is meant to result from the proper practice of a tradition’s “path” (mārga). If part of what one means by instrumentality is that an instrument of knowledge must be “good for something,” one presumably will show a special concern for verifying the instrumentality of an alleged instrument of knowledge that is meant to be good for the obtainment of one’s highest purpose. The context of a highest purpose, however, confronts Pramāṇa Theorists with a basic problem: each tradition conceives its ultimate purpose—and the path that leads to it—in such a fashion that to some significant extent some elements of that purpose and its path are not amenable to empirical examination. Dharmakīrti, for example, posits buddhahood as his ultimate goal, and while he argues tenaciously that the possibility and general
characteristics of buddhahood can be inferred prior to its attainment, he admits that there are aspects of that state which we cannot know or understand prior to obtaining it. Likewise, in terms of the path that is meant to lead to that goal, our spiritual exercises may rest in some cases on beliefs about the transempirical. One notable example is the doctrine of karma, according to which the activities of this life will lead to specific results in the next life. Again, Dharmakīrti will maintain that much that is at stake in the doctrine of karma—including the existence of former and future lives—is indeed amenable to examination through an ordinary person’s senses or inferences based on what is available to the senses. Nevertheless, the details of karma’s workings are entirely beyond such empirical examination.

In this way, Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti—and indeed all Pramāṇa Theorists—are confronted with the need to support claims about transempirical entities, whether those entities be in the form of an ultimate purpose or some other entity whose existence is required by the procedures or practices one is to follow in order to obtain that ultimate goal. At the same time, Pramāṇa Theorists clearly feel that they must demonstrate how it is that we can know that such transempirical entities exist; in other words, the traditions engaged in this style of discourse argue for some instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) that will enable ordinary persons to confirm (or deny) that such transempirical entities exist. The paradigmatic form of such an instrument is Śruti or Āgama, both of which we may refer to as “scripture.”

**The Role of Scripture**

At the risk of trivializing the notion of scripture, let us take a mundane example in order to understand the special relevance of arguments about instrumentality in the context of claims that scripture can serve as an instrument of knowledge for transempirical objects. For the purposes of our example, let us suppose that we are standing in a valley, and that I have a special instrument of knowledge—a pair of digitally enhanced videographic binoculars. We are interested to know what might be on the distant top of the mountain above, and pointing the binoculars upward, I report that I clearly see an enormous purple house. You are doubtful, since the mountaintop seems too remote for any houses, and in any case, purple seems an unlikely color. Spurred on by doubt, you ask for more detail. I then describe circular windows, triangular doors, a roof made of crystal, and other such oddities, all of which I can clearly see in the video image presented to me by the binoculars. You are still skeptical, but as long as I describe features that are at least possible (even if improbable), you cannot definitively reject what I claim to see and know. Suppose further that you gain access to my instrument of knowledge—I give you the binoculars—and then you also clearly see these strange sights on the mountaintop. Without
the binoculars, the peak is too far away to make any definitive judgment. Except for the binoculars themselves, you have no way to verify what the binoculars show you, and the rugged terrain prevents any attempt at climbing closer. If you wish to doubt the clear video image presented by the binoculars, your only recourse is to ask: are these digital binoculars reliable? Might they have been tampered with in some fashion? Has the software been manipulated to create strange distant sights? The point, in any case, is that if the data that we gain from this instrument of knowledge are to be questioned, our sole recourse is to examine the reliability of that instrument itself.

Our example illustrates an important shift that occurs when Pramāṇa Theorists take scripture as a means to gain knowledge about transempirical entities. In the case of empirical entities, one can always resort to other perceptions and inferences to confirm (or reject) the alleged knowledge gained from some supposed perception or inference. One can always resort to other perceptions and inferences because Pramāṇa Theorists clearly expect that any empirically knowable object should be amenable to many different acts of perception or inference: for them, it would be anomalous indeed to claim that, for example, an object is generally perceptible (drśya) and yet known through only one act of perception, or only in the perceptions of one person. But an appeal to scripture as an instrument of knowledge amounts to the claim that there is but one instrument of knowledge—the scripture in question—that will give one access to the transempirical entities in question. And since we can neither confirm nor deny the scripture’s claims about the transempirical, our only way to contest those claims is to contest the reliability of the scripture. To return to our example, if we are joined by fifty other observers in the valley, and if I claim to see with my own eyes some house in the distance, each of those fifty persons can test my claim through an act of perception unique to each person. But if I claim to see the house only through our one set of special binoculars, my claim can be tested only by passing the binoculars around, which may not be much of a test at all. And of course, Pramāṇa Theorists were not contending with just one scripture—each tradition had its own scripture (or body of scriptures) that presented its own version of the transempirical. Adding these competing scriptures to the mix is akin to finding other binoculars that we might use. In lieu of just one pair of binoculars, we would now have five or six, but each set of binoculars presents a different (or even incommensurate) picture of the scene on the mountaintop.

Although our example may be crude, it has the advantage of presenting in rather stark terms the issues that Pramāṇa Theorists face in sorting out the competing claims about the transempirical that they encounter in the various scriptures or scriptural traditions of South Asia. Since each tradition’s ultimate purposes focus on transempirical goals, the Pramāṇa Theorists in each tradition cannot simply ignore scriptural disparity because scripture alone gives ordinary persons access to the transempirical.
To ignore the competing claims of scripture would be to ignore one’s highest purpose or goal. And since the scriptures provide the sole access to the transempirical, when thinkers from different traditions debate the transempirical, they cannot overtly begin with the assumption that any given scripture is true. Otherwise, debate would be reduced to tautological assertion. Hence, although Pramāṇa Theorists argue directly about the claims made in scripture, they focus most of the debate about scripture on the question of instrumentality: what is it that makes any scripture an instrument of knowledge? And the style of argument employed across traditions tends to focus such debates on one critical criterion of instrumentality: the origin of a scripture. In brief, one aims to show that the content of one’s scripture is reliable because its source is flawless.

In examining this issue, Pramāṇa Theorists prior to Dharmakīrti employ two general strategies that are well known in this style of discourse. First, one may argue that a scripture is the “speech of a credible person” (āptavāda), and as such, its instrumentality is derived from the extraordinary qualities that make that person credible (āpta). Second, one may argue that a scripture is eternal and not of human origin (apauruṣeya); its instrumentality is somehow innate to it. Of these two options, most Pramāṇa Theorists, including Buddhists, follow the former option, and this in turn raises two questions: is it possible for a person to be or become “credible”? And second, can we determine that a specific person is indeed credible? Dharmakīrti’s own answers to these questions are important because they clarify his apparent attempt to ground instrumentality in a seemingly circular appeal to the Buddha’s credibility.

A Seeming Circularity

In the academic study of Buddhist Pramāṇa Theory, some scholars have suggested that Dharmakīrti’s notion of instrumentality rests ultimately on a type of circularity. Specifically, in arguing for the instrumentality of perception and inference, Dharmakīrti appears to make an appeal to the instrumentality of the knowledge derived from reading or listening to the words of a “credible person,” namely, the Buddha. It is this appeal that leads to a circle, which in its most general and trenchant form, is as follows:

As instruments of knowledge, perception and inference allow us to demonstrate that the Buddha has certain extraordinary qualities. Since he has those qualities, he is credible (āpta). Since he is credible, his teachings can be used as a source of instrumental knowledge. Since his teachings are a source of instrumental knowledge, we can use them to demonstrate that perception and inference are instruments of knowledge.

This circle moves from the instrumentality of perception and inference as
irrefutable evidence (E) for the credibility (C) of the Buddha, and that credibility then justifies the instrumentality of his teachings (T). Likewise, the teachings themselves justify the instrumentality of perception and inference, but these are already adduced as evidence (E) for the Buddha's credibility. As a matter of convenience, let us refer to this argument as the “ECTE” circle.

It should be clear that, in terms of the two questions about credibility mentioned above, the ECTE circle requires an affirmative answer to both. That is, one must affirm that it is indeed possible to obtain the extraordinary qualities that make a person credible, and one must likewise maintain that it is possible to know through perception and inference that a specific person (in this case, the Buddha) has the qualities that make him credible.

In order to assess how Dharmakīrti does answer these questions—and hence whether he asserts an ECTE argument—one must examine his comments on two concise statements made by his predecessor Dignāga. The first of these is the famed namaḥśloka (“verse of homage”) that begins Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya:

> He has become an instrument of knowledge, and intent on the weal of the world, he is the teacher, the Sugata, the protector.

Bowing to him, I will collect here in this text my theories scattered in various works so as to establish the instruments of knowledge.16

Various interpreters ancient and modern have shown that Dharmakīrti devotes the entire Pramāṇśiddhi chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika to the unpacking of this verse. Specifically, the chapter is structured so as to demonstrate that the Buddha is worthy of the primary epithet in Dignāga’s praise—that is, the Buddha can be correctly praised as “one who has become an instrument of knowledge” (pramāṇabhūta). Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the Buddha is worthy of this primary epithet by arguing that he is also correctly described through the four subsidiary epithets in the verse: “he who is intent on the weal of the world” (jagaddhitaiśīna), “the teacher” (śāstṛ), “the one who has well understood” (sugata), and “the protector” (tāyin).17 We need not address the details of this intricate argument, but we should note that after he has argued that the Buddha is indeed worthy of the subordinate epithets, Dharmakīrti concludes with a set of statements that might easily suggest ECTE circularity:

> Out of compassion (dayā) he states what is best [for his listeners], and through his knowledge (jñāna) he says what is true. And since he is intent (abhiyogavant) upon stating that which is best and true along with the means to realize it, he is an instrument of knowledge. He is praised as an instrument of knowledge in that
his teaching is of that kind, and the purpose of praising him in that fashion is to establish the nature of the instruments of knowledge through that teaching.\(^{18}\)

In relation to the notion that the Buddha is “one who has become instrument of knowledge” (pramāṇabhūta), the commentarial tradition generally interprets these lines as simply restating the long argument through the four epithets that precedes this verse. That is, (1) out of his compassion (dayā), the Buddha “seeks the weal of the world,” and (2) because of his knowledge (jñāna) concerning what is true, he is “One who has well understood.” Since (3) he teaches not only that truth, but also a means (sādhana) to realize it, he is the “Teacher,” and since (4) he is effortful (abhiyogavant) in that task, he is the “Protector” (tāyin). And thus, as one who has these four qualities—compassionate, knowledgeable, informative and effortful—the Buddha is therefore one who has become an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇabhūta).

How might these statements lead us to ECTE circularity? First, following Franco, we interpret the term pramāṇabhūta (“one who has become an instrument of knowledge”) as a synonym of āpta (“credible person”). We would certainly be within our rights to make this interpretation; indeed, it is difficult to imagine why Dharmakīrti’s contemporaries would not themselves immediately see his use of pramāṇabhūta as a reference to credibility.\(^{19}\) Thus, the argument by way of the four epithets becomes an argument about the qualities that make the Buddha credible. And once we are in the context of credibility, we are de facto concerned with the instrumentality of the Buddha’s teaching. What role does the teaching play here? The verse maintains that through the teaching (upadeśaṭaḥ), we establish that perception and inference are instrumental. And what is the relevance of perception and inference? The verse is not explicit in this point, but it is clear that, on Dharmakīrti’s view, an acceptable and convincing argument must employ instruments of knowledge as its warrants. Hence, presumably we accept the long argument concerning the four epithets because it proceeds through a rigorous application of perception and inference.

In short, the statements that we have just cited seems to invoke an ECTE circle:\(^{20}\)

Using perception and inference, the long preceding argument has demonstrated that the Buddha has four extraordinary qualities, and since he has those qualities, he is an instrument of knowledge—that is, he is credible (āpta). Moreover, we praise him as an instrument of knowledge precisely so as to demonstrate that his teachings are also instrumental, and we use the teachings to establish that perception and inference are instruments of knowledge. And of course, it is perception and inference that
have allowed us to demonstrate in the previous argument that
the Buddha has the extraordinary qualities in question.

If we accept this restatement of the verses that conclude Dharmakīrti’s
argument for the Buddha as pramāṇabhūta, we obviously must accept that
his argument evinces ECTE circularity. And on my view, any
straightforward reading of the statements in question will lead to some
version of an ECTE argument. Hence, if we are to avoid this circularity, we
must suggest how we can read those statements in a manner that is not
straightforward, and we must likewise provide sufficient grounds for doing
so. We can accomplish both of these tasks by attending to the wider context
that informs these verses and the long argument that they conclude.

To suggest how we might read the verses in a manner that is not circular,
we can rely on Franco’s interpretation:

The framework in which these statements are made is clearly
apologetic, as Dharmakīrti aims at anchoring his own
epistemology in the original message of the Buddha. Thus,
according to Dharmakīrti, Dignāga praises the Buddha for being a
teacher not only in religious matters, but also in matters of
epistemology. These apologetics, however, are to be distinguished
from the actual procedure by which Dharmakīrti reaches the
conclusion that the Buddha is a means of knowledge. Even if the
usage of perception and inference has been observed in the
Buddha’s teachings and serves as a model for establishing their
true characteristics, one can test and independently use them to
establish, among other things, the validity of the Buddha’s
teachings, and from it the authority of the Buddha himself.
Perception and inference within this context are certainly not
established from the outset just because of the Buddha’s
authority. Nevertheless, one is justified to claim later on, in an
apologetic context, that the means which have proved so
successful were already discovered by the Buddha and taught in
his teachings.

In effect, Franco suggests that the seeming circularity of the statements
is a product of their rhetorical context. Dharmakīrti strikes a deliberately
apologetic stance that allows him to make the type of claims about the
Buddha that thinkers in other traditions routinely assert in relation to their
own founders. This interpretation rests on Franco’s larger argument that
Dharmakīrti’s discussion of the Buddha as pramāṇabhūta is susceptible to a
“double reading” whereby “we can read the text as a proof that the Buddha
is pramāṇabhūta in the Buddhist or more specifically in Dignāga’s sense, but
also as a proof that he is an āpta [i.e., credible person] in the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika or Sāṃkhya-Yoga sense.” Recalling the “sliding scale of
“analysis” discussed previously, we might readily accept that Dharmakīrti adopts here a sliding scale in relation to the question of credibility, such that he is willing to argue provisionally in a manner that leads to ECTE circularity, only to abandon that argument at a higher level of his scale. Nevertheless, to claim that Dharmakīrti escapes ECTE circularity in this fashion, we must have good reason to do so: we must show that a straightforward reading of the statements cited above (with their attendant ECTE circularity) are superseded by a clearly articulated position in Dharmakīrti’s work that sees the fault in an appeal to credibility.24

As it turns out, we can point to a clearly articulated position of this kind, and to do so, we must turn to Dharmakīrti’s comments on another of Dignāga’s statements, this time concerning credibility and the instrumentality of scripture.

**Scriptural Inference and Dharmakīrti’s Rejection of Credibility**

At the beginning of his treatment of scriptural inference, Dharmakīrti cites a short but crucial statement from his predecessor Dignāga: “Since the statements of a credible person are generally trustworthy, a cognition arising from them is an instrumental inference.”25 Dignāga’s statement certainly appears to evoke the typical argument for scriptural instrumentality that on our analysis would lead Dharmakīrti to ECTE circularity. Thus, when Dharmakīrti unpacks Dignāga’s statement, we should expect him to focus his argument on the credibility of the Buddha, since credibility is the decisive issue in this approach to the instrumentality of scripture.

Surprisingly, however, Dharmakīrti does not argue for the instrumentality of scriptural knowledge by arguing for the credibility of the Buddha; moreover, we can readily justify the stronger claim that he explicitly rejects any appeal to credibility as an acceptable means of grounding the instrumentality of scripture. To demonstrate how this is the case, we need not present a detailed analysis of Dharmakīrti’s approach to scripture, since both Tillemans and Franco have already provided such studies.26 Instead, let us offer a brief summary and then cite his explicit rejection of credibility.

In sum, Dharmakīrti’s discussion of scripture falls into eight significant parts:27

1. An initial reference to Dignāga’s words that emphasizes the context in which an appeal to scripture is permissible [Preamble to PV1.214]. One can only make such an appeal if (a) the issue at hand is wholly transempirical (atyantaparokṣa) in that it cannot be adjudicated on the basis of empirical instruments of knowledge; and (b) it must be settled in order for one to advance in one’s spiritual exercises.
2. The general characteristics that a scripture must have if it is to be a candidate for use in a scriptural inference [PV1.214 and PVSV ad cit.]. The scripture must address the concern mentioned in (1) above in an intelligible and practicable fashion.

3. The “threefold analysis” that a candidate scripture must pass if one is to use it as the basis for a scriptural inference [PV1.215 and PVSV ad cit.]. To be used for a scriptural inference, the passage must pass three tests: (a) it cannot be contradicted by empirical knowledge acquired through perception; (b) it cannot be contradicted by empirical knowledge acquired through inference; and (c) it must not contradict itself concerning transempirical matters.

4. A restatement of Dignāga’s words [PV1.216 and PVSV ad cit.]. This almost literal restatement’s rhetorical location suggests that 1–3 can be considered a complete account.

5. An alternative test that obliquely refers to the extraordinary qualities of the scripture’s author (i.e., the Buddha) [PV1.217 and PVSV ad cit.]. This test either supplements or perhaps replaces (3) the threefold analysis. According to this test, one may employ a scriptural inference with regard to transempirical matters because the “important topics” (pradhānārtha) of the Buddha’s teachings, i.e., the Nobles’ Four Truths, can be confirmed on the basis of an ordinary person’s empirical instruments of knowledge alone. Hence, since his teachings are known to be trustworthy in this regard, one trusts them with regard to other, empirically inaccessible matters. To trust the teachings in this manner, one must also maintain that the scripture’s author (namely, the Buddha) had knowledge of matters that are transempirical to us, and that he had no reason to deceive us.

6. A denial that scriptural inference is actually an inference [end of PVSV on PV1.217]. Dharmakīrti says that it is “not without problems,” and his commentator Śākyabuddhi describes such an inference as “not actually instrumental.”

7. An explicit rejection of the appeal to credibility [PV1.218–219 and PVSV ad cit.], which we will cite below.

8. And finally, a reaffirmation of the possibility of attaining the kind of qualities that, if it were possible for others to know them, would make one credible [PV1.220–223 and PVSV ad cit.]. Here Dharmakīrti cites many of the issues that he will take up in greater detail in the aforementioned discussion of the Buddha as “one who has become an instrument of knowledge” (pramāṇabhūta).

A significant feature of this argument is the tension that it evinces between an appeal to one’s own empirical knowledge as opposed to trusting in another’s (i.e., the Buddha’s) transempirical knowledge. Dharmakīrti
begins in an empiricist vein by avoiding any reference to credibility (1–4), and the rhetorical structure of this portion of the argument suggests that we may consider it a complete account of scriptural inference, if we were so inclined. Perhaps, however, Dharmakīrti recognizes that in the context of Dignāga’s notion of scriptural inference, one cannot fail to speak of the Buddha as credible—i.e., a person with the extraordinary qualities required for direct epistemic access to the transempirical. Dharmakīrti therefore supplements the initial account (1–4) by referring somewhat obliquely to the Buddha’s extraordinary qualities and transempirical knowledge (5). Even here, however, he manages to cast the issue in an empiricist light: he affirms unequivocally that one can determine the “important topics” of the Buddha’s teaching just on the basis of one’s own, ordinary perceptions and inferences. Nevertheless, despite this claim’s empiricist tones, Dharmakīrti is apparently troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha’s transempirical knowledge and concomitant extraordinary qualities. How else can we explain the fact that he immediately backpedals by denying that scriptural inference is really an inference at all (6)? Moreover, he then proceeds to reject explicitly any appeal to credibility (7). Nevertheless, he apparently has qualms about implying that, by rejecting credibility, he means to reject the notion that it is possible to obtain the kind of extraordinary qualities attributed to the Buddha. He therefore reaffirms (8) that if one follows the Buddhist path to its completion, one can attain the kind of extraordinary qualities that would make one credible, even if ordinary persons cannot definitely know whether any specific person has done so.

Overall, the argument thus exhibits an ambivalence that oscillates almost wildly between an appeal to the transempirical knowledge of an extraordinary person (i.e., the Buddha) and a staunch affirmation that even as ordinary persons, we can confirm and know the important part of the Buddha’s teaching just on the basis of our own empirical perceptions and inferences. I would argue that this ambivalence is certainly part of what contributes to the appearance of ECTE circularity in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter. Below we will also see that this ambivalence is an important thematic issue that must inform our examination of the Buddhist approach to instrumentality.

Let us first settle, however, the question of whether Dharmakīrti is indeed caught in ECTE circularity. We have noted that we seek a clearly articulated position in which Dharmakīrti rejects the appeal to credibility that would be required for him to be committed to an ECTE position. We find a clearly articulated rejection at PV1.218–219, which on our account is the seventh section of the argument on scriptural inference. To be clear that Dharmakīrti is indeed rejecting any appeal to credibility, it is worth citing this passage in full:

*Others [such as the Naiyāyikas] think that a statement dependent for its origin on a superior person is in accord with reality (yathārtha).*

[PV1.218ab] According to others,29 a credible speaker (āpta) is a
person with good qualities such as experience of things as they truly are (yathārthadarśana); that person’s teachings are trustworthy. This point is admitted if one is able to know that that person has that superior quality.30 [PV1.218cd] Every judicious person who wishes to act analyzes statements to determine what is and what is not scripture (āgama); he does so as one who wishes to act [effectively], and not because of some pernicious habit. Learning what should be put into practice from the scripture, he thinks, “Having acted accordingly, I might realize my goal.” On the basis of the trustworthiness of that scripture with regard to things that can be experienced [through perception or empirical inference], that person acts with regard to other things [i.e., the supersensible objects described in that scripture] because such is the case for most practical action in the world.

But if one is to act on the basis of examining the person, one would not act at all because one cannot know whether or not that person has those kind of extraordinary qualities. It is not the case that persons such as us would not act because of not accepting that there are some persons with those qualities, since that kind of person does indeed make true statements.31 In other words,

32 [PV1.219] The truthful (samyag) and deceitful actions of persons are due to their good mental qualities and their mental flaws. Those mental attributes are supersensible, and they would have to be inferred from the physical and vocal behavior that arises from them. And most behavior can also be performed deliberately (buddhipūrvam) in a way other than the mental state they seem to reflect because those behaviors occur as one desires and because those behaviors may be intended for various aims.33 Thus, there is an overlap of the alleged evidence for faults and faultlessness. Therefore, not having made a definitive determination, how is one to establish that the author of the scripture is flawless?34

The above passage leaves little doubt that, for Dharmakīrti, one cannot demonstrate that scriptural statements are a reliable source of knowledge on the basis of the claim that their author has the kind of extraordinary qualities that constitute a credible person. For Dharmakīrti, one cannot use this procedure for the simple reason that one cannot reliably determine whether the person in question has the requisite qualities or not.

On my view, the above passage constitutes the kind of clearly articulated
rejection of an appeal to credibility that allows us to discount any apparent ECTE circularity in Dharmakīrti’s thought. On this interpretation, the seeming ECTE circularity of the statements that end Dharmakīrti’s discussion of the Buddha’s extraordinary qualities (i.e., the qualities that make him pramāṇabhūta) must reflect a calculated excess of apologetic rhetoric along the lines suggested by Franco. Whatever else Dharmakīrti may be up to, his affirmation of the metaphorical instrumentality of the Buddha as “become an instrument of knowledge” (pramāṇabhūta) is not meant to suggest that the Buddha’s words are what literally prove the instrumentality of perception and inference.

We might think that the passage cited above, which has also been discussed most notably by Tillemans, would put an end to all talk of circularity, but it has not. Instead, it has prompted Steinkellner to reassess the issue of circularity in terms of a far subtler issue, namely, the relation between Dharmakīrti’s conception of ultimate goal and the need to define the instrumentality of perception and inference in a manner that suits that ultimate goal. This subtler approach creates an important interpretive context for our study of instrumentality, and it especially helps to clarify the curious ambivalence—the oscillation between the empirical and the transempirical—in Dharmakīrti’s discussion of scripture.

Axiological Concerns: Mutual Restraint of Path and Goal

At the humble and amusing outset of his recent article, “Once More on Circles,” Ernst Steinkellner remarks, “At a certain stage of life one’s research work seems to oscillate between three options: correcting old mistakes, repeating old mistakes, and making new mistakes.” This self-effacing quip introduces Steinkellner’s abandonment of the notion that Dharmakīrti espouses a form of ECTE circularity, and Steinkellner emphasizes that change by citing and agreeing with the interpretations offered by Franco and Tillemans. Steinkellner, however, does not merely surrender his earlier position; instead, he also seeks to explain the underlying qualm that prompted him to interpret Dharmakīrti’s argument about instrumentality as circular, and this reformulated circularity is of great hermeneutical interest. Indeed, for our purposes Steinkellner certainly is not “making new mistakes.”

Describing this underlying circularity as “conceptual,” Steinkellner summarizes it schematically:

1. Our ordinary valid cognitions (pramāṇa) establish the authority of the Buddha’s teaching (buddha-vacana),
2. the validity of our cognitions (pramāṇya) is understood as their reliability (avisamvāditva),
3. reliability depends on successful activity (puruṣārtha-siddhi),
4. all human goals are determined by the ultimate goal (nirvāṇa),
5. the “ultimate goal” is indicated by the Buddha’s teaching (buddhavacana).

As we shall see, Dharmakīrti’s notion of a cognition’s instrumentality (which Steinkellner calls “validity”) rests on the cognition’s trustworthiness or reliability, and that trustworthiness is largely constituted by one’s accomplishment of a goal through the knowledge supplied by that cognition. Steinkellner’s point here is that, if we do not have a notion of what constitutes our goal, how can we appeal to the accomplishment of a goal as a central criterion of a cognition’s instrumentality? And if, as a good Buddhist, one strives toward the ultimate goal of nirvāṇa, will not all other goals be defined in terms of it? Likewise, if all our goals are defined in terms of that ultimate goal, then since only the Buddha (or some other arhat) has knowledge of that goal, we must appeal to his words (i.e., the Buddhist scriptures) in order to posit it as the ultimate touchstone for a cognition’s instrumentality.37 Finally, Steinkellner draws a hermeneutical lesson here—one that is clearest when he refers to the parallel case of Vārṣagāṇya’s Saṣṭitāntara, an early Sāṃkhya treatise that discusses the instruments of knowledge. Speaking of the seven forms of “connection” (sambandha) necessary for Vārṣagāṇya’s theory of inference, Steinkellner notes:

All these seven kinds of connection are clearly conceived in such a way that the logical theory which uses them for explaining the necessity of the logical connections only allows for such inferences that are able to accomplish what is expected of them. And that is a derivation of the Sāṃkhya system with its principles and all its corollary elements.38

In other words, Vārṣagāṇya seeks to present an epistemology that all others will accept as a neutral account of knowing, but he has unwittingly stacked the philosophical deck: if we accept his account of inference, we will be de facto obliged to accept the Sāṃkhya system and the ultimate goal toward which it is directed. In other words, “the system is established with the help of such means of [instrumental] cognition whose presuppositions are taken from the system itself.”39 This amounts to what Steinkellner calls a “true circle,” and he suggests that Dharmakīrti’s notion of instrumentality is caught up in the same problem. This is a remarkably valuable insight whose full force will take some time to become evident. We will attempt to make some contribution in that direction by unpacking and modifying Steinkellner’s argument.

As I see it, at the core of Steinkellner’s argument lies a recursive definition of instrumentality. Simplifying Steinkellner’s approach, we will rephrase that recursive definition as follows:

R1: Any cognition that leads to the obtainment of the ultimate goal instrumental (i.e., is a pramāṇa).
R2: Any cognition that leads to the obtainment of a goal that leads to the obtainment of the ultimate goal is instrumental.

R3: No other cognition is instrumental.

Working with this recursive definition, we would conclude, for example, that any cognition that appeared to directly apprehend an absolute self (ātman) would not be instrumental, since one obtains the ultimate goal (nirvāṇa) by eliminating the belief in the self. Likewise, we would claim that any cognition—such as the belief in ultimately real universals—that led to the belief in the self would also not be instrumental. In effect, this recursive definition would exclude the instrumentality of any cognition whose content directly or indirectly expressed any philosophical position that contradicted Dharmakīrti’s notion of nirvāṇa. Thus, all cognitions—even the most ordinary ones—would have to contribute either directly or indirectly to my progress toward nirvāṇa.

The problem, however, is that as it stands, this tripartite recursive definition also excludes a good many cognitions that Dharmakīrti clearly would take to be instrumental. For example, if I enjoy smoking cigarettes, then in order to satisfy that desire, I must be able to correctly identify something that I can use to light my cigarette. Presumably, I would do so by relying on one or more acts of perception and inference such that, for example, I identify the flame of a candle burning on the table in front of me. Surely, Dharmakīrti would agree that at least some of the cognitions involved in my finding the candle’s flame are instrumental, but he surely would also assert that the goal accomplished by those cognitions—i.e., smoking a cigarette—cannot in itself lead me either directly or indirectly to nirvāṇa.

Thus, the recursive definition given above is overly restrictive because R3 incorrectly eliminates many instances of instrumental cognition. Nevertheless, in its attempt to apply to all ordinary instrumental cognitions, the definition suggests a crucial insight that is well worth preserving: for Dharmakīrti, at least some of an ordinary person’s instrumental cognitions can indeed lead either directly or indirectly to nirvāṇa. This is the gist of claiming that an ordinary person can determine the truth of the “important part” of the Buddha’s teaching just on the basis of her own perceptions and empirical inferences. That is, those cognitions that determine the truth of the important part of the Buddha’s teaching in themselves constitute the first step toward nirvāṇa: once one has established the real possibility of nirvāṇa, one has already set out on the path. At the same time, Dharmakīrti clearly means that except for their objects and results, there is nothing distinctive about the ordinary perceptions and empirical inferences that lead us, however incrementally, toward nirvāṇa. In other words, in their nature they are the same as every other perception and empirical inference. Hence, when he presents the instrumentality of ordinary perception and inference, his discussion must
apply to all such cognitions, not just those that lead directly or indirectly to \textit{nirvāṇa}. Dharmakīrti thus has two concerns: that some instrumental cognitions of ordinary persons be capable of knowing the truth of \textit{nirvāṇa}, and that his account of instrumentality construes these cognitions to be the same in their basic nature as every other ordinary instrumental cognition.

When these two concerns are combined, we arrive at a clear constraint on the way that Dharmakīrti must approach instrumentality. That is, since some ordinary instrumental cognitions move one toward \textit{nirvāṇa} (by giving one access to the important part of the Buddha’s teaching), those cognitions cannot be inimical or contradictory to the obtainment of \textit{nirvāṇa}; otherwise, they would be moving one away from it, not toward it. At the same time, his general account of instrumentality must apply not only to those cognitions, but to all ordinary perceptions and inferences; otherwise, ordinary instrumental cognitions could not do the work that he claims they can do. In other words, if the ordinary instrumental cognitions that lead us toward \textit{nirvāṇa} are not identical in nature to all other ordinary instrumental cognitions, then Dharmakīrti would in effect be asserting that those perceptions and inferences are not ordinary. Hence, since the account of instrumentality must apply to all ordinary cognitions, and since that general account must also apply to the specific cognitions that lead to \textit{nirvāṇa}, Dharmakīrti’s general account of the instrumentality of perception and inference must avoid any features that would be inimical to the obtainment of \textit{nirvāṇa}. In short, the nature of \textit{all} ordinary instrumental cognitions must be compatible with \textit{nirvāṇa}, but those cognitions must also be capable of establishing the important part of the Buddha’s teaching without reference to scripture or transempirical knowledge.

From an interpretive standpoint, this “compatibility-capability” constraint may help to identify and explain a number of features of Dharmakīrti’s thought. He must give an account of inference, for example, that enables inference to be a powerful analytic tool extending far beyond the range of our perceptions, since inference is our primary means of establishing the truth of the teaching’s “important part.” Dharmakīrti must, however, thoroughly critique not only inferences that allegedly apprehend an absolute self (\textit{ātman}), but he must also refute any assertions that would indirectly lead to the affirmation of such an entity. Hence, his account of inference must deny the reality of all universals, of which the self may be considered a special case. Thus, inference must at once be far-reaching in its scope and utterly shorn of any ontological commitment to entities whose existence would directly or indirectly contradict Dharmakīrti’s conception of \textit{nirvāṇa}.

Employed in this fashion, the compatibility-capability constraint suggests a hermeneutic of suspicion, such that we will tend to suspect that, despite Dharmakīrti’s empiricist rhetoric, his approach to instrumentality is in fact guided by the need to defend his ultimate, transempirical goal.\textsuperscript{40} Or to put it another way, we may suspect that in the background of
Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality operates an unacknowledged axiom: “if by accepting a particular position, one would be led to conclude that nirvāṇa is indefensible or unobtainable, then that position cannot be correct.” In broad terms, I would characterize such an axiom as “axiological,” in that it aims to preserve primarily that which Buddhists value in their final goal (be it the removal of suffering, the attainment of happiness, the survival of Buddhist institutions, or some other such concern). The probable role of this type of implicit axiology is surely not to be dismissed—at least some of Dharmakīrti’s philosophical choices are likely guided by the need to defend the values embodied by nirvāṇa, even if at this point we cannot specify which choices those might be. Nevertheless, we should make an additional specification: that the goal need not be the only source of value, since the means may also be.

To explain fully what I mean by this last remark would draw us too far away from our already delayed task, namely, a discussion of Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality. Let us, therefore, consider just one example. It is well known that Dharmakīrti and his fellow Mahāyānists conceive buddhahood in such a way that while a Buddha may still have perceptions, he no longer employs concepts. Indeed, Dharmakīrti himself identifies conceptuality with ignorance. Moreover, since conceptual thought is necessary to Dharmakīrti’s theory of inferential reasoning, this means that, strictly speaking, a Buddha does not employ reasoning (yukti). If his notion of instrumentality were designed simply to lead us to that conclusion, we would expect him to emphasize perception or experience over reason. But in fact, our best way to read Dharmakīrti is the inverse: for him, experience is clearly subordinate to reason, as is illustrated, for example, by the argument—made explicit by the earliest commentators—that only inference is intrinsically instrumental, while perception on many occasions is only extrinsically so. The pride of place that inference takes in Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality indicates the crucial role that reason plays not only on the Buddhist path, but also as the mark of the prekṣāvant, the “rational” or “judicious person.” For Dharmakīrti and his fellow Buddhist thinkers, reason is crucial to obtaining nirvāṇa, and that goal is thus obtained by judicious, rational persons. In short, nirvāṇa is not beyond reason—it is perfectly in accord with reason.

By raising this example I do not mean to indicate only that the ultimate goal, nirvāṇa, must be defined in a way that is plausibly compatible with the empirical. Mere compatibility with the empirical would still be satisfied by an emphasis on an irrational or trans-rational access through faith, for example. I mean to suggest further that Dharmakīrti’s conception of nirvāṇa is also constrained by the importance that he places on reasoning and debate as practices in and of themselves. On this interpretation, Dharmakīrti sought to define and explain his ultimate goal in terms that preserved the centrality of those practices. Hence, in this regard, it is not just the values inherent in the goal that constrain the means, but also the
values one sees in the means that constrain the goal.

It is the importance of such a reciprocal relation—of mutual constraint and compatibility—pertaining between nirvāṇa and its means that I derive as the central lesson of Steinkellner’s “true circle.” On my view, this reciprocal restraint likewise underlies the ambivalence in Dharmakīrti’s account of scriptural inference. In short, he must strike a delicate balance between the empiricism that he values on the path and the extraordinary qualities of buddhahood, his ultimate goal. In his attempt to strike that balance, Dharmakīrti thus oscillates between a denial of the relevance of the Buddha’s extraordinary qualities—since an appeal to their relevance would endanger his emphasis on empiricism—and an affirmation of those qualities, since they are precisely what make that goal valuable.

At this point in the study of Dharmakīrti’s thought, however, I do not know how to make good hermeneutical use of the implicit axiological concerns raised by Steinkellner’s analysis. Certainly for me, and perhaps for the field at large, Dharmakīrti’s highly complex theory of instrumentality often does not lend itself easily to what we might call an “axiological analysis” through which we may uncover the values in path or goal that may sway Dharmakīrti in some of his philosophical choices. The difficulty is not only knowing when a consideration of axiological issues may give us our best explanation of the topic at hand, but also determining which pole in any given case is regnant: path or goal? Probably conceiving the question in this fashion is already far too simple. For these reasons my analysis of instrumentality below will only make a passing attempt at such an analysis. We must instead be satisfied with the knowledge, first, that Dharmakīrti does not facilely justify the instrumentality of perception and inference by rooting them in the Buddha’s transempirical knowledge, which we would then access through scripture; second, that axiological considerations likely play an as yet unclear role in his notion of instrumentality; and finally, that we may heuristically bracket axiological considerations for the moment, since the values of path or goal likely stand in a relation of mutual constraint, such that an account that ignores axiological concerns, while incomplete, will nevertheless not be grossly misleading.

4.2 Dharmakīrti on Instrumentality: the Earliest Commentarial Account

The preliminary conclusions on the general issue of instrumentality that we have just sketched leave us free to attempt a close reading of Dharmakīrti’s arguments. Nevertheless, even with this freedom, we immediately face an intractable problem: Dharmakīrti’s own account of instrumentality is so elliptical and brief that an interpretation based upon his works alone would be either trivial or excessively speculative. Hence, to seek a more substantial reading we have no choice but to focus on commentaries. Each generation of commentary, however, introduces an ever-thicker layer of philosophical accretions deposited by each commentator’s attempts to plug
perceived holes in Dharmakīrti’s theories or to respond to new issues with which Dharmakīrti could not have contended. Given our interest in a historical reading, the best compromise is to consult the earliest layer of commentary: namely, the work of Devendrabuddhi, along with occasional references to the sub-commentary of Śākyabuddhi. Of course, while Devendrabuddhi’s comments will give us a richer sense of what Dharmakīrti might mean by instrumentality, he too adds his own layer of ideas. Indeed, the philosophical creativity required to fill out Dharmakīrti’s account renders Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation nearly as much an independent work of philosophy as a way of accessing Dharmakīrti’s views. This is not, however, entirely problematic, for part of our aim here is also to present Devendrabuddhi’s views in their own right, since many of them reappear in the works of later Buddhist philosophers. The same qualifications must also be applied to Śākyabuddhi’s remarks, to the extent that we will rely upon them.

Some Basic Definitions

For Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, Dharmakīrti’s definition of instrumentality is found primarily in the first six verses of the Pramāṇavārttika’s second chapter, the “Pramāṇasiddhi.” Subsequent Buddhist commentators (as well as more recent interpreters) tend to see this section as the locus classicus for Dharmakīrti’s views on instrumentality. Both Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi comment extensively on this series of verses (i.e., PV2.1–6), and a full account of their rich and intricate analysis would require more space than is available here. I will therefore restrict myself to the more salient points of their interpretation.

To lay the groundwork for our discussion, in this first section we will focus upon some basic definitions. An examination of the details and controversies alluded to here will be deferred to the following sections of this presentation.

In Dharmakīrti’s analysis of instruments of knowledge in PV2.1–6, one of the most basic and fundamental claims is found in the statement that opens the discussion:

[Def1.1:] An instrument of knowledge is a trustworthy awareness [PV2.1a–b1].

Devendrabuddhi understands this statement to constitute the initial and most salient part of the definition of an instrument of knowledge. On Devendrabuddhi’s view, this initial statement must be supplemented with a remark that Dharmakīrti makes near the end of this section on instrumentality (i.e., at PV2.5c). This latter statement concerns the “novelty” of the cognition, and according to Devendrabuddhi, it must be added to Def1.1 in order to form a complete definition of an instrument of
knowledge that covers all possible cases. The statement reads:

**Def1.2:** Moreover, an instrument of knowledge is that which illuminates an unknown object (artha) [PV2.5c].

Thus, on Devendrabuddhi’s view, the full definition of an instrument of knowledge is an awareness that is both trustworthy (Def1.1) and also “novel” (Def1.2) in that it “illuminates” or makes known an unknown object.

If we combine our bipartite definition, we can restate the definition of an instrument of knowledge more concisely. In doing so, let us also take advantage of the fact that, for Dharmakīrti, an instrument of knowledge is always a cognition (jñāna). Hence, by way of a terminological shorthand, our discussion will often translate pramāṇa as “instrumental cognition.” With this in mind, we can restate the definition as follows:

**Def1.1 & 1.2:** An instrumental cognition (pramāṇa) is a trustworthy awareness that illuminates an unknown object.

This way of defining an instrumental cognition clearly gains favor among Dharmakīrti’s commentators beginning with Devendrabuddhi. The exact place of novelty in this definition is a matter of some contention, but let us leave that discussion for a later point. Instead, let us continue with these basic definitions by citing Dharmakīrti’s explanation of trustworthiness. On Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation, the explanation reads:

**Def2:** Trustworthiness is a cognition of telic function (arthakriyā) [PV2.1b-c].

On the most straightforward reading, Def2 means that, if perception and inference are instrumental, then they must be cognitions of that which accomplishes the desired goal. Devendrabuddhi notes that as such, perception and inference are trustworthy, for they are what “cause one to obtain (prāpaka) the desired object (artha).” As we shall see, on Devendrabuddhi’s view, the obtainment of the desired object consists in the activation of a cognition in which there appears the accomplishment (kriyā) of one’s aim or telos (artha). Within the context of this interpretation, Devendrabuddhi refers to a statement from Pramāṇaviniścaya, where Dharmakīrti remarks:

There are two forms of correct knowledge (saṃyagjñāna): perception and inference. They are correct because, one who determines the object (artha) by means of one of those two and then acts on that knowledge is not deceived (na ... visaṃvādyate) about that object’s telic function (arthakriyā).
In this passage, where “correct knowledge” (saṃyagijñāna) is synonymous with “instrumental cognition” (pramāṇa), Dharmakīrti employs a verbal form (i.e., na ... visasavādyate) of visasavāda, the term so far translated as “trustworthiness.” In the passage just cited, the verbal form has been translated as “is not deceived.” This translation, which reflects the Tibetan interpretation (mi slu ba), in part merely stems from the absence of an appropriate verbal form of “trustworthy.” But it also serves to emphasize the fact that, in the above passage, the notion of visasavāda is placed unambiguously within the context of action. In short, an awareness is visasavādin—trustworthy or non-deceptive—in that if one acts, the object obtained through one’s action will be infallibly capable of the desired or expected telic function (arthakriyā). This raises the question of what we mean by “telic function,” a notion that we shall now examine.

“Telic Function” (arthakriyā)

Any attempt to understand Dharmakīrti’s notion of telic function is complicated by the ambiguity of the Sanskrit term, artha. Dharmakīrti uses artha in four senses that often overlap: “aim” (i.e., prayojana or “purpose”), “object” (or “thing”), “meaning,” and “referent.” When using artha in the sense of “aim,” Dharmakīrti admits two basic types of aim: acquisition and avoidance. One can speak of obtaining warmth, for example, or avoiding the cold. The sense of artha as aim, however, may also overlap with its sense as object (arthas). The objects of perception and inference are often called arthas, but an “object” here may itself be an “aim” because of its relevance to some further aim: the distant fire that is the object (arthas) of one’s perception may also be one’s aim or purpose (artha) in that one wishes to obtain the warmth that is one of its property-svabhāvas. This overlap between “aim” and “object” appears to be based upon the degree to which causal efficiency is linked to purpose: considered just in terms of the causal efficiency of producing perceptions and (indirectly) inferences, an artha is an object. And considered primarily in terms of purpose, an artha is an aim. Although artha as “aim” and “object” may thus be distinguished, even when the term artha is best rendered as “object” it retains some connection to the notion of a purpose or goal. Such is the opinion of Devendrabuddhi, as is apparent when he comments upon Dharmakīrti’s statement at the outset of PV3 that the illusory “hairs” or “flies” perceived by a person with cataracts cannot be considered “objects” (arthas). As noted earlier, the crux of the problem here is that Dharmakīrti might be obliged to posit not only particulars and universals as objects of knowledge (jñeya), but also a third type, namely, illusory objects. Commenting on this problem, Devendrabuddhi raises an objection and offers his reply:
“Well, in the awareness of a person with defective vision there are false appearances such as hairs, flies, two moons and so on. Those false appearances do not accomplish any purpose (artha) at all; hence, they are not counted as particulars. But even though they are devoid of telic efficacy, they are not included among universals because they appear clearly and because they are not distributed over anything. Thus, since they are not subsumed under the categories of particulars and universals, they are another kind of object. Hence, it is not correct that there are just two kinds of objects.”

No, it is not the case that our view is not correct. To be specific, hairs and so on are not objects (arthas). Why? Because they are not considered to be objects [PV3.1d]. That is, persons engaged in practical action (vyavahāra) do not consider them to be objects. The intention of this statement is as follows. If the flies and so on that are perceived by a person with cataracts and so on were to be objects, then one would investigate the situation, asking, “Is it a particular, or is it the other [i.e., a universal]?” But they are not objects in that fashion because, with regard to an awareness in which there is the appearance of flies and so on, persons engaged in practical action do not have the intention, “This is the object of that awareness.”

Devendrabuddhi’s comments make it clear that, on his view, the term artha, even when used in the sense of “object,” has a relation to some goal or purpose that beings pursue through their “practical actions” (vyavahāra). When artha is construed within a linguistic or conceptual context (i.e., as referent or meaning), the place of purpose is even more prominent, for we have already seen that a perceiver’s expectations play a role in the determinations that she draws in relation to an object. In other words, an entity’s causal characteristics, while independent of a perceiver’s expectations, are conceptualized by the perceiver within the context of expectations concerning some goal.

The ambiguity in Dharmakīrti’s use of the term artha becomes particularly salient in the compound term arthakriyā. As we have seen, in the context of instrumentality arthakriyā is applied to the objects of a trustworthy awareness: that awareness is trustworthy because it is a cognition of arthakriyā. This may seem a straightforward characterization of trustworthiness, but when we try to specify exactly what arthakriyā means here, we encounter the aforementioned ambiguity. In a seminal article on the topic, Nagatomi describes our dilemma as a choice between two interpretations of the compound arthakriyā:

Are we to analyze [the compound arthakriyā] as padārthasya kriyā “the action of a thing, its causal efficiency,” or as arthavatī =
prayojanabhūtā kriyā “action that serves a purpose, purposive or useful action”\(^{61}\)

In other words, if we say that an awareness is trustworthy because it is a cognition of arthakriyā, does this mean that that object of that cognition functions so as to fulfill a specific purpose, or does it mean that the object is simply causally efficient, i.e., that it produces effects simpliciter?

To demonstrate that both the telic meaning (i.e., “purposeful action”) and the causal meaning (“causal efficiency”) can apply to the term arthakriyā, Nagatomi cites various passages that illustrate each meaning. Although some of the passages chosen by Nagatomi may not fully support his readings, there seems little doubt that the term arthakriyā does range over a scale of meanings bracketed by these two extremes (i.e., the telic and the causal).\(^{62}\)

It is important to note, however, that Dharmakīrti’s philosophy probably would not support an interpretation of arthakriyā solely in terms of either extreme. This is certainly the case with the interpretation of arthakriyā in terms of purpose or aim, for to fulfill an aim, an object must be causally efficient. As for the interpretation in terms of causal efficiency, we have seen that for Devendrabuddhi and most subsequent Buddhist commentators, the content of awareness is an “object” (artha) only if it is interpreted within the context of persons engaged in practical action (vyavahāra). However, as a speculative interpretation, we should note that in at least one context—that of reflexive awareness (svaśāṃvedana)—the notion of arthakriyā may be applicable only in terms of sheer causal efficiency, since it is difficult to see how practical action (vyavahāra) makes sense within this context. Whether this latter interpretation be plausible (or implausible), it is nevertheless the case that all passages where a telic meaning is stressed still contain some appeal to causality, and the vast majority (if not all) passages that stress the notion of causal efficiency still rest on some notion of a telos within the context of practical action (vyavahāra).\(^{63}\)

**Instrumentality (prāmāṇya) in Terms of Two Effects**

Nagatomi’s identification of the two different emphases—i.e., the telic and the causal—that may be applied to the term arthakriyā is highly significant, for these two different emphases correspond to two different ways of understanding Dharmakīrti’s notion of instrumentality, especially as interpreted by Devendrabuddhi. To see how this is the case, we need to first recall the definition of an instrument of knowledge within the kāraka system as the “most prominent factor” (sādhakatama) in the production of the resulting activity (kriyā); specifically, that resultant activity is the instrumental effect (pramāṇaphala), which most Pramāṇa Theorists define...
as the resultant act of knowing (pramiti). On Devendrabuddhi’s view, Dharmakīrti proposes two alternative interpretations of what constitutes the instrumental effect. He claims that “… there are two kinds of instrumental effects: one called a “human aim (puruṣārtha),” which is a mediated (chod pa = vyavahita) effect, and a distinctive one (khyad par can = viśīṣṭa) that is not mediated.”

When Devendrabuddhi speaks of a human aim as the mediated (vyavahita) instrumental effect resulting from the application of an instrument of knowledge, he does not explicitly define what is meant by “mediated” (vyavahita). Nevertheless, his point is clear: the effect is mediated (vyavahita) in that there is an “interval” (vyavadāna) between the functioning of the instrument (the karaṇa, i.e., the pramāṇa) and the effect. In other words, the effect is separated (vyavahita) from the instrument by virtue of other intervening causes and conditions that must be in place for the effect to occur. The effect is thus “remote” (vyavahita) relative to the instrument, and since some obstruction can therefore occur between the functioning of the instrument and the production of the effect, the effect may not necessarily occur, even if the instrument functions correctly. Thus, although the English term “mediated” best conveys the notion that the production of the effect requires other causes and conditions subsequent to the functioning of the instrument, we could as easily refer to this effect as “remote,” “separated” and so on.

In contrast to the mediated effect, the unmediated effect is “distinctive” in that, as Śākyabuddhi notes, it “necessarily occurs.” This is so because the effect is not separated (avyavahita) from the instrument; it is, in fact, identical to the instrument itself. As such, it is not remote (avyavahita); instead, the effect is actually simultaneous with the instrument. In other words, the instrumental cognition (pramāṇa) is itself the instrumental effect (pramāṇaphala).

**Instrumentality in Terms of the Mediated Effect**

Devendrabuddhi develops this theory of mediated and unmediated instrumental effect in order to elucidate Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality as found in PV2.1–6. Starting at PV2.3b, Dharmakīrti focuses upon the claim that an awareness is the instrument of knowing. Dharmakīrti offers two reasons for this claim, and according to Devendrabuddhi, the notion of human aim (puruṣārtha) as mediated effect is the focus of Dharmakīrti’s first reason for the instrumentality of awareness:

[PV2.3b-d:] Awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one’s action toward an entity that one wishes to obtain or avoid.
Part of Dharmakīrtī’s motivation here is to defend Dignāga’s claim that awareness alone—and not the sense faculties or any other factor in the process of knowing—is instrumental.69 But in comparison to his Brahmanical counterparts, Dharmakīrtī’s defense involves a significant shift in the way instrumentality is being defined. Specifically, rather than consider an instrument of knowledge to be instrumental relative primarily to the resultant act of knowing, Dharmakīrtī construes an instrument of knowledge in terms of another resulting action, namely, the perceiver’s activity (pravṛtti) in relation to what is to be attained or avoided. This is the effect that Devendrabuddhi considers to be a human aim (puruṣārtha), a claim warranted by the fact that, elsewhere, Dharmakīrtī equates a human aim with that which is to be either attained or avoided.70

In speaking of activity (pravṛtti) as the mediated effect that is a human aim, Devendrabuddhi proposes a specific interpretation of “activity.” Describing the manner in which the instrumentality of cognition applies to the context of a human aim, he says:

Having known through awareness an aim (artha) that should be done, a person implements its means and thereby attains the activity defined as the direct apprehension of it. Likewise, knowing that some thing is to be avoided, a person does not implement its means and thereby obtains the activity of not directly apprehending it. Thus, awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one’s activity with regard to a real thing that one should obtain or avoid [PV2.3b–d]. That is, it is the primary factor—awareness is the primary factor—in the activity whose object is a real thing which one should obtain or avoid and which is thus called a “human aim.” Therefore, since awareness is the primary factor, awareness is instrumental.71

Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation suggests three phases in the process of employing an instrumental cognition to obtain a human aim. First, one has a cognition that apprehends some entity as what one needs to obtain or avoid, i.e., as that which fulfills one’s aim. Second, one implements the means for obtaining or avoiding that entity. And third, one obtains the “activity” or “activation” (pravṛtti) of another cognition, namely a perception in which that entity is experienced as fulfilling one’s goal. Thus, on Devendrabuddhi’s view, at PV2.3b-d, Dharmakīrti uses the term “activity” to refer to the activation of a perception of that entity. To be specific, it is a perception that Devendrabuddhi elsewhere describes as one “in which the accomplishing of one’s goal appears” (arthakriyānirbhāsa).72

From a lexical standpoint, the interpretation of “activity” (pravṛtti) in this fashion is certainly legitimate, since Dharmakīrtī often uses this term to speak of the “activation” or occurrence of an instrumental cognition.73 And from a commonsense standpoint, Devendrabuddhi’s description makes
good sense. In the context of wishing to obtain heat, first one apprehends some heat-source: one sees, for example, that a fire is burning in the fireplace across the room. Second, one implements the means to obtain that entity: one walks across the room. And third, one apprehends the fulfillment of one’s goal: one experiences warmth.

On this model, what then does it mean for an instrumental cognition such as a perception to be the “primary factor in one’s activity with regard to a real thing that one should obtain or avoid?” In brief, it means that the perception is an instrument (karaṇa) in that it enables one to act in a manner that results in the accomplishment of one’s goal; in other words, it is what “makes one obtain” (prāpaka) an object that accomplishes that goal. Below we will explore some obvious problems that this raises, such as the fact that one’s activity might be hampered—some intervening turn of events might prevent one from reaching the fire. For the moment let us simply acknowledge that this would be a plausible way to define an instrumental cognition in terms of a human aim (puruṣārtha).

Although this interpretation may be plausible, it does not strike me as the most straightforward reading of PV2.3b–d. Instead, on a more natural reading, to say that an instrumental cognition is the primary factor in one’s activity with regard to some human aim is simply to say that an instrumental cognition motivates or prompts that activity. Indeed, even for Devendrabuddhi this interpretation must also be part of what PV2.3b–d means, although for him this sense appears to be secondary.74 Speaking of why the cognition itself—and not other factors in the knowing process such as the sense faculties—is the instrument, Devendrabuddhi explains:

> It is claimed [at PV2.3b-d] that awareness is instrumental so as to refute the notion that the sense faculties and such are also causes for activity. That is, a person who has faculties and so on does not thereby necessarily engage in activity toward some sense object; otherwise, one would have to conclude that one engages in activity merely by virtue of their existence. Instead, it is as follows: having known what should be obtained and avoided, a person who is that knower applies himself accordingly. That in terms of which a judicious person (preksāpūrvakārin) is initially prompted to act is the cause of action toward the intended object (artha). Since other awarenesses arise by dint of that initial awareness or have that initial awareness as their object, only that initial awareness is instrumental.75

These comments immediately follow Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation of “activity” (pravṛtti) as the activation of a perception in which one experiences the accomplishment of one’s goal. But here, a different interpretation of activity is suggested: it is the perceiver’s initial activity toward the goal. In the example cited above, activity would be the first
moment of setting out across the room to reach the fire, or more specifically, the first moment of the intention to do so. Thus, on this interpretation a cognition is an instrument of knowledge whose application results not in a perception of the accomplishment of one’s aim, but rather in one’s activity toward an entity that is capable of accomplishing that aim. In short, such a cognition is an instrument (karaṇa) because it is “that which causes one to act” (pravartaka) toward the fulfillment of one’s aim.

That Devendrabuddhi is here speaking of an instrumental cognition as that which initially motivates action will become particularly clear when we return to a discussion of instrumentality in terms of human aims. In brief, Devendrabuddhi is obliged to see an instrumental cognition as a “motivator of action” (pravartaka) in order to avoid the conclusion that certain forms of determinate knowledge that are not inferences would also be instrumental, as we will see. The key overall issue is that, in the context of the mediated instrumental effect that is a human aim, Devendrabuddhi construes an instrumental cognition as an instrument (karaṇa) in terms of two related but undeniably different “actions”: (1) in the primary sense, the action is the cognitive act of having a perception in which appears the accomplishment of one’s aim; and (2) in a secondary sense, the action is the initial action of setting out to accomplish that aim.

Before moving on to the notion of an unmediated effect, we need to make one final observation: namely, that on Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation, Dharmakīrti accepts the notion that, from at least the perspective of attaining a human aim, an instrument of knowledge and its effect may be construed as distinct. This is indicated most starkly by Devendrabuddhi’s claim that contrary factors may intervene between the instrumental cognition and the effect, such that the effect is not necessarily attained in each case. At first glance, this separation of instrument and instrumental effect (pramāṇaphala) might not seem problematic, inasmuch as both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti explicitly note that such a distinction may be made in conventional terms. But Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s explicit statements about such an imputed or conventional separation rest upon the claim that the instrument and its effect are ultimately a single entity: the cognition that is the “instrument” is itself the “effect.” It is difficult to see how this approach to the singularity of instrument and effect can apply to Devendrabuddhi’s notion of a mediated instrumental effect, since the sensation of warmth, for example, that is obtained after approaching a fire clearly cannot be considered identical in any fashion with the initial perception of that fire from a distance.

It would thus appear that Devendrabuddhi’s notion of the mediated effect, if it is not to contradict Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s claims about the ultimate identity of instrument and effect, must be construed as conventional in a different fashion. Specifically, rather than a conceptual differentiation of the singular entity that is awareness into a distinct instrument and effect, for Devendrabuddhi an entirely different context
must be assumed whereby entities that are ultimately distinct are related through causality: the effect (whether action as initial motivation or action as subsequent perception) is caused, even if indirectly, by the instrumental cognition.

How useful is this aspect of Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality? For many subsequent commentators, the answer might well be “not at all,” inasmuch as the subsequent tradition of Buddhist Pramāṇa Theorists, which often relies quite squarely upon Devendrabuddhi’s commentary, has largely abandoned this portion of his interpretation. But despite this later rejection, Devendrabuddhi’s approach does provide a plausible and attractive interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s explicit construal of instrumentality in terms of an awareness as “the primary factor in action toward a human aim.” And even though Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation may appear to contradict some aspects of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, the commentarial gymnastics that an abandonment of Devendrabuddhi’s view prompts in later commentators suggests that the flaw may lie in Dharmakīrti’s theory, rather than Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation.

Instrumentality in Terms of the Unmediated Effect

Devendrabuddhi notes that Dharmakīrti does not argue for the instrumentality of awareness solely on the basis of its primacy in action, in which context the notion of a mediated instrumental effect is particularly relevant. Instead, immediately following PV2.3b-d, Dharmakīrti presents an entirely different argument for the instrumentality of awareness:

[PV2.4a-c:] Also, awareness is instrumental because a cognition is differentiated due to the differentiation of the awareness’ objective image; this is the case because that cognition only occurs when that objective image is present.

For Devendrabuddhi, this second argument establishes the instrumentality of awareness not in terms of a mediated effect, but rather in terms of an unmediated (avyavahita) one. Interpreting PV2.4a-c, Devendrabuddhi remarks:

The [mere] cognition of an object (don rtogs pa ≈ arthādhigama) is an unmediated instrumental effect. That is, that through which, when all other causes are in place, the convention of “knowing” (rtogs pa = pratipatti) is satisfied without further mediation is an instrument of knowledge. And nothing but the simulacrum [i.e., image] of the object has that lack of mediation, for it is through that image that instances of knowing are distinguished from each other, even though they are indistinguishable in terms of their nature of being experiences. Hence, due to the differentiation of the
objective image—i.e., due to that quality of the cognition—the awareness, i.e., the knowing, is differentiated. And since this effect exists when that is present—i.e., when the object-image is present—awareness is therefore instrumental. If when “y” is present, “x” comes into existence, it makes sense that “y” is the most efficient cause of “x.” 81 But if at some point there were no such effect [i.e., “x"] when “y” was present, then one would realize that “x” depends upon some other mediating causal factor. That being the case, since that former cause, “y” is mediated by something else on which it depends to produce x, y would not be the most prominent causal factor. Therefore, it would not be the instrumental cause. Even when the sense faculties and so on are present, they do not [necessarily] have the causal function of producing an awareness because they are mediated by the object-simulacrum. But if the simulacrum is present, it is necessarily known because it is not mediated by anything else for that knowing to occur. Since it is of the nature of awareness, it is the basis for positing an effect that does not depend on anything further for its presence. 82

From the viewpoint of Dharmakīrti’s Brahmanical counterparts, the above argument for the instrumentality of awareness (as opposed to the sense faculties, etc.) follows an analysis more typical to this style of discourse, for the instrumental effect (pramāṇaphala) in question is not the attainment of some human goal, but rather the mere act of knowing (pramiti) itself. But even here Dharmakīrti adds a significant twist to his argument, for his analysis does not follow the typical kāraka-theory discussed earlier. 83 On that theory, an instrument of knowledge would be the instrument (karaṇa) for the production of a resulting action (kriyā) that is an instrumental effect (pramāṇaphala) consisting of the act of knowing (pramiti). There is thus a cause-effect relationship between an instrument of knowledge and the instrumental effect that arises from it, and as such, the instrument of knowledge and the instrumental effect are distinct. Likewise, on Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation, an instrument of knowledge construed in terms of a mediated effect is also based on a cause-effect relationship: an instrumental cognition is the cause, and the resultant activity (pravṛtti) is the effect.

In contrast to the kāraka-theory and the context of a human aim qua mediated effect, Dharmakīrti’s analysis of an instrument of knowledge in terms of what Devendrabuddhi calls an unmediated effect does not employ a causal model, in part because Dharmakīrti follows Dīnāgā in rejecting the distinction between instrument (karaṇa) and effect (kriyā, phala) as found in the kāraka-theory. 84 Dharmakīrti thus rejects the notion of understanding instrumentality in terms of a causal relationship between two distinct
entities—the instrument and its effect. He instead maintains that instrument and action are identical; specifically, they are the awareness’ objective aspect (grāhya) and subjective aspect (grāhakākāra), respectively.\textsuperscript{85}

Dharmakīrti’s ultimate rejection of the kāraka-theory’s differentiation of instrument and action becomes clear when he returns to this issue later in the Pramāṇavārttika. Responding to the claim that instrument and instrumental effect are actually identical, his objector remarks, “It is contradictory for action and instrument to be identical.”\textsuperscript{86} And Dharmakīrti answers:

This is not true because we admit that there is a [conceptually constructed] difference between these qualities [of awareness, i.e., the objective and subjective aspects]. But we maintain that the real thing [i.e., awareness itself] is undifferentiated.\textsuperscript{87} Such is the case for any establishment of action and causal factors because even when the real things construed as the instrument and such are considered to be different, the establishment of them as instrument and such occurs through imputation (āropa).\textsuperscript{88}

To support the claim that instrument and instrumental effect are actually identical, Dharmakīrti effectively proposes an entirely new way of understanding what constitutes an instrument: rather than being the cause of some resultant activity (kriyā), it is instead that which is unmediated (avyavahīta) with regard to the activity. As Devendrabuddhi explains in the comments cited above, when the activity (kriyā) in question is an indubitable cognition (pramiti), the instrument is thus “that through which, when all other causes are in place, the convention of ‘knowing’ is satisfied without further mediation.” In short, it is that which requires nothing further in order for one to be currently having a cognition of the object.

In establishing the instrumentality of an instrumental cognition in these terms, Dharmakīrti (as interpreted by Devendrabuddhi) recognizes that one must be able to distinguish between cognitions. That is, if an instrument of knowledge is that which enables one to claim that a cognition of an object is occurring, one must be able to distinguish the case where a cognition of that object is occurring from a case where such a cognition is not occurring. With this in mind, Dharmakīrti also claims that the instrument of knowledge is the “final differentiator” (antyabheda) of cognitions. Thus, not only does it provide the basis for claiming that a cognition is occurring, but it also accounts for the differences between the contents of cognitions.\textsuperscript{89} As Devendrabuddhi points out, on Dharmakīrti’s view the only facet of knowing that can meet these criteria of an instrument of knowledge is the “objective image” (grāhakāra) or “object-simulacrum” (viṣayasya-dṛṣṭya)—i.e., the appearance (pratibhāsa, pratibimba) in a cognition.
Furthermore, since the image is actually an aspect of the mind arising in the form of an image, and since the mind is ultimately undifferentiated, the instrument is ultimately nothing but the mind (i.e., the cognition) itself. Thus, for an entirely different reason than the one proposed in the context of a human aim, an instrument of knowledge is once again shown to be nothing but the awareness itself, i.e., the instrumental cognition.

**The Two Effects and the Two Senses of ArthaKRiya**

At the beginning of our discussion on instrumentality in terms of mediated and unmediated effects, I mentioned that Nagatomi’s division between two senses of arthaKRiya is relevant here, for it parallels the distinction between Devendrabuddhi’s two types of instrumental effects. More specifically, it seems likely that something akin to Nagatomi’s two senses of arthaKRiya are presupposed by Devendrabuddhi in the formulation of his theory: the notion of a mediated instrumental effect presupposes the sense of arthaKRiya as “telic function” (Nagatomi’s “purposive action”), while the notion of an unmediated instrumental effect presupposes the sense of arthaKRiya as “causal efficiency.” In this section we will explore how this might be the case, with the important proviso that, since Nagatomi’s categories are not recognized per se by Dharmakirti and Devendrabuddhi, we are necessarily engaged in a somewhat speculative enterprise.

To understand the relevance of Nagatomi’s two senses of arthaKRiya, we need first to recall that when a cognition’s instrumentality is defined in terms of a mediated effect, it is an instrument (karaṇa) because it is the most important factor in the production of a subsequent effect, namely, the attainment of a human aim (puruṣārtha). As we have noted, the instrument’s effect is “mediated” (vyavahita) because even though the cognition is instrumental, its function must be supplemented by later conditions and developments, if the desired effect is to be obtained.

The fact of being mediated indicates that this way of defining instrumentality emphasizes the first of Nagatomi’s interpretations of the compound arthaKRiya, i.e., arthaKRiya as “telic function” or, to use Nagatomi’s term, “purposive action.” As noted above, arthaKRiya is relevant to an instrumental cognition’s trustworthiness. Specifically, an instrumental cognition (pramāṇa) is always trustworthy, and that trustworthiness is described as arthaKRiyasthiti, which Devendrabuddhi interprets as a cognition of arthaKRiya. Now, if arthaKRiya is understood as telic function, this means that an instrumental cognition is trustworthy in that it results in a cognition of telic function. Or, to put it another way, the instrumental cognition is trustworthy because it results in the activation of a cognition in which the accomplishment of one’s goal appears. This is, as we have seen, Devendrabuddhi’s way of construing an instrument of knowledge in terms of a mediated instrumental effect. Thus, by interpreting arthaKRiya as “telic function,” we arrive at Devendrabuddhi’s notion of an instrumental cognition in terms of a mediated instrumental
effect: the cognition is instrumental in that it is a cause for the resulting “activity” that is a cognition of the accomplishment of one’s aim.

In contrast, when understood in terms of an unmediated instrumental effect (avyavahitapramāṇaphala), the instrumentality of a cognition involves no appeal to a causal relation between instrument and effect. On this approach, a cognition is instrumental not because it is the most important factor in the production of some goal, but rather because it is that which is the primary factor in establishing that an “effect”—i.e., the pramiti itself—is already in place. Since the instrumental cognition is thus occurring at the same time as the instrumental effect (pramāṇaphala), there can be no question of mediation, whether causal or otherwise. But although neither Dharmakīrti nor Devendrabuddhi is specific on this point, it appears that when an instrumental cognition is defined in this fashion, one likewise cannot construe its trustworthiness in terms of a cognition of arthakriyā as “accomplishment of a goal” (i.e., “telic function”). The reason for abandoning this model of trustworthiness is that it would lead to an infinite regress. That is, consider the trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition that “results” in an unmediated effect—i.e., that cognition itself is the manifestation of the desired effect that is one’s goal. If the trustworthiness of such a cognition were to consist of it leading to some subsequent cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one’s goal, then no such cognition would ever be trustworthy, for no cognition would be trustworthy in and of itself without appealing to a later result. 90

It can be argued, however, that the trustworthiness of at least one type of awareness whose effect is unmediated can (or perhaps must) be interpreted in this fashion, i.e., in such a way that its trustworthiness consists of its resulting in a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one’s aim (arthakriyānirbhāsa). To be specific, such a cognition would be one that is the latter cognition itself, i.e., one in which the accomplishment of one’s aim already appears. An example would be the sensation of heat when, after seeing a fire from a distance, one finally reaches it and feels its warmth. Here the perception—the sensation of warmth—is itself the fulfillment of one’s aim; hence, no further mediation is required in order for one’s aim to be accomplished. The instrumental cognition, in short, would be its own effect, which is exactly what is meant by an unmediated instrumental effect. If this interpretation is correct, such an instrumental cognition may be counted as having an unmediated instrumental effect at the same time as involving the notion of resulting in the accomplishment (kriyā) of one’s aim or telos (artha). 91

It would thus appear that some notion of aim or telos is applicable to the interpretation of arthakriyā as the criterion for trustworthiness even in this particular type of cognition with unmediated effect, namely, a cognition in which the accomplishment of one’s aim already appears. But even if this is the case, Devendrabuddhi’s discussion of unmediated instrumental effect—and Dharmakīrti’s initial development of the idea—is probably also
intended to account for instrumentality in another fashion. Specifically, the notion of an unmediated effect also enables one to understand a cognition’s instrumentality without any concern for human aims at all. On this alternative interpretation, one can claim that all cognitions are instrumental in a minimal sense. Although neither Dharmakīrti nor Devendrabuddhi is explicit on this issue, it would appear that an alternative interpretation of arthakriyā must also be applied on this interpretation, since the entire point here is to evaluate a cognition without reference to goals. Following Nagatomi, the alternative interpretation suggested—but never clearly stated—by Dharmakīrti or the earliest commentators is that of arthakriyā as mere causal functionality: an entity has arthakriyā in the simple sense that it has effects. On this interpretation of arthakriyā, an awareness would be trustworthy in the minimal sense that it is a real mental event: it has arthakriyāsthiti in the mere sense that it is established (sthita) as a causally efficient moment of consciousness. This minimal trustworthiness amounts to the claim that, regardless of the determinate interpretation of a cognition’s content, one can always reliably know that one is cognizing. Since this minimal trustworthiness is applicable to all awarenesses, all awarenesses can be considered trustworthy.

Although it may seem odd to maintain that every instance of awareness is trustworthy in the minimal sense discussed above, this interpretation helps to explain two other notions proposed by Dharmakīrti. The first is one we have discussed previously, namely, that illusory objects such as the hairs seen by a person with cataracts are not “objects” (arthas) because they are not considered such by persons engaged in practical action (vyavahāra); in other words, from the perspective of seeking a human aim (artha), that visual cognition of “hairs” in the mind of a person with cataracts is not instrumental. But for that person, those “hairs” are objects when considered simply as mental events. If we understand Devendrabuddhi’s twofold explanation of instrumentality in terms of the two aforementioned senses of arthakriyā, the perception of those hairs is not instrumental on the definition in terms of a mediated effect (i.e., puruṣārtha) because they do not lead to or are not themselves the accomplishment of one’s aim (arthakriyā). But that cognition is instrumental in terms of an unmediated effect (i.e., the mere fact of having an awareness) because that moment of consciousness is real, i.e., it is causally efficient (arthakriyā) in that it is a mental product and will itself lead to other mental effects.

This way of defining the unmediated instrumental effect in terms of causal efficiency helps to explain a second, related notion: namely, reflexive awareness (svasamvedana), the “self-cognizing” or “self-presencing” of every cognition. Reflexive awareness itself is an exception to the rule that the object of a perception (pratyakṣa) is the cause of the image in the perceptual cognition. Hence, if it is to be considered instrumental, it clearly cannot be considered in terms of a mediated instrumental effect, since this would require an appeal to causality that is not possible in the
case of reflexive awareness. And it likewise difficult to imagine how reflexive awareness can fit into a scheme of human goals; hence, unlike a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one’s aim, one cannot appeal to some unmediated experience of telos, except the restricted telos of knowing that one knows. It seems likely, then, that the instrumentality of reflexive awareness cannot be established in terms of a mediated effect, and even as an unmediated effect the issue of arthakriyā as telic function is nonsensical in this case. Thus, if we are to accept reflexive awareness as a trustworthy cognition, and if we are to maintain that trustworthiness means arthakriyāsthiti, we must again turn to an alternative interpretation of arthakriyā, namely, that reflexive awareness is reliable in that it reveals the mere fact of experience, which is the same as saying that it reveals the mere causal efficiency (arthakriyā) of awareness.

If we close this section by returning to the notion of a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one’s aim, we can now add an important qualification to the way we have characterized it so far. That is, even if such a cognition combines a telic meaning of arthakriyā with the notion of an unmediated instrumental effect, it also places greater emphasis upon arthakriyā as causal efficiency, in comparison to instrumental cognitions that are considered trustworthy in terms of mediated effects. In the case of these latter cognitions, trustworthiness means that they lead to some subsequent cognition in which the accomplishment of one’s aim appears. Thus it is not their causal functionality as mere cognitions that makes them trustworthy, but rather their causal functionality in relation to some subsequent effect. But in the case of a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one’s aim, it is the causal functionality of that cognition itself—the very fact of its appearance—that makes it trustworthy. In other words, the trustworthiness of the visual perception of fire is that it leads one to have, for example, a subsequent sensation of warmth. But the trustworthiness of that sensation of warmth is nothing but the fact of that sensation itself. In this sense, the trustworthiness of a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one’s aim (arthakriyānirbhāsa) is, much like reflexive awareness and the perception of illusory hairs, based primarily upon its arthakriyā as the mere causal efficiency of the cognition itself.

The Primacy of Puruṣārtha

There is much more to explore in Devendrabuddhi’s notion of two types of instrumental effect, including the way that his interpretation has been partially adopted (and hence partially abandoned) by the commentarial tradition. But one more limited question that comes to mind is the role played in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy by these two ways of defining instrumentality. More specifically, should one way of construing instrumentality be considered primary and the other secondary? If Devendrabuddhi’s presentation of instrumentality in terms of two types of instrumental effect reflects some distinction between
instrumentality in terms of sheer causal efficiency and instrumentality in terms of telic function, it nevertheless remains the case that Dharmakīrti himself does not explicitly tell us whether we should favor one approach or another, primarily because such a distinction is only inchoate in Dharmakīrti’s work. In more recent times, however, Nagatomi and Steinkellner have noted that Dharmakīrti tends to employ the term arthakriyā primarily with the emphasis on its meaning as “telic function,” and not primarily with the meaning of causal efficiency. 95 If we are correct in maintaining that these two different senses of the term arthakriyā correspond to the two different ways of construing the instrumentality of a cognition, then the emphasis on the telic sense of arthakriyā suggests that the definition of an instrumental cognition in terms of a mediated effect—i.e., in terms of a human aim—will also be the principal one in Dharmakīrti’s work. Although neither Devendrabuddhi nor Śākyabuddhi offers any explicit answer to this question, they too appear to consider the establishment of instrumentality in terms of a human aim to be of primary importance, for when presenting Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality, they spend far more time on this way of defining an instrument of knowledge.

At the price of moving beyond the usual historical limits of our interpretation, we can also turn to the opinion of a later commentator, Dharmottara. In a fashion that is closely related (but not identical)96 to Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation, Dharmottara draws a distinction between an instrumental cognition as “the appearance of the accomplishment of one’s aim” (arthakriyānirbhāsa) and an instrumental cognition as “what motivates action toward an object capable of the accomplishment of one’s aim” (arthakriyāsamarthe pravartakam). He then notes that the type of instrumental cognition analyzed by Dharmakīrti is the latter, for it is this type of instrumental cognition that a judicious person (preksāvant) seeks in order to attain his goal. In short, for Dharmottara as well, Dharmakīrti’s primary concern is with establishing the instrumentality of a cognition as a means to obtain a human aim.97

Assuming that such is the case, let us now examine a few issues that become evident when one defines the instrumentality of cognition in terms of human aims, especially as presented in Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation of PV2.1–6.

**Instrumentality in Terms of Human Aims: Some Problems and Solutions**

As noted above, if an awareness is instrumental in terms of the mediated effect that is a human aim (purusārtha), then it is the primary factor in activity (pravṛtti) toward an entity that is to be attained or avoided. For Devendrabuddhi, the resulting activity in question is secondarily one’s initial activity toward the object; primarily, activity means the “activation” (pravṛtti) of a cognition to which appears the accomplishment of one’s aim
A cognition is deemed trustworthy because it does not deceive people; this includes perception and inference, which have the characteristic of causing one to obtain \( \approx \text{prāpaka} \) the intended object. To comment on that, [Dharmakīrti] says: "trustworthiness is a cognition of telic function." This means that one has a cognition of the accomplishing of the aim \( \text{artha} \) that is to be accomplished by the object \( \text{artha} \) that is determined through the instrumental cognition.

As Devendrabuddhi goes on to explain, the context here is one of action: one acts on the basis of an initial cognition, i.e., the instrumental cognition, and one obtains the desired result: a cognition of the accomplishment of the desired goal by the object of that instrumental cognition. As we shall see in greater detail below, Devendrabuddhi is at points obliged to abandon this model. Nevertheless, in many instances, the fact that an initial cognition results in a cognition of the accomplishment of one’s goal by that object is precisely what makes that initial cognition instrumental. In other words, the subsequent cognition in which appears the desired telic function (i.e., the accomplishment of one’s goal) confirms the trustworthiness of the initial awareness. As such, it confirms the fact that the instrumental cognition is “what causes one to obtain” \( \text{prāpaka} \) an object that accomplishes one’s goal.

The confirmation-model and related claims about trustworthiness lead Devendrabuddhi into a series of problems and attempted solutions. We will now consider a few of these, first by examining two general issues, and then by turning to problems that arise in the specific contexts of perception and inference. Although many of these problems and solutions resurface in the works of subsequent Buddhist commentators, I will restrict myself to occasional reference only to the sub-commentary of Śākyabuddhi.

Devendrabuddhi points to two issues that cause trouble for the definition of instrumentality in relation to the attainment of a human aim. The first of these is a disparity in time, that is, a problematic lag in time; the second concerns the possibility that activity initiated by an instrumental cognition might be obstructed.

**A Disparity in Time**

In our discussion of ontology we remarked upon the connection between momentariness and causal efficiency in Dharmakīrti’s theory of the particular. To reiterate, Dharmakīrti maintains that particulars are momentary because: 1) particulars necessarily have the minimal effect of
producing a cognition of themselves; 2) only entities that change may produce effects; and 3) by its nature, an entity that changes must always be changing; otherwise, that entity would never change. To this we should add the observation that, when one is in pursuit of a human aim, one is interested specifically in particulars, for only particulars are causally efficient; hence, only they can be employed to accomplish one’s aim.\textsuperscript{103}

Thus, in the context of instrumentality in terms of a human aim, one seeks to act in regard to momentary particulars, and the trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition is that it makes one obtain the telic function of the expected or required particulars. The problem, however, is that in the case of perception, since the object (grāhya) of perception is the particular(s) that caused it, the object of perception has ceased at the time that the perception occurs. The same applies to inference, inasmuch as the indirect objects of inferences are also particulars.\textsuperscript{104} Thus, the crux of the problem is that these instrumental cognitions—perception and inference—are meant to be instrumental for a human aim because they take as their direct or indirect objects particulars that are capable of the necessary telic functions. But precisely because those particulars can function in a causally efficient manner, they have necessarily ceased to exist by the time one has acted upon them.

For Devendrabuddhi, this problem of a time-lag is most acute in the context of the confirmation-model: when one acts upon some initial cognition, the instrumentality of that cognition consists of its resulting in a cognition in which appears the required telic function (arthakriyānirbhāsa), i.e., one in which appears the accomplishment of one’s aim. As noted previously, the subsequent, confirming cognition would be the sensation of warmth, for example, that one has when, having seen a fire from a distance, one draws near to it. On Devendrabuddhi’s view, this type of subsequent cognition is particularly important, for he claims that it establishes the trustworthiness of the first. Although we will return to this notion of confirmation below, the following passage offers a clear summary of Devendrabuddhi’s position:

For one who acts through being prompted to act by a faulty cognition that apprehends something that is not fire as fire, a subsequent awareness that has as its object burning and cooking does not arise. That awareness does not arise because an awareness in which the expected telic function appears is based on a real thing. If that subsequent awareness does arise, then the former can only be trustworthy because: 1) one obtains a telic function in accord with one’s expectations and because 2) the cause of just that kind of awareness of telic function is a real thing. Therefore, if the latter has a real thing as its object, then the former is trustworthy with regard to it.\textsuperscript{105}
This approach to trustworthiness involves two cognitions: an initial instrumental cognition, and a subsequent cognition, which is also instrumental. In that latter cognition appears the telic function (such as producing heat) of the object (such as a fire) apprehended by the initial instrumental cognition. As such the latter cognition confirms—or even constitutes—the trustworthiness of the initial instrumental cognition.

With this context in mind, Devendrabuddhi describes the time-lag problem as follows:

Someone objects: “The latter instrumental cognition in which appears the telic function of the object apprehended by the former awareness does not cognize the object (arthā) that was apprehended by the former. If that is the case, how can it have as its object the telic function of an object apprehended by that former awareness such that the former awareness is an instrumental cognition because it does not deceive one about that telic function?”

Devendrabuddhi answers:

This is not a problem. Beings engaged in practical action (vyāvahār̥ta) act on those two objects without differentiating them. Hence, in accord with such practical action (vyāvahāra), we say that beings act on objects that occur in temporal sequence as if those objects were a single thing. In reality (dngos su = vastutah), the former and latter objects are distinct. However, the real thing that is the object of the latter instrumental cognition would not exist if the object of the former instrumental cognition had not been existent. Hence, we metaphorically say that the latter cognition has as its object just that object of the former cognition. Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was established prior to the cognition in which its telic function appeared, that initial cognition is instrumental because through it the latter cognition engages with the telic function (arthakriyā).

Devendrabuddhi’s answer to the time-lag problem does not deny that such a lag exists: in reality, the object of the instrumental cognition on the basis of which one initially acts is not the object whose telic function one experiences as the fruition of one’s action. Nevertheless, when beings act to obtain some human aim, they believe that the former and latter objects are the same, and beings thus behave accordingly. The crucial outcome of this answer is that, if the trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition is in at least some cases constituted by this model involving confirmation by a subsequent cognition, then the determination of an instrumental cognition’s trustworthiness is in fact based upon an error, namely, the false
belief that the object of the instrumental cognition and the object of its confirming cognition are identical. That Devendrabuddhi is willing to accept this notion suggests that, at least in the context of a human aim, trustworthiness concerns the results of actions initiated by instrumental cognitions, and not the exact, isomorphic correspondence of a cognition to reality. We shall see that this way of understanding trustworthiness in terms of its results—rather than correspondence—is also applicable to inference.

**Obstructed Action**

In addition to the aforementioned difficulty involving time, a second general problem persists with the notion of instrumentality in terms of a human aim, and it concerns the identification of an instrumental cognition as “that which makes one obtain” that aim (artha) by virtue of obtaining an object (artha) that accomplishes it. This issue is broached when Devendrabuddhi notes, “Since an instrumental cognition is this or that cognition whose trustworthiness has been ascertained, doubtful cognitions and such are not instrumental.” In response, one may ask:

“But since a person may be obstructed in his activity, even an instrumental cognition may not be trustworthy, and it therefore would not be instrumental.”

The objector here believes that, on Dharmakīrti’s view, what distinguishes an instrumental cognition from a doubtful cognition is that the former necessarily leads one to an object that can accomplish one’s goal; in contrast, an instance of doubt might lead one to that object, but it will not necessarily do so. Devendrabuddhi responds:

That trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition does not consist of the fact that one definitely obtains the desired object (artha) through that instrumental cognition. Instead, it consists of the fact that one obtains only the desired object through that instrumental cognition. When one acts, the instrumental cognition is what makes one obtain the object. Thus, an instrumental cognition’s instrumentality consists of its capacity to make one obtain the desired object, and not that it does make one obtain it. Since just that capacity is said to be the trustworthiness of the instrumental cognition, there is no problem concerning obstructed action.

As the Tibetan translation of Śākyabuddhi’s commentary suggests, this argument amounts to a placement of the Sanskrit restrictive particle eva in the phrase abhimatārthasya prāpanam, “obtainment of the intended aim.” The opponent would have us understand this phrase as abhimatārthasya
prāpañam eva, “only the obtainment [and not the non-obtainment] of the intended arthā,” where arthā may be construed as either “aim” or “object.”113 In short, if an instrumental cognition’s trustworthiness consists of the fact that it leads us to the obtainment of the intended object or aim, and if that means that an instrumental cognition leads only (eva) to the obtainment, then in cases where one’s actions are obstructed, the instrumental cognition in question would no longer be instrumental. In the context of seeking to slake my thirst, if I have correctly identified fresh water from a distance and yet my attempt to reach it fails, that perception would not be instrumental because I have failed to obtain my aim.

Devendrabuddhi’s above-cited answer is to place the restriction not upon the obtainment, but upon the object. From an instrumental cognition there is thus abhimatārthasy aīva prāpañam, “the obtainment of only the intended arthā [and not something else].” If I act on the basis of an instrumental cognition, and if my actions are not obstructed, I will obtain only the result that I expect: if my perception of fresh water was an instrumental cognition, then the object I obtain will slake my thirst. The point here is to distinguish the instrumental cognition from a doubtful cognition, for even if such a cognition may lead me to what I expect in some cases, in other cases it will not do so: in some cases a doubtful perception might lead me to water, but in other cases I will find only the hot sand of a mirage. In short, what distinguishes an instrumental cognition is not that it necessarily leads one to the result, but rather that it has the capacity to lead one to that result if all other conditions are in place.

An important outcome of the definition of instrumentality in terms of capacity is that it amounts to a rejection of Devendrabuddhi’s earlier “confirmation-model” of trustworthiness in the context of a human aim. To reiterate, the confirmation-model is: with some goal in mind, one has an instrumental cognition of an object that has the capacity to fulfill that goal; one implements the means to obtain that object, and one then has a cognition of the fulfillment of one’s goal. On this model, the trustworthiness of that initial instrumental cognition consists of the fact that it leads to another instrumental cognition whose content is the desired telic function, i.e., the achievement of one’s goal. But if trustworthiness is redefined in terms of capacity, then the production of that subsequent, confirming cognition is irrelevant to trustworthiness.

Why does Devendrabuddhi find himself in such a muddle? Certainly, part of what explains this tension is simply that Devendrabuddhi has backed himself into the corner. Devendrabuddhi’s redefinition of an instrumental cognition in terms just of the capacity to result in the achievement of one’s goal comes after his initial presentation of the confirmation-model, and it strikes me as an attempt to avoid a claim made in that context: namely, that a trustworthy cognition actually does lead one to accomplish one’s aim.114 But although the move to mere capacity is a tactical retreat in his argument, for our purposes it serves to highlight another, implicit aspect of
Devendrabuddhi’s account: namely, the bipartite notion of extrinsic and intrinsic instrumentality. To see how this is the case, let us now turn to Devendrabuddhi’s discussion of the confirmation of the instrumentality of perception.

Perception and Confirmation

In his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s presentation of instrumentality in PV2.1–6, Devendrabuddhi devotes considerable effort to the analysis of perception, probably because the issues surrounding perception prove the most problematic. One major difficulty is accounting for the observed dubiety of perception—the fact that we cannot always determine what it is that we are sensing—and the consequent need for confirmation. This issue begins with a passage that we have already cited:

Something is trustworthy if it does not deceive people. This includes both perception and inference, both of which are what cause one to obtain (prāpaka) the desired object (artha). To comment on that, [Dharmakīrti] says: “trustworthiness is a cognition of telic function.” This means that one has a cognition of the accomplishing of one’s aim by the object (artha) that one has definitively determined through the instrumental cognition.

As we have noted, Devendrabuddhi here presents a notion of trustworthiness (and hence, of an instrumental cognition) that falls within the context of a human aim. This becomes clear when, immediately after the above statement, Devendrabuddhi clarifies his point in a passage that concerns actions that are initially motivated by perceptions:

For example, for the person who, having cognized a fire through perception, then acts (‘jug pa) on fire’s capacity to burn, cook and so on, there is the activation of a perception whose object is the sensation of warmth and such. Or, for example, on certain occasions there might be a cognitive error due to something which has a form similar to fire and so on; at that time, there is for that person the activation of an inference through smoke which definitively determines the fire. [Depending on the context, one of these two—the engagement of a subsequent perception or inference—confirms] the trustworthiness of a perception. Because various causes of error are possible in the case only of perception, it is known to be instrumental through the activation of a subsequent instrumental cognition that has as its object that thing’s (artha) telic function.

In this passage, Devendrabuddhi speaks of two cases involving action that is
motivated by an initial perception that requires confirmation. In the first case, an initial perception of an object capable of the desired telic function motivates one to act toward that object. For example, one perceives what one believes to be a fire, and intent upon obtaining heat, one walks toward that fire. In this first case, that action results in the activation (pravṛtti) of a perception whose content is the desired telic function: one experiences heat. In the second case, one is also prompted to act by a perception, but one’s action results in a perception that is not definitive: perhaps one only draws close enough to perceive a color that might be a fire, but might also be a brilliant clump of flowers. On the view of Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi, in this second case the perception following upon the action is unable to produce an immediately subsequent definitive determination or correct perceptual judgment (pratyaksaprśṭhalabdhaniscaya) of the object as having the desired telic function. In this latter case, the initial perception must be confirmed by an inference.

The key here is that, regardless of whether the initial, motivating perception is confirmed by a subsequent perception or a subsequent inference, that initial perception cannot in and of itself guarantee that one will attain one’s goal. In short, that initial perception does not enable one to determine whether the content of that perception is something (such as fire) capable of the desired telic function (such as heat). Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that Devendrabuddhi does not wish to claim that such a perception cannot be instrumental. Instead, according to Devendrabuddhi and the sub-commentator Śākyabuddhi, when one acts on the basis of such a perception and one then attains an object with the desired or expected telic function, that initial perception was instrumental; one was simply unable to determine the instrumentality of that perception at the time of the perception.

To account for these cases and preserve the instrumentality of such perceptions, Devendrabuddhi proposes that instrumentality in this context be confirmed by a subsequent instrumental cognition—specifically, an instrumental cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one’s goal, or more simply translated, one in which the desired telic function appears. As noted just above, that subsequent instrumental cognition will be either another perception (such as the sensation of the fire’s warmth) or an inference (such as the inferential cognition of the fire from its smoke). If one acts and one has an instrumental cognition in which the desired telic function appears, then the initial perception that prompted action was instrumental. On the other hand, if one experiences no such confirming cognition—whether perceptual or inferential—then one cannot claim that the initial perception was instrumental.

One key point here is that, if the instrumentality of that initial perception is to be confirmed by a subsequent perception, that subsequent perception must itself not require further confirmation; otherwise, one
would fall into an infinite regress. One cannot wonder, for example, whether one is feeling warmth from the fire or simply experiencing hot flashes. This distinction between a perception that requires confirmation and one that does not require confirmation is recognized by Devendrabuddhi, but Śākyabuddhi renders it more explicit. Śākyabuddhi first focuses upon this distinction by noting that Devendrabuddhi’s argument concerning confirmation implies that, in at least some cases, activity is prompted not by an unconfirmed perception, but by one that is self-confirming. Śākyabuddhi remarks:

Activity that is based on perception is twofold: initial and habitual. One has clear and habitual perception of those things to which one is habituated. When that perception arises, it arises determining its image in accord with one’s habituation in a manner that avoids all causes for error. And that awareness produces a subsequent verifying awareness of that kind; hence, the person acts on that object. Therefore, in that case the awareness itself determines its own instrumentality. Since it does not depend on the activity of some subsequent instrumental cognition, it is not inappropriate to say, “determines the object. …” It is not the case that all perceptions are determined to be instrumental through something else. In the case of acting due to an initial perception [i.e., one which does not involve habituation], if one has not definitively apprehended the object’s identity (rayu mtshan ≈ nimitta), one acts out of doubt.

Śākyabuddhi’s point here is that not all actions based upon perceptions are tentative, for in some cases one’s action is “habitual” (abhyāsavati), in the sense that the one has undergone “habituation” or “conditioning” (abhyāsa). In such cases, one’s perception is able to “determine its image,” which means that the perception itself is capable of directly producing a subsequent correct judgment that can guide one’s action. Someone might, for example, become sufficiently familiar with the fire-like flower that she can easily distinguish fires from a clump of such flowers, and she is thus able to determine without hesitation that the entity on the far side of the field is indeed a fire.

Śākyabuddhi later goes on to specify that this distinction amounts to one between perceptions that have intrinsic instrumentality (svataḥ prāmāṇyam) and extrinsic instrumentality (parataḥ prāmāṇyam). He comments:

Hence, a perception whose object is capable of accomplishing an aim (artha), since it is devoid of any causes of error, is ascertained (yongs su bcad pa ≈ paricchinn) by reflexive awareness as being by nature instrumental. It produces a correct judgment of that
object in accord with the way that it was ascertained. Hence, it is intrinsically instrumental, and therefore, there is no infinite regress.\textsuperscript{128}

Śākyabuddhi’s argument stems from a particular concern: namely, that no infinite regress ensue in Devendrabuddhi’s notion of confirmation. Clearly, part of his concern focuses upon confirmation through perception, since if a subsequent perception is to confirm an initial perception, that subsequent perception obviously must be self-confirming.

But Śākyabuddhi is also concerned with inference, such as the cognition of fire from smoke, where the cognition of the evidence (smoke) is a perception whose certainty could be called into question. While Dharmakīrti himself maintains that the evidence may be ascertained through inference,\textsuperscript{129} if no form of perception were self-confirming (i.e., intrinsically instrumental), then in no case could one ever establish one’s evidence through perception. That is, one could not appeal to one’s indubitable perception of smoke when inferring fire from smoke, for one could always ask, “How do you know that you are seeing smoke?” Śākyabuddhi apparently feels that this would lead to an insurmountable infinite regress in Dharmakīrti’s system, and his discussion of intrinsically instrumental perception is in part meant to prevent any such problem.\textsuperscript{130}

Having presented this notion of an intrinsically instrumental perception, Śākyabuddhi goes on to contrast it with one that is extrinsically instrumental. Citing what appears to be the case of confusing the shimmer of a distant fire for a pool of water, he continues the passage just cited:

One might not, however, be habituated to an initial awareness with the appearance of fire or water; in that case, that awareness does not have the capacity to produce a definitive determination because, even though that fire or water has been apprehended by an independent (rang rgyud \( \approx \) svatantra) instrumental cognition, there are causes that induce errors [which prevent such a definitive determination]. In that case, that initial awareness is established to be instrumental by the engagement of a subsequent instrumental cognition. Hence, it is extrinsically instrumental. However, if one has an awareness that involves habituation and clarity, then its instrumentality is determined from itself (rang las \( \approx \) svatāḥ), as was explained above.\textsuperscript{131} In this way, it remains the case that perception is instrumental in some cases intrinsically and in some cases extrinsically....\textsuperscript{132}

What is it that distinguishes an intrinsically instrumental perception from one that is extrinsically instrumental? It is the capacity to produce—without any additional conditions—a definitive determination of the object in question. Śākyabuddhi does not go beyond Devendrabuddhi’s specific
[A perception] ... is asserted to be instrumental concerning that objective aspect (bzung ba’i mam pa = grāhyākāra) with regard to which it produces a definitive determination because it causes action toward that aspect. It is not instrumental with regard to any other aspect. Even though there is no difference in terms of being experienced, there is the definitive determination of that aspect for which there are the causes of definitive determination, such as interest, habituation, context and so on. What requires the mediation of other conditions is not determined.\footnote{133}

Although Devendrabuddhi is here discussing the more particular case of determining the instrumentality of an awareness from reflexive awareness, Śākyabuddhi understands this observation to be more generally applicable: a perception is instrumental specifically with regard to that aspect of its object for which it can produce a specific kind of correct perceptual judgment, namely, an immediately subsequent definitive determination (pratyakṣapṛśthahalabdhaniścaya).

We have already discussed the notion of definitive determination (niścaya): in the context of perception, it is the conceptual cognition following upon a perception that interprets the content of that perception, which is necessarily nonconceptual and thus indeterminate. According to Dharmakīrti, a perception may be capable of generating a subsequent definitive determination of some aspects of its object, but not of all aspects. One might, for example, be able to determine that one is seeing a water-jug, but one may not be able to determine, on the basis of that perception alone, that the water-jug is momentary (kṣanika). As noted earlier and as Devendrabuddhi remarks here, whether one determines one or another aspect of an object depends upon numerous factors, including the perceptual acuity of the perceiver.\footnote{134}

Drawing out the implications of Dharmakīrti’s theory of definitive determination, Devendrabuddhi applies it to the instrumentality of perception in the aforementioned fashion. And expanding on Devendrabuddhi’s analysis, Śākyabuddhi applies the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction: for a person who is seeking warmth, for example, a perception of fire that is intrinsically instrumental is one that can produce an immediately subsequent definitive determination of its object as “fire” or as a “heat source,” and so on. A perception that is extrinsically instrumental cannot do so, and if its instrumentality is to be determined, one must depend upon confirmation by some later instrumental cognition.

And what of inference? Is it too sometimes instrumental intrinsically, and sometimes extrinsically? Continuing a passage that we cited earlier,\footnote{135} Devendrabuddhi notes:
Because various causes of error in the case only of perception are possible, it is [sometimes] known to be instrumental through the activation of a subsequent instrumental cognition that has as its object that thing’s (artha) telic function; this is not the case with inference. That is, a property-svabhāva used as an inferential sign and an effect used as an inferential sign are restricted to being the property-svabhāva of the real thing in question and the effect of the real thing in question, respectively, and only they [i.e., a property-svabhāva and an effect] are the causes for the respective sign-awareness. Hence, if that kind of thing [i.e., a property-svabhāva or effect] is absent, there is no inference. Therefore, inference does not rely on the engagement of a subsequent instrumental cognition.¹³⁶

Unlike perception, inference is always intrinsically instrumental, and its instrumentality stems directly from the svabhāvapratiṃbandha, the invariable relation between the evidence and the predicate to be proven (sādhya). The svabhāvapratiṃbandha guarantees the presence of a predicate with a specific kind of nature, precisely because, if the predicate (or the subject that possesses that predicate) did not have that nature, the evidence could not have the nature that it is determined to have. Smoke, for example, can have the nature of smoke only if it has been produced by fire; a maple can be a maple only if it is a tree.¹³⁷ Thus, the dubiety that is possible in perception can never apply to inference, for if an inference is well-formed, it is indubitable.

To close this section, let us now see how this bipartite approach to instrumentality—as intrinsic and extrinsic—relates to the “muddle” that closed the previous section. There, we noted that Devendrabuddhi begins by claiming that, in the context of a mediated instrumental effect, an instrumental cognition is “what makes one obtain” (prāpaka) an object with the desired telic function, and that the fact of obtaining such an object constitutes the instrumental cognition’s trustworthiness. But toward the end of his argument he must account for the possibility of obstructed action, and he is thus obliged to redefine instrumentality simply in terms of an instrumental cognition’s capacity to make one obtain one’s goal (i.e., an object with the desired telic function).

We can see this tension between actual and potential obtainment of one’s aim as parallel to the division between extrinsic and intrinsic instrumentality. Specifically, for an extrinsically instrumental perception to be known as instrumental, it must actually lead to the accomplishment of one’s aim, where this is defined as a cognition in which appears the desired telic function. This is so because when a cognition’s instrumentality is extrinsic, it requires confirmation by a subsequent instrumental cognition whose content is the desired telic function, which is the same as saying that the confirmation requires that one actually obtain one’s aim.
In contrast to the case of extrinsic instrumentality, a cognition whose instrumentality is intrinsic requires no subsequent confirmation, and this amounts to the claim that the cognition is instrumental even if one’s aim is not actually obtained. This notion corresponds to the characterization of instrumentality as the cognition’s capacity to make one obtain one’s aim (i.e., its capacity to lead one to a cognition of an object with the desired telic function). If one understands the term “capacity” (śakti) to include cases where the goal is actually realized, one can interpret such a cognition as the trivial case of a cognition that contains the appearance of the desired telic function (arthakriyānirbhāsa), since that appearance is equivalent to the obtainment of one’s aim. But more interestingly, such a cognition can also be understood as one that, even though it does not directly contain an appearance of the desired telic function, nevertheless is indubitable about its object’s capacity for that telic function. Although Śākyabuddhi points out that some cases of perception fall into this category, Devendrabuddhi places particular stress upon inference as intrinsically instrumental. For as we have seen, a well-formed inference must be based upon a svabhāvapratibandha pertaining between evidence and predicate. Since that relation guarantees that the entity inferred has a certain type of nature, it likewise guarantees that that entity is capable of specific telic functions; this so because telic function rests upon an entity’s causal characteristics, and “nature” (svabhāva) is a way of referring to the totality of those characteristics.

There are, however, certain problems with the instrumentality of inference, but before we consider them, let us examine one more topic under the rubric of perception: namely, the notion of perception as motivating action.
We have already mentioned the notion of the correct perceptual judgment that Dharmakīrti calls a “subsequent definitive determination immediately following upon a perception” (pratyakṣaprasthālabdhaniścaya). A key question, however, has yet to be raised: why is this theory introduced? The answer lies in a tension within Dharmakīrti’s philosophy: on the one hand, perception is necessarily nonconceptual, which is to say that it is indeterminate: it cannot determine its object as being “fire” or “water” or any other entity. Dharmakīrti shows no willingness to relinquish this point, and on my view, he is in part motivated by a concern that I have cast as “axiological.” Although Dharmakīrti does not put the problem in this fashion, if perception were determinate, then universals would be ultimately real because universals would be the content of determinate perception, and perception apprehends what is ultimately existent. And if universals were real, then the arguments employed to refute them would be incorrect. These same arguments are employed against the self (ātman), a distributed entity that can be considered a special case of a universal. Hence, if the arguments against universals are incorrect, the arguments against the self are incorrect. Thus, since Dharmakīrti’s soteriology rests finally upon the negation of the self, his soteriology would be contradicted by the introduction of determinate perception.

On the other hand, if perception is to initiate one’s actions toward the accomplishment of a human aim, then it should be determinate: if one has not identified some object as “fire,” why would one seek its warmth? At issue here is the notion that part of what constitutes the instrumentality of a cognition in the context of human aims is that it is a “motivator” (pravartaka) of action. As noted earlier, the notion of “action” (pravṛtti) here is the secondary sense applied to that term by Devendrabuddhi when he addresses Dharmakīrti’s claim that “awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one’s action toward an entity that one wishes to obtain or avoid” (= PV2.3b–d). It is clear that Dharmakīrti himself is concerned with the argument that perception, as indeterminate, could not be instrumental because it could not motivate action. In his Pramāṇaviniścaya, he raises the problem with an objector’s voice:

“Well, now how can there be practical action (vyavahāra) from direct awareness, whose nature is not that of a definitive determination? One could not engage in practical action because one acts in order to obtain things that cause happiness and avoid things that cause suffering only when one has made the definitive determination ‘This is [a thing that causes happiness, etc.]’.”

To resolve this problem, Dharmakīrti must find a way to introduce a kind of determinacy into perception without actually claiming that perception is
determinate. He does so with the following response:

This poses no problem, since just when one sees the object, there occurs a mnemonic awareness that arises due to that perceptual awareness. Due to that mnemonic awareness, practical action occurs because of one’s desire [to avoid or obtain some aim].\(^{141}\) \([\text{PVin:1.18}]\)

Although direct awareness is the bare perception (lta ba tsam = drṣṭimātra) of an object, just when one sees the object, there occurs a mnemonic awareness—i.e., one that is immediately following that experience—and due to that awareness, purposeful action occurs with regard to what one has seen as being what is desired or what is not desired.\(^{142}\)

The introduction of the theory of definitive determination allows Dharmakīrti to attribute what might be called a clandestine determinacy to perception without actually claiming that perception is itself determinate. In doing so, he can salvage the claim that, in terms of obtaining a human aim, perception is instrumental because it is a motivator of actions oriented toward such aims.\(^{143}\)

Nevertheless, while introducing the notion of a subsequent definitive determination may solve some problems, it creates others. Consider specifically what we know from our previous discussion about an instrumental cognition (pramāṇa): in brief, it is a trustworthy awareness, where trustworthiness in the context of a human aim means that it enables one to obtain an object that accomplishes one’s aim. This way of characterizing an instrumental cognition can be reduced to one claim, namely, that it is “what makes one obtain one’s aim” (prāpaka). And to do so, it must also be “what motivates action” (pravartaka); otherwise, the question of obtaining an aim would be moot.

Since Dharmakīrti maintains that only perception and inference are instrumental, he would have the description we have just given apply to those two types of cognitions, and only those two. We might grant that the description does indeed apply to perception and inference, but if no further specifications are made, a third type of cognition will also satisfy this description. Devendrabuddhi describes the problem in an objection:

“You say that an instrumental cognition is that which is trustworthy with regard to the telic function when one acts having become aware of the instrumental object through that instrument. If that is so, then consider the case where one acts upon a water-jug through the conceptual awareness of a water-jug; when one does so that conceptual awareness is also trustworthy with regard to the telic function of acting in that fashion. Hence, that conceptual awareness would also be instrumental, but you do not accept that it is. Therefore, the
definition of instrumentality is faulty.”

This objection is clearly tied to one raised by Dharmakīrti himself:

\[PV2.5d–6a:] “The knowledge of a universal that follows the [perceptual] cognition of an object in itself (svarūpa) would be instrumental.”

The major problem here is definitive determination itself. That is, following upon a habituated perception of a water-jug, in the proper context one will have the definitive determination, “This is a water-jug.” Since that perception leads to such a determination, it is considered instrumental. That is, in the case where one seeks the function(s) that a water-jug performs, that perception can (indirectly) prompt one to act in such a fashion that one will definitely obtain what one seeks, provided that nothing hinders one’s actions. But clearly, the same is true of that definitive determination itself: it can effectively prompt a person who seeks a water-jug to act in such a fashion that, provided there are no obstructions, she will definitely obtain the water-jug. In short, it is both “what makes one obtain one’s aim” (prāpaka) and “what prompts (or guides) action” (pravartaka).

We have already seen that Dharmakīrti is unwilling to admit such cognitions as instrumental, in part because that admission would lead him down a slippery slope to determinate perception and, hence, the ultimate reality of universals. Thus, he must add some further specification that will disallow the instrumentality of definitive determinations. In a reference to Dignāga’s work, he does so by maintaining that such cognitions are “conventional” in that they are “apprehending what has already been apprehended” (grhītāgrahāṇa); as such, they are not instrumental. Devendrabuddhi, citing Dharmakīrti’s response, offers these comments:

[The aforementioned objection]...is not a problem. Since conventional cognition apprehends that which has already been apprehended, we do not claim that it is instrumental. [PV2.3a–b1]

That is, conventional awarenesses that have objects such as a water-jug, existenthood, number and upward movement are not claimed to be instrumental. Why? For the reason that they apprehend what has already been apprehended. Here [Dharmakīrti has said that] just the initial experience of an object is instrumental—it is what makes one act. The subsequent conceptual awareness that comes from it arises recalling that object as it was apprehended. Hence, it is not at all an awareness of a real thing that can accomplish a goal (artha). So how can it be what makes one act after one has known its object?
As is suggested by Devendrabuddhi’s comment, part of the concern here is that these cognitions’ content, being universals such as “water-jug-ness” (ghaṭatva) or other hypostasized entities such as number (saṃkhya) or movement (karman), would be de facto ultimately real by virtue of their appearance in a perceptual judgment, if that judgment were construed as part of the perception itself. In proposing that these cognitions are “apprehending what has been apprehended,” Dharmakīrti means—at least in part—that these cognitions have undergone a conceptualization process whereby the initial, indeterminate content of perception is falsely interpreted. Even in the absence of any explicit statement to this effect, we can thus hear an implicit claim in this argument: namely, that since conceptualization always involves error or distortion (bhrānti), a conceptual cognition cannot be considered instrumental if one does not demonstrate how that error has been overcome.

Devendrabuddhi, however, largely avoids this tack and instead turns the argument to a more specific description of what it means for an instrumental cognition to be “what prompts action” (pravartaka). As noted above, within the context of a human aim, a cognition’s instrumentality is in part constituted by the fact that, by virtue of prompting one’s action toward some aim, it is an instrument for the accomplishment of that aim. Alluding to Dharmakīrti’s Hetubindu, Devendrabuddhi here adds the specification that only the initial experience (ādyadarśana) can be what prompts action. Thus, since a definitive determination is following upon such an initial experience, it cannot be instrumental in the context of obtaining a human aim because it does not initially prompt one’s action toward that aim.

With this argument, Dharmakīrti (as interpreted by Devendrabuddhi) may employ the theory of definitive determination to account for the determination necessary for perception to be instrumental while denying that a definitive determination is instrumental. But although these two problems may thus be solved, the solutions have created a third problem. Specifically, by requiring that an instrumental cognition must pass the test of not being what apprehends the already apprehended, Dharmakīrti has apparently eliminated a whole class of inferences from consideration as instrumental, even though he clearly must admit that those inferences are instrumental.

To understand the class of inferences in question, we must recall that, according to Dharmakīrti’s theory of definitive determination, one has a determination immediately following a perception only of that property-svabhāva of the perceived object for which the proper conditions are in place. Since neither Dharmakīrti nor his commentators offer us systematic terminology to refer to this type of property-svabhāva, let us coin our own term and call it a “perceptually determinable property-svabhāva.” In short, a perceptually determinable property-svabhāva is one for which the perception in question is capable of producing an immediately subsequent
definitive determination in the mind of the perceiver because all the conditions for producing such a determination are present.

In contrast to such cases where the perception is capable of inducing such a definitive determination, in some cases the proper conditions are not in place, and therefore the perceiver will not have an immediately subsequent definitive determination of the property-\textit{svabhāva} in question. We will call this type of property-\textit{svabhāva} a “perceptually indeterminable property-\textit{svabhāva}.” This is a property-\textit{svabhāva} for which the perception in question is not capable of producing an immediately subsequent definitive determination in the mind of the perceiver because one or more of the conditions for producing such a determination are absent.

Let us now make some further specifications concerning the types of conditions that are required for the production of a definitive determination immediately following a perception. As noted earlier, some of the required conditions can be considered contextual. The perceiver must, for example, find himself in the appropriate context (\textit{prakaraṇa})—one formed by interests and expectations—in order to have a determination of the aspect in question.\footnote{Thus, in some contexts—as when the perceiver is thirsty—the perceiver may have the determination, “This is a water-jug,” while the same perceiver may not have that determination in some other contexts, as when he is not thirsty. But other conditions are embedded in a wider, more stable context, in that they depend primarily upon the perceptual capabilities of the perceiver’s mind. For example, Dharmakīrti maintains that if a “dim-witted” (\textit{mandabuddhi}) person sees an object existing in a homologous continuum (i.e., not actually disintegrating at a gross level), then that perception cannot directly induce the determination that that object is impermanent. Thus, when such a person perceives an intact water-jug, that perception cannot ever induce an immediately subsequent definitive determination of that water-jug’s momentariness as long as that person is “dim-witted.” With this in mind, we can make the specification that this type of property-\textit{svabhāva} is perceptually indeterminable \textit{in principle for such a person}.}$}\footnote{Although he is not explicit on this point, Dharmakīrti’s reference to “dimwitted persons” appears to be an allusion to a typical division between “ordinary persons” (\textit{pṛthagjana}), whose perceptions are relatively limited by their weak mental capabilities, in contrast to “adepts” (\textit{yogins}), whose perceptions enable them to directly perceive objects that are inaccessible to ordinary persons. This allusion becomes especially clear when, in one of the passages where this issue is discussed, Dharmakīrti contrasts the dim-witted with “those of great intellect” (\textit{mahādhi}).\footnote{Śākyabuddhi identifies these latter as those “who see what is beyond the senses” (\textit{aṇindiryadarśin}), a typical epithet for \textit{yogins} and especially buddhas.} More specifically, in this context they are those whose perceptions are capable of inducing a definitive determination of \textit{any} aspect of an object that they perceive.}\footnote{More specifically, in this context they are those whose perceptions are capable of inducing a definitive determination of \textit{any} aspect of an object that they perceive.}
Assuming that the distinction between ordinary persons and yogins is indeed operative here, we can apply the notion of a property-svabhāva that is perceptually indeterminable in principle to a soteriological context. That is, on Dharmakīrti’s view, what makes the extreme perceptual acuity of yogins valuable is not their ability to see long distances, but rather their ability to have a certain type of instrumental cognition: namely, a direct, nonconceptual experience of the sixteen aspects of the Nobles’ Four Truths. These aspects include property-svabhāvas such as emptiness and momentariness that ordinary persons are unable to determine without recourse to inference. As we have just seen, Dharmakīrti maintains that yogins have perceptions that are capable of immediately producing definitive determinations of these and any other property-svabhāvas of a perceived subject (dharmin) without recourse to inference, and this is probably part of what Dharmakīrti means in his discussion of the “yogic perception” (yogipratyakṣa). The way a yogin attains that exalted state, however, is precisely that, as an ordinary person, she focused in meditation upon a concept—i.e., one of the sixteen aspects—until she attained a direct, nonconceptual experience of that content. The key, however, is that in order for that meditative experience to be instrumental, it must be trustworthy, which means that the original conceptual cognition from which it is derived must itself be indubitable. Since the only conceptual cognition that is guaranteed to be indubitable is an inference, this means that Dharmakīrti’s soteriology ultimately rests upon the use of certain types of inferences that enable ordinary persons to develop trustworthy concepts that, when meditated upon, will lead to the direct experiences that are sought on the Buddhist path. That is, beginning from a state in which one has no perceptions of the entities in question, one uses such inferences to develop an initial, unhabituated perception. Finally, through repeated practice, one develops a fully habituated perception, whereupon the inferences are no longer needed. In this way, certain inferences are crucial to the Buddhist soteriological project, but many such inferences are endangered by the principle of “apprehending what has been apprehended” (gṛhitagrahaṇa).

With this in mind, let us note four characteristics of these endangered inferences. First, the subject (dharmin) is perceived by the perceiver. Second, both the predicate to be proven (sādhyadharma) and the evidence are property-svabhāvas abstracted from that subject. Third, the property-svabhāva adduced as evidence is perceptually determinable for that perceiver. And fourth, the property-svabhāva to be proven is in principle perceptually indeterminable for that person. These all apply, for example, to the case where an ordinary person infers that a water-jug is momentary because it is produced: (1) she perceives the water-jug; (2) both momentariness and producthood (kṛtakatva) are property-svabhāvas of the water-jug; (3) she determines directly from perception that the water-jug is produced; and (4) as an ordinary person, she can never determine just from
perception that the water-jug is momentary.

The important point to recall here is that, on Dharmakīrti’s view, a perception apprehends all the aspects of its object, which is simply to say that an object contributes in its entirety to the production of a perception. This means that all the property-svabhāvas of an object have been apprehended (gṛhīta), even if one has no determinate cognition of them. Hence, it is clear that if a definitive determination immediately following a perception is not an instrumental cognition because it apprehends the already apprehended, then the instrumentality of this type of inference should also be rejected. The reason for this is that the water-jug has already been perceived; hence, even if the ordinary person did not determine from that initial perception that the water-jug is momentary, that property-svabhāva has de facto been apprehended by that initial perception. Thus, as with a definitive determination immediately following a perception, this type of inference should not be instrumental because it apprehends what has already been apprehended.

We have seen, however, that on our interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s soteriology, he is obliged to preserve the instrumentality of such inferences. Hence, he must specify some additional criterion that will show how those inferences do not involve the apprehension of what has already been apprehended (gṛhītagrahaṇa). Devendrabuddhi maintains that Dharmakīrti establishes this additional criterion by claiming that, since the property-svabhāva about which one is concerned is perceptually indeterminable in that case, instrumentality can still apply to that inference. As Dharmakīrti puts it, such inferences “illuminate what has not yet been known (ajñārāthapratkāśa) [= Def1.2]” in a case “when the particular has not been discerned” (avijñāte svalakṣāne) with respect to a property-svabhāva that is necessary for the fulfillment of one’s aim. In short, it is what has been called in recent times the “novelty” of the knowledge offered by such an inference that preserves its instrumentality.

Alluding to the case where one infers the impermanence of sound from the fact of being produced, Devendrabuddhi offers us the above interpretation with an objection and response:

Someone objects, “Inference would not be instrumental because it is an awareness of what has already been observed, as when one infers that impermanence is a property-svabhāva of sound.”

This is not so. Even though sound’s unique nature, which is excluded from all other things, has already been apprehended, the object of practical action (vyavahāra) can only be that aspect with regard to which that perception has produced a definitive determination and so on as its effect. Therefore, since it applies to that which has not been apprehended, inference is instrumental.
For Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti’s argument amounts to the claim that, if a perception cannot induce a definitive determination of a property-svabhāva with which one is concerned, then the object of that perception has not been “known” (jnāta) or “discerned” (vijñāta). It is still true that the property-svabhāva in question has already been apprehended (gṛhīta) in that it, being identical with the object itself, has contributed to the production of perception. Nevertheless, to borrow Śākyabuddhi’s phrase from a related context, it is as if that property-svabhāva had not been apprehended at all, since one can have no indubitable determinate knowledge of that property-svabhāva without relying upon inference.166

Thus, if we can combine Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation with what we know of Dharmakīrti’s soteriology, novelty plays a crucial role in Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality, for it preserves the instrumentality of a class of inferences that are central to his soteriology. This is certainly Devendrabuddhi’s opinion, and for him the overall definition of an instrumental cognition therefore has two aspects: first, an instrumental cognition is a trustworthy awareness; this warrants the claim that an instrumental cognition is “what makes one obtain” (prāpaka) one’s aim. And second, an instrumental cognition must “reveal what has not been known” (ajñāarthaprajñāsa); this warrants the claim that an instrumental cognition is what “motivates action” (pravartaka).

This way of defining an instrumental cognition later comes under attack, for subsequent commentators, probably including Śākyabuddhi, maintain that, since only novel cognitions are trustworthy, an explicit statement of novelty is not necessary. Without going into the details of such arguments, we need only note that such interpretations do not abandon the criterion of novelty; they simply subsume it under trustworthiness. The main motivation here is probably in response to Devendrabuddhi’s somewhat vague approach to trustworthiness: he is apparently willing to apply the term “trustworthy” (avisamvāda) to a definitive determination following on a perception, but he never explicitly states whether or not such an application would be legitimate. By eliminating any such application, Śākyabuddhi (who himself is somewhat vague on this point) and certainly later commentators forego the need to adjust the overextension of the term “trustworthy” as a description of any pramāṇa; instead, they simply maintain that what is trustworthy is necessarily novel in that it is a “motivator of action” (pravartaka).167 However, in contrast to Devendrabuddhi, these later interpretations obscure the likely motivations behind the various claims that Dharmakīrti makes. And since Devendrabuddhi’s argument draws upon other portions of Dharmakīrti’s work, his interpretation likewise suggests how Dharmakīrti’s presentation of instrumentality accords with other elements of his philosophy, most notably his theory of definitive determination (niścaya) as a means of reintroducing conceptuality into perception. For these reasons, and in view of its subsequent impact upon the commentarial tradition, Devendrabuddhi’s
interpretation strikes me as the most useful starting point for an interpretation of PV2.1–6. In any case, Devendrabuddhi’s work certainly helps to clarify the reasons for citing both trustworthiness and novelty as essential characteristics of any pramāṇa.¹⁶⁸

**Inference, Error, and Trustworthiness**

While the qualification of novelty preserves the instrumentality of certain forms of inference, other problems arise. These specifically focus on the fact that the objects of inference are unreal universals. As such, the objects of inference are incapable of any telic function, for since only ultimately real particulars can be causes or effects, only ultimately real particulars have telic function.¹⁶⁹

In their discussion of PV2.1–6, neither Devendrabuddhi nor Śākyabuddhi consider this issue at any length. Their comparative silence is probably due to the way they understand the overall argument of the Pramāṇavārttika—namely, that the entire preceding chapter (PV1) had already addressed these aspects of inference. Indeed, in the course of that chapter, Dharmakīrti returns repeatedly to a crucial question: if conceptual cognitions—including inferences—take unreal universals as their objects, why would anyone bother with them? After all, reasonable or “judicious” (preksāvant) persons seek to accomplish their goals, and to do so, they seek to obtain that which is capable of the desired telic functions. Why, therefore, would they concern themselves with cognitions whose actual content is incapable of any such functionality? Alluding to an answer, Dharmakīrti employs a provocative metaphor to formulate the problem in the following verses:

> Through distinguishing the propositions that the thing in question is “real” and that it is “unreal,” those who do not deny the utility of an expression’s meaning analyze the real thing itself, for the production of an effect depends upon that real thing. Why would those who seek the goal in question bother to analyze something that is incapable of accomplishing that goal? Why would a lustful woman bother to see whether a eunuch is beautiful or not?¹⁷⁰

Dharmakīrti adds his own comments:

> Whether an expression’s object (artha) is real or unreal, it can neither prevent nor accomplish a human aim (puruṣārtha) because that object does not actually exist in the way that it is imaginatively determined through the expression, and because the expression’s object is not intended in the way that it actually exists.¹⁷¹ Therefore, a person, when inquiring into the reality or
unreality (sadasat) of the thing in question, always ignores the conceptual appearance and takes as the focus of his inquiry just that real thing, such as fire, on which depends the accomplishment of the [desired] human aim, such as counteracting the cold. He does so because the expression’s object is not capable of that function, since even when one experiences the object of the expression, such as the concept “fire,” there is no experience of the accomplishment of that aim, such as counteracting cold. And it does not make sense for a person who seeks to accomplish some aim to exert himself toward something that is not capable of accomplishing it. Indeed, why would a sexually aroused woman strive to see whether a eunuch is beautiful or not?

Although Dharmakīrti offers the above comments in relation to linguistic (śābda) cognitions, his observation is equally applicable to all conceptual cognitions, including inference and definitive determination: one may infer, be told, or determine subsequent to a perception that a fire is present before one, but the universal “fire” that is the actual content of all such cognitions cannot accomplish one’s aims. In this passage, Dharmakīrti responds to the problem by only briefly noting that the conceptual appearance is “ignored” (avadhīrita). But this brevity is warranted, for he is simply alluding to his previous, lengthy presentation of the apoha-theory.

In our own treatment of apoha, we have seen that this act of “ignoring” the conceptual appearance qua construction is a cognitive error or distortion (bhrānti, viplava, etc.). In part, this involves what Tillemans has called an “unconscious error,” whereby the image is erroneously construed to be identical or “mixed” (samsṛṣṭa) with the individual (vyakti, vastu) in which it is alleged to be instantiated. This identification (ekī-vkt) of image and individual is in part an epistemological error, in that it concerns the manner in which the universal is apprehended. But the error in question also involves an ontological imputation: namely, that the universal is construed as distributed in space and time. The universal “cowness” (gotva), for example, is understood to somehow qualify all cows in all places at all times.

For Dharmakīrti, the ontological and epistemological error in conceptual cognitions does not render inferences incapable of guiding one to entities that have the desired telic functionality. In the previous chapter, we have already examined at length how this is possible: the svabhāvapratibandha between evidence and predicate guarantees that the former is invariably indicative (gamaka) of the latter. But it is likewise essential to note that, from the standpoint of actually employing inferences in practical contexts, the aforementioned error is indispensable. When one infers that that there is fire in the hearth by observing smoke pouring from the chimney, if one does not have the belief that the concept “fire” that is the object of this
inference somehow participates in the real (i.e., telically efficient) fire in
the hearth, one obviously will not go inside to warm oneself. In other
words, without construing the concept “fire” as “mixed” (saṃṛṣṭa) with the
actual fire, one will never be prompted to act upon the real fire. Likewise,
even if one construes “fire” as participating in that individual fire, if one
does not also believe that that fire is thereby the same (eka) by nature as all
fires (i.e., that it burns, cooks and so on), one will once again have no reason
to act on that individual fire. It is thus clear that both the epistemological
and ontological aspects of error (bhrānti) are psychologically indispensable
for one to employ inference effectively in pursuit of a human aim.

For Dharmakīrti, this problem expresses itself in the tension within the
claim that at least one form of instrumental cognition—namely, inference
—is at once erroneous and trustworthy. In fact, Dharmakīrti explicitly
states that even though the utility of such cognitions makes them
instrumental, they can nevertheless be characterized by “falsity”
(mithyātva). He comments:

> Although all conceptual cognitions such as inference are
> confused, we still define some as instrumental and some as
> spurious. We do so because we agree on the intended capacity or
> lack thereof for telic function. We do so until we are
> foundationally transformed. [The cognitions of selflessness and
> such] are false [because they proceed from the imputation of
> unreal universals]. Nevertheless, they are instrumental
cognitions because they are conducive to the pacification [of
> negative mental states]. An example is the practice of having
> the attitude that a being that is not one’s mother is one’s mother
> [in order to eliminate desire].

Despite the fundamental error in conceptuality, one can still speak of some
conceptual cognitions—specifically, inferences—as instrumental because
they are trustworthy in that they reliably enable us to achieve our goals,
such as the goal of pacifying one’s mind and attaining spiritual liberation.
But one admits their instrumentality until one attains “foundational
transformation,” which refers to the elimination of the form of ignorance
(avidyā) that underlies the errors in conceptual cognitions. This implies
that after foundational transformation, inferences are no longer
instrumental for that person. In short, Dharmakīrti appears to maintain
that, from at least some rarefied perspective, inferences are not ultimately
instrumental, for once a person has obtained the human aims for which
such cognitions are useful, why would one continue to admit the
instrumentality of such cognitions? Why would one continue to carry one’s
raft on one’s back?

*Ultimate and Conventional Pramāṇa*
The metaphor of the raft, to which we have just alluded, is a well-known trope found in the Alagaddūpama Sutta. The Buddha instructs his followers that “the Dhamma is similar to a raft, being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping.” That is, just as it would be pointless to carry a raft on one’s back after one has reached the far bank, so too it would be pointless to hold on to the Buddha’s teachings after one has reached the ultimate goal. Taken to its furthest point, this metaphor suggests that, while the Buddha’s teachings are true to his followers, they are not true to him. In this way, the metaphor apparently points to the pragmatism of the Buddha’s teachings: they are only to be accepted in relation to a goal, and once that goal has reached, the pragmatic truth of the teachings should be abandoned, since they were only to be considered true for the purposes of reaching that goal. This appeal to pragmatism, however, is in some ways misleading, especially when we consider Dharmakīrti’s notion of “conventional” (saṃvyahārika) and “ultimate” (pāramārthika) instruments of knowledge.

Dharmakīrti’s notion of conventional and ultimate instruments of knowledge falls within the Epistemic Idealist critique of perception. At that level of analysis, not only inference, but also perception is distorted or erroneous (bhrānta) because perception involves an “internal distortion” (antarupaplava). This distortion, a form of ignorance, makes the cognitive image in perception seem as if the objects of perception are external, even though, according to Epistemic Idealism, no such objects exist outside the mind. On an even stronger reading, the distortion also causes the “variegation” (citratā) of the object, such that it appears to have various attributes (such as colors) and dimensions (such as height and width). Whether understood in its strong or weak form, the error is nonconceptual: the cognitive image itself is distorted. If, however, even perception is somehow distorted, what distinguishes a reliable or trustworthy cognition from one that is not? If all our ordinary cognitions are distorted such that none actually reflect or represent things the way they truly are, then would not all cognitions become equally unreliable? In his Pramāṇaviniścaya, Dharmakīrti considers this issue.

“[Since they do not exist externally] all cognitions’ objects are refuted. If that is the case, then since there is no difference between cognitions in that all their [seeming] objects are distorted, how do you say that one cognition is confused while another is otherwise [i.e., it is instrumental]?”

Since some cognitions have the fault of lacking a consistent imprint for distortion (viplava), even the unskilled say that some cognitions are not reliable for practical action (vyavahāra); thus, it is said that a cognition of that type is not instrumental. The other kind of cognition has a stable imprint; hence, for as long as
samsāra endures, it has an unbroken continuity. Having such an imprint, the cognition is in this context an instrumental cognition in terms of being trustworthy for practical action, and the nature of these conventional (saṃvyavahārika) instruments of knowledge has been stated. Others are confused—and cause confusion—even in regard to these conventional cognitions. Hence, it is only those who cultivate the wisdom born of contemplation that thereby orient themselves toward the ultimate instrumental cognition that is devoid of error and immaculate.\textsuperscript{182}

Although all perceptions are distorted by the internal distortion, one can still distinguish between perceptions that are instrumental and those that are not. In effect, one can do so because the internal distortion is always present in an ordinary being’s mind: for as long as a being is in samsāra, the defect that causes the distortion remains. Since all beings in samsāra have the imprint, they are all equally confused in this regard, and they thus can interact consistently within that mutual confusion. In a similar context, a later Buddhist thinker speaks of two persons who, because they have the same ocular defect, can hold an intelligent conversation about the two moons that they see.\textsuperscript{183} Other, additional, errors are not “stable” (dṛthā) and all pervasive, and they therefore can be contravened by other perceptions which lack those errors. No perception of an ordinary being, however, could ever contravene the internal distortion, because an ordinary being’s perception is always distorted by it.

Nevertheless, beings are not eternally doomed to distorted perception. They may “cultivate the wisdom born of contemplation,” and here, “contemplation” clearly means the rigorous analytical and meditative practice that leads to “seeing things as they are” (yathābhūtadarśana). To engage in such a practice, one must have a proper understanding of how conventional perception and inference operate. Having learned the correct (i.e., Buddhist) theories concerning the instruments of knowledge, and having applied one’s instrumental cognitions to the analysis of reality itself, one then develops the contemplation that leads to the realization of the ultimate instrument of knowledge. If we trust Śākyabuddhi’s opinion, the ultimate pramāṇa would be the pure, non-dual, reflexive awareness of the mind itself.\textsuperscript{184} But while this ultimate instrumental cognition is the means to Dharmakīrti’s final soteriological goal, it is not useful for practical action in the world (i.e., samsāra). If the ultimate instrument of knowledge is indeed some pure form of reflexive awareness, then there are no longer external objects—or even mental content—on which to act. Hence, it would seem that conventional perceptions and inferences are eventually left behind, but in terms of cognitions for practical action in the world, these conventional cognitions are as trustworthy and irreproachable as any such cognition could ever be.

I have discussed Dharmakīrti’s notion of ultimate and conventional
cognition in order to bring us back to the issues that opened the chapter, namely, the notion that the instrumentality of inference is accepted in relation to a final goal. Borrowing from Karl Potter’s work, we made the overall point that the general notion of instrumentality is tied to purpose, and that South Asian thinkers of Dharmakīrti’s time were especially concerned with some highest purpose. Drawing on Steinkellner’s work, I pointed to Dharmakīrti’s need to defend the value of his highest goal, but I also suggested that his conception of what is valuable in the means to that goal likewise provides an axiological context for his thought. We find here a reciprocal relation of mutual constraint and compatibility that pertains between path and goal.

To close this final chapter, I would further suggest that Dharmakīrti’s notion of ultimate and conventional instruments of knowledge may well embody that relation between path and goal. If we were good Buddhist students of Dharmakīrti, we would seek to be as fully correct as we could possibly be in our conventional knowledge within saṃsāra, most particularly when that knowledge pertains to the Buddhist path. At the same time, we would wish that scrupulous adherence to correct ways of knowing—verifiable through the efficacy of our interactions within saṃsāra—to lead us to some higher way of knowing in an immaculate state free of ignorance. Our ordinary instruments of knowledge are contaminated by the internal distortion that is ignorance, yet they must be compatible with that extraordinary state of pure cognition in which ordinary objects fall away. And that same exalted state, while utterly free of ignorance, means that to that edifying state of pure cognition in which ordinary objects van — to lead us to some higher way of knowing in an immaculate state free of ignorance. Our ordinary instruments of knowledge are contaminated by the internal distortion that is ignorance, yet they must be compatible with that extraordinary state of pure cognition in which ordinary objects fall away. And that same exalted state, while utterly free of saṃsāra’s impurities, must itself remain accessible to those correct (but worldly) ways of knowing.

1 On sādakamatatva, see chapter 1 (15ff) and also below (260ff). It is worth noting that even the Mīmāṃsakas, for whom the grammatical instrumentality of a pramāṇa is a theoretical inconvenience, will still discuss a pramāṇa in these terms. See, for example, ŚV (codaṇā 9ab): nimittātmaram voceta pramāṇam ceha lakṣanam. Pārvatīśasthānapriyā (Nyāyaratnakāra: 36) comments: nimittātmātmam kāraṇamātmātmātmātmātmātmam tattadvīcesah karaṇam iti / karaṇatvam ca sādakamatatvatvam āprakāram vivaśādhiham iti vivayakāhēdē pramāṇabhēdenāḥ....


3 I am referring to the notion of a “definitive determination following upon a perception” (pratyakṣapratyakṣabhādhaniścaya), which I will discuss in some detail below (287ff). It is worth noting that, when Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception is construed in terms of Epistemic Idealism, no perception is “true,” in that they are all affected by the “internal distortion” (antarupaplava), whereby the cognitive image in perceptual cognition appears erroneously to be external (see PV 3.359–362). For a treatment of such issues in relation especially to Kamalaśīla’s appropriation of Dharmakīrti’s theory, see Funayama (1999).

4 This aspect of Dharmakīrti’s theory of yogic perception (as found at PV 3.281–286) has yet to be adequately discussed. The key verse is PV 3.285: “Therefore, that to which one meditatively conditions oneself, whether it be real or unreal, will result in a clear, non-conceptual cognition when that meditative conditioning reaches its culmination” (tasmiñā bhūtām abhūtām vā yad yad evābhihāvyate/bhāvanāparināspattu tat sūtra- kalpadhīpalam//). One might easily misconstrue the term bhūta here to mean that the content of the cognition is “true,” but Dharmakīrti makes it quite clear that in relation to their phenomenal contents alone, yogic perceptions are indistinguishable
from the hallucinations of a lovesick person. Instead, Dharmakīrti specifies (PV3.286) that yogic perceptions are pramāṇas because they are “trustworthy” (sāmacchādin), and we will see that this term refers to the results obtained (or obtainable) through the cognition. Most recently, Woo (2003) touches on these issues.

5 According to Devendrabuddhi, the notion that the sense faculties are themselves pramāṇa is raised by Dharmakīrti at PV2.3 (PVP:3b7ff; see below, n.75).

6 Of course, the term “valid” does offer some tempting (and very bad) puns when we consider the notion that the sense organs themselves can plausibly be construed as pramāṇas: if I have cataracts and see little hairs everywhere, my eyes are invalid because I am an invalid. If a corpse had sense organs they nevertheless would not be valid. Why? Because they would have passed their expiration date.

7 See Potter (1984:316), where he remarks:

... a pramā [i.e., an instance of a cognition for which a pramāṇa is the instrument] may not correspond with the nature of things (it is "compatible with error," as Mohanty expresses it). Whether or not pramāṇa is confined in its application to awarenesses which attribute to their content properties which an object corresponding to that content actually has is not a matter of the definition of pramāṇa (as it is taken to be a matter of the definition of “truth” in Western contemporary thought), but constitutes rather further theory about which awarenesses satisfy the purposes motivating them. Naiyāyikas think that [the] further theory which requires correspondence is the correct one; other systems, such as Buddhism and Advaita, do not.

8 Potter is concerned primarily with the question of whether truth is a necessary condition for a cognition to be a pramāṇa, i.e., the result of the application of a pramāṇa. He notes (1984:311),

To decide whether truth is a necessary condition for an awareness to be a pramāṇa one must carefully assess the relation which a pramāṇa must bear to its content. We want a relation, R, which holds between any pramāṇa and its content, a relation which can be admitted by every Indian philosopher to hold between a pramāṇa and its content regardless of the particular theory he or any other Indian philosopher proposes about the nature of or proper analysis of R.

Using “C” to represent content and “J” to represent the cognition (i.e., jñāṇa) itself, Potter suggests that R be schematized thus (1984:312):

R, iff J apprehends (lit. “measures out”) C in accordance with the purpose that motivated J.

9 In Dharmakīrti’s work, this notion is best illustrated by the metaphor of the eunuch (see PV1.210–211 and PSVV ad cit.; translated below, 310). See also the discussion of purpose in chapter 1 (45ff).

10 The highest goal attained through such spiritual practices is variously described by terms such as mokṣa (“liberation”), naiṣreyasa (“the highest good”), svarga (“heaven”) and so on. See the fine study by Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (2001) for details.

11 I use the term “empirical” as a convenient means to refer to Dharmakīrti’s notion of the three types of knowable objects (jñeya): those that are perceptible (pratyakṣa), those that are “remote” (parokṣa or viprakṛṣṭa), and those that are “extremely remote” (ātyantaparokṣa). With the term “remote” Dharmakīrti is referring to those objects that, while not perceptible, are amenable to being known through inference. Remote objects are known “empirically” in that such inferences rely directly or indirectly on the evidence of the senses; hence, such inferences “operate by the force of real things” (vastubhalapratyavettam). In contrast, an “extremely remote” object is one that is “transempirical,” in that it cannot be known through either perception or inference. See Dreyfus (1997:295) and Tillemans (1999:28–32) for further discussions. We will take up the issue of scriptural inference in the next section.

12 One obvious example of Dharmakīrti’s agnosticism concerning certain aspects of buddhahood is found in his Santānāntarasiddhi, where his argument eventually compels him to claim that the Buddha’s knowledge is “inconceivable” (59a).

13 See, for example, Tillemans (1999:29). Concerning the notion that the detailed workings of karma are transempirical, Kapstein (2001:370) records this well-known verse from the Pudgalavīṇiścaya of Vasubandhu: “The totality of the causal features of a single peacock feather’s eye is not knowable except by an omniscient one, for the knowledge of that is the power of omniscience.” [AKBh 1222:
Dharmakirti’s attitude toward scripture in debate is a recurring theme in PV4 (see Tillemans 2000). Of particular interest are two passages: PV4. 48 (Tillemans 2000:78–79; see Tillemans’ comments thereon) and the related discussion of āptatava (Tillemans 2000:129–153).

The circularity sketched here is the most defensible version of a set of positions initially proposed by Nagatomi (1959) and Vetter (1964); for a clear summary of their actual positions, see Franco (1999). Hayes’ version of circularity (1984), while loosely resembling that of Nagatomi and Vetter, is less relevant for our purposes. Steinkellner (1982) later reiterated and argued for Vetter’s position, but he has since opted (Steinkellner 2003) for a subtler version of circularity that we will discuss below.

PS (1.1; cf. Hattori 23): pramāṇaḥabhūtāya jagaddhitaiścē pranāmya śāstre sugatāya tāyine / pramāṇasiddhyai svamataḥ samuccayaḥ kariṣyate vipraśriyād dhātikataḥ ./

See Tillemans and Inami (1986) and Franco (1997) for discussions of the structure of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter.

PV2.282–283c: dayaya śreyā ācāste jñānāt satyam saśādhanam // tac cābbhyogavān vaktum yatas tasmaḥ pramāṇaiḥ / upadeśatathāhāvastutis tadupadeśaḥ / pramāṇatattvavisddhyartham.

Franco (1997:29) offers a convincing comparison on Dharmakirti’s approach to pramāṇabhūta and Vātsyāyana’s discussion of āptatva. Certainly, it seems that the characteristics evoked by the four subsidiary epithets resemble in significant ways the extraordinary qualities that, for Vātsyāyana, constitute credibility. See also Silk (2002).

We should note here that the question of whether the Buddha is an instrument of knowledge literally or only metaphorically actually makes little difference to the issue of circularity. I have earlier suggested (1999) that the literal interpretation of the epithet pramāṇabhūta is highly problematic, at least on the interpretation of the earliest commentators, and Krasser’s work (2001) strongly supports this conclusion. Nevertheless, the key issue here is whether the term pramāṇabhūta should be taken as essentially synonymous with āpta. I think that it must be.

Franco (1999:65) argues against the interpretation of the verse as rooted in a circular argument:

As a matter of fact, the immediate context of the verse does not support Vetter’s and Nagatomi’s interpretation [i.e., that the argument here is circular] because Dharmakirti argues here and in the following two verses that the Buddha used perception and inference, not that they are valid because of him. Nor does the commentators’ interpretation support Vetter’s or Nagatomi’s hypotheses, for none of Dharmakirti’s commentators detects here the circularity perceived by Vetter or the reciprocity claimed by Nagatomi.

While it may be true that the verse (which is actually a verse and a half) is not susceptible to the versions of circularity suggested by Nagatomi and Vetter, it is difficult to defend against the circularity we have sketched above, if one appeals only to this verse and its immediate context. When, in the verses that follow, Dharmakirti cites the Buddha’s use of perception and inference, we certainly seem justified in claiming that we should accept the instrumentality of perception and inference because the Buddha considered them instrumental. That is, the fact that perception and inference are instrumental is demonstrated by the fact that the Buddha, who is a credible authority on such matters, used them (cf. Franco 1999:66). And of course, we have already used perception and inference to demonstrate that the Buddha is a credible authority on such matters.

Finally, while the commentators do not mention any such circularity, their silence on the matter might simply be an attempt to avoid an intractable issue. Hence, I doubt that we can dismiss the seemingly circular argument suggested by the verse just on the basis of its context alone. Indeed, if anything, inasmuch as they occur at the end of an argument for the Buddha’s credibility as pramāṇabhūta, the verse’s immediate context supports that circular argument. Instead, as Franco also affirms, it is the later discussion of scriptural inference that allows us to reject more definitively the accusation of circularity, as we will see below.

In effect, I am suggesting that the issue at hand invokes our hermeneutics of charity, which in this case rests on a hypothetical articulation of Dharmakirti’s implicit method for ordering positions
along a sliding scale of analysis. If we uncover a passage or position that does not cohere with our overall view of Dharmakīrti’s thought, we may generally revise our view along either of two lines: by increasing our suspicion that Dharmakīrti’s work is incoherent, or by assuming some currently obscure deficiency in our reading. If, however, a well articulated passage or position clearly contradicts some other, equally well articulated passage or position, then the general principle of hermeneutical charity that we have adopted will prompt us to rank these positions along a hierarchical scale: the lower position, while contextually expedient, is superseded by the higher position that, by virtue of passing a rational test that the lower position fails, conforms more closely to Dharmakīrti’s version of ultimate truth. To employ this hermeneutical technique, we must be able to specify both the contextual expediency in question and the specific fault in the lower position that Dharmakīrti corrects in the higher position. I suggest that we can meet both of these conditions: the expediency consists of the rhetorical triumphalism described by Franco (an expediency that involves a wide range of issues, including institutional identity and survival), and the fault that the higher position deliberately critiques and abandons is the lower position’s appeal to credibility, as I explain just below.

25 PS2.5ab: अपत्यक्याविस्मृदसामथन्याद anumānataḥ. Note, first, that although the phrase “a cognition arising from them” must be supplied by context, Dharmakīrti clearly understand this statement in that fashion (see PV1.216, translated along with the rest of the section on scripture in the appendix). Note also that I prefer to avoid the interpretation of सामथ्यa as “the same as” or “similar to.” Although my interpretation is not directly supported by the Tibetan translation (mtshungs pa), a compound of the form “x-sāmānya” can certainly have the meaning of “x in general” or “a general version of x” (e.g., PV1.12d, kāryasāmānya), where it stands in contrast to x-viśeṣa. Since the sense of “in general” renders the comments by Jinendrabuddhi, Karṇakagomin, and Śākyabuddhi more intelligible, I have chosen that reading.


27 See the translation in the appendix (361ff). See also Tillemans (1999).

28 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:242b5 = K:390) remarks:

In other words, the ficārya [Dignāga] did not say that knowledge from scripture is a type of instrumental inference by claiming that it is actually or truly (bhāvika) instrumental. Rather, it is instrumental with regard to the way in which a person should proceed.

29 Śākyabuddhi (247a) does not identify who these others might be; K(396) glosses aparé as vādinaḥ, while Manorathanandin provides naiyāyikādayaḥ.

30 Śākyabuddhi (247b3) comments:

We accept the point that has just been stated—we do not reject that kind of idea. But it is accepted only if one is able to know that superiority, defined as the experience of things as they truly are, etc., as being a definite aspect of that person. But one is not able to know that.

[bshad ma thag pa’i don gang yin pa de nyid ni kho bo cag ’dod pa kho na yin te / kho bo cag ni de lta bur guyr pa spong bar byed pa ni mi byed do / ’on kyang gal te don ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba la sog’i mtshan nyid can gyi phul du byung ba de skyes bu’i [D.: bus] nges par shes pa nus na de yang shes par mi nus so:].

K(396) preserves this statement almost entirely:

yo ’yam anantaroko ’rtha sa iṣṭo ’smākam / kām tu śākyeta jñātum puruśaṇaïyamyena yo ’tisayo yathā-darśaṇālakṣaṇo na tu śākyath [Sāmkṛtyāyana reads: yathā darśaṇālakṣaṇaśaśa tu śākyath; this has been emended ex conj. to accord with PVT: laṅkṣaṇo na tu ... in accord with Śākyabuddhi].

31 The portion corresponding to Śākyabuddhi (248a2) ... de lta bur guyr pa’i don ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba la sog’s pa’i yan tan dang ldan pa’i skyes bu de shes par mi nus pa nyid kyi phyir should occur after kīm kāraṇum and tasya putras in K(396.25–26).

32 The prefix duḥ- is often translated simply as “difficult,” but this English word is too weak for the sense that the prefix conveys. In nearly every case, duḥ- expresses something more than English “difficult” but not necessarily quite as strident as “impossible.”

Note that, according to Śākyabuddhi (248a)=K(397), durbodhāḥ is feminine nominative singular when construed with nirdeṣṭatāḥ, but masculine nominative plural when construed with anyadeśāḥ.
As an example, Śākyabuddhi ((248b)–K(397)) notes: “That is, persons who have desire may make themselves appear as if they were desireless, and desireless persons may make themselves appear as if they had desires.” [tathā hi sarāṇa api vitarāṇavat ātmanat darśayanti / vitarāṇaḥ ca sarāṇavaḥ].


37 See Steinkellner’s further elucidation (2003:229):

There seems to be a gap of awareness on the part of Dharmakīrti as well as the whole tradition he represents concerning the analysis of puruṣārtha: it does not seem to have been expressed in any context that success (siddhi) in attaining (upādāna) or avoiding (hāna) a certain ordinary goal (arthā) is determined in fact, if only indirectly, in my opinion by the definition of the “ultimate goal,” for attainment of which all previous attainments or avoidances are considered either as necessary steps or as impediments. But only if we know the direction to go, do we also know the difference between right and wrong, good and evil, or better, wholesome (kūṣala) and unwholesome (akūṣala). Evidently this gap has not been closed by Dharmakīrti. On the contrary: since he wants to propose, I think, an epistemology which can be accepted by non-Buddhists as well, he would certainly not have derived a distinction between correct and contrary: since he wants to propose, I think, an epistemology which can be accepted by non-Buddhists as well, he would certainly not have derived a distinction between correct and incorrect cognitions from the authority of the Buddha’s teaching. Yet this is exactly what we have here: not a circle in the sense of a literally visible circular argumentation which would be vicious. Such a circle has already been rightly refuted by Tillemans (1993) and Franco (1999). Rather it is a circle that I assume to exist as the outer frame of a certain way of seeing, as the horizon of a way of thinking, such as that of Dharmakīrti, which, however, does not itself become part and object of such thought.


39 Van Harvey (1995) gives a fine summary of the “hermeneutics of suspicion” in the sense alluded to here.

40 My thinking about the axiological nature of such constraints has been influenced by Kapstein (2001).

41 See Eckel (1992) and Dunne (1996).

42 See below, 287ff.

44 See Eckel (2002).

45 I am deliberately echoing the opinion of Jñānaśarabha (Satyadvayavibhaṅga k.4; Eckel 1987:71). See also Eckel (1986).

46 In the discussion that follows, only certain passages will be chosen out of a larger discussion. To read the entire discussion (PV2.1–6 with the comments of Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi), see the translation in the appendix (374ff).

47 PV2.1a–b1: pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam. Note here that jñāna has been translated as “awareness.” The general question of translating the term jñāna is of greater importance than it might first appear. Potter has remarked on this issue in a somewhat different context. Questioning whether “knowledge” as “justified true belief” is applicable to Pramāṇa Theory, Potter has noted:

A jñāna is ... an act of awareness. It does not name a disposition (say, to respond in a certain
way when meeting a certain sort of thing). A jñāna is ... an occurrent. If it involves belief, it does so only in the sense of a believing as a fleeting act of awareness. A jñāna is not a belief in a dispositional sense .... Any act of awareness which has intentionality constitutes a jñāna. (1984:309–310)

This aspect of Potter’s argument supports the point I am making here: namely, that a jñāna need not involve the determinacy implicit in the term "knowledge." This is especially the case if we understand the "beliefs" that constitute dispositions to be necessarily determinate, or even propositional, in nature.

48 PV2.5c: ajñāthaprakāśa vā.

49 Both Dreyfus (1997:291) and Franco (1997:47) maintain that Devendrabuddhi understands these two statements to be taken separately, but Devendrabuddhi explicitly construes them together at the end of this discussion when he remarks: "[A cognition] which by nature contains the aforementioned two kinds of characteristics is an instrument of knowledge; the Blessed One is an instrument of knowledge like that [cognition]." [PVP (6b4): ji skad du bshad pa'i mtnah nyid rnam pa gnyis brten pa'i ngo bo can gang yin pa de ni tshad ma yin no / de bzhin bcom ldan tshad ma nyid. Cf. PVV where yukta (ms.: ukta) is read for brten pa (-apekṣa): yathoktadvividhālaṇaṇayuktaṁ yat pramāṇaṃ [/] tadvad bhagavān pramāṇaṃ....] For more on the dispute concerning this bipartite definition, see n.170 and also Krasser (2001).

50 PV2.1b2–c: arthakṛyāsthiti / avisaṃvadānam. Note that the interpretation of arthakṛyāsthiti as "cognition (rtogs pa ≈ pratipatti) of arthakṛyā" is provided by Devendrabuddhi (PVP:2a2–5) and explained by Śākyabuddhi (nye73a4ff):

An artha is burning and so on. The "accomplishment" of that means the arisal of it. The sthiti of it means the cognition of it because the verbal root [i.e., sthā] has various meanings. [don ni sreg pa la sos pa'o / de'i byed pa ni skyed pa'o / de'i gnas pa ni rtogs pa ste khams kyi don sna tshogs pa nyid kyi phyin ro].

51 PVP:2a1–2, translated below, 280.

52 PV1.1 dvividham samyagijñānam / pratyakṣam anumāṇaṃ ceti na hy ābhyyām arthaṃ paricchidya pravartamānaṁ 'arthakṛyāyām visaṃvadāyate.

53 This follows the interpretation of Devendrabuddhi, especially in terms of puruṣārtha. See below, (262).

54 Examples of all four meanings abound, but in Dharmakīrti’s commentary on the first verse of Pramāṇavārttika alone, one can find artha used clearly in three meanings: aim (e.g., G:1.8: arthāṃarthāveivecasyānumāṇāśrayatyāravat tadviparatipattes tadvyavasthāpanya ...); meaning (e.g., G:2.6: sāmarthasād arthaśāttvam pratiptattvavairavāpan枢纽rtham ...); and object (e.g., G:19:20–21: svabhāvapravartanbhe hi saty artho'ṛtham na vyahicarati). In the context of language, the verb-pra vṛt regularly appears with artha (in locative), where the latter has the sense of referent. For one of many examples without pra vṛt, see PVSV ad PV1.62 (G:34:1–2: tasmān na sarvatva dharmadharmivācinoh sabdayor vācye ‘rthe niścayapratyayaviṣayatvena kaŚcid viśeṣaḥ).

55 This way of understanding artha is closely related to Nagatomi’s analysis of the compound arthakṛyā. See below (259). While unambiguous examples of artha as object or aim are not difficult to find, some of the more interesting cases are those where artha is used as aim and object within the same statement. See, for example, PV1.93 (cited by Nagatomi (1967–19856): api pravarteta puruṣaṃ vijnāyārthakṛyaśākṣamān / tatādhanānāt artheśu samayojyante 'bhidābhavakāḥ'/). More interesting yet again are the numerous cases where the choice between "aim" and "object" is not at all clear. Consider, for example, PV1.111–112: akāryaśuddhaśāntaśīrśasām / dhiyam vastupthabhāvāmārthābhum anārthakām // janayanty api atakārimārthāmbhāvataḥ / vastubhedāśrayac ārthena visaṃvadākā mata //.

56 Dharmakīrti’s statement (PV3.1d) reads:

Illusions such as the hairs that appear in the visual perceptions of a person with cataracts are not objects (arthas) because there is no consideration of them as objects [keśādir nārtha 'narthāḥ kimokṣataḥ].

57 See chapter 2, 87–88.

58 In Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, the use of the Sanskrit term vyavahāra is somewhat complex. In the
classical Sanskrit of Dharmakīrti’s time, the term was used outside of philosophy in the sense of a “business agreement,” “transaction,” “litigation,” “legal proceedings” and other related senses (see Böhltingk, ad cit.). Such meanings are also found in Buddhist literature. One example is the term rūpākavyabhāra, one of the thirty “offenses expiated by forfeiture” (naḥsārīgika). As is clear from the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinayaṭīhaṛṣa (153a–154b; cf. Horner, Suttavibhāṣa, II:106ff), the term vyavāhāra in this rule means a “business agreement” or “transaction,” especially one where usury is involved. The meaning of vyavahāra as an agreement resonates with what may be the best known sense of vyavahāra in Buddhist philosophy—namely, vyavahāra in the sense of a “convention.” In Dharmakīrti’s case, “convention” is certainly one of the meanings of vyavahāra, but he more often uses the term in another, related sense: “practical action,” which includes all of the activities, such as communication, that are oriented toward some goal. All of these meanings of vyavahāra can be derived simply from the various contexts in which the term is used, but one can also find glosses in the commentary of Śākyabuddhi, such as amuṣṭhāna, “action” or “implementation” (PVT:228a7 = K:370.24–25).

59 PVP (123a4ff): 'ō na skyes bu mtshong ba 'khrul pa can gyi shes pa la skra shad dang sbring ma dang / zla ba gnyis pa la sogs pas brdzun pa sbring ba de dāg don gyi bya ba cung zad kyang mi byed pa'i phyir / de dāg rang gi mtshan nyid kyi nang du 'du ba ma yin zhing / don byed pa dang bral du zin kyang spyi'i nang du 'du ba yang ma yin te / gsal bar so sor sbring ba nyid kyi phyir dang / la lar rjes su 'gro bo ma ped pa'i phyir ro / de ltar na rang dang sphyi'i mtshan nyid kyi yul du mi 'du ba'i phyir de yul gzhan pa3 yan pas na / yul rnam pa gnyis rigs pa ma yin no zhe na / mi rigs pa ma yin te / di ltar skra shad la sogs don min no / ci t'i phyir zhe na / don du mos pa med phyir ro / skyes bu thu snyad 'dogs pa po dāg de la don du mos pa med pa'i phyir ro / dags pa ni 'di yin te / gal te rab rib can la sogs pas dmigs pa'i sbring ma la sogs pa'i yul yin par 'gyur ba de'i tshe / ci de rang gi mtshan nyid kyi yun gzhan yin zhes dpyad par bya ba yin na / 'di ltar don ni ma yin no / gang gi phyir skyes bu thu snyad 'dogs pa po dāg gi phyir shes pa gang la sbring ma la sogs pa sbring ba de'i yul 'di yin no zhes de dāg la mos pa ma yin no. Cf. PVV-n (111, n. 2): arthaḥkrīyāt or svaśākhāṣṭram, spoṣṭpratibhyāsanavanyavītāvyāyām na ca sāmānāyam iti viṣayāntaratvam asya/.

8PVP: gzhan ma yin, but PVV-n (111, n. 2): viṣayāntaratvam asya.

60 See chapter 2 (124–25) and Dharmakīrti’s comments in PSVS ad PV1.137–143, translated in the appendix (353ff). It is worth noting that the independence of an object’s causal functionality from the telic concerns of the perceiver makes it difficult to accurately characterize Dharmakīrti’s philosophy as any form of pragmatism, despite certain “pragmatic overtones” in his philosophy. Cf. Dreyfus (1995).


62 See Nagatomi (1967–68:55–57). Among the passages cited by Nagatomi, it is not at all clear that in PV3.1–3 arthaḥkrīyā is used primarily in the sense of causal efficiency.

63 Among the passages cited by Nagatomi (1967–68:56), one is PV1.98–99ab (jñāṇārthaḥkrīyām āthaśāṃ dṛśvā bhede ‘pi kurvataḥ / arthaḥ tadāyavāśīrīsa yād vibhūṣanāḥ saka // sāthyaśyajña bhikṣaḥ kuryād apy anyadarśanā.), Even in this case, where arthaḥkrīyā is construed merely with the production of a visual awareness, the discussion of illusion later in the passage suggests (albeit indirectly) that some notion of goal or purpose—even if it be simply clarifying the status of one’s perceptions—is still relevant.

64 See chapter 1, 1.1.

65 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:3b4ff): 'di ltar tshad ma'i 'bras bu ni rnam pa gnyis te / skyes bu'i don zhes bya ba chod pa dang khyad par can chod pa med pa'o.

66 Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:77b2–3) glosses distinctive as meaning that it “will definitely occur” (gdon mi za bar 'gyur ba). He remarks:

[Devendrabuddhi] says that it is “distinctive.” The distinction is that it will definitely occur. Since that way of occurring is fulfilled (spyod pa ≈ carita) by that kind of effect, it is called “distinctive.” In other words, if there is an instrumental cognition, an instrumental object (prameya) will necessary be cognized (rṭaogs par 'gyur) because that object is not different from the instrumental awareness. This is not the case with a mediated effect because it is possible for something else to obstruct its occurrence. [de yang khyad par can zhes brjod de gdon mi za bar 'gyur ba ni khyad par yin la des spyod pa'i phyir khyad par can no / tshad ma yod na gdon mi za bar gzhal bya rṭaogs par 'gyur te tshad ma las thad pa med pa'i phyir ro / chod pa'i 'bras bu ni ma yin te
There are two reasons that prompt me to maintain that this sense is secondary. First, kyi shes pa PVP (3b7ff): "The 'unmediated' is an effect that is dependent on merely the instrumental cognition, and not on any other causes. An example is a cognition of an instrumental object." (chod pa med pa zhes bya ba ni gang tshad ma tsam la rag lus pa yin gyi rayu gzhon gyis ni chod pa ma yin te dper na gzhal bya rtogs pa lta bu'o). See below, 268ff.

It is worth noting that Uddyotakara (NV 89.2ff) makes a similar move when dealing with a problem in Vātsyāyana’s presentation of inference. To be precise, the problem here is that, if inference has to know, then since inference is itself a cognition of an object, it could have not have a cognition (pramiti) as its result (pramāṇaphala) because its object has already been cognized. After first proposing a grammatical solution, Uddyotakara turns to a philosophical one that has some resonance with Dharmaśīla’s approach:

"Let us suppose that the statement in the text has the following meaning: inference is a cognition that involves that which is marked by an inferential sign (lāṅgkī). But in that case, there would be the fault of having no resultant act of knowing."

We say the following: This is not correct because the cognitions of the object as what one should avoid, employ or ignore are the result. Moreover, in regard to its own object, any instrumental cognition functions as the verbal activity, such that “instrument of knowledge” means “resulting cognition (pramiti).” With regard to another object, all pramāṇas function as the instrument, such that “pramāṇa” means “that by means of which the object (prameya) is known (pramīyate).”

“If the word ‘pramāṇa’ functions as the verbal activity, then what would be the resultant activity? There could be no result because the object is already cognized.”

[In response Vātsyāyana] has said that the cognitions of the object as that which one should avoid, employ or ignore are the result because the object is known, one has those cognitions. That is, when the object is known, one has three kinds of cognitions—one cognizes the object as that which is to be avoided, employed or ignored: bhāvanā on bhāvanāṃ phalatvāt / sarvām ca pramāṇaṃ svāśīyam prati bhāvāsādhanam, pramātiḥ pramāṇaṃ iti / vīśyāntaram prati karatāsādhanam / pramīyate ’neneti pramāṇaṃ / yadi bhāvāsādhanah pramāṇaśādah kim phalam, vīśyādhiṣṭātvaḥ / uktaṃ [90] phalaṃ hāṇāśuddhiḥ / jñāre tadbhāvāt / jñāte khāl arthe triḍhāḥ buddhīḥ bhavati heyo vopadeyo vopadeyo yevi].

PVP (3b5ff): shes pa blang bar bya [ba]'i don shes nas de sgurb par byed pa nan tan du byed pas mngon sum du byed pa’i mts dan niyi can gyi ’jug pa skyes bus thob par ’gyur ro / de bzhin du dor bar bya ba shes nas de sgurb par byed pa nan tan du mi byed pas / de mngon sum du mi byed pa’i mts dan niyi can gyi ’jug pa thob pa’i ’gyur te / blo ni tshad ma niyi / blang dang dor bar bya’i dngos po yi / ’jug la de gtsod niyi phyir dang / blang bar bya ba dang dor bar bya ba’i dngos po’i yul can dang / skyes bu’i don zhes bya ba can gyi ’jug pa de la / de gtsod niyi phyir te shes pa gtsos bo niyi yin pa’i rayu’i phyir / blo ni tshad ma niyi yin no.

Devendrabuddhi first uses the term arthakriyānirbhāsa explicitly at PVP:2b7 (ji ltar ’dod pa’i don byed par snang ba can ≈ yathābhīmatārthakriyānirbhāsa), but this notion is clearly what he has in mind when he refers repeatedly (starting at 2a3) to cognitions such as “a perception whose object is the sensation of warmth of a fire” (de’i dro ba’i reg pa la sogs pa’i yul can gyi mngon sum), “a subsequent cognition whose object is burning, cooking, etc.” (4a3: sreg pa dang ’tshed pa la sogs pa’i yul can gyi phyis kyi shes pa), and so on.

Perhaps the best known example is the negative statement in the context of nonperception (PV1.3a apravṛttiḥ pramāṇaḥ apravṛttiḥphalasati).

There are two reasons that prompt me to maintain that this sense is secondary. First, Devendrabuddhi’s direct gloss of apravṛtti in the verse refers only to apravṛtti in the sense of the “activation” of an instrumental cognition (PVP:3b5–6). Second, in subsequent points in his comments on PV2.1–6, it is that earlier sense that is again reiterated, and not the sense of apravṛtti as a person’s action toward an object.

PVP (3b7ff): blo tshad ma niyi du ’dod pa ni dbang po la sogs pa yang ’jug pa’i rayur ’gyur ro zhes bya ba’i
The fault in Dharmakirti’s theory is specifically that, in PV3, he considers an instrumental cognition only in terms of an unmediated instrumental effect with little reference to human aims. This makes it difficult for him to reconcile the tension between the latter attainment of a goal—which is clearly the purpose of employing an instrumental cognition in the context of human aims—and the refusal to admit that the effect could be separate from the instrumental cognition. See, for example, the somewhat tortured interpretations of प्राप्तिक and प्रवार्तिक in LPP (e.g., 5.2–8.3; translated in Krasser 1991).

The fault in Dharmakirti’s theory is specifically that, in PV3, he considers an instrumental cognition only in terms of an unmediated instrumental effect with little reference to human aims. Dharmakirti’s extensive treatment of instrumental effect (प्रमाणाधिकार) in PV3 does not correspond well to his account of instrumental cognition in PV2.1–6.

80 The Tibetan (PVP:442) reads tshad ma'i 'bras bu ma chod pa yang don rtsogs pa yin no. However, this seems again to be one of the many cases of subject/predicate inversion in a Tibetan translation for a Sanskrit statement that was probably: avyavahitapramāṇapahalam evarthadhigamaḥ. Note that here I understand eva to be merely marking the predicate.

81 This complex relative construction has been represented using the variables “x” and “y” for the sake of clarity in its English rendering.

82 PVP (4a2ff): tshad ma'i 'bras bu ma chod pa yang don rtsogs pa yin no / de yang rgyu thams cad nge ba na yang gang las chod pa med par rtsogs pa'ti tha snyad thob pa na de tshad ma yin no / ma chod pa de yang yul dang 'dra ba las gzhon la yod pa ma yin no / des na blo ni nyams su mong ba'il bdag nyid du tha dad pa med du zin kyang de don so so la ta dad par byed pa yin no / de lkar na yul rnam [PVP-D: rnam] can ni thi dad phyir te shes pa'i chos yin pa'i phyir / blo rtsogs pa tha dad pa yin pas te rgyu de'phyir ro / de yod na ste yul [PVP-D: lam] gyi rnam pa can yod na 'bras bu 'di yod phyir / blo ni tshad ma nyid yin no / gang yod pa yin yin na gang 'gyur ba de ni de' shin tu sgrub par byed pa yin par rigs so / de yod na yang 'ga' zhig gi tshe 'bras bu med pa yin na ni / ltos par bya ba gzhon 'di la yod do zhes rtsogs par 'gyur ro / de'i tshe snga ma de nyid ltos par bya ga gzhan des chod pa'i phyir phul du byang ba can gyi byed pa yin du mi 'gyur ro / de bas na byed pa yin du ma yin no / dbang po la sogs pa yod pa la yang bya ba med pa yin te / yul dang 'dra bas chod pa'i phyir ro / 'dra ba nyid yod na ni gdon mi za bar de rtsogs te / de'i de ni 'ga' zhig gi kyang chod pa ma yin no / shes pa'i nbo byi nyin yin pa'i phyir gzhon la ltos pa med pa can gyi 'bras bu rnam par gzhag pa'i rten yin .... Read shes pa'i chos for zhes pa'i chos, ex conj.

83 For Dignāga’s presentation, see especially PS1.3.3c–4 and PSV ad cit.

85 Taking the position that the kriyā is that which is to be established (sādhya) by the instrument (karaṇa = sādhana), Dharmakirti interprets the grāhakāra as the kriyā because it is established in terms of the grāhya, which is thus the instrument. This is the basis for the claim that grāhya- and grāhakāra stand in the relation of vyavasthāvyavasthāpakabhāva. See, for example, PV3.314–315:

We do not accept that there is a difference between the object of the action and the object of the instrument. If they have the same object (artha), then the notion that they are actually two different entities is meaningless. Moreover, if they have the same object, they should not occur sequentially. If they occur at the same time, then there is no relation of them as the establishing means (sādhana) and the established entity (sādhya). [But on our view], the subjective and objective aspects of the cognition are defined as the establishing means and established entity because the establishment (vyavasthā) of the subjective aspect is based upon the objective aspect. [ṇesto viśayabheda ‘pi kriyāsādhhanayor dvayaḥ / ekārthatve dvayaṃ vyartham]
Note that although Devendrabuddhi here (PV3:218b2) and elsewhere refers to the two “parts” (āṃśa) of awareness (dhi, etc.) as the “object-simulacrum” (arthaśārya) and the “cognition of the object” (arthaśāhigati), I understand these two to be synonyms for grāhyākāra and grāhalakāra, respectively.

86 PV318b1: kriyākaraḥ tayoḥ aikyavirodhā iti ced.
87 Cf. Devendrabuddhi (219a); “dir yon gzhal bya’i nγo bo nyid dang don rtags pa zhes bya ba’i chos thay dad pa gang yin pa de khas len pa nyid ni idog pa’ti tha dad pas nye bar btags pa yin no.
88 PV3.318b2–19 (see the critical notes in Tosaki, ad cit.): asat / dharmahedābhinyapagamād vastv abhimnam itiṣyate / evamprakāra sarvaiva kriyākarakasmāsthītī / bhāveṣu bhinnabhimateśv ayo āropeṇa vṛttatāh //.
90 Although Devendrabuddhi does not discuss it specifically, Śākyabuddhi notices that the problem of infinite regress must be addressed (PVT, nye:74a5–6 and 74b2).
91 This certainly becomes the case of late commentators. See, for example, Dharmottara’s comments to that effect (Steinkellner and Krasser 1989:13.3ff).
92 See chapter 2 (87ff) and above, 257.
93 That reflexive awareness is noncausal follows from its simultaneity with its object, namely, the awareness that is reflexively perceived itself. Indeed, what can be most confusing about reflexive awareness is the notion that reflexive awareness is merely a way of conceptualizing the object (grāhya) of perception as a distinct object. This distinction is clearly the case for all forms of perception, including mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa), for in all cases the object (grāhya) of perception is its cause (see, for example, PV3.224). The same is true of inference, since it too arises indirectly from its object (see the succinct statement in PVSV ad PV1.1; G:3.8: avyābhicāraḥ cānyasya ko ‘nyas tadutpattah, where tadutpatti is meant to apply to both effect- and svabhāva-evidence). In contrast, what Dignāga first identifies as the three aspects of an awareness—namely, reflexive awareness, the objective aspect (grāhyākāra), and the subjective aspect (grāhalakāra)—are all ultimately identical and hence simultaneous. The notion that reflexive awareness is cognizing the subjective and objective-aspects is merely a way of conceptualizing the process of knowing (see the locus classicus in PS1.1.10: yadābhāsām prameyam tatpramāṇapralabdhe punah / grāhalakārasamvitānām nātāḥ prthuk kṛtam). Although Dignāga maintains that External Realism can propose a similar way of analyzing cognitions (PS1.1.9), this way of explaining cognitions assumes the Epistemic Idealist position. Dharmakīrti accepts and elaborates upon Dignāga’s opinion in the following verses [PV3.333–339]:

“If we maintain that an external object is experienced, what would be wrong with that claim?”

There is nothing wrong with it, but what is the point of saying this: “An external object is experienced”? [PV3.333] If awareness has the image of the object, then it must have something that distinguishes [each] image [for each awareness], [PV3.334] It would be wise to look into whether that differentiation must come from something external, or whether it might just as easily come from something else.

[1] There is no apprehension of an object devoid of qualification by the experience of it; and [2] when that experience itself is apprehended, the object is apprehended. Therefore for these two reasons, the cognitive appearance of blue is the experience (darśanā) of blue. There is no independent (kevalaḥ; cf. PVP:223a7) external object. Instead, something activates the internal imprint for some experience. It is due to that awakening of an imprint that there is the restriction [of a particular image] to a [particular] cognition; that restriction is not dependent on an external object [PV3.335–336].

Therefore that one awareness which is experienced and remembered in that fashion has two aspects (dvīrūpa); the instrumental result is the reflexive awareness of both aspects [PV3.337].

When the object is considered to be other than the mind and established with a nature that is desired or not desired, then the object is the cause of the representation and the effect is the experience of that representation in that way, i.e., as desired or not desired [PV3.338].

If awareness includes the object (yadā saśayam jñānām) due to the positing (vyavasthitā) of the object as an aspect (āṃśa) of awareness [and not as actually external], then the
determination (viniścaya) of the object is just the awareness’ experience of itself. [PV3.339]

[72x-809]because the positing of an instrumental cognition is conventional. [72x-822]the basis of this determination the world posits them as the same object

104 This is the force of Dharmakīrti’s claim that there is only one instrumental object (PV2.53c1–d): meyam tv evam svadāśā tam.


96 Dharmottara does not appear to accept Devendrabuddhi’s notion of a mediated effect in any of his many writings on instrumentality (i.e., NBT, LPP, Prāmāṇyaparāśa and PVinT). Hence, the contrast he draws between pramāṇa relative to puruṣārtha and mere arthakriyāparāśa, although parallel to Devendrabuddhi’s approach, is clearly not the same.


93 See PV1.210–211 with PVSV ad cit.; translated below, 310.

92 See PV(2a3ff) translated in the appendix and below, 288.

91 This is the force of Dharmakīrti’s claim that there is only one instrumental object (PV2.53c1–d): meyam tv evam svadāśā tam.

90 Thus, in saying therefore he means: “since the latter instrumental cognition is impossible without the object of the former instrumental cognition.” Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was established prior—i.e., prior to the latter cognition whose object is the telic function—that initial cognition is instrumental. That is, since it is the cause of the latter cognition

94 Lingering questions include how Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation relates to what he and later commentators call the three “versions” (vikalpa) of instrumental effect (see, e.g., PVP:223bff and PVT, nyc:229a7ff). How, for example, does this analysis relate to Dharmakīrti’s actual presentation in PV3 and Dignāga’s initial foray (PS1.18cdff)? Concerning Devendrabuddhi’s impact upon later commentators, his words often appear verbatim in their commentaries, but I have yet to find any commentator after later than Sākyabuddhi who supports the notion of a mediated instrumental effect. A study of how and why this notion was rejected would surely help us to understand the works of Dharmottara, Prajñākāra-gupta and others.

93 See PV1.210–211 with PVSV ad cit.; translated below, 310.

92 See PV(2a3ff) translated in the appendix and below, 288.

91 This is the force of Dharmakīrti’s claim that there is only one instrumental object (PV2.53c1–d): meyam tv evam svadāśā tam.

90 Thus, in saying therefore he means: “since the latter instrumental cognition is impossible without the object of the former instrumental cognition.” Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was established prior—i.e., prior to the latter cognition whose object is the telic function—that initial cognition is instrumental. That is, since it is the cause of the latter cognition

94 Lingering questions include how Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation relates to what he and later commentators call the three “versions” (vikalpa) of instrumental effect (see, e.g., PVP:223bff and PVT, nyc:229a7ff). How, for example, does this analysis relate to Dharmakīrti’s actual presentation in PV3 and Dignāga’s initial foray (PS1.18cdff)? Concerning Devendrabuddhi’s impact upon later commentators, his words often appear verbatim in their commentaries, but I have yet to find any commentator after later than Sākyabuddhi who supports the notion of a mediated instrumental effect. A study of how and why this notion was rejected would surely help us to understand the works of Dharmottara, Prajñākāra-gupta and others.

93 See PV1.210–211 with PVSV ad cit.; translated below, 310.

92 See PV(2a3ff) translated in the appendix and below, 288.

91 This is the force of Dharmakīrti’s claim that there is only one instrumental object (PV2.53c1–d): meyam tv evam svadāśā tam.

90 Thus, in saying therefore he means: “since the latter instrumental cognition is impossible without the object of the former instrumental cognition.” Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was established prior—i.e., prior to the latter cognition whose object is the telic function—that initial cognition is instrumental. That is, since it is the cause of the latter cognition

94 Lingering questions include how Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation relates to what he and later commentators call the three “versions” (vikalpa) of instrumental effect (see, e.g., PVP:223bff and PVT, nyc:229a7ff). How, for example, does this analysis relate to Dharmakīrti’s actual presentation in PV3 and Dignāga’s initial foray (PS1.18cdff)? Concerning Devendrabuddhi’s impact upon later commentators, his words often appear verbatim in their commentaries, but I have yet to find any commentator after later than Sākyabuddhi who supports the notion of a mediated instrumental effect. A study of how and why this notion was rejected would surely help us to understand the works of Dharmottara, Prajñākāra-gupta and others.
whose object is the telic function, the initial cognition is instrumental, and it is such because it too has a real thing as its object. Otherwise, if it were to have an unreal thing as its object, it would not be the cause for that kind of subsequent cognition; he says: because through it that very cognition engages with the telic function. Here, through it means "through the initial cognition." In other words, the initial cognition is instrumental because the initial cognition is itself the cause of the latter cognition whose object is the telic function.

The Tibetan of the passage from Devendrabuddhi (PVP:2b5ff) reads: ma yin te tha snyad 'dogs pa po dag tha dad pa med par 'jug pa'i phyir tha snyad kyi rjes su 'brangs nas / dus snga phyir 'byung ba can la gcig tu 'jug par brjod do / 'dgos su ni thi dad pa nyid yin no / de lta na phyis kyi tshad ma yul gyi 'dgos po ni / tshad ma snga ma'i yul med na med pa'i phyir de yang de'i yul can nyid yin no zhes nge bar btaa pa yin no / de bas na snga 'dgos po grub pa'i phyir dang po nyid tshad ma yin de / de las don byed ma la 'jug pa'i phyir ro.

109 PVP (3a1ff): mi slu ba de dang de nges pa gang yin pa de ni tshad ma yin pa'i phyir / the tshom za ba'i shes pa la sogs pa ni tshad ma yin no. Note the typical subject/predicate inversion in the Tibetan translation.

110 PVP (3a2): gal te skyes bu'i 'jug pa la yang gags yod pas / tshad ma yang slu ba srid pa'i phyir tshad ma ma yin no zhe na.

111 Śākyabuddhi notes (PVT, nye:76b1–2), "By implication one supplies (adhyāhāra): 'In all cases when one is not obstructed...’" [thams cad du gaas byed pa'i rgyu med na zhes bya ba khong nas dbyung ngo].

112 PVP (3a2ff): de ni tshad mas nges par 'dod pa'i don dang phrad pa ni ma yin no / 'o na ci yin zhe na / de las mngon par 'dod pa nyid dang phrad pa yin no / 'jug pa yod na tshad ma phrad par byed pa nyid yin pa de lta na phrad par nus pa tshad ma nyid yin gyi phrad pa nyid ni ma yin no / nus pa de nyid 'di'i slu ba yin par brjod pa'i phyir skyon yod pa ma yin no.

113 See PVT, nye:76a7ff.

114 See his initial account of confirmation cited above, 280.

115 PV-D: khyad par byed pa → khyab par byed pa (ex.conj.).

116 For the Tibetan, see above, n.101.

117 mes → me'i (ex.conj.).

118 Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:72b7) makes it clear that this passage concerns the instrumentality of perception.

119 PVP (2a3ff): ji lta mngon sum gyis shes nas me'i sreg pa dang / 'tshed pa la sogs pa'i nus pa la 'jug pa de'i dro ba'i reg pa la sogs pa'i yul can gyi mngon sum dang /] ji lta 'ga' zhiq gi tshe me nyid la rnam pa mtsungs pa la sogs pa 'ga' zhiq gis 'khrul pa du ba las me nges par byas pa'i rjes su dpag pa'i 'jug pa mi slu ba yin no / mngon sum nyid la 'khrul pa'i rgyu sna tshogs pa nyid kyi slu ba srid pa'i phyir de'i don gyi don byed pa'i yul can gyi tshad ma phyi ma 'jug pas tshad ma nyid du rtoogs par bya'i.... See also PVT (nye:73b1ff) translated in the appendix.

120 For the relationship between pratvakaṣaptaḥalabdhanisa and instrumentality, see PVP (5a4ff), discussed below, 294.

121 See PVP (5a3ff) and PVT (nye:76a2–3).

122 Note that I am not dealing here with the question of how an inference of fire from smoke could be a cognition "in which appears the accomplishment of one's aim" (arthakriyānirbhāsa).

123 Śākyabuddhi raises this issue at several points in the discussion on confirmation (see, e.g., PVT, nye:73a6ff).

124 Śākyabuddhi here refers to PVin 1.1; cited above, 256.
125 The "definitive apprehension of the object's identity" (rgyu mtshan nges par gzung ba) appears to be a straightforward reference to the Abhidharmic definition of satyānā as nimittodgraha. The term nimitta in this context is sometimes translated as "distinguishing mark," but "identity" carries more clearly the notion of the determinacy required here. A typical treatment appears in AK 14c2–d and AKBh ad cit. (48.5ff):

> Recognition is by nature the apprehension of the object's identity (nimitta). That is, recognition is the apprehension of an object as blue or yellow, long or short, woman or man, friend or enemy, pleasant or unpleasant (duḥkha), and so on. [satyānā nimittodgrahaṇātmākā [14.c2–d] yāvanillapadītyadgrhavastriṣṭāpuramānimittasukhadaduḥkhādinimittodgrhātum asa sa satyānāśākandaḥ.]

126 PVT (nyc:72a6ff): brjod pa mngon sum gyer 'rtan can gyi 'jug pa ni mnam pa gnyis te dang po nyid dang goms pa can no / de la goms pa dang Idan pa gang yin pa de la shin tu goms pa gsal ba can gyi mngon sum skyes pa na ji Ita ba bzhin du goms pa'i rmam pa 'khrul pa'i 'rgyud mtshan spangs pa can nyid gyis yongs su bcad nas skye ba dang / de Ita bur gyur pa' phyis 'byung bo'i nges pa skyed par byed pa'i phyir de la skyes ba 'jug par byed do / de'i phyir de la rang nyid kyi tshad ma nges par byed pa'i phyir phyis kyi tshad ma 'jug pa la ltos pa med pa can yan pa'i phyir don yongs su bcad nas zhes ba'i tshig mi 'thad ma ya yin no / mngon sum thams cad ni gzhed las tshad ma nges par gzhaq ma pa yin no / dang po nyid kyis 'jug pa gang yin pa de la yang rgyud mtshan nges par gzung ba med pa na the tshom nyid kyi sgo nas 'jug par byed do /

Commenting on the notion that a person who acts on an instrumental cognition is judicious, and that acting out of doubt would not be judicious, Śākyabuddhi also notes (PVT, nyc:72b2ff):

If one is acting out of doubt, how is it correct to say that people who do so are 'judicious' (prakṣaṇapūrvakārin)?

What is the contradiction here? A person who investigates the situation before acting is not a person who acts just out of a definitive determination [or certainty: nges pa = niścaya]. Thus, there are two causes which compel one to act: doubt about an object (artha) and the definitive determination of an object (artha). Inactivity also has two causes: doubt that there is no artha (don med pa) and definitive determination that there is no object (artha). A person who acts out of these two causes and a person who does not act out of the second two is what the world means by a judicious person. If acting without definitive determination is so unusual, then it would be contradictory for farmers to work in the fields and so on, when they have no instrumental cognition which has definitively determined their future wheat and such will grow. [gal te the tshom gyi sgo na 'jug pa yin na ji Itar rtog pa sgzon du song ba can zhes bya zhe na 'di la 'gal ba ci yod / gang kho na nges pa'i sgo na 'jug par 'gyur ba de nyid rtog pa sgzon du song ba can ma yin no / de Itar na 'jug par byed pa la don la the tshom za ba dang dang nges pa dang rgya rnam pa gnyis yin no / ldag pa yang don med pa la the tshom za ba dang / don med par nges pa gnyis kho na yin no / de la dang po nyid kyi rgyu gnyis kyi 'jug par 'gyur ba can yin pa de nyid phyis bshad pa gnyis kyi ldag par 'gyur ba gang yin pa de ni rtog pa sgzon du song ba can yan par 'jug rten dag brjod do / gal te nges pa nyid kyi sgo na 'jug par byed par 'gyur ba ngo mtsar yin na / o na ni zhi na la sogs pa zhin la sogs pa la 'jug par byed pa 'gal bar 'gyur te de dag la ma 'ongs pa ti 'bru la sogs pa 'grab pa la nges par byed pa'i tshad ma yod pa ma yin no].

127 Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nyc:74b2ff) notes:

In other cases—in [other] cases of perception—lacking habituation, the experience (mthong ba = darśana) is not clear, so the particular identity (khyad par = viśeṣa) of the object is not definitively determined; this explains the case where one is initially prompted to act [as opposed to habituated actions—see above]. At that time, one also acts out of doubt. By implication this states that if, due to habituation, one definitively apprehends (nges par gzung ba) the particular identity, even perception does not depend upon the engagement of a subsequent awareness. [goms pa med par mthong ba gsal ba po med pa'i phyir khyad par nges pa med pa yin te / 'dis ni dang po nyid kyi 'jug par byed pa'i gnas skabs bshad do / de'i tse the tshom gyis kyang 'jug par byed do / goms pa las kyang khyad par nges par gzung ba yod na phyis kyi tshad ma'i 'jug pa la mngon sum yang ltos pa ma yin no zhes don gyis bshad par 'gyur ro /].

128 PVT (nyc:75a6ff): de'i phyir don byed par nus pa'i yul can gyi mngon sum ni 'khrul pa'i 'rgyud mtshan med pa'i phyir tshad ma nyid kyi bdag nyid du gyur pas rang ri pas yongs su bcad pa yin no / ji Itar yongs su bcad pa bzhin du de la nges par skyed par byed pa de Itar na rang nyid kyi tshad ma ya yin pa de'i phyir thug pa med ma pa yin no.

129 See HB (2.*13–14): tatra pakṣadharmsaya śādhyadharminī pratyakṣato 'numānato vā prasiddhir
Šākyabuddhi addresses this problem earlier in the argument (PVT, nye:73b6ff) by raising an objection in the context of inferring fire from smoke:

Is it not the case that, if smoke is apprehended through perception, then since there are causes for error, the evidence will not be definitively determined? That is, there are the causes for error that prompt one to wonder, "Is this a thing that has the appearance of smoke but is actually magically created by a yogin? Or is it coming from a termite tower?" [du ba mngon sum gyis gzung ba na de la yang 'khrul pa'i rgyu yod pa'i phyir rtags nges pa nyid med pa ma yin nam / de ltar na ci 'di ni rnal 'byor pas sprul pa'i du ba'i rnam pa'i dngos po'am / ci braya byin gyi spyi bo las byung ba yin zhes 'khrul pa'i rgyu yod do zhe na /].

Šākyabuddhi goes on (nye:74a1ff) to argue that this is not a problem since the evidence can be confirmed by a perception that is "fully habituated" (shin tu goms pa), i.e., one that is intrinsically instrumental.

Namely, PVT, nye:75a6ff, cited just above.

PVT (nye:75a7ff): dang pa'i me dang chur snang ba'i shes pa yang goms pa med pa na rang rgyud kyi tshad ma nyid kyiis gzung du zin kyang 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan yod pa'i phyir nges pa bskyed pa'i nus pa med pa de bas na / de la phyis kyi tshad ma 'jug pas tshad ma nyid du rnam par gzhang pa / de ltar na gzhan las tshad ma yin no / de yang goms pa yod cing gsal ba can thob pa na rang nyid las yin te / sngraj skad bshad pa lta bu'o / de bas na 'di ltar mngon sum ni rang dan gzhang la tshad ma yin la.

PVP (5a5): ... bzuung ba'i rnam pa yang yin pa dag la yang nges pa skyped par byed pa de la / 'jug par byed pa'i phyir tshad ma nyid du 'dod kyi / gzhan du ni ma yin no / mthong ba las khyad par med na yang / rnam pa gang don du gnyer ba dang / goms pa dang skabs la sogs pa nges pa'li rgyu yod na de nges pa yin gyi / gzhan chod pa ni ma yin no.

See chapter 3 (n.59).

135 I.e., PVP (2a1ff). See above, 280.

136 PVP (2a4ff): mngon sum nyid la 'khrul pa'i rgyu sna tshogs pa nyid kyiis slu ba srid pa'i phyir de'i don gyi don byed pa'i yul can gyi tshad ma phyi ma 'jug pas tshad ma nyid du rtoqs par bya'i / rjes su dpag pa la ni ma yin no / de ltar de'i rang bzhin can nam / 'bras bu'i rtags dngos po'i rang bzhin nyid dang / dngos po'i 'bras bu nyid du nges pa ni rtags can gyi shes pa'li rgyu yin gyi / mngon sum kyis slu ba yin gyi / de la bur gyur ba'i dngos po med par rjes su dpag pa yod pa ma yin pa'li phyir / phyis kyi tshad ma'li 'jug pa la ltaos pa ma yin no.

See above, chapter 3.

There is no doubt that on Dharmakīrti’s view, what he sometimes refers to as selfless (e.g., at PV2.135–136) and sometimes as emptiness (e.g., at PV2.214d–215ab) is to serve as the "antidote" (vipakṣa) to sarkāra, and hence to all suffering. Dharmakīrti does not, however, provide any extended refutation of the self in either PV or PVSV. But as with the Abhidhammic analysis of sāṃśāra and paramārtha-satya (see chapter 1, 41), it appears that his refutations of distributed entities—at least the causes for error—that prompt one to wonder, "Is this a thing that has the appearance of smoke but is actually magically created by a yogin? Or is it coming from a termite tower?" [du ba mngon sum gyis gzung ba na de la yang 'khrul pa'i rgyu yod pa'i phyir rtags nges pa nyid med pa ma yin nam / de ltar na ci 'di ni rnal 'byor pas sprul pa'i du ba'i rnam pa'i dngos po'am / ci braya byin gyi spyi bo las byung ba yin zhes 'khrul pa'i rgyu yod do zhe na /].

For more on Dharmakīrti’s soteriology, see chapter 2 (60ff).

PVIn ad 1.18 (58.12ff): ‘o na da ni mngon sum ma nges pa’i bdag nyid las ji ltar tha snyad du ’gyur / ’di’o zhes bya bar nges na ni bde ba dang sduag bsngal gyi sgrub par byed pa dag thob pa dang spong ba’i don du ’jug pa’i phyir ro zhe na.

PVIn 1.18: tadāstān eva dṛṣṭe su sāṃśāra smarthyabhāvavānāḥ / smaranād abhīhāsena vyavaharaḥ pravartate/.

PVIn ad 1.18 (58.15ff): / skyon ’di med de / gang gi phyir / don mthong ba nyid mthong rnam la / myong ba’i mthu las byung ba yi / dran las mngon par ’dod pa yis / tha snyad rab tu ‘jug pa yin / mngon sum don la lta ba tsam yin yang nyams su myong ba’i mthu las byung ba myong ba mtshams sbyor ba’i dran pa las / de mthong ba nyid na mthong ba rnam la mngon par ’dod pa dang cīg shos dag gis tha snyad du ’gyur ba yin no.

See Dreyfus (1996) for an account of these issues; for the title, Dreyfus draws on Tibetan authors, one of whom compares the problem to "the fool leading the blind." The question here is how the "fool" (perception, which cannot think thoughts) can lead the "blind" (conceptual thought, which cannot directly see any objects).
This is, in short, an argument against admitting conceptual gyur.

See PVT (178a6): 152 This is a reference to HB:2*18–19 (tatra yad ādyam asādhāranāvāsyam darśanam tad eva pramāṇam). See the passage in the appendix (412ff).

This is, in short, an argument against admitting conceptual (savikalpa) perception. See, for example, PV3.133 (manasor yogapadārvitteśa savikalpavikalpayoh / vimūḍha laghu-vṛttter vā tayer aikyaṃ vyayasyati //).

For Dharmakīrti, inference also involves this kind of error, but the error is overcome by means of the svabhāva-pratibandha. See chapter 3.

See PVSV ad PV 1.58 (G:32.7–8): vikalpā / tatra buddhipātivām tadvāsanābhīyāsah prakaraṇām / ityādayo 'nubhavād bhedamāscayotpattisahakārīnaḥ. See also the comments of Śākyabuddhi (PVT:70b4ff).

See PVSV ad PV1.33ab (G:21.6ff) and the closely related discussion at PV3.101–107.

PV3.107d.

See PVT (178a6): blo gros chen pos zhes bya ba ni dbang po las 'das pa'i don mthong ba'o.

PV3.107cd: vyavasyāntikaḥ eva sarvākāraḥ mahābdhiyāḥ.

See Dharmakīrti’s account of yogpratyakṣa (PV3.281–287), especially with the comments of Devendrabuddhi (PVT:210b3ff).

Note that although the context here is the application of the property-svabhāva selflessness to an entity on the basis of the perception of that entity, this does not mean that selflessness per se is perceptible. Rather, the distinction here is between the ability to have a definitive determination of selflessness directly from the perception and the need to resort to evidence to apply that property-svabhāva.

See the highly concise statement of this point at PV3.285: “Therefore, whether it be true or untrue, whatever is meditated upon will result in a clear, nonconceptual cognition when the meditation is perfected.” [tasmand bhūtam abhūram vā yad yad evābhībhāvyate / bhāvanāparimāśpattau tat spuhū.ḥkapaddhipalāhām //].

PV3.286: “Among these experiences, a meditatively induced perception that is trustworthy is instrumental, as is the case with an experience of [any of the sixteen] realities that were previously examined [in the Pramāṇasūtras chapter]. The remainder, such as the hallucinations of a love-crazed man, are mistaken.” [tatra pramānaḥ sambādi yat prāṇa nirūtavastuvat / tadbhāvanāyam pratyakṣaṃ
See, for example, PVT, nye:79a5ff, where Śākyabuddhi, by reducing the discussion of a second characteristic to a matter of worldly convention, seems to suggest that an explicit statement of novelty is not essential to the definition of an instrumental cognition.

Franco (1991 and 1997) has argued that Dharmakīrti does not give a general definition of an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) anywhere in his works. This interpretation is largely based upon the argument that the particle vā in PV2.5 can only properly be construed as a disjunction. Franco’s work, which seeks a historical reading that at points must resist the commentaries, has elicited considerable comment (see for example, the exchange between Franco and Oetke in Katsura 1999). Beyond Franco’s insightful suggestions concerning the relation of Dharmakīrti’s work to the wider philosophical context of his time, one salient outcome of this ”vā controversy” may be the finding that, if we do not resort to commentarial interpretations, our conclusions on the matter are necessarily underdetermined by the available evidence, namely, Dharmakīrti’s laconic statements. This is not a problem in itself, but it is one that must be tolerated when we assay the difficult exploration of Dharmakīrti’s immediate historical context in isolation from the commentarial tradition. When, however, we seek to situate Dharmakīrti within the commentarial tradition that follows him, our task is less difficult. Indeed, we find unanimity on the notion that Dharmakīrti necessarily underdetermined by the available evidence, namely, Dharmakīrti’s laconic statements.

Since I am thankfully concerned with this latter, less assiduous task, I have forgone any extensive discussion of the ”vā controversy.”

See chapter 2 (84ff).

Śākyabuddhi (241a) offers a slightly different interpretation:

"It does not actually exist—it does not exist—in the way that it is imaginatively determined—that is, a person imaginatively determines the expression’s artha to be capable of accomplishing the [desired] artha. And the expression’s artha is not established (gnas = sthita) in the way that it actually exists—i.e., in the way that the particular is established (gnas = sthita)."

K(388) follows Śākyabuddhi on the first phrase, but on the second phrase he remarks:

"Because it is not intended in the manner that it actually exists—because the artha is not taken as an object by the expression in the manner that the artha-particular or mental particular is established to exist. [yathātattvam vasmāhitavā / yathātattvam cāsamāhitavā / tad ayam pravartamānāḥ sarvāda sadasaṃkāyām avadhātirvikalpaprātibhūtaḥ vavstev eva śākyakaroti yat yathātūrtham pratibadho yathāgnaḥ śītrapratikārthāḥ / na hy atra śubdārtho samarthis tadanubhāvapāvā api tadabhāvā / tad ayam arthakriyārthī tadasadhartham prati dattānuyoga bhavītum na yuktāḥ / na hi"
Since it acts upon an imputed universal, the cognitions of selflessness and such are false. Nevertheless, because they are conducive to pacification, they are instrumental. “Pacification” is the elimination of desire (rāga) and such. Having apprehended a real thing as an image that is a universal such as selflessness, one meditates. When the meditation of those who meditate in that fashion is perfected, they no longer perceive the particular that is the object of desire and such, and they thus eliminate desire and such. [bdag med pa la sogs pa'i shes pa ni spil'i rnam par zhugs pa'i phyir nor ba yin mod kyi/ on kyang rab tu zhi ba dang mthun pa'i phyir tshad ma yin no/ rab tu zhi ba ni 'dod chags la sogs pa spangs pa ste/ dngos po bdag med pa la sogs pa spil'i rnam par gzung nas sgom pa byed pa'i sgom pa grub na/ 'dod chags la sogs pa'i rang gi mthsan nyid mngon sum du mi byed pas 'dod chags la sogs pa spong ba'i phyir ro/ = K:211.20: mithyēyādī/ sāmānyākārānapratyāptattavādi antāmādījñānasa mithyāvām/ tathātā prasāmānukū latvat prāmāṇyam prāsaṃ roṣādiprūhānām/ antāmādījñānasa vastu gṛhitvā bhāvayatam bhāvanāṇapattav antāmādīvālakṣānakāna prapratyāptāntām]. Note the crucial difference between the ways Śakyabuddhi and Karṇātakagomini interpret the results of the meditation.

See the fine translation in Nāṇamoli and Bodhi. See the discussion of nonconceptual error in chapter 02 (88).

My reading of this passage is influenced by Dharmottara’s commentary (PVinT 166 a—168a).
Conclusion

Throughout this book I have aimed to develop a historical reading of the central issues in Dharmakirti’s philosophy so as to provide an interpretation of his work as it is presented by the earliest known commentators. In doing so, I hope to have contributed to the history of ideas embodied by a line of imagined Dharmakirtis found in the various commentaries to Dharmakirti’s works. But I also hope that an account of Dharmakirti’s thought from the perspective of a single commentarial stratum will prompt questions that are otherwise more difficult to ask. For example, in some contexts one may find it best to examine a specific issue—such as the notion of instrumentality—at various commentarial strata. To do so, one would trace the interpretation of that issue through many centuries of commentaries, perhaps including not only commentators writing in Sanskrit, but also those who compose their works in Tibetan. To be worthwhile, such a study would have to provide a history of the interpretation of instrumentality, and one would therefore be obliged also to notice and interpret the distinctions among various commentarial interpretations. As a result, we will certainly learn a great deal about the issue under examination, but we will also find it difficult to gain an understanding of the way in which that issue relates to other aspects of Dharmakirti’s thought. Our difficulty in gaining such an understanding stems largely from the enormity of the task in question: on the one hand, we wish to discuss the way in which various aspects of Dharmakirti’s thought are intertwined, but on the other, we have committed ourselves to examining several centuries of commentary. To accomplish both tasks, we would be compelled to give an account that addresses several aspects of Dharmakirti’s thought in terms of several distinct commentarial strata. The sheer quantity of material and the divergent tendencies of the different commentarial strata involved render that approach impossible, both for its audience and its author(s). As a result, the practical and interpretive limitations of a study that ranges widely across commentarial layers will tend to avoid certain questions.

The questions I have in mind are those that involve an interpretation focused on the systematicity of Dharmakirti’s work as it is presented in each commentarial stratum. In attending especially to systematicity, we echo certain concerns of the commentarial tradition, in that its method...
presumes such systematicity: each position must be fully compatible with, or ideally, imply every other position.\textsuperscript{1} Our appropriation of the commentators’ attention to systematicity allows us to more clearly understand certain choices that they have made, and by asking questions that the commentators have not asked, we also highlight the concerns that we bring to the text—whether our concerns be historical, philosophical, ethical, or of some other variety. Certainly, it is not the case that a systematic reading of this kind will respond to all of our interests: the notion that Dharmakīrti’s views changed over the course of his life is one issue that attention to systematicity might obscure. Nevertheless, it may give us a greater appreciation not only for certain elements of Dharmakīrti’s work, but also for the tradition of interpretation that descends from it.

In discussing Dharmakīrti’s work through its foundational points, I hope not only to have encouraged questions that attend to systematicity, but also to have raised some of them obliquely. One example is my allusion to the place of axiological concerns in Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality. This is a question that can only be asked in a way that emphasizes the systematicity in Dharmakīrti’s thought. Along similar lines, I will conclude with the overall contours of an interpretation that springs from a similar question, namely, the relationship among three issues in Dharmakīrti’s thought: nature (svabhāva), intrinsically instrumental perception, and personal transformation or refinement. My argument on this point will remain only suggestive, but it will serve to exemplify the type of study that might emerge from the interpretation I have presented.

\textit{Nature, Perception and Refinement}

As mentioned above, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi maintain that, on Dharmakīrti’s view, a perception is instrumental in that it leads to a correct judgment about that aspect of the object in question which has the expected telic efficacy (abhimatārthakriyā). In the case of some perceptions, instrumentality may depend on a subsequent instrumental cognition. For example, when I see a bright color on the other side of the field, I may think that I am seeing a fire, but that perception’s lack of acuity will require that I use some other instrumental cognition to come to a definitive determination (niścaya) concerning this issue: in such a case, I will only know that I am seeing fire when, for example, I infer its presence from seeing the smoke rising above that spot. The instrumentality of this type of perception is considered to be “extrinsic” (parataḥ). Under other conditions, a perception produces such a determination directly in the form of a correct perceptual judgment. A perception of this latter kind is considered to have “intrinsic instrumentality” (svataḥ prāmāṇya). Such perceptions are instrumental only in that they directly produce a definitive determination of (the capacity for) the expected telic efficacy; hence, even though any
such perception is necessarily nonconceptual, its instrumentality rests on a
correct conceptual cognition, namely, the correct judgment (a definitive
determination or niścaya) that it immediately produces. That judgment,
moreover, is correct in that it successfully refers to an entity that has the
expected telic efficacy. It is in relation especially to these latter perceptions
and the judgments they must produce that Dharmakīrti’s notion of nature
(svabhāva) plays an especially crucial role.

The notion of nature captures our attention when we note how the
apoha-theory accounts for a correct judgment’s successful reference to such
an entity. Let us suppose that we have a perception that immediately
induces the judgment, “This is a water-jug.” Recalling our discussion of the
apoha-theory, we know that this determination cannot refer by way of its
relation to some real universals because Dharmakīrti denies the ultimate
existence of universals. Instead, Dharmakīrti must account for reference
simply on the basis of particulars alone. He does so by appealing to the
notion that each entity that we call a “water-jug” is the same as every other
entity that we call a water-jug in that all those entities have the same effect.
One may thus differentiate them from other entities that do not have the
effect in question. Hence, even though every entity is entirely unique, one
effectively ignores the uniqueness of “water-jugs” in relation to each other
and focuses on their distinction from those entities that do not have the
effect in question. One thus constructs a universal that, in the final analysis,
consists of this exclusion of those entities that do not have the causal
characteristics expected of what we call a “water-jug.”

Discussing the apoha-theory, we noted the difficulty Dharmakīrti faces in
justifying the claim that all the entities in question have the same effect.
Paradigmatically, he appeals to the sameness of the perceptual image
caused by each particular water-jug. Thus, all “water-jugs” are the same in
that they all have the same effect: they produce the same image. Perceptual
images, however, are mental particulars, and Dharmakīrti strictly maintains
that all particulars are unique. How, then, can he claim that all those mental
images are the same? It would seem that, just as all the particulars that we
call “water-jugs” are in fact different from each other, all the images
produced by those entities should likewise be unique. Dharmakīrti responds
once again by appealing to sameness of effect. That is, even though all the
entities that we call “water-jugs” are actually different from each other, we
call them the same in that, with other conditions in place, they produce the
same effect, which is a perceptual image. Likewise, even though the
perceptual images produced by those entities are actually different from
each other, we may consider those images to be the same because, with
other conditions in place, they too produce the same effect. But what is this
same effect that all the images produce? It is a second-order determination
that construes the entity that produced the image to be the same as the
other entities in question. Thus, all “water-jugs,” although actually unique,
may be considered the same in that they have the same effect: a certain
kind of perceptual image; and all those images, although actually unique, may be considered the same in that they all have the same effect: a certain kind of second-order determination.

In our earlier discussion of this appeal to a second-order determination, I noted that Dharmakīrti’s initial problem was an infinite regress: at each level, the conceptually constructed sameness of a set of entities is warranted by the actual sameness of their effect, but those first-order effects are the same only inasmuch as their effects are also the same. Hence, in order to avoid this infinite regress, Dharmakīrti does not argue that the aforementioned second-order determinations are the same because they all have the same effect. Instead, he asserts that those determinations simply present themselves in such a way that they seem to be the same. But why do those determinations seem to be the same? The answer is straightforward: because it is the nature of their causes—the perceptual images—to produce determinations that seem the same. And why do the perceptual images have that nature? Because it is the nature of their causes—the perceptual objects in question—to produce images of that kind. Explained in this way, Dharmakīrti’s theory roots the conceptually constructed sameness that accounts for a correct judgment’s reference in the nomological natures of causally efficient things.

Returning now to the intrinsic instrumentality of habituated perceptions, we see that the notion of nature plays a critical role in Dharmakīrti’s theory. Such a perception is considered to be instrumental because it immediately produces a correct judgment concerning the relevant causal capacities of the object in question. And the correctness of that judgment is warranted by the very nature of the object itself. Read in this fashion, Dharmakīrti’s thought appears to be a fairly straightforward brand of realism, in combination with a nominalist stance toward universals. In the context of instrumentality, his thought appears to rest on a kind of internalist foundationalism, where knowledge is ultimately rooted in the indubitability of habituated perceptions.

We come to such a conclusion, however, only if we ignore other contexts in which the notion of nature appears. In our analysis of svabhāvapratibandha, for example, we saw that, for Dharmakīrti, an entity’s “nature” must be a conceptual construction that represents the totality of that entity’s causal characteristics. While that construction is restricted by the causal functionality of the particulars involved, it is nevertheless mind-dependent, in that factors such as interest, acuity and habituation always play a role in the formation of concepts according to Dharmakīrti’s apoha-theory.

Another way to express this point is to note that, if two persons are observing the same perceptual object, the images produced in the minds of those persons are unique particulars. As particulars, those images differ, and whatever might be the causal variations in the non-mental factors, the differences in the minds involved will make those images different. Hence,
the “nature” of the object in question is in significant ways reflective of the mind in which that object is being perceived. This dependence on the particular state of a being’s mind might lead us to think even more strongly that Dharmakīrti is resorting to an internalist foundationalism rooted in irrefragable and private sense data, but in fact, Dharmakīrti clearly rejects the ultimate reliability of such data.

The previous chapter ended with a reference to Dharmakīrti’s notion of an “internal distortion,” which applies only at the level of Epistemic Idealism. Through that distortion, all the perceptions of ordinary persons are contaminated by ignorance. That distortion, moreover, operates in a manner analogous to other cases of nonconceptual error, as in the example of the bent stick: when one visually examines a stick that is partially submerged in water, one will have the visual impression that the stick is bent, and any straightforward phenomenal account of one’s perception would have to include a report such as, “That stick is bent.” This example demonstrates that, given the circumstances (angle of vision, a particular kind of visual faculty, and so on), the error will remain irremediable: the cognitive image in the perception is one in which the stick will always look bent, and an image produced under those circumstances can never be phenomenally “straightened out” as it were. Along these same lines, Dharmakīrti’s Epistemic Idealism maintains that the “internal distortion” applies to all perceptions of all ordinary persons: all cognitive images involving the five sense faculties will always include an irremediable distortion whereby the perceptual object would appear to exist outside of mind. And just as the stick is not actually bent, so too the object is not actually extra-mental. Thus, in a significant way, the sense data of all ordinary persons are fundamentally flawed, and with regard to at least some ontological issues, sense data therefore cannot be the foundation for one’s knowledge.

Our discussion of ultimate and conventional knowledge, however, indicated that Dharmakīrti does not just dismiss the perceptions of ordinary persons, despite the distortion inherent in them. Instead, he considers them to be “conventional instruments of knowledge” that we may use for various purposes, including our progress toward spiritual emancipation. Hence, even though the mind-dependency of a perceptual object’s nature in part means that an ordinary person’s perception of it will be distorted, that distortion does not entirely vitiate the perception. We can understand this point by recalling that the intrinsic instrumentality of a perception depends on that perception’s ability to immediately produce a correct judgment of some aspect of the perceptual object that is relevant to the purpose at hand. But to be instrumental in this fashion, the perception need not produce a correct judgment about every aspect of an object. Hence, my perception of a patch of blue may lead directly to the determination, “That is blue.” And if that judgment is relevant to my purpose, then that perception is intrinsically instrumental. Suppose, however, that I am concerned with the
question of whether that perceptual object endures for more than one instant. In my current state, my perceptual data alone will not enable me to directly determine, “That is momentary”; hence, that perception is not instrumental in regard to momentariness. Likewise, if my purpose requires that I know whether that perceptual object is in fact extramental, then my perception will again not be instrumental, since it is contaminated by the internal distortion that makes all of my sensory objects seem external.

Despite such distortions and inadequacies, an ordinary person’s perceptions have what we might call a “quotidian instrumentality”; that is, they are instrumental about numerous ordinary issues. Indeed, most of our quotidian concerns (Is this teacup hot? Is this water cold?) are matters about which our perceptions are instrumental, despite any internal distortion and other such problems. This quotidian instrumentality is certainly part of what Dharmakīrti means when he speaks of such perceptions as conventional instruments of knowledge. Moreover, the Sanskrit term saṃvyavahārika, the “conventional,” suggests that a perception is conventionally acceptable in that it somehow coheres with the distorted lifeworld of ordinary beings. One playful metaphor that applies in this context is the coherent (if limited) conversation that two drunkards may have about the two moons that both see. Both being equally soused, they both see two moons, and they can each remark to the other about this remarkable event. Or perhaps even more à propos is the example of the “pus-rivers” seen by pretas (“hungry ghosts”). That is, when humans and pretas gaze at the same flowing substance, humans see a river of water, but pretas see a river of pus. The fact that their perceptions cohere differently—humans agree that it is water, hungry ghosts agree that it is pus—is a result of the karma that has shaped the lifeworld that they inhabit. From the perspective of humans, the hungry ghosts’ perceptions are distorted, and from the point of view of a phungry ghost, the humans see it wrong. Nevertheless, the humans agree among themselves that what they are seeing is water, just as the hungry ghosts agree that they are seeing pus. This cosmological example is useful for understanding Dharmakīrti’s notion of conventional perception. That is, even though the lifeworld experienced by ordinary persons is contaminated by the internal distortion and other such problems, they can usually agree on what they are seeing. In other words, their perceptions cohere in regard to most daily issues.

We might think, then, that we have returned to some admixture of internalist foundationalism, confirmed by an appeal to coherence. The ultimate arbiter of a habituated perception’s intrinsic instrumentality amounts to the fact that our perceptual content appears a certain way to us, and in this sense the theory resembles an internalist foundationalism. But when we examine our perceptual process rationally, we uncover certain contradictions that point to fundamental distortions (such as the internal error) in that process. Concerned that our sense data may therefore be
somehow compromised, we confirm our interpretations of our perceptions by appealing to what others report, and we find that everyone from whom we can receive a verifiable report is in agreement, at least to a degree that enables us to engage in practical actions about subjectively obvious sense objects, such as a glass of water. It would seem this confirmation need be performed only by those who have uncovered the rational inconsistencies in our understanding of perception, and once we know that those inconsistencies are irrelevant to our quotidian concerns, we can bracket out the distortion revealed by our rational analysis and rely on our habituated sense impressions—the ones that do not involve any doubt—to pursue our quotidian goals. Metaphorically, we might say that we are all wearing defective glasses of a certain type. We find that the defects are irrelevant for quotidian matters, and since everyone is wearing the glasses, no one offers a divergent report on obvious perceptual objects. Thus, even though we know that the glasses are somehow distorting our perceptions, we need not be concerned with those distortions because they affect neither our daily goals nor our known communications to other perceivers. We can thus rely on those habituated perceptions at face value, at least for the purpose of daily matters.

Dharmakīrti’s notion of conventional instruments of knowledge suggests an account along these lines, but we need to add an important stipulation: namely, that on Dharmakīrti’s view, we are all deeply dissatisfied with those daily lives. Thus, even though our perceptions are adequate to (and consistent with) the way we lead our lives, we would prefer that our lives were otherwise. In short, Dharmakīrti’s theory assumes that we seek to escape the lifeworld in which our perceptions are embedded. The possibility of escape is indicated by the very conventionality of perception itself: although our perceptions are coherent in relation to that lifeworld, they are in fact erroneous from an ontological perspective. It is thus not contradictory for hungry ghosts to see pus in one locus, while humans see water in the very same locus. A contradiction is avoided because these perceptions do not fully correspond to ontological realities, and to the extent that they differ, they are located within different conventions which are sustained by the beings within each world. Hence, inasmuch as some aspects of our perceptions are erroneous, the way we perceive the world does not reflect an ontological reality. In part this means that, even if we feel and believe that our perceptions correspond to the way things really are, the lifeworld with which those perceptions cohere is not ontologically given. Leaving that lifeworld behind therefore does not require some kind of radical ontological makeover—a task that would seem impossible, given Dharmakīrti’s notion of causality. Instead, escaping that world is a matter of eliminating the perceptual errors that sustain it.

For Dharmakīrti, it would seem that this elimination of error proceeds through a gradual process of refinement. Speculatively, we might say that the goal is to alter the dispositions that, from the perceiver’s side, contribute to the construction of a perceptual object’s nature. In other
words, the transition from one lifeworld to a more refined one is facilitated by coming to see the world in a certain way, which in effect means learning to construct natures in a particular fashion. The construction of nature, however, is not a matter of manipulating sense data after they are in place; rather, it is creating a mental context in which sense data will appear a certain way, within the constraints posed by the causal characteristics of the objects in question. For Dharmakīrti’s purposes, perhaps the most effective way of shaping the mind in this fashion is reasoning.

Consider, for example, the reasoning that leads one to understand that a seemingly perdurant entity—such as a water-jug—is in a constant state of instantaneous flux. Through the careful application of that reasoning and subsequent contemplation of the conclusions that one reaches, one eventually begins to see such entities as momentary. In other words, one starts with an unhabituated perception: the water-jug just looks utterly perdurant, and this perception is therefore not instrumental in regard to the water-jug’s momentariness; indeed, the notion that it is momentary may seem so counterintuitive that it is at the very edge of what we can plausibly entertain. Applying, however, the appropriate inferential reasoning to that perception, one realizes that the water-jug is indeed momentary. Eventually, by using reasoning and contemplation to habituate the mind to the momentariness of such objects, one no longer needs to rely on an inference: the object now appears momentary when one gazes upon it; that is, one may immediately determine that it is momentary without appealing to any intervening inference. Gaining this insight, one has effectively left behind one faulty lifeworld—in which beings see and react to such objects as if they were perdurant—and moved on to a more refined one, in which at least that one error has been eliminated.8

If some such model underlies Dharmakīrti’s notion of refinement, then reasoning plays a crucial role in the transition from an erroneous lifeworld to a more refined one. Nevertheless, reasoning is clearly not sufficient in itself: it must be guided by certain interests and questions, without which one could not construe an object’s nature in the required fashion.9 That is, to begin an inquiry into the seeming perdurance of entities, one must be motivated by some desire to know (jīnāsa) directed toward some purpose (prayojana). Here, one central purpose is to eliminate the suffering associated with loss: when my favorite water-jug breaks, I am disturbed; as my body decays and dies, I feel unhappy. But to address the problem of loss, I must accept that I am suffering in that way. Likewise, I must believe that it is possible to eliminate that suffering, and I must agree that rational inquiry into my belief in perdurance is at least part of the means to do so. Numerous other Buddhist claims soon become crucial: contemplation enables reasoning to refine the mind; moral rectitude is a prerequisite for effective contemplation; a morality rooted in compassion is the most effective context for such practices. Dharmakīrti would surely maintain that, without these and numerous other conditions, refinement through
reasoning cannot even begin. In short, the process of refinement requires not just Buddhist reasoning, but a Buddhist way of life.

Dharmakīrti’s recommendation that we refine ourselves through reasoning and contemplation can thus be read as an indirect argument for the importance of Buddhist institutions. To put it baldly, in order to become more refined one must learn to see the world like a Buddhist. And seeing the world in that fashion requires the pervasive context provided by the Buddhist community. In other words, to see the world as a Buddhist, one must allow Buddhist institutions to mold one accordingly. And we can thus suspect that, whatever else they may do, Dharmakīrti’s arguments arise from—and serve to defend—those institutions. Nevertheless, setting aside our suspicion, we can draw other lessons from Dharmakīrti’s notion of refinement: to be refined, one must acknowledge the contingency of one’s lifeworld, including its institutions. Refinement also requires that one accept the possibility that other equally contingent lifeworlds and institutions, whose otherness places them at the edge of our ken, may have resolved some of what we find unsatisfactory in our own. On this charitable reading, Dharmakīrti counsels us to seek out those institutions that accept contingency and the possibility of refinement, and he urges us to inquire into those other lifeworlds that, while not yet understood, may one day aid us in the goals that we seek.

1 In other words, Dharmakīrti’s commentators tend to interpret Dharmakīrti’s texts as a single, non-contradictory whole whose parts mutually reinforce each other. See the Introduction.

2 See the discussion in chapter 3 (184ff).

3 Note that, on Dharmakīrti’s view, the particular conditions in the production of an effect will slightly alter that effect such that it may have a distinctive quality; hence, even if it may be counted as the same as other effects in a general sense, its particularity will distinguish it even from those other effects. This basic point is made in PV1.21: “It is seen that substances have different kinds of capacities due to the differences in conditions, such as location. Because one has observed such a special capacity in a thing in one place, it is not correct that one is certain of the existence of that special quality in the same kind of thing in another place” [deśāḥ śādibhedāḥ drṣyantē bhināṃ dravyeyuṣu śāktayāḥ / tatraikadṛṣṭyā nānyatra yuktas tadbhāvaniścayah].

4 See the discussion of perceptual error in chapter 2 (87ff).

5 I am thinking especially of the way in which saṃyavahārika implies a transactional or interactive reality that forms the context of one’s practical actions toward a goal. See the previous chapter, n. 58.

6 Along the lines of Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasamgraha (15b–16b), this case is raised by Vasubandhu in his Viṃśatikā, a text that Dharmakīrti probably considered important. Śākyabuddhi and Devendrabuddhi refer quite clearly to the Viṃśatikā (see the translation in Appendix 7, especially notes 14 and 18). The point of the example is that the same locus is seen by different communities of beings in divergent ways. Vinātadeva (177a) limits his interpretation to different communities of hungry ghosts; this is less striking (and less well known) than the notion that beings in entirely different karmic states are having radically different experiences of the same spatiotemporal locus. In Dharmakīrti’s time, Candrakīrti refers to such a case (Madhyamakāvatāra 6.71), but a particularly clear account is offered much later by Asvabhāva in his commentary (82b–83a) on a verse from Kampala’s filokamālā:

Due to the variety in their karma, when pretas look at one river, it is filled with pus, and it likewise has the scum of urine and excrement; that is, it has a scum that is a mixture of feces
and urine. But when humans look at that same river, they see it as clean; and they drink it. [’las
sna tsogs pas chu bo geig la yang nhag tu ’brub cing de bzhin du bshang gein rnyog pa dang ldan na /
phyis dang gein ’dres pa’i rnyog pa dang ldan par yi dags kyiis mthong ngo / de bzhin du chu bo de nyid la
mi yis chu bo dri ma med par mthong ba dang ni ’thung ba yang yin no /
]

7 I will not discuss here the mechanisms of that coherence, but in addition to an obvious appeal to
karma, Dharmakīrti’s theory also likely rests on some notion of intersubjectivity as briefly described
by Vasubandhu (Viṃśatikā 18ab and Vṛtti): “Cognitive representations are mutually restricted due to
mutual influence. That is, due to the mutual influence of their cognitive representations, all beings’
cognitive representations mutually restrict each other, as is appropriate” [anyonyādhipatīyena
vijñaptinyānā mithāḥ//18ab/sarveśāṃ hi sattvāṃ anyonyavijñaptīdhipatyāḥ mitho vijñānter niyamo
bhavati yathāyogam]

8 I am alluding again to the verse cited earlier from Śāntideva (BCA 9:3–4ab): “In this regard, it is
observed that there are two kinds of persons, the spiritual adept (yogin) and the ordinary person.
Among these, the ordinary person is refuted by the adept. And adepts are refuted by successively
more advanced yogins through a distinctive quality of their understanding” [tatra loko dvīdhā drṣṭo
yogī prākṛtakas tathā / tatra prākṛtako loko yogilokena bādhya // bādhyaṃ dhi viṣeṣena yogino ‘py
uttarottaraḥ /]. Prajñākaramati provides the gloss of loka as “person(s)” (jana), but it is tempting here
to translate it as a “lifeworld.”

9 To put it another way, the problem of a subject-shift in Dharmakīrti’s notion of nature (see 200ff),
along with his notion of the conditioning of perceptual judgment (see 184ff) requires that, before any
reasoning can be applied, one must first see the subject of one’s inference in the appropriate fashion.
If, for example, one cannot see that oneself is a suffering person, inferences concerning the cause of
that suffering cannot be applied.
Appendix of Translations

A Note on the Translations

The following translations provide the larger context of the portions cited in the body of this work. Where possible, the translations have been prepared from critical editions (see the bibliography). In the case of some Tibetan texts—most notably the commentaries of Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi—critical editions are not available. For these texts, I employed the Sde-dge edition of the Tibetan canon. On some occasions, a passage in one of these texts would present, as it stands, a meaning that seemed either grammatically incoherent or irreconcilable with the context of the argument. Only such passages were checked for variations in the Peking edition of the Tibetan canon.

Some of the passages translated here have been previously translated, and the chart below lists those previous versions. In my experience, the best translations build on the invaluable work of their predecessors, and I am clearly indebted to all who have worked on this material. I generally avoided, however, any consultation of previous translations until the point of preparing final drafts of the passages presented below. It is hoped that this procedure preserved a certain freshness of interpretation.

Translations into German and Japanese were consulted only on questionable readings. Translations into English or French were checked more thoroughly. In some cases, an initial evaluation of a translation prompted me to avoid consulting it further. One or more of three basic reasons underlie such decisions: (1) the translation follows primarily an indigenous Tibetan interpretation of an Indian text where the aforementioned interpretation cannot be reconciled with Dharmakīrti’s earliest commentators; (2) the translation is unintelligible; and/or (3) the translation consistently interprets passages in a manner that is so grammatically or semantically implausible that no informed reader could accept its interpretation. It is particularly important to note that the first criterion—i.e., a translation by way of a uniquely Tibetan interpretation—has no bearing whatsoever on the quality of the translation. It is instead the historical constraints that I have placed upon this work that limit the relevance of such translations.

In general, I have avoided specific reference to previous translations in
the notes below, in part because repeated mention of disagreements would be both tedious and pointless. I thus leave the task of detailed comparison to the reader. It is, of course, my contention that where previous versions are available, I have made at least some incremental improvement, in the hope that this work too will be superseded before long.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passage</th>
<th>Previous Versions</th>
<th>Amount Translated¹</th>
<th>Target Language</th>
<th>Consulation²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PV1,14–37</td>
<td>Frauwallner (1910–35)</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVSV and PV1,14–37</td>
<td>Moskowitz &amp; Nagaaki (paraphrase)</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV and PV1,14–37</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K and PV1,14–37</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV,68–73</td>
<td>Frauwallner (1930–35)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVSV and PV,68–73</td>
<td>Ona &amp; Vora</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetter (1964)</td>
<td>Most</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwilling (1976)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Set aside</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV and PVSV and PV,68–73</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K and PV1,68–75</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV,137–142</td>
<td>Frauwallner (1930–35)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVSV and PV,137–144</td>
<td>Zwilling (1976)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Set aside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetter (1964)</td>
<td>Selections</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV and PVSV and PV,137–142</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K and PVSV and PV,137–142</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 A translation of “selections” includes up to a third of the passage. A rendering of “most” includes more than a third, but significant portions have been elided. A translation of “all” is of the entire passage.

2 A “full” consultation means that I have read all of the translation and compared a significant portion in detail. A “limited” consultation means that I have read only a portion of the translation and compared few if any passages. A translation that has been “set aside” is one that, after an initial evaluation, has not proven useful. Finally, a translation may be “not consulted” due to the unavailability of the publication.
1. *PVSV ad PV1.34–371*

“Well, then, if observation and nonobservation are not the basis for knowing the positive and negative concomitance, then how does one know that smoke is invariable as an indicator of fire?”

One knows it since

smoke is fire’s effect because the characteristic of being its effect is distributed over all instances of smoke. [PV1.34ab]

If a previously unperceived thing defined as perceptible is later perceived when other things are perceived, and if that thing is not perceived when one among those other things is absent, then it is the effect of that thing. That kind of definition of an effect applies to smoke.

If it exists even when the fire does not, then it is no longer causally arisen. [PV1.34cd]

Smoke is established to be the effect of fire from being seen to be so just once because, were it not its effect, it would not occur even once from that which is not its cause. And if an effect were to exist without its cause, then it would be causeless. For that which exists without something else does not have that other thing as its cause. If smoke were to exist without fire, then fire would not be the cause of smoke.

Someone objects, “It would not be causeless because something else could be its cause.”

Such is not the case because the same problem applies, since smoke occurs when fire is present, even if that other, alleged cause is absent. How, moreover, could smoke occur from that which does not have the property-*svabhāva* of producing smoke, whether it be fire or something else? If you do not admit that the cause must have the property-*svabhāva* of producing smoke, then since an entity that does not have that property-*svabhāva* of producing smoke does not produce smoke, smoke would be causeless.

“We are not saying that the smoke itself occurs from something other than fire because we mean that something similar to smoke occurs from that other thing.”

How can an entity that is similar to smoke come from a cause that is dissimilar to fire? This is not possible because an entity similar to smoke comes from an entity similar to fire. If an effect *y* that is similar to some other effect *x* were to come from a cause that was dissimilar to cause of *x*, then the causal capacities of those dissimilar causes would not be restricted to producing dissimilar effects. Hence, a difference in cause would not be
determinative of things as different. Therefore, the diversity of the universe would be causeless, or else anything would come from anything. Therefore, since those conclusions are unacceptable, it must be the case that the difference or nondifference of effects is due to the difference or nondifference of causes. Hence, smoke does not come from an object (artha) that is dissimilar to its observed source because one would be forced to conclude that smoke is causeless. And thus,

since that which is causeless does not depend on anything else, it would be either permanently existent or permanently nonexistent. Things occur intermittently because they are dependent. [PV1.35]

If smoke were causeless, then, since it would not depend on anything for its existence, it would never be nonexistent because there would be no incompleteness in the conditions for its existence, just as there is no incompleteness in the conditions for its existence at the time that it is accepted to have been produced. Or else it would not even occur at the time when one accepts that it has been produced because that time would not be distinct from the time when it is not existent. For it is by virtue of their dependence [on a complete causal complex at a specific time and place] that things are intermittent (kādācitka).

Entities must be dependent in this fashion because the time [and place] when and where an entity does occur have the capacity required for that entity to occur, but the time [and place] when and where an entity does not occur do not have the capacity required for that entity to occur. This must be the case because otherwise the time [and place] that are a locus of that entity’s occurrence and the time [and place] that are not such a locus would be equal in terms of whether or not they had that capacity. As such, the fact of being a locus for the occurrence of that entity would not be restricted [to just the time and place that had that capacity] and the fact of not being a locus for the occurrence of that entity would not be restricted [to just the time and place that do not have that capacity]. And what else but the presence of the cause could constitute that capacity?

Therefore, a thing that is occurring in one time and place in distinction to another time and place where it is not occurring is dependent upon the conditions in the aforementioned time and place. In other words, its occurrence in that fashion [i.e., in a specific time and place] constitutes its dependence on the conditions in that time and place because a thing that did not depend on the causal support provided by those conditions in that time and place could not be restricted in its occurrence to that time and place. Hence, since smoke is restricted to a specific time and place, the nature-svabhāva of smoke is the product of that in whose time and location smoke is observed [at least] once and in whose absence it is then not observed. This must be the case because otherwise, smoke would not occur
even once. And being restricted to that time and place where its cause is present, how could smoke occur elsewhere [i.e., where its cause is absent]? If it were to occur elsewhere, it would not be smoke because a particular property-\textit{svabhāva} of smoke is that it is produced by that cause.

Likewise, the cause, namely fire, also has the property-\textit{svabhāva} of producing that kind of effect. If smoke were to come from something else, then the capacity to produce smoke would not be a property-\textit{svabhāva} of fire. Hence, fire would not produce smoke even once. Nor can that which comes from that other thing be smoke, for it has come from an entity that does not have the property-\textit{svabhāva} of producing smoke. And if that other thing actually does have that property-\textit{svabhāva} of producing smoke, then that other thing must be fire. Hence, the relation between an effect and a cause is invariable.

A termite tower is fire if it has the nature of fire. If it does not have the nature of fire [which is unique in including the property-\textit{svabhāva} of producing smoke], how could smoke arise in the presence of just a termite tower? Smoke could not arise in that case because fire has the property-\textit{svabhāva} of being the cause of smoke; its distinguishing characteristic (\textit{bheda}) is to have the causal potential to produce smoke. If smoke were to come from that which is not the cause of smoke, it would be causeless. [PV1.36–37]

---

1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from PVSV are based upon the interpretation of Śākyabuddhi.
2 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:50b) supplies:

One might wonder, “One has seen that one instance of smoke came from a particular causal complex of fire and so on. But if that which one sees later is something different, how can one establish that it is the effect of fire by observing that smoke came from fire just once?”

3 In other words, one could not establish that \(x\) and \(y\) are different by appealing to the fact that \(x\) and \(y\) have different causes.

4 A termite tower (\textit{sakramūrdhan}) may sometimes emit smoke due to the decaying matter used to warm the egg chambers.
Real things are themselves different, but in conceptual cognition they appear as if nondifferent in that they appear in some single form. Those things appear that way in that their differentiation is obscured by an obscurative cognition which obscures the form of something else [i.e., those distinct real things—] with its own form [i.e., the form of a single image]. That obscurative cognition, although based on those different real things, has the cognitive appearance of a single object. [PV1.68–69]

Due to the intention of that cognition, a universal is commonly said to exist. But it does not ultimately exist in the way that it is conceptualized by that cognition. [PV1.70]

A conceptual awareness arises in dependence on things which are excluded from what is other than those [that have the same cause or effect]. In conformity with the nature (prakṛti) of its imprints, that awareness conceals the distinct form of each of those things, and ascribes to them its own nondifferent appearance. Doing so, that conceptual awareness conflates those things and presents them as nondifferent. Those things conceptualized as nondifferent are excluded from others in that they have the same effects and causes; there is also a cognitive imprint (vāsanā) that induces one to conceptualize those things in that fashion. The nature (prakṛti) of those distinct things themselves and the nature of that imprint are such that the cognition that arises from those things and that imprint appears in this way [i.e., such that those things seem nondifferent]. That awareness is obscurative (saṃvṛti); that is, it obscures the form of something else [i.e., those distinct things] with its own form. In other words, that cognition obscures the difference among those things; even though they are themselves different, they appear nondifferent in that they appear with some single form. In conformity with those things, appearance, we call [the mentally constructed image] the “universal” of those mentally occurring real things, which appear to be external due to being apprehended in the form of a specific kind of cognitive image.

“But how is it that a universal is an other-exclusion?”

That [conceptually constructed image] is itself an other-exclusion. Conceptual awareness apprehends that, and since concepts are by nature erroneous, the awareness appears as if it were apprehending a real thing. That conceptual cognition occurs only with regard to things that are excluded from others [that do not have the same causes or effects]; as such,
that awareness is understood to have an exclusion as its object.\(^6\)

“But the distinct things in question are external, and concepts do not refer [directly] to external things. So how can one have a conceptual awareness with regard to them?”\(^7\)

Those who are analyzing universals distinguish [the conceptually constructed image from the object], but people engaged in practical action (\textit{vyavaharīḥ}) do not. Thinking that their percept is capable of telic function, those engaged in practical action unify the visible object with the conceptual object, and having done so, they act. It is in terms of the intention of persons engaged in practical action that the relationship between universals and particulars is explained in this way—i.e., such that particulars which, by virtue of producing the [desired] effect, are different from those that do not produce that effect, are made known as such by an expression [whose direct object is necessarily a universal]. But those who ponder reality do not consider the universal and the particular to be nondifferent because particulars have distinct cognitive images [in perceptual awareness] and so on.\(^8\)

“But if your statement that concepts occur with regard to particulars conforms to the intention of the person knowing them, then the universal should not be an other-exclusion because it is not known in that way by those persons.”

Not only is it not known in that way, but it is also not known as either the same as or different from its instances, or as permanent, all pervasive, and so on. Rather, awareness arises with just a nondifferent image. What is the basis for that awareness? We say that its basis is other-exclusion, and we say this because: [1] that other-exclusion does exist in real things; [2] there is no contradiction [in claiming that other-exclusion is the basis for such cognitions]; and [3] practical action that is based on language is observed to proceed in that manner.

Moreover, there is no real universal whatsoever that exists in the way that a conceptual or linguistic cognition appears, since

\[
\text{the individuals (\textit{vyakti}) they themselves do not occur in many things; and nothing else that occurs in many things appears. [PV1.71ab]}
\]

Individuals are not distributed over each other. They cannot be distributed because if they were, there would be no distinct individuals; hence, one would be forced to conclude that there would also be no universal.\(^9\) Moreover, it is not the case that something that is other—i.e., distinct from those individuals—appears that way in awareness. And how can that which has no cognitive appearance induce one to apprehend or designate something else as itself?\(^10\) Nor is it the case that something is universal just because it is a single thing which is connected to those [particulars] because one would incur an overextension. I have already explained this.\(^11\)
“A single universal is the warrant for expressions and cognitions that construe many individuals as nondifferent. It is not the case that all [entities that inhere in things, such as numbers, serve as warrants in that fashion].”

But how can one have a cognition of one thing from another thing?
“Because the one thing has a relation to the other.”

Then one would be forced to conclude that number, effect-substance, and so on are also universals. But how can one have a cognition of one thing from another thing? Because the one thing has a relation to the other.

They are not universals because they do not have the nature of universals.

Well, we should investigate what the nature of a universal might be. In this regard, some philosophers say that when a certain kind of singular, real thing has a relation to multiple individuals, one has a cognition of those individuals as the same; thus, they call that real thing a universal. But here, we say the following. One could have a cognition of some individuals as the same from effect-substance and so on, which are also connected to many individuals; one could have such a cognition because effect-substance and so on can serve as the warrant for such a cognition. Therefore, effect-substances and such should also have the nature of universals. Otherwise, the other case—the case of what you call universals—should also not be the warrant for a cognition of many things as the same because there is no distinction in this regard between what you call universals and what you call effect-substance, number, and so on. Thus, on these philosophers’ definition the natures of substances, qualities and universals are all muddled.

“Well, then, the universal is the appearance in a cognition; and since it is of the nature of awareness, it exists.”

That is not so, because of the following question:

And how can that which is not different from awareness occur in another object? [PV1.71cd]

How can a universal allegedly instantiated in some objects have the nature of awareness? It cannot because that which has the nature of awareness does not exist in those objects.

“The universal has the nature of awareness because one imagines that the mental universal has the nature of those external objects whereby one commits a cognitive error; it is through this error that one engages in practical action.”

What then causes awareness to arise in that fashion with regard to those particulars? If it arises without any basis, one would have such awarenesses with regard to everything. Alternatively, [if one ignores the problem of the cause, one can still ask:] how can a form which is not different from one awareness be the form of another awareness that comes from another thing? Therefore, how could that which does not pervade other awarenesses or other things be a universal?
Therefore, the apprehension of a single essence (ātman) in many things is a false cognition. [PV1.72ab]

Objects are not the same in terms of any essence present in all of them, whether it be distinct or not distinct from each thing that instantiates it. Therefore the apprehension of those things in that way is just a false conceptual cognition.

The seed of this conceptual cognition is each object’s difference from this and that other object; one engages in the formation of linguistic conventions (saṃjñā) for the purpose of knowing that difference. [PV1.72cd]

One forms linguistic conventions in order to have a cognition of a certain type of difference such that, having known that things which have nondifferent effects are different from those which do not have those effects, persons who understand those conventions act by avoiding those things that do not have the aforementioned effect. This difference from this and that is the seed for the false conceptual cognition in which those things appear to have a single essence. Having apprehended that difference that those things seem to share, the conceptual cognition appears in that way due to the nature of the imprint for it.

“You maintain that different things have a nondifferent effect, whereby those things are said to share a nondifference in that they can all be characterized by a difference from things that are other than those that have the aforementioned effect. But how can this be the case?”

The nature (prakṛti) of things is such that although they are different, by their nature (svabhāva) some of them are restricted to the accomplishment of the same telos (artha) such as inducing the same judgment (ekapratyavamarṣajñāna) or producing an awareness of an object; the sense faculties and so on are examples. [PV1.73]

For example, the sensory faculty, the object, light, and mentation (manasikāra)—or [according to other philosophies], the self, the faculty, mind, the object, and contact—produce a single effect, namely, an awareness of a visible form. They produce this one, same effect even though they do not instantiate a universal that is restricted to having the nature of producing that effect. Likewise, distinct instances of trees such as śimśapās and so on by their very nature produce the same effect, namely, a recognitional awareness that has an image of each instance as the same as the others, i.e., as a “tree.” All tree-instances have those same effects even though they are not distributed the one over the other. Or they accomplish some other telic function that is to be done by wood, such as combustion,
housing, and so on, in accord with the conditions. But even though water and such are also not distinct from trees in that any entity is different from all others, water and so on nevertheless do not perform the aforementioned telic functions, just as the ear and so on cannot produce an awareness of visible form.

A further examples are certain medicines which, although they are different from each other, are seen to eliminate fever, either in combination or individually. Other things do not do so. [PV1.74]

The Guḍūcī herb, purgation and so on, either together or separately, perform a single function such as the elimination of fever. Even though these things are different, a universal is not required for such to be the case—in i.e., for them to have the same effect—because their nature is such that they relieve fever. Even though they are not different from those medicines in that they are also unique [i.e., different from all other things], curds, lead, and such do not do so.

But someone might say, “Some universal exists in those kinds of things; and it is due to that universal that they perform one function.”

This is not correct. The universal is without distinction. Therefore, the universal is not [PV1.75a] that which performs that function

because one would be forced to conclude that those medicines’ performance of that function would not be distinct, even when there are differences among those medicines, such as being produced in different fields. [PV1.75b–c]

If the effect of alleviating fever and so on were performed through a universal, then since the universal is not distinct in any of its instances, the individuals, despite the difference in the fields where they are planted and such, would also have no distinctions, such as bringing slow or quick relief. So too, the qualities of some plants would not be better than others. Alternatively, if the universal had some distinction in this or that instance, then it would by its nature-svabhāva be different in its various instances; hence, it would lose the nature of being a universal [which is necessarily the same in all its instances].

Also, the universal is not what performs functions because, since the universal is constant, it cannot causally support anything. [PV1.75d]

[Since it is unchanging,] a universal cannot be augmented, so if it were to provide causal support, it would produce all of its effects at once. Otherwise, it would not have the nature-svabhāva of producing that effect. But individuals occur in distinctive ways due to the time, place, and modifying conditions of their occurrence. There is no contradiction if one says that those individuals produce distinctive effects. Likewise, even
though they are by nature different, certain things accomplish the same
telic function, such as producing the same recognitional awareness
(pratyabhijñāna). As such, they are different from other things that do not
perform that function, and they are therefore said to be nondifferent. Or
those various things that are produced by a single cause are said to be
nondifferent because they are different from those things that are not
produced by that cause.

“Well, through the universal—which you have defined as difference
[from that which does not have the intended telic function]—does one
cognize the particular as the same as other particulars, or does one cognize
something other than a particular in that fashion? What problem comes
from this? Well, if the particular is what one cognizes as the same, then how
can it be an object of conceptuality? And if one cognizes something else,
then how could there be telic function from something other than a
particular? And since one would not cognize impermanence and such in a
particular, the particular would not have the nature of being impermanent
and so on. Furthermore, since they are not cognized in particulars, those
universals such as impermanence would not be qualities of real things.”

This fault does not apply because it is in relation to the appearance in
conceptual cognition that we form conventions for universals, co-
referentiality, and the subject-predicate relation. This type of awareness
arises in dependence on imprints that have been left by perceptual
experience, which apprehends the natures of real things. The awareness
that arises in this fashion is conceptual; as such, even though it does not
have those real, extramental particulars as its object, conceptual cognition
seems to have them as its object. In other words, being conceptual, that
cognition has a nature such that its object is imagined (adhyavasita) to have
that nature [i.e., the nature of being an extra-mental particular]. Conceptual
cognition operates in that fashion because it is by nature produced by
imprints that have been placed in the mind by experiences of those
particulars [i.e., the ones that prompt the concept in question]. And since
conceptual cognition is [indirectly] produced by objects (padārthas) that
have nondifferent effects, it has an aspect that is ultimately the same for all
those objects—namely, the difference from objects or cognitions that are
other than those [that have the expected effect]. Having that aspect, each
such cognition seems to apprehend an [external] object that is not different
[than other objects of the same class].

The image which appears to the conceptual cognition seems to be
external, singular, and capable of telic function, even though it is not
capable of it. It appears this way because persons engaged in practical
activity (vyavahārin) proceed by imagining that an aspect of a conceptual
cognition17 is that way [i.e., external, etc.]. Otherwise, it would not be
possible for them to engage in practical activity.

Because it appears as something that is capable of a telic function, the
cognitive appearance seems to be different from that which does not have
that telic function, but it is not ultimately real because it is not a factor in a practical test, as I will explain.

Those mentally experienced objects [i.e., the images that come about through the particulars]\textsuperscript{18} are apprehended as “the same” by virtue of that universal because they appear in terms of an exclusion from some other things. But a particular is not what is apprehended as the same because it does not appear to a conceptual awareness. Those conceptual appearances appear as nondifferent in that they are excluded from some things, but they may also appear to be nondifferent in that they possess exclusions from other things. Therefore, although those appearances are not real in and of themselves, conceptual cognition presents them as if they were; and one thus forms conventions for universals and co-referentiality even though the object of these conventions is false.

Furthermore, all of these and other such conventions are erroneous (viplava) in that they are constructed through the imprints left by experiences of particulars. Thus, conceptual cognitions whose production is connected to those real things by way of imprints are trustworthy with regard to a real thing, even though the real thing in question does not appear in those conceptual cognitions. An example is the erroneous cognition of a jewel when one sees the glimmer of the jewel. Other cognitions are not trustworthy because, even though they also arise from a distinction of the real thing, these other cognitions fail to determine\textsuperscript{19} the distinctive qualities of the thing in accord with the way in which it was experienced through the senses; having failed to make that determination, they impute some other distinction onto the thing by apprehending some slight (kimcit) similarity.\textsuperscript{20} An example is the cognition of a jewel when one sees lamplight.

The above response to the objections raised above shows that [the capacity for] performing telic functions does not apply to things that are conceptual objects. It also shows that it is not the case that impermanence and so on do not pertain to particulars. This is so because there is no impermanence other than the fluctuating thing (anyac calād vastunah) itself. That is, one apprehends a thing which is of that kind [i.e., impermanent] to be something that perdures for only an instant; hence, one has cognitions such as: “This is impermanent” or “Impermanence pertains to this.” Focusing on the nature (dharmatā) of the particulars in question, such concepts present various qualities [conceptualized as attributes of a single thing], single qualities [conceptualized as common to a group of things], and qualities which are conceptualized as distinct [from what they qualify]. Those conceptual cognitions are not groundless because they are based on the experience of an aspect (bheda) of the real thing.\textsuperscript{21} Nor are conceptualized qualities such as impermanence not qualities of real things because that which has that nature (tatsvabhāva) appears in that way.

However, it is still erroneous to apprehend a real thing as having various distinct attributes, or as the same as other real things, or as distinct from
the qualities abstracted from it. It is erroneous because an individual that performs a function that is the same as the function performed by other individuals or that performs many functions is defined in that way just for the purpose of making those who wish to know about such things aware that it has such a nature. One does not define it in that way because of the real presence of distinct aspects of real things because: [1] a single thing cannot be manifold; [2] many things cannot be singular; and [3] we have already refuted the distinction of an abstracted predicate from the subject from which it is abstracted. Since property-svabhāvas are conceptualized as being by nature different from each other and from the subject of which they are predicated, if one were to accept that the objects (arthas) of expressions corresponded to real things, co-instantiation (sāmānyādhikaraṇya) would be impossible.

Someone objects, “Expressions for both quality-universals and class-universals denote the one substance that possesses those qualities and universals as its delimiting qualities. Hence, there is no such problem.”

If the substance does not causally support a universal or any other alleged delimiting quality, then that universal or other such entity is not that substance’s delimiting quality because that universal or other entity cannot depend on that substance. If that universal or other such entity were dependent on that substance, then substance and universal, etc. would stand in the relation of producer and produced. Hence, those two could not occur together [i.e., simultaneously], so one could not express both of them [i.e., whereby the substance is expressed as qualified by the qualifier that is its delimiting quality]. And if one [i.e., the substance] must be expressed through semantic implication (adhyāhāra) [by way of an expression that refers to a delimiting quality], then expressions do not have real things as their objects. And if the expression for the substance has as its object a cognitive appearance, then such should be the case for every expression. This must be the case because, if the singular possessor of various delimiting qualities is apprehended in that fashion [i.e., through conceptual imputation], then the delimiting qualities [which should be apprehended non-conceptually] would not appear in that cognition.

The objector responds, “The delimiting quality and the substance that possesses it are the causally supported and the causal support; as such, they occur together. Therefore, the fault you have raised does not hold true.”

No, this response is not correct. Something which is already created is not dependent on anything, so it could not be a delimiting quality. And something that is not yet created cannot be a delimiting quality because its nature (svarūpa) is not established [such that it could, by that nature, be a delimiting quality]. Thus, whether the delimiting quality be already created or not yet created, there is no dependence whatsoever. Hence, the convention for the quality/qualified relation must be established after one has conceptually imputed the existence of these entities. If that is the case, why should conceptual and linguistic cognitions not occur in conformity to
conventions that have been constructed through conceptual imputation in all cases?\textsuperscript{24}

It has been previously stated that if a single expression or instrumental cognition takes some quality of a thing as an object by the force of real things themselves, then other expressions or instrumental cognitions would be useless because all other qualities of the object would already be implied. But if such cognitions conform to conventions in the aforementioned manner, this would not be the case. That is, since the appearance in cognition is unreal, the problems that arise due to [the claim that the objects of such cognitions] are real do not follow.

Therefore (tad),\textsuperscript{25} a universal is not contradictory in accord with the way it is cognized because the cognitive image appears in cognition to be nondifferent from some other images. The relationship of qualifier and qualified [as in the expression “blue lotus”] is also not contradictory in the way that it is cognized for the following reason: even though one aspect (ākāra) [such as “blue”] has been taken as an object, the other [such as “lotus”] has not been determined; that other aspect is what is apprehended by a cognition which involves some doubt or expectation about that other aspect, [as in the doubt, “there is a blue what?”]. Co-instantiation is also not contradictory in the way it is cognized because even though two exclusions are indicated (upasāṃhāra)\textsuperscript{26} to be objects of different expressions, they appear in cognition to be nondifferent [in that they seem to be instantiated in a single locus or subject].

In addition to the conventions of co-instantiation and the like, the distinction of subject and predicate pertaining to the cognitive appearance in a conceptual cognition is also not contradictory in the way that it is cognized. It is possible that a cognitive appearance be distinct from various objects. That being the case, when some questioner wishes to know whether that cognitive appearance is established or rejected as distinct from one of those objects (artha-s), the respondent indicates that mentally occurring\textsuperscript{27} real thing having expressed it (saṃcodya) as if it were a predicate separate from the subject—since it appears that way in cognition—by means of a predicate-expression (dharmaśabda) that precludes other distinctions [i.e., other predicates]; he does so having established another property-svabhāva of that mental entity as the subject without the distinction of precluding other predicates.\textsuperscript{28} To this extent, subject and predicate are slightly (amśena) different; hence, a conceptual cognition involving a subject/predicate construction appears in such a way that it seems to be differentiated. Cognition is not, however, differentiated due to some differentiation in the real thing because this would entail the problems discussed above.\textsuperscript{29}

Moreover, since persons express many differences of that kind such as qualifier/qualified and subject/predicate, there is therefore a difference in an expression that indicates quality and qualified; there is also a difference between a predicate to be inferred and the evidence that indicates it, even
when they are actually identical to the same undifferentiated real thing. These differences in the context of language and inference are drawn by means of conceptual differences that appear in cognition as predicates that are based on the property-śvabhāvās of the real thing. Such distinctions are drawn so that one might know that real thing’s nature.

1 Note that the Sanskrit syntactical structure of these verses (PV1.68–69) cannot even be approximated in English.
2 Passive voice has been changed to active voice for syntactic simplicity.
3 The term saṁvṛti literally conveys the sense of “the obscuring” or “the action of obscuring.” Hence, the cognition is literally “an action of obscuring.” This has been rendered with “obscurative” to avoid unnecessary syntactic complexity.
4 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:87b2ff = K:169.6ff):

   Mentally occurring real things means the following. Having perceptually experienced particulars, in accord with that experience there arises in one’s conceptual awareness unclear images of some things such as water-jugs, and one thinks, “This is a water-jug, and that is also a water-jug.” The universal pertains directly (dngos su) to those images, but it does not pertain [directly] to particulars because they do not appear in an awareness whose object is a universal.

5 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:87b = K:169–170) precedes this section with an objection:

   “If the universal—which pertains only to mentally occurring entities [i.e., images]—is a form (rūpa) presented by conceptual cognition, then how can the universal be an other-exclusion? You have said the exclusion of particulars from their heterologues is the universal that is of the nature of those particulars. That is, instead of speaking of some mental form, you previously said that the sameness (‘dra ba nyid ≈ sāmānatā) of those individuals [e.g., those called ‘blue’] that have been excluded from these [i.e., those not called ‘blue’] is their non-relation with these other ones [i.e., the non-blue individuals].”

6 PVT (87b6 = K:170.6)

   The author says, That .... That appearance that has been placed in conceptual awareness is itself the other-exclusion because it has come about through the experience of a real thing (dngos po; K: padārtha) that is separate from other things. That is the direct (dngos su) object of expressions. The non-connection [of any given particular with all others] is the similarity [among particulars] in the sense that it is [the object of expressions only] metaphorically. [When Dharmakīrti says this,] he is demonstrating that individuals (gsal ba = vyakty) are similar for just this reason only.

Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation is a clear forerunner to the analysis of apoha offered by Śaṅtarakṣita (TS:1002–1005) and Kamalakṣīla (TS ad cit.).

7 The objector’s point here is that, on Dharmakīrti’s theory, concepts directly refer only to a conceptually constructed image. Hence, how can one account for reference to actual, external things?

8 According to Śākyabuddhi (PVT:88b4 = K:171.19ff), “and so on” indicates two other reasons: “... because concepts do not cease to exist when there are no observable [particulars] and because [particulars] have telic function, but [concepts] do not.”

9 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:89a6 = K:173.8) glosses “individuals” (vyaktayaḥ) as “particulars” (svalakṣaṇānā). Dharmakīrti’s use of the term “individuals” probably reflects an attempt to adopt, for the sake of argument, the terminology of Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika authors.

10 Note that bheda is used as a count-noun (“distinct thing”) rather than an abstract noun (“difference”). The point here is that a hypostasized universal is only possible if there are instances in which it is instantiated. Note that in this sentence, the particle eva (sāmānyaṣyaiva) only adds emphasis, and it has not been directly translated.

11 As Śākyabuddhi makes clear (PVT:89b4ff = K:173.22ff), the notion here is that in a conceptual or linguistic cognition, individuals that possess or instantiate a certain universal are construed in terms of that universal. For example, all individuals that instantiate “water-jugness” are apprehended as
“water-jugs” by virtue of the presence of that universal in each individual. The argument here is that to do so, the universal must actually appear in one’s cognition.

12 See PVSV ad PV1.40–42 (G:25.4ff).

13 An “effect-substance” (kāryadravya) is a substance that results from the conjunction of other substances; as Śākyabuddhi notes (90a3 ≈ K:174.12) the term often stands for a “whole” (avayavin). See, for example, its usage at PDS (125).

14 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:91b1 = K:176.20) glosses samāñā as “formation of linguistic convention” (bdar byed pa = samketakriyā).

15 Shah (1967:92) suggests this translation.

16 In other words, the universal always remains the same, regardless of the individual that instantiates it.

17 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:94b = K:181) suggests that Dharmakirti is speaking of an “aspect of cognition” (rnam par rtag pa’i cha = vikalpāṁśa).

18 Śākyabuddhi (95a3ff ≈ K:182.15) glosses buddhinvivesināḥ as “Those images of objects (arthākārāḥ) that have come about through particulars (svalaksanadvārayātāḥ) and appear in conceptual cognition.”

19 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:96a3=K:183.24) glosses anusaraṇa as niścaya.

20 Note that the term sāmāṅya is not used here in the sense of “universal,” as is evident from Śākyabuddhi (PVT:96a3), where sāmāṅya is rendered by the Tibetan ‘dra ba and glossed: ‘dra ba gzhan ‘byung ba’i mtshan nyid kyi ’dra ba.

21 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:96b ≈ K:184) glosses tadbheda as “an aspect of the real thing, that aspect being defined as impermanence and so on” [dnogs po’i khyad par mi rtag pa nyid la sogs pa’i mtshan nyid.... Cf. Karmakagomin, who modifies Śākyabuddhi’s statement by typically injecting a greater degree of realism into the discussion: vastubhedasyāṇityādirūpasya svalaksṇasasvatasya...].

22 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:98a ≈ K:186) now inserts the following objection:

   Someone might think, “The [substance] that is qualified [by those delimiting qualities] has ceased to exist [because it has served as a causal support for the delimiting qualities; hence,] the expression whose object is that qualified [substance] has a cognitive appearance as its object. But the expression whose object is the delimiting quality, which exists, has as its object a real thing.”

23 I have followed Śākyabuddhi (PVT:98b) who says:

   One must admit the following: the cognition that imputes the already ceased substance qualified by the delimiting quality in question is conceptual; the cognition that perceives the quality, which is an [allegedly] real thing, is otherwise—it is perceptual. It is not possible for a single cognition to perceive both a real quality and an unreal conceptually imputed substance.

24 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:98b–99a = K:187):

   It makes sense for such cognitions to occur in conformity with conventions because it is not possible to engage in practical action without depending on a mentally presented appearance of an object.

25 The complicated syntax of the following Sanskrit statements has been re-arranged to avoid unnecessary complexity in English.

26 Glossed by Śākyabuddhi (PVT:99a = K:187) as pratipādana.

27 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:99b = K:188) suggests: tad eva buddhipratibhāsahūtam vastu. Karṇakagomin offers a second interpretation in which the vastu is understood to be bāhya. That is, instead of saying “The distinction of subject and predicate pertaining to a cognitive appearance is also not contradictory in the way that it is cognized,” he says “The distinction of subject and predicate pertaining to a real thing is also not contradictory in the way that it is cognized.” He then makes the appropriate changes in his commentary:

   yad vā dharmadharmibheda ’py asya vastuno na virudhyata iti sambandhaḥ / katu ātyaḥ / anekasmād arthāḥ bāhyasya bhedasambhavate sati tasaya kasyasmād yo bheda tasya vidhipratibhāsahūtaṃ ।

28 The complicated statement from dharmadharmibheda to pradarśyate is difficult to render in intelligible English, and I have therefore chosen to break the statement into more manageable
Śākyabuddhi (PVT:99b6ff ≈ K:189.11) claims that this complex passage treats two separate cases of the subject/predicate relation: a predicate-expression (dharmaśabda), such as “śabdasyānityatvam,” and a subject-expression, such as “anityaḥ śabdaḥ.” This interpretation is weakened by the absence of a conjunction, and I have thus not followed it. One might suggest, however, that the current translation problematically suggests that a single statement can be both predicate- and subject-expressive. Since this objection is plausible, I will note here a translation based upon Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation:

The distinction of subject and predicate pertaining to a cognitive appearance is also not contradictory in the way that it is cognized. A cognitive appearance can be distinct from various objects (arthaḥ). That being the case, when someone wishes to know whether that cognitive appearance is established or rejected as distinct from one of those objects (arthaḥ), the respondent presents that mentally occurring real thing having expressed it by means of a predicate-expression that precludes other distinctions that could be predicates. Thus expressed, it seems as if a separate predicate is expressed because it appears that way to cognition. But he may also present it having established another property-svabhāva of that mental entity as the subject without the distinction of precluding other predicates. To this extent, subject and predicate are slightly different; hence, a conceptual cognition of this type appears in such away that it seems to be differentiated. Such a cognition is not, however, differentiated due to some differentiation in the real thing because this would entail the above discussed problems.
3. **PVSV ad PV1.137–142**

In order to point out that the things in question perform the [desired] effect, the ancient ones assigned the same expression to those things which, although different, performed the same function; the semantic cause (nimitta) of that expression is the exclusion from that which does not have that effect. They did not assign an expression for each thing because an expression for each distinct thing would be impossible due to the difficulty of doing so and because it would be pointless. The ancient ones did not assign the same expression to a real universal because all things are situated in their own property-svabhāvas. [PV1.137–138]

The essence of a Hereford is not a Jersey’s essence, but the exclusion from that which does not have the effect of a cow exists in both of them. [PV1.139]

Without the nondifference of the objects, a nondifference of the expression used for those things does not make any sense. Therefore, we accept that the capacity to perform the same effect is the difference from that which does not have that effect. [PV1.140]

For example, when at a certain time it is possible to express that the things such as the eye and so on, whose effect is an awareness of form, have that effect as their nondifference, someone forms a signifying expression so as to know all of those things as causes of ocular awareness at once; that sign is formed without a separate universal which would be their essence. [PV1.141–142]

Someone thinks the following. “Without a nondifferent entity instantiated in each instance, how could a single expression [such as ‘cow’] apply to many [individual cows]? A single expression could not refer to them all because: [1] they would have no similarity; [2] since they have no similarity, that expression would refer to only one individual; therefore, that expression would not produce the cognition of another individual of that type; [3] if an awareness of one thing as the same as another were to arise without any semantic proximity (pratyāsatti), then an overextension would occur; [4] the application of a single expression to them would be useless because one would not be applying the expression to a single thing (artha) [since they do not share a universal]; and [5] if one were to apply one
expression separately to each individual for the sake of cognizing\(^2\) those individuals whose essential natures are different from each other, one’s listener would not know that those distinct things that have been expressed in that fashion [i.e., as distinct instances of the same type of entity] are different.\(^3\)

[In this regard, there are two possibilities]. Thinking, “that individual also has that single universal,” people apply an expression to it. Or a single universal manifests the expression just by its capacity as a real thing [i.e., without any human agency]. But neither of these possibilities is the case. Instead, a person applies expressions to something with some purpose in mind. That is, if different things are useful for one telic function, persons concerned with that function definitely (avaśyam) should express that efficacy of those things with regard to that function. If one were to express that efficacy individually [i.e., with an expression for each particular], it would be extremely difficult to communicate. And in any case, it is not possible to express the unique essence of a particular; the attempt to do so would also be useless. Instead, that person using language or concepts should just express those objects that are capable of that function. The speaker has autonomy in this regard: he can choose to express those things that are capable of that effect with one expression or with many. Therefore, it is simply by virtue of the speaker’s intention (abhiprāya) that one expression could refer to many things, and that being so, it is not correct to object to the use of a single expression for many things. Moreover, it is not impossible for that one expression to be used for all those things because the capacity to refer to things depends on the speaker’s wishes (icchā) [or needs]. If meaning is not fixed by the wishes (icchā) of the person using the expressions, then how could an expression refer to even one thing? And if intention does fix meaning, then who could prevent this expression from referring to many things?

“But there would be no purpose to using expressions [if there is nothing to which they really refer]; therefore, one would not use expressions.”

I have already said that the purpose is to know from one expression that distinct particulars are different from that which does not fulfill the [expected] purpose. It is not the case that one applies expressions because a property-svabhāva of the things in question is the same. And I have already asked, “The property-svabhāvas of real things are situated respectively in their respective real things, and as such, they are not distributed over each other; hence, how could an expression for those distinct things have as its semantic cause (nimitta) a single property-svabhāva occurring in all those things?”\(^4\) But even though things are different, it is not contradictory for them to have an exclusion from that which does not fulfill the [expected] purpose. Hence, let us consider this nondifference of the things (artha) to be the cause for the nondifference of the expressions applied to them. Therefore, in saying, “These are what fulfill that purpose,” those things are stated to be distinct from others that do not fulfill that purpose. But the fact
of having that effect is not some quality that is other than the particulars themselves; otherwise, they would not be different from the other things which do not have that effect.\(^5\)

For example, [according to Buddhists] the eye, color, light and mentation all have [under certain conditions] the same effect: ocular consciousness. [According to others] the self, the faculty, the object and their conjunction have that one effect. Whatever theory one proposes, it is possible to express their sameness (sāmānyya) in terms of having that effect, as when someone asks, “From what does consciousness of visible color arise?” This being the case,\(^6\) in order to facilitate practical action (vyavahāralāghavārtham), someone applies a convention-establishing (saṃkṣetikī) statement: “The causes are such-and-such and so-and-so.” One uses these expressions such that the listener somehow knows all of the causes of ocular cognition and so on at once. Hence, there is no essence that is distributed over all of them. Rather, their nondifference is this difference—namely, that since they accomplish that telos (artha), those things are different from those that do not accomplish that telos.

To be specific, they, being all of such-and-such a kind, are expressed by expressions that indicate a certain conglomeration (samūha), continuum (santāna), or state (avasthā). Those particulars that when conglomerated perform a single effect have no distinction from each other with regard to that effect. Therefore, it would be pointless to express any such distinction. For this reason, in order to refer (niyojana) to all of them at once, people apply one expression to them, such as “water-jug.”

Those [i.e., the particulars that form a water-jug] are all equally different from their respective homologues and heterologues, but since they contribute to the accomplishment of that single purpose [such as containing water], they are distinguished from others that do not do so. Hence, they are cognized as non-distinct due to that nondifference.

In regard to the point just raised, the expression “the color and so on of a water-jug” means that the color and such that are the property-svabhāvas of the water-jug are capable of an effect such as a specific\(^8\) way of containing water.\(^9\) Through the expression “color and so on” is indicated (prasiddha) their nature that is well known (prasiddha) to be the means for producing a general effect (sāmānyakārya).\(^10\) They are then specified (viśiṣṭa) by the specification (viśeṣa) [i.e., “water-jug”] that indicates that they also have certain specific effects (viśiṣṭakārya) [such as containing water]. Being so specified, they are called such [i.e., “the color and such of a water-jug”]. But other than that color and such, there does not exist here any substance that has characteristics in the manner described by those expressions. It does not exist because one does not perceive that kind of substance.\(^11\)

The expression “water-jug” is used in the singular to indicate that those particulars [i.e., the many particulars that compose it] have the causal
potential to together produce the same effect [even though there is no such real causal potential actually instantiated in all those particulars].\(^{12}\) Or else, the singular is dependent on linguistic convention (saṁketa).

For instance, certain kinds of causes and effects [i.e., those that form a continuum] either produce some single effect or are produced by a single cause. In order to cognize those causes and effects all at once, one expresses them with an expression such as “rice” for which the linguistic convention has been formed. This should be explained as in the above explanation of expressions for conglomerates such as water-jugs. Likewise, those particulars which are effective for some single function either separately or in combination are expressed by expressions that indicate a particular state; they are expressed in that way so that one might make them known all at once. Examples of such expressions are “visible” or “obstructive.” The particulars in question can be expressed in that way due to the sameness of their difference (bhedaśaṁāṇya) from other particulars that are not occurring in that kind of state.

In some cases, where some particulars have the same effect, in order to indicate that they have that effect, they are expressed by expressions such as “water-jug” through their difference from what is other than them; they are so expressed provided that a suitable convention has been formed (kṛtasamaya). In the same way, in terms of having the same cause, one can express what is non-singular with a single expression in order to facilitate practical action. Examples are “Hereford,” “Jersey cow,” or “a sound arises immediately after effort,” or “sound is causally produced.” One can also express multiple things with a single expression as a negation of their ability to have the effect in question. Examples include: “sound is not visually perceptible”; or “impermanent”; or “essenceless (anātma).” One can also use expressions in this fashion as negations of the notion that certain things have the cause in question. Instances include the expressions “unowned” (asvāmika)\(^{13}\) and “empty.” One may also state other ways in which expressions are formed in accord with the theory presented above.

In the case of expressions such as “empty” and “impermanent,” expressions perform their semantic function (vyapadeśa) by [first] inducing in cognition an image that is intended in accord with the interlocutor’s concepts and then excluding that image. Expressions work this way because all the objects (artha) of expressions have a distinctive aspect that is projected by cognitive intent.\(^{14}\) Poor thinkers\(^{15}\) bombasts which raise problems such as the assertion that there is no [real] contrary (pratipakṣa) for expressions such as “essenceless” should be ignored.

---

1 “Hereford” has been used to translate Śābaleya, while “Jersey” translates bāhuleya. The most obvious difference between a Śābaleya and a bāhuleya is their respective colors, and it as for this reason that I have chosen to use the more familiar terms “Hereford” and “Jersey.”

2 According to Śākyabuddhi (PVT:158b4 = K:134.22–23), pratipataye is to be supplied by context (adhyāhāra).
3 Literally, "one would not recognize the disunity (vibhāga) of the things that had been expressed as such."

4 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:160a = K:269) refers us to PV1:40–42.

5 PVSV-D(299a) reads: de dag ni gzhan du de ’bras bu can nyid kyang ma yin te / gzhan las tha dad pa ma rtogs pa ’phyir ro. This should probably be amended to de dag gi..., which makes much more sense in light of the reading offered by Gnoli and K. Secondly, one should realize that this almost certainly represents a variant reading that could be reconstructed as follows: na punar esāṁ anyatra tatkāryatā anyato bhedaprāferī yathā.... It is possible that rtogs pa ≈ prāferī was added by the Tibetan translators for clarity. In any case, Gnoli is clearly incorrect when he remarks that such a reading "in this context is wholly meaningless," for a negative here makes more sense than Gnoli’s reading. Indeed, the absence of a negative in Gnoli’s reading renders it highly problematic.

Although the text of K supports Gnoli’s reading, K remarks (269–270), "in other words, their property-svabhāva that is excluded from other things is their nondifference" (anyavyāptita eva svabhāva esāṁ abheda itī yāvat). This statement refers obliquely to PV1:59, where Dharmakīrti points out that an exclusion (a quality or predicate) and the excluded thing (the quality-possessor or subject) cannot be actually different; they are only conceptually different. Applying the same analysis here, one can remark that the "fact of having that effect" (tatkāryatā) or "that-effectness" (if one can tolerate the horrendous neologism) cannot be something distinct from the particulars that are qualified by "that-effectness." If those particulars were distinct from their "that-effectness," they would be excluded from "that-effectness"; as such they would fall into that class of things which do not have that effect, which means they would no longer be understood as distinct from those things which do not have that effect.

This interpretation makes more sense than Gnoli’s reading, for it seems clear that Dharmakīrti is referring to the issues raised at PV1:59. That he is raising these issues is further supported by his decision to discuss the problem of the genitive relation a few lines later, for this is the same issue that he takes up at PV1:60. To support such an interpretation, the extant Sanskrit in both K and Gnoli can be simply amended by the addition of an avagraha, an orthographic device that is often elided in manuscripts. The manuscript of K, for example, is peppered with numerous such elisions. The amended Sanskrit would thus read na punar esāṁ anyā tatkāryatā / anyātanyatā bhedāt.

Unfortunately, Śākyabuddhi (PVT:160b) does not provide any additional clarification, although he also offers the unsatisfactory reading anyatranyatā bhedaś (gzhan du ghan las tha dad pa’ phyir te) without the avagraha. Reader’s of the Sde-dge Śākyabuddhi have the additional and quite unusual property of a large portion of text that is out of order. This irregularity is not due to a fault in translation, for when the correct order is restored, the translation follows exactly the Sanskrit of K. Hence, it seems that in the several centuries between the translation of the text and the carving of the Sde-dge woodblocks, some Tibetan scribe inadvertently copied a folio out of order. The order is as follows:

From 160b1 after “gzhan dag las log pa kho na” skip forward to 161b1 and begin at “de dag tha dad pa med pa kho na’o.” Read to 162b1. From 162b1 after “de dag kyang zhes bya la sos pa smos te” skip back to 161b1 and begin at "rīgs mthun pa." Read to 161b1. From 161b1 after “ji ltar na” skip to 162b1 and begin at “mang po dag la.” From this point the text is no longer out of order.

In other words, the section of text from 161b1 “de dag tha dad pa med pa” up to 162b1 “de dag kyang zhes bya la sos pa smos te” needs to be inserted at 160b1 after “gzhan dag las log pa kho na.”

6 “This being the case” represents the locative of tatkāryasāmānyacreditśambhave.

7 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:160b = K:171) raises an objection:

“There is just color and so on; but there is no water-jug that is a substance separate from the color and so on. So how can there be a separation [between the water-jug and its property-svabhāvas] as in the statement, ‘The water-jug’s color and so on ...?’”

This comment and the answer that Dharmakīrti proffers rely quite clearly on the analysis of the subject-predicate relation presented in PV1:59–61 and PVSV ad cir. This serves as further evidence that the reading given by Gnoli (67), anyatranyato bhedaś, must be changed to anyatranyato bhedāḥ. See just above, n.5.

8 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:160b6–7 = K:271.18) glosses specific (viśeṣa) as “that which cannot be accomplished by non-water-jugs” (ghatād anyenāādhyatvaṁ). It thus appears to be used in this context as a synonym for niyata.

9 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:160b7–161a2 = K:271.19) remarks:

The above means the following. The expressions “color” and so on induce the understanding that color and so on are nondifferent in that they are capable of the mere effect that is to be
accomplished by color. But the word “water-jug” expresses that the color-particles in question are specified (viśeṣṭa) by their difference from that color and so on that are property-svabhāvas of a cloth; the water-jug’s color and so on are specified in that fashion because they are capable of a specific effect (viśeṣṭakārya). Hence, the statement “the water-jug’s color and so on” produces through the operation of the two words an awareness with a cognitive image of a universal (sāmānyā) [i.e., that of color] and a specifying distinction (viśeṣa) [i.e., that of contributing to specific effects such as holding water]. Therefore, a genitive grammatical relation (vibhakti) in which the two members are distinct is applied to express the relation of a universal [i.e., color and such in general] and a specific [sub-species, i.e., the color and such of a water-jug] (sāmānyaviseṣabhāva).

Note that, for K(271.24) ... sāmānyaviseṣabhāvo vyatirekakavitaś ca prayujyata iti, Śākyabuddhi (PVT:161a2) reads ... spyi dang khyad par gyi drags po la tha dad pa’i rten can gyi drag pa sbyor ba yin no ≈ sāmānyaviseṣabhāve vyatireka[saṣṭi]vibhaktah prayujyate. I have followed Śākyabuddhi.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:161a3 = K:271.25) glosses “common effect” as “one that is to be accomplished by mere [i.e., unqualified] color and such” (sāmānyakāryam rūpādimaṇḍrasādhyam). Śākyabuddhi also notes (161a3 = K:271.26) that the instrumental prasiddhena can be construed either as itthambhūtalokasāna or as a reason, I have construed it here as itthambhūtalokasāna. With this instrumental construed as a reason, the phrase would read, “Since color and such have a nature that is established to be the means for producing certain common effects, they are made known by the expressions ‘color’ and such.”

10 According to Śākyabuddhi (PVT:161a = K:272), this is a case of the nonperception of something that is by definition perceptible. He then makes the important statement, “In the third chapter [Dharmakūṭa] will explain the way in which just infinitesimal particles are the object of perception without there being any part-possessor” [yathā vānternāpy avayavināṃ paramāṇava eva pratyakṣasya viśayaḥ tathā tīryage [K reads: dvitiye] paricchede pratipādiṣyate].

11 … śāntaṃ akṛtyaḥ pratyakṣaḥpratyakṣaḥ … etc.

12 K(272): na punas teṣu ekā śaktir vidyate.

13 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:164b2 = K:274.13) remarks:

Others assert that that which is controlled (adhiṣṭhitam) by an autonomous self is “owned,” and such things are also asserted to be non-empty because they are controlled by that kind of controller (adhiṣṭhitam). The controller is what appropriates (śīkaraṇa) which is controlled (adhiṣṭhitavya); otherwise, it could not be the controller. Therefore, others use words such as “owned” (svāmikā) with respect to some self being a cause for such a relation. But there is no controller with an established essential nature who would control things that disintegrate instantaneously and exist in dependence upon a mere collocation [of conditions or parts]. There is no such controller in connection with which the mental conditions (samskāra) would occur. Therefore, “unowned” and “emptiness” are posited by refuting the existence of the aforementioned self acting as a warrant [for the designations “owner,” etc.].

For K(274.14) adhiṣṭhitā cādihiṣṭhitavyasyā karaṇam Śākyabuddhi (PVT:164b3) reads bdag gi byed pa nyid kyang bdag gir bya ba’i ruy yin gyi. The Tib. corresponds to adhiṣṭhitā cādihiṣṭhitā, but this reading seems problematic.

14 Emend G(69.7) buddhisamiḥ samārṣita ... to: buddhisamiḥ samārṣitavibhāgaḥpatvar in accord with PVSV-D (299b6): sgru’i don thams cod ni b’i rtoas pas bstan pa rgyan par dbya bca’i nyid yin pa’i phyir ro. Śākyabuddhi (PVT:165a = K:274) glosses buddhisamiḥ: buddhes samihā imam artham āropayāmi sma’kalabḥ—“Cognitive intent is the intention, ‘I will induce this object (artha) [in that person’s mind].’”

15 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:165a = K:275) mentions Uddyotakara as the object of this critique.
4. PVSV ad PV1.214-223

"[Dignāga] said, 'The testimony of a credible person is the source for an inference because it is generally trustworthy.' In this way, he said that scripture is a source of inferential knowledge. But how can this be the case?"

A person cannot proceed without relying on the instrumentality of scripture because: [1] he has heard that, in the case of some activities whose effects are not perceptible, engaging or not engaging in those activities will have some extremely praiseworthy or disastrous results; and [2] there is no observed contradiction in that being the case. He would thus act, thinking "If this is to be done, it is best that it be done thus." It is through analyzing it in this manner that [Dignāga] stated the instrumentality of scripture.

In this regard,

A statement that is a worthy subject of examination is one that is coherent (sambaddha), offers a suitable method, and cites some human aim. Other statements are not worthy subjects of examination. [PV1.214]

Coherence means that the statements coalesce (upasamhāra) on a single topic, and by doing so they are helpful for understanding that topic. This is not the case with statements such as "ten cardamom pods" and so on, which are incoherent. Otherwise, the ineptitude of the author would ensue. Also, a person who seeks a result should not bother to examine treatises that propose the attainment of results through impossible means; nor should he bother to examine treatises that discuss results that are not human goals. Examples of the former include the instruction that one use the jewel taken from the cobra-hood of the Nāga king Takṣaka as an ornament in order to counteract poison, and an example of the latter is the analysis of the number of teeth that a crow has.

In contrast to that kind of treatise, one may examine a treatise that [1] is coherent, [2] proposes possible means, and [3] discusses a human goal. This is the kind of treatise that is worthy of examination because it is unreasonable to concern oneself with those other kinds of treatises. If when investigated the treatise in question is not liable to being untrustworthy (visaṃvādabhāk), then it is good to put it into practice.

But what constitutes its trustworthiness?

Its trustworthiness consists of not being contradicted by perceptual awareness and two kinds of inference with regard to both the observable (dṛṣṭa) and unobservable (adṛṣṭa) things
(artha) that are the objects (artha) of those instrumental cognitions.⁶ [PV1.215]

Not being contradicted by perception means that those things that are considered to be perceptible according to the treatise actually are perceptible. Examples include the color blue, pleasure and displeasure, the recognition of a characteristic, mental states such as desire, and awareness. Also, things that are not considered to be perceptible should not be perceptible. Examples include the claim that one can perceive pleasure and so on as a conjunction of form particles such as sound;⁷ and the notion that substance, motion, universals, contact, and so on are real, perceptible things.⁸ Likewise, those objects that are considered to be inferable without relying on scripture should be so—the Nobles’ Four Truths are an example. And those things that are considered not to be inferable must not be—examples include the self. This is also the case for inference based on scripture.⁹ For example, having accepted that the essential nature (rūpa) of negative mental states such as desire is adharma, and having accepted that the origin of those negative mental states is adharma [in the sense of karma], the suggestion that one perform ablutions and fire sacrifice in order to eliminate adharma is not sound advice. The scripture’s purity [i.e., its lack of contradictions] in regard to all those objects which can be determined in the above manner constitutes its trustworthiness.

[Dignāga] said that, since the statements of a credible person are generally trustworthy,¹⁰ a cognition from such statements of those statements’ object is a well-formed inference of that object, even though the object is epistemically remote. The cognition is said to be an inference because there is no other way to know that object. [PV1.216]

These kinds of statements of a credible person—those [described by Dignāga] and those [accordingly delineated above]—are generally (sāmānyā) trustworthy. Hence, not observing those statements to be misleading, one infers the trustworthiness of a cognition of those statements’ object, even though it is not knowable by perception and empirical inference. One infers that such a cognition is trustworthy because it is based on those statements, just like the other cognitions based on those statements that can be verified by perception and empirical inference.

Hence, even though that cognition comes from language, it does not make known just the speaker’s intention like a cognition coming from [ordinary] language because in this case the cognition is also an inference of the statement’s objects, since it is trustworthy with regard to those objects (artha).¹¹

Alternatively, we state in another fashion the fact that, due to its trustworthiness, the speech of a credible person is the basis for an
instrumental inference:

Alternatively, since the true nature (tattva) of that which is to be avoided and that which is to be done along with the methods for doing so are well established, the statements of the credible person in question\(^\text{12}\) are trustworthy with regard to the most important issues (pradhānārtha). Hence, they are a source of inferential knowledge with regard to other objects. [PV1.217]

That credible person taught what to avoid, what to do, and the methods for each; what he taught in regard to these issues is not erroneous, and hence, those teachings are trustworthy. An example is the Nobles’ Four Truths, in the way that will be explained.\(^\text{13}\) Since those statements are trustworthy, the assumption (upagama) that other statements—which are useful for accomplishing a human aim and suitable to be practiced—are also trustworthy with regard to other issues will not lead to one’s deception because [1] there is no instrumental knowledge that contradicts that assumption, and [2] it is pointless for that speaker to make false statements without a purpose.

\(^{14}\)Thus, in the two ways [described in these two verses], it is said that a cognition coming from scripture is an inference since there is no other way for one to proceed, as is illustrated by the thought, “If one is to act in accordance with scripture, it is best to do it thus.” However, this kind of inference is not without problems (anapāya), since expressions are not invariably concomitant with objects, as has been already pointed out.

Others think that a statement dependent for its origin on a superior person is in accord with reality (yathārtha). [PV1.218ab]

According to others,\(^\text{15}\) a credible speaker (āpta) is a person with good qualities such as experience of things as they truly are (yathārthadarśana); that person’s teachings (praṇayana) are trustworthy.

This point (artha) is admitted (iṣṭa) if one is able to know that that person has that superior quality.\(^\text{16}\) [PV1.218cd]

Every judicious person who wishes to act analyzes statements to determine what is and what is not scripture (āgama); he does so with the desire to act effectively, and not because of some pernicious habit. Learning what should be put into practice from the scripture, he thinks, “Having acted accordingly, I might realize my goal.” On the basis of the trustworthiness of that scripture with regard to things that can be experienced [through perception or empirical inference], that person acts with regard to other things [i.e., the supersensible objects discussed in the scripture] because such is the case for most practical action in the world.
But if one is to act on the basis of examining the person, one would not act at all because one cannot know whether or not that person has those kind of extraordinary qualities. It is not the case that persons such as us would not act because of not accepting that there are some persons with those qualities, since that kind of person does make true (avitatha) statements. In other words, others [namely, we Buddhists] know that it is extremely difficult to know (durbodha) whether others have faults or are faultless, as when one responds to the question, “Is this person like this or not?” It is extremely difficult to know because the instrumental cognitions for determining such issues are almost unobtainable (durlabha). [PV1.219]

The truthful (samyag) and deceitful actions of persons are due to their good mental qualities and their mental flaws. Those mental attributes are supersensible, and they would have to be inferred from the physical and vocal behavior (vyavahāra) that arises from them. And most behavior can also be performed deliberately (buddhipūrvam) in a way other than the mental state they seem to reflect because those behaviors occur as one desires and because those behaviors may be intended for various aims. Thus, there is an overlap of the evidence for faults and faultlessness. Therefore, not having made a definitive determination, how is one to establish that the author of the scripture is flawless? Then is there no such a person who is faultless?”

All flaws, being susceptible to decrease and increase, have counteragents (vipakṣa); hence, due to having inculcated the counteragents through habituating oneself to them, at some point the negativities (āsrava) should be eliminated. [PV1.220]

However, it is extremely difficult to know whether someone else has attained that elimination of negativities. Indeed, inasmuch as flaws have the quality of undergoing decrease and increase, they demonstrate the corresponding abundance or paucity (utkarṣopakarṣa) of the eradicative force (abhibhava) of the counteragents, as is the case with fire. This is the case because, being produced from conceptuality, through habituating oneself to some positive mental quality, they will decrease, even though their basic cause (upādāna) is still present. And when that habituation of oneself to the counteragents becomes intense, those flaws have the quality of being eliminated without a trace, as is the case with fire and such. Therefore, someone may indeed be flawless.

“But how could someone be flawless? No one could be for the following reason: even when the flaws’ counteragent (vipakṣa) is infused (sātmatva) in a person’s mind, faults would arise again in accord with the conditions that
become available, just as that counteragent arises in a person whose mind is
infused with the flaws.”

This is not a problem, since:

The nature of the mind is such that it is free of negativity and by
nature it has a real object (bhūtārtha); as such, it cannot be
counteracted (bādhā) by what is opposite to it because, even if
one were to attempt to do so, the mind is naturally inclined
toward its nature. [PV1.221]

It is not possible to alter the nature of the mind without making an effort,
just as a Brahman scholar (śrotriya) who later becomes a kapālika cannot
stop his disgust (ghṛṇā) without making an effort. And it is by seeing the
good qualities in the nature-svabhāva of what one seeks to obtain and faults
in the nature of what aims to eliminate that one makes an effort to obtain
or eliminate something. But it is not possible for one who has inculcated the
counteragents of the flaws to see good qualities in the flaws because their
opposites [i.e., the states that counteract the flaws] are free of negativity.
They are free of negativity because [1] in them all flaws are eliminated; [2]
they are devoid of the suffering that comes from negative orientations
(paryavasthāna) and birth; and [3] they never turn away from the taste of
the bliss of peace.

A mental state that has an unreal object (abhūtārtha) arises due to a
primary cause (upādāna) [i.e., the conceptual imprint for a false, conceptual
cognition]. As a result of appropriating (upādānāt) what opposes the
continuum of that mental state, that mental state should not continue to
exist. However, a mental state [such as an awareness of selflessness] that
has a real object cannot be halted by cultivating its opposite because it
arises due to real things themselves. The flaws have unreal objects, and as
such, they cannot oppose a mental state in which their counteragent has
been infused. Therefore, the faults do not arise again. This is the case
because even if one were to strive to re-create the flaws in the mind, since
the mind tends toward positive qualities (guṇa), a judicious person [who
still has some flaws] will make an effort only for what counteracts those
faults. How much more so is this the case for a person who is unflawed.

“But what is the source of these flaws such that by inculcating that
source’s counteragent they can be eliminated?”

All types of flaws are born from the belief that the evanescent
components of body and mind are the locus of an essential self
(satkāyadarśana). Ignorance is that belief. When that belief occurs,
one experiences clinging to that alleged self, and from that
clinging comes anger and so on. [PV1.222]

A person who has neither the notion of “I” nor the notion of “mine” is
without grasping, and as such, he does not cling to anybody or anything. And a dispassionate person cannot have hatred for anybody or anything. This is so because hatred cannot occur if there is no harm being done to one’s self, nor to what pertains to it. Nor can one have hatred for a person or thing that opposes what harms one’s alleged self. Therefore, the belief in an essentialized self (ātmadarśana), which arises from being mentally conditioned to previous moments of that same type of belief, gives birth to the fixation on what pertains to that self (ātmiyagṛaha). Those two—namely, the self-belief and the fixation on what pertains to it—give birth to clinging to the self, or self-love; and that clinging or self-love gives rise to anger and so on.

In this way, all flaws arise from the belief that the evanescent psychophysical components are the locus of an essential self (satkāyadrśti). And that very belief is called ignorance.

Confusion [i.e., ignorance] is therefore said to be the fundamental cause (nidāna) of the flaws. In other contexts, the cause is said to be the belief that the evanescent components of body and mind are the locus of an essential self because when that belief is eliminated, the flaws are eliminated. [PV1.223]

[The Buddha] said that confusion is the fundamental cause of the flaws because the flaws do not arise in one who is not confused. In other contexts, he said that the fundamental cause of the flaws is the belief that the evanescent aggregates constitute an essential self. This point about the cause of the flaws is made in terms of the primary cause because it is contradictory for the flaws, which arise due to various causal conditions, to be produced by a single cause [without other causal conditions]. Moreover, if both “ignorance” and “the belief that the evanescent components are a locus of an essential self” were each the primary cause, then stating one in one context and the other in another context would not show much skill in teaching. But if both indicate the same cognitive flaw, then there is no contradiction in using one term or another in different contexts. A primacy or emphasis (prādhānya) is placed on the belief that the evanescent components are a locus of an essential self. This belief is considered primary because it serves as the substantial cause (upādāna) for the flaws, since the flaws are eliminated when it is eliminated.27

Thus, it is possible that one might eliminate the flaws, which arise from the belief that the evanescent psychophysical components are the locus of an essential self. One can eliminate the flaws by eliminating that belief, and one eliminates that belief by means of its counteragent, which is the realization of emptiness. But it is difficult to know (duranvaya) whether the person in accord with whose teachings one might practice has indeed eliminated the flaws.
See PS 2.5a.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:242b = K:390) presents an objector’s position:

“If an expression is not instrumental for knowledge of external real things, then what about [the statement made by Dignāga; namely, that] ‘The statements of a credible person are the basis for a well-formed inference because they are generally trustworthy’ [āptavādavisaṃvādaśāṃśāmyaḥ anumānataḥ]? That which is a statement of a credible person is incontrovertible; an example is the statement ‘All conditioned things are momentary.’ There are also statements of a credible person concerning extremely remote objects; therefore, they are also incontrovertible. In this manner, knowledge derived from the testimony of a credible person is a form of inference because such statements are generally trustworthy. Thus, ficārya Dignāga said that [knowledge derived from] scripture is a [form of] inference concerning external objects."

To state that this contradicts what has been accepted [by Dharmakīrti, the objector then says,] “But how can this be the case?”

Note that the phrase āptavādaḥ ca ayam is not to be construed with the example yathā sarve ..., but rather as the statement of the pakṣa in this inference.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:242b5 = K:390) offers the gist of Dharmakīrti’s answer:

In other words, the ficārya [Dignāga] did not say that knowledge from scripture is an inference by claiming that it is actually [or truly] (bhāvika) instrumental. Rather, it is instrumental with regard to the way in which a person should proceed.

For G(108) āpāya read -āpāya with Śākyabuddhi (PVT:243a), which seems much preferable reading.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:243a) says that upākāra means that the statements “point out” (ston par byed ≈ pratiṣṭhāna) that topic. K(391) offers no gloss.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:243b = K:393) provides the glosses for the two senses of artha.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:244b = K:393) notes that the theory criticized here is from the Sāṃkhya system.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:244a = K:393) remarks that the view rejected here is that of the Vaiśeṣikas and so on.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:245a):

After purifying the scripture by means of the two kinds of instrumental cognition that proceed on the basis of real things (dngos po stobs khyis zhub pa ≈ vastubalapravṛttā), one then posits that scripture to be a subject of predication (chos can ≈ dharmini) as a treatise that has been accepted as instrumental. Then, due to inferring a contradiction between some earlier and later passages, when one engages in an analysis of the difference between those passages, the scriptural inference—the inference based on scripture—should not be contradicted. This is the context of what follows. [dngos po stobs khyis zhub pa’i tshad ma gnyis khyis lung rnam par dag pa’dus phyis tshad ma khas len pa can gyi bstan bcos kyi chos can rnam par bzhag nas / sna phyi ’gil ba rjes su dpag pa’i phyir / gang gi tsho khyad par dpyod pa la ’jug pa de’i tsho lung la tsho pa’i rjes su dpag pa ste / lung la tsho pa’i rje su dpag pa de la gnod pa med pa zhes bya ba’i skabs yin no /].

K(393) offers a somewhat less helpful comment:

One might investigate a scripture due to a contradiction between earlier and later passages concerning the two kinds of objects that are pure [in that they are not contradicted by perceptual awareness or inferences based on real things] and extremely remote objects. In that case, inference based on scripture should also “not contradict that scripture”—supplied by context. [viśuddhe viśayadaye tyantaparokṣe caṇamaviśaye paurvāparavyaidhena yasmin cintām pravarttayati tasmin nāgam apekṣam anumānam api / abādhanaṁ iti prakṛtam /].

The compound āptavādaḥavisvaṃśāmyaḥ can be read in one of two ways. The term Sāṃśāya may be interpreted in the sense of “sameness.” In this case, the argument would be that the trustworthiness (avisvaṃśa) of a credible person’s statements about observable objects is the same as the trustworthiness of those statements with regard to unobservable objects. In other words, the statements are trustworthy precisely because they are the statements of a credible person. This appears to be the interpretation taken by Śākyabuddhi (PVT-p:289b5–6 = K:393):

... Because that credible person’s speech is the same in its trustworthiness (avisvaṃśaśāmyaḥ). That is, just as the credible person’s speech is trustworthy with regard
to an object that can be determined [through perception and ordinary inference], likewise it is trustworthy with regard to an extremely remote object also, precisely because it is the speech of a credible person. [nyses pa zad pa’i tshig de ni mi bslu bar mshungs pa’i phyir te / ci litar mgon sum dang rjes su dpag pa mi bslu ba’i don yongs su gcod par nus pa la nyes pa zad pa’i tshog mi bslu ba de litar shin tu skog tu gyur pa yang rin te / nyes pa zad pa’i tshig nyid yin pa’i phyir ro / K: tasyāptavādaśāvyasaṃvādāṃ nyathā * / yathā śākyaparicchedhe ’rthe āptavādaśāvyasaṃvādāṃ tathāyantaparokṣe ’pi āptavādaśāvyasaṃvādā eva / [* Śāmkṛtyāyaana reads tasyāḥ īvād asyāḥ visamvādāṃ sāṃtyāyā. This is clearly corrupt and has been corrected ex conj. to conform to PVT].

This interpretation bases the argument upon a svabhāvahetu, namely, āptavādaśāvyasaṃvādāṃ, which is taken as a vyāgya of aśīvaṃvāda. Philosophically, this interpretation is problematic, for Dharmakīrti himself denies that one can determine whether any given individual has the qualities that would make him credible.

On a second interpretation, the term – sāṃtyāya can here be understood in the sense of “in general.” For a parallel usage in PV, see PV1.12d, kāraṇa sāṃtyāya. On this interpretation, the argument is that, since the statements of a particular author have been observed to be trustworthy in terms of observable objects, this general trustworthiness may be extended to unobservable objects. The obvious problem with this second interpretation is that it uses a type of reasoning that Dharmakīrti explicitly rejects, namely, śēṣavāya evidence, whereby the mere co-occurrence of the evidence in a probandum replaces a necessary relation between the evidence and the probandum. However, since Dharmakīrti is not concerned with rendering scriptural inferences fully instrumental, this tentative reasoning may be adequate for his purposes. It at least has the advantage of not explicitly contradicting statements that he makes only two verses later.

11 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:246a = K:394) remarks:

*It does not indicate just the speaker’s intention. [K: The word just (eva) should be read in a different order [than what is recorded]]. Instead, since it is trustworthy in the manner just described with regard to an object (artha) that cannot be known by either perceptual awareness or [non-scriptural] inference, it is also an inference from the perspective of the intention of a person who wishes to engage in activity. [K: But it is not actually (vastutas) an inference because there is no relation between expressions and objects].

12 We supply from context the phrase, “the statements of the credible person in question.” That we are dealing with the trustworthiness of a credible person’s statements is evident from the way that Dharmakīrti introduces the verse (PVSV ad PV1.217; G:109.11–12): “Alternatively (atha vā), we state in another way the fact that, since the speech of a credible person is trustworthy, [knowledge derived from that speech] is inferential.” [āthavānyathāptavādaśāvyasaṃvādāṃ anumāntvam ucyate].

13 Dharmakīrti is referring to the discussion in PV2.

14 Introducing this next statement, Śākyabuddhi (PVT:247a2–4; absent in K) raises an objection:

“A person who is trustworthy and who acts so as to benefit others will necessarily not deceive others about any object or issue if s/he perceives the supersensible (aṭhānirvādārśin), but this cannot be certain that s/he can perceive the supersensible. Therefore, his statements may be trustworthy with regard to a human aim that is knowable (bgraṅ par bya ba = gamya) through reason, but due to a lack of knowledge, his statements may be deceptive about knowledge derived from objects.” [gal te skyes bu gtso bo’i don la bslu bar [P: mi] byed pa yin la / gzhan la phan pas ’jug pa dbang po las ’das pa’i don mthong ba can yin na / gdon mi za bar ‘ga’ zhig la gzhan mi lhu bar ’gyur ba yin pa de’i dbang po las ’das pa’i don mthong ba nyid ni nyes par nus pa ma yin no / de bas na rigs pas bgraṅ par bya ba’i skyes bu’i don la mi bslu ba yin gyi mi shes pa nyid kyis na shin tu skog tu gyur pa la bslu bar yang ’gyur ro zhe na /].

The sense of this objection is clear: one cannot guarantee that the trustworthiness of such a person necessarily extends to extremely remote objects. Śākyabuddhi continues:

*It is true that this is an issue (don = artha) concerning which one cannot be certain. But the Buddha is posited (bzhag pa) as such [i.e., as credible,] in terms of an individual’s [soteriologically oriented] activity. In order to demonstrate this, [Dharmakīrti] says... [nyes par mi nus pa can gyu don ’di nyid ni bden te / ’on kyang skyes bu ’jug pa la ltos nas de litar rnam par bzhag pa yin no / de nyid bstan pa’i phyir de dang zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos...].

15 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:247a) does not identify who these others might be; Karnakagomin (396) glosses apare as vādinaḥ, while Manorathanandin (PVV ad cit.) provides nāyāvikādayāḥ.

16 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:247b3) comments:

We accept the point that has just been stated—we do not deny that kind of [possibility]. But it
Karṇṇākagomin (396) preserves this statement almost entirely:

yo 'yam anantaroko 'ṛtha sa iṣṭo 'smaṅkam / kim tu śākyeta jñāntum puruṣanaiyamyaṇa yo 'nīṣayo yathādaśanālaksanā no tu śākyāḥ [For: yathā daśanālaksanā tu śākyāḥ read – laksanā no tu ... in accord with Śākyabuddhi].

17 The portion corresponding to Śākyabuddhi (PVT:248a2)... de lta bur gyur pa'i don ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba la sogs pa'i yon tan dang idan pa'i skyes bu de shes par mi nus pa nyid kyi phyir should occur after kim kāraṇām and tasya putmas in K(396.25–26).

18 The prefix duḥ is often translated simply as “difficult,” but this English word is too weak for the sense that the prefix conveys. In nearly every case, duḥ - expresses something more than English “difficult” but not quite as strident as “impossible.”

Note that, according to Śākyabuddhi (PVT:248a = K:397), durbdhā(h) is feminine nominative singular when construed with nirdeśā, but masculine nominative plural when construed with anyādośā.

19 As an example, Śākyabuddhi (PVT:248b = K:397) notes: “That is, persons who have desire may make themselves appear as if they were desireless, and desireless persons may make themselves appear as if they had desires” [rathā hi sarāgā api viśārjavaś vad ātmānām darśayanti / viśārjavaś ca sarāgavat/].

20 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:249a1; absent in K) comments:

It is not ... because of not accepting that there are some persons with those qualities, since that kind of person does make true statements. Through this statement [Dharmakirti showed that he] accepts the claim that there are some persons who are faultless. Having accepted this claim, he seeks to establish it by demonstrating the instrumental cognition that shows such a state to be possible, he puts forward an opposing opinion (phyoṅ snga ma = pūrvapakṣo) by saying, “Then is there no such...?” [mi 'dod pa'i phyir ni ma yin te 'dra ba ni phyin ci ma lo ṭa pon pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba la sogs pa snyes pa ma lus pa zad pa 'dod pa zhes bya ba de khas blang sas srid pa'i tshad ma bstan pa'i sgo nas de bsgrub par 'dod pas [P,D: 'l] phyoṅ snga ma ci ste gang zhes bya ba la sogs pa'gad par byed do/].

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:249a4) after going through the verse, also remarks:

In the second chapter [Dharmakirti] shows that the knowledge of selflessness counteracts all flaws. Therefore, it is not that we do not accept that there is any such person. We are just saying that it is extremely difficult to know whether or not the person who is one’s teacher is devoid of faults. [nyes pad thams cad kyi gnod pa can ni / bdag med pa'i sles pa yin no zhes le tu gnyis pa la sva pa/gyur ro / de bav na de lta bur gyur pa'i skyes bu mi [PVT-D and -p: ni] 'dod pa ma yin gyi / skyes bu sva pa zo gag pa zad pa de yang zhes par dka' ba yin no zhes de tsaṁ zhig smar'o / Note that skyes bu ni 'dod pa should be emended to skyes bu mi 'dod pa in accord with K(398): tsaṁ ma na tathāākāṛūḥ puruṣo neṣṭye eṣṭaṁ tu buddhaḥ sa tu kāśāstraṁu durṣrāna iti].

21 In other words, when the mind is filled with flaws, one can make it flawless by counteracting those flaws with their counteragent. The “counteragent” of the flaws is a mental state that opposes them—specifically, it is the realization of selflessness. But just as the realization of selflessness can counteract the flaws, one might claim that the flaws could also counteract the realization of selflessness. The point here is that, on Dharmakirti’s view, the realization of selflessness can serve as a counteragent to the flaws because that realization and those flaws stand in opposition to each other. The objector points out that the opposition goes both ways: just as the realization of selflessness can supplant the flaws, the flaws can likewise supplant the realization of selflessness.

22 Both here and when it is restated in PV2, this verse could be understood to be referring to the mind of a person who has at least understood selflessness, rather than the mind in general.

Dharmakirti, as well as Śākyabuddhi and Devendrabuddhi, understands the realization of selflessness to be a state that is natural to the mind. On this verse, Śākyabuddhi (PVT:250b) comments:

It is free of negativity because it is devoid of all the negativities of samsāra. A real object (bhūṭara) means that its object (artha)—which is to say its object (viśaya) that are particulars
such as the impermanent and so on—are real, in that they are not distorted (avipariṇāma). And precisely because it apprehends a real object, it is the path-state (mārga) that is the nature of the mind. That is, in mentioning the real object, he refers to the mind’s object (artha). In this regard, when the mind functions through superimposed images, it is confused; since that superimposed image is not the nature of the mind, the faults are adventitious since they are occurring through superimposed images. If even in the state where one has not yet cultivated the path it still makes sense for the path-mind (lam gyi sems) to be the nature of the mind because it is confirmed by an instrumental cognition, then why would it not be the nature of the mind when one has cultivated the path? As it says in the second chapter (PV2.210cd–211ab):

> The mind is by nature luminous cognizance (prabhāsva). Defilements are adventitious. The defilements do not have the capacity to arise in the mind even [when one just intellectually understands selflessness] prior to [actually meditating on it]. So they obviously cannot arise in the mind that has the nature of that realization of selflessness after [one has perfected one’s meditation on selflessness].

23 This verse is identical to PV2.212cd–213ab.

24 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:251a) reads ‘dod pa for ghṛṇā, but the sense of “disgust” seems more appropriate here.

25 These three are the opposites of the three “negativities” (upadrava). Śākyabuddhi (PVT:251a–251b) records them as follows:

> There are three negativities due to the absence of which the path is considered to be devoid of negativity. That which binds the mind is the negativity of the flaws, and by it the mind is bound such that it cannot engage in the experience (darśana) of real objects. The negativity of suffering and mental unease is what causes bodily and mental disequilibrium (vyathā). And due to not having pacified contaminated pleasure, one has a taste for experiencing it—this is the negativity of the “taste” of contaminated pleasure.

26 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:251b–252a = K:401) is particularly helpful for this section, as is indicated by the need to insert several parenthetical phrases into the translation. At the end of his comment he remarks:

> Even when the flaws are still infused (sātmya) in the mind, instrumental cognitions that apprehend real images such as the impermanent and so on induce the path-state (mārga) that counteracts (pratipakṣa) those flaws—how much more so, then, when insight (vipaśyanā) has been infused in the mind?

27 Dharmakīrti’s point here is simply to bring together slightly different ways of speaking about the fundamental cause (nidāna) of faults. On the one hand, some sources speak of satkāyadrṣṭi (i.e., the belief or “view” that the evanescent components of body and mind are a locus of an essential self). This belief, however, may be called “ignorance” (avidyā), and ignorance may be called “confusion” (moha). Therefore, even though both moha and satkāyadrṣṭi are said to be the cause of the flaws, no contradiction is involved, since they may be treated as synonymous in this context. Dharmakīrti chooses to emphasize satkāyadrṣṭi because it more readily accounts for his way of speaking about flaws and their elimination.
5. PV2.1–6 with Selections from PVP and PVT

[Introducing the general theme of the chapter, Devendrabuddhi remarks:]

He, namely the Blessed One, is an instrument of knowledge because he is similar to an instrument of knowledge. An objector asks, “But what is the nature of an instrument of knowledge such that you claim that he is similar it?”

[In response, Devendrabuddhi cites PV2.1a:]

An instrument of knowledge is a trustworthy awareness. [PV2.1a]

[Devendrabuddhi(1b4ff) notes that there are two kinds of trustworthiness:]

As for that trustworthiness, “having determined the object, when one then acts upon it,” that thing’s causal capacity is established; hence, [in one sense] the trustworthiness is that that thing has the kind of nature which it is asserted to have. This kind of trustworthiness is a quality of the object. When one knows it as such, the awareness is trustworthy; this is a quality of the subject.

[Devendrabuddhi (2a1ff) raises the objection that, since inference is erroneous (bhrānta), it would not satisfy the definition of trustworthiness given in PV2.1. He remarks:]

“Since inference does not determine the object in itself, the definition of ‘trustworthiness’ does not include it; hence, your definition is incorrect.”

We respond that a cognition is trustworthy because it does not deceive people; this includes perception and inference, which have the characteristic of causing one to obtain the intended object. To comment on that, [Dharmakīrti] says: trustworthiness is a cognition of telic function. This means that one has a cognition of the accomplishing of the aim that is to be accomplished by the object that one has determined through the instrumental cognition (tshad mas yongs su nges pa’i don gyis bsgrub par bya ba’i don byed par rtogs pa’o). For example, for the person who, having cognized a fire through perception, then acts (jug pa) on fire’s capacity to burn, cook and so on, there is the activation of a perception whose object is the sensation of warmth and such. Or, for example, on certain occasions there might be a cognitive error due to something which has a form similar to fire and so on; at that time, there is for that person the activation of an
inference through smoke which definitively determines the fire. Depending on the context, one of these two—the engagement of a subsequent perception or inference—confirms the trustworthiness of a perception.10

Because various causes of error in the case only of perception are possible, it is sometimes known to be instrumental through the activation of a subsequent instrumental cognition that has as its object that thing’s telic function; this is not the case with inference. That is, a property-śvabhāva used as an inferential sign and a cause used as an inferential sign are restricted to being the property-śvabhāva of the real thing in question and the effect of the real thing in question, respectively. And only they [i.e., a property-śvabhāva and an effect] are the causes for the respective sign awareness. Hence, if that kind of thing [—i.e., a property-śvabhāva or effect—] is absent, there is no inference. Therefore, inference does not rely on the engagement of a subsequent instrumental cognition. 11

In other cases,12 one may not be certain of the difference between a perception and a spurious perception when they occur; in such cases the actual perceptual awareness is known to be trustworthy through the engagement of a subsequent instrumental cognition.

“The latter and former perceptions are not distinct, so, since one might doubt that one is not acting on a real thing, one could not be certain that it is not erroneous.”13

This is not the case because both would not occur (jug pa) in the absence of a real thing. That is, for one who acts through being prompted to act by a faulty or dubious cognition that apprehends something that is not fire as fire, a subsequent awareness that has as its object burning and cooking does not arise. It does not arise because that [awareness in which the expected telic function appears] is based on a real thing. If that subsequent awareness does arise, then the former can only be trustworthy because: [1] one obtains a telic function in accord with one’s expectations; and because [2] the cause of just that kind of awareness of telic function is a real thing. Therefore, if the latter has a real thing as its object, then the former is trustworthy with regard to it.14

Someone objects: “The latter instrumental cognition [in which appears the telic function of the object determined by the former awareness] does not cognize the object that was apprehended by the former. If that is the case, how can it have as its object the telic function of an object determined by that former awareness such that the former awareness is instrumental because it does not deceive one about that object’s telic function?”

This is not a problem. Beings engaged in practical action (vyavaharī) act on those two objects without differentiating them. Hence, in accord with such practical action, we say that, beings act on objects that occur in temporal sequence as if those objects were a single thing. In reality, the former and latter objects are distinct. However, the real thing that is the object of the latter instrumental cognition would not exist if the object of
the former instrumental cognition had not been existent. Hence, we metaphorically say that the latter awareness has as its object just that object of the former awareness. Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was established prior [to the cognition in which its telic function appeared], that initial cognition is instrumental because through it the latter awareness engages with the telic function.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{[Continuing on the issue of trustworthiness,\textsuperscript{16} Devendrabuddhi (2b7ff) turns to an interpretation in terms of Epistemic Idealism:]} 

According to those for whom external objects do not exist, the object which is determined by the former instrumental cognition is not incontrovertibly the cause of the latter instrumental cognition; however, it is the cause of an awareness that has the appearance of the desired telic function. Whatever does not have that appearance is not instrumental; hence, there is no contradiction. Even if there were no external objects, the awareness that arises with that kind of appearance is a human aim (skyes bu’i don = puruṣārtha). Thus, with regard to their theories of trustworthiness, there is ultimately no difference between those who maintain the existence of external objects and those who do not.

\textit{[Devendrabuddhi now examines to two issues concerning trustworthiness: doubt and obstruction. He raises an objection and answers it:]} 

Since an instrumental cognition is this or that cognition whose trustworthiness has been ascertained, doubtful cognitions and such are not instrumental.

“But since a person may be obstructed in his activity, even an instrumental cognition may not be trustworthy, and it therefore would not be instrumental.”

The trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition does not consist of the fact that one definitely obtains the desired object through that instrumental cognition. Instead, it consists of the fact that one obtains only the desired object through that instrumental cognition. When one acts,\textsuperscript{17} the instrumental cognition is what makes one obtain the object. Therefore, a cognition’s instrumentality consists of its capacity to make one obtain the desired object. Since just that capacity is said to be the trustworthiness of the instrumental cognition, there is no problem concerning obstructed action.

\textit{[Dharmakīrti next raises the issue of language:]} 

This instrumentality is also the case with linguistic awareness because it makes one aware of the intention [in the speakers’ mind]. [PV2.1d]
Neither Devendrabuddhi nor Sākyabuddhi offer particularly striking comments on this point. Van Bijlert, who understands this entire discussion to refer to the instrumentality of the Buddha and his scriptures, interprets the verse as referring to the Buddha as speaker. A more likely interpretation would be to construe the verse as a defense against objections based on Dharmakīrti’s antirealist semantics. In other words, if Dharmakīrti denies that expressions refer to real universals instantiated in substances, then language is ultimately meaningless. Why bother to use it? The response is simply that language does yield trustworthy knowledge, but only with regard to the linguistic intentions of the speaker:

An expression is instrumental in that it indicates the object that appears in awareness as the object of the speaker’s linguistic intention. But it is not caused by the actuality of things. [PV2.2]

The other issue that language raises is one that applies to conceptual cognitions in general. Devendrabuddhi expresses the problem in the following objection (3a7):

“An instrumental cognition is that which is trustworthy with regard to the telic function when one acts having become aware of the instrumental object through that instrument. If that is so, consider the case where one acts upon a water-jug through the conceptual awareness of a water-jug; when one does so that conceptual awareness is also trustworthy with regard to the telic function of acting in that fashion. Hence, that conceptual awareness would also be instrumental, but you do not accept that it is. Therefore, the definition of instrumentality is faulty.”

According to Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti’s next statement responds to this issue:

Since conventional awareness apprehends that which has already been apprehended, we do not claim that it is instrumental. [PV2.3a]

Devendrabuddhi comments (3b2):

That is, conventional awarenesses that have objects such as a water-jug, existenthood, number and upward movement are not claimed to be instrumental. Why? For the reason that they apprehend what has already been apprehended. Here [Dharmakīrti has said that] just the initial experience of an object is the instrumental cognition, i.e., it is what makes one act. The subsequent conceptual awareness that comes from it arises recalling that object as it was apprehended. Hence, it is not at all an awareness of a real thing that can accomplish a telos. So how can it be what makes one act after one has known its object?
In PV2.3b–4c, Dharmakīrti defends an important claim made in PV2.1—namely, that awareness itself is instrumental. This conflicts with many of Dharmakīrti’s Brahmanical opponents, and to introduce Dharmakīrti’s verse, Devendrabuddhi raises a typical objection (3b4):

“But why is an awareness with the aforementioned kind of image instrumental and not the faculties and so on?”

[The answer is Dharmakīrti’s verse:]

Awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one’s action toward an entity that one wishes to obtain or avoid. [PV2.3b–d]

[To clarify the point being made here, Devendrabuddhi (3b4ff) makes an important innovation: he introduces the notion of “mediated” (vyavahita) and “unmediated” (avyavahita) instrumental effects (pramāṇaphala). He begins by answering the question he posed just above—“Why cannot the sense faculties themselves be considered instrumental?”]

Because it is not possible for the faculties to be instrumental. To be specific, there are two kinds of instrumental effects: one called a “human aim” which is a mediated effect and a distinctive one that is not mediated.20

Having known through awareness an aim that should be done, a person implements its means and thereby attains the activity defined as the direct apprehension of it. Likewise, knowing that some thing is to be avoided, a person does not implement its means and thereby obtains the activity of not directly apprehending it. Thus, awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one’s activity with regard to a real thing that one should obtain or avoid. That is, it is the primary factor—awareness is the primary factor—in the activity whose object is a real thing which one should obtain or avoid and which is thus called a “human aim.” Therefore, since awareness is the primary factor, awareness is instrumental.

It is claimed [at PV2.3b–d] that awareness is instrumental so as to refute the notion that the sense faculties and such are also causes for activity. That is, a person who has faculties and so on does not thereby engage in activity [toward some sense object]; otherwise, one would have to conclude that one engages in activity merely by virtue of their existence. Instead, it is as follows: having known what should be obtained and avoided, a person who is that knower applies himself accordingly. That in terms of which a judicious person is initially prompted to act is the cause of action toward the intended object. Since other awarenesses arise by dint of that initial awareness or have that initial awareness as their object, only that initial awareness is instrumental.
[Devendrabuddhi thus maintains that, when Dharmakīrti defends the instrumentality of awareness by claiming that it is “the principal factor in action,” he is referring to a mediated instrumental effect. Here a “mediated effect” is synonymous with a puruṣārtha. In the next portion of verse, Dharmakīrti presents two additional reasons for the claim that awareness itself is instrumental:]

Also, awareness is instrumental because a cognition is differentiated due to the differentiation of the awareness’ objective image; this is the case because that cognition only occurs when that objective image is present. [PV2.4a-c]

[Here, Devendrabuddhi understands Dharmakīrti to be referring to an unmediated instrumental effect. He comments (4b2ff):]

The [mere] cognition of an object is an unmediated instrumental effect. That is, that through which, when all [other] causes are in place, the convention of “knowing” is satisfied without further mediation is an instrumental cognition. And nothing but the simulacrum [i.e., the cognitive image] of the object has that lack of mediation, for it is through that simulacrum that instances of knowing are distinguished from each other, even though they are indistinguishable in terms of their nature of being experiences. Hence, due to the differentiation of the objective image—i.e., due to that quality of the cognition—the awareness, i.e., the instance of knowing, is differentiated. And since this effect exists when that is present—i.e., when the object-image is present—awareness is therefore instrumental. If when “y” is present, “x” comes into existence, it makes sense that “y” is the most efficient cause (shin tu sprubs par byed pa = sādhakatama) of “x.” But if at some point there were no such effect [i.e., “x”] when “y” was present, then one would realize that “y” depends upon some other mediating causal factor. That being the case, since that former cause “y” is mediated by something else on which it depends, it would not be the most prominent causal factor. Therefore, it would not be the instrumental cause. Even when the sense faculties and so on are present, they do not [necessarily] have the causal function of producing an awareness because they are mediated by the object–simulacrum. But if the simulacrum is present, it is necessarily known because it is not mediated by anything else for that knowing to occur. Since it is of the nature of awareness, it is the basis for positing an effect that does not depend on anything further for its occurrence. As such, the object-simulacrum is the cause of both kinds of effects. And since it is of the nature of awareness, awareness alone is instrumental.

[This all raises the question of how instrumentality is to be determined. Devendrabuddhi briefly discusses and rejects the Mīmāṃsaka solution—namely, that all instruments of knowledge are intrinsically instrumental (svataḥ prāmāṇyam). To show that the awareness itself cannot present its own}
instrumentality, Devendrabuddhi (5a3) cites Dharmakīrti’s next verse:

The awareness’ essential reality (svarūpa) is known through the awareness itself, [but not its instrumentality]. [PV2.4d]

[Devendrabuddhi (5a3ff) comments:]

That is, through reflexive awareness, an awareness that is called “instrumental” is established to be an extant awareness, but it is not thereby established to be instrumental.

“But on your view its instrumentality is not distinct from the extant awareness itself; therefore, that instrumentality is also apprehended when one apprehends the awareness as extant.”

This is true. Since a perception does not arise in a piecemeal fashion, that instrumentality should also be apprehended. Nevertheless, that awareness is asserted to be instrumental concerning that objective aspect (bzung ba'i rnam pa = grahyākāra) with regard to which it produces a definitive determination (niścaya) because it causes action toward that aspect. It is not instrumental with regard to any other aspect. Even though there is no difference in terms of being experienced, there is the definitive determination of that aspect for which there are the causes of definitive determination, such as interest, habituation, context and so on. What requires the mediation of other conditions is not determined. Therefore, although one has already apprehended the instrumentality when one perceives an extant awareness, it is as if one had not apprehended because there is no definitive determination of it.

“How then is one to determine instrumentality?”

[To answer this question, Devendrabuddhi cites the first portion of Dharmakīrti’s next verse:]

Instrumentality is known through practical action (vyavahāra). [PV2.5a]

[Devendrabuddhi remarks (5b6–7):]

...through practical action. That is, instrumentality is known through a subsequent awareness whose object is telically efficacious.24

This leads to an obvious problem: if one can determine what is instrumental simply by acting, why would anyone bother to write a treatise? Dharmakīrti anticipates this problem and responds:

In this regard, treatises are for the purpose of eliminating
Composing treatises is not useless because treatises are for the purpose of eliminating confusion. When one is prompted to act, if one acts without knowing the defining characteristics of an instrumental cognition, one may be deceived. Therefore, those who wish to act should know before they act the defining characteristics of an instrumental cognition and of a spurious one. Those defining characteristics that one does not know are learned (rig pa = √ vid) as they are taught in a treatise, defined as that which teaches the Dharma, which is here typified by instructions on proper knowledge. Having learned those defining characteristics, one will then act in some appropriate manner. It is for this purpose that treatises are composed. That is, they eliminate the audience’s confusion about what is an instrumental cognition and what is not. In this sense, a treatise is not pointless. Thus, those who maintain that a treatise would accomplish nothing are not correct. That is, the instrumental cognitions are not commonly established because, by way of the mutually contradictory definitions that are presented, it is observed that even thoughtful scholars misunderstand what constitutes an instrumental cognition. How much more so is it the case for the world in general? Hence, if one’s actions are not preceded by an instrumental cognition, one will be deceived. And it is also not at all acceptable that a cognition be considered nondeceptive by virtue of [mere] accidental success.

Moreover, an instrumental cognition is that which illuminates an unknown object (ajñātārtha). [PV2.5c]

An instrumental cognition is also a cognition that illuminates—i.e., makes known—the reality of an object—i.e., a thing—of which the cognizer is not yet aware. In this context, since it also illuminates that a particular is absent, by saying “thing” (artha), he accepts that it gives knowledge of the reality that is defined as the existence or nonexistence of a thing.

This leads to a few problems. Some have to do with the possible instrumentality of hallucinations, inasmuch as they also “illuminate what has not been discerned.” Devendrabuddhi (5b6) claims that this notion is averted by the use of the term “artha.” Devendrabuddhi also claims that the term “artha” enables one to count
nonperception (anupalabdhi) as instrumental (5b7a1). But the most important objection raised here is the one contained in Dharmakīrti’s next statement:

“The knowledge of a universal that follows the [perceptual] cognition of an object in itself (svarūpa) would be instrumental.” [PV2.5d–6a]

[Devendrabuddhi explains this objection (6a1ff):]

“If an instrumental cognition is that which illuminates an unknown object, then the awareness involving a universal that comes after the cognition of a thing’s nature (svarūpa) would be instrumental. That is, the awareness involving a universal that follows upon the cognition of a particular would also be instrumental since it takes as its object a universal that was not apprehended by the preceding perception. But you do not accept this; hence, your definition is erroneous.”

[Dharmakīrti answers:]

[Not all such subsequent conceptual cognitions are instrumental; only some are] because [the statement concerning the illumination of what is unknown] is intended to refer to an awareness in the case where some aspect of the particular has not been discerned. [PV2.6b-c]

[Devendrabuddhi (6a2ff) amplifies on Dharmakīrti’s response:]

That criticism [raised in PV2.5d–6a] is not a problem. To be specific, when a perceptual awareness apprehends an object such as blue whose essential nature is excluded from this and that other thing, there may arise a mnemonic cognition whose object is a specific aspect in accord with the way the particular was perceived. Therefore, it is not making one cognize what one has not yet cognized such that the definition would be erroneous due to all subsequent conceptual cognitions being instrumental. And even if we suppose that an awareness involving a universal cognizes what has not been known, nevertheless it is not erroneous because [that second characteristic] is intended to refer to the case where the particular has not been discerned. That is, an instrumental cognition is that awareness that cognizes as its object a particular that one has not discerned. Since he states this definition along with a qualification, awareness involving a universal is not instrumental.

“Then inference would not be instrumental because it is an awareness of what has already been observed, as when one infers that impermanence is a property-svabhāva of sound.”

This is not so. Even though sound’s unique nature, which is excluded from all [other things], has already been apprehended, the object of
practical action (vyavahāra) can only be that aspect with regard to which that perception has produced a definitive determination and so on as its effect. Therefore, since it applies to that which has not been apprehended, inference is instrumental. This has already been explained [in PV1].

“Why is it that only an awareness that cognizes a particular is asserted to be instrumental, and not any other?”

[Devendrabuddhi uses this question to introduce Dharmakīrti’s last remark in this section:]

Because [judicious persons] analyze the particular. [PV2.6d]

[Devendrabuddhi (6a7ff) remarks:]

Only the particular accomplishes a telic function. Hence, for the sake of that telos, a person seeks an instrumental cognition with regard to an object that is a particular, which is asserted to be the basis for [the desired] telic function. He does not seek an instrumental cognition with regard to another object that does not accomplish that telic function, because by accomplishing that kind of thing, the telic function is not accomplished.

---

1 See Krasser (2001) for a number of useful Sanskrit fragments, many of which were included in a previous version of this translation (Dunne 1999:436ff).

2 Commenting on Devendrabuddhi’s statement, Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye: 71b7ff), raises the following objections and responses:

“Inference and perception are instrumental; that being the case, how can the Blessed One, who does not have the nature of [inference and perception] be called such [that is, ‘instrumental’]?"

He is called an “instrument of knowledge” because he is similar to those two kinds of instruments of knowledge. In other words, he can be subsumed in the metaphor, “instrumental.”

“But the Blessed One has the nature of the stainless, nonconceptual, unerring wisdom that arises by force of his meditation. Hence, the Blessed One is actually by nature a perception, so why does one need to rely on a metaphor?”

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:72a1ff) responds:

Some say that this is not a problem because the epithet pramāṇabhūta is intended to refer to a conceptual state. But here, the correct response is as follows: Even if the Blessed One has the nature of the aforementioned instrument of knowledge, he is nevertheless not commonly known as such. Therefore, he is metaphorically compared to a saṃvyavahārika instrument of knowledge.

3 PV in ad 1.1.

4 Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:72a6ff) makes some important comments on this point:

“If perception is non-conceptual, it cannot determine whether [the percept] water and so on are true or false. Hence, how can one say that one ‘determines the referent and acts’?”

Here we say the following. Activity that is based on perception is twofold: initial and habitual. One has clear and habitual perception of those things to which one is habituated. When that perception arises, it arises determining its image in accord with one’s habituation in a manner that avoids all causes for error. And that awareness produces a subsequent verifying awareness of that kind; hence, the person acts on that object. Therefore, in that case the awareness itself determines its own instrumentality. Since it does not depend on the activity of some subsequent instrumental cognition, it is not inappropriate to say, “determines the object.
...” It is not the case that all perceptions are determined to be instrumental through something else. In the case of acting due to an initial perception [i.e., one which does not involve habituation], if one has not definitively apprehended the object’s identity (arya mtsan ≈ nimitta), one acts out of doubt.

“Well, how is it appropriate to say, ‘Having determined the object (artha)’?”

The mere production of the perception with the image of that object is conventionally designated in that fashion, as has already been explained [PVSV ad PV 1.57b–d].

“If one is acting out of doubt, how is it correct to say that people who do so are ‘judicious’ (prakṣapūrvakārin)?”

What is the contradiction here? A person who investigates the situation before acting is not a person who acts just out of a definitive determination. Thus, there are two causes that compel one to act: doubt about an object (artha) and the definitive determination of an object. Inactivity also has two causes: doubt that there is no object and definitive determination that there is no object. A person who acts out of the first two causes and a person who does not act out of the second two is what the world means by a judicious person. If acting without definitive determination is so unusual, then it would be contradictory for farmers to work in the fields and so on, for they have no instrumental cognition which has definitively determined their future wheat and such will grow.

5 PV-D: khyad par byed pa → khyab par byed pa (ex conj.).
7 PV2.1bff: arthakriyāsthitiḥ / avisaṃvādanam.
8 Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:73a4ff) glosses the terms:

An artha is burning and so on. The “accomplishment” of that means the arisal of it. The sthiti of it means the cognition of it because the verbal root [i.e., sthā] has various meanings. (don ni sreg pa la soṣp pa’o / de’i byed pa ni skyed pa’o / de’i gnas pa ni rtogs pa ste khams kyi don sna tshogs pa nyīd kyi phyir ro).

9 mes → me’i (ex conj.).
10 Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye: 72b7) makes it clear that this passage concerns the instrumentality of perception.
11 According to Śākyabuddhi (PVT:74b2), the point here is that inference involves no infinite regress (by virtue of requiring yet another subsequent awareness for the determination of its instrumentality) because inference is intrinsically instrumental (rjes su dpag pa ni rang nyid kyi tshad ma nyid du nnam par bzhag pa yin pa’i phyir thug pa med pa ma yin no).
12 Śākyabuddhi (PVT:74b2ff) notes:

In other cases—in other cases of perception—lacking habituation, the experience (mthong ba = darkāna) is not clear, so the particular identity (khyad par = viṣeva) of the object is not definitively determined; this explains the case where one is initially prompted to act [as opposed to habituated actions—see above]. At that time, one also acts out of doubt. By implication this states that if, due to habituation, one definitively apprehends (rjes par bzūng ba) the particular identity, even perception does not depend upon the engagement of a subsequent awareness.

13 Śākyabuddhi notes that the former and latter awarenesses are not different in that the latter awareness of burning and cooking might also be dubious, as when one appears to see fire in a dream and then appears to see its heating and cooking. This dubiety of even the confirming awareness would require it to be confirmed by yet another confirming awareness, and one thus arrives at an infinite regress. If on the other hand, one admits that the latter awareness is self-confirming, then why not admit that the first one is as well? Śākyabuddhi (PVT:74b7–75a1) then quotes two verses he attributes to Kumārila, and which may well be from the āvadāna. They are cited at TS vv.2853–2854:

Just as the first awareness depends upon that trustworthiness [supplied by the second one], in the very same way that trustworthiness [supplied by the second] would also require yet another trustworthiness [supplied by some third]. If, however, one were to admit that some [awareness in this chain] is instrumental intrinsically [i.e., on its own], then why are you angry about the first awareness being that way such that you will not let it be so? [yathāvai prathamām jñānam tattvātmām apekṣate / somvādanī samvādhipunar māyas tathāha śrī // kasyacit tu yañīsya śrī eva pramaṇāt / prathamasya tathābhāve pradvavac kena hetunā //]

14 Śākyabuddhi remarks on the section, starting with Devendrabuddhi’s statement: This is not the case
because both would not occur (jug pa) in the absence of a real thing. Śākyabuddhi comments (75a1ff):

Both means the two appearances: the appearance of fire in the former cognition and the appearance of burning and such in the latter. Although a cognitive appearance of fire may apply to even unreal things, the appearance of burning and such will not. This is expressed by [Devendrabuddhi’s] statement: for one who acts through being prompted to act by a faulty or dubious cognition that apprehends something that is not fire as fire, a subsequent awareness that has as its object burning and cooking does not arise. It does not arise because that—namely, the awareness that arises with an object that has the telic function of burning, cooking and so on—is based on a real thing. If it does arise, then the former can only be trustworthy; that is, if, a subsequent awareness of the object (artha) that accords with one’s expectations arises in a person who acts through being prompted by that kind of former awareness, then that is or constitutes the former awareness’ trustworthiness.... This is so because the cause of just that kind of awareness of telic function is a real thing. That is, since it accomplishes a telos (artha) such as burning and cooking, fire is that which accomplishes burning, cooking and so on; likewise, water is that which is used to accomplish washing and drinking. This is so because a real thing is by definition that which is capable of telic function (arthakriyāsamartha).

“But there is that kind of trustworthiness with regard to a telos (artha) even in a dream.”

It is preferable that there be a real thing in that case; when awake, there is no other basis (rgyu) for positing a real thing.

“Then dream-awarenesses would be instrumental.”

Since we admit that this is the case, this is not a flaw in our argument.

“How is it that one says that an awareness is not instrumental?”

Because one thinks, “This is erroneous.” Hence, a perception whose object is capable of accomplishing an aim (artha), since it is devoid of any causes of error, is ascertained (yongs su bcad pa ≈ paricchinnā) by reflexive awareness as being by nature instrumental. It produces a definitive determination of that object in accord with the way that was ascertained. Hence, it is intrinsically instrumental, and therefore, there is no infinite regress. One might not, however, be habituated to an initial awareness with the appearance of fire or water; in that case, that awareness does not have the capacity to produce a definitive determination because, even though that fire or water has been apprehended by an independent (rang rgyud ≈ svatantra) instrumental cognition, there are causes that induce errors that prevent such a definitive determination. In that case, that initial awareness is established to be instrumental by the engagement of a subsequent instrumental cognition. Hence, it is extrinsically instrumental. However, if one has an awareness that involves habituation and clarity, then its instrumentality is determined from itself (rang las = svataḥ), as was explained above. In this way, it remains the case that perception is instrumental in some cases intrinsically and in some cases extrinsically. Inference is instrumental intrinsically.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT:75b6ff) comments on the last sentence:

Thus, in saying therefore he means: “since the latter instrumental cognition is impossible without the object of the former instrumental cognition.” Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was established prior—i.e., prior to the latter cognition whose object is the telic function—that initial cognition is instrumental. That is, since it is the cause of the latter cognition whose object is the telic function, the initial cognition is instrumental, and it is such because it too has a real thing as its object. Otherwise, if it were to have an unreal thing as its object, it would not be the cause for that kind of subsequent cognition; he says: since through it that very cognition engages with the telic function. Here, through it means “through the initial cognition.” In other words, the initial cognition is instrumental because the initial cognition is itself the cause of the latter cognition whose object is the telic function. [de’i phyir de bas na zhes bya ba ‘di smos te gang gi phyir tshad ma sngag ma’i yul med par tshad ma phyi ma’i yul mi srid pa de bas na sngar dngos po grub pa’i phyir te don byed pa’i yul can gyi shes pa las sngar yang ngo / dang po nīyid tshad ma yin te don byed pa’i yul can gyi shes pa phyi ma’i rgyur ayur pa dang po’i shes pa yang tshad ma yin te de yang dngos po’i yul can nīyid yin po’i phyir ro / de lta ma yin na ni de dngos po med pa’i yul can yin na de lta bur gyur pa’i shes pa phyi ma’i rgyu nīyid du mi’i ‘gyur ro / de nīyid ni de las don byed pa la ‘jug pa’i phyir ro zhes bya ba smos te de las zhes bya ba dang po’i shes pa nīyid las te dang po’i shes pa ni don byed pa’i yul can gyi shes pa phyi ma’i rgyu nīyid yin po’i phyir ro zhes bya bo’i don to /].

Summarizing the objection and response that have been made here, Śākyabuddhi notes (PVT:75bs):

Someone objects, “But since the former instrumental cognition is what causes the activation (jug pa byed pa ≈ pravartaka) of the latter instrumental cognition, the former instrumental cognition is instrumental only when the latter instrumental cognition is activated; previously,
it was not instrumental. But that latter instrumental cognition does not have the capacity to make that former awareness which does not have [the nature of being instrumental] into an awareness that does have the nature of being instrumental." As Kumārila has said: "Let it be known that all instruments of knowledge are intrinsically instrumental, for that which does not have the capacity to act as an instrumental cognition on its own cannot be made capable of doing so by another [subsequent] cognition" [svataḥ sarvapramāṇāṇāṁ prāṇāṇyam iti gamyatiḥ / na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śākyate / (Śv: Codanā, 47)].

For this reason, [Devendrabuddhi] says: Thus, since .... In other words, without the object of the former instrumental cognition, the object of the latter instrumental cognition would be impossible; hence, the latter one establishes that the object of the former is a real thing; therefore the first awareness—the one that is before the awareness which has as its object accomplishment of the [expected] telos (artha)—is instrumental. In other words, the first awareness causes the latter awareness whose object is the accomplishment of the [expected] telos (artha); as such the first awareness is instrumental because it also has a real thing as its object. (76a) If that were not the case, then the first awareness would have an unreal thing as its object; as such, it would not be the cause of that kind of subsequent awareness [i.e., one whose object is the accomplishment of the expected telos]. This is so since through it the latter awareness engages with the accomplishment of the [expected] telos. Through it means "through the first awareness." In other words, this means: "since the first awareness is the cause of the latter awareness whose object is the accomplishment of the [expected] telos."

This argument demonstrates the following. When it arises from its own causes, the former awareness arises as having only the nature of an instrumental cognition because a real thing (dngos po ≈ vastu, bhāva) is partless. However, if there are causes for error, merely the definitive determination of it as instrumental is expressed through another [subsequent] cognition.

17 Śākyabuddhi notes (PVT, nye:77b1–2), "By implication one supplies (adyāhāra): 'In all cases when one is not obstructed'..." [thams cad du gags byed pa'i rgyu med na zhes bya ba khong nas dbyang nga].


19 This is a reference to HB:2*,18–19. See below.

20 Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:77b2–3) glosses distinctive as meaning that it "will definitely occur" (gdon mi za bar 'gyur ba). He remarks:

[Devendrabuddhi] says that it is "distinctive." The distinction is that it will definitely occur. Since that way of occurring is fulfilled (spyod pa ≈ carita) by that kind of effect, it is called "distinctive." In other words, if there is an instrumental cognition, an instrumental object (prameya) will necessarily be cognized (rtogs par 'gyur) because that object is not different from the instrumental cognition. This is not the case with a mediated effect because it is possible for something else to obstruct its occurrence.

21 The Tibetan (PVP:4a2) reads tshad ma'i 'bras bu ma chod pa yang don rtags pa yin no. However, this seems again to be one of the many cases of subject/predicate inversion in a Tibetan translation for a Sanskrit statement that was probably: avyavahītāpramāṇāphalaḥ evārthaḥdhiṣamāḥ. Note that here I understand eva to merely be marking the predicate.

22 PVP (4a3) ex.conj.: zhes pa'i chos → shes pa'i chos.

23 This complex relative construction has been represented using the variables "x" and "y" for the sake of clarity in its English rendering.

24 Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:79a1) notes: "Since it produces a definitive determination subsequent to itself, in that it is an instrumental cognition, perception is instrumental with regard to the objective image." [tshad ma'i phyis 'byung ba can gyi nges pa skyed pa'i phyir mngon sum ni gzung bo'i rnam pa dag la tshad ma ni yin no /].

25 PVP(5b5–6): de bas na de ṭar tshad ma'i mtshan nyid mi slu ba cīq ci cīg bshad do / mi shes don gyi gsal byed kyang / gzhain mtshan nyid gnis pa yin no /. Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye: 79a6–7) rejects the notion that this actually constitutes a second definition; instead he maintains that Devendrabuddhi is merely speaking of this as a second "general characteristic" [gzhain mtshan nyid gnis pa zhes bya ba ni 'rīg rten gyi rjod par byed pa'di ni cīq cīn la / di ni gzhain rnam pa gnis pa yin no zhes bya ba smos pa yin no / yang na gzhain med pa zhes bya ba 'dis khyab pa nyid ston te / gzhain mtshan nyid gnis pa yang byar yod pa ma yin te / gang la 'dis ma khyab pa'i yul la mtshan nyid gzhain 'jug par 'gyur ro / 'di nyid kyis tshad ma gnis la khyab pa nyid kyi phyir ro /].

26 See also his comments on PV3.1 (PVP:123a4ff).

27 In a loose sense, the term svarūpa here functions as a synonym for sva-lakṣaṇa. In more precise
terms, to apprehend the svarūpa of an object is to apprehend it in its actuality. Thus, only perception apprehends the svarūpa of things, inasmuch as conceptual cognitions apprehend objects in a pararūpa fashion—namely, through the mediation of a universal. See PV3.53–55 and the comments of Devendrabuddhi (144b).
Instrumental cognitions are of two kinds because there are two kinds of objects. There are two kinds of objects because some objects are capable of telic function while others are not. [Illusions such as] the hairs [that appear in the visual perceptions of a person with cataracts] are not objects (arthas) because they are not considered to be objects.¹ [PV3.1]

There are two objects because some are similar across instances and others are not similar; because some are the objects of words and others are not the objects of words; and because the cognition of some occurs when there are causes other than the object, and the cognition of others does not occur when there are causes other than the object. [PV3.2]

In this context, that which is capable of telic function is said to be ultimately real. The other one is said to be conventionally real. They are, respectively, the particular and the universal.² [PV3.3]

“But nothing is capable of telic function.”

We observe that things such as seeds have a capacity for telic function in the case of sprouts, and so on.

“Such things are considered to have such a capacity conventionally, not ultimately.”

Let it be so in the way as you have said (āstu yathā tathā).³ [PV3.4]

“That capacity for telic function is found in all objects.”

It is not found in universals, which are not observed to have either positive concomitance [in which a universal necessarily exists when there is a cognition of a universal] or negative concomitance [in which such a cognition exists in the presence only and merely of a universal] with the cognition of a universal. An example in which these relations do occur is that of the eye faculty and the form perceived in relation to the cognition of that form. [PV3.5]

The fact that a universal is not invariably concomitant with the cognition of a universal explains cognitions of supposedly extra-mental entities, such as substantial wholes—i.e., a water-jug—projections, universals, numbers, etc. They are also not invariably concomitant with their cognitions because, like universals, the cognition of them follows from the presence of other
factors, such as signs and mental effort. [PV3.6]

4 Things such as the hairs [that appear to a person with cataracts] are not universals because they are not considered to be objects [by persons who act upon them]. This fault does not ensue for absences because they are apprehended as knowable.5 [PV3.7]

The fault also does not ensue for those hair-like appearances when they are apprehended in that fashion [i.e., as objects by some other awareness]. This is so because there is no reason to deny that they are apprehended as knowable objects. The clarity of the appearance of hairs in cognition is due to the fact that they are objects [i.e., particulars]6 in that they are of the nature of awareness.

However, thoughts such as “These are hairs” have universals as their objects; but the appearance of hairs does not have any object. [PV3.8–9ab]

“If a universal is also a [real] object in terms of having the nature of awareness, then you would have to conclude that it is a particular.”

Since we do indeed assert that a universal is a particular,7 your statement poses no problem for us. But in terms of having the nature of other objects, it is a universal in that it has the same form for all [the objects that it seems to qualify]. It has that same form because it is based upon their exclusion [from other objects that do not have the expected causal characteristics]. [PV3.10]8

---

1 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:123a4ff):

“Well, in the awareness of a person with defective vision there are false appearances such as hairs, flies, two moons and so on. Those false appearances do not accomplish any purpose (artha) at all; hence, they are not included in [the category of] particulars. But even though they are devoid of any such telic function, they are not included among universals because they appear clearly and because they are not distributed over anything. Thus, since they are not subsumed under [the categories of] particulars and universals, they are another kind of object. Hence, it is not correct that there are [just] two kinds of objects.”

No, it is not the case that our view is not correct. To be specific, hairs and so on are not objects (artha). Why? Because they are not considered to be objects [PV3.1d]. That is, persons engaged in practical action (vyavahāra) do not consider them to be objects. The intention of this statement is as follows. If the flies and so on that are perceived by a person with cataracts and so on were to be objects, then one would investigate the situation, asking, “Is it a particular, or is it a universal?” But they are not objects in that fashion because, with regard to an awareness in which there is the appearance of flies and so on, persons engaged in practical action do not have the intention, “This is the object of that awareness.”

Thus, as in the case of the subjective aspect of awareness, even though they are determined, they do not have the status of being objects of practical action. But although a universal is not ultimately an object, persons engaged in practical action imaginatively determine it to be a real thing, and they act accordingly; hence, it is posited as an object. This will be explained later.

The proof statement is as follows. That which is not considered by persons to be the object of some awareness does not satisfy the convention of being the object of that awareness. An example is the subjective aspect of that awareness. Persons engaged in practical action do not
consider the hairs and so on perceived by persons with cataracts and so on to be objects. The evidence here is the perception of a property-svabhāva that contradicts a property-svabhāva that pervades the negandum.

"The subjective aspect is the object of reflexive awareness; therefore, the example is not established."

This is not so, because the subjective aspect is cognized (rig pa=vedita) in that it itself arises as reflexive awareness.a

4 Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:152b2f):

This means the following. [Reflexive] awareness is not something other than the subjective aspect such that its object would be that subjective aspect. Rather, the subjective aspect is cognized in that it arises with the nature of reflexive awareness. If they are not distinct, how can there be the relation of subject and object such that the example would not be established?


3 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:124b) makes the following remarks:

An objector says, "But nothing is capable of telic function." This means, "The capacity for telic function does not exist ultimately whatsoever." That is, a real thing that is asserted to exist ultimately does not have any characteristics (lakṣaṇa) whatsoever. The argument is: That which does not exist in something else is not a characteristic of that thing; an example is the characteristic, "horned" when applied to a horse. The capacity for telic function does not exist in that which is asserted to be the particular. This is an argument by reason of the nonperception of the pervading quality.

[Dharmakīrti responds]: We observe that things such as seeds have a capacity for telic function in the case of sprouts, and so on. When he says that the capacity is observed, he means that an effect is observed. This means the following. When one thing comes into existence when the other is present, that latter thing has a capacity to produce the former because to be capable of telic function is to have just that kind of characteristic. That capacity is what seeds and so on have in relation to sprouts and so on. Thus, the reason for the objector’s argument is not established. The objector says: "The production of a sprout and so on when a seed and so on exists is a case of conventional production; it is not ultimate production. Therefore, if the capacity for telic function is stated in terms of ultimate production as the definition of a real thing, then it is not its definition because it does not cover all instances of the definiendum. And if it is stated in terms of conventional production, universals would also have it; the definition would thus be invalid by reason of overextension."

[Dharmakīrti responds:] Let it be as you have said. We say that the capacity for telic function is not qualified[a] [as either ultimate or conventional]. But the kind of capacity for telic function that is experienced (mthong ba ≈ drṣṭa) [by beings] is indisputable, and what characterizes a particular is therefore that kind of indisputable capacity for telic function. We do not have the least objection to you calling it whatever you might wish.

Moreover, what is it that you assert to be conventionally existent such that you assert conventional production [125a] but not production in the other way [i.e., ultimately]? If the conventional is that which is utterly nonexistent in its entirety, then when speaking of the "conventional," one would mean that the thing has no capacity. But in speaking of "production" one would mean that the thing has [telic] capacity. And inasmuch as the capacity [for telic function] and the absence of that capacity are mutually exclusive (parasparaparipāraśrasthit), how can a single thing have both that capacity and its absence?

Or else, if you assert that the term "conventional" means "produced" then [since "ultimate" means "nonproduction"] you have thereby asserted that there is nonproduction in ultimate terms, i.e., by the nonproduced. [Cf. PVT, nye:155a2] That being the case, others [i.e., those who hold our opinion] do not accept that there is the production of the nonproduced and such. Hence, let it be accepted in that way [i.e., as you have stated it]. It is not, however, too elegant to say that "the produced produces the produced" because there is [obviously] no other form of production.


Devendrabuddhi’s objector responds that the statement "Let it be as you have said," would mean that even universals have telic function, but Devendrabuddhi responds that they do not because they are not invariably concomitant with the occurrence of an awareness of them. He says, "At the very least, the telic function of real things is to produce an awareness that has the thing as its object; universals do not even have the capacity to produce awarenesses [that have as their objects the
universals]."

4 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:126b) introduces this verse with this objection:

“You claim that a universal is that of which one has a cognition when there are other factors that do not depend on an object (artha). But the awareness of things such as the hairs that a person with cataracts perceives occurs without the presence of hairs and such that are capable of telic function; rather, such awareneses occur when there are other causes, such as cognitive effort (ābhoga). That being the case, those hair-clumps must be universals.”

5 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:126b):

Things such as hairs are not universals. Why? Because they are not imagined to be objects. Persons with cataracts do not engage in practical action by imagining that the hair-clusters and such that appear in their own awareness are objects. Hence, one should not think of it as a universal or a distinct object. Rather, one should have this notion with regard to that which is imagined to be an object by persons engaged in practical action....

If hairs and such are not universals because people do not engage in practical actions in regard to them by having imagined them to be objects, then absences are also not universals, for they are not imagined to be objects.”

It is not the case that, since absences do not have the nature of universals, one would be obliged to admit that this flaw also applies to absences. Why? Because they are apprehended as knowable. Even though it is not the case that one engages in practical actions in relation to absences through having imagined them to be objects, one nevertheless may engage in practical action through having construed absences as knowable. It is not the case that only existent things (vastu) are knowable because its absence may be taken as an object in some fashion.

6 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:127a).

7 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:127a):

Since the universal also is by nature awareness itself, we accept that it is a particular. Hence, there is no contradiction [raised by our opponent’s objection]. [shes pa’i ngo bo nyid yin pa’i phyir spyi yang rang gi mtshan nyid yin par’od pa de tse na ‘gal ba med do].

8 Summarizing the point here, Devendrabuddhi (PVP:127b1–2) remarks:

Since it is based upon the exclusion, it is the same—that is, it is the same because the cognition appears in that fashion by virtue of depending upon the exclusion of other objects. It does so since it is produced through one’s experience (mthong ba = darśana) of the excluded real thing. Appearing as such, it is the universal of that object. In this way it is defined as both a particular and a universal.
That which is aggregated (sāṃcita) is a conglomerate (samudāya), and in that sense it is a universal (sāṃanya). [According to Buddhists such as Vasubandhu], one has perception of such things. Furthermore, any cognition of a universal is necessarily associated with conceptuality. [Hence, it is wrong to say that perception is free of conceptuality].” [PV3.194]

Due to a relation with other things [i.e., other particles], infinitesimal particles that are different than their own previous moments arise [from their own previous moments such that they can produce an awareness]. In that sense, they are said to be “aggregated,” and as such, they are said to be a condition for the production of awareness.2 [PV3.195]

Moreover, the distinctive quality that particles obtain does not occur without the other particles with which they are in proximity. Hence, since awareness does not have any necessary relation to a single particle, awareness is said to have a universal [in the sense of a group of aggregated particles]3 as its object.4 [PV3.196]

“Even though they occur in the same perceptual field, if they do not form a new, distinct substance, then those various particles are not observed simultaneously.”

Then how does one experience the simultaneous apprehension of small things such as sesame seeds that are disjunct [i.e., that are not forming a separate entity that is a whole]?5 [PV3.197]

The objection that awareness occurs quickly and hence one mistakenly apprehends them as one entity has already been refuted [at PV3.135]. And why would sesame seeds and so on that are falling down sequentially not be apprehended simultaneously? Moreover, all cognitions are equal in duration, so why would some have sequential conceptual appearances while others are simultaneous? One would be forced to conclude that the apprehension of any object is non-sequential. [PV3.198–199]

And how could one see a variegated form such as a multicolor (citra) butterfly?

“That multicolor is a single real color.”
Then that multicolor is even more psychedelic than that multicolored butterfly! [PV3.200]

There is no single entity, “multicolor,” just as a form composed of an arrangement of jewels is not a single entity. This case is the same as the conceptual appearance of blue and so on in the observation of multicolored (citra) things such as cloths [that are composed of threads of different colors]. [PV3.201]

“In those cases where one sees a single color and not the multicolor, one is just seeing the color that is a part [of the whole].”

If after eliminating the constituent colors such as blue, you can still see some multicolor that is other than those constituent colors, then what you see is indeed psychedelic! [PV3.202]

Two [cognitions, one of a manufactured butterfly made from different colored thread or paints and one of a natural butterfly,] are both determined to have the same cognitive appearance of their object and to have the same duration. So why do you say that one is a sequential cognition of various objects and the other is a non-sequential cognition of a single object? [PV3.203]

For we posit that things are various because cognitions are various; [and when one sees a variegated or multicolored (citra) object, the variegation remarked in cognition must reflect a variety of things that produce that cognition].

“The difference remarked in cognitions does not contribute [to establishing that things are different].”

What then would establish that things are different? [PV3.204]

Because heterogeneous substances do not combine to form [a distinct substance, a whole], one would have no cognition of variegated color in the case of paintings and such. And the conjunction relation (saṃyoga) [whereby the substances of the painting are held together] cannot itself be multicolored because it has no visible form. Nor can conjunction serve as a locus of a metaphor because there is no variegation in the individual [parts of a painting]. It cannot serve as a metaphor also because there is no variegation in the individual [colors]. [PV3.205–206a]

And things that have been grasped sequentially cannot be conflated by a cognition that construes them as a singular multicolor because [on your view] that which is non-singular cannot be grasped by a single cognition. [PV3.206b–cd]
Therefore, a single cognition that has various [simultaneous] objects should be established to occur. Hence, [perception, even though caused by multiple particles] is established to be non-conceptual, since when conceptualizing one object, what one sees is another. [PV3.207]

“If singularity is not possible in the case of objects [such as a butterfly’s wing] that have variegated appearances, then how can there be a single cognition whose cognitive appearance is variegation?” [PV3.208]

Those who analyze reality make a statement that is entailed by real things themselves—namely, that the way in which they think of objects is the way in which those objects disappear.

“Might there be variegation in a single cognition?”

There should be no variegation in the cognition as well. But if one is content to have this be the objects’ essence, who are we to object to that? [PV3.209–210]

Therefore, neither the objects nor the awareness has a spatially extended appearance because, since that kind of property-svabhāva [—namely, spatial extension—] has already been disproved in the case of a singular entity, it is also not possible in the case of what is many. [PV3.211]

This part of awareness—namely, the one that is established such that it seems external—is different from the internal determination [which is the part of awareness that seems to be the subjectivity that apprehends that apparently external part]. Awareness is not differentiated, but its appearance is differentiated into two. That being the case, that dualistic appearance must be cognitive confusion. [PV3.212]

The nonexistence of one of the two in awareness eliminates the existence of both. Therefore, the emptiness of duality is the suchness (tattva) of the awareness. [PV3.213]

The definition (saṃsthiti) of things as different is based on the difference between those [i.e., the object and the subject]. If the awareness is erroneous (upaplava), then their difference is also erroneous. [PV3.214]

There is no definition of things outside of the definition of them as either objects or subjects. [Those definitions do not ultimately make sense; therefore, since things are empty of any definition, it is explained that they are essenceless. [PV3.215]

All distinctive definitions of things such as the aggregates are delimited by activity. That activity is not ultimate; therefore, those things are also devoid
of [ultimate] definition. [PV3.216]

As is the case with persons who have cataracts, those who are by nature confused by ignorance have cognitive presentations (vijñāpti) with false images that arise in dependence on their respective conditions. [PV3.217]

The ultimate nature of the cognitive content [in perception] is not known by any [ordinary beings] whose vision is not supreme; they do not know that ultimate nature because it is impossible for them to experience that content without the error (viplava) of subject and object. [PV3.218]

Therefore, [the buddhas], ignoring the ultimate (upekṣatattvārtha), close one eye like an elephant and propagate theories that involve external objects merely in accord with worldly conceptions. [PV3.219]

A color such as blue in a variegated or multicolored awareness is a quality contingent on awareness (jñānopādhi) and as such it does not participate in any other awareness [such as the awareness of just blue]. Hence, it cannot be seen [as distinct from the variegation] because when analyzing it [as distinct], one is focusing on the object (artha) [that produced the awareness, not the awareness itself]. [PV3.220]

An awareness is experienced in whichever way that awareness appears. Therefore, indeed (nāma), the variegated or multicolored image in awareness should be simple. [PV3.221]

If the colors of a cloth and such also formed a simple or single entity, then they should not be analytically distinguishable from each other. And when the analyzed parts are eliminated, a remaining unanalyzable whole is not observed. [PV3.222]

And what is the contradiction if many [particles] that have the special characteristic [of producing awareness] when aggregated are not the cause of awareness individually, as is the case with the senses and such? [PV3.223]

And except for something being a cause, there is nothing else that could constitute that thing’s being the apprehended object. That is, the apprehended object of an awareness is said to be that in the image of which awareness arises. [PV3.224]

---

1 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:189a) prefaces this verse with the following objection:

"The sensa (ālambana) of the five awarenesses are aggregated substances, as is expressed in the philosophical position, 'The corpus of five awarenesses have aggregates (bsags pa-saṃcitā) as their sensa.' How is it appropriate, then, to conceive of those aggregates as a single thing? For the venerable Vasubandhu said, 'It is asserted that the corpus of five awarenesses have as their objects sensa-particulars such as that which is apprehended by the ocular faculty; it is not
asserted that they take substance-particulars as their objects. So how is it that their objects are particulars [in the sense meant by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti]? Their objects are just universals.” [cf. PS1.1.4, quoting AKBh on AK1.10].

2 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:189b) notes that they are distinct from previous particles in that they are in proximity to each other; as a result, they gain a property-svabhāva (svabhāva) which is their capacity to produce awareness. Presumably, proximity to a perceiver’s sense faculty is also intended here. The relevant portion from Devendrabuddhi reads:

*Due to a relation with other objects—due to the presence of conditions which create the property-svabhāva which is the capacity to produce an awareness—other infinitesimal particles that have the capacity to produce an awareness arise from their substantial causes, namely, previous infinitesimal particles [in the same continuum] that do not have that capacity. The word “aggregated” expresses those particles that have their respective capacities that are attained when they are in proximity with this and that other particle.*

3 The word for universal is sāmānaya, but this word can also mean a “whole” or a “composite entity.” Inasmuch as the relation of a universal to its particulars poses many of the same problems as the relation of a whole to its parts, Dharmakīrti collapses discussion of one into the discussion of another. Here, Dharmakīrti recognizes that a conglomerated entity that exists separate from its constituents would amount to an admission of a kind of real universal; hence, he uses the word “universal” [i.e., “composite entity”] to name a conglomerate of particulars without making any ontological commitment to the existence of that composite entity in distinction from the particulars of which it is composed. This point is clarified by Devendrabuddhi (PVP:189b–190a).

4 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:189b) remarks:

There is no sāmānaya (“universal”) called a “conglomerate” that is either distinct or non-distinct from its parts such that, when we say that the percept is a “conglomerate,” the opposing position has an opportunity [to refute us]. That is, [Dignāga] said, “It is in regard to a sensum-particular (skyed mched kyi rang gi mtshan nyid) that sensory awareness is said to have a particular as its object; it is not in regard to a substance-particular” (dzas kyi rang gi mtshan nyid). [See PS1.1.4 and PSV ad cīr]. In this regard, the special quality of producing awarenesses that arises in infinitesimal particles due to their relation with other things arises from the transformation of their former respective continua that are in mutual conjunction (phan tshun nye bar ’gro ba). That distinctive quality will not arise without other particles that are occurring without interstice because that kind of particle on its own does not have the nature of producing awareness. Hence, since awareness does not have any necessary relation to a single particle—since awareness does not have the property-svabhāva of being necessarily related to the establishment of a substance which is a single particle, and since the capacities of those particles together produces a single awareness as their effect, they are said to be the common object of an awareness. As a universal (spyīr = sāmānaya), they are all the object of the awareness, but the awareness is not necessarily related (nges pa = ni yata) to any single one of them. In other words, that awareness is the common effect of all of them. It is not that they are not the common object of awareness because awareness apprehends a sensum universal (āyatanasāmānaya) (skyed mched kyi spyī). [190a] Since the statement “It is not by virtue of a substance-particular” is seen (lta ba = drṣṭa) to dispel the necessary relation of awareness to a single substance [composed] of infinitesimal particles, it is not contradictory to claim that awareness does not have as its object a sāmānaya (“universal”) that is augmented by a capacity to produce awareness.

5 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:190a).

6 Here Dharmakīrti mocks this position with a play on words. The word citra means both “multicolored” and, by extension, wondrous or amazing. To attempt to convey a little of the flavor of this play on words, I have translated the latter meaning as “psychedelic,” in that sense peculiar to American culture.

7 These examples are provided by Devendrabuddhi (PVP:191ab).

8 As Devendrabuddhi (PVP:192a) notes, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas maintain that sāṃyoga is a quality-particular (gupta). Since color (rupa) is also a quality-particular, sāṃyoga cannot have any coloration because a quality-particular cannot qualify another quality-particular.

Devendrabuddhi next records this retort on the part of the objector:

“Although the object (arthā) of the word ‘multicolor’ is not a multicolored conjunction, nevertheless, the conjunction of the elements in a painting is similar in quality to the multicolored form of the whole that is present in multicolored butterflies and so on. Therefore,
This interpretation is based on Devendrabuddhi (PVP:191b–192a). Note that on his interpretation, the phrase pratyekam avicitratvād should apparently be repeated. Neither Śākyabuddhi nor Devendrabuddhi offers particularly clear comments on this phrase, but their comments on the argument as a whole are worth noting.

Devendrabuddhi (PVP:192a) comments:

Conjunction cannot be the object of a metaphor in the sense of being called “multicolor” (citra) because it is similar to [some real] multicolor. That is, there is no multicolored (citra) whole in a butterfly, and there is no reason at all to metaphorically attribute multicoloredness (citratā) to the parts of the butterfly.

“In both cases a distinct entity is the reason for the metaphor.”

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, n²: 200b) explains:

“In both cases a distinct entity is the reason for the metaphor.”

That is, the objector claims that the entity which is the whole of the butterfly and the distinct entity that is the part[s] of a multicolored (citra) carpet and such are the multicolored color of both; as such, they are the reason for the metaphor that the conjunction is multicolored.

Devendrabuddhi (PVP:192a) continues:

This cannot be the case because there is no multicoloredness [i.e., variegation] in the color of a multicolored butterfly, and because there is no multicolored entity in the painting and such.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, n²:200b) clarifies:

*This cannot be the case because there is no multicoloredness in the color of a multicolored butterfly. That is, there is no multicoloredness [i.e., variegation] in the conceptually constructed singular entity that is the whole (avayavin). And because there is no multicolored entity in the painting and such. That is, since there is first of all no whole, the opponent does not accept a separate, multicolored entity that is the whole. Rather, only the colors of the parts appear. They individually do not have any multicoloredness, and various distinct colors cannot be the basis (yan lag = aṅga) for a metaphorical use of “multicoloredness” because the opponent does not accept that one can apprehend many things simultaneously.*

Commenting on pratyekam avicitratvād, Devendrabuddhi (PVP:192a) next says:

Moreover, someone might claim that paintings and such are metaphorically called “multicolored” because the parts inhere in a single conjunction, but this also does not make sense. That is, there is no conjunction that is a multicolored entity in the individual parts, such as the color blue, in terms of which there is said to be a conjunction. Instead, those parts have their own essence of being blue and so on; as such, they are individually not multicolored; therefore, since they are not connected to a single object (artha), they cannot be the object (artha) of a metaphor.

Devendrabuddhi (PVP:192b):

That is, just as mental awareness tends to apprehend many objects, likewise what contradiction is there if sensory awareness also apprehends many objects [simultaneously]? Hence, it is not at all unacceptable for sensory awareness to do so. That is, even though there is no single multicolored or variegated essence in the color blue and so on of a painting, the awareness that arises with a multicolored or variegated appearance is singular; therefore, a *single that has various—that is, a single cognition that has many objects—should be established* to occur. Hence, they are produced by many objects, one can say that some sensory awarenesses have a “universal” [in the sense of a conglomerate] as an object. Hence, since they simultaneously apprehend various objects, *(these and other cases of perception) are established to be non-conceptual.* Why? First of all, it has already been explained that a conceptual cognition does not have a clear cognitive appearance, but since this explanation has not been heeded, he says, “when conceptualizing one object (artha), what one sees is another.” Having simultaneously seen various objects such as blue and so on, when one seems to be apprehending just one “blue” that is connected with its name, as in the [process of conceptually identifying those many objects as] “blue” and “blue” [etc.], then the mere appearing object (artha) that exists separate from those [other objects identified as blue] is not at that time conjoined with its name because a name and a concept do not arise simultaneously.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, n²:201a) clarifies:
“...then how can there be a single cognition whose cognitive appearance is variegated?” The objector thinks the following: “You who espouse this theory about perception also assert that cognitions occur with cognitive images. Hence, a variegated image is essentially the cognition itself (blo'i bdag nyid du gyur pa); that being the case, you accept that cognition has a variegated cognitive appearance.” [And when Devendrabuddhi (193a2) comments], “Therefore, it is inconclusive,” he means that the objector thinks the following: “The reason stated in the form, 'that which is variegated does not have a single essential nature' is inconclusive because even though cognition is of a singular nature, it can have a variegated cognitive appearance.”

12 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:193a) introduces the next verse with these remarks:

This criticism applies to one who maintains that the image (rnam pa) is ultimate, but it does not apply to me because I do not accept that the image exists in that fashion. To demonstrate this point, [Dharmakirti] says....

13 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:193a) makes it clear that the ones doing the analyzing here are the Buddhas. He also remarks:

...the way in which they think of objects; that is, when one rationally analyzes them as either singular or multiple, they disappear—they are devoid of existing—in that way, i.e., in that fashion [as either singular or multiple]. In other words, they cannot be established in terms of any essential nature whatsoever.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:201a) makes these comments:

...the way in which they think of objects refers to external blue, yellow and so on. He says “object” (artha) to refute the notion that it is distinct from consciousness (vijñāna) itself; he is not refuting the notion that consciousness is by nature paratantra. This will also be explained later. The way in which they disappear means they are not established as either singular or multiple. [When Devendrabuddhi says] in terms of any essential nature whatsoever, he means that the object cannot be established as external, nor can it be established as having the nature of consciousness. In other words, they are not established as appearing separately (chaus=bhāyga?). In the immediately following phrases he demonstrates the way in which it is not established.

Devendrabuddhi (PVP:193a) continues:

Accepting that dharmas have been shown to be essenceless, it is from the perspective of others that he states the opinion of an objector, “Is there multicoloredness or variegation (citratā) in a single cognition?”

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:201a) comments:

As for the statement that begins, dharmas have been shown to be essenceless, total nonexistence (thams cad med pa) is not the essencelessness of dharmas because one would be forced to conclude that there is neither affliction nor purification and because the conventional is reliable in the manner explained earlier. Later, the author himself will explain that selflessness refers to the mere reflexive awareness that is devoid of conceptually constructed object and subject.

Devendrabuddhi (PVP:193a) continues:

“If there somehow were ultimate variegation or multicoloredness in a single awareness, then in ultimate terms that variegated or multicolored awareness would establish that the real thing was also variegated or multicolored. Likewise, it would be real.” This is what the questioner is getting at. In response, the author says, There is also no variegation or multicoloredness in awareness. Singularity and variegation/multicoloredness are contradictory. If the cognition is singular, it ultimately does not have a variegated or multicolored nature; if it nevertheless appears with a variegated or multicolored cognitive appearance, then that cognitive appearance does not ultimately exist in those cognitions. One must accept this position because otherwise the singularity of the cognition would be countermanded. Other than a different or nondifferent cognitive image, there is ultimately no other basis for the establishment of something as one or many. In this regard, if one were to maintain that cognition is ultimately both one and variegated, then the whole variegated world would be one single substance, and that being the case, that position would incur flaws such as the fact that everything would be produced simultaneously. Therefore, if it is singular, then it cannot have a plural image.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:201a–b) comments:
Devendrabuddhi also comments on the last part of the verse:

On Devendrabuddhi
have a variegated nature

‘He (201b) also comments on Devendrabuddhi
Śā
14 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:193b) comments on verse 211:

If one is content to have this be the objects

likewise— as is the case with the singular cognition that has a
variegated/multicolored cognitive image—it would be real.

He (201b) also comments on Devendrabuddhi’s phrase, If (the cognition) is singular, it ultimately does not
have a variegated nature:

That is, it does not have a variegated essential nature because if its essence were variegated,
then it would be contradictory for it to be singular. Instead, the cognition appears with a
variegated cognitive image due to cognitive error.

On Devendrabuddhi’s comment, therefore, if it is singular, it cannot have a plural image, he says (201b–
202a):

If cognition is singular, then it cannot have a plural cognitive image; rather, cognition {202a}
just has the nature of mere reflexive awareness which is devoid of duality.

Devendrabuddhi (PVP:193b) also comments on the last part of the verse:

If one is content to have this be the objects’ essence—that is, even though they do not have that
nature [of being external], they become apparent (gsal ba ≈ vyakta) in terms of that nature; if
ultimately abiding in that manner is their suchness, why should we bother refuting it? The idea
is that one should just let it be so.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:202a) comments:

“If there is no variegated external real thing, and if there is no singular cognition with a
variegated image, then how does cognition appear with the color of the external object in a
manner that is restricted to a particular time and place?” In response to such a qualm,
[Devendrabuddhi] says, If one claims .... One speaks of an “object” due to the imaginative
apprehension of that which is by nature the cognizer’s (sgrub pa po = pratipatt) cognitive error
as being an object. Those appearances are not [actually] objects because the constructed nature
does not exist at all.

What is being asserted? [Devendrabuddhi] says, even though they do not have that nature, they
become apparent in terms of that nature. The phrase even though they do not have that nature
means “even though they do not have the nature of being external.” They become apparent—
they appear—in terms of that nature—in terms of being external. The phrase, if ultimately
abiding in that manner is their suchness, means the following. Appearing as having a nature that
they do not have is the way that they ultimately—really—abide because there is an
instrumental cognition that establishes that appearance. Therefore, that appearance is not
unmistaken suchness. The idea here is that since the cognition of them as external objects is
contradicted by an instrumental cognition, that appearance of them as external is not
suchness.

It is correct that the experience of external objects is erroneous; it is not correct to claim
that that experience is not erroneous. But what is correct (rigs pa = yukta) [i.e., the fact that the
external appearance is an error] is not presented in that [sensory awareness itself];
nevertheless, we refute what is presented by false conceptual cognition that is instrumentally
contradicted. Hence, as in the case where nonexistent things such as hairs and flies appear to a
person whose eyes are impaired by cataracts, an external object, even though nonexistent,
appears to those whose eyes are covered by the cataracts of ignorance. Since it is appropriate
to present this notion in this context, the author of the treatise says, “Just let it be so.”

Another interpretation (mam pa gzhan du = aṭha vā) of this section is as follows. The phrase if
ultimately abiding in that manner is their suchness means the fact that things which do not have
that nature appear to have that nature comes about through an instrumental cognition. As
such, it is not confused; instead, it is ultimate. That is, the fact that those things actually exist
externally is their non-erroneous suchness. Hence, what would be the point in my refuting a
rationally supported object by this wrong idea? Hence, his idea is: how can one show that what
is reasonable is false [i.e., nonultimate]?

Devendrabuddhi (PVP:193b) comments on verse 211:

But since the appearance of the object’s cognitive image is not its suchness, therefore, neither the
objects—which are claimed to be the objects—nor awareness—which is claimed to be the subject
—have any spatially extended appearance; in other words, that which appears with a spatially
extended cognitive image does not exist either externally or internally. That is, that which
Śānye kyabuddhi (PVT, nye:202b), discussing the nature of aggregated entities, makes these remarks:

Even if infinitesimal particles are mixed with other infinitesimal particles, they do not lose their nature of being infinitesimal particles. Even in aggregation, they would by nature be infinitesimal particles; if such is the case, then an awareness whose cognitive image is spatially extended cannot have infinitesimal particles as its object. That being the case, it cannot be determined by a non-erroneous awareness because a cognition (rtogs pa) that has one cognitive image cannot apprehend some other thing [with a different cognitive image]. Otherwise, one would incur an overextension.

Some unskilled persons say the following: “There is no spatially extended image either externally or internally, and it is not the object of awareness. Rather, the object of perception is an infinitesimal particle surrounded by other infinitesimal particles such that they are extremely close without being interrupted by an object. Those infinitesimal particles, however, are not mixed because mixing is not possible in either of the two possible arrangements: if they are conjoined at just one point, then the particles would have parts and hence extension; and if they are conjoined in their entirety, then the aggregated clump would just be the size of an infinitesimal particle. Therefore, [the objects of perception are infinitesimal particles that are] extremely close to each other such that they are not interrupted by any heterogeneous particles but do have an interstice between them. Moreover, the appearance of a spatially extended cognitive image that is a perduring conglomerate is erroneous because it could not have even a minute interstice [between the atoms that composed it; it has been shown that such an interstice is necessary].”

Those who express this argument are foolish; mocking their own words with their own words, they are confused. If it is the case that the appearance of a spatially extended cognitive image in an awareness asserted to apprehend infinitesimal particles is an error, then how can the awareness that has that kind of spatially extended image take infinitesimal particles as its objects? An awareness that has one thing as its cognitive image cannot have something else as its object because otherwise one would incur an overextension. This has already been explained. Now, consider the person who could actually cognize (yang dag par rig pa) an awareness whose cognitive image was an infinitesimal particle. [203a] Therefore, infinitesimal particles are not the objects of perception, nor are they the objects of inference. Concerning the existence of external infinitesimal particles, one might investigate it by way of an inferential sign which is the absence of the awareness that is the effect [of the alleged objects]. Other persons maintain that even the resulting consciousness is the product (byas pa) of an internal imprint; even so, the consciousness would not serve as an inferential sign for those imprints as well. Although one can claim that it does occur, it is easy to see that the spatially extended cognitive image which is asserted to be what one experiences does not ultimately exist because when one analyzes whether it is singular or plural, it does not withstand such an analysis. The essential nature (ngo bo = rūpa / bhāva) of infinitesimal particles is extremely remote in the previously described manner. But it cannot be denied as such, and there is no instrumental cognition that contradicts it because unlike a spatially extended image it is singular by virtue of being partless.

On the other hand, one might think, “There is also no instrumental cognition that proves it. Therefore, it is doubtful. That being the case, it has not been indubitely demonstrated that things are in all cases selfless.”

To this we respond as follows. Even persons who make such claims must admit that infinitesimal particles are material things (lus can = mūrtā) because it is not possible for an immaterial thing to be an infinitesimal particle. Otherwise, why would one not cognize mind and mental functions as material? If something is a material thing, it necessarily has distinct sides and sectors because that which is devoid of distinct sides and sectors cannot be a material thing, as is the case with awareness. And if something has distinct sides and sectors, then it has parts. Therefore, as is the case with spatial extension, when one analyzes whether infinitesimal particles are singular or plural, they do not withstand such an analysis. Therefore, infinitesimal
particles are also contradicted by an instrumental cognition. This has also been clearly presented by powerful thinkers such as Master Vasubandhu; hence, external objects do not exist.

15 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:193b):

“Even though there is no external object, the awareness that has that dualistic appearance ultimately exists.”

This also does not make sense for the following reasons. The internal determination means the definitively determined experience of the subject-image which is internal (nang gi bdag nyid = adhyātmaka) and determined to be a single entity. This is the one from which the other aspect is different; that other aspect is the one that is established such that in the considerations of childish beings it seems external. Whether or not external objects exist, cognition has a dual nature, but it does not ultimately make sense for a single cognition to have two cognitive images because the cognition would no longer be singular.

On the other hand, if the appearance of its object-image were not a cognitive appearance, then it would no longer be the cognitive image of the cognition’s object; that being the case, one could not say, “This is the awareness of that” just by the mere fact of experience. Hence, one must accept that the image is similar to the cognition’s object (artha). Moreover, there is no similar image other than what is internal to cognition, so cognition itself is what appears to cognition.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:203a) comments on the phrase “childish beings”:

He says childish beings because [the duality of object and subject] appears in that fashion only to those who are confused. The bodhisattvas who have realized that dharmas are selfless only know (mkhyen = śāyā) mere reflexive awareness (rang rig pa tsam = svasaṃvedanamāra) which is devoid of duality.

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:203a) continues:

Due to these cognitive images that appear to be external and internal, cognition is dualistic, regardless of whether or not there are external objects. Hence, even if there are external objects, one must admit that awareness includes a cognitive image because without a cognitive image, apprehension is impossible. And even if external objects do not exist, awareness nevertheless arises with that cognitive image [i.e., with an image that appears to be external]. That being the case, in terms of just what appears (gsal ba kho nar = prabhāsa eva), awareness is dualistic. However, dualistic awareness is not real; rather, it is established (rna par bzhag pa = vyavasthita) through cognitive error because in conventional terms, real things are established in accord with the way that they are imaginatively determined. If that were not the case, how could the duality in a singular awareness be real?

Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:203b) notes that in the section that begins on the other hand, Devendrabuddhi is addressing the nirākāra-vāda. Śākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:203b–204a) also comments:

Someone objects: “If the object and subject do not exist, then what would be left but the suchness of awareness itself? Cognitively myopic beings do not experience anything but the objective and subjective cognitive images. If they were to experience something else, they would see suchness. {204a} That being the case, beings would be effortlessly liberated. That suchness cannot be definitively determined through inference. First of all, an inference by way of an essential property serving as evidence is not possible in that case because its essential property has yet to be proven. An inference also could not come from an effect serving as evidence because the perceptions and non-perceptions that would establish the non-duality of awareness and the causal relation necessary for an inference from an effect are not established. Nor can one have the kind of proof of a causal relation that is defined through the absence of the effect when the cause is absent because the effect is not established [in some parallel case such that one could notice its absence in the case in question]. That being the case, if the non-dual suchness of the Yogācāra is an effect, it cannot be established instrumentally. The dualistic appearance is not an effect at all because it is like the horns of a rabbit.”

To this we respond as follows. These statements have been made by those who, due to their stupidity, do not understand duality. That is, with the word “subject” we do not mean to express reflexive awareness—the internal cognition that arises in various forms such as the pleasant and the unpleasant—such that by expressing it with the term “subject” we would be saying that it does not exist. Rather, we mean the following. Cognitive appearances such as blue seem to be external to awareness, but when one analyzes whether those appearances are singular or plural, they are unable to withstand that analysis; hence, they are not suchness.
The definition (samsthiti) of things as different is based on the difference between those. That is, it has \textit{ṃdo} so. Dualistically presents distinct qualities such as production; mere reflexive awareness does not do so in terms of the non-dual dependent nature. Hence, only awareness that appears \textit{Prajā} are devoid of the aforementioned duality; it is not, however, devoid in all respects. When the \textit{svabhāva} is the subject which apprehends that object, which is the real entity that it cognizes. Since an agent and its patient are constructed in dependence upon each other, these two (i.e., subject and object) are posited in dependence on each other. The expression "subject" does not express mere reflexive awareness, which is the essential nature of cognition itself. The essential nature of cognition is not constructed in mutual dependence on something else because it arises as such from its own causes. The essential nature of cognition is established in mere reflexive awareness. Since it is devoid of the above-described object and subject, it is said to be non-dual.

As it has been said:

“The appearance of blue, yellow and such as if they were external to awareness is not real; \{204b\} therefore, it is said that the external does not exist ultimately. The entity that is the agent is asserted to be the cognizer in relation to that [apparently external but actually unreal object]; as such, it is also not ultimate. Hence, it is definitively determined that experience is non-dual.” (\textit{sngo danga} ser soqs nam shes las / phyir rol bzhin du snang ‘gyur ba / de bden ma yin de phyir phyi / de nyid du ni med ces bya / de llos byed pa po’i ngo bo / rig par ’dod pa gang yin pa / de yang de nyid min de phyir / myong ba gnyis med ces nges ‘gyur /).

Since the essential nature of awareness is established by reflexive awareness, it is not the case that one is compelled to admit that all beings would see suchness [if the object and subject images were unreal]. That is, even though the essential nature of awareness is apprehended as partless (\textit{cha med pa nyid kyi phyir = amamSatvena}) by reflexive awareness, as a result of its connection with the seeds of error, that reflexive awareness does not produce a subsequent definitive determination of the nature of cognition as non-dual in the way that it has been perceived (\textit{trogs pa = pratipatti}). Therefore, even though reflexive awareness has already apprehended the non-dual nature of cognition, it is as if it has not been apprehended.

But this in and of itself does not establish that the cognition is not a general [i.e., unqualified] subject of predication. That is, the qualities (\textit{khyad par} = \textit{viSeśa}) that one might wish to predicate of the subject "cognition" would be duality or non-duality. Even though these might be in dispute, no reasonable person would be able to say that since the reality of the distinct qualities (\textit{bye brag = bhedā}) under dispute are not yet determined, the mere subject of predication itself is also not determined. That is, when "sound" and such is established as a general subject of predication, one might argue about whether or not it is momentary; in that case, one would then use an inference to determine whether it is momentary.

“If one cannot say that the mere subject of predication is not established just because the quality of being momentary and such is not established prior to the inference, then how could any evidence be unreliable by way of not having an established locus of predication? One would have to accept that a general subject is established in all cases of inference.”

If it were the case that one could say that, then when one had definitively determined the subject, one would also definitively determine the predicate that is under dispute. That being the case, it would be pointless to seek out evidence that had the three requisite characteristics. Therefore, in this context one has established through perception that cognition (\textit{trogs = pratipatti}) is a predicate that has the quality of being pleasant and such. Nevertheless, due to one’s cognitive error, one has not definitively determined its non-dual nature. Thus, in order to establish that, one employs an inference.

The proof statement is as follows. That entity that is contradictory to some property-\textit{svabhāva} is devoid of that property-\textit{svabhāva}. For example, heat, which contradicts the property-\textit{svabhāva} of being cold, is devoid by nature of being cold. The essential nature of cognition contradicts the property-\textit{svabhāva} of being dualistic in the manner discussed above. \{205a\} The evidence used here is the perception of a contradictory antecedent. Therefore, it remains the case that mere reflexive awareness is what constitutes selfless things (\textit{dharma}) that are devoid of the aforementioned duality; it is not, however, devoid in all respects. When the \textit{Prāṇāparāmitā} and so on cites the refutation of things being essential singular or plural, and when it refutes production and so on, it does so in terms of the constructed nature; it does not do so in terms of the non-dual dependent nature. Hence, only awareness that appears dualistically presents distinct qualities such as production; mere reflexive awareness does not do so.

\textbf{16 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:194a):}

\textit{The definition (samsthiti) of things as different is based on the difference between those. That is, it has}
as its cause the difference between object and subject. The difference and nondifference of the cognitive appearance is the cause for the definition of things as different and nondifferent. If there were nothing at all, then on what basis would real things be different and not different? Likewise, the same argument applies to things’ arisal and so on. That is, consider the case where a perception that was previously not present later occurs; that perception is such that it apprehends the cognitive image of an object (artha). At that time, the subjective cognition of that object arises; when it becomes devoid of the appearance of the perception of that cognitive image, it is said to have “ceased.” But if both that which perceives and that which is perceived do not exist, then there is no perception at all because there is no cognitive image of object and subject. That being the case, it is thus determined that arisal does not have perception as its basis.

17 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:194b) remarks:

Even if one accepts external objects, all things (chos = dharma) still have no definition. For instance, the distinctive definition of the aggregates is that they are “heaped up”; thus, “aggregate” has the meaning of “being heaped up.” Also the term “extension” (skyed mched = āyātana) has the sense of “that which is extended”; “fundamental element” (kham = dhātu) has the sense of “source of production.” All such definitions are qualified by activity (vyāpāra), in that they are delimited by activity. Activity is also a superimposition; since all things are devoid of activity, it does not ultimately exist.

18 Both Devendrabuddhi (PVP:195a) and Manorathanandin (PVV: ad cit.) note that the ignorance cited here is the unafflicted ignorance. Sākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:205b) defines it as the “the imaginative determination of object and subject” (nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa’i mi shes pa ni gzung ba dang ’dzin par mgon par zhen pa’o).

Devendrabuddhi (PVP:195a) raises a potential problem: “If a cognitive presentation does not depend on an external object, then why does it occur with respect to a fixed location and so on?”

This is also the problem raised by Vasubandhu at the beginning of his Vimśatikā (v.1; Levy:3.8ff). Devendrabuddhi offers an answer:

Even though it does not depend on external objects, a cognitive presentation does not occur independently [of causes and conditions]. Rather, the productive cause of a cognitive presentation is some change in the mental continuum. That being the case, it arises in some [specific] form in accord with the nature of the available conditions. This is what [Dharmakīrti] indicates [with the phrase in dependence on their respective conditions]. It is not the case that this false—i.e., erroneous—presentation has no seeds at all; it is just that one cannot point it out by saying, “This is its seed.” One cannot specify the seed in this fashion because the seed has the nature of the apparent similarity [in the succession of moments of] the mind and mental states.

See Sākyabuddhi (PVT, nye:206b) for the bracketed phrases supplied here. Devendrabuddhi (195a) continues:

“If the nature of the seed cannot be pointed out, then how does it exist?”

If it were nonexistent, then since there are no differences among the nonexistent, all the conventions of birth, death and so on that are perceived of persons who are perceived in dreams would also be perceived of those dream persons when one was awake, just as they are perceived to apply to the person who is perceiving those dream beings. What difference would there be among these nonexistent persons? Even utterly nonexistent entities such as a barren woman’s son would be born and die, just as with a person whose birth and death are accepted. Otherwise, the person whose birth and death are accepted would also not exist. Hence, if there were no seed for error, then confused cognitive appearances would not occur.

See also Sākyabuddhi’s extensive comments on this section (PVT, nye:206a–b).

19 As Manorathanandin explains (ad cit.), an elephant’s eyes are on the sides of its head; hence, it can choose not to look at what is occurring on one side by simply shutting one eye.

20 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:196a=M) glosses jñānopādhi as anubhavasyaśamabhūta.

21 Devendrabuddhi (PVP:196a) notes:

In other words, when a cognizer (pramārt) through another cognition distinguishes that image of blue and such from others, such as yellow—thinking, “This is blue,” “This is yellow”—s/he, analyzing it in this way, is not focusing on that multicolor/variegated awareness because that separate color is not of the nature of that multicolored-variegated awareness. Instead, s/he is
focusing on the object. In other words, that [analytical] awareness is engaging with just the object.

Many of these comments are contained in Manorathanandin (PVV: ad cit.), whose remarks are clearer in this instance. Some of his comments are particularly interesting:

The pramāṭī, analytically distinguishing that blue from the yellow that is being experienced—that is, establishing that the blue is different from the yellow—is focusing on only the object—i.e., blue—as the analytical object. At that time, the object (artha) is a remote (parokṣa) blue. But that which has the nature of awareness is not remote. Therefore, what is analyzed is not awareness. And what is awareness is not analyzed. (ato yad vivicyate tad ājñānam / yaj jñānam tan na vivecyate eva).

22 Read anubhūyate for prakāśate following Pramāṇālaṃkāra, M, PVSV-D, and Devendrabuddhi (PVP:196b).

23 Read anyadāviveki with all commentaries and PV-D.
Note: In the immediately preceding passage of the Hetubindu, Dharmakīrti has introduced the three aspects (rūpa) necessary for evidence to be trustworthy—namely, the positive concomitance (anvaya), the negative concomitance (vyatireka), and the evidence-subject relation (pakṣadhartamā). In that discussion, Dharmakīrti has briefly mentioned that these relations must be definitively determined (niścita), and the passage translated below begins with a discussion of what that means in the case of the evidence-subject relation (pakṣadhartamā). This leads Dharmakīrti to more general considerations concerning the characteristics of an instrumental cognition.

Concerning what has just been said, the “definitive determination”¹ [of the evidence-subject relation] is the common establishment (prasiddhi) through either perception or inference of a quality of the subject serving as evidence in the subject to be proven. Examples include the determination that smoke is present in a locus or that constructedness applies to sound. That is, a person first experiences through perception a smoke-possessing place whose nature-svabhāva is distinct from everything else as being unique.² In that person who has perceived that place there subsequently arises a cognition of the evidence (liṅgavijñāna); that awareness is a mnemonic cognition (smārtam) whose object is the difference [that distinguishes smoke from non-smoke] in accord with what has been perceived.

In this regard, only the initial experience, whose object is a unique thing, is an instrumental cognition.³ When a thing of that kind has been experienced, there occurs a mnemonic cognition that represents that thing’s uniqueness with regard to this and that other thing in terms of which it is unique. That mnemonic cognition represents that uniqueness as a difference from those other things; as such, that mnemonic cognition has as its object the thing’s exclusion from that which it is not. This mnemonic cognition arises by the force of that perception. Since it apprehends a cognitive image of the observed thing in the manner in which it was observed, that mnemonic cognition is not instrumental. This is so because, one having first seen a unique thing, the subsequent mnemonic awareness represents the image generated in perception as “unique”; representing the object in that fashion, that mnemonic awareness has no cognition of an object that was not previously cognized. Also that mnemonic cognition is not instrumental because, since the previous perception observes the entity that is the means for [the expected] telic function, there is no cognition through that conceptual awareness of a previously unseen particular that is
by nature the means for that telic function, as is the case with inference.4

The reason for this is as follows. Seeking some telic function, a judicious person investigates what is and is not an instrumental cognition. And a universal is not capable of accomplishing any telos at all, for it is what is apprehended by a conceptual awareness that, after the perception of a particular, arises by the force of that perception. An example is the concept, "blue," that appears in the conceptual cognition of a person immediately after he has seen blue. For it is only that blue-particular that performs that kind of telic function, and it is seen with that very nature by perception. However, the object of the conceptual cognition, "blue," that arises after the apprehension of that particular does not perform the telic function which should be accomplished by the color blue.5 Therefore, even though it is said, "an instrumental cognition has as its object a thing that has not yet been cognized," one should add the qualification, "in case the particular has not been cognized." But if the particular has been cognized, the conceptual cognition that arises by force of that previous cognition in correspondence to the image [of the object in perception] is only a mnemonic cognition because that [perceived thing] is its object only in terms of that conceptual cognition’s effect [which is to induce action directed toward the particular].6 As such, that mnemonic cognition is not instrumental because: [1] there is no cognition of a real thing that has not yet been cognized; and [2] the determination of a cognition as being instrumental is based upon real things. This latter reason is the case because the activity of persons who are intent on the [desired] telic function has as its object a thing that is capable of that telic function, and a real thing is defined as that which is capable of telic function. A further reason why this mnemonic, conceptual cognition is not instrumental is also that one acts upon a real thing through that conceptual cognition by imagining its object to be the particular. [The conceptual cognition still guides one to the particular] because when one acts, [the objection of the conceptual cognition] has a coherence and continuity that is not different from [that previous object of] perception.7

---

1 Arcaṭa (HBT:20.9) claims that the term niścaya is only being used metaphorically here.
2 The past active participle dṛṣṭavantaḥ has been interpreted in an active sense to facilitate breaking this long Sanskrit sentence into two shorter English sentences. This particle is used in its past sense in the following sentence.
3 Arcaṭa remarks (HBT:25.17):

That is, the definition of an instrumental cognition is that whose object was not previously known and that whose object is a means for telic function (arthakriyā). This pertains only to perceptual experience. In this regard, the qualification “the initial” expresses the fact that that experience has an object that has not been previously known. And “whose object is unique” expresses the fact that that experience has an object that is a means for a telic function since only a particular can be a means for telic function. [nathā hi—anadhiṣṭhāvitisāyatyam arthakriyādhanavisāyatavam ca pramāṇalakṣaṇarat / tad darśanasyāṅviṣṭi tatra āhyāṃ ity apuḥ dharmaviṣṭhānāyaḥ śāyam asadharṣaśāyāyaḥ iti arthakriyādhanavisāyatavam /}
4 As Arcaṭa (HBT:27.28–28.1) points out, inference (anumāna) is mentioned as a counterexample. In other words, inference is instrumental because it does involve the cognition of something that has not yet been cognized.

5 Steinkellner gives niśārthasādhyaśārdhyakriyā, where the first instance of artha (i.e., niśartha-) is supplied from the Tibetan (34.12). However, HBT (33.2) reads only niśārthasādhyaśārdhyakriyā. This reading seems preferable, for it corresponds to similar constructions in PVSV (e.g., G:41.5: dahanaryādikāṃ kāṣṭhasādhyāṃ arthahāriṇyām).

6 Arcaṭa (HBT:34.1) glosses: kāryatas tadviṣayatvā na paramārthaḥ / kāryam atra svalakṣaṇe puruṣasya pravartanam, tadādyavasāyaś ca.

7 Arcaṭa (HBT:36.4) offers the following comments:

“But if through that imaginative determination (adhyavasāya) a person acts on just the real thing, then why do you not likewise admit that, since that conceptual cognition is observed to be apprehending a universal that has not yet been cognized, it also has its own distinct instrumentality?”

[Dharmakīrti] says, “Because when one acts on just the particular, that conceptual cognition has a continuity and coherence (yogakṣema) that is not different from that perception, namely, the visual awareness.” Here coherence (yoga) is the obtaining that is defined is the exclusion (pariccheda) of an object that has not been obtained by that perception. Continuity (kṣema) means maintenance, defined as the continuance (anuṣṭhāna) of that telic function. That of which there is nondifferent continuity and coherence is called such [i.e., the compound is a bahuvrahi]. In this regard, the conceptual cognition has a coherence that is not different from the nonconceptual perception because it imagines its object to be the particular. It also has nondifferent continuity because, as if one had acted due to the visual perception, also when one acts due to the conceptual cognition, one acts upon just the particular. [yad nāma tadādyavasāyena vastuny eva puruṣasya pravṛttis tathāpy anadhiyogavatāparicchedalakṣaṇāḥ prāptiḥ / kṣemaḥ tadārthaḥkriyānuṣṭhānālakṣaṇaḥ paripālanam / abhinnaḥ kṣemaḥ asyeti sa tathoktaḥ / tatra vikalpasāya nirvikalpapratyakṣenābhinno yogyoḥ svalakṣaṇēdhyavasāyataḥ / abhinnaḥ kṣema ālocanāvijñānāḥd eva vikalpaḥ api svalakṣaṇa eva pravṛtteḥ/
5 Bibliography

Primary Sources—Consulted Works and Editions Only

[Brackets around an author’s name are used to indicate an author, whether actual or attributed, when that author is not listed as the author on the title page of an edited or translated work.]


[Dharmakīrti]. (1991b) Tshad ma rnam par nges pa [= Pramāṇaviniścaya].


92a. Reproduced in Barber, Vol. 49.


Gautama. (1985) _Nyāyasūtras_. Reproduced in Nyāya-Tarkāṭīrtha and
Tarkatīrtha (1985).


Mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang. (1988a) Tshad ma rnam 'grel ūk chen rigs pa'i rgya mtsho. Lhasa: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.


Śākyabuddhi. (1955–61) Tshad ma rnam 'grel kyi 'grel bshad


*Secondary Sources Cited*


Iwata, Takashi. (1991) *Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, dass Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschliesslich*


Nagatomi, Masatoshi. (1967–68) “Arthakriyā.” In Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation


Prets, Ernst. (1992) “On the Development of the Concept of


Steinkellner, Ernst. (1994) “Buddhist Logic: The Search for Certainty.” In


Tillemans, Tom J.F. (1990a) Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti. The “Catuḥṣataka” of Āryadeva, Chapters XII and XIII, with the Commentaries of Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti: Introduction, Translation,


Index

Due to the frequency of their citation, the works of Dharmakīrti, Devendrabuddhi, and Śākyabuddhi are not listed in the index. For major themes, see the table of contents.

A

abhāva. See nonexistent referent
Abhidharmakośa (Vasubandhu), 58n12, 165n37
See also Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Vasubandhu)
  on apprehension of identity, 291n125
  on beginninglessness, 1n1
  on conglomerated particles, 79n38
  on karma as transempirical, 230n13
  on momentariness, 80n39
  on primary cause and supporting condition, 165n37
Sautrāntika theories in, 58n.12, 59n13, 79n38, 80n39
  on sense perception, 24n23, 396n1
  on sense sphere particulars, 79n38
  as source for Abhidharma typology, 58n12
  svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa in, 82
  on two realities, 40–42, 79
  ultimate reality in, 81–82
Abhidharmakośasphutārthavyākhyā (Yaśomitra), 57n11
Abhidharma typology, 57–58, 63, 64, 78, 82, 109n87
abhiprāya. See intention
abhāṣa. See habituation
abstraction
  as applying to both subject and predicate, 156n23, 349
  and causal characteristics, 172–73
  and concept formation, 197–99
  of properties, 95, 96, 142, 159n28, 200–201, 348–49
  and svabhāva-evidence, 210, 213–14, 306
abstract predicates
  as not bearing qualities, 78, 127
as not distinct from particulars, 95, 142, 159n28, 172–73, 204
See also abstraction
accidental/essential distinction, 188–91, 200, 218–21
See also necessity
accidental properties, 93
action (kriyā)
equated with subjective aspect of awareness, 271
in kāraka system, 17–18, 20, 261, 270
meaning in compound arthakriyā, 259–60, 261, 274
relation to instrument, 20, 21n.16, 49–50, 51, 270–72
See also activity; practical action
action of knowing (pramiti; pramā), 18–19, 20, 49–50, 51
activation (pravṛtti)
of a cognition in which the accomplishment of one’s goal appears, 264, 266, 280, 290, 380n16
of an instrumental cognition, 265n74, 288–89
activity (pravṛtti)
awareness as primary factor in, 262, 265–66, 268, 280, 383–84
as directed to particulars, 84n49, 171n43, 414n7
as effect of instrumental cognition, 165, 256, 262–68, 270, 279, 288–89, 294, 387
as guided by determinate cognitions, 16n2, 47, 114, 386
as motivated by indeterminate perception, 298–309, 386
obstructed, and instrumentality, 285–87, 297, 381
as prompted by goals, 16n2, 45–49, 115n98, 259
See also activation; practical activity
adhyavasāya. See false determination
affirmation (vidhi), 10, 114, 115, 157n25
āgama. See scripture
āgamāśrayānumāna. See scriptural inference
agent (kartt), 17–21, 49–51, 407n15
agent of knowing (pramāttr), 17–21, 49–51, 411n21
aggregation (samudāya; samūha).
See infinitesimal particles
ākāra. See cognitive image
Alagaddūpamasutta, 55n4, 314
Ālokamālā (Kampala), 326n6
analogy (upamāna; also “analogical induction”), 23n20, 145, 146, 147n6
analysis, levels of. See levels of analysis
analysis, reductive. See reductive analysis
anātman. See selflessness
anekatā. See multiplicity
antarjñeyavāda. See Epistemic Idealism
antarupapalava. See internal distortion
antirealism, 52, 79, 101, 114, 381
anumāna. See inference
anupalabdhi. See nonperception
anvaya. See distribution
anvayavyāpti. See concomitance, positive
anyāpoha. See apoha-theory; exclusion
apoha. See apoha-theory; exclusion
apoha-theory
as based on the nature of things, 125, 160
and construction of svabhāva, 156–57, 195, 197–98
negative and positive interpretations of, 123n12, 137–38
role of error in, 140–43, 312, 316n183
and sameness of effect, 119–26, 158–60, 321–22
status of universals in, 126–31
subjective factors in, 124–25, 323
summary of, 116–19
and svabhāva-evidence, 205
three ways of construing, 131–33
Uddyotakara’s critique of, 137–38
See also concepts; exclusion; universal
appearance (pratibhāsa, pratibimba).
See cognitive image
application (upanaya). See evidence-subject relation
āpta. See credibility
āptavāda. See credibility
Arcaṭa, 82n43, 412n1, 412n3, 413n4, 414n6, 414n7
āropa. See imputation
arthra. See purpose
arthakriyā (”causal efficiency”; “telic efficacy”; “telic function”)
cognition in which the accomplishment of one’s goal appears
(arthakriyānirbhāsa), 273–84, 287–290, 297, 321, 377, 379, 380n16
cognition of as mark of trustworthiness (arthakriyāsthiti), 255, 259, 273–76,
280, 376–79, 382
conceptual appearances as seeming to possess, 141–43, 341, 347–48
as criterion for knowledge, 49, 256, 321–22, 386, 413
as criterion for the real, 45n64, 76–77, 81n41, 83–86, 170n43, 193n74, 378,
392, 414
and Epistemic Idealism, 380
expected (abhimatarthakriyā), 89, 90, 117–19, 134, 139, 156, 157n24, 158, 160,
174, 201, 212, 256, 281–82, 286, 289, 321, 347, 355, 377, 378n14, 380n16,
395, 413
false appearances as lacking, 257–58, 391
and inference, 145, 296–98, 310–13
as mark of particulars, 83–84, 91, 97, 116, 222, 390, 391
as mere causal efficiency, 256–60, 273, 275–78
as not ultimate, 392–93
perceptibility as minimal capacity of, 86, 87n53, 393n3
related to goals, 48, 256–60, 278–79, 281–82
role in concept formation, 112n94, 134n131, 160n29, 170n45, 344–45, 346, 354, 356
as telic function, 48, 255, 256–60, 264, 273–79, 288, 376
two senses of, 256–60, 272–78
universals as lacking, 81n41, 86n52, 93–94, 114, 143, 311, 346

arthāpatti. See presumption
arvāgdarśin. See ordinary persons
Asaṅga, 326n6
āśrayaparāvṛtti. See foundational transformation
Asvabhāva, 326n6
atindriya. See supersensible object
atiprasāṅga. See overextension
ātman. See self
ātmasneha. See self-clinging
atyantaparokṣa. See transempirical object
authorial intent, 5–7
avadhi. See delimiter
avayavin. See whole.
avidyā. See ignorance
avinābhāvaniyama. See rule of unaccompanied non-arising
avisamvāda. See trustworthiness
avyabhicāra. See evidence, reliability of
avyavahitapramāṇaphala. See instrumental effect, unmediated awareness
as causally efficient, 275–76
as intentional, 36, 254n47
as primary factor in action, 262–64, 268, 299, 383–84
as undifferentiated, 59, 262n66, 268–72, 351, 406–11
See also cognitive image; concepts; reflexive awareness
axiological concerns, 245–52, 298, 317–18
āyatana. See sensible element

B
bāhyārthavāda. See External Realism
beginningless imprint (anādivāsanā). See imprint
beginninglessness, 1, 140–41, 162, 195
Bhatt, Govardhan, 23n20, 26n29, 35n45
bhāva. See existent thing
Bhāvaviveka, 1n2
bhedaśāmānya. See sameness, of difference
bhṛṇti. See error
Biardeau, Madeleine, 18n10, 93n61, 101n74
Bodhicaryāvatāra (Śāntideva), 56, 328n8
Bronkhorst, Johannes, 38n52
Buddha
authority of, 233–52
as ignoring the ultimate to teach beings, 55, 410
as not employing reasoning, 250–51
pragmatism of, 314–15
as seeing the transempirical, 305
buddhahood, 230, 245–52
Butzenberger, Klaus, 16n4, 36n47
C
Cabezón, José, 13n24
Candrakīrti, 17, 36n48, 54n3, 326n6
capacity (yogyaṭā; Śakti)
of aggregated particles to produce awareness, 102–3, 396n2
of causal complex, 163n34, 208n100
of instrumental cognition to make one attain a goal, 286–87, 288, 297, 313, 381
of instrumental cognition to produce a definitive determination, 294, 321, 378n14
nature-svabhāva and, 167–68, 170, 174, 194
as not separate from things themselves, 187
property-svabhāva and, 176, 181, 337, 396n2
causal complex (hetuśāmagṛi)
complete (sakalā hetuśāmagṛī), 180, 336
incomplete (vikalā hetuśāmagṛī), 165n38
nature-svabhāva and, 161–69, 170, 175n48, 193, 199, 201
participation of aggregated atoms in, 102–3, 201, 208n100
causal efficiency. See arthakriyā
causal potential (Śakti). See capacity
certainty (niścaya), 3n6, 16n4, 159, 206n98, 291n126
See also definitive determination
cessation (vināśa), 86n53, 95, 97n68
See also momentariness
citra. See variegation
class-sign (jāti). See universal
cognitive image (ākāra; pratibimba; pratibhāsa; also “appearance”; “conceptual image”)
as both real and unreal, 90, 116, 129–31
and conceptual illusion, 87–88
construed in terms of a negation, 94n64, 116–44, 340
correspondence with particulars, 100–113, 120
erroneously construed as extramental objects, 63, 141–42, 226n3, 277n93, 315, 324, 340, 346–47, 396, 401–14
and error in conceptual cognition, 58, 61n17, 283n107, 312, 339–52
as instrument of knowledge, 272, 383–85
as mental particular, 90, 116–17, 119, 121, 322
and perceptual illusion, 87–90
as produced through particulars, 84–85, 94, 120, 268
See also awareness; concepts; objective image; subjective image
commentaries
reasons for reliance on, 3–5
strata/layering of traditional, 7–11, 252–53, 319–20
style of reasoning in, 5–7, 320
commonsense objects, 69–79
comparative philosophical endeavors, 227–28
compassion, 54n3, 66, 235–36, 329
complete causal complex (sakalā hetuśamagrī). See causal complex, complete concepts
as erroneous, 56, 61n17, 129, 140–43, 250, 303, 312–14
formation of, 94n64, 116–26, 134–36, 169–73, 197–201, 204, 215, 322, 339–52
illusion and, 87–88
levels or orders of in Dharmakīrti’s thought, 199–201
as mental content, 10n20, 123n112, 129
as mental images, 129–31, 137–39
as not taking the ultimate as an object, 80, 91, 302, 354
as not vivid, 24n25, 90
as object of inference, 114, 145, 250–51, 306
relation to the real, 38, 45n64, 72, 112n94, 114–15, 133–34, 139–44, 157n25, 170n43, 300–301, 310–14, 382
See also apoha-theory; cognitive image; definitive determination; universal conceptual extension, 57–58, 62
See also distribution
conceptual perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa). See perception, conceptual conclusion (nigamana; also “summation”), 34n45, 35n45
concomitance
inferences involving only negative (kevalavyatirekin), 35n45, 205–8
inferences involving only positive (kevalāvayavin), 35n45
need for examples to establish, 29–31, 206–8
negative (vyatireka), 28–29, 31n39, 148n11, 205, 211n104
ontological basis for, 96n67
positive (anvayavyāpti), 28–29, 30, 31, 32
as translation choice, 28n36
See also evidence-predicate relation
conditioning (abhyāsa). See habituation
confusion (moha), 54n2, 58n.12, 61n16, 373n27
context (prakaraṇa), 45–49, 54, 124, 158n25, 184, 185n59, 259–60, 295, 304, 328, 386
contingent reality. See conventional reality
continuity (anvaya). See distribution
convention (vyavahāra; lokaprasiddha), 89n57, 141–42, 155, 221–22, 258n58, 309n167, 346–47, 350, 351
See also conventional cognition; conventional reality; practical action;
semantic convention
conventional cognition (samvṛtiñāna; sāṃvṛta), 87n54, 301–2, 339, 382
See also convention; conventional reality
conventional pramāṇa. See instrument of knowledge, conventional
conventional reality (saṃvṛtisat; prajñāptisat; also “contingent reality”) buddhas teaching in accord with, 55n5
of distributed entities, 45, 76–79, 155, 169–70
knowledge and perception within, 324–28
levels of analysis and, 62–64, 67–68
of svabhāva, 193–96, 198–99
telic function as, 392
of universals, 81n41, 114–15, 392, 393n3
Vasubandhu on, 40–42, 79–80
See also conventional cognition; two realities; semantic convention
copresence (sahabhāva; also “cooccurrence”), 28n36, 29n38, 31n38, 150
coorientiality, 118n104, 128n119, 141–42, 346–47
correct knowledge (saṃyagjñāna), 22, 256
See also instrument of knowledge
correct perceptual judgment (pratyakṣaṇa; rṣṭalabdhaniscaya). See definitive
determination, as perceptual judgment
Cortens, Andrew, 59n13
counterexample (vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta), 30, 211n104
See also examples
Cox, Collett, 109n37
credibility (āptatva), 233–45, 361–73
credible person (āpta). See credibility

D
debate, 2, 25, 232–33, 251
De Breet, Jan, 55n4
definitive determination (niścaya)
as conditioned by mind-dependent factors, 184, 294–95, 304–5, 408n15
instrumentality and, 287–309, 321, 378n14, 386, 389, 412
as prompting action, 291n126, 312, 375n4
as subsequent perceptual judgment (pratyakṣapṛṣṭalabdhanīścaya), 37, 157n25, 225n3, 287–309, 321
delimiter (avadhi; also “limit”), 117, 118n104, 205, 160n28
delimiting quality (upādhi), 136n133, 349–50
desire to know (jijñāsā), 16n4, 24n25, 188n63, 329
See also doubt
determinate cognition (niścayapratyaya)
conforming to semantic conventions, 172n44
dependent on mental conditioning, 184n59
necessary result of an instrument of knowledge, 47
See also concepts; definitive determination
determinate content, 16n2, 101
dharma. See elemental quality; predicate to be proven; property
dharmaśabda. See predicate expression
dharmavāciśabda. See predicate-expression
dharmin. See subject of a proposition
dharmivāciśabda. See subject-expression
Dharmottara, 9, 222n118, 268n77, 274n91, 278n94, 279, 308n167, 315n181
difference in nature (svabhāvabheda), 123
Dignāga
on credibility, 239–42, 361, 363–64
critical of Nyāya sense theory, 23n22
on definitive determinations, 301–2
on error, 87n54
on the instruments of knowledge, 21, 145–47, 262
on particulars (svalakṣaṇa), 81–83, 145, 397n4
on pramāṇabhūta, 234–39
problem of induction and, 148
on reflexive awareness, 90n59, 276n93, 277n93
on sameness of instrument and effect, 50, 267, 270
and vyāpti, 28n35
Uddyotakara’s critique of, 29n38, 137–38
on the ultimate as inexpressible, 80
on universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), 82–83, 96n114, 145, 199
on wholes, 39n54, 42, 103n77
See also Pramāṇasamuccaya; Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti
dim-witted person (mandabuddhi), 222n118, 304–5
disposition
as factor in concept formation, 118, 124–25, 159, 184n59
knowledge as, 16n2, 18, 254n47
refinement and, 328
self-clinging as, 60
dispositional property, 179–80
See also accidental/essential distinction; necessity
distribution (anvaya; also “continuity”; “extension”)
as absent in the ultimately real, 40, 78–81
as apparently required by language, 42, 80, 101–102, 117–118, 158
as constructed, 187, 201, 312
and ignorance, 60–61
of the self, 44n62, 298
soteriology as progressive rejection of, 61–63
as spatial, temporal or conceptual, 42–43, 78–81
See also universal; whole
doubt (saṃśaya)
as prompting action, 291, 292n127, 375n4, 377
as prompting inquiry, 16n4, 188n63, 351
eliminated by certainty, 25n24
misleading evidence and, 206n98,
Dravid, N.S., 36n48
dravya. See substance
Dreyfus, Georges
on the “alternative view,” 98–100, 110n89
on cessation, 97n68
on commentary, 8n14
on the definition of a pramāṇa, 254n49
on the instrumentality of perception, 300n143
on the place of Dharmakīrti in Dge lugs pa education, 2n3
on Śākya Mchog ldan, 9n17, 69, 76–78
on the scale of analysis, 53n1, 55, 66, 69–79, 85n51
on Tibetan views of universals as permanent, 127n117
on translating svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, 83n45
dṛśṭānta. See examples
dṛṣṭya. See perceptible thing
duality, 54n3, 59, 89n57, 403n13, 406n15, 407n15, 408
See also extra-mental object
duḥkha. See suffering

E
Eckel, M. David, 79n37, 250n42, 251n45
effect-evidence (kāryahetu), 152–53, 177, 188–92, 208n100, 216
See also evidence; svabhāvapratibandha, production-mode of ekapratyavamarṣajñāna. See judgment of sameness
ekatā. See simplicity; singularity
ekatva. See simplicity; singularity
elemental quality (dharma; also “elemental thing”), 41, 57, 58n12, 82n45, 140n139
empiricism, 241–42, 250–52
Epistemic Idealism (vijñaptimātratā; also shes bya nang gi yin par smra ba ≈
antarjñeyavāda)
critique of perception on, 315–17, 324
definition of 59, 60n14,
neither-one-nor-many arguments and, 63, 110–13
reflexive awareness and, 277n93
sense objects as reducible to mind in, 64,
shift from External Realism to, 66, 68–69, 73, 78, 85n51, 99
trustworthiness and, 379–80
See also levels of analysis; Yogācāra
error (bhrānti; upaplava; viparītañāna; viplava)
instrumental cognition as compatible with, 227n7, 284, 312–14, 375–80
nonconceptual, 87–89, 315–17, 324, 391, 396–411
progressive refutation of through the scale of analysis, 53–64, 327–29
shared notions concerning, 24, 48, 51, 56n7
See also illusion; internal distortion; spurious perception
essence
as translation for svabhāva, 161n30, 164n35, 200–201, 212–17
as translation for ātman, 343
as inexpressible, 354
as undistributed, 356
See also svabhāva, as nature-svabhāva
essencelessness, 359, 360
essentialism, 183–84, 186–87, 372
essential nature (svabhāva; rūpa).
See svabhāva, as nature-svabhāva
essential property, 93, 126, 135–36, 141n139, 154, 171n43, 182–91, 200, 219–21, 407n15
See also accidental/essential distinction; necessity
evidence (hetu; liṅga; gamaka; sādhana)
ascertainment of, 293, 296
description of, 26–35, 51, 114
incompatibility with the contradictory of the predicate to be proven
(sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa), 219–220
ontological basis for, 96n67, 352
reliability (avyabhicāra) of, 150–53
of the senses, 75, 230n11
threefold (trairūpyaliṅga), 35n45, 147n9
two forms of, 152–53
See also effect-evidence; svabhāva-evidence
evidence-predicate relation (vyāpti; also “pervasion”)
description of, 28–32, 34, 114
established through a single observation, 208
and identity-mode of the svabhāvaṇapratibandha, 202–22
as not established through mere observation and nonobservation, 149–53,
205, 335–38
and problem of induction, 148–53
and production-mode of the svabhāvaṇapratibandha, 174–82
See also concomitance; rule of unaccompanied non-arising
evidence-subject relation (pakṣadharmatā; upanaya; also “application”), 33–
34, 35n45, 412
examples (drṣṭānta; udāharaṇa; also “exemplification”)
necessity of in inference-for-others, 30–35
See also counterexample; supporting example
excluded entity (vyāvṛttta), 80–81, 108, 117, 130n125, 131–33, 134, 172n44,
389
exclusion (vyāvṛtti; apoha)
as abstraction, 197
as based on unique particulars, 117, 125, 134, 138, 170, 195–96, 339
as both real and unreal, 129–30, 395n8
as conceptual appearance, 117, 132–33, 138, 340–41, 347
as identical to that which is excluded (vyāvṛttta), 131–33, 172n44
as mere excluding of other (anyāpohanam), 132–33, 135–36
nature-svabhāva as being, 201–2
nature-svabhāva as warrant for constructing, 159–61
as negation, 10, 119, 123, 127, 132–33, 135–36
as neither permanent nor impermanent, 126–30
as object of expressions, 9–10, 118n104, 130, 132, 137–38, 353–60
property or predicate as equivalent to, 156–57
role of expectations in constructing, 118–19, 124, 156, 321
and svabhāva evidence, 205
See also apoha-theory; excluded entity
exemplification (udāharaṇa). See examples
existent thing (bhāva; also “entity”; “thing”)
as capable of telic function, 81n41
as causing unique cognitions, 120
as experienced in its entirety in perception, 307n164
as having a nature that does not overlap, 122
and the real in Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika, 45n64
as referring to extended entities, 76–78, 83, 113, 119n106
expectations
and goals, 259,
role in concept formation, 117–19, 124–25, 158n25, 159
role in judgment subsequent to perception, 184, 304
and semantic conventions, 128n119, 351
See also arthakriyā, expected
telic efficacy (abhimatārthakriyā). See arthakriyā, expected experience
arguments from, 37, 138
appeal to, 32, 124–25
initial alone as instrumental, 302–3, 382, 312–13
and karma, 325–26
nonconceptual, 305–7
of things as they truly are (yathārthadarśana), 243, 366, 367n16
as subordinate to reason, 251
external objects. See extra-mental objects
External Realism (bāhyārthavāda)
description of, 58–59, 65–69
divergent interpretations of, 69–79
motivations for adopting, 65–69
ontology in, 79–113, 155, 171, 199–200, 208n100
perception in, 24n26, 99–105,
shift to Epistemic Idealism from, 63n18, 64, 85n51, 98–99, 110–13
See also levels of analysis
extension. See distribution
extra-mental objects
accepted by buddhas to aid beings, 55n5
as cause of image in awareness on third level of analysis, 24n23, 55–56, 64, 109, 340–41
as erroneously appearing to be the object of cognition, 89, 141–42, 226n3, 277n93, 315–16, 324–25, 343–47, 401–14
existence or nonexistence as irrelevant to trustworthiness, 380
as infinitesimal particles, 98, 109, 155
as object of negation at fourth level of analysis, 58–59, 63, 64, 66, 79n38, 85n51, 110–11,
as spatially extended, 69–79, 98–100
extremely remote object (atyantaparokṣa). See transempirical object
extrinsic instrumentality (parataḥ prāmāṇyam). See instrumentality, extrinsic

F
false appearance, 257–58, 391
See also error; illusion; spurious perception
false determination (adhyavasāya), 143, 312n175, 346, 414n17
See also imputation
formalism, 25, 31, 47
formal logic. See formalism
foundationalism, 3n6, 323–24, 326
foundational transformation (āśrayaparāvṛtti), 313–14
Franco, Eli
on the Cārvāka tradition, 22n19
on the definition of a pramāṇa, 254n49, 309n168
on error, 56n7
on Dharmakīrti’s critique of the self, 44n62
on Dharmakīrti’s reductive method, 199n87
on the Nyāya tradition’s use of arthakriyā, 49n73
on the seeming circularity in Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality,
233n15, 236–39, 245
Frauwallner, Erich, 1n1
Funayama, Toru, 87n54, 226n3

G
gamaka (“indicator”). See evidence
gamyā (“indicated”). See predicate to be proven
Ganeri, Jonardon, 15n1
Gautama, 17, 19, 22n18, 23n22, 45–46
Gillon, Brendan, 4, 151n17, 152n18, 189n67, 191–92, 208n100
goal (artha). See purpose
God, 94
Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge, 82n43
grāhakākāra. See subjective image
grāhyākāra. See objective image
grammatical relations, 172n44, 173n44, 357n9
See also predicate-expression; Sanskrit grammatical tradition; subject-expression
Griffiths, Paul, 13, 36n48
Gyatso, Lobsang, 2n3

H
habituation (abhyāsa) to counteragents of flaws, 369
and intrinsic instrumentality of perception, 290–92, 294–95, 374n4,
377n12, 378n14
role in concept formation, 158n25, 323
role in perceptual judgment, 3, 88n55, 89, 125, 184, 386
Hacking, Ian, 5n10
Halbfass, Wilhelm, 38n.53, 48n.73
Hallisey, Charles, 12n.23
happiness, 46–47, 299
Harvey, Van, 250n40  
Hattori, Masaaki, 23n22, 50n76, 103n.77, 147n6, 234n16  
Hayes, Richard  
on accidental and essential properties, 189n67  
on bhāva and svabhāva, 153n19  
on circularity of Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality, 233n15  
on Dharmakīrti’s prose, 4  
on Dignāga’s assessment of language, 146n5  
on inductive assumption in Dignāga’s thought, 148n11  
on inference of capacity through svabhāva-evidence, 208n100  
on inversion of pervader-pervaded relation, 213n107  
on translation of dharmin and dhamma as quality-possessor and quality, 27  
on translation of svabhāvapratibandha as natural relation, 151n17  
Hegel, G.W.F., 2n4  
hermeneutics of charity, 11, 239n24  
hermeneutics of suspicion, 250  
heterogeneous instance (vipakṣa), 30, 31n39, 149n14, 205n98, 206n98  
hetu. See evidence  
Hetubinduṭīkā (Arcaṭa), 81n43, 412n1, 412n3, 413n4, 414n6, 414n7  
hetusāmagrī. See causal complex  
hierarchy of views. See levels of analysis  
highest level of reality. See ultimate reality  
homologous instances (sapakṣa), 30, 31n19, 149n14  
Hoy, David, 7n13  
human aim (purusārtha; also “human goal”)  
as focus of treatises worthy of investigation, 362  
instrumentality and, 280–87, 288, 311, 313, 314, 380  
knowledge of as mark of credibility, 365, 366n14  
as mediated instrumental effect, 261, 262–68, 273, 279, 383–84  
as requiring determinate content, 16n2, 298–300, 303  
hungry ghost. See preta

I

identification, 198, 200

identity-mode of the svabhāvapratibandha. See svabhāvapratibandha, identity-mode of

ignorance (avidyā)  
as cause of subject/object duality, 59, 315, 324, 414n.13, 409  
as cause of suffering, 54n2, 61  
as conceptuality, 61n17, 250, 314  
equated with satkāyadrṣṭi, 58n12, 60–61, 371–73  
See also internal distortion

illusion, 36n48, 87–90, 391
See also error; illusory objects
illusory objects, 88–90, 257–58, 275, 391–95, 404n13
image in awareness. See cognitive image
impermanence. See momentariness
imprint (vāsanā; also “tendency”), 85n51, 61n17, 140–42, 277n93, 315–16, 339, 344, 346–47, 371, 405n14
imputation (āropa; samāropa), 61n17, 157n25, 271, 312–13, 349–50
Inami, M., 235n17
individual (vyakti), 42, 62, 80n41, 84n49, 91–93, 120–25
See also particular
indriya. See sense faculty
induction, 148–149, 191–92
inference (anumāna)
elements (aṅga) that must be stated, 30n39, 45n34
empirical (vastubalapraṇāṭaṇumāna), 230, 243, 248–49
for-oneself (svārthaṇumāna), 25–26, 34, 147
for-others (parārthaṇumāna), 25–26, 30–32, 34, 147
as grounded in the svabhāvakratibandha, 148–222
as having universals as its objects, 113–15
as including other instruments of knowledge, 146–47
involving only negative concomitance (kevalavyatirekin), 35n45, 205–8
involving only positive concomitance (kevalānvayin), 35n45
language, presumption, and analogy as forms of, 145–47
shared notions of, 25–34, 51
See also instrumentality; instruments of knowledge; svabhāvakratibandha
inference-for-oneself (svārthaṇumāna). See inference, for-oneself
inference-for-others (parārthaṇumāna). See inference, for-others
infinitesimal particles (paramāṇu) aggregation of, 69–79, 98–113, 396–97, 404n14, 411
as basic building blocks of matter, 24
linguistic reference and, 68, 72, 75–77, 116
reality of, 42, 58, 69–79, 99
and svabhāva, 169–73, 196n85, 197–200
See also particular
instrument (karaṇa), 17–22, 224, 234, 270–71
instrumental cognition (pramāṇa).
See instrument of knowledge
instrumental effect (pramāṇaphala)
mediated (vyavahita), 261–68, 278–79, 383–85
as not distinct from instrument of knowledge, 267, 270–72
shared notions concerning, 49–50, 51, 270
unmediated (avyavahita), 261–62, 268–78, 383–85
instrumentality (prāmāṇya)
definition of, 253–56
extrinsic (parataḥ prāmāṇya), 251, 292–97, 321, 378n14
immediacy as a mark of, 224
of inference, 310–14
intrinsic (svataḥ prāmāṇya), 251, 292–97, 321–26
and novelty, 254–55, 298–309
of perception, 287–309
and purpose, 239–31
recursive definition of, 247–48
of scripture, 231–33, 239–45
seeming circularity of, 233–52
in terms of the mediated effect, 261–68, 278–87, 383–85
in terms of the unmediated effect, 261–62, 268–78, 383–85
as translation for prāmāṇya, 223–29
See also trustworthiness
instrumental object (prameya)
and the real, 79–84, 143–44, 145, 282
shared notions concerning, 18–22, 35–45, 50, 51
instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa; also “instrumental cognition”)
conventional, 283n107, 314–18, 324–27
definition of, 254–56
and instrumental effect (pramāṇaphala), 260–87
language, presumption and analogy as, 145–47
as most prominent factor in production of activity, 20n15, 224, 261, 269, 385
as motivator of action (pravataka), 265–66, 268n7, 298–309, 380n16
relation to action, 49–50, 270–72
and purpose, 45–49
scripture as, 239–45, 361–73
shared notions concerning, 15–35, 51, 234, 270
ultimate, 314–18
as unmediated with regard to activity, 272
as what makes one obtain a goal (prāpaka), 143, 255, 264–65, 268n7, 280–87, 288, 297, 300–302, 376–77, 381
See also instrumentality
intention (abhiprāya; samīhā), 146n5, 341, 354, 365, 381–82
internal distortion (antarupaplava), 55n5, 89n57, 226n3, 315–18, 324–28, 410
See also error
intertextuality, 8, 16, 52
intrinsic instrumentality (svataḥ prāmāṇya). See instrumentality, intrinsic irreducibility
and commonsense objects, 71–74
of infinitesimal particles, 24, 42, 45
of particulars, 98
of the ultimately real, 38, 42, 57, 68, 74, 79, 81, 99
See also reduction; reductive analysis
Śvarasena, 148n10, 149n13, 206n98
Iwata, Takashi, 204n95, 209, 211n104, 213n107, 215–16, 218n113

J
James, William, 228
jāti (class-sign). See universal
Jayatilleke, J.N., 17n6
Jha, Ganganath, 23n22
jijñāsā. See desire to know
jñāna. See knowledge
Jñānaśrīmitra, 132n128
jñeya. See knowable object
judgment of sameness (ekapratyāvaramaṣajñāna), 119–26, 158–59
judicious person (prekṣāvant; prekṣāpūrvakārin)
   as acting for the sake of goals, 279, 310
   as acting on particulars, 390, 413
   as acting through doubt, 375n4
   as acting through instrumental cognitions, 266, 291n126, 384
   reason as the mark of, 251
   and scripture, 243, 367
   as seeking to eliminate flaws, 371
justification, 3, 225
See also instrumentality

K
Kajiyama, Yuichi, 191n70
Kamalaśīla, 10n21, 109n87, 116n99, 122n110, 131n126, 226n3, 316n183, 340n6
Kampala, 326n6
Kapstein, Matthew, 40n55, 42n58, 230n13, 250n41
kāraka system, 16–20, 261, 270–71
karaṇa. See instrument
karma, 230
   See also karmic world
karman [as motion], 302
karman [as object]. See patient
karmic world (loka), 186n61, 325–30
kartṛ. See agent
kāryahetu. See effect-evidence
Katsura, Shōryū, 56n7, 109n87, 116n99, 199n88, 201–2, 272n89
Kātyāyana, 93n61
Kellner, Birgit, 86n53, 146n4, 316n182
kevalānvayin. See inference, involving only positive concomitance
kevalavyatirekin. See inference, involving only negative concomitance
Keyt, C.M., 105n79, 109–10, 113
Kirkham, Richard, 100n72
knowable object (jñeya)
illusion and, 257–258, 394–95
as internal, 59
as real and instrumental object, 36, 51, 86n53
types of, 230, n.11
See also instrumental object
knowledge (jñāna)
appropriateness as term, 16n2
in Euroamerican epistemological theory, 18–19
as event, 18–19
as justified true belief, 254n47
See also instrument of knowledge; instrumentality
Krasser, Helmut
on Dharmottara, 11n22, 268n77, 308n167,
on pramāṇabhūta, 236n20, 255n49, 374n1,
on relative dating of South Asian philosophers, 1n2
kriyā. See action
kṣaṇikatva. See momentariness
Kumārila
as Dharmakīrti’s interlocutor, 16
on elements of an inference, 35n45
on examples, 30n39, 31n39, 32n42
on instrumental knowledge as distinct from action, 49
on instruments of knowledge, 146
on intrinsic instrumentality, 377n13, 380n16
on perception, 24n25
on predicate-evidence relation, 28n35, 29, 30n38
on purpose and instrumental knowledge, 48
on sense organs, 23n22, 23n23, 24n24
on simplicity and the real, 37n50
See also Ślokavārttika
Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan Sa skyā pandita, 97n68

L
LaCapra, Dominick, 2, 5n9, 12n23
Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā (Dharmottara), 268n77, 279n96
language (śabda/śābda)
centrality to pursuit of spiritual freedom, 25n28
as having a negation as its object, 9–10, 116–25, 132, 353–60
as an instrument of knowledge, 145–46
and the real, 37–39
referential function (pravṛtти) of, 68, 72, 75, 91–93, 114, 123n112, 353–60
as requiring a distributed object, 80, 83, 94n64, 117
as requiring a notion of sameness, 117, 122, 321
as requiring an unchanging object, 91–93, 126
See also linguistic cognition; scripture; semantic convention
Lasic, Horst, 192n72
levels of analysis, 53–79, 98–99
Lindtner, Christian, 1n2
liṅga. See evidence
linguistic cognition
as created through semantic convention, 172n44
as having a universal as object, 101n74, 115, 311–12, 341, 342n11
as leading to particulars, 139–40
phenomenal content as image conjoined with negation, 94n64, 350
reality of object in non-Buddhist thought, 45n64
as spurious perception, 87n54
linguistic convention (saṃketa). See semantic convention
logic, formal. See formalism
loka. See karmic world
lokottarajñāna. See transcendent awareness

M
Madhyamaka, 59n13, 201n90
Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (Bhāvaviveka), 1n2
Madhyamakāvatāra (Candrakīrti), 36n48, 326n6
Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (Candrakīrti), 36n48
Mahābhāṣya (Patañjali), 17n7, 18n10, 93n61
Mahāyāna Buddhism, 54–55
Mahāyānasamgraha (Asaṅga), 326n6
madabuddhi. See dim-witted person
Manorathanandin, 8n15, 85n51, 128n119, 366n15, 409n18, 410n19, 411n21
material implication, 150n15
Matilal, B.K., 15n1, 16n2, 16n4, 17n8, 18n10, 19, 25, 35n45, 37n51, 200n89
matter (rūpa), 23, 24, 39, 42, 58, 59, 73, 82
See also substance
McClintock, Sara, 53, 54n3, 109n87, 238n23, 251n44
mediated instrumental effect. See instrumental effect, mediated
mental faculty (manas), 23, 89n57
mental image. See cognitive image
mereological analysis, 40, 42–43, 58, 62–63, 99
See also reductive analysis
Mīmāṃsā, 16, 146, 224n1, 228, 385
mind-dependency, 64, 100n71, 124–25, 159–60, 184–88, 195, 304, 323–25
Mkhas grub Dge legs Dpal Bzang, 71
moha. See confusion
Mohanty, J.N., 24n25, 25n27, 27n32, 31n40, 35n45, 38n52, 227n7
mokṣa. See spiritual freedom.
momentariness (kṣaṇikatva), 42, 80n39, 91–97, 281, 304–7, 325, 328, 361n2
most prominent causal factor (sādhakatama). See instrument of knowledge,
as most prominent factor in action
Much, Michael Torsten, 101n74,
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Nāgārjuna), 1n1, 54n3
Mūlasarvāstivāda, 258n58
multiplicity (anekatā)
of the causes of a single perceptual image, 100–113
of cognitive images, 396–411
and simplicity, 37–45
See also variegation

N
Nāgārjuna, 1n1, 44n62, 54
Nagatomi, Masatoshi
on arthakriyā, 84n49, 257n55, 259–60, 272–73, 275, 278,
on circularity in Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality, 233n15, 237n21
on impermanence and change, 94n63
nairātmya. See selflessness
natural relation. See svabhāvapratibandha
nature (prakṛti; rūpa; svabhāva).
See svabhāva, as nature-svabhāva
necessity
de re and de dicto, 183–91
pervasion relations as grounded in, 29–30, 148–51, 177–91
See also accidental/essential distinction
negative concomitance (vyatireka).
See concomitance, negative
neither-one-nor-many argument, 40, 43, 62–63
See also mereological analysis
nigamana. See conclusion
nirvāṇa. See ultimate goal
niścaya. See certainty; definitive determination
niścayapratyaya. See determinate cognition
niyama. See restriction
Nobles’ Four Truths, 82, 241 305, 363, 365
nominalism, 59n13, 68, 93, 323
nominal reality. See conventional reality
nondispositional property, 179–80
See also accidental/essential distinction; necessity
nonexistent referent (abhāva), 137–38
nonperception (anupalabdhi), 91n60, 220–21, 358n11, 388
novelty of instrumental cognition, 254–55, 298–309
nyāya. See reasoning
Nyāya, 17, 27n32
Nyāyabhāṣya (Vātsyāyana)
on analogy, 145n2
on desire to know and doubt, 16n4, 24n25
on goals, 46
on grammar and ontology, 38n52
on indispensibility of correct knowledge for liberation, 22n18
kāraka analysis and pramaṇa, 16n2, 18n9, 20n15
on perception, 23n21, 24n26, 104n78
on Pramāṇa Theory, 22n17
Nyāyabinduṭkā (Dharmottara), 222n118, 279n96, 279n97
Nyāya method, 16n4
Nyāyapraveśa (Śaṃkarasvāmin), 23n21
Nyāyasūtras (Gautama), 17, 19, 22n17, 22n18, 23n22, 45–46, 145n2
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 37n50, 111, 238
Nyāyavārttika (Uddyotakara)
on the agent of knowing, 50n78
on analogy, 145n2
on the centrality of purpose, 46n67, 47n68, 263n70
on correspondence of grammar to ontology, 38n52
critique of apoha-theory, 10n20
emphasis on importance of instrument of knowledge, 20n15, 21n16
on evidence-predicate relation, 28n35, 29n38, 30n39
on importance of knowledge for spiritual liberation, 22n18
on inference as grounded in perception, 32n42
on the object of language, 101n74, 137n134
on relation between action and instrument, 49n74, 49n75
on sense perception, 23n22, 23n23, 24n24, 24n25, 105n79
on shared philosophical principles, 22n17
on the whole (avayavin), 39n54, 105n79, 110n90

O
Oberhammer, Gerhard, 28n36
object (artha). See instrumental object; knowable object; object of language object (karman). See patient
objective image (grāhyākāra; also “objective aspect of awareness”; “object-simulacrum”), 268, 269, 271–72, 276n93, 294, 384, 385–86
object known (prameya). See instrumental object
object of language (śabdaṛtha; also “object of an expression”)
as arising through imprints, 140n139
as an exclusion, 9–10, 137–39, 353–60
as including a universal, 80, 83
as necessarily unchanging, 97
Patañjali on, 93n61
positive interpretation of, 10, 123
Uddyotakara on, 101n74, 137–38
as ultimately real, 45n64
as ultimately unreal, 123n112, 311–12
object of negation, 66
object-simulacrum (arthaśūpya; viṣayasārdṛśya). See objective image
Oetke, Claus, 80n39, 94n63, 97n68, 148n10, 148n12, 181n54, 218n113,
309n168
one who has become an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇabhūta), 234–38,
241, 245
See also credibility
ontological reduction. See reduction
orders of concepts, 199–201
ordinary persons (prthagjana, arvāgdarśin)
beliefs of as object of refutation, 54–57, 61, 64
as capable of determining the doctrine of karma, 230–31
as capable of determining the truth of nirvāṇa, 248–49, 316–18
cognitions of as erroneous, 36n48, 140, 315–18, 324, 410
cognitions of as having quotidian instrumentality, 324–28
as incapable of directly perceiving momentariness, 304–7
infinitesimal particles as not perceived by, 24, 99–100, 102
as requiring scripture to access the transempirical, 232, 242
other-exclusion (anyāpoha). See apoha-theory; exclusion
overextension (atiprasyaṅga), 209–10, 309, 342, 354, 393n3, 404n14, 405n14

P
Padārthadharmasaṃgraha (Praśastapāda)
on effect-substance, 342n13
on evidence-predicate relation, 29n38
on instrumental action and instrument as distinct, 49n74
on instrumental agent as the self, 50n77
on instruments of knowledge, 147n7
on knowledge as crucial for spiritual liberation, 22n18, 48n70
on purpose, 48n69
on sense perception, 23n21, 24n26, 28n35
pakṣa. See subject of a proposition; thesis
pakṣadharma. See evidence-subject relation
paradox of material implication, 150n15
paramāṇu. See infinitesimal particles
parārthānumāna. See inference, for others
parataḥ prāmāṇyam. See instrumentality, extrinsic
parokṣa. See remote object
particular (svalakṣaṇa)
   as basis for conceptual construction, 116–44
   as causally efficacious, 83–84
   inexpressibility of, 80, 91–97, 145
   as lacking spatial extension, 69–79, 82–83, 98–113
   mental, 90, 116–18, 120, 130–31
   as momentary, 91–97
   as partless, 80n39
   perceptibility of, 84–91
   as ultimately real, 81n41, 84–97
   as unique, 133
part-part possessor (avayavin). See whole
Patañjali, 17n7, 18n10, 93n61
patient (karman), 17, 21, 407n15
Peirce, C.S., 49
perceptible thing (drśya; pratyakṣa) as inexpressible and momentary, 91–97
   as lacking spatial extension, 98–113
   as one of three types of knowable objects (jñeya), 230n11, 232
   as ultimately real particular, 84–91, 170n43
   See also infinitesimal particle; particular
perception (pratyakṣa)
   as causal, 84–85, 91, 94, 97
   conceptual (savikalpaka pratyakṣa), 302n152
   confirmation of, 287–98
   epistemic idealist critique of, 396–411
   inference as grounded in, 31, 32, 33
   instrumentality of, 287–309, 374–90
   and internal distortion, 36n48, 55n5, 89n57, 315–17, 324–27
   as a motivator of action, 298–309
   as nonconceptual, 87–88
   as not random, 81, 83, 96–97
   and personal transformation, 320–30
   problem of disparity in time of, 281–85
   problem of obstructed action in, 285–87
   shared notions concerning, 22–25, 37, 39, 51, 52
   as undistorted reflection of reality, 74–75
   as vivid, 24, 51, 90
   See also cognitive image; perceptible thing
perceptual illusion. See error, nonconceptual; illusion; spurious perception perceptual judgment (pratyakṣapṛṣṭalabdhaniścaya). See definitive determination, as subsequent perceptual judgment perdurant entity, 42, 44, 96–97, 126–31, 328, 329 See also momentariness

Person (puruṣa), 50
personal transformation, 313–14, 320
pervaded entity (vyāpya), 28n35, 178, 213, 220
pervading property (vyāpakadharma; vyāpaka; also “pervader”), 28n35, 178, 213, 220–21
pervasion (vyāpti). See evidence predicate relation
Phillips, Stephen, 44
Plantinga, Alvin, 183n58, 185n60
plurality (anekatā). See multiplicity; variegation positive concomitance (anvayavyāpti). See concomitance, positive possible worlds, 185–86
Potter, Karl
on assumptions in Pramāṇa Theory, 20n14
on instrumentality, 227n7, 228–29, 317
on necessary relations in inference, 29n38
on Nyāya, 17n6, 35n45
on the real as necessarily knowable, 36n49, 45n64
on the term knowledge for jñāna, 16n2, 254n47
practical action (vyavahāra; pravṛtti)
and conceptual cognition, 115n98, 132, 341, 347, 350n24, 356, 359
and instrumentality, 260, 283–84, 386
and internal distortion, 141–42, 312, 315–17, 325–26
and linguistic convention, 120n107, 141, 344, 356, 359
and perceptual illusion, 258–59, 275, 391n1, 394n5
as prompted by perception, 299, 308, 379, 389
as translation choice, 258n58
See also activity; convention; semantic convention pragmatism, 49, 228, 259n60, 315
Prajñākaragupta, 9n15, 278
Prajñākaramati, 56n8, 328n8
prajñaptisat. See conventional reality
prakaraṇa. See context
pramā. See action of knowing
pramāṇa. See instrument of knowledge
pramāṇabhūta. See one who has become an instrument of knowledge
pramāṇaphala See instrumental effect
Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga)
on conventionality of definitive determinations, 301n147
on credibility, 239, 361n1
on error, 87n54, 90n59,
on instrumental effect, 267n76, 270n84, 278n94
on language as inference, 146n5
on nonduality of awareness, 277n93
on sense perception, 23n22, 24n23, 396n1, 397n4
verse of homage, 234
See also Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti

Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga)
on awareness alone as instrumental, 262n69
on inexpressibility of particulars, 80n40
on inference-for-others, 147n9
on instrumental effect, 50n76, 267n76, 270n84,
on presumption (arthāpatti) as inference, 146n6
on sense perception, 397n4
on the refutation of a whole (avayavin), 39n54
See also Pramāṇasamuccaya

Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (Prajñākaragupa), 9n15, 411n22
Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (Manorathananandin), 8n15, 85n51, 128n119, 409n18, 411n21

Pramāṇavinīścayāṭikā (Dharmottara), 9n16, 279n96, 279n97, 315n181
pramāṇa. See instrumentality
pramāṇa. See agent of knowing
prameya. See instrumental object
pramiti. See action of knowing
prāpaka. See instrument of knowledge, as what makes one obtain a goal
Prasannapadā (Candrakīrti), 54n3
Praśastapāda, 16, 22n18, 28n35, 29, 47–48, 49, 101, 147
See also Padārthadharmasamgraha

pratibhāsa. See cognitive image
pratibimba. See cognitive image
pratijñā. See thesis
pratyabhijñāna. See recognition
pratyakṣa. See perceptible thing; perception
pratyakṣābhāsa. See spurious perception
pratyakṣapraśtaladhaniścaya. See definitive determination, as subsequent perceptual judgment
pravartaka. See instrument of knowledge, as motivator of action
pravṛtti. See activation; activity; practical action; referential function
prayojana. See purpose
predicate (dharma). See property
predicate-expression (dharmaśabda; dharmavāciśabda), 127n119, 128n119,
156n23, 172n44, 203n94, 351, 352n29
See also property
predicate of a subject (dharma). See evidence-subject relation
predicate to be proven (sādhya; sādhyadharma; dharma; gamya), 26–28, 114, 148–51
See also evidence-predicate relation
prekṣāpūrvakārin. See judicious person
prekṣāvant. See judicious person
presumption (arthāpatti; also “presumptive induction”), 23n20, 146
preta (“hungry ghost”), 186n61, 325–26
Prets, Ernst, 148n9
primary cause (upādānahetu), 164–66, 181–82, 369–72
production-mode of svabhāvapratibandha. See svabhāvapratibandha, production-mode of property (dharma; also “predicate”), 93, 95–96, 153–57, 159n28, 162n33, 172n44, 183–90, 197–202, 203–22, 239, 351–52
See also svabhāva, as property-svabhāva
property-possessor (dharmin). See subject of a proposition
property-svabhāva. See svabhāva, as property-svabhāva
property that pervades (vyāpakadharma). See pervading property property to be proven (sādhyadharma). See predicate to be proven proposition to be proven (pratijñā; pakṣa). See thesis
prthāgjana. See ordinary persons
psychologism, 24n25, 27n32, 31, 47, 188
psychophysical aggregates (skandha), 60, 61n17, 372–73, 409
puḍgala, 57n11
Pudgalaviniścaya (Vasubandhu), 230n13
purpose (artha; prayojana; also “aim”; “goal”; “telos”)
centrality of, 16n2, 31n41, 45–49, 51, 327–30
concepts as requiring, 115, 124, 344, 348, 354–55, 357
telic function and, 193–94, 256–60, 272–78, 376, 391n1
of a treatise or scripture, 53–54, 361–62, 387
See also human aim
puṟuṣa. See Person
puṟuṣārtha. See human aim
Pye, Michael, 55n4

Q
quality, 27–28, 33
See also predicate of a proposition; svabhāva, as property-svabhāva
quality-possessor, 27–28, 37n50
See also subject of a proposition
quality/qualified relation, 119, 126, 128n119, 348–52, 355
Quine, W.V., 221n117

R
Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi, 229n10
Ratnakīrti, 132n128
Ratnāvalī (Nāgārjuna), 54n3
real (sat)
  as characterized by telic efficacy, 45n64, 83–85
  as content of indubitable knowing, 35–36, 51, 84–87, 98–113
  as inexpressible, 80, 91–97
  as momentary, 91–97
  as simple, 37–45, 51, 79–81, 98–113
See also particular; two realities
realism, 36n48, 52, 59n13, 77, 126–27, 158, 323
reasoning (nyāya; yukti)
  as Buddhist practice, 251, 328–29
  conditionals in, 150n15
  and levels of analysis, 62
  purpose as a necessary factor in, 47
See also inference; reductive analysis; style of reasoning
recognition (pratyabhijñāna; samjñā), 116, 120, 134n131, 161n29, 291n125, 344, 346
reductio ad absurdum, 40, 174
reduction
  conceptual, 215, 218
  of extended entities to particulars, 64, 72–74, 83, 95, 113, 201
  ontological, principle of, 199, 203–5, 207–8, 214, 217, 218
  of properties to particulars, 198–200
See also irreducibility; reductive analysis
reductive analysis (vibhāga, vicāra; also “reductive reasoning”)
  of distributed entities, 44, 69–79, 99
  and levels of analysis, 64, 68, 70–76
  mereological, 40, 42–43, 58, 62–63, 99
  of the real, 38, 79, 81, 98–99, 198–99
See also irreducibility; mereological analysis; reduction
referential function (pravṛtti), 91, 195, 222n118
See also semantic convention
refinement, 320, 328–30
reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana)
  as arising as the subjective aspect of awareness, 391n1
  instrumentality of as sheer causal efficiency, 260, 276, 278
  nonduality of, 407n15
  role in ascertaining instrumentality of perception, 292, 295, 378n14, 385–
selflessness as, 402n13, 406n15, 408n15
as ultimate pramāṇa, 317
relations, 42–45, 95
religious substratum, 20n14
remote effect (vyavahitapramāṇaphala). See instrumental effect, mediated remote object (parokṣa; viprakṛṣṭa), 85n52, 91n60, 230n11, 411n21 See also transempirical object
repeatability (anvaya). See distribution restriction (niyama; also “invariable rule”) in causal potentials (śaktiniyama), 160n29, 161–62, 174, 195, 344 intersubjective, 326n7
of pervasion relation, 28n36, 29, 149–53, 203, 206n98, 209–10 of the real to a spatiotemporal locus, 81, 117, 337 See also rule of unaccompanied non-arising; svabhāvapratibandha
Rorty, Richard, 5n9
Ruegg, David Seyfort, 20n14
rule of unaccompanied non-arising (avinābhāvaniyama), 149–53, 202, 208n101
rūpa. See matter
S
Śabara, 146n3
Śabdārtha. See object of language
śabda/Śābda. See language
Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, 55n4
sādhakatamatva. See instrument of knowledge, as most prominent causal factor in action
sādhana. See evidence
sādharmyadrṣṭānta. See supporting example
sādhyadharma. See predicate to be proven
sādhyadharmin. See subject of a proposition
sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. See evidence, incompatibility with the contradictory of the predicate to be proven
sādṛśya. See similarity
sahabhāva. See copresence
sahakāripratyaya. See supporting condition
śakti. See capacity
śaktiniyama. See restriction, in causal potentials
Śākya Mchog Idan, 9n17, 69, 76–78
sāmānьяlaksanā. See universal
samāropa. See imputation
sameness
as conceptual extension, 57–58, 61
of difference (*bhedasāmānya*), 107–8, 358
of effects, 107, 119–26, 135n32, 322–23
as required by language, 91–92, 116–17, 134
See also distribution; judgment of sameness
śaṃjñā. See recognition
śaṃketa. See semantic convention
Sāmkhya, 49, 50, 73n31, 162n33
śaṃśaya. See doubt
śaṃvṛtisat. See conventional reality
śaṃyagjñāna. See correct knowledge
Saṅgabhadra, 109n87
sannikarśa. See sensory contact
Sanskrit grammatical tradition, 18n10, 38n52, 93n61
Śāntanāntarasiddhiṭikā (Vinātadiva), 60n14
Śāntarakṣita, 9, 11n21, 53n1, 109n87, 116n99, 122n110, 131n126, 340n6
Śāntideva, 56, 61, 328n8
sapakṣa. See homologous instance
Śārvāstivāda, 58, 59n13, 109n87
Śaśṭitantra (Vārṣaganyā), 246–47
Śāstradīpikā, 23n22
sat. See real
satkāyadṛṣṭi (“belief that the psychophysical aggregates are the locus of a self”), 57, 60–61, 298n138, 371–73
Sautrāntika, 58, 59n.13, 70, 71, 74, 79n38, 80n39, 98
scale of analysis. See levels of analysis
Scharf, Robert, 93n61, 101n74
Schmithausen, Lambert, 56n7
scriptural inference (*āgamāśrayānumā*), 239–45, 251–52, 361–73
scripture (*āgama; Śruti*)
Dharmakīrti’s sparing citation of, 17n5
Dharmakīrti’s attitude toward in debate, 233n14
eight elements of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of, 240–41
instrumentality of, 21, 23n20, 224, 231–33, 239–45, 361–73
as not of human origin (*apauruṣeya*), 233
threefold analysis of, 240–41
See also credibility; scriptural inference
self (*ātmā*), 50
as agent of instrumental knowing in Brahmanical thought, 50
belief in as eliminated in *nirvāṇa*, 248, 250
as distributed entity, 44n62, 61n17, 298
as object of belief in satkāyadṛṣṭi, 57, 60, 371–72
as a single essence, 343, 359n13
as uninferrable, 363
self-clinging (*ātmansneha*), 60, 371–72
selflessness (anātman; nairātmya) as antidote to suffering, 60n15, 298n138, 368n20, 369n21, 371
  as a distributed entity, 44n62
  as instrumental object, 313, 402n13, 405n14, 408n15
  as object of spiritual adepts, 305n160, 369n22, 406n15
  as a universal characteristic of elemental things, 82n45
Vātsiputriya position on, 57n11
semantic convention (saṃketa; vyavahāra; also “linguistic convention”)  
  analogy as associated with, 145n2
  as crucial to inference by svabhāva-evidence, 222n118
  as indirectly refering to infinitesimal particles, 72, 120n107
  as rooted in exclusion, 344, 353–60
  for subject and predicate, 127n119, 128n119, 172n44
sense datum, 84
  See also cognitive image
sense faculty (indriya; also “sense organ”), 23–24, 224, 226–27, 262, 265, 269–70, 383–85
sensible element (āyatana; also “sense sphere”), 69, 70–73, 79n38, 103n77, 109n87, 397n4
sensory contact (sannikarṣa; sparśa), 23, 51, 168n40, 344, 363
Shah, Nagin, 345n15
Siderits, Mark, 116n99, 131n126, 148n12, 150n15
Silk, Jonathan, 236n19
similarity (sādṛśya)
  as basis for error, 56n7, 88–89, 142
  of images to their objects, 84–85, 100
simplicity (ekatā; ekatva)
  shared notions concerning, 37–39, 51
  Buddhist views on, 40–45, 51, 79n38, 80
  See also singularity
singularity (ekatā; ekatva)
  linguistic reference without, 353–60
  of perceptual images, 101–113, 396–411
  See also simplicity
skandha. See psychophysical aggregates
skill in means (upāyakauśalya), 55
Skinner, Quentin, 5n9
sliding scale of analysis. See levels of analysis
Ślokavārttika (Kumārila)
  on agent of knowing as the self, 50n77
  on elements of an inference, 35n45
  on grammatical instrumentality, 224n1
  on sense organs, 23n22, 23n23, 24n24
Sosa, Ernest, 183n58
soteriology, 44n62, 42, 53–54, 60–61, 298, 305–8, 317

sparśa. See sensory contact

spatial extension (sthūlatā), 39, 42, 56–58, 62, 69–79, 80–83, 98–113, 155, 404, 405n14

See also distribution; whole

speech of a credible person (āptavāda). See credibility; scripture

spiritual adept (yogin), 24n26, 56, 184, 186n61, 226–27, 293n130, 305–6, 328n8

spiritual exercises, 230, 240

spiritual freedom (mokṣa), 22, 25n28, 48, 64, 144, 229n10, 314, 324

spurious perception (pratyakṣābhāsa), 36n48, 87n54, 377

See also error; illusion

square brackets, 12–13

Steinkellner, Ernst

on the argument for momentariness from existence, 97n68

on arthakhriyā, 278–79

on circularity in Dharmakīrti’s theory of instrumentality, 234n15, 245–47, 251–52, 317

on the compound svabhāvahedha, 124n112

on the compound tatsvabhāva, 211n104, 212

on the contradictory of the predicate to be proven, 219–21

on inferring an effect from a cause, 178n52

on problems in Dignāga’s theory of inference, 148n10, 148n11

on svabhāva, 153–54, 156n23, 161n30, 163–64, 170n42, 186n61, 193–96, 201–2, 209n102, 222n118

on svabhāvapratibandha, 151n17

Sthiramati, 17

sthūlatā. See spatial extension

style of reasoning, 3, 5, 11, 15, 63, 99

Śubhagupta, 59n13

subject-expression (dharmivāciśabda), 127n119, 128n119, 203n94, 351n29

subjective image (grāhakākāra; also “subjective aspect of awareness”), 271, 276n93, 391, 407

subject/object duality. See duality

subject of a proposition (dharmin; sādhyadharmin; pakṣa), 19n13, 26–28, 156, 169–73, 199, 200n89, 204–5

subject-predicate relation, 141, 156, 172n44, 346–52, 357n7


suffering (duḥkha), 46–47, 54, 60–61, 250, 298n138, 299, 329

superimposition (samāropā). See imputation

supersensible object (atindriya)

as amenable to perception of yogins, 24n26

as the domain of scripture, 243, 367

as not amenable to inference, 32n42, 244, 366n14, 368

as not characterizing infinitesimal particles, 109n87
one who sees (atīndriyarśin), 305, 366n11
See also transempirical object

supporting condition (sahakāripratyaya), 94n63, 165–68, 181–82, 184n59, 208n100

supporting example (sādharmyadṛśṭānta), 30, 205n98

svabhāva
as constructed, 125–26, 156–57, 186–87, 323, 339–52
as nature-svabhāva, 153–55, 158–73, 193–202
and necessity, 182–91
as property-svabhāva, 94–95, 153–57, 170–73, 182–91, 193–202
two senses of, 153–55, 164n34, 170–73, 193–222
universals and, 201–2
See also svabhāvapratibandha

svabhāvabhedā. See difference in nature

svabhāva-evidence (svabhāvahetu), 95n65, 152–53, 179, 203–22
See also evidence; svabhāvapratibandha, identity-mode of

svabhāvahetu. See svabhāva-evidence

svabhāvapratibandha ("natural relation")
general definition, 148–52
identity-mode (tādatmya) of, 152–53, 203–22
and intrinsic instrumentality of inference, 296, 297–98
meaning of svabhāva in, 153–55, 193–202
production-mode (tadutpatti) of, 152–53, 174–92
as response to problems in Dignāga’s theory, 148–49
See also evidence-predicate relation; necessity

svalakṣaṇa. See particular

svārthānumāna. See inference, for oneself
svasamvedana. See reflexive awareness

svataḥ prāmāṇyam. See instrumentality, intrinsic syllogism, 25

systematicity, 2–11, 65, 74, 78, 320

T
tādātmya. See svabhāvapratibandha, identity-mode of
tadutpatti. See svabhāvapratibandha, production-mode of
tatsvabhāva ("that svabhāva"), 211–18

Tattvasamgraha (Śāntarakṣita), 9n16, 109n87, 122n110, 131n126, 340n6, 377n13

Tattvasamgrahapaññikā (Kamalaśila), 122n110, 131n126, 316n183, 340n6
telic efficacy/function. See arthakriyā
telos. See purpose
temporal extension, 42, 44, 45, 56–58, 62, 80, 94n63, 283, 379
See also distribution; momentariness
theory of unconscious error, 143, 312, 316n183
See also error
thesis (pratijñā; pakṣa; also “proposition to be proven”), 27, 30, 34, 206–7
threefold evidence (trairūpyaliṅga). See evidence, threefold
Tibetan commentators, 2, 9, 59, 69–79, 82n43, 300n143, 319
Tibetan translations, 2, 97n68, 109n86, 256, 269n80
Tillemans, Tom
on apoha, 116n99
on Candrakīrti, 36n48
on congruence, 100n72
on the credibility of the Buddha, 245, 247n37
on doubt as a necessary element of reasoning, 188n63
on elements of an inference, 35n45, 206n99
on examples, 31n39
on the neither-one-nor-many argument, 40n55
on scripture, 233n14, 240
on the structure of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, 235n17
on the theory of unconscious error, 143, 312
on the transempirical, 230n11, 230n13
on truth, 225
totality of causal characteristics, 161–73, 185, 197–200, 212–13, 298, 323
trairūpyaliṅga. See evidence, threefold
transcendent awareness (lokottarajñāna), 41n57
transempirical object (atyantaparokṣa; also “extremely remote object”), 230–32, 240–42, 245, 249–52, 361–67, 405n14 See also supersensible object
translation, 12–13, 223–28
transworld identity, 185–86
trustworthiness (avisaṃvāda)
of conceptual cognitions, 142
of scripture, 239, 241, 243, 361–73
of speech, 146
of yogic perceptions, 226n4, 306
See also instrumentality
truth, 5n10, 18, 101n72, 225–28
See also conventional reality; two realities; ultimate reality
two realities, 40–42, 63, 201n90
See also conventional reality; ultimate reality
two truths. See two realities

U
udāharaṇa. See examples
Uddyotakara
on agent and ātman, 50
on centrality of goals for reasoning, 46–47, 48
critique of āpoha-theory, 137–38
as Dharmakīrti’s interlocutor, 16
on inference, 28n35, 29n38, 30n39, 31n39, 32n42, 33, 34n45
on instrumental effect, 263n70
on instruments of knowledge, 20, 49, 145–46
on parts and wholes, 38n52, 39, 104–5, 110n90
on perception, 23n22, 23n23, 24n24, 24n25, 101
on shared principles of Pramāṇa Theory, 22n17, 22n18
on universals, 101n74, 114
See also Nyāyavārttika
ultimate goal (nirvāṇa; also “ultimate purpose”), 223, 229–31, 245–52, 314
ultimate pramāṇa. See instrument of knowledge, ultimate
ultimate reality (paramārthasat)
buddhas as ignoring when teaching beings, 55
commonsense objects and, 69–79
inexpressibility of, 80, 83, 91–97
as lacking distribution, 80–81, 98–113, 134–36, 155, 169–70, 321
levels of analysis and, 62–64, 67–68, 70–79, 239n24
of mind as undifferentiated, 272, 276n93, 401–14
momentariness of, 91–97
as object of perception, 84–91, 101, 298, 301–2
of particulars, 69, 71, 76, 81–84, 310
regularity of, 81
simplicity of, 42–45, 79–80, 83
telic function and, 83–84, 114, 193–94, 310, 393
Vasubandhu on, 40–42, 79–80
See also conventional reality; particular; two realities; universal
unconscious error, theory of. See theory of unconscious error
uniqueness
as criterion for the ultimately real, 80–81
of the excluded entity, 132n128, 133, 134, 389
as ignored in process of exclusion, 321–22
of images, 116–18, 120–22, 130, 138, 322, 323
of momentary particles, 58, 63
of particulars, 81–84, 85n51, 170n43, 354
as a theoretical position, 3, 81
of unique individuals (viśeṣa), 81n41, 345, 412–13
See also exclusion; simplicity; singularity
universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa; jāti)
as associated with concepts, 102
as causally inefficient and ultimately unreal, 78, 81n41, 85n52, 93–94, 114, 129–31, 143, 345–46, 392–94
construction of, 94n64, 108, 116–26, 139–44, 170n43, 198, 339–52
construed as a particular, 90, 116, 130–31, 395
as conventionally real, 80, 81n41, 90, 144, 339
Dharmakīrti’s rejection of, 59n13, 62–63
as not an instrumental object, 143, 301–3, 310–14, 388–89, 413
as paradigmatic case of conception extension, 62
question of being an object of language (Śabdārtha), 80, 92, 101, 114, 137–143, 321, 353–60, 381
question of permanence or impermanence of, 78, 92, 126–31
relation to individuals, 42, 44, 80, 92–93, 125–26, 133–43, 342–43
Śākya Mchog ldan on, 76–77
the self as a special instance of, 298
svabhāva and, 201–2
three types of, 116
Tibetan understanding of as permanent, 77–78, 126–27
Vasubandhu on, 81–82, 83, 102, 396–97
See also apoha-theory; conceptual awareness; exclusion; judgment of sameness
unmediated instrumental effect (avyavahitapramāṇaphala). See instrumental effect, unmediated
upādānahetu. See primary cause
upādhi. See delimiting quality
upamāna. See analogy
upanaya. See evidence-subject relation
upāyakauśalya. See skill in means

V
Vācaspatimiśra, 20n15
vaidharmyadrśṭānta. See counterexample
Vaipulya sūtras, 55n4
Vaiśeṣīka, 16, 38n53, 49, 56n10, 80n39, 101, 342n9, 363n8, 399n8
See also Nyāya-Vaiśeṣīka
validity as translation for prāmāṇya, 225–28, 246
Van Bijlert, Vittorio, 381
variegation (citra; citratā)
critique of singularity of, 101–13, 396–411
as produced by internal distortion, 315
as standing for all forms of multiplicity, 106
See also multiplicity
Vārṣaṅgaṇya, 246–47
vāsanā. See imprint
vastubalapraśāttānumāna. See inference, empirical
Vasubandhu
on intersubjectivity, 326n6, 326n7
on knowledge of the detailed workings of karma, 230n13
mereological analysis and, 42, 405n14
on momentariness, 80n39
on primary cause and supporting conditions, 165n37
as representative of Abhidharma typology, 58
on ”seeds” as the cause of cognitions, 410n18
on sense perception, 24n23
on svaḷkaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, 81–82, 83, 102, 396
on two levels of reality, 40–42, 79
See also Abhidharmaṅkaśa; Abhidharmaṅkaśabhāṣya
Vātsīputrīya, 57n11
Vātsyāyana, 17–20, 22, 24n25, 38n52, 46, 104, 145n2, 236n19, 263n70
See also Nyāyabhāṣa
Vedas, 24n25, 48
Vergauwen, Roger, 185n60
veridicality as translation for prāmāṇya, 16n4, 226–28
Vetter, Tilmann, 233n15, 237n21
vidhi. See affirmation
viṣṇaptimātrata. See Epistemic Idealism
vikalpa hetusāmagrī. See causal complex, incomplete
Viṃśatikā (Vasubandhu), 58n42, 326n6, 326n7, 410n18
Viṃśatikāvarṛttri (Vasubandhu), 58n42, 79n38, 326n7
vināśa. See cessation
Vinayavinibhaṅga, 258n58
Vinītadeva, 60n14, 326n6
vipakṣa. See heterogeneous instance
viparītajñāna. See error
viplava. See error
viprakṛṣṭa. See remote object
vyakti. See individual
vyāpakadharma. See pervading property
vyāpti. See evidence-predicate relation
vyāpya. See pervaded entity
vyatireka. See concomitance, negative
vyavahāra. See convention; practical action; semantic convention
vyavahitapramāṇaphala. See instrumental effect, mediated
vyāvṛtta. See excluded entity
vyāvṛtti. See exclusion
W
Walser, Joseph, 54n3
whole (avayavin; also “part-posessor”)
dharmin as roughly equivalent to, 37n50
effect-substance (kāryadravya) as standing for, 342n13
as object of negation at second level of analysis, 66
and ontological simplicity, 39–40, 44
as paradigm for distributed entities, 42–43, 57, 397n3
Uddyotakara on, 39, 101, 104–5
See also distribution; mereological analysis; reductive analysis
Williams, Paul, 15n1
Woo, Jeson, 226n4

Y
Yaśomitra, 57n11
yathārthadarśana. See experience, of things as they truly are
Yogācāra, 79n38
See also Epistemic Idealism
yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa), 24n25, 226–27, 305–6
See also spiritual adept
yogin. See spiritual adept
yogipratyakṣa. See yogic perception
yogyatā. See capacity
yukti. See reasoning
Yuktidīpikā, 23n23, 24n24, 49, 50, 73n31, 171n43

Z
Zysk, Kenneth, 20n14
About Wisdom

Wisdom Publications, a nonprofit publisher, is dedicated to making available authentic Buddhist works for the benefit of all. We publish translations of the sutras and tantras, commentaries and teachings of past and contemporary Buddhist masters, and original works by the world’s leading Buddhist scholars. We publish our titles with the appreciation of Buddhism as a living philosophy and with the special commitment to preserve and transmit important works from all the major Buddhist traditions.

To learn more about Wisdom, or to browse books online, visit our website at wisdompubs.org.

You may request a copy of our mail-order catalog online or by writing to:

Wisdom Publications
199 Elm Street
Somerville, Massachusetts 02144 USA
Telephone: (617) 776-7416
Fax: (617) 776-7841
Email: info@wisdompubs.org
www.wisdompubs.org

Wisdom is a nonprofit, charitable 501(c)(3) organization affiliated with the Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (FPMT).
Throughout the history of Buddhism, few philosophers have attained the stature of Dharmakirti, the “Lord of Reason” who has influenced virtually every systematic Buddhist thinker since his time. Dharmakirti’s renowned works, written in India during the philosophically rich seventh century, argue that the true test of knowledge is its efficacy, and likewise that only the efficacious is knowable and real. Around this central theme is woven an intricate web of interrelated theories concerning perception, reason, language, and the justification of knowledge. Masterfully unpacking these foundations of Dharmakirti’s system, John Dunne presents the first major study of the most vexing issues in Dharmakirti’s thought within its Indian philosophical context. Lucid and carefully argued, Dunne’s work serves both as an introduction to Dharmakirti for serious students of Buddhism and a groundbreaking resource for scholars of Buddhist thought.

"On the basis of thorough philological work, John Dunne presents the essentials of Dharmakirti’s ontology, epistemology, and logic in philosophically informed language and admirably interprets even those more difficult aspects of Dharmakirti’s thought with readable clarity. His interpretation is conscientious of the context, well-documented, and Dharmakirti’s problems are carefully analyzed. The book promotes our understanding and, at the same time, serves as a lucid introduction to one of the most important philosophers of India’s past."

—Ernst Steinkellner, University of Vienna

“A milestone in the modern history of Dharmakirti studies. Dunne thoroughly examines the achievements of previous scholars in the field, presents his own answers to the various questions related to Dharmakirti’s philosophy, and suggests what problems are yet to be solved. Apādaśa theory, one of the least-investigated subjects of Buddhist logic and epistemology, is beautifully explained. A brilliant work!”

—Shōryū Katsura, Professor of Indian Philosophy, Hiroshima University

John D. Dunne is Assistant Professor of Languages and Cultures of Asia at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where his teaching and research focus on the interpretation of Buddhist thought.